FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Staunton v Zahab (No 3) [2026] FCA 1639

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

TO:    HAISEM ZAHAB

IF YOU (BEING THE PERSON BOUND BY THIS ORDER):

(A)    REFUSE OR NEGLECT TO DO ANY ACT WITHIN THE TIME SPECIFIED IN THIS ORDER FOR THE DOING OF THE ACT; OR

(B)    DISOBEY THE ORDER BY DOING AN ACT WHICH THE ORDER REQUIRES YOU NOT TO DO,

YOU WILL BE LIABLE TO IMPRISONMENT, SEQUESTRATION OF PROPERTY OR OTHER PUNISHMENT.

ANY OTHER PERSON WHO KNOWS OF THIS ORDER AND DOES ANYTHING WHICH HELPS OR PERMITS YOU TO BREACH THE TERMS OF THIS ORDER MAY BE SIMILARLY PUNISHED.

Confirmation of Interim Control Order

1.    Pursuant to s 104.14(7) of the Criminal Code (Cth), being the Schedule to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), the interim Control Order made in relation to the respondent on 23 March 2026, as varied on 9 July 2026, is confirmed. The terms of the Control Order, as confirmed, are set out in Annexure A to these Orders.

2.    The confirmed Control Order remains in force until and including 22 March 2027.

3.    The respondent’s lawyer may attend the Australian Federal Police Sydney office at 110 Goulburn St, Sydney NSW 2000 between 9:00 am and 4:00 pm, Monday to Friday in order to obtain a copy of this confirmed Control Order.

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

4.    The Court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities:

(a)    that the respondent has been convicted in Australia of an offence relating to terrorism (s 104.4(1)(c)(iv) of the Criminal Code);

(b)    of the matters in s 104.4(1)(c) and (d) of the Criminal Code, that confirming the order would substantially assist to:

(i)    protect the public from a terrorist act: s 104.4(1)(d)(iii) of the Criminal Code; or

(ii)    prevent the provision of support for or the facilitation of a terrorist act: s 104.4(1)(d)(iv) of the Criminal Code; or

(iii)    prevent the provision of support for or the facilitation of the engagement in a hostile activity in a foreign country: s 104.4(1)(d)(v) of the Criminal Code.

(c)    that each of the obligations, prohibitions and restrictions to be imposed on the respondent by the confirmed Control Order is reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted, for the purposes of s 104.4(1)(d)(iii) to (v) of the Criminal Code.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

ANNEXURE A

CONDITIONS OF INTERIM CONTROL ORDER

1.    Where you live

1.1.    You must reside at the specified premises and nowhere else.

1.2.    The specified premises is:

a.    [REDACTED]; or

b.    any other premises nominated by you and approved in writing by the AFP Superintendent.

1.3.    You must seek approval from the AFP Superintendent under paragraph 1.2(b), or an exemption from Condition 1.1, in writing at least two (2) business days prior to any:

a.    change to the premises you nominate under Condition 1.2(b); or

b.    planned or anticipated temporary absence of 24 hours or more from the specified premises.

1.4.    The prohibition in Condition 1.1 and the requirement in Condition 1.3 do not apply during any period in which you are admitted to hospital.

1.5.    The prohibition in Condition 1.1 and the requirement in Condition 1.3 do not apply to a temporary absence from the specified premises provided the following conditions are met:

a.    The temporary absence from the specified premises is no more than 72 hours;

b.    For the duration of the temporary absence, you reside at a close family member’s address specified in Confidential Annexure B to this order, or at an address otherwise agreed with the AFP Superintendent in writing for the purposes of this Condition; and

c.    You notify the AFP Superintendent in writing at least (2) business days prior to the planned or anticipated temporary absence of the following:

i.    the period for which you will be temporarily absent from the premises; and

ii.    the address or addresses at which you will reside for the duration of the temporary absence.

2.    Checking in

2.1.    Within 24 hours of this order being given to you, you must call the AFP Superintendent.

2.2.    You must also call or meet with the AFP Superintendent when they direct you to do so.

3.    Travel

3.1.    You must not leave or make arrangements to leave Australia.

3.2.    You must not apply for any Australian or foreign travel document (including passports), visa, or travel authorisation.

3.3.    You must not possess an Australian or foreign travel document (including passport), visa, or travel authorisation which is in another person’s name.

3.4.    You must not travel or make arrangements to travel outside the state of New South Wales or the Australian Capital Territory.

Note: For the avoidance of doubt, travel between the state of New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory is permitted.

4.    Electronic monitoring

Condition removed.

5.    Voluntary psychological support and treatment

5.1.    You must consider, in good faith, participating in counselling, or psychological or psychiatric assessment and treatment, with a suitably qualified professional counsellor, psychologist or psychiatrist.

Note: The Australian Federal Police will pay the cost of your psychological or psychiatric assessment and treatment, or counselling, for the duration of this order.

5.2.    If you participate in counselling or psychological or psychiatric assessment and treatment:

a.    you must tell the AFP Superintendent the name of the suitably qualified professional counsellor, psychologist, or psychiatrist you intend to see before you see them;

b.    you can request that the AFP Superintendent recommend a suitably qualified professional counsellor, psychologist, or psychiatrist for you;

c.    you may withdraw your consent to attend counselling, or psychological or psychiatric treatment at any time; and

d.    you may change your counsellor, psychologist or psychiatrist at any time for another suitably qualified person, as long as you tell the AFP Superintendent their name and occupation before you see them.

6.    Sharing information

6.1.    If the AFP Superintendent directs you under this order to give information, you must not give false or misleading information to the AFP Superintendent.

6.2.    You must allow the provider of any service described in Condition 5.1 to share information with the AFP Superintendent about when and for how long you met with them.

7.    Who you can’t communicate with

7.1.    You must not communicate with anyone who is detained in a correctional facility, unless you are detained in that facility.

7.2.    You must not communicate with anyone you know or suspect to be located overseas, unless they are a close family member. However, before you communicate with a close family member who is located overseas, you must advise the AFP Superintendent in writing of the full name and contact details of the close family member.

7.3.    You must not communicate or associate by any means, with anyone you know or suspect to be, or who professes to be, a member of Islamic State or any other terrorist organisation.

7.4.    You must not communicate or associate by any means with any person known to you to be convicted of, or currently charged with:

a.    a ‘terrorism offence’ within the meaning of section 3(1) of the Crimes Act 1914

(Cth);

b.    an offence against Subdivision C (urging or threatening violence, offences against groups or members of groups, and advocating terrorism or genocide) or CA (publicly displaying, and trading in, prohibited symbols and giving Nazi salute) of Division 80 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (‘Criminal Code’); or

c.    an offence against Part 5.3B (prohibited hate groups) of the Criminal Code.

7.5.    You must not communicate or associate with any person known to you to be currently or previously subject to:

a.    a control order made under Division 104 of the Criminal Code; or

b.    an interim or extended supervision order made under the Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017 (NSW) or Division 105A of the Criminal Code.

7.6.    You must not communicate or associate with:

a.    Samata Ullah born 7 November 1982.

7.7.    If the AFP Superintendent determines that you must not communicate or associate with a person, you must not communicate or associate with them.

Note: As explained in Condition 22, you must not ask or cause someone else to communicate on your behalf with a person described in Condition 7.

8.    Employment and Education

8.1.    You must tell the AFP Superintendent before starting any job, volunteer work, vocational training, or education.

8.2.    (a) You must give any information the AFP Superintendent directs you to give about your, volunteer work, vocational training or education.

(b)     You must give any information the AFP Superintendent directs you to give about your job where that information falls within the scope of the below categories:

i.    name of employer;

ii.    job title and role description;

iii.    location and hours of work; and

iv.    descriptions of tools and supplies accessible to you in your employment.

9.    Groups

9.1.    You must not join or otherwise associate with any groups, clubs or organisations (including online) which:

a.    circulate or discuss violent extremist material or material created by a terrorist organisation (other than as part of professional psychological treatment, rehabilitation or intervention program);

b.    claim to be part of a terrorist organisation;

c.    advocate for, or support a terrorist organisation; or

d.    advocate for, or support the doing of terrorist acts, either in Australia or overseas.

10.    Prohibited items

10.1.    You must not buy, make, possess or use any of the following:

a.    a knife;

b.    a ‘firearm’, a ‘firearm part’ or ‘ammunition’ within the meaning of s 4(1) of the

Firearms Act 1996 (NSW);

c.    a ‘prohibited weapon’ within the meaning of s 4(1) of the Weapons Prohibition Act 1998 (NSW)’;

d.    laser guidance or laser detection technology;

e.    a 3D printer or related 3D printer technology;

f.    a drone or related drone technology;

g.    a hobby rocket, a hobby rocket engine or other hobby rocket supplies; or

h.    explosives, explosive devices, initiation systems, or firing devices.

10.2.    Condition 10.1 does not prohibit you from possessing or using a knife if it is:

a.    ordinary cutlery used for eating;

b.    a kitchen knife within your household for ordinary domestic purposes; or

c.    a tool reasonably necessary in the ordinary course of business as an electrician; or

d.    a tool reasonably necessary for farming or fishing purposes.

10.3.    You must not be in the company of any person who you know has, on their person or in a vehicle in which you are travelling with them, any of the items referred to in paragraph 10.1.

Note: This condition does not prohibit you from being in the company of a person who has a knife on their person or in their vehicle that is:

a.    ordinary cutlery used for eating;

b.    a kitchen knife within their household for ordinary domestic purposes; or

c.    a tool reasonably necessary in the ordinary course of that person’s employment or business.

10.4.    You must not possess any quantity of any chemical which is not consistent with ordinary domestic purposes.

10.5.    You may seek approval from the AFP Superintendent in accordance with Condition 21 to possess a quantity of chemical greater than that which is consistent with ordinary domestic purposes.

11.    Places you can’t go

11.1.    You must not go to any prison or correctional facility unless you are detained there.

11.2.    You must not go to the following places:

a.    within 1 km of any Australian airport which has an international point of departure;

b.    within 1 km of any Australian port that has an international point of departure.

11.3.    You must not be present at places where firearms are stored, sold or used, including firearm dealers, shooting ranges or private premises where firearms are stored.

11.4.    If the AFP Superintendent directs you not go to a place, you must not go there.

12.    Phone rules

12.1.    The AFP Superintendent will give you a phone and SIM card. This is referred to as the ‘AFP phone’ and ‘AFP SIM card’. You may only use the AFP phone and AFP SIM card. You must not use any other mobile or landline phone or SIM card.

Note: As explained in Conditions 12.5 and 12.7, you may use another phone only in specific circumstances.

12.2.    The AFP Superintendent will provide you with the following information:

a.    The password for the AFP phone; and

b.    The phone number for the AFP phone.

12.3.    You must:

a.    keep your AFP phone switched on, charged and with you at all times;

b.    be available to answer calls from the AFP Superintendent;

c.    if you are unable to answer a call from the AFP Superintendent, return the call as soon as reasonably practicable;

d.    do anything else the AFP Superintendent directs you to do with your AFP phone in relation to Conditions 12.3(a),(b) or (c);

e.    provide passwords and PIN codes for your AFP phone and any files, folders, programs and applications on your AFP phone, when directed to do so by a police officer for the purposes of searching or seizing your AFP phone or data within or accessible from it;

f.    permit one or more police officers to inspect, repair, service, or replace your AFP phone or AFP SIM card, when directed to do so by a police officer;

g.    if you become aware that your AFP phone, AFP SIM card or charging equipment is not working properly, notify the AFP Superintendent as soon as possible and, in any case, within 12 hours of becoming aware.

12.4.    You must not:

a.    enable any face ID, fingerprint, or other biometric security features on the AFP phone;

b.    change the password for the AFP phone unless:

i.    the AFP Superintendent has given you approval to do so; and

ii.    you have provided the new password to the AFP Superintendent.

c.    let anyone else use your AFP phone or AFP SIM card unless it is an emergency. You must tell the AFP Superintendent if this happens;

d.    connect your AFP phone to any Wi-Fi network, including public Wi-Fi or your home Wi-Fi;

e.    connect your AFP phone to any other device, or allow another device to connect to your AFP phone, over a wired connection, Wi-Fi, hotspot, Bluetooth or similar means;

f.    tamper with, damage or destroy any component of your AFP phone or any equipment necessary for the operation of your AFP phone (e.g. charging cables);

g.    change, remove, modify or disconnect the SIM card, telecommunication service provider or phone number connected to your AFP phone;

h.    utilise any call-forwarding to your AFP phone, or from your AFP phone to another device;

i.    obtain a different SIM card or eSIM; or

j.    ask or allow any other person to make calls or send messages on a different device on your behalf.

12.5.    There are exceptions to Conditions 12.1, 12.3 and 12.4. You may:

a.    connect your AFP phone to your AFP computer (see Condition 13 below);

b.    connect your AFP phone to your AFP internet service (see Condition 13 below);

c.    use the Bluetooth function on your AFP phone to connect to personal Bluetooth enabled devices (such as headphones or an in-car Bluetooth connection);

d.    use another phone for the sole purpose of telling the AFP Superintendent that the AFP phone or AFP SIM card is not working;

e.    use another phone in an emergency to call ‘000’ or the State Emergency Services (SES).

12.6.    If you obtain a job where the employer requires you to use a different phone, you must notify the AFP Superintendent of that phone prior to its first use. This is referred to as the ‘work phone’. You must also provide the following details about the work phone to the AFP Superintendent prior to its first use:

a.    particulars explaining why the work phone is necessary for your job;

b.    particulars explaining what functionalities of the work phone you will use including any applications or programs you will use;

c.    confirmation as to whether the work phone will be used by any other person;

d.    brand and model of the work phone;

e.    phone number for the work phone; and

f.    International Mobile Equipment Identity number for the work phone.

12.7.    You may use the work phone for the purpose of your job only.

13.    Computer and internet rules

13.1.    The AFP Superintendent will give you a computer or tablet device. This is referred to as the ‘AFP computer’. Apart from your AFP computer and AFP phone, you must not use any other computer, tablet or internet capable device.

