FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Top Ryde Financial Services Pty Ltd v RAMS Financial Group Pty Limited (Settlement Approval) [2026] FCA 1652

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

Approval of settlement

1.    Pursuant to ss 33V and 33ZF of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (Act), the settlement of the proceeding as against the respondent be approved in the terms set out in these orders and the Settlement Deed dated 17 September 2026 (Settlement Deed) between:

(a)    the applicants;

(b)    the respondent;

(c)    Morris Mennilli Pty Ltd, the solicitors for the applicants (Solicitors); and

(d)    CHC Investment Fund III Pty Ltd as trustee for CHC Investment Fund III (Funder).

2.    To the extent of any inconsistency between these orders and the Settlement Deed, these orders prevail.

3.    Nothing in Order 1 operates to impose upon a group member who is not a party to the Settlement Deed any contractual obligation under the Settlement Deed, including any covenant, acknowledgment or obligation contained in cll 8.1, 9.1, 9.3, 9.4 or 11, unless that group member has agreed to assume that obligation.

4.    Pursuant to s 33ZB of the Act, the persons affected and bound by the settlement of the proceeding are the applicants, the respondent and the group members.

Deductions

5.    Pursuant to s 33V(2) of the Act, the following deductions from the Settlement Sum, as defined in the Settlement Deed, be approved (Deductions):

(a)    a funding commission of $12 million payable to the Funder;

(b)    $4 million, comprising costs and disbursements paid by the Funder, payable to the Funder;

(c)    $461,354.87, comprising unfunded solicitors’ costs and disbursements incurred by the Solicitors, payable to the Solicitors; and

(d)    $113,611.50, comprising actual and anticipated costs of settlement approval and settlement distribution incurred and to be incurred by the Solicitors, payable to the Solicitors.

6.    The approval in Order 5 does not prevent any group member from seeking an assessment of the costs and disbursements referred to in Orders 5(b) to (d).

7.    If any assessment referred to in Order 6 results in a reduction of the costs or disbursements payable, the amount of the reduction:

(a)    be added to the amount available for distribution to group members from the Additional Amount; and

(b)    be distributed among the group members in the same proportions as the balance of the Additional Amount.

Funding equalisation

8.    Pursuant to ss 33V and 33ZF of the Act, the Deductions be apportioned on a pro rata basis among all group members.

Settlement Sum

9.    The respondent pay the Settlement Sum, as defined in the Settlement Deed, together with any Additional Withheld Trail and Interest, as defined in the Settlement Deed, as follows:

(a)    $20,798,980.52 to the Solicitors (Additional Amount), on the basis that the Solicitors:

(i)    pay from the Additional Amount the Deductions referred to in Order 5; and

(ii)    subject to Orders 10 to 12, distribute the balance among group members in the proportions identified in paragraph 133 of the affidavit of Simon Jacob Morris sworn 23 October 2026; and

(b)    the balance of the Settlement Sum, comprising the Withheld Trail and Interest and the Additional Withheld Trail and Interest, as those terms are defined in the Settlement Deed, to the applicants and each group member, as applicable and as calculated by the respondent, by payment into the bank accounts into which they ordinarily receive trail commission payments.

10.    Before any distribution of the balance of the Additional Amount, the principal of RAMS Blackburn may, by 6 November 2026, notify the Associate to Justice Lee and the parties in writing that the revised proportional interest allocated to RAMS Blackburn is disputed.

11.    Any notice given pursuant to Order 10 must:

(a)    identify the basis upon which the revised proportional interest is disputed; and

(b)    be accompanied by any material upon which RAMS Blackburn relies in support of the dispute.

12.    If no notice is given pursuant to Order 10, the balance of the Additional Amount may be distributed in the proportions identified in paragraph 133 of the affidavit of Simon Jacob Morris sworn 23 October 2026.

13.    The payments referred to in Order 9 be made within 21 days after the later of:

(a)    the day after the appeal period in respect of these orders expires without an appeal being commenced; or

(b)    if an appeal is commenced, the business day after the appeal is finally determined, including any determination by the High Court of Australia, with the result that these orders are made or confirmed.

Confidentiality

14.    Pursuant to ss 37AF and 37AG(1)(a) of the Act, on the ground that the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, there be no publication of any item identified in Annexure A to any person other than:

(a)    the Court;

(b)    the applicants and their legal representatives; and

(c)    the Funder and its legal representatives.

