Federal Court of Australia

Telstra Group Limited v Ieraci [2026] FCA 1661

ORDERS

UPON THE APPLICANT, BY ITS COUNSEL, UNDERTAKING:

(a)     to submit to such order (if any) as the court may consider to be just for the payment of compensation (to be assessed by the Court or as it may direct), to any person (whether or not that person is a party) affected by the operation of the order or undertaking or any continuation (with or without variation) of the order or undertaking; and

(b)     to pay the compensation referred to in (a) to the person affected by the operation of the order or undertaking.

AND UPON THE APPLICANT, BY ITS COUNSEL, FURTHER UNDERTAKING:

1.    That it will pay the respondent the following amounts (gross) on the following dates, namely:

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    Until 1 January 2027, the respondent be restrained from serving Vocus Group Limited (ABN 96 084 115 499)—or its business units or functional divisions, its subsidiaries or other related bodies corporate (as defined in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)) or entities in which Vocus Group Limited has any direct or indirect shareholding or ownership interest of any kind—pursuant to the contract of service described at paragraph 12 of his affidavit sworn on 6 October 2026.

2.    Costs be reserved.

3.    The matter be referred to the National Operations Registrar for allocation to a docket judge and for case management as he or she determines appropriate.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS BY CONSENT:

1.    Pursuant to section 37AF of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act) and subject to order 2 below, the publication or disclosure of the information identified in Schedule A (Confidential Information) be prohibited for a period of five years from the date of this order on the grounds that the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice within the meaning of section 37AG(1)(a) of the FCA Act.

2.    Disclosure of the Confidential Information be permitted to the following entities or individuals:

(a)    the Court;

(b)    the Applicant and its related entities;

(c)    the solicitors and counsel for the Applicant;

(d)    in respect of the information identified in item 2 (but not item 1) of Schedule A, the Respondent;

(e)    the solicitors for the Respondent, being Maddy Lodge and David McLaughlin of Rigby Cooke Lawyers, and counsel for the Respondent; and

(f)    any person who has, with the approval of the Applicant, signed a Confidentiality Undertaking in a form as agreed between the parties.

3.    The Confidential Information is not to be published or have its contents disclosed in open Court.

4.    In aid of orders 1 and 2, pursuant to rule 2.32(3), the unredacted documents containing the Confidential Information are not to be made available for inspection.

5.    Costs be reserved.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

SCHEDULE A

1.    The information which is contained in Confidential Exhibit OCW-2 to the Affidavit of Oliver Camplin-Warner affirmed 30 September 2026, to the extent that such information is redacted in Confidential Exhibit AQ-1 to the Affidavit of Alexandre Quenot affirmed 21 October 2026.

2.    The first sentence of paragraph [13] of the Affidavit of John Ieraci sworn on 26 October 2026.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Delivered Ex tempore

SNADEN J:

1    By an amended originating application dated Monday, 12 October 2026, the applicant (“Telstra”) moves for relief in various forms in consequence of conduct that it attributes to the respondent, Mr Ieraci; specifically conduct in which it asserts that he has engaged or threatens to engage in contravention of certain statutory and contractual obligations that are said to be binding upon him. Mr Ieraci is a former employee of Telstra’s; and the conduct in respect of which it has commenced its action inheres most basically in his acceptance of employment with a new employer, Vocus Group Limited (“Vocus”).

2    Allied to the final relief for which Telstra moves is a related application for interlocutory injunctive relief, by which Telstra hopes to secure orders temporarily restraining Mr Ieraci from maintaining his employment with Vocus. It is that application to which these reasons pertain. It was the subject of an urgent hearing that was brought before me on Thursday, 29 October 2026, in my capacity as the court’s region 2 general duty judge. At the conclusion of that hearing, I substantially granted the interlocutory injunctive relief for which Telstra pressed. I gave brief oral reasons for doing so; but in addition indicated that, because the relief was akin to a form of final relief, I would supplement them with more detailed written reasons. It is in the discharge of that indication that the following reasons are offered. For ease of reading, I will continue to phrase them predominantly in the present tense.

3    Before descending to those reasons, I should identify the material upon which the present interlocutory application proceeds. Telstra relies upon seven affidavits: three of Mr Oliver Camplin-Warner (Group Executive, Telstra Enterprise), one affirmed on 30 September 2026, another affirmed on 13 October 2026 and a third affirmed on 22 October 2026; an affidavit of Mr Paul Harrison (Director, Forensic Technology) affirmed on 13 October 2026; an affidavit of Ms Justine Giuliani (solicitor) affirmed on 1 October 2026; and two affidavits of Mr Michael Tamvakologos (solicitor), one affirmed on 6 October 2026 and another affirmed on 23 October 2026. Additionally, it tendered (and the court received) a small number of documents apparently obtained on subpoena. Mr Ieraci relies upon four affidavits: three sworn by him (one on 6 October 2026, one on 12 October 2026 and one on 26 October 2026); and a fourth affirmed by Ms Madeline Lodge (solicitor) on 1 October 2026.