Note: ‘Internet capable device’ includes any phone, computer, laptop, tablet, gaming device, television, or any other electronic device capable of connecting to the internet (either directly or by connecting to a wireless network). A device can be an internet capable device even if it is not currently connected to the internet.

Note: As explained in Conditions 13.5, 13.7 and 13.9, you may use another computer, tablet or internet capable device in specific circumstances.

13.2.    You will get an internet service for use with your AFP computer. This is referred to as the ‘AFP internet service’. You must not use any other internet service or wireless network with your AFP computer.

Note: You are permitted to use another internet service or wireless network in connection with Conditions 13.7 and 13.9.

13.3.    You must:

a.    provide passwords and PIN codes for your AFP computer and any files, folders, programs and applications on your AFP computer, when directed to do so by a police officer for the purposes of searching or seizing your AFP computer or data within or accessible from it;

b.    permit one or more police officers to inspect, repair, service, or replace your AFP computer, when directed to do so by a police officer;

c.    if you become aware that your AFP computer or associated equipment is not working properly, notify the AFP Superintendent as soon as possible and, in any case, within 12 hours of becoming aware.

13.4.    You must not:

a.    let anyone else use your AFP computer unless it is an emergency. You must tell the AFP Superintendent if this happens as soon as reasonably possible;

b.    connect your AFP computer to any Wi-Fi network, including public Wi-Fi and your home Wi-Fi;

c.    connect your AFP computer to any other device, or allow another device to connect to your AFP computer over a wired connection, Wi-Fi, hotspot, Bluetooth or similar means; or

d.    tamper with, damage or destroy any component of your AFP computer or any equipment necessary for the operation your AFP computer (e.g. charging cables).

13.5.    There are exceptions to Conditions 13.1, 13.3 and 13.4. You may:

a.    connect your AFP phone to your AFP computer;

b.    connect your AFP computer to a wired display, keyboard, mouse, headphones, speaker, microphone, printer, dock or other ordinary accessory or peripheral device;

c.    use the Bluetooth function on your AFP computer to connect to personal Bluetooth enabled devices (such as headphones or a wireless keyboard or mouse);

d.    use a computer or internet capable device and internet service to make ordinary business transactions (such as using an EFTPOS terminal, ATM or ordering food or paying for groceries or other goods via a self-serve screen);

e.    use a smart TV connected to the internet to access television services and streaming services (but not a smart TV’s internet browser or any chat or social media capabilities).

13.6.    If you obtain a job where the employer requires you to use a different computer or internet capable device, you must notify the AFP Superintendent before using that computer or device. This is known as the ‘work computer’. You must also provide the following details about the work computer to the AFP Superintendent prior to its first use:

a.    particulars explaining why the work computer is necessary for your job;

b.    particulars explaining what functionalities of the work computer you will use including any applications or programs you will use;

c.    particulars of any data storage or cloud storage you will use in connection with the work computer;

d.    confirmation as to whether the work computer will be used by any other person;

e.    brand and model of the work computer;

f.    any usernames you will use to sign in to the work computer or to operate software on the work computer;

g.    any phone number or SIM card number connected to the work computer; and

h.    International Mobile Equipment Identity number or serial number for the work computer.

13.7.    You may use the work computer for the purpose of your job only.

13.8.    If you undertake study which requires the use of a different computer or internet capable device, you must seek approval from the AFP Superintendent before using that computer or device. This is known as the ‘study computer’. You must also provide the following details about the study computer to the AFP Superintendent when seeking approval:

a.    particulars explaining why the study computer is necessary for your study;

b.    particulars explaining what functionalities of the study computer you will use including any applications or programs you will use;

c.    particulars of any data storage or cloud storage you will use in connection with the study computer;

d.    confirmation as to whether the study computer will be used by any other person;

e.    brand and model of the study computer;

f.    any usernames you will use to sign in to the study computer or to operate software on the study computer;

g.    any phone number or SIM card number connected to the study computer; and

h.    International Mobile Equipment Identity number or serial number for the study computer.

13.9.    If your request is approved, you may use the study computer specified in the approval for the purpose of your study only.

14.    Email use

14.1.    You must not use any email account other than one nominated by you and approved in writing by the AFP Superintendent. This is referred to as the ‘AFP email account’.

14.2.    You must not:

a.    sign up for any online account or engage in any transaction using any email account other than the AFP email account;

b.    use any function which uses temporary or forwarding emails (such as an iPhone’s ‘Hide My Email’ function).

14.3.    If you obtain a job or undertake study which requires a different email account, you must notify the AFP Superintendent before using that email account. This is known as

the ‘work or study email account’. You must also provide the following details about the work or study email account to the AFP Superintendent prior to its first use:

a.    particulars explaining why the work or study email account is necessary for your job, vocational training or education;

b.    confirmation as to whether the work or study email account will be used by any other person;

c.    the email address for the work or study email account.

14.4.    You may use the work or study email account for the purpose of your job, vocational training or education only.

15.    Programs, applications and data

15.1.    Conditions 15.2 to 15.7 apply to your AFP phone, AFP computer, and AFP internet service.

15.2.    You must only use the applications and programs that are already on your AFP phone or AFP computer at the time they are provided to you, or which are approved in writing by the AFP Superintendent.

15.3.    You must not:

a.    install any programs or applications onto your AFP phone or AFP computer without prior approval from the AFP Superintendent;

b.    use any social media or messaging services not approved by the AFP Superintendent.

Note: A social media or messaging service includes any internet-based service that can be used to communicate with, or broadcast or disseminate information to, other users, such as WhatsApp, X, Instagram, Signal, Telegram or Facebook. For the avoidance of doubt, ‘using’ a social media or messaging service includes using that service via a web browser.

15.4.    There is an exception to Conditions 15.2 and 15.3(a):

a.    You may install software updates that are automatically available on your AFP phone or AFP computer.

15.5.    If you want to use an application or program that is not already on your AFP phone or AFP computer, you can ask the AFP Superintendent to approve the application or program.

15.6.    If you want to use a social media or messaging service, you can ask the AFP Superintendent to approve the social media or messaging service.

15.7.    You must not:

a.    hide any of your online activity (including by using private browsing, incognito/hidden mode, or using a virtual private network, also known as a VPN);

b.    use any data storage or cloud storage other than the cloud storage account provided to you with your AFP phone or AFP computer; or

c.    deliberately delete or alter any of the following on or from your AFP phone or AFP computer: applications; programs; emails; text messages; electronic messages; call history; data; internet or application search history; application chat or communication history.

15.8.    Condition 15.9 applies to the work phone, work computer and study computer.

15.9.    You must not:

a.    hide any of your online activity (including by using private browsing, incognito/hidden mode, or using a virtual private network, also known as a VPN);

b.    deliberately delete or alter any of the following on or from your work computer or study computer: applications; programs; emails; text messages; electronic messages; call history; data; internet or application search history; application chat or communication history.

16.    Possessing documents and other media

16.1.    You must not possess or access documents or other media that:

a.    relate to any of the following

i.    propaganda or promotional material for a terrorist organisation; or

ii.    activities of, or otherwise associated with, any terrorist organisation;

b.    depict or describe:

i.    laser guidance or laser detection technology;

ii.    3D printer technology or related 3D printer technology;

iii.    drones or related drone technology;

iv.    hobby rockets, hobby rocket engines, or related hobby rocket material;

v.    explosives, explosive devices, initiation systems or firing devices;

vi.    military arms or equipment such as missiles or rocket launchers;

vii.    manuals or instructions on carrying out terrorist attacks, counter- surveillance or making explosives, weapons, firearms, or military arms or equipment such as missiles or rocket launchers; or

viii.    a prohibited symbol;

c.    provide instruction in, advocate for, encourage or praise:

i.    the use of a ‘prohibited weapon’ within the meaning of s 4(1) of the

Weapons Prohibition Act 1998 (NSW);

ii.    arson;

iii.    the use of a ‘firearm’, a ‘firearm part’ or ‘ammunition’ within the meaning of s 4(1) of the Firearms Act 1996 (NSW);

iv.    genocide or the persecution of an ethnic or religious group;

v.    terrorism; or

vi.    violence, including but not limited to shooting, immolation, stabbing, bombing, beheading, torture and execution.

16.2.    Condition 16.1 does not apply to a document or other media if the document or other media is:

a.    published by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), Australian Community Media (ACM), News Corp Australia, Nine Entertainment Co, Schwartz Media, Seven West Media, the Special Broadcasting Service (SBS), the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), CNN, CBS, PBS, NBC, the Guardian and any other publisher or broadcaster approved in writing by the AFP Superintendent;

b.    broadcast on Australian free to air or pay television;

c.    broadcast on one of the following streaming services available in Australia: Netflix; STAN; Amazon Prime; Binge; ABC iView; 10play, 9Now, 7plus, SBS on Demand, Kayo Sports, Apple TV+, Paramount Plus, Disney+ and any other streaming service approved in writing by the AFP Superintendent;

d.    broadcast in Australia by a licenced AM or FM radio station;

e.    shown in a commercial movie cinema;

f.    contained in material that is received by you or your legal representatives, or created by your legal representatives, for the purpose of any legal proceeding you are involved in (referred to as ‘Court Material’).

17.    Creating or sharing documents and other media

17.1.    You must not create, publish or share documents and other media that:

a.    relate to a terrorist organisation;

b.    depict or describe:

i.    laser guidance or laser detection technology;

ii.    3D printer technology or related 3D printer technology;

iii.    drones or related drone technology;

iv.    hobby rockets, hobby rocket engines, or related hobby rocket material;

v.    a ‘prohibited weapon’ within the meaning of s 4(1) of the Weapons Prohibition Act 1998 (NSW);

vi.    arson;

vii.    explosives, explosive devices, initiation systems or firing devices;

viii.    a ‘firearm’, a ‘firearm part’ or ‘ammunition’ within the meaning of s 4(1) of the Firearms Act 1996 (NSW);

ix.    genocide or the persecution of an ethnic or religious group;

x.    a prohibited symbol;

xi.    military arms or equipment such as missiles or rocket launchers;

xii.    manuals or instructions on carrying out terrorist attacks, counter- surveillance or making explosives, weapons, firearms, or military arms or equipment such as missiles or rocket launchers;

xiii.    terrorism; and

xiv.    violence, including but not limited to shooting, immolation, stabbing, bombing, beheading, torture and execution.

17.2.    Condition 17.1 does not prohibit you from distributing, or directing a person to distribute, Court Material for the purpose of the conduct of any legal proceeding you are involved in.

18.    Access to accounts and devices

18.1.    You must give the AFP Superintendent access to your AFP phone, AFP computer and study computer, and any password protected applications or files held on your AFP phone, AFP computer or study computer, and any of your email or other online accounts, when directed to do so for the purposes of the AFP Superintendent searching or seizing the device or accessing data held within or accessible from it.

18.2.    You must give the AFP Superintendent access to any device in your possession when directed to do so for the purposes of the AFP Superintendent searching or seizing the device or accessing data held within or accessible from it.

19.    Reasonable direction

19.1.    You must comply with any reasonable direction given to you by the AFP Superintendent in connection with Conditions 1-18 in this order.

EXEMPTIONS AND APPROVALS

20.    Getting exemptions

20.1.    You can request a temporary exemption from any of the conditions in this order, by writing to the AFP Superintendent.

a.    You must provide the reason why you are requesting an exemption and any other information that AFP Superintendent directs you to provide in relation to the request. If you do not provide the information you are directed to provide, your request will not be considered.

b.    The AFP Superintendent can grant or deny a request for an exemption.

20.2.    The AFP Superintendent can also grant an exemption to any condition in this order without you requesting an exemption. The AFP Superintendent will provide you with reasonable notice in writing of any exemption granted under this Condition, and any associated conditions.

20.3.    If an exemption is granted under either Condition 20.1.b or 20.2, the AFP Superintendent can make it subject to reasonable directions that will be given to you writing. If you do not comply with those directions, the exemption is to be treated as having no effect.

20.4.    The AFP Superintendent may cancel any exemption that has been granted by providing reasonable notice to you in writing. After you are notified that an exemption to a

condition has been cancelled, you must comply with the condition as it is written in this order.

21.    Getting approvals

21.1.    This order applies to any conditions which allow you to seek approval from the AFP Superintendent to do something (for example, to install and use a new program or application on the AFP phone or AFP computer).

21.2.    You can request an approval by submitting a written request to the AFP Superintendent. You must provide any information the AFP Superintendent directs you to provide in relation to the request. If you do not provide the information you are directed to provide, your request may not be considered.

21.3.    The AFP Superintendent can approve or deny these requests. If a request is approved, the AFP Superintendent can make it subject to reasonable directions that will be given to you in writing. If you do not comply with those directions, the approval is to be treated as having no effect.

21.4.    The AFP Superintendent can also grant an approval without you requesting an approval. The AFP Superintendent will provide you with reasonable notice in writing of any approval granted under this Condition.

21.5.    The AFP Superintendent may cancel any approval that has been granted by providing reasonable notice to you in writing. After you are notified that an approval has been cancelled, that approval no longer has any effect.

22.    Attempting to contravene this order or causing a third party to do something on your behalf

22.1.    Where this order prohibits you from doing something:

a.    You must not attempt to do that thing. For example, you must not attempt to leave Australia.

b.    You must not ask or cause someone else to do that thing on your behalf. For example, where you are prohibited from communicating with a person, you must not ask someone else to communicate with that person on your behalf.