15.    Order 14 cease to have effect:

(a)    upon expiry of the appeal period in respect of these orders, if no appeal is commenced; or

(b)    if an appeal is commenced, upon final determination of the appeal.

Dismissal

16.    With effect from the date upon which final distribution of the Settlement Sum occurs in accordance with the Settlement Deed, the proceeding against the respondent be dismissed with no order as to costs.

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

A.    Pursuant to cl 4 of the Settlement Deed, on and from the date of these orders:

a.    cll 29.14(a)–(c) of each Franchise Agreement, or any equivalent provisions providing for the respondent to pay Post Agreement Trailer Income rather than Trailer Income following termination, will not apply; and

b.    the respondent will pay the applicants and each group member Trailer Income in accordance with the surviving terms of the relevant Franchise Agreement.

B.    Within five business days after the date of these orders, the respondent will make an offer to each applicant and group member to buy out the applicant’s or group member’s entitlement to Trailer Income in accordance with cl 5 of the Settlement Deed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Delivered ex tempore, revised from the transcript)

LEE J:

A    INTRODUCTION

1    This is an application pursuant to s 33V of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (Act) for approval of the settlement of this representative proceeding.

2    The application arises in somewhat unusual circumstances. The proceeding was heard concurrently with Sech Finance Pty Limited v RAMS Financial Group Pty Limited, NSD 1363 of 2025 (Fairfield Proceeding), and the evidence in the two proceedings substantially overlapped. After detailed written closing submissions had been exchanged, but before closing addresses had been completed, the applicants and RAMS Financial Group Pty Limited (RFG) reached an agreement in principle to settle this proceeding. The Fairfield Proceeding did not settle and reasons determining liability and causation were subsequently published: Sech Finance Pty Limited v RAMS Financial Group Pty Limited (Initial Trial) [2026] FCA 1458.

3    The present application therefore differs in an important respect from many applications under s 33V. I am not being asked to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the competing cases upon the basis of the affidavits, pleadings and the opinions of counsel. I heard the evidence upon which substantial parts of this proceeding were based, including the extensive evidence concerning the Fairfield investigation, the Secured Lending Task Force, Project Guardian and the changing approach taken by Westpac Banking Corporation (Westpac) to the risks associated with the RAMS franchise network. Some of that evidence assumed importance in the findings made in Sech Finance.

4    Having considered the terms of settlement against that background, I am amply satisfied that the compromise is fair and reasonable and should be approved under s 33V(1). I am also satisfied, upon the material presently before me, that the proposed deductions from the settlement fund are just within the meaning of s 33V(2), including the proposed funding commission.

B    THE PROCEEDING AND THE SETTLEMENT

5    The nature of this proceeding and its relationship with the Fairfield Proceeding are explained in some detail in Sech Finance. It is unnecessary to repeat that account. It suffices to recall that this proceeding arose from the RAMS franchise business conducted by the first applicant at Ryde and challenged RFG’s conduct in connexion with the heightened scrutiny to which loan applications became subject and its later decisions to revoke the relevant authorised credit representative arrangements and take steps to terminate the Ryde franchise.

6    There was a substantial factual connexion between this proceeding and the Fairfield Proceeding because events concerning Fairfield were the genesis of an investigation within Westpac and broader consideration of the RAMS franchise network, culminating in Project Guardian. Ryde was one of the franchises subsequently subjected to heightened review. The evidence concerning the investigation of Fairfield, the response of Westpac and RFG, the Front Book and Back Book Reviews and the later development of Project Guardian accordingly formed part of the common factual history.

7    Under the settlement deed dated 17 September 2026 (Settlement Deed), the settlement has an asserted value to group members, excluding the proposed buy-out of future trailer income, of approximately $33 million. The Settlement Sum itself is $29,624,397.67, comprising: (a) $7,783,183.14 in withheld trail commission; (b) $1,042,234.01 in interest upon that withheld trail commission; and (c) an Additional Amount of $20,798,980.52.

8    The applicants attribute a further estimated value of $3,375,602.33 to additional withheld trail and interest, together with the estimated net present value of the additional 25% of future trail commission which RFG will cease withholding after approval.

9    In addition, within five business days of approval, RFG is to make each group member an offer to buy out its entitlement to future trailer income under an agreed formula reflecting its net present value. The withheld trail commission and associated interest are referable to the contractual entitlement of each group member. The Additional Amount is to be divided according to percentages reflecting the highest value of each group member’s loan book during the 12 months preceding revocation of its authorised credit representative arrangement and termination of its Franchise Agreement.