4    Some of the affidavit material was the subject of a separate application; specifically, for relief in the form of suppression under pt VAA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the “FCA Act”). It may shortly be summarised. To a significant extent, Telstra’s application for interlocutory injunctive relief was founded upon assertions that Mr Ieraci is possessed of information in various forms that, it says, is confidential to it. In order to substantiate those assertions, it has led evidence about Mr Ieraci’s role and about the various species of information to which he was made privy in its discharge. Its application for relief under pt VAA of the FCA Act is predicated upon the need to maintain the confidentiality of that information. The application was not opposed and, at the hearing on Thursday, 29 October 2026, I accepted that relief in that form was appropriate. I will return later in these reasons to explain why.

5    There was an additional application for relief under pt VAA of the FCA Act made orally at the start of the hearing. By it, Mr Ieraci moved for orders to prevent certain information about him from making its way into the public domain. That relief was not granted and, again, I will return later in these reasons to explain why.

6    Telstra’s application for urgent interlocutory injunctive relief has not progressed as quickly as applications of that kind usually or should progress. It has already been the subject of three hearings before a different duty judge and was, howsoever unusually, delayed—seemingly by (or partially by) agreement—in order to accommodate the service and return of subpoenas. Save for an observation that I will make later in these reasons (below, [54] and [55]), nothing turns upon that timetable.

7    The affidavit material before the court presently paints a factual landscape that, although not free of dispute, is nonetheless relatively clear. I say so conscious, of course, that what follows is offered in determination of an interlocutory application, in respect of which there has been no testing of the evidence upon which the parties rely. Although the observations that follow will present as though findings of fact, they are strictly to be understood in that light.

Background

8    Telstra is a large and well-known telecommunications company. Mr Ieraci’s employment with it (or his most recent employment with it) began in January 2007. Between then and the end of his employment in July 2026, Mr Ieraci held a series of roles, including senior technical, sales, customer-facing and management roles. At the point of his departure from Telstra, Mr Ieraci was employed in the position of Executive Director, Strategic Portfolio Management. He was also a director of various entities within the broader Telstra group.

9    At the point of his departure from Telstra, Mr Ieraci’s employment was subject to terms contained within a contract dated 12 March 2024. Relevantly, that contract (the “2024 Contract”):

(1)    imposed upon Mr Ieraci various obligations of confidence, including that he not obtain or disclose confidential information otherwise than in authorised manners;

(2)    required that Mr Ieraci return all of Telstra’s property upon the cessation of his employment; and, most relevantly,

(3)    contained restrictive covenants by which Mr Ieraci agreed to be bound after his employment with Telstra came to an end.

10    It is those restrictive covenants that loom largest presently. One obliged Mr Ieraci to refrain from equivalent employment by a “Restricted Business” for a “Restricted Period” and within a “Restricted Area”. Those concepts were defined. “Restricted Business” was apt to include “[a]ny business that competes with [Telstra]”. “Restricted Period” was defined to mean six months or, in the event that a court were to find that period unenforceable, three months from the cessation of his employment with Telstra. Mr Ieraci was not required to refrain from all employment within Restricted Businesses; but was prohibited from providing services the same as or similar to those which he provided to Telstra during his final 12 months in its employ.

11    Additionally, Mr Ieraci agreed to refrain during the “Restricted Period” from soliciting or enticing away from Telstra certain of its customers, employees and suppliers.

12    A large volume of evidence was led as to the nature of Mr Ieraci’s role and the constituent activities by which it was comprised during the 12 months prior to his departure from Telstra. For reasons that will become apparent, it is unnecessary to particularise it in great detail. It suffices to note that Mr Ieraci was responsible for the day-to-day operation, performance and strategic direction of the Network Application Services (or “NAS”) part of Telstra’s “Enterprise” customer segment. It is apparent that that was a significant venture within the broader Telstra business and Mr Ieraci’s role within it was one of executive-level significance. He was responsible for the strategic direction of the NAS business, which involved him in determining (no doubt amongst other things) the development of its capabilities and partnerships. In the 12 months preceding Mr Ieraci’s departure from Telstra, the NAS business was the subject of an internal project, the particulars of which are sensitive and needn’t be rehearsed.

13    Mr Ieraci’s responsibilities necessitated that he should possess—and, on any view, he did possess—a detailed appreciation of the NAS business’s operations, financial performance and strategy, including as to Telstra’s products, pricing and commercial plans and the extent to which they married with its customers’ needs. Mr Camplin-Warner deposes that at least some of the services and capabilities that Telstra offers are the kinds of services and capabilities that he understands Vocus also to offer.