DEFINITIONS

In this order:

AFP Superintendent means a member of the Australian Federal Police performing the duties of a Superintendent with responsibility for National Security Investigation functions and includes any AFP member or special member authorised to perform

duties or functions or otherwise act on behalf of a Superintendent with responsibility for National Security Investigation functions in connection with this control order.

close family member means:

a.    the persons listed in (a) to (h) of the definition of “close family member” in s 102.1(1) of the Criminal Code; and

b.    the person’s mother-in-law, father-in-law, sister-in-law and brother-in-law

documents and other media means any hardcopy or electronic record of information and includes, but is not limited to, video and audio recordings, pictures, computer games, online articles and social media ‘posts’. Sharing documents and other media includes, but is not limited to, sharing an electronic link to that material.

police officer means:

a.    a ‘member’ or ‘special member’ of the Australian Federal Police, as defined by the Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth); or

b.    a ‘police officer’ as defined in the Police Act 1990 (NSW).

password includes but is not limited to any passcode, swipe pattern or any information or function necessary to facilitate access to a device or account.

phone means a phone of any kind, including but not limited to a mobile phone, Voice Over Internet Protocol (VoIP) phone, landline phone, satellite phone or public payphone.

prohibited symbol has the same meaning as in s 80.2E(1) of the Criminal Code.

reasonable direction means a direction that the AFP Superintendent giving the direction is satisfied is reasonable in all the circumstances to give effect to:

a.    the condition; or

b.    the object of Division 104 of the Criminal Code.

terrorist organisation has the same meaning as in s 102.1 of the Criminal Code.

violent extremist material has the same meaning as in s 474.45A of the Criminal Code.

CONFIDENTIAL ANNEXURE B

1.    For the purpose of Condition 1.5 of the confirmed Control Order, the following addresses are specified:

(a)    [REDACTED];

(b)    [REDACTED]; and

(c)    [REDACTED].

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BROMWICH J:

1    On 23 March 2026, Burley J made an interim control order (ICO) against the respondent, Mr Haisem Zahab, under s 104.4 of the Criminal Code (Cth), within Ch 5, Pt 5.3, Div 104 and published reasons: Staunton v Zahab [2026] FCA 308 (Staunton v Zahab ICO). The Criminal Code is in the Schedule to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (Criminal Code). The regime in Div 104 provides that where an ICO is made, a senior AFP member may either elect to confirm the control order, in which case the court must adjudicate whether that confirmation should take place, or elect not to confirm the control order, in which case the control order lapses.

2    The applicant, Detective Superintendent Jeremy Staunton (DS Staunton), applies in his capacity as a senior member of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) for an order that the ICO made against Mr Zahab be confirmed. The basis for seeking confirmation is that DS Staunton considers there is a real risk that, in the absence of a control order, Mr Zahab could engage in conduct that constitutes a terrorist act or conduct that supports or facilitates a terrorist act or conduct supportive or facilitative of engagement in a hostile activity in a foreign country. The conditions of the ICO which DS Staunton seeks to have confirmed are summarised in the course of my reasons at [97]ff below.

3    Mr Zahab opposes the confirmation of the ICO on the basis that the risk posed by him is remote, because, since sentencing, he has taken significant steps to disengage from violent extremism and extremist ideology, and several protective factors are in place to mitigate against the risk factors identified by the DS Staunton.

4    On 2 June 2026, DS Staunton elected to confirm the ICO. On 2 July 2026, the confirmation application was heard. I reserved my decision, but a week later on 9 July 2026, I made orders varying the conditions in the ICO, which was intended to make ‘interim’ variations to the conditions imposed on Mr Zahab until the confirmation application was determined. As outlined in more detail from [97] below, by those orders, the electronic monitoring condition (Condition 4) was removed and the following conditions were varied in relation to:

(a)    absences from regular premises: Condition 1;

(b)    information sharing: Condition 6;

(c)    communication restrictions: Condition 7;

(d)    employment: Condition 8; and

(e)    prohibited items: Condition 10.

5    Mr Zahab has been subject to the ICO as varied since the confirmation hearing on 2 July 2026. Most importantly, he has not been required to wear the electronic monitoring device since 9 July 2026. For the purposes of this confirmation decision, the conditions of the ICO are addressed as though the variations made pursuant to the orders on 9 July 2026 had not been made.

6    On 14 August 2026, I heard the parties on an application for suppression orders and published my reasons (revised from ex tempore) on 20 August 2026: Staunton v Zahab (No 2) [2026] FCA 1173.

7    The primary question now to be determined is whether I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the conditions in the ICO as originally made are reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted, for one of the purposes in s 104.4(1)(d) of the Criminal Code, so as to justify their confirmation. For the following reasons, the ICO should be confirmed, subject to variations which are set out and considered below at [95]ff. The net effect of this decision is that the ICO as varied by orders made on 9 July 2026 is confirmed, and therefore the conditions will stay the same as they have been since 9 July 2026 until the expiry of the confirmed control order at midnight on 22 March 2027.

Background

8    On 27 May 2019, Mr Zahab pleaded guilty to the following charges:

Count 1: between on or around 1 December 2014 and on or around 28 February 2017, at Young in the state of New South Wales, Mr Zahab did, contrary to section 102.7(1) of the Criminal Code, intentionally provide support or resources to a terrorist organisation, namely Islamic State, that would help the organisation engage, directly or indirectly, in preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act, knowing that the organisation was a terrorist organisation.

Count 2: Between about 28 February 2017 and 1 March 2017, at Young in the State of New South Wales, Mr Zahab did, contrary to section 3LA(5) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), fail to comply with an order under section 3LA(2) of the Crimes Act.

9    Count 1 is ‘an offence relating to a terrorist organisation’ for the purpose of s 104.4(1)(c)(iv) of the Criminal Code, because it is an offence against s 102.7(1) of the Criminal Code. Mr Zahab does not contest Count 1 being an offence relating to terrorism. This satisfies one of the criteria for the making of an ICO, and thus for confirming it: see s 104.4(1)(c)(iv).

10    On 7 June 2019, Mr Zahab was sentenced to imprisonment for a period of nine years in respect of Count 1, with a non-parole period of six years and nine months. He was not granted parole. The head sentence, which was backdated to 28 March 2017, expired on 27 March 2026. The ICO application was made, and the ICO granted, on 23 March 2026, just before his release from prison on 27 March 2026. It follows that Mr Zahab has been in the community and subject to the ICO, as originally made and later as varied, since his release from prison.

11    The conduct and behaviour constituting the offending is summarised in more detail by Burley J in Staunton v Zahab ICO. For the purpose of these reasons, that conduct and behaviour can be briefly summarised as follows:

(a)    Between around July 2014 and December 2014, Mr Zahab used electronic devices to share ideological support for Islamic State, generated pro-Islamic State and anti-Western content, and established and engaged with an online network of persons sharing in these views.

(b)    Commencing around November 2014, and then from December 2014 to around June 2015, Mr Zahab began online research on the following subjects: laser guided weapons; laser target designation; use of computer-aided drawing packages for activities relevant to laser warning receivers; and development of mechanical design and fabrication of laser warning receiver using 3D printing technology. A laser warning receiver is an electronic device which provides advanced warning of laser guided munitions. In relation to these research activities, Mr Zahab then created a 288-page document which referenced Islamic State and contained enough information for a person with a reasonable technical background to be able to repeat the work.

(c)    Between June 2015 and February 2016, Mr Zahab engaged in activities which included research into performance and manufacture of rocket propellant; conducting flights of hobby rockets for proof of concept of computer software used to design and simulate rockets; designing unguided rockets including a six-metre-long rocket; and researching and developing guidance for rockets using GPS. He generated a number of written reports and a video regarding this research which included references to Islamic State, extremist ideology and anti-Western sentiment.

(d)    Between June 2015 and April 2016, Mr Zahab made considerable efforts to conceal his activities including by using multiple operating systems and encrypted devices to save, access and communicate information securely. On 13 November 2016, after being informed that a search warrant had been conducted at his sister’s premises, Mr Zahab deleted several emails and images.

(e)    On 16 April 2016 and 28 February 2017, search warrants were conducted at Mr Zahab’s home address and various items were seized which included the following (across both searches): two laser modules, a laser diode, air rifle and pellets, 3D printed components for laser warning devices, a 2.5 kg bag of potassium nitrate, two containers of material used for making electronic circuitry, and several drones, hobby rockets, hobby rocket engines and other hobby rocket material. Mr Zahab was arrested during the search conducted on 28 February 2017 and required to provide assistance by providing passwords for various encrypted USB sticks and files pursuant to s 3LA of the Crimes Act. Mr Zahab said he could not remember the passwords, and he was charged with an offence, this being the conduct comprising Count 2.

12    In Staunton v Zahab ICO, Burley J made the following observations in relation to sentencing:

[37]    As summarised in document 4 at [75], the sentencing judge found that:

a.    The offending in count 1 was very serious, as it involved a high degree of planning, sophistication and analysis over a long period of time. Mr Zahab earnestly engaged in intricate and planned scientific research, with an unwavering focus, and at all times intent upon assisting Islamic state in its involvement in armed and violent hostilities overseas. The results of Mr Zahab’s research were substantial and tangible. It was significant that Mr Zahab engaged in subterfuge in an attempt to ensure that this offending was not discovered; and

b.    The offending in count 2 was also serious, as Mr Zahab admitted that he knew the passwords, and his failure to comply with the demand frustrated the police investigation for a significant period of time. Mr Zahab’s conduct in refusing to comply with the demand was consistent with a desire to ensure, as far as possible, that the full extent of his offending would not be discovered.

[38]    The sentencing judge did not accept that at the time of the offending in count 1, Mr Zahab held a genuine belief that Islamic State was a force of good rather than a force of evil. He found that Mr Zahab had become aware of atrocities committed by Islamic State and his level of dedication to that organisation saw him choose to ignore what had come to his attention. He found that the evidence was “reflective of a person who holds radical and extremist views”. The sentencing judge noted evidence given by Mr Ahmed Kilani, a Muslim Prison Chaplin, that in April 2019 Mr Zahab denounced his views of Islamic State. However, the sentencing judge expressed scepticism as to the genuineness of Mr Zahab’s expressions of contrition and was guarded about his prospects of rehabilitation based on a renunciation of his views.

13    On 26 March 2026, AFP members attended Wellington Correctional Centre and served the ICO on the Mr Zahab. On 27 March 2026, being the day of Mr Zahab’s release from prison, AFP Members attended Wellington Correctional Centre and fitted Mr Zahab with an electronic monitoring device in accordance with Condition 4 of the ICO.

Mr Zahab’s behaviour and rehabilitation since sentencing

14    Mr Zahab’s conduct and rehabilitation since sentencing, particularly as it relates to disengagement from his previously held extremist views, is a key component of the case advanced on his behalf. It is important to note at the outset, and as addressed in more detail below, that these submissions, made by counsel on his behalf, were not supported by any evidence adduced from Mr Zahab at the confirmation hearing. I therefore did not have the benefit of any positive views I might have formed had he been in the witness box. Nor were the factual assertions, especially those made on an inferential basis, able to be tested.

15    Mr Zahab says, through his counsel rather than from the witness box, including by reference to documentary records in evidence, that since sentencing and during his incarceration, he has disavowed Islamic State and taken active steps to disengage from the extremist ideology that led to the offending. Mr Zahab points to the material before the Court in support of his assertion, which includes prison case notes and records of interactions with prison officials, in which he has consistently and expressly disavowed Islamic State. Mr Zahab says that this stance caused him to be subject to verbal abuse from other inmates, which he says was as a result of his reduced religious practices and unsympathetic attitude towards the common Islamic belief within the prison.

16    Mr Zahab says that his disavowal and disengagement is supported by prison records, and there is no evidence that demonstrates that he continues to hold ideologically extreme beliefs. He says this is significant when regard is had to ongoing monitoring, including surveillance and interception of his phone calls and letters, and, since being subject to the ICO, surveillance of his online activities.

17    Mr Zahab has participated in a number of relevant programs during incarceration, which include the following:

(a)    Corrective Services New South Wales’s (CSNSW) Countering Violence Extremism service (CVE) since 2021. CVE is a multidisciplinary team comprised of non-custodial and custodial staff which provides services to individuals identified as vulnerable to violent extremism.

(b)    EQUIPS Foundation and EQUIPS Addiction programs, which are general offender programs which aim to reduce reoffending.

(c)    PRISM program which is a voluntary enhanced case management model for persons in custody who are considered at risk or vulnerable to radicalisation or violent extremism.

(d)    PRAXIS program, which is aimed at diverting persons being considered for terrorism related post-sentence order schemes.

18    Mr Zahab was recently diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), which he has acknowledged. He has expressed openness to exploring his diagnosis and seeking treatment. This is supported by the expert report prepared by Dr Katie Seidler dated 16 June 2026 in evidence before me. A CVE Service Summary report prepared in June 2025 stated that Mr Zahab had attended 21 sessions with CVE support staff during his incarceration, which included psychology.

Mr Zahab’s current circumstances

19    Mr Zahab submits that there are significant protective factors which will support him not to re-engage with extremist ideology should the ICO not be confirmed:

(a)    During the offending, Mr Zahab says there were several factors which were relevant to, or contributed to, his engagement with extremist ideology, including that he was socially isolated and anti-social, including that at times he refused to engage in activities with family or friends. Mr Zahab apparently had disrupted sleep patterns, did not exercise, and was under marital stress at the time of the offending.

(b)    Mr Zahab has a strong family network who are committed to supporting him. There is no evidence that Mr Zahab’s family is sympathetic towards extremist ideology, and four of his immediate family members have voluntarily completed an online deradicalisation program to equip them with the skills to identify signs of reengagement with extremism. Mr Zahab has increased efforts to socialise with his family and participate in activities.

(c)    Mr Zahab’s family are aware of his ASD diagnosis. Mr Zahab has acknowledged his ASD and can recognise his autistic traits, which is apparently a significant change from his previously held attitudes towards mental health and neurodivergence.

(d)    Mr Zahab takes ongoing steps towards employment, despite feeling that he cannot work while subject to the conditions of the ICO. Mr Zahab has taken steps to renew his electrical licence. He plans to undertake a solar PV and Battery course which would allow him to work installing solar panels and batteries. He continues to engage with the Engagement and Support Program.

(e)    Mr Zahab has complied with the terms of the ICO, including by taking proactive steps to ensure correct compliance by checking with AFP officers when he considered himself to be possibly breaching the conditions or at risk of breaching the conditions. Mr Zahab’s compliance with the ICO is supported by DS Staunton’s affidavit sworn on 2 June 2026, which indicates Mr Zahab has no incidents of breaching the conditions.