C    APPROVAL OF THE SETTLEMENT

10    The relevant principles are very familiar. Section 33V(1) prevents settlement or discontinuance of a representative proceeding without the approval of the Court. The question is whether the proposed settlement represents a fair and reasonable compromise of the claims advanced on behalf of group members, having regard to their interests collectively and as between themselves: see Camilleri v The Trust Company (Nominees) Limited [2015] FCA 1468 (at [5], [40]–[45]); Lifeplan Australia Friendly Society Limited v S&P Global Inc (formerly McGraw-Hill Financial, Inc) [2018] FCA 379 (at [12]–[15]); Webb v GetSwift Limited (No 7) [2023] FCA 90; (2023) 414 ALR 500 (at 504 [15]–[17] per Murphy J).

11    As I have already noted, there is considerably firmer ground than usual upon which to assess the litigation risks.

12    The findings subsequently made in Sech Finance demonstrate both the force and the limitations of aspects of the case advanced against RFG. Westpac had substantial grounds for investigating Fairfield, was entitled to alter its risk appetite and was entitled to subject business introduced through RAMS to greater scrutiny. The intensive review undertaken by the Secured Lending Task Force did not, without more, mean that every anomaly identified during that review represented misconduct by a franchisee or loan writer.

13    The Fairfield applicants succeeded in establishing a breach of the obligation of good faith, but the breach found was a confined one. RFG’s decision-maker had identified a want of connexion between serious concerns communicated to him and the evidence said to support those concerns, and yet the evaluative process was completed while that deficiency remained unresolved. The Court did not find dishonesty and the unconscionability claim failed.

14    Of particular relevance to an assessment of risk was the conclusion on causation. The Fairfield applicants did not establish that proper performance would probably have resulted in the continuation of an ordinary franchise for the balance of its term. What was lost was an opportunity that a proper process would have produced a commercially useful continuation of the franchise while the business remained subject to heightened scrutiny. Having regard to Westpac’s genuine concerns, its attitude towards Fairfield, the consequences of continuing heightened scrutiny and subsequent events affecting the RAMS business, that opportunity was assessed at 12.5%.

15    It would be quite wrong simply to transplant those findings from Fairfield to Ryde or to any other franchise. The circumstances differed and this proceeding raised claims extending beyond those determined in the Fairfield Proceeding. But what Sech Finance does provide is an unusually concrete demonstration of the hazards attending continued litigation. It confirms that the applicants faced real difficulties concerning aspects of liability, causation and the amount recoverable.

16    There is, on the other side of the ledger, much of substance obtained by the settlement. There is a substantial monetary payment; the withheld 25% trail commission is restored with interest; the withholding of that proportion of future trail commission will cease; and group members will receive an opportunity to accept a buy-out of their future trailer income.

17    The timing of the compromise is also important. It was reached when those advising the applicants had the benefit of the evidence adduced at the initial trial and were fully acquainted with the strengths and weaknesses of the case.

18    I have also considered the proposed allocation methodology. The Additional Amount is to be divided by reference to the highest loan-book value of each group member during the 12 months preceding revocation or termination. The applicants contend that this approach avoids allowing the deterioration said to have been caused by the investigations and heightened review itself to depress the allocation to an affected franchise. I am satisfied that this provides a rational and fair means of distributing the Additional Amount between group members. That conclusion concerns the methodology; the discrete question concerning its application to RAMS Blackburn is addressed below.

19    There is another circumstance which, in this particular proceeding, carries real weight. This is a small and readily identifiable class. The evidence identifies 15 franchise businesses within the class. Save for one franchisee and its principal, the group members were represented by the applicants’ solicitors. There was a Steering Committee comprising Ms Wodecki and three other franchise principals, which communicated with other funded group members and was involved in answering questions about the settlement. The solicitors also engaged directly with funded group members concerning the settlement and its proposed distribution. No objection to approval of the settlement was received (the principal of RAMS Blackburn did, however, reserve her position concerning that franchise’s revised proportional interest, a matter addressed in Section E below).