14    Mr Ieraci’s executive-level accountabilities exposed him to various of Telstra’s strategic projects and operations outside of his NAS focus. Mr Camplin-Warner deposed to three such projects, two of which Mr Ieraci was accountable for and another with which he was actively involved.

15    “Project Cobalt” involves a review of Telstra’s Enterprise network and security services within the NAS operation. By its nature, it remains a commercially sensitive project that is intended to shape the future operations and commercial partnerships of the NAS business.

16    “Project Miro” involves a review and proposed modernisation of Telstra’s managed services business. Mr Camplin-Warner deposes that Mr Ieraci has had access to confidential information in the form of customer and revenue analyses arising from his subjection to that project.

17    “Project Lantern” is another multi-year strategic project with which Mr Ieraci was, prior to his departure, actively involved. Again, by that involvement, Mr Camplin-Warner deposes that Mr Ieraci was privy to confidential information comprising knowledge of Telstra’s existing service and delivery model, awareness of the deficiencies inherent in that model, and knowledge of the methods by which potential vendor partners are evaluated.

18    In addition to his involvement with those strategic projects, Mr Ieraci was, in the final year of his employment with Telstra, the “executive sponsor” in respect of four significant Telstra “Enterprise” customers and two key vendors. Insofar as concerned those customers, Mr Ieraci developed an understanding of those customers’ needs and how Telstra sought to deliver upon them. Insofar as concerned those vendors, Mr Ieraci’s role was to oversee significant commercial concerns such as pricing and contractual terms, and to resolve performance or other relationship concerns as required.

19    Mr Camplin-Warner also deposed to Mr Ieraci’s long-standing government-sector experience and relationships, and his involvement in managing or maintaining major state government customer relationships.

20    The executive and strategic significance of Mr Ieraci’s role reflected in his remuneration. At the time that his employment with Telstra ended, his remuneration package (inclusive of incentive or discretionary bonuses and superannuation) was in excess of one million dollars per annum.

21    I have already noted that Mr Ieraci’s employment terminated with effect from 1 July 2026. It did so by reason of redundancy, of which Mr Ieraci was notified in May 2026. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that that is when he was given formal notice of his redundancy. The evidence suggests that his departure from Telstra was earmarked from as early as 2025. Telstra seeks to make something of the fact that Mr Ieraci explored his post-Telstra future in the months before he was told formally that his employment would end. At least for present purposes, I am not persuaded that much—indeed, anything—turns upon that.

22    In any event, it is not controversial to observe that Mr Ieraci’s employment terminated with effect from 1 July 2026 and that the six-month restraint contained within the 2024 Contract expires on 1 January 2027.

23    At this juncture, it repays to say something about the Vocus business within which Mr Ieraci is now engaged. Mr Ieraci accepted employment as its Managing Director, Business and Digital Infrastructure and commenced in that role on 1 October 2026.

24    Vocus is a telecommunications company based in Melbourne. It owns and operates approximately 51,000km of fibre network that connects all Australian mainland capitals and extends to New Zealand, Asia and the United States of America. Vocus owns several telecommunications brands that provide services to enterprise, government, wholesale, small business and residential customers throughout Australia. Amongst those businesses are the consumer brands, Dodo and iPrimus, and the network service provider, Vision Network.

25    Mr Camplin-Warner’s evidence is that Telstra and Vocus compete in various segments of the telecommunications space. At the enterprise and government levels, both provide similar (although not necessarily identical) product offerings, including enterprise- and government-level network and technology services. Vocus’s marketing promotes it as a business that “… has the scale, agility and reliability to meet the fast-moving needs of enterprises across all sectors” and that “… nearly two-thirds of ASX 200 companies trust … to help them transform and grow”.

26    On 21 September 2026, Vocus announced Mr Ieraci’s appointment to the role of Managing Director, Business and Digital Infrastructure. That followed his execution of contractual terms on 3 August 2026 (to which I shall refer hereafter and collectively as the “Vocus Contract”). It was reported that Mr Ieraci would (and, by all accounts, he did) commence in his new role on 1 October 2026. He assumed (or was reported to have assumed) responsibility for “lead[ing] Vocus’[s] business-to-business go to market function, including product, marketing and sales”. In his new role, Mr Ieraci reports to Vocus’s chief executive officer.