Reasons for confirming the ICO

20    In his affidavit filed on 2 June 2026, DS Staunton explained his reasons for electing to confirm the ICO and provided a history of Mr Zahab’s engagement with the AFP since being subject to the ICO. In his affidavit, DS Staunton says the following about Mr Zahab’s compliance with and behaviour since being subject to the ICO:

(a)    The AFP have established a good rapport with Mr Zahab, having regard to the frequency and nature of the communications between them.

(b)    The AFP have not issued any cautions or formal warnings to Mr Zahab for contraventions of the ICO, and Mr Zahab is progressing appropriately with the monitoring framework imposed under the ICO.

(c)    AFP members have observed Mr Zahab to be ‘earnest’ in his willingness to adhere to the ICO, including on one occasion by voluntarily showing AFP members his online search history.

(d)    Since his release from custody, Mr Zahab has demonstrated efforts to reintegrate into Australian society and engaged with appropriate service providers including practitioners from NSW Engagement and Support Program (ESP) and mental health practitioners.

(e)    AFP members have observed Mr Zahab to have strong relationships with his family and to spend time working on his farm, but the AFP’s monitoring has identified that he has had relatively limited engagement with the wider community and remains relatively socially isolated. Mr Zahab has been observed to frequent his home, local shops and banks, and attend the local Mosque.

21    DS Staunton says that while Mr Zahab’s conduct under the ICO was ‘positive’, he nevertheless decided to elect to confirm it for the following reasons (in summary):

(a)    Mr Zahab has only been subject to the ICO for a short time, less than 3 months when the election to confirm the ICO was made. Therefore, insufficient time has passed to determine that his risk has reduced to a level that no longer requires the conditions.

(b)    While the AFP have not identified any breaches of the ICO, Mr Zahab is still in the progress of reintegrating into the community and circumstances have not yet arisen to see how Mr Zahab will respond where his compliance may be at risk.

(c)    Mr Zahab has had limited engagement with the wider community and continues to be relatively socially isolated. Mr Zahab has not yet gained employment.

(d)    Mr Zahab remains under the same contributing factors or stressors that he experienced at the time of the offending including social isolation in a regional community, financial stress, and unemployment.

(e)    Mr Zahab has shown positive steps to engage with psychological support, but it is too early to assess the effect of the support.

(f)    Mr Zahab continues to remain interested in technology, and the ICO is considered necessary to control and monitor his access to technology in the circumstances of the offending.

(g)    The ICO is required to ensure Mr Zahab remains compliant with non-association conditions and so the AFP can prevent contact with persons identified to be a security concern.

The legislative regime for control orders and relevant principles

22    Subdivision D of the Criminal Code sets out the provisions which relate to confirmation of an ICO. Section 104.14 of the Criminal Code deals with the Court’s power to confirm an ICO, and, pursuant to s 104.14(1A), applies where:

(a)    an interim control order is made in relation to a person; and

(b)    an election is made under s 104.12A to confirm the order; and

(c)    the issuing court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that s 104.12 and s 104.12A(2) have been complied with in relation to the order.

23    Section 104.12 deals with the service, explanation and notice requirements once an ICO is made in relation to a person. Section 104.12A(2) requires that where a senior AFP member elects to confirm the order, an AFP member must serve personally on the person the subject of the order a copy of the notification and other documents mentioned in ss 104.2(3)(aa) and 104.3(d).

24    When a relevant person elects to confirm an ICO as DS Staunton has done, the Court may, pursuant to s 104.14(7):

(a)    revoke the order if, at the time of confirming the order, the Court is not satisfied on the balance of probabilities as to the criteria listed in s 104.4(1)(c); or

(b)    confirm and vary the order by removing one or more conditions if, at the time of confirming the order, the Court is satisfied in accordance with s 104.4(1)(c) but is not satisfied on the balance of probabilities as to each control condition, and the combined effect of all the control conditions, is reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted in for the purposes of any of the protection or prevention criteria listed in s 104.4(1)(d); or

(c)    confirm the order without variation if, at the time of confirming the order, the Court is satisfied as to the criteria listed in both s 104.4(1)(c) and (d).

25    The following conditions that apply to making an ICO also apply in relation to the decision to confirm the ICO under s 104.14(7):

104.4  Making an interim control order

…

(c)    the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities:

(i)    that making the order would substantially assist in preventing a terrorist act; or

(ii)    that the person has provided training to, received training from or participated in training with a listed terrorist organisation; or

(iii)    that the person has engaged in a hostile activity in a foreign country; or

(iv)    that the person has been convicted in Australia of an offence relating to terrorism, a terrorist organisation (within the meaning of subsection 102.1(1)) or a terrorist act (within the meaning of section 100.1); or

(v)    that the person has been convicted in a foreign country of an offence that is constituted by conduct that, if engaged in in Australia, would constitute a terrorism offence (within the meaning of subsection 3(1) of the Crimes Act 1914); or

(vi)    that making the order would substantially assist in preventing the provision of support for or the facilitation of a terrorist act; or

(vii)    that the person has provided support for or otherwise facilitated the engagement in a hostile activity in a foreign country; and

(d)    the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that:

(i)    each of the conditions; and

(ii)    the combined effect of all of the conditions;

to be imposed on the person by the order in accordance with section 104.5A is reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted, for the purpose of:

(iii)    protecting the public from a terrorist act; or

(iv)    preventing the provision of support for or the facilitation of a terrorist act; or

(v)    preventing the provision of support for or the facilitation of the engagement in a hostile activity in a foreign country.

26    For the purposes of determining whether s 104.4(1)(d) is met, the objects of Div 104 are the paramount consideration, and an additional consideration is the impact of each of the proposed conditions and the combined effect of the conditions on the person’s circumstances: s 104.4(2).

27    The objects of Division 104 are provided at s 104.1:

104.1 Objects of this Division

The objects of this Division are to allow conditions to be imposed on a person by a control order for one or more of the following purposes:

(a)    protecting the public from a terrorist act;

(b)    preventing the provision of support for or the facilitation of a terrorist act;

(c)    preventing the provision of support for or the facilitation of the engagement in a hostile activity in a foreign country.

28    The criteria in s 104.14(1)(c) and (d) have changed in a sufficiently significant way that there is no longer any utility in having regard to what was said in some detail about the now superseded terms considered in Thomas v Mowbray [2007] HCA 33; 233 CLR 307 at [480] (Hayne J), though the discussion beyond those specific provisions remains relevant to the Court’s consideration of what is involved in the application of those and other provisions.

29    Pursuant to s 104.14(3)(a), the Court must take into consideration the terms of the ICO which has been made and elected to be confirmed, the subject of the proceeding. Pursuant to s 104.14(3A), the Court may only act on the evidence adduced for the purposes of, and the submissions made at the hearing of, the confirmation application. As expressly stated, both s 104.4(1)(c) and (d) operate on the balance of probabilities, being the civil standard of proof.

30    The exercise involved in s 104.4(1)(d) remains one involving proportionality, as explained by Gleeson CJ in Thomas v Mowbray (at [19]):

The requirement that a Court consider whether each of the obligations imposed by a control order is both reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted, for the purpose of protecting the public was the subject of debate. A requirement of that kind would sometimes be described as a requirement of proportionality. Judgments about proportionality often require courts to evaluate considerations that are at least as imprecise as those involved in formulating a control order.

31    Also in Thomas v Mowbray, Gummow and Crennan JJ considered that s 104.4(1)(d) involves a balancing exercise (at [99]):

Section 104.4(1) requires in para (d) that each of these be measured against what is “reasonably necessary” and also against what is “reasonably appropriate and adapted” for attainment of the purpose of public protection from a terrorist act. This is weighed with the impact upon the circumstances of the person in question as a “balancing exercise” (s 104.4(2)).

32    The purpose of proceedings and orders under Div 104 of the Criminal Code is not punitive, but protective. The task of the Court is not to determine whether the respondent to the ICO should be punished or further punished, but rather whether restrictions should be placed on that person, and what those restrictions should be: Jabbour v Hicks [2008] FMCA 178 (Donald FM) at [8]; McCartney v EB [2019] FCA 183; 263 FCR 170 (Wigney J) at [18]. As observed by Donald FM in Jabbour at [8], “the matters are to be considered on what could be described as a prospective basis – what is to occur in the future so that the public is protected from a terrorist act”.

CONFIRMATION APPLICATION

Evidence before the Court

33    DS Staunton relies on the following evidence:

    his affidavit sworn 27 February 2026;

    his further confidential affidavit also sworn 27 February 2026 (handed up at the hearing, considered, and returned);

    affidavit of Anthony Allan O’Meara affirmed 6 May 2026;

    his further affidavit sworn 2 June 2026;

    affidavit of Keiran Prakash Mirchandani affirmed 2 June 2026;

    affidavit of Brian Russell Coe affirmed 2 June 2026;

    affidavit of David John Ringrose sworn 2 June 2026;

    affidavit of Samuel Adam Vesper affirmed 24 June 2026; and

    affidavit of Catherine Rose Ellis affirmed 24 June 2026.

34    Mr Zahab relies on the following evidence:

    affidavit of Sarah Elizabeth Hedberg, one of his solicitors, affirmed 17 June 2026;

    affidavit of Joseph Harding, another of his solicitors, affirmed 18 June 2026; and

    affidavit of Mervat Chehaita, his wife, sworn 26 June 2026.

35    A number of documents were annexed or exhibited to the affidavits relied upon by the parties. It is not necessary to set out the contents of those documents in any detail. I have made reference to some individual documents, records, and material as relevant to the arguments advanced and considered in these reasons.

36    The AFP prepared statements of facts as to why the ICO should or should not be made (SOF-For and SOF-Against), for the hearing before Burley J on 11 March 2026. An aide memoire was prepared for the confirmation hearing, which left intact undisputed facts and indicated Mr Zahab’s objections to assertions made in the SOF-For. Despite s 104.14(3) and (3A), which require the Court only have regard to the evidence and submissions advanced for the purpose of the confirmation hearing, the evidence relied upon by DS Staunton for the original interim request was before the Court on this occasion too, so did form part of the evidence at the confirmation hearing.

Report of Dr Katie Seidler prepared 16 June 2026

37    On 13 and 27 May 2026, Mr Zahab participated in psychological assessment by Dr Katie Seidler for the purpose of preparing a report. Dr Seidler is a Clinical and Forensic Psychologist, and her qualifications include a Graduate Certificate in Terrorism and Security Studies. The assessment included two virtual interviews with Mr Zahab, and psychometric testing independently completed by Mr Zahab. The report was annexed to the affidavit of Ms Hedberg affirmed 17 June 2026 and before the Court. I have had regard to the entirety of Dr Seidler’s report and summarise key components relevant for the purpose of these reasons below.

38    Dr Seidler concurs with Mr Zahab’s diagnosis of ASD. Dr Seidler opines that Mr Zahab’s functioning has been impaired as a result of this condition, but that the diagnosis “seems to have given Mr Zahab, and his wife, a great deal of understanding, such that they both are now better able to cope with the challenges that this condition creates for Mr Zahab”: Dr Seidler’s report [166].

39    In relation to the context of the offending, Dr Seidler states as follows:

[167]    Within the context of undiagnosed ASD, coupled with the psychosocial challenges of being unemployed and having an unstructured routine, Mr. Zahab drifted into online activities in the period leading up to his offending. This also happened to coincide with a significant time in world history that had serious implications for Muslims around the world and which coloured much of the online content available at the time. Mr. Zahab spent excessive periods of time online consuming social media about these events and he developed an obsessional interest in this, commensurate with his ASD symptomatology. Moreover, and again consistent with ASD, Mr. Zahab did not critically evaluate what he consumed and rather, accepted the propaganda, missing the complex human nuances that would have allowed him to have a more sophisticated appreciation of what he was reading.

[168]    Mr. Zahab described how in the period leading up to his offending, his thinking became distorted and he developed what he experienced as an addiction to online content reflecting increasingly extremist ideological content and this clearly had a devastating impact on his own thought processes. It is within this context that Mr. Zahab offended. Mr. Zahab openly recognises that he was supportive of Islamic State and their activities in Syria, although he believes he was misinformed and ultimately ‘duped’ in this. However, Mr. Zahab is adamant that he never pledged allegiance to IS nor was he ever supportive of violence, especially against civilians. He also denied ever being involved in the planning of a terrorist action, here or overseas.

[169]    To his credit, Mr. Zahab appears to have insight now into the antecedents to his offending behaviour. Moreover, his thinking has changed, as has his pattern of behaviour. These will result in meaningful reductions in his risk and a reorientation towards prosocial activity and community engagement.

40    Dr Seidler refers to several risk assessment tools relevant to the area of violent extremism and applies those in her assessment of Mr Zahab. Dr Seidler firstly applies the Violent Extremism Risk Assessment tool (version 2 Revised: VERA-2R) which she says is a widely used measure for the assessment of risk in relation to extremist violence, designed to evaluate an individual’s risk for future violence/offending motivated by extremist ideology. Dr Seidler notes existing criticisms and deficiencies of using this tool, including that it has “been criticised on a number of grounds including on the basis of the suggestion that it is tautological at best and irrelevant at worst”. In applying the VERA-2R, Dr Seidler reflects on the following categories: beliefs, attitudes and ideology; social context and intention; history, action, and capacity; commitment and motivation; and risk mitigating indicators:

[183]    Beliefs, Attitudes and Ideology – This is an area in which there has been evidence of significant shift since the time of Mr. Zahab’s offending. Mr. Zahab was an obsessive consumer of online content previously that distorted his thinking, such that he was supportive of Islamic State, and personalised a sense of grievance on behalf of the Syrian people, based on what he understood was happening overseas. However, Mr. Zahab denied ever being supportive of violence. The grievance and ideology that motivated Mr. Zahab’s offending has since shifted and this was also supported by change in the international landscape. Further to this, there is no evidence that Mr. Zahab ever rejected democratic ideals, his Australian identity or others outside of his perceived “ingroup”. In sum, whilst there was a moderate loading on factors in this domain leading up to and during Mr. Zahab’s offending, there is no evidence for such risks currently.