20    Care must always be taken before placing too much weight upon silence in a representative proceeding. In a large and diffuse class, the absence of objection may reveal little about whether group members have engaged with, or even properly appreciated, what is proposed. The circumstances here are materially different. Given the small size and composition of the class, the common legal representation of almost all franchisees and the involvement of the Steering Committee, I consider the absence of objection to be of genuine weight.

21    That said, the settlement also binds a non-client group member and, in any event, representation does not displace the Court’s own obligation under s 33V. The Court cannot delegate its protective function to group members or treat acquiescence as conclusive. It does, however, provide substantial reassurance that the compromise is not being imposed upon a large body of passive group members without meaningful engagement or any realistic opportunity to object.

22    There is a separate question concerning the extent to which the Settlement Deed purports to impose contractual obligations upon group members who are not parties to it. The release itself is appropriately confined. The difficulty lies in provisions which go beyond the compromise of the claims advanced in the proceeding and purport to require group members to give covenants or acknowledgments, including promises concerning public statements and the destruction of documents.

23    A representative applicant’s capacity to compromise the proceeding, subject to approval under s 33V, is not authority to make separate contractual promises on behalf of every group member. The claims of group members are resolved through the Court-approved settlement and the binding effect of the orders under s 33ZB, not by treating absent group members as having themselves executed releases or undertaken contractual obligations under the deed. A group member may agree to assume such obligations, but agreement must be established; the mere absence of objection to the settlement does not establish it.

24    The orders preserve that distinction. They do not interfere with obligations which a group member has agreed to assume, but make clear that approval does not itself impose contractual obligations under the Settlement Deed upon a group member who is not a party to it. In particular, Order 3 addresses the covenants, acknowledgments and obligations in cll 8.1, 9.1, 9.3, 9.4 and 11. This qualification ensures that the settlement of the claims is not used as a means of imposing additional contractual burdens without consent.

25    Upon consideration of all these matters, including the litigation risks revealed by the trial and by Sech Finance, the substantial benefits obtained, the proposed allocation methodology, the stage at which the compromise was reached and the informed response of this small class, I am well satisfied that the settlement represents a fair and reasonable compromise and should be approved under s 33V(1).

D    THE PROPOSED DEDUCTIONS

26    The applicants also seek approval under s 33V(2) of deductions totalling $16,574,966.37, comprising: (a) $12 million as the funder’s commission; (b) $4 million reimbursing funded legal costs and disbursements; (c) $461,354.87 in unfunded solicitor costs and disbursements; and (d) $113,611.50 in actual and anticipated settlement approval and distribution costs.

27    The proposed deductions are undeniably large. If approved, approximately $13,049,431.30, or 44% of the Settlement Sum, will remain for group members. If the additional withheld trail, interest and estimated net present value of future trail are included, the applicants calculate that approximately $16,425,033.63, or 49.77% of the asserted overall settlement value of $33 million, will remain for group members.

28    Section 33V(2) provides that, where the Court gives approval under s 33V(1), it may make such orders as are just with respect to the distribution of any money paid under the settlement. The breadth of that discretion was considered by the Full Court in Elliott-Carde v McDonald’s Australia Limited [2023] FCAFC 162; (2023) 301 FCR 1 (at 20 [97]–[98] per Beach J; Lee and Colvin JJ writing separately and concurring). The statutory task requires an evaluative conclusion as to what is just in the circumstances.

D.1    The funder’s commission

29    The component calling for the closest consideration is the $12 million commission payable to the funder. It is a large sum and represents a higher percentage than the average commission recorded in some recent settlement approval decisions.

30    A funding return cannot sensibly be evaluated simply by comparing percentages after the event; it is always necessary to avoid the vice of hindsight reasoning and to recognise that funding commissions must be commercially realistic, having regard to the costs and risks undertaken by the funder.

31    There is a related point I made in Lifeplan Australia Friendly Society Limited v S&P Global Inc (formerly McGraw-Hill Financial, Inc) [2018] FCA 379. The bargain with a commercial funder is struck at a time when the course and outcome of the litigation remain uncertain. Put figuratively, the price of the voyage is struck before the voyage is undertaken. A court examining the bargain after the vessel has reached port must take care not to price the voyage upon the false assumption that the perils which did not eventuate were never real.

32    The eventual success of the proceeding does not retrospectively remove the risks accepted at its commencement, just as the safe conclusion of a voyage does not establish that the weather was always certain to be fair. The question is whether the proposed return is just when assessed by reference to the circumstances in which the risk was assumed, while retaining sight of the Court’s responsibility to protect the interests of group members.