27    Save for in one respect, it is unnecessary to trace in additional detail the trajectory of the matter to this point. What should be noted are the undertakings that Mr Ieraci gave to the court when the matter first came on for hearing. They are recorded in the orders that were made herein on 2 October 2026. They are extensive but, in short, Mr Ieraci undertook that he would not, prior to 1 January 2027:

(1)    be involved in the development of managed services and security products at Vocus, including services or products equivalent to those on which he relevantly worked at Telstra;

(2)    involve himself in the product development, marketing or sales planning of Vocus’s “business-to-business” and “go-to-market” functions;

(3)    provide services to Vocus related to customers of Telstra that “… are the subject of negotiations between Telstra and its customers, and in which [he] had an involvement in the final 12 months of [his] employment with Telstra”; and

(4)    solicit Telstra customers with whom he had certain dealings at Telstra to cease or reduce the scope of their commercial relationship with Telstra.

28    Additional undertakings were proffered as to the efforts that Mr Ieraci would take to avoid the improper use of information, including confidential information, that he obtained during his employment with Telstra. All of the undertakings that Mr Ieraci gave were given on the basis that he would continue to serve pursuant to the Vocus Contract.

Principles to be applied

29    Telstra’s claim to interlocutory injunctive relief proceeds in contract and pursuant to ss 182(1) and 183(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). It is unnecessary to rehearse those provisions and the court’s power to grant interlocutory injunctive relief is not credibly to be doubted: FCA Act, s 23.

30    Likewise, the principles that govern the court’s discretion to grant interlocutory injunctive relief are well settled and not in dispute. In order to qualify for the relief that it seeks, Telstra must demonstrate that it has a prima facie case for relief at trial and that the balance of convenience favours the grant of an injunction: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57, 81-4 [65]-[72] (Gummow and Hayne JJ, with whom Gleeson CJ and Crennan J agreed).

31    When considering the grant of an interlocutory injunction, the issues of whether an applicant has established a prima facie case and whether the balance of convenience favours injunctive relief are related inquiries. Whether there is a prima facie case is to be considered together with the balance of convenience: Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc (2011) 217 FCR 238, 261 [67] (Dowsett, Foster and Yates JJ).

32    In Bullock v Federated Furnishing Trades Society of Australasia (No 1) (1985) 5 FCR 464, Woodward J (with whom Smithers and Sweeney JJ relevantly agreed) stated (at 472):

… an apparently strong claim may lead a court more readily to grant an injunction when the balance of convenience is fairly even. A more doubtful claim (which nevertheless raises “a serious question to be tried”) may still attract interlocutory relief if there is a marked balance of convenience in favour of it.

33    An applicant for interlocutory injunctive relief must, in showing that the balance of convenience favours that outcome, point to inconvenience for which an award of damages at trial would not be a sufficient remedy: Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148, 153 (Mason ACJ); Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia v Blue Star Pacific Pty Ltd (2009) 184 IR 333, 339 [21] (Greenwood J).

The prima facie case for relief

34    Telstra’s principal contention is that Mr Ieraci’s assumption of his role at Vocus has been effected in contravention of the covenants that are contained in the 2024 Contract. The interlocutory relief for which it moves seeks to restrain Mr Ieraci from maintaining that employment until 1 January 2027.

35    The principles that govern the interpretation and enforceability of covenants in restraint of trade are well settled and do not appear presently to be in doubt. A contractual term that purports to shield a plaintiff from competition is presumed void—and, therefore, unenforceable—on public policy grounds. However, that presumption may be rebutted if it can be demonstrated that the term is reasonable as between the parties and not unreasonable in the public interest. A restraint will be reasonable as between parties if the employer that seeks to enforce it can show that, by its nature, duration and extent, it does no more than is reasonably necessary to protect a legitimate interest. It is well established that employers have a legitimate interest in protecting confidential information, trade secrets and customer connections. Insofar as concerns confidential information, a restraint does not need to be limited so as to preclude the use or disclosure thereof; it may restrain a former employee from being involved with or employed by a competitor business. Those propositions are not controversial and authority for them may readily be found: Liberty Financial Pty Ltd v Jugovic [2021] FCA 607 (“Liberty Financial”), [194] (Beach J), citing Just Group Ltd v Peck (2016) 344 ALR 162, 174-5 [30]-[36] (Beach and Ferguson JJA and Riordan AJA).

36    In Littlewoods Organisation Ltd v Harris [1977] 1 WLR 1472, Lord Denning MR observed (at 1479):

It is … established that an employer can stipulate for protection against having his confidential information passed on to a rival in trade. But experience has shown that it is not satisfactory to have simply a covenant against disclosing confidential information. The reason is because it is so difficult to draw the line between information which is confidential and information which is not: and it is very difficult to prove a breach when the information is of such a character that a servant can carry it away in his head. The difficulties are such that the only practicable solution is to take a covenant from the servant by which he is not to go to work for a rival in trade. Such a covenant may well be held to be reasonable if limited to a short period.