[184]    Social Context and Intention – The only risk in this domain that remains evident for Mr. Zahab is with respect to him being vulnerable to influence within the context of his ASD symptomatology and tendency to rigid, concrete thinking. However, Mr. Zahab has some insight into this and has an active approach to managing this vulnerability. Further to this, it is noted that accessing online content was the primary driver of Mr. Zahab’s change in ideology contributing to his offending behaviour. He does not have access to such content now, nor has he in about a decade given his incarceration. Mr. Zahab does not express any interest in consuming such content now. Further to this, in this domain, it is noted that there is no evidence that Mr. Zahab was ever involved in planning a violent attack or identifying a target for the same. He did however, have contact online with someone who was subsequently charged with terrorism offences in the UK. To my knowledge, Mr. Zahab has never had any other connection with individuals involved in violent extremism/terrorism.

[185]    History, Action and Capacity – The primary drivers of risk in this domain at the time of Mr. Zahab’s offending were the “training” he was indirectly exposed to through consuming extremist social media content in the period leading up to and during his offending, in addition to his online connection with a radicalised individual, who was later charged with offences overseas. Such risks are not present currently, nor is Mr. Zahab seemingly connected to a network of extremists, or had relevant paramilitary training. It is also noted that Mr. Zahab does not have a history of violence, criminal or otherwise. However, Mr. Zahab’s ASD may make him vulnerable to obsessional or fixated interests in pursuing support for an extremist cause, should he become so inclined, although he does not have the interpersonal skills or motivation to actualise this in “real life”.

[186]    Commitment and Motivation – In understanding the motivations in Mr. Zahab’s offending, the strongest contributor is suggested to be a moral obligation on behalf of the internalised grievance Mr. Zahab held in relation to the Syrian people. However, I am also of the view that Mr. Zahab was motivated by the intellectual challenge of creating something he considered would be difficult to achieve, although useful to the Islamic State resistance movement, as he understood it. There is no evidence of current motivations relevant to violent extremism for Mr. Zahab.

[187]    Protective Factors – Mr. Zahab presented with high loading on all the protective factors listed in this section. Specifically, he is surrounded by prosocial others, with a number of significant personal supports being active in his goal of relapse prevention. Further to this, Mr. Zahab denied ever being supportive of violence as a means of achieving sociopolitical ends. Further to this, and importantly, there has been an apparent shift in ideology since the time of his offending, which has also included abandoning the concept of the previous Assad regime as an enemy and Islamic State as heroes to be idealised.

41    Dr Seidler also relies upon the Terrorist Radicalisation Assessment Protocol (TRAP-18) in preparation of the Expert Report, which is a risk assessment heuristic that is designed to assist in considering the risk an individual poses for lone actor, or individual, terrorist violence. Dr Seidler opines, in the context of TRAP-18 (at [191]):

There is no evidence for any of the proximal warning behaviours related to risk of an attack now for Mr. Zahab, although I note that some were present in the period leading up to his offending. With respect to the distal characteristics identified on the TRAP-18, the only factor that continues to be present is Mr. Zahab’s ASD, which is understood to have contributed directly to his offending context. Although there is evidence for some of these factors in the period leading up to and during Mr. Zahab’s offending, they are not considered relevant or evident now.

42    Taking together the findings of the VERA-2R and TRAP-18, Dr Seidler opines:

[192]    Summary - Overall, taking into consideration the findings of the VERA-2R and the TRAP-18, there is no evidence for salient, current or influential risks for violent extremism being present for Mr. Zahab at the present time. In addition, he presents with a number of important protective factors that can mitigate against the influence of risk. This suggests that Mr. Zahab’s risk is now well mitigated and that there is limited evidence for ongoing concern that should require external control, monitoring or management. Mr. Zahab’s ASD remains present naturally but he presents with much greater insight into the manner in which this condition impacts on him. As a result, Mr. Zahab reported an ongoing and active commitment to utilising strategies that may mitigate this risk, including limiting and structuring his time online, engaging in critical evaluation and analysis and working on establishing his “real life” connections with prosocial members of the community.

[193]    The aforementioned analysis also demonstrates that there have been significant shifts in the factors that are understood to have contributed to Mr. Zahab’s offending in the period of the last ten years. Of course incarceration has naturally provided some interruption in this, as have international changes that have all but seen the dissolution of Islamic State as a source of power and influence and the dismantling of the Assad regime. Further to this, Mr. Zahab’s lifestyle and behaviour have changed and he has put in place strategies to make changes to the other areas of risk that contributed to his offending behaviour at that time.

[194]    It is further noted that there is no evidence that Mr. Zahab was ever directly interested or involved in planning a terrorist act or engaging in any act of violence here or internationally. In sum, there is no convincing evidence that Mr. Zahab now poses any substantial risk in relation to future violent extremism or that there are any significant risks that require ongoing external controls. As such, it is argued that his risk is well managed and that there is no need for additional measures to protect the public from Mr. Zahab committing a terrorist act, from supporting or facilitating a terrorist act or from supporting or facilitating engaging in hostile activity overseas, either by Mr. Zahab or an associate of his.

43    In relation to the impact of the ICO on Mr Zahab, Dr Seidler opines that the conditions are “not especially” difficult for him to comply with, noting that he “is likely to do well with rules and structure and the ICO will provide this”: [195].

44    In relation to whether the conditions of the ICO are counter-productive to Mr Zahab’s rehabilitation, Dr Seidler observes at [195]:

The conditions of the ICO are not considered counter-productive to Mr. Zahab’s rehabilitation. However, it is noted that the Order is not indicated on the basis of the risk assessment in this case. Notwithstanding, should the Court impose such an Order on Mr. Zahab, it is noted that the conditions of the ICO hold Mr. Zahab accountable and make his activities transparent. They also limit his ability to engage with activities, peoples, groups or behaviours that may increase his risk or expose him to radicalising influences. However, other than encouraging and supporting his engagement in mental health treatment, it is noted that the conditions do not support Mr. Zahab’s rehabilitation directly either.

CONSIDERATION

Pre-requisite and procedural conditions

45    Subdivision D sets out the requirements for confirming an ICO under s 104.14. I am satisfied, on the affidavit evidence before the Court, as required by s 104.14(1A), that:

(a)    an ICO has been made in relation to Mr Zahab;

(b)    an election to confirm the ICO has been made;

(c)    on the balance of probabilities, the requirements of s 104.12(1) of the Criminal Code have been met, in that:

(i)    the ICO was personally served on Mr Zahab by a member of the AFP, as required by s 104.12(1)(a);

(ii)    an explanation was given to Mr Zahab as to the effect of the ICO and related information has been provided (which was furnished in writing and read out), as required by s 104.12(1)(b); and

(iii)    reasonable steps were taken at the time of service to ensure that Mr Zahab understood that information, as required by s 104.12(1)(c);

(d)    a relevant person has elected to confirm the ICO and has given written notification to this Court of that election, and that the same member of the AFP has personally served upon Mr Zahab a copy of that election notification and related documents in accordance with s 104.12A(2)(a)(ii) and (iii); and

(e)    Mr Zahab has been convicted of a “relevant offence”, as required by s 104.4(1)(c) for an ICO and thus to confirm that ICO (as varied) by reliance on s 104.4(1)(c)(iv), namely that “that the person has been convicted in Australia of an offence relating to terrorism, a terrorist organisation (within the meaning of subsection 102.1(1)) or a terrorist act (within the meaning of section 100.1)”, noting that it is not contested by Mr Zahab that an offence contrary to s 102.7 of the Criminal Code, of which he has been convicted, constitutes a conviction for an offence related to a terrorist organisation for the purpose of s 104.4(1)(c)(iv).

46    In compliance with s 104.14(3A), I have taken judicial notice that the original request for the ICO was made in particular terms, and acted only on the evidence and submissions advanced in relation to the confirmation of the ICO.

47    Given that s 104.4(1)(c) is satisfied, the primary issue that remains to be determined under s 104.14(7) therefore is whether the Court can be satisfied that the necessary conditions under s 104.4(1)(d) have been met, to which I now turn.

Section 104.4(1)(d) – whether or not the Court is satisfied that each of the conditions of the ICO, and the combined effect of all of those conditions, are reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted for one or more of the purposes in (iii), (iv) or (v)

48    The Court must be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that that each of the conditions of the ICO, and the combined effect of all of those conditions, are reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted for one or more of the purposes in s 104.4(1)(d)(iii), (iv) or (v). For the reasons set out below, I am satisfied they do apply.

Overview of arguments made by the parties

49    DS Staunton contends that the ICO should be confirmed, and that the Court can be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the conditions to be imposed on Mr Zahab are reasonably necessary and reasonably appropriate and adapted for the purposes identified by s 104.4(1)(d). As part of his material, DS Staunton filed a ‘Summary of Grounds on which the Order should be made’, which he relies upon to support the argument advanced for confirming the ICO, and which provides the factual basis upon which this argument is made. The Summary of Grounds is a requirement pursuant to s 104.2(3)(c) of the Criminal Code.

50    Some of the reasons relevant to DS Staunton’s decision to elect to confirm the ICO have been set out above at [21]. Having regard to the conditions and combined effect of the conditions of the ICO, DS Staunton says that there remains a real risk that, in the absence of the conditions, Mr Zahab poses a risk of the kind contemplated by s 104.4(1)(d). He says he has also had regard to the terrorism threat environment domestically and internationally, including the current terrorism threat level, his understanding of the Syrian civil war and Islamic State, and recent publications of Islamic State.

51    Mr Zahab contests the confirmation application and submits that the Court should refuse to exercise its discretion to confirm the ICO, or in the alternative, if satisfied that the ICO should be confirmed, that it should be varied and specific conditions be varied or removed. Mr Zahab has identified which conditions are opposed in an annexure to his written submissions dated 29 June 2026, and by way of oral submissions made on his behalf at the confirmation hearing. Some of the changes proposed have already been addressed by the variations already made, but reasons for doing so were still needed. Mr Zahab says that the applicant bears the onus of satisfying the Court that the risk to the community is significant enough to further his liberty under threat of custodial sanction in the event of non-compliance.

Assessment of risk

52    There is no express threshold of risk identified in s 104.4(1). However the existence of some unacceptable level of risk is inherent in the overall requirements of that provision, and the protection and prevention contemplated by s 104.4(1)(d) would not be required if there was no risk that the events mentioned in s 104.4(1)(d)(iii) to (v) would occur: Staunton v MHK [2026] FCA 546 at [24] (Hill J); McCartney v Abdirahman-Khalif (No 2) [2020] FCA 1002 at [209] (Charlesworth J). The Court need not identify what the person will do if the conditions are not imposed in order to determine that there is a real and reasonable risk: Staunton v MHK at [25]; McCartney v Abdirahman-Khalif at [78]. The Court has regard to the chance or likelihood of the risk eventuating, in addition to the nature and extent of the consequences if it does: Staunton v MHK, citing Booth v Abdirahman-Khalif [2021] FCA 1651 at [40] (Besanko J). It will not be enough to point to a merely theoretical possibility, and the level of risk must be sufficient to justify making the order: Staunton v MHK at [25].

53    In determining the level of risk, the Court has considered that what has occurred in the past is likely to be the most reliable guide as to what will happen in the future: McCartney v EB at [18]; Fogarty v Jakovac [2022] FCA 1454 at [21]-[22] (Bromwich J); Taylor v Brookman [2024] FCA 200 at [22]; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo Wei Rong (1987) 191 CLR 559. The level of risk and of apprehended danger to the public will vary according to international or local circumstances: Thomas v Mowbray at [9] (Gleeson CJ). The Court may rely on matters of common knowledge: Taylor v Brookman at [7]; Thomas v Mowbray at [92].

54    DS Staunton submits that notwithstanding Mr Zahab’s time in custody, stated disavowal of Islamic State, and behaviour and actions since sentencing (some of which are detailed above at [20]), there remains a risk that he may engage in conduct constituting a terrorist act, supportive or facilitative of a terrorist act, or supportive or facilitative of engagement in a hostile activity in a foreign country. DS Staunton says the following factors are relevant to that risk:

(a)    Mr Zahab’s previous radicalisation via online platforms on which he accessed and distributed religious extremist material;

(b)    the specialised technical skills and capabilities possessed by Mr Zahab;

(c)    the steps taken by Mr Zahab to provide support to a terrorist organisation (which included sharing of his work with a member of Islamic State, who was part of his online network of Islamic State supporters);

(d)    the sophisticated steps taken by Mr Zahab to conceal his online conduct and communications even after he was aware of the AFP’s investigation; and

(e)    Mr Zahab’s return to the same environment in which he committed his index offending.

55    Those points are developed by DS Staunton in his written submissions, which are convenient to reproduce below (verbatim, footnotes omitted):

(a)    The Respondent has returned to his home where the offending conduct took place. He remains relatively socially isolated in a regional community and has had limited engagement with the wider community.

(b)    Since being released from custody, the Respondent has demonstrated an interest in accessing online platforms and new technologies, including requesting access to YouTube and approval to download artificial intelligence applications. Since his release, and as at the date of the June Affidavit, the Respondent has requested and been approved to download 20 applications onto his AFP phone. Given his previous online activities and its link to his offending it is important for his online access to be controlled and monitored.

(c)    The Respondent attributed his offending to factors including being in a bubble of ISIS supporters on Twitter and sourcing his news from social media. The Respondent has also been diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder, which may give rise to particular vulnerabilities in respect of pursuing support for an extremist cause. While the Respondent has since reflected on the role that social media played in his offending:

(i)    this risk was controlled while the Respondent was in custody and he did not have access to online platforms;

(ii)    the Respondent has not been in the community and monitored under the ICO for enough time to demonstrate that the risk of the Respondent being influenced into extremist thinking and action in the future is sufficiently reduced.