33    That warning against hindsight has especial force here. This was quite high-risk litigation. It presented difficult questions concerning the content and application of the obligation of good faith, the relationship between decisions made by RFG and the investigations and risk assessments undertaken within Westpac, the legal consequences of revocation of the authorised credit representative arrangements, causation and counterfactual loss. The findings in Sech Finance illustrate how genuine those risks were.

34    Nor was the risk confined to liability. Quantum depended upon contested counterfactuals. Any loss-of-opportunity analysis potentially required a substantial discount, and the applicants’ Downturn Case and Termination Case were attended by considerable factual and legal difficulties. The result ultimately reached in Sech Finance demonstrates the extent to which success upon a confined aspect of liability may fail to translate into recovery of the loss initially claimed.

35    Moreover, the funder’s financial commitment was significant. It paid $4 million in solicitors’ fees and disbursements.

36    It also incurred expenditure in obtaining after-the-event insurance. Importantly, the $4 million reimbursement now sought does not include the cost of that insurance. This is appropriate. As I have previously remarked, a litigation funder’s remuneration is the price it receives for accepting the risks associated with funding the litigation. How the funder chooses to protect itself against some aspect of that risk, and how it chooses internally to characterise the expenditure associated with doing so, is ordinarily a matter for the funder.

37    The funding arrangements provided for a commission calculated by alternative mechanisms. The applicants’ material records that 26% of Claim Proceeds would produce $8.58 million, whereas four times the Project Payments would produce $16 million. The amount now sought is $12 million, corresponding to three times the $4 million in Project Payments for which reimbursement is sought.

38    The question for present purposes is whether that return is just, having regard to the risks undertaken, the capital exposed, the terms upon which funding was obtained and the circumstances existing when the bargain was made. The contractual formula supplies important context, but it does not determine the statutory inquiry.

39    The proceeding itself demanded extensive expenditure. Among other things, the affidavit evidence records production by RFG and Westpac of 27,579 documents in 35 tranches, together with substantial expenditure upon solicitors and counsel and expert evidence. The matter proceeded through extensive interlocutory and preparatory stages and into a substantial initial trial. The funder’s capital remained exposed while those steps were undertaken and while the outcome of the litigation remained uncertain.

40    Further, this was not a funding charge first revealed to group members when the fruits of the litigation were in sight. As I have explained, save for one franchisee group member, the group members entered litigation funding agreements with the funder. The agreements followed an approach to prospective funders and contemplated a return potentially greater than that now sought. The proposed commission was disclosed to the unfunded group members, and no objection was made to its amount.

41    None of this means that contractual agreement by funded group members determines what is just under s 33V(2). But the Court’s protective jurisdiction does not require it to disregard a commercial bargain knowingly made by a small and commercially experienced group, particularly where the risk which prompted the obtaining of commercial funding was genuine, the proceeding could not sensibly have been maintained without substantial financial support, and the eventual success of the litigation provides no proper basis for pretending that the hazards attending it were less than they appeared when the bargain was struck.

42    Comparisons with percentages allowed in other representative proceedings must therefore be approached with care. I made a related observation in Williams & Kersten Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Limited (No 5) [2025] FCA 155 (at [10]). One recurring difficulty is the inability to compare like with like because payments described as a funder’s commission may sit alongside other payments for insurance, action costs, reimbursement or other components. The commercial circumstances and risk profile of each proceeding also differ. A headline percentage may conceal more than it reveals.

43    Standing back, I am satisfied that the $12 million commission, although high, is just. This was litigation involving substantial capital expenditure and genuine forensic risk; the return sought is below one measure of the return contractually available to the funder; the funded group members entered contractual arrangements providing for the funder’s remuneration; and no member of this small and engaged class objected.

44    I am satisfied that the Court would fall into the very error of hindsight against which the authorities warn if the ultimate achievement of the settlement were allowed retrospectively to diminish the assessment of the risk for which the funder contracted to be remunerated.

D.2    The other deductions and funding equalisation

45    I am also satisfied that reimbursement of the $4 million in funded solicitors’ fees and disbursements and the $461,354.87 in unfunded solicitors’ costs and disbursements should be allowed. The material identifies the expenditure incurred and explains the connexion between the funded and unfunded costs. No uplift is included in the latter amount.