37    Those observations have been routinely endorsed in Australian courts: Kone Elevators Pty Ltd v McNay (1997) ATPR ¶41-564 (“Kone”), 43,834 (Sheller JA, with whom Meagher and Cole JJA agreed); Miles v Genesys Wealth Advisers Ltd (2009) 201 IR 1, 15-16 [24] (Hodgson JA, with whom Basten JA relevantly agreed), 23 [64] (Handley AJA, with whom Basten JA agreed); Cactus Imaging Pty Ltd v Peters (2006) 71 NSWLR 9, 13-14 [13] (Brereton J); EzyDVD Pty Ltd v Lahrs Investments Qld Pty Ltd [2010] 2 Qd R 517, 529-30 [26]-[29] (Fraser JA, with whom Fryberg and McMeekin JJ agreed); Emeco International Pty Ltd v O’Shea (No 2) (2012) 225 IR 423, 445 [99] (Edelman J); Luvalot Clothing Pty Ltd v Dong [2022] FCA 1411, [160] (Anderson J); Avant Group Pty Ltd v Kiddle (2023) 325 IR 292, 324 [101] (Wheelahan J).

38    In Kone, Sheller JA (with whom the other members of the court agreed) identified why a blanket prohibition against employment by a trade rival might, at least in some cases, reasonably be preferred in place of a prohibition against the use of confidential information. His Honour recognised (at 43,834) that there may be (and, in that case, was):

… a legitimate interest in an employer’s protecting itself from a competitor poaching an employee who possesses information about new products and future marketing strategies.

39    Later (at 43,835), his Honour observed that, by taking a covenant that purported to restrain an employee who possessed confidential information belonging to Kone from taking up employment with one of its rivals, Kone:

… avoided the difficulties and impracticabilities of investigating whether or not and to what extent the employee possessed confidential information or was likely to pass it on to [the rival]. That is not the question the covenant poses. The question is whether the employee proposed to engage in any business in Australia as a consultant or employee which could make use of confidential information as defined to the material detriment of Kone’s business.

40    In Liberty Financial, the court, in fear of indulging “innovative incrementalism”, declined to recognise what is apparently known in jurisprudence that has developed in the United States as the “inevitable disclosure doctrine”: Liberty Financial, [264]-[268] (Beach J), and the authorities there cited. Nonetheless, it was observed (at [269]) that the employee there, Mr Jugovic:

… cannot realistically work for [a competitor of the applicant’s] at least in the short term without a real risk of using, whether subconsciously or inadvertently, [the applicant’s] confidential information.

41    I am satisfied that Telstra has established a strong prima facie case that, by commencing his employment with Vocus, Mr Ieraci has contravened and is contravening the post-employment restraint that finds expression in the 2024 Contract. Moreover, and by reason of the seniority of the position that he held under that contract, and his exposure to and involvement in matters of executive, commercial and strategic significance, there is a strong prima facie basis for holding that Mr Ieraci possesses information that is of material value both to Telstra and to its competitors, including Vocus, about aspects of Telstra’s business, its operations, its customers and its strategic commercial postures. That information—at least for prima facie case purposes—is properly to be described as confidential information.

42    Additionally, there does not appear to be much in the way of doubt about Mr Ieraci’s relationships with a number of Telstra’s strategically important clients—the maintenance or management of which remained within his purview prior to his departure from Telstra—as well as with various of its employees and suppliers. Those relationships are significant and valuable, both to Telstra and to its competitors. At the least, there is a prima facie basis upon which so to hold.

43    Telstra has, at least for present purposes, a legitimate commercial interest in protecting itself against the use by its competitors of the information and relationships that Mr Ieraci possesses and enjoys. There is a strong prima facie case for holding that the measure by which it hopes to do so—that is to say, the restrictive covenant that it accuses Mr Ieraci of contravening—is directed to the protection of that interest. Further, given particularly the modest six-month timeframe over which it purports to operate, there is a strong prima facie case for holding that the means by which that protection is to be afforded do not trespass beyond what is reasonably necessary in terms of duration or extent. Mr Ieraci did not contend otherwise.

44    Mr Ieraci maintains that it is not established that his employment with Vocus suffices to implicate him in the provision of services that are the same as or relevantly similar to those that he provided to Telstra prior to 1 July 2026. To be more precise, he maintains that Telstra cannot establish the necessary correspondence of activity to a point that reflects a prima facie case. Respectfully, that is not so. As the factual summary rehearsed above lays bare, there is at least a prima facie basis upon which to hold that Mr Ieraci’s role at Telstra involved him in the executive and strategic management of an important part of Telstra’s business; and that, in his new role, he is to have equivalent oversight over a no less significant aspect of Vocus’s undertaking. At trial, the position might well be clarified such that a different conclusion is warranted; but there is, for now, a strong prima facie basis upon which to suppose that the services that Mr Ieraci is to provide under the Vocus Contract are at least materially similar to those that he provided to Telstra under the 2024 Contract. Mr Ieraci’s submissions as to the propriety of his conduct both before and after his redundancy (as to which I venture no findings at this interlocutory juncture) are, similarly, not to the point of the present inquiry.