(d)    Since his release from custody, the Respondent has shown positive steps to access mental health support; however, it is too early to assess the effect of this, particularly in light of the Respondent’s [autism] spectrum disorder (ASD). The Respondent intends to have sessions with a psychologist.

(e)    The Respondent is experiencing a range of other stressors on his return to the community, including challenges in opening a bank account and has not yet found employment.

(f)    The Respondent’s capacity to conceal his online conduct and communications means that an escalation in his risk, particularly if it occurs rapidly, could be missed if the control order was not in place.

(g)    The Respondent has technical skills in 3D printing, electronic circuitry and coding, among other capabilities, and has previously demonstrated willingness to transition his research and development into the “real world”, including 3D printing component parts for the laser warning receiver.

(h)    The Respondent has previously demonstrated his willingness to share his technical skills, research and development with like-minded individuals online. There is a potential for this to transition to teaching or influencing others or other real world conduct requiring monitoring in the real world not just online.

(i)    The Respondent was previously influenced by geopolitical events. The security environment into which the Respondent has returned is highly volatile, with significant domestic and international tensions that could similarly influence the Respondent.

56    Several concerns are raised by DS Staunton with respect to the sincerity of Mr Zahab’s engagement with counter-extremist programs. In the Summary of Grounds, it is noted that Mr Zahab’s efforts need be viewed in context (footnotes omitted):

Mr Zahab has participated in rehabilitation and counter-extremism programs in custody, and received positive reports for that participation. However, that fact should be considered in context. During his time in custody, Mr Zahab also demonstrated awareness that reports from custodial programs may impact on the length of his time in custody, and expressed an intention to participate only where it would benefit him positively in that respect. For example, Mr Zahab initially refused to participate in the Proactive Integrated Support Model (PRISM) in part because of his concern that information he disclosed in the program would be misinterpreted and impact negatively on his release. He started participating in May 2024, only after parole was first refused in December 2023, and he was notified that in making that decision the Attorney-General had regard to his decision not to participate in PRISM.

57    In connection to these concerns, the Summary of Grounds outlines concerns about Mr Zahab’s grievances related to his incarceration, and the extent of his insight into the impact of his offending. That description is sufficient to capture the nature of this concern.

58    DS Staunton says that the proposed conditions will support and monitor Mr Zahab’s reintegration into the community, and though there are protective factors in place, the circumstances are such that the proposed controls are necessary to properly protect against the risk of Mr Zahab committing further offences. The Summary of Grounds states that “the proposed ICO conditions are designed both to assist Mr Zahab engage positively with the community on his return, and to allow the AFP to monitor his activities, and especially his online activities, during that period of re-engagement”.

59    Mr Zahab contends that there is compelling evidence to support his claim to have entirely disengaged from extremist ideology, and that he is unlikely to re-engage. Mr Zahab rejects DS Staunton’s contention that without the ICO, he may re-engage with extremist content, be re-radicalised, and if so, pose a risk of the kind contemplated by s 104.4(1)(d).

60    I have had regard to the entirety of the written and oral submissions advanced by or on behalf of Mr Zahab, but draw out the following as key components of his argument as to risk:

(a)    The circumstances and context in which the offending occurred has materially changed in relation to the following:

(i)    The offending occurred in the context of undiagnosed ASD, and Mr Zahab’s neurodivergence and autistic traits are directly relevant to the path that led him to extremist ideology. Mr Zahab’s undiagnosed ASD meant that he was acutely vulnerable to the propaganda he was consuming online, and that he had a tendency to accept what he was told without engaging in critical thought. Mr Zahab and his family are now aware of the diagnosis, which is a significant protective factor.

(ii)    Related to his autistic traits, the offending occurred in the context of an acute political conflict in Syria, where Mr Zahab developed an obsessive interest in the Assad regime in Syria, which is no longer in power.

(b)    Mr Zahab has disavowed Islamic State and proactively disengaged from groups and people associated with extremist ideology. Some of those steps are detailed above at [17]. Mr Zahab submits that the evidence before the Court is consistent with this.

(c)    There is positive evidence that persons in positions of authority have concluded or recorded that Mr Zahab does not subscribe to extremist ideology.

(d)    Mr Zahab has demonstrated significant steps towards rehabilitation, including by way of engagement with extremism disengagement services, and taking proactive steps towards reintegration into the community such as completing various courses and steps towards gaining employment.

(e)    Mr Zahab possesses insight into the offending and the relevance of the ASD diagnosis.

(f)    There are significant protective factors which mitigate the risk of Mr Zahab re-engaging with extremist ideology, which have been set out above at [19].

(g)    In the absence of the control order, Mr Zahab would still be subject to a Weapons Prohibition Order under s 33(1) of the Weapon Prohibition Act 1988 (NSW) and a Firearms Prohibition Order under s 73(1) of the Firearms Act 1996 (NSW). This means that even without the control order, he is subject to police powers which include powers to detain him, search and enter, and search vehicles.

(h)    Since his release, Mr Zahab has complied with the terms of the ICO and the AFP have not uncovered any evidence that he is at risk of reengaging with extremist ideology, or that he has engaged in concerning conduct.

(i)    The expert report prepared by Dr Seidler militates against confirming the ICO. I have summarised the substance of the report above at [37]ff, and considered what can be drawn from it below at [66]ff.

61    It is necessary to consider the degree or extent of the risk, which will partly depend on the nature and circumstances of Mr Zahab’s offending and his conduct, and the extent of demonstrated rehabilitation since conviction: see Booth v Khazal [2020] FCA 1241 at [23] (Wigney J); Staunton v MHK at [43]. The further factor of demeanour identified in those cases is not available because, unlike the respondent in each of those cases, Mr Zahab did not give evidence in this proceeding. Indeed, there is absent the direct evidence that was available in those cases, with him relying on inferences to be drawn from past events, however recent.

62    Having outlined the respective positions and arguments advanced by the parties, I set out below my assessment of key aspects of the evidence before me, the several risk factors addressed by both parties which are particularly relevant, and my ultimate conclusion on risk.

Consideration of the evidence before the Court relevant to risk

Weight of DS Staunton’s opinion

63    DS Staunton’s policing experience and relevant knowledge is set out in his affidavits sworn on 27 February, 9 March, and 2 June 2026. In his first affidavit, DS Staunton says he has been a member of the AFP for 19 years, in which time he has acquired significant knowledge and experience in the investigation of state and commonwealth offending, including terrorism offending. In September 2025, he commenced in a role within the National Security Investigations NSW team (NSI). NSI works with the AFP Counter-Terrorism and Special Investigations command “with the aim to target groups and individuals causing high levels of harm to Australia’s social cohesion”. He has held a range of other roles within the AFP, including those relating to terrorist attacks inspired or encouraged by Islamic State. In May 2026, DS Staunton commenced a new role in Covert and Technical Operations.

64    In his affidavit sworn 27 February 2026, DS Staunton outlines current and historical circumstances which inform his assessment of the level of threat of domestic terrorism in Australia. DS Staunton says that in his opinion, there is a real risk that Mr Zahab will engage in conduct of the kind contemplated by s 104.4(1)(d) in the absence of the conditions imposed by the ICO. In his most recent affidavit sworn on 2 June 2026, DS Staunton opines that his risk assessment and opinion reached in the affidavit sworn 27 February 2026 remains true and correct. Some of the factors the basis for this conclusion are set out at [49]-[50] above.

65    For the purpose of this proceeding, I accept that DS Staunton is well qualified to give the opinions he has given regarding the risk of Mr Zahab engaging in the conduct contemplated by s 104.4(1)(d), based on his experience in policing including experience in matters directly related to terrorism.

Dr Seidler’s report

66    Mr Zahab submits that Dr Seidler’s report should be given significant weight in relation to the assessment of risk. DS Staunton did not object to the admission of Dr Seidler’s report but contended that consideration should be had as to how much weight it can be afforded in the circumstances where Mr Zahab has not filed an affidavit in the proceedings and the statements from him to her upon which she has based her conclusions are untested.

67    Dr Seidler’s report has been summarised above at [37]ff, including the material and assessment methods Dr Seidler has relied upon in reaching the conclusions therein. Dr Seidler was not the subject of any cross-examination at the confirmation hearing, recognising that there would not have been any utility in relation to what he told her: the live issue was not whether he said what she records, but the inability to tests those representations at their source. Little or none of the factual material directly provided to her by Mr Zahab was proven before me except to the extent it was in documentary form, which, insofar as those records record what he said, could not be tested either. The critical factual foundation for the most important parts of the expert opinions expressed has not been established, contrary to what would usually take place.

68    Mr Zahab’s written submissions seek to address this problem by referring to Lloyd v R [2022] NSWCCA 18, in which McCallum JA observed at [46]-[47] in the context of District Court proceedings:

[46]    In cases where a report is not challenged, the correct approach is as stated by Allsop P (with whom Price J agreed at [101]) in Devaney v R [2012] NSWCCA 285 at [88] (cited by Hamill J in Luque v R [2017] NSWCCA 226 at [116] and Fullerton J in Pym v R [2014] NSWCCA 182 at [79] (Hoeben CJ at CL and Price J agreeing at [1] and [2]):

It is one thing to discount admissible statements made to a psychiatrist or psychologist if the offender is not prepared to give evidence to the same effect: Qutami at 377 [58]-[59] and 380 [79] and [83] and Palu at 184-185 [40] and 175 [1] and [2] (although care needs to be taken not effectively to exclude admissible evidence by a process going beyond an assessment of weight); it is quite another to lessen the effect of the opinion of a professional psychiatrist, without cross-examination, when that opinion is based on history. In most cases, a psychiatrist will form a diagnosis from what is said to her or him; that is the very nature of the professional expertise being deployed. Part of the professional skill of the psychiatrist is the assessment of the history – how it accords with hypothesised and formed views of the professional. To say that the applicant was manipulating the psychiatrists is to criticise the professional opinions of the psychiatrists and should be put to them. The sentencing judge should not have diminished the weight of the psychiatrists who came to the view that the applicant had some insight into his condition.”

[47]    I would particularly endorse his Honour’s observation that care needs to be taken not to exclude admissible evidence “by a process going beyond an assessment of weight”. Where the report of a mental health professional is admitted without objection, qualification as to its use or cross-examination of the author, no principle of law requires the sentencing judge to exercise “very considerable caution” before relying on its contents absent evidence from the offender. It is by no means beyond debate that the court is the only forum in which a reliable medical history can be obtained. To sweep aside the considered opinions of medical experts with clinical experience in taking psychosocial histories and assessing their significance is, with respect, a lawyerly arrogance.

69    Part of the fact-finding task embarked upon by the Court requires evaluation and assessment of the evidence that is relied upon to advance the arguments made by either party. That does not equate to blind acceptance (or rejection) of medical expertise. Consideration must be had to the factual substratum for Dr Seidler’s report and opinion, rather than just the opinion itself. As part of the evaluative exercise required by the Court, it is necessary to have regard to the conclusions reached by Dr Seidler, the basis upon which it was reached, the duration and nature of the assessment, and the way the report has been expressed.

70    Dr Seidler’s report and conclusions therein have been reached by way of two virtual interviews and assessments with Dr Zahab, and self-administered testing completed by Mr Zahab. Dr Seidler’s report is based on what she has been told by Mr Zahab. Dr Seidler expressed Mr Zahab’s history in terms of what he has claimed, denied, described, identified, reported, suggested, and told to Dr Seidler during the assessments. I do not take issue with Dr Seidler’s qualifications, nor her relevant expertise, but rather consider that the report can only go so far to reassure me that the material changes asserted by Mr Zahab have occurred, without testing Mr Zahab’s own account and personal history. In the absence of Mr Zahab’s evidence being tested, or perhaps very much as a second-best, a more forensic account of the veracity and sincerity of what she has been told, Dr Seidler’s report does not go much higher than providing a chronological and comprehensive account of what Mr Zahab now says is true.

71    If the conclusions reached in the report are accepted on their face, Dr Seidler’s primary conclusion is that that there is no evidence of salient, current, or influential risks for violent extremism being present for Mr Zahab, and there are a number of protective factors that can mitigate against the influence of risk. This evidence does not adequately grapple with future risk. Dr Seidler does not opine, or apply some measure to assess, the likelihood, or even possibility, of recidivism. The conclusions reached on Mr Zahab’s likelihood of re-engaging in the behaviour that contributed to the offending are limited. Dr Seidler’s report does no more than convey, by untestable hearsay, Mr Zahab’s account as to the current situation, including his state of mind. While the report is certainly a positive piece of evidence for the arguments advanced by Mr Zahab as to his current circumstances (still with the limits of being untested), but it does little to address the future possibility that Mr Zahab will reengage with the type of online content that indoctrinated him and drew him to extremist ideology in the first place. There are limits as to how far this evidence can go without the factual substratum, being what was told to Dr Seidler by Mr Zahab, being established and tested by means of direct evidence.

72    Limiting the weight given to Dr Seidler’s report in these circumstances accords with the first part of the formulation expressed by Allsop P in Devaney v R [2012] NSWCCA 285 at [88], referenced in the Lloyd extract above, namely that admissible statements made to a psychiatrist or psychologist may be discounted if the offender is not prepared to give evidence to the same effect. It certainly does not amount to ‘lawyerly arrogance’ as referred to in Lloyd. These are very practical matters directed to the state of satisfaction able to be reached by reference to essentially unchallenged evidence about what has happened in the past, and essentially unchallengeable current circumstances available to resist the past being a guide, especially as to risk, in the future.

73    I am fortified in my conclusion by a body of authorities in which decision makers have exercised caution of the same nature, and applied limitations to the weight of expert evidence where the person the subject of the evidence has not given evidence: see R v Qatami [2001] NSWCCA 353; 127 A Crim R 269 at [58]-[59]; Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions v Aussie Skips Bin Services Pty Ltd; Aussie Skips Recycling Pty Ltd; Roussakis [2024] FCA 122 at [80]; Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions v Kirby [2025] FCA 757 at [77]. As expressed by Abraham J in Lusty v HJA25 [2025] FCA 1458 at [40] in a contempt of court proceeding, “the weight to be attached to any opinion of an expert must be assessed in the context of the underlying factual foundation.” That is necessarily a reference to the independently proven underlying factual foundation.