46    The applicants also seek $113,611.50 for actual and anticipated settlement approval and distribution costs. The evidence identifies the work undertaken in connexion with the approval application and includes an estimate for the future work associated with distribution. I am satisfied that this amount may properly be allowed.

47    There is a minor discrepancy in the affidavit evidence concerning the settlement approval costs incurred as at the date of the affidavit. One paragraph states the amount as $68,345.50, whereas the accompanying table totals $68,611.50. The difference does not affect my conclusion concerning the overall deduction sought, and the final form of the orders identifies with precision the amount authorised.

48    The applicants also seek to apportion the deductions pro rata across the class by means of funding equalisation. The possibility of such an order was disclosed to group members in the opt-out notices and subsequently in the settlement material.

49    In circumstances where the expenditure and risks incurred secured a common settlement fund, it is just for the deductions to be borne proportionately across those receiving the benefit of the fund. The contrary course would confer upon the unfunded group members the benefit of a recovery made possible by expenditure and risk borne for the class as a whole, without requiring them to bear a proportionate share of that burden.

50    I will accordingly approve the proposed deductions totalling $16,574,966.37 and the proposed funding equalisation order.

E    ADMINISTRATION AND DISTRIBUTION

51    There remains a discrete question concerning the mechanics and cost of distribution. The applicants have not prepared a formal settlement distribution scheme. Their position is that distribution is sufficiently straightforward to be managed by Morris Mennilli and RFG. The withheld trail and interest are to be paid by RFG directly into the bank accounts through which group members ordinarily receive trailer commission, while the residual Additional Amount is to be distributed through the solicitors’ trust account according to the specified proportions.

52    The relative simplicity of those arrangements may mean that little purpose would be served by introducing another administrator. There are few group members (almost all of whom are clients of the solicitors), the recipients and their respective proportions have been identified, and part of the distribution is to occur through existing payment arrangements maintained by RFG.

53    A discrete issue arose at the hearing concerning the proportional interest allocated to RAMS Blackburn. Counsel explained that, following execution of the Settlement Deed, the solicitors had checked the loan-book information against RFG’s records and revised the proportional allocations. The revision reduced RAMS Blackburn’s share from approximately 20% to approximately 17%, with corresponding increases for the other franchises. The reduction had only been communicated to its principal on the day before the hearing. She did not oppose approval of the settlement, but wished to check her records before accepting the revised allocation.

54    It was important that she have a proper opportunity to do so. Although the revised calculation appeared correct on the material before me, the late communication of a change of significance to her economic interests made it inappropriate to treat the question as finally resolved without allowing time for verification. I therefore allowed seven days, until 6 November 2026, for the principal of RAMS Blackburn to notify my Associate and the parties in writing of any dispute, identifying its basis and providing the supporting material. Orders 10–12 preserve that opportunity before distribution of the balance of the Additional Amount. If no notice is given, distribution may proceed according to the proportions identified in paragraph 133 of Mr Morris’s affidavit sworn 23 October 2026.

55    This course did not require approval of the settlement to be postponed. Counsel confirmed that any later adjustment of the proportional allocation would not affect the buy-out arrangement, and the ordinary steps preceding distribution allowed time for any genuine dispute to be addressed. The safeguard thus permitted approval to proceed while ensuring that the principal was not required to accept the revised allocation without a reasonable opportunity to check it.

F    THE APPLICATION FOR NON-PUBLICATION ORDERS

56    The applicants seek non-publication orders pursuant to ss 37AF and 37AG(1)(a) of the Act in respect of specified parts of the material relied upon on this application. The material includes the Settlement Deed, privileged communications concerning the litigation, and invoices and costs schedules containing narrative descriptions of legal work.

57    The applicants’ case is that publication of the material may prejudice them if approval is refused, or disturbed on appeal, and the proceeding resumes. The orders are confined to the period ending upon expiry of the appeal period concerning settlement approval or, if an appeal is commenced, upon its final determination.

58    I am satisfied that the limited non-publication orders are necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice if settlement approval is overturned and the litigation resumes.

G    CONCLUSION

59    I am satisfied that the settlement is fair and reasonable and in the interests of group members, and I will approve it pursuant to s 33V(1). I am also satisfied that the deductions totalling $16,574,966.37, including the $12 million funder’s commission, are just within s 33V(2), and I will approve those deductions together with the proposed funding equalisation order.

Associate:

Dated: 2 November 2026

Annexure A

Confidentiality Claims Schedule