45    All of that distils to recognition of the following—namely, that there is a strong prima facie basis upon which to hold that:

(1)    Vocus is a “Restricted Business” (within the meaning attached to that phrase under the 2024 Contract);

(2)    the Vocus Contract contemplates that Mr Ieraci will, within the “Restricted Area”, provide to Vocus services that are the same as or similar to those that he provided in the final 12 months of his service to Telstra;

(3)    insofar as he does so prior to 1 January 2027, he will do so in breach of the restrictive covenant that is contained in the 2024 Contract;

(4)    that covenant is reasonable as between Telstra and Mr Ieraci, and not unreasonable in the public interest; and

(5)    by serving Vocus in the manner that the Vocus Contract contemplates, Mr Ieraci is conducting himself in breach of the 2024 Contract.

Balance of convenience

46    The balance of convenience here favours the granting of the interlocutory injunctive relief for which Telstra moves.

47    That is so notwithstanding the undertakings that Mr Ieraci has offered. It is to be recalled that, by those undertakings, Mr Ieraci will refrain until 1 January 2027 from certain activities in his new employment. Those restrictions, he says, will mean that there will be no occasion to realise the concerns that Telstra has about the misuse of its confidential information or the customer connections that Mr Ieraci developed whilst in its employ. Mr Ieraci says that there is no need to grant injunctive relief to restrain his employment by Vocus because the knowledge and relationships that he has will not in any event be used to Telstra’s prejudice. He maintains that there is no evidence to suggest that there is in prospect any misuse by him of the information or relationships of which he is possessed; indeed, he is critical of Telstra’s evidence in that regard, which he says does not rise beyond the level of speculation and against which in any event his undertakings are designed to protect.

48    Respectfully, those arguments are precisely of a kind that authority in Australia has consistently rejected. The covenant to which Telstra hopes that Mr Ieraci will be held is not a covenant (or the covenant) prohibiting him from using information or capitalising upon relationships; it is a covenant prohibiting him, for a short period, from taking up employment with businesses like Vocus. The authorities recognise that such a covenant might reasonably be enforced because of the difficulties inherent in the notion that it should be left to the former employee to make assessments of his or her own as to what information is or is not properly to be used in the service of a new employer.

49    All of that is to recognise that there is significant force in Telstra’s contention that it should not be left to take Mr Ieraci at his word. I should be careful to make sure—as senior counsel for Telstra did—that there is no suggestion that Mr Ieraci’s intentions should be doubted. There was some suggestion that Mr Ieraci’s conduct, either by reason of having dealt with some Telstra-issued devices contrary to Telstra’s request or by reason of his having explored post-Telstra employment options before he was told formally that his employment would end for reasons of redundancy, might be understood to reflect upon him in some way helpful to Telstra’s application. I do not accept that, at least not for interlocutory injunctive purposes.

50    Mr Ieraci should be (and is) presumed to intend to honour the undertakings that he has offered. That, though, is not to the point. It is in the very nature of what Mr Ieraci knows and the difficulty involved in preventing its use (howsoever innocently) that the prejudice to Telstra inheres. Mr Ieraci possesses confidential information and valuable customer relationships that he cannot “unpossess”. By its nature, it is unrealistic to expect that he might entirely isolate that information from the high-level and fast-moving decision making to which he will inevitably devote himself at Vocus.

51    The inconvenience that will inhere to Telstra’s prejudice if interlocutory injunctive relief is not granted sounds not merely in the realisation of misuse; it sounds additionally in the risk—measured both in terms of probability and consequence—that misuse might, even innocently, occur; and in Telstra’s loss of the opportunity for which it bargained to protect itself from that risk. I do not consider there to be much doubt that that risk properly sounds as inconvenience that will befall Telstra in the event that injunctive relief is not granted. Although difficult reliably to measure, I do not consider there to be much scope to doubt that it qualifies as prejudice that could not realistically be remedied by an award of damages. If, howsoever innocently, Mr Ieraci were to use what he knows in the service of Vocus’s interests, the consequences for Telstra could be dramatic and, on any view, beyond Mr Ieraci’s means to compensate.

52    There is, undoubtedly, at least some inconvenience that a grant of interlocutory injunctive relief will visit upon Mr Ieraci and others; but it is substantially limited. The impact upon Vocus is, in the absence of evidence, difficult to assess. One assumes that it will suffer in at least some form from the temporary loss of its Managing Director, Business and Digital Infrastructure. Beyond that, not much may be said. The impact upon Mr Ieraci is also limited. Telstra has undertaken to pay him for the period between now and 1 January 2027. There is no suggestion that his position at Vocus will be imperilled; and, even if it will be, it is apparent that Mr Ieraci is possessed both of means and skill, such that he is likely to present to other potential employers as no less of an attractive executive addition than he did to Vocus. If, at trial, it were to emerge, in effect, that interlocutory injunctive relief ought not to have been granted, it may be that he avails himself of Telstra’s undertaking as to damages.