74    It follows that, contrary to Mr Zahab’s position, I consider that I must approach Dr Seidler’s expert evidence with some considerable caution, especially when it contains benign assertions made to her by Mr Zahab that have not been supported by direct evidence given to the Court by him.

Direct evidence by Mr Zahab

75    Mr Zahab contends that in the absence of him giving evidence which can be tested, his case is supported by a body of ‘second best’ indirect evidence from other sources, being the body of evidence before the Court which he says demonstrates he has disavowed Islamic State and taken positive steps to rehabilitation. In relation to Mr Zahab choosing not to give evidence in the proceeding, counsel for Mr Zahab drew me to Lloyd, as well as my reasons in Jakovac at [26]. In Jakovac, I observed that the respondent in that proceeding was best placed to demonstrate in a compelling way that his stance causing the offending had changed, whether by the best means of direct evidence from him, the respondent, or the distinctly second best means of indirect evidence from other sources. However, relying on that extract in Jakovac misses the second part of that point, that while the second-best means of indirect evidence will be (at best) a positive indicator, it may ultimately be equivocal or at least uncertain. It also overlooks the fact that while Mr Jakovac did not give evidence at the ICO stage, and the ICO was granted; he did give evidence at the confirmation stage, and the ICO was not confirmed, largely because I was persuaded by the evidence he gave, including in cross-examination.

76    As I expressed similarly in Jakovac and in Nicolson v Naizmand [2022] FCA 1108, Mr Zahab and Mr Zahab alone is best placed to demonstrate his outlook and stance has in fact changed, and if he chooses not to do so, the ordinary inference might well be that there has not been any material change, or at least there remains a live risk that no such material change, or alternatively no safely enduring change, has taken place. I accept that the evidence supports Mr Zahab’s claims to have reformed from the extremist ideology that motivated his offending, but reiterate that the evidence before the Court can only go so far when I have not heard from him.

Other evidence before the Court

77    Aside from Dr Seidler’s report, Mr Zahab relies upon the body of documentary evidence before the Court, which consistently represents that Mr Zahab has reported a disavowal of Islamic State and disengagement from related groups and activities. Like Dr Seidler’s report though, that evidence is predominantly based on what Mr Zahab has told others. Some evidence offers insight by external parties such as relevant prison services and officials. But there is limited evidence that grapples with the risk that Mr Zahab might retreat into the same behaviour which contributed to his offending. This is important where the risk is formed by the possibility that Mr Zahab’s relevant behaviours will reoccur and reinvigorate the views, even if it is accepted that he presently does not subscribe to extremist ideology or support Islamic State. This is subject to certain confidential evidence adduced by DS Staunton, considered below.

Consideration of various risk factors

78    Having addressed at a high-level the portions of the evidence relied upon by the parties and outlined my consideration as to their significance for the risk assessment, it is now convenient to turn to particular risk factors which attract particular focus in the parties’ submissions, which necessarily builds on and to a certain extent overlaps with the preceding discussion.

Mr Zahab’s autism spectrum disorder

79    Both parties’ submissions focus to differing extents on Mr Zahab’s diagnosis of ASD and draw differing conclusions about its relevance to risk assessment. Mr Zahab’s argument is in essence that the offending occurred in the context of his undiagnosed ASD, and now that he has received a diagnosis and taken steps towards awareness, support, and treatment, he is in a significantly ameliorated position to prevent engagement or reengagement with the types of materials that radicalised him and led to the offending. Mr Zahab says that the offending cannot be divorced from the context in which it occurred, which was not known to the sentencing judge at the time, and there are several relevant protective factors now in place to support him.

80    On the other hand, DS Staunton says that Mr Zahab’s ASD makes him vulnerable to obsessional or fixated interests, and it is his autistic traits that contributed to his engagement with extremist ideology in the first place, and therefore which increases the risk that they could again contribute to such radicalisation and indoctrination. DS Staunton says Mr Zahab requires additional monitoring by way of the ICO to supervise his reintegration and ensure there are appropriate mechanisms in place to protect against any realised risk should Mr Zahab retreat to the same behaviour.

81    Mr Zahab’s diagnosis is addressed in some detail in Dr Seidler’s report, as outlined above. Dr Seidler makes several observations in relation to the relevance of the diagnosis to the conduct and behaviour constituting or leading to the offending. Dr Seidler observes that Mr Zahab now presents with greater insight into the manner in which ASD impacts him. Dr Seidler says that Mr Zahab reported “an ongoing commitment” to strategies to mitigate the risks posed by his ASD, including limiting and structuring his time online, engaging in critical evaluation and analysis, and working on establishing his “real life” connections in the community. Dr Seidler opines that the protective factors in place to support Mr Zahab can help mitigate against the identified risk.

82    It is positive that the evidence from Dr Seidler indicates that Mr Zahab is now able to deploy certain strategies to mitigate against the risk posed by his autistic tendencies and traits, and that he has greater understanding and awareness of how the ASD contributed to his offending. However, the fact that Mr Zahab can identify why he acts or thinks a certain way, or the impact of these traits, does not fully protect him from that impact being realised.

83    The behaviours that Mr Zahab described to Dr Seidler as being present at the time of the offending are not averted simply by awareness now of this condition that existed at the time. Those traits or tendencies (namely, fixation, obsessiveness, a tendency to social introversion, and an inability to critically analyse information) may be better managed with an increased awareness of their existence but cannot ultimately be cured (as acknowledged by Dr Seidler). There is limited evidence before the Court about the strategies which are said to assist Mr Zahab to avoid reengaging with extremist ideology and radicalisation. While he has identified a few strategies to Dr Seidler, this has been reported in limited detail without any conclusion as to the effectiveness of those strategies or how they will continue to be developed. It is in this sense that Mr Zahab’s ASD diagnosis is relevant to the assessment of risk, because, accepting that the offending occurred in the context of those traits, there is no evidence before me that would indicate that, despite the ASD, Mr Zahab’s susceptibility to radicalisation has necessarily been effectively managed.

84    I accept that the diagnosis and resulting treatment, though limited, mean that Mr Zahab is in a better position to identify when certain thinking patterns or actions are the result of his autistic traits. It follows that, as a result, Mr Zahab may engage more critically with material that he is exposed to and may be better able to realise when he is going down a ‘rabbit hole’ and seek help at an earlier stage if inclined to do so. I do not think this follows to permit safely making a finding that Mr Zahab will therefore be immune to repeating the same patterns and behaviours that first lead to his radicalisation and indoctrination to extremist ideology.

85    Mr Zahab’s family’s efforts are of note in regard to preventing recurrence of those patterns and are a very positive protective feature. However, the offending occurred privately, in the home, despite the surrounding presence of his family. Now they are aware of the offending, it would be reasonable to think they would intervene if they became concerned about Mr Zahab’s behaviour. However, given the concealment of his activities and his prior success in hiding them from his family, there is at least a reasonable possibility that he would be able to conceal the behaviour again should it arise.

86    Overall, Mr Zahab’s ASD diagnosis weighs as a risk factor in favour of confirming the ICO.

Mr Zahab’s rural location

87    Mr Zahab lives in Young, NSW, a rural town not far from Canberra. On the evidence before the Court, Mr Zahab participates in the community mainly by attending the local Mosque. He is currently unemployed but hopes to obtain work in the future. DS Staunton highlights Mr Zahab’s regional location as a factor that exacerbates the risk of him retreating to extremist ideology, in so far as geographic isolation may contribute to social isolation and introversion which was a factor relevant to his offending. In essence, DS Staunton’s concern is that, given the context of the offending, the fact that Mr Zahab remains living rurally is relevant to the Court’s assessment of risk because geographic isolation may impede on his rehabilitation by indirectly restraining the extent to which he can participate socially and remedy anti-social behaviours. DS Staunton raises this point specifically in relation to some of the proposed conditions, including the electronic monitoring condition which he also says is necessary because Mr Zahab lives rurally and is therefore more difficult to monitor. I have addressed this point as it relates to electronic monitoring in more detail below at [112]ff.

88    Similarly to the impact of Mr Zahab’s ASD on the assessment of risk, his regional location is relevant in two distinct ways. I accept that geographic isolation may contribute to social isolation and introversion, even if only indirectly by limiting the opportunities or resources available to Mr Zahab to assist with his rehabilitation and reintegration to the community. I accept that increased isolation increases the possibility that Mr Zahab will retreat to online activities which is the domain in which the offending occurred. However, the contribution to risk needs to be balanced against the appropriateness of the proposed conditions in circumstances where the conditions should be designed to facilitate and support rehabilitation, not hinder it.

89    Mr Zahab’s location is relevant to that balance because he is in a different position to someone with abundant access to different communities, social interactions, and wellbeing resourcing. Therefore, if conditions imposed upon him would further limit his willingness or ability to participate in the limited available activities that will support his rehabilitation, such as obtaining employment, they should be given careful consideration because his potential to be isolated is already heightened. Similarly, Mr Zahab’s location should also be considered in relation to its impact on his ability to visit family and friends. I have considered these points with reference to the proposed conditions of the ICO below from [97].

90    Overall, Mr Zahab’s rural residential location weighs as a risk factor in favour of confirming the ICO.

Disavowal of Islamic State

91    As outlined above, Mr Zahab contends that his risk of reoffending is low in circumstances where he has denounced the ideology which contributed to his previous offending. Consistent with the above consideration of the evidence relied upon in that regard, the central problem I have in being satisfied that that there has been a change in ideology by Mr Zahab (extending to disavowing Islamic State, but also going beyond that to the underlying ideology, that is both genuine at this point in time and enduring as to the future) is that it was not supported by any direct evidence from Mr Zahab and was not able to be tested in any way. This is of considerable importance because the presence or absence of such an ideology is a central consideration in assessing the risk of recidivism. Confidential affidavit material that was adduced by DS Staunton did have some positive bearing on this in ways that I cannot discuss, tending to support the genuineness of the disavowal. Nonetheless, I am ultimately unable to be satisfied that critical factor does not continue to operate as an unacceptable risk due to the real possibility that his belief in this ideology may re-emerge. It is that possibility that has not been addressed to my satisfaction. That largely leaves untouched the ordinary assessment of the inferred risk arising from past conduct being repeated.

Other general risk factors

92    While there are other general risk factors identified in the evidence, Mr Zahab’s ASD, his rural location, and whether his disavowal of Islamic State is both genuine and enduring were the key risk points identified and addressed in different ways by the parties.

93    The remaining factors identified as being relevant to risk in the evidence, and addressed to some extent in submissions, were somewhat disjointed, and in places episodic in nature, such as additional relevant social stressors, an interest in accessing online platforms and new technologies since his release, and connection with family members or associates located overseas, or who have connections to extremism. I would not regard any of these lesser considerations to be determinative, either individually or collectively. Although I have had regard to each of them as part of the factual matrix, I will therefore not address them further.

Conclusion on risk

94    I consider that there remains a real and unacceptable level of risk, in all the circumstances, that Mr Zahab could retreat to behaviour that led to his indoctrination into extremist ideology, which could in turn result in future offending of the kind contemplated by s 104.4(d)(iii)-(v). The evidence of Mr Zahab’s disengagement from extremist ideology, his family support, and his commitment to psychiatric or psychological treatment are countervailing factors. But a key limitation of the evidence is the glaring absence of Mr Zahab from the witness box, the lack of testing of his assertions of change, and my consequential inability to be satisfied that the past does not provide a better predictor of the future than those untested assertions. Moreover, the inherent limitation on the effectiveness of the protective factors relied upon by Mr Zahab do not render the risk that remains present as remote. In summary, the following factors have led me to conclude that there is a real risk that Mr Zahab could engage in behaviour contemplated by s 104.4(d)(iii)-(v):

(a)    Mr Zahab has returned to a rural environment substantially similar to the one in which the offending occurred. There are some material changes, which include his strengthened family relationships, his family’s awareness of the offending and efforts to understand the contributing behaviour, and Mr Zahab’s own awareness of his contributing behaviour. I accept that in returning to an environment where the risk factors that contribute to his radicalisation remain, there is a possibility that Mr Zahab is vulnerable and susceptible to a similar chain of events occurring, namely participation in online behaviour that leads to re-radicalisation.

(b)    Mr Zahab’s offending demonstrates that he is vulnerable to being influenced by online ‘propaganda’ and echo chambers, which is then exacerbated by autistic traits that affect his ability to question and avoid the content he may be exposed to. Mr Zahab’s diagnosis is fairly recent, and as per the indication given at the confirmation hearing and in Dr Seidler’s report, he has not commenced psychological or psychiatric treatment in relation to the ASD. In these circumstances, I do not consider that diagnosis, awareness, and ongoing commitment to treatment is enough to protect against the precursory behaviours. It may be that with time and treatment, Mr Zahab can develop strong strategies to mitigate against this. The evidence shows that Mr Zahab’s prior offending was informed or contributed to by an obsessive interest with foreign regimes, a tendency to fixate on certain acquired interests, and tendencies to self-isolate and introvert.

(c)    While Mr Zahab participated in relevant counter-extremism programs during incarceration, there are concerns about the sincerity of his involvement and participation. I did not hear from Mr Zahab, and therefore this could not be tested at the confirmation hearing.

(d)    Mr Zahab says that the offending occurred in a specific geo-political context, in which he was motivated by a desire to assist civilians in the conflict in Syria against what he regarded as the former oppressive Assad regime in Syria. Whilst this may have been Mr Zahab’s catalyst or focal point, the evidence before the Court also shows more generalised or non-specific support for Islamic State. Mr Zahab’s online activities around the offending included commenting on other conflicts in West Asia and North Africa, which remain ongoing.