53    I consider that the balance of convenience favours the granting of interlocutory injunctive relief. Even were that balance to be more finely poised, I would still consider, adjudging it in combination with what is a strong prima facie case for relief, that interlocutory injunctive relief remains appropriate.

Discretionary considerations

54    There are no other discretionary considerations that incline me to moderate the views that I have expressed. I should, however, wish to address the question of delay. For reasons upon which I needn’t be drawn, more than four weeks have passed since the point at which Telstra’s application for urgent interlocutory relief was filed. So far as the court was made aware, Mr Ieraci commenced in his new role as planned on 1 October 2026; and, one assumes, has acquitted himself in it much as he and Vocus might have hoped. The delay that has attended the pressing of the application for interlocutory injunctive relief—some, although not all, of which is fairly sheeted home to Telstra—is properly to be taken into account in assessing whether the court’s discretion to grant it should be exercised.

55    Had I been minded to reach different conclusions about the strength of Telstra’s prima facie case and where it is that the balance of convenience lies, it might be that the delay that has occurred in this matter could have loomed more significantly than it does.

Suppression

56    I return, then, to the two applications for relief under pt VAA of the FCA Act to which I earlier referred.

57    The first was made by means of an amended interlocutory application dated 29 October 2026. By it, Telstra sought relief in the form of suppression (otherwise than in respect of disclosure to certain persons) of certain information contained within what was described as “confidential exhibit” OCW-2 to the affidavit of Mr Camplin-Warner affirmed on 30 September, as well as a sentence contained within Mr Ieraci’s affidavit of 26 October 2026. Without venturing into the detail (for obvious reasons), that material discussed matters of some commercial sensitivity to Telstra. Its application was predicated upon suppression being necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice: FCA Act, s 37AG(1)(a). That application was not opposed.

58    The second application was made orally on behalf of Mr Ieraci. He asked that various details concerning his remuneration at Vocus and Telstra, including his final termination and redundancy payments, as well as of his present address and financial circumstances, be suppressed (again, otherwise than in respect of disclosure to certain persons). That application was made on the grounds set out at ss 37AG(1)(a) and (c). Mr Ieraci contended that the disclosure of the information in question would expose him to safety hazards and would, otherwise, prejudice the proper administration of justice.

59    The principles that apply to applications for suppression or non-publication orders under the FCA Act are well-trammelled. The starting point, expressed at s 17(1) of the FCA Act, is that the court’s jurisdiction is ordinarily to be exercised openly. That reflects the fundamental importance of the principle of open justice: Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Peever (2025) 123 ATR 42 (“Peever”), 45 [8]-[10] (Wheatley J) and the authorities there cited.

60    Where orders for suppression or non-publication are sought under s 37AF of the FCA Act, the court, in deciding whether to make such an order, “must take into account that a primary objective of the administration of justice is to safeguard the public interest in open justice”: FCA Act, s 37AE. Such orders may be made on one or more of the grounds enumerated in s 37AG(1); including, relevantly for present purposes, that they are necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice (s 37AG(1)(a)) or to protect the safety of any person (s 37AG(1)(c)).

61    Necessity is the central feature of the grounds set out in s 37AG(1) of the FCA Act. As the full court explained in Country Care Group Pty Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (No 2) (2020) 275 FCR 377, 379 [9] (Allsop CJ, Wigney and Abraham JJ):

The critical question is whether the making of a suppression or non-publication order is “necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice”. The word “necessary” in that context is a “strong word”: Hogan v Australian Crime Commission (2010) 240 CLR 651 (Hogan) at [30]. It is nevertheless not to be given an unduly narrow construction: Fairfax Digital Australia and New Zealand Pty Ltd v Ibrahim (2012) 83 NSWLR 52 (Ibrahim) at [8], citing Hodgson JA in R v Kwok (2005) 64 NSWLR 335 at [13]. The question whether an order is necessary will depend on the particular circumstances of the case. Once the court is satisfied that an order is necessary, it would be an error not to make it: Hogan at [33]. There is no exercise of discretion or balancing exercise involved: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Ltd (No 3) [2012] FCA 1430 at [21].

62    It is for the party seeking a suppression or non-publication order to discharge the “very heavy” onus of persuading the court that an order must be made: LAZ24 v Purcell [2025] FCAFC 132, [141] (Bromwich, Stewart and Vandongen JJ) and the authorities there cited.

63    Sensitivity to the publication of personal or private circumstances, howsoever understandable, cannot without more justify the making of an order under pt VAA of the FCA Act: Peever, 46 [15] (Wheatley J) and the authorities there cited. Generally speaking, the same is so insofar as concerns information that is commercially sensitive: Betfair Pty Ltd v Racing New South Wales (No 5) [2009] FCA 1011, [9] (Perram J).

64    Those general principles acknowledged, “… commercial sensitivity can be an appropriate basis for making a suppression or non-publication order”: Motorola Solutions Inc v Hytera Communications Corporation Ltd (No 2) [2018] FCA 17 (“Motorola Solutions”), [8]-[9] (Perram J). The proper administration of justice may be imperilled when litigation presents as a means through which a party’s competitors might peripherally gain knowledge to which they would otherwise not have access. Prejudice, in that sense, inheres in the loss of the integrity of the litigious process: Motorola Solutions, [9] (Perram J). It is contrary to the interests of justice that litigants might hesitate to vindicate or defend their legal rights for fear that confidential information might make its way into the hands of others and be used to their prejudice. Litigation should not serve as a vehicle for advantaging or disadvantaging competitors: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v eToro AUS Capital Ltd [2025] FCA 100 (“eToro”), [16] (Stellios J) and the authorities there cited.

65    Dealing first with Telstra’s application—and, again, without venturing into the detail of the material to which it relates—it is clear that the proper administration of justice will be imperilled unless the identified information is suppressed. That information concerns endeavours of current (and, to some extent, ongoing and future) sensitivity and includes:

(1)    business transactions that remain afoot and that have not necessarily been finalised or disclosed to the market;

(2)    the names of certain of Telstra’s customers and sensitive information about them, such as the contractual terms upon which Telstra transacts with them;

(3)    Telstra’s long-term business plans, reaching several years into the future, which go to details such as planned product retirements and customer acquisitions;

(4)    Telstra’s position with respect to its technology vendors and prospective partners, including its negotiation of contractual terms with them;

(5)    Telstra’s plans regarding its workforce;

(6)    financial details, such as revenue, margins and costs as between business units; and

(7)    personal and system-security details such as the mobile phone numbers of Telstra’s employees.

66    Details about Telstra’s business and Mr Ieraci’s responsibilities within it are likely to underpin the parties’ respective cases at final hearing. But it does not follow that those details must, as a consequence, be made available to all and sundry by operation of the court’s record. So to hold would force Telstra to bear that harm—which it submitted, and I accept, could well be very significant—in order to proceed with its applications for interlocutory and final relief. That would be antithetical to the proper administration of justice: eToro, [16] (Stellios J).

67    Having inspected the abovementioned information in its unredacted form, there is no question that it qualifies as commercially sensitive and will remain so for the five-year period to which Telstra’s relief is directed. Its suppression is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice. The relief for which Telstra presses must be granted.

68    I turn, then, to Mr Ieraci’s application, which was advanced upon two broad points. The first was that Mr Ieraci is a man of some means, whose concerns about the publication of the information adverted to at [58] above are legitimate. Specifically, Mr Ieraci is concerned that the publication of his address and information about his financial circumstances might subject him to personal risk and is otherwise not germane to the relief for which Telstra moves.

69    I have no reason to (and do not) doubt the legitimacy of Mr Ieraci’s concerns; but so to observe is not to recognise prejudice of a kind that might justify the relief for which he moves. There are two reasons why that is so.

70    First, there is no evidence to suggest that the publication or disclosure of what Mr Ieraci hopes to suppress might result in any risk to his or anybody else’s personal safety. That contention did not rise beyond assertion and counsel wisely recognised as much.

71    Second, sensitivity, howsoever legitimate, to the publication of personal and private information does not, without more, clear the very high bar that must be cleared in order that the court might indulge an application under pt VAA of the FCA Act: Peever, 46 [15] (Wheatley J).

72    Mr Ieraci next submitted that publication was simply not necessary either for the court to perform justice as between the parties or for the purposes of open justice. The submission was straightforward: the interests of justice do not here necessitate that the information concerning Mr Ieraci be made public.

73    Evaluating necessity in that way is not the task set for the court by s 37AF(1). In entertaining an application for relief under pt VAA, the court is not concerned with what is necessary to serve the interests of justice; rather, it is concerned with potential sources of prejudice to those interests and what might be necessary to avoid them.

74    Mr Ieraci has not identified any prejudice to the proper administration of justice that the disclosure or publication of information about him might realise. Absent his doing so, it is impossible to conclude that an order prohibiting such disclosure or publication is necessary in the sense that the statutory regime contemplates. On that basis, Mr Ieraci’s application for relief under pt VAA of the FCA Act cannot succeed.

Next steps

75    The urgent application for interlocutory relief now resolved, the matter should proceed to case management in the normal course.

Associate:

Dated:    5 November 2026