(e)    While positive that Mr Zahab is willing to participate in psychological treatment, his diagnosis is recent and the specific treatment is yet to commence. There is limited evidence before the Court that such psychological or psychiatric evidence has led to strategies or mechanisms that would assist Mr Zahab to resist retreating to the same online behaviour and introversion that led to the offending.

(f)    The evidence to support Mr Zahab’s claim to have disavowed Islamic State and disengaged from extremist ideology is based on what Mr Zahab has told others about his views and mindset. Mr Zahab did not give direct evidence. The evidence before the Court can therefore only go so far to reassure me that his stance has indeed changed, and in an enduring way.

Adjudication on proposed conditions

95    I now turn to consider the conditions proposed by the ICO. In order that I reach the state of satisfaction required by s 104.4(1)(d), I must be satisfied that each of the conditions, and the combined effect of all the conditions, are reasonably necessary and reasonably appropriate and adapted for the purposes mentioned in s 104.4(1)(d)(iii) to (v). I am satisfied that the risk is such that confirming the ICO is justified, provided the remaining limb of the threshold is met. To meet that, I have first considered the conditions separately, and then their combined effect. I have considered some conditions separately, and others together where the requirements or restraints imposed on Mr Zahab are of a similar kind.

96    In the event that the Court confirms the ICO, Mr Zahab sought in the alternative that certain conditions be varied or removed. His position is contained in an annexure to his written submissions and was conveyed during the confirmation hearing on 2 July 2026. While some of the conditions are not objected to by Mr Zahab, I am still required to be satisfied that the conditions are reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted for the purposes mentioned in s 104.4(1)(d)(iii) to (v). A relevant consideration is that any confirmed control orders expire on the twelve-month anniversary of the making of the ICO by Burley J on 23 March 2026, in just under five months.

97    Condition 1 (premises): Condition 1 would require Mr Zahab to reside at specified premises and prescribes requirements to seek approval from the AFP Superintendent for exemption. Mr Zahab must seek exemption if he intends or plans to be temporarily absent from his address for 24 hours or more.

98    DS Staunton says that this condition will assist police to monitor Mr Zahab’s whereabouts, and whether he is engaging in activities of associating with people of concern. DS Staunton also opines that in his experience of the post-release management of terrorist offenders, residing at a known address is a “means of providing stability during the period of re-integration into the community”.

99    Mr Zahab contends that the condition should be amended to require he only seek approval for an exemption if he intends to be absent from the premises for 72 hours or more. He says it is a significant additional burden on him and his family in the circumstances where he has family living in Sydney and is a barrier to effective re-integration.

100    Mr Zahab says that the exemption process has caused him anxiety and distress in the past, and confused his understanding of what is allowed or required.

101    It is convenient at this point to consider this aspect of what is sought to be achieved by the conditions of the ICO. It is relevant to my conclusions reached about the remaining conditions below. A key statutory purpose of imposing a control order is protection of the community, and this is what is contemplated by the objects of Division 104 at s 104.1, and a paramount consideration to which I must have regard under s 104.4(2).

102    DS Staunton says that the ICO will provide support as Mr Zahab reintegrates into the community, to ensure that while he is still vulnerable and untested, his behaviour is adequately monitored. A balance must be struck between protecting the safety of the Australian public and mitigating the risk posed by Mr Zahab on the one hand, and the curtailment of Mr Zahab’s liberties on the other. This is an exercise in proportionality. However, as outlined above in relation to his rural location as a risk factor, consideration ought to be had to the impact of the restrictions on Mr Zahab’s rehabilitation. If Mr Zahab is subject to unduly oppressive limitations, that may have the unintended consequence of curtailing the progress of his rehabilitation. Then, once the ICO expires, he will return to the community without having achieved the level of rehabilitation that might otherwise have been possible. The situation would be without the monitoring and structure that is said to be required to protect the community. The conditions imposed upon him must be flexible enough to permit him to engage and participate meaningfully in activities and communities that will support his reintegration and mitigate the risk of recidivism. That way, he can continue to rehabilitate and address the risk factors so that once the ICO expires, the risk he poses to the community has been meaningfully reduced and perhaps, so far as that is possible, even eliminated. In that sense, the community is better protected by the conditions permitting effective and meaningful rehabilitation so that by the time he is released from their constraints, he has made as much progress as possible while still subject to the “safety net” that the ICO is said to provide in monitoring or controlling his behaviour.

103    Although in a separate context, my reasoning from DYS21 v Attorney General [2021] FCA 1331; 288 FCR 607 illustrates a similar notion or basis for flexibility of controls and conditions imposed with a view to protecting the community. In that case, I considered the benefit to an offender, and to the community, of the offender being released on parole prior to release on completion of sentence:

[28]    The pre-release report from CSNSW made it clear that for those very reasons it was considered to be in the interests of community safety that the applicant participate, or at least commence participating, in a sex offender course before he concluded his sentence and was then beyond the reach of conditions or supervision. This was endorsed by the writer’s chain of command up to a very senior level. The only way in which that could be required to take place, so as to make it reasonably certain that it would take place during the balance of the sentence, and more likely to continue to take place voluntarily after the conclusion of the head sentence, was if attendance and related measures were a condition of parole.

[29]    If the applicant was never released on parole, and simply served his full sentence, participating in such a course upon his release would be entirely voluntary. This is despite such a course being likely to be challenging and confronting, such that it would not be an unreasonable assumption to make that, without the compulsion of parole requirements, such a course may either never be commenced, or if commenced, not successfully completed. Moreover, there would be no post-release supervision at all. If parole was to be granted closer to the time of the completion of the sentence, any supervision and compulsion to at least commence a sex offender course would necessarily be of shorter duration, and less likely to be effective in managing risk.

104    Similar to the reasoning described above, the community will be better protected if at the time that Mr Zahab is no longer bound by the monitoring and restrictions of the ICO, and his liberties are restored unfettered, he has had the chance to meaningfully work towards rehabilitation. This will not be possible if the conditions imposed upon him are so restrictive that they prevent him from engaging in the very activities that facilitate that rehabilitation.

105    I accept that requiring an exemption to be granted for an absence of more than 24 hours is a not insignificant limitation on Mr Zahab’s liberty, and in the circumstances, hinders his reintegration. Conditions which indirectly curtail against Mr Zahab being able to socialise with friends and family, or in the community, are not aligned to the purpose of the ICO, being to support Mr Zahab to rehabilitate so to manage or reduce the risk to the community. As has been explained, the offending occurred in the context of social isolation, which has been recognised by Mr Zahab and also by DS Staunton. It is not sensible that conditions be imposed which restrict socialisation when DS Staunton says that this is a risk factor in relation to Mr Zahab’s reengagement with extremist ideology and therefore to re-offending. It should be noted that Mr Zahab’s offending occurred in the home, on a computer, rather than in direct or personal connection with other persons. I do not consider that significant restrictions on Mr Zahab’s movement are required to mitigate against the level of risk identified.

106    I accept that some level of monitoring of Mr Zahab’s residence or whereabouts is required in order that the purpose of the ICO be achieved. I am satisfied that Mr Zahab’s proposal, that the period of absence be extended to 72 hours, is appropriate. In balancing the competing arguments, I consider that this adjustment strikes a balance between the objects of the Division and purpose of the controls, and Mr Zahab’s rehabilitation and liberties. The proposed adjustment will allow Mr Zahab to make weekend or long-weekend trips with his family, which will support his socialisation and ability to strengthen connections with his friends and family. I consider this an important aspect of his rehabilitation. Condition 1 should be varied in those terms. I made an interim order varying condition 1 in those terms following the hearing and, with that variation, I am satisfied this condition, read as a whole, is reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted for the purposes mentioned in s 104.4(1)(d)(iii) to (v). The effect is that the condition will continue as it has been since shortly after the confirmation hearing.

107    Condition 2 (Checking in): Condition 2 would require Mr Zahab to contact the AFP Superintendent in certain circumstances, including when directed to do so. In the alternative that the ICO is confirmed, Mr Zahab does not oppose this condition.

108    DS Staunton says this enables continued contact between AFP and Mr Zahab so his reintegration into the community can be observed, and emerging risks can be identified. The restriction on Mr Zahab is limited, and I am satisfied this condition is reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted for the purposes mentioned in s 104.4(1)(d)(iii) to (v).

109    Condition 3 (Travel): Condition 3 would require Mr Zahab not to leave Australia, apply for travel documents, possess other person’s travel documents, or travel outside of New South Wales or the Australian Capital Territory. In the alternative that the ICO is confirmed, Mr Zahab does not oppose this condition.

110    DS Staunton says the condition is necessary, having regard to the risk that if Mr Zahab were to travel overseas, he could be further exposed to religiously motivated extremist views having regard to the nature of the offending. It will assist police to monitor Mr Zahab’s whereabouts.

111    Similarly to my comments above, I accept that some level of monitoring of Mr Zahab’s residence or whereabouts is required in order that the purposes of the ICO be achieved. Such monitoring would be made more challenging if interstate movement was permitted. I consider DS Staunton’s concerns with respect to overseas travel are well-founded, at least at this point in time. Mr Zahab has family in Sydney, and the condition allows him to travel to see them. It will be easier do so with Condition 1 continuing to be relaxed to 72 hours. This condition, in that context, is appropriately adapted to Mr Zahab’s circumstances, in allowing movement between NSW and ACT having regard to Mr Zahab’s location, and therefore fairly strikes a balance between the competing arguments and interests. The restriction on Mr Zahab is limited, and I am satisfied the condition is reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted for the purposes mentioned in s 104.4(1)(d)(iii) to (v).

112    Condition 4 (Electronic Monitoring): Condition 4 would require Mr Zahab to wear a monitoring device at all times. In the event that the ICO is confirmed, Mr Zahab proposes Condition 4 be removed.

113    DS Staunton says Condition 4 is necessary to assist police to monitor Mr Zahab and is complimentary with other controls. DS Staunton says that Condition 4 cannot be replaced by some other form of monitoring, such as geolocation tracking via a mobile device, because it is easy for Mr Zahab to evade.

114    Mr Zahab says that a monitoring device would act as a barrier to reintegration, because it is a highly visible indicator that he is being monitored. Mr Zahab says that it could lead to assumptions being made about him, by members of the public or a future employer. In an affidavit prepared by Mr Zahab’s wife, she says that the electronic monitoring condition is a disincentive for Mr Zahab to obtain employment.

115    I accept Mr Zahab may hold concerns about being seen to wear a monitoring device, which could lead to embarrassment, shame, and concerns about what others may think. This could certainly act as a barrier to employment, as Mr Zahab says it does. This type of impediment could be realised solely through ‘anticipatory’ fear, rather than concerns developed by exposure to social consequences as a result of wearing the monitoring device, if Mr Zahab’s worry is so great that he avoids being in a situation where it might occur. It is enough that someone fears being perceived a certain way, which has the indirect effect of preventing that person from participating in society even though it is not a direct or physical impediment to his rehabilitation.

116    As I raised with the parties at the confirmation hearing, the context of Mr Zahab’s offending is relevant. Mr Zahab’s offending occurred primarily online, from within his home. While Mr Zahab did try to conceal his behaviour, there is no evidence that points to a risk that Mr Zahab will abscond. The risk which has informed the election to confirm the ICO is said to be from the risk that Mr Zahab will engage with extremist material or groups online. It is difficult to see how Condition 4 will meaningfully protect against that risk occurring, or act as an early warning sign of elevated risk. Counsel for DS Staunton said that Condition 4 could, for example, reveal Mr Zahab attending and utilising an internet café (in circumstances where his online behaviour by his home/provided devices is heavily monitored by the suite of controls). That is a somewhat tenuous connection, especially in the circumstances where so far, Mr Zahab has remained fully and anxiously compliant with the conditions of the ICO.

117    As per the above discussion at [101]ff, the conditions must be appropriately adapted to the risk and purpose, which requires a degree of flexibility to allow Mr Zahab to meaningfully participate in his own rehabilitation and reintegration.

118    Similarly to Condition 1 above, a balance needs to be struck between mitigation of risk and sufficient flexibility to allow Mr Zahab to operate in the community, engage socially, and effectively rehabilitate. As above, controls that prevent Mr Zahab from accessing social benefits, like employment, have the effect of mitigating the risk without leaving any room for rehabilitation.

119    For the above reasons, Condition 4 is not sufficiently connected to the risk identified, because of the nature of Mr Zahab’s offending and the imposition it has in the circumstances. I consider the impact to Mr Zahab is disproportionate to the risk, and contrary to the purpose of protecting the community in so far as it restricts Mr Zahab’s rehabilitation. It is not reasonably necessary or reasonably appropriate and adapted for the purposes mentioned in s 104.4(1)(d)(iii) to (v).

120    I made an interim order removing Condition 4 on 9 July 2026, after the confirmation hearing, and that position will continue.

121    Condition 5 (support and treatment): Condition 5 would require Mr Zahab to participate in psychological or psychiatric assessment and treatment. In the alternative that the ICO is confirmed, Mr Zahab does not oppose this condition. Mr Zahab expressed to Dr Seidler that he was interested in continuing to engage in psychological treatment to help him manage his anxiety and ASD.

122    Condition 5 is sufficiently connected to the purpose of protecting the community, because it will support Mr Zahab’s rehabilitation and strengthen protective features that will help Mr Zahab avoid retreating to the same behaviours that led to the offending. The restriction on Mr Zahab is limited, and I am satisfied it is reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted for the purposes mentioned in s 104.4(1)(d)(iii) to (v).

123    Condition 6 (Sharing Information): Condition 6 would require Mr Zahab to provide information to the AFP Superintendent when directed to do so. Condition 6.2 requires that Mr Zahab allow service providers to share information with the AFP Superintendent about their interactions with Mr Zahab, including “any safety concerns they may have, including regarding your risk or risk factors”.

124    Mr Zahab partly opposed this condition, namely on the basis that the above extracted wording is unduly broad and unclear. Mr Zahab says that it could undermine the therapeutic relationships between Mr Zahab and the service provider, and notes that many service providers have existing mandatory reporting obligations. I accept Mr Zahab’s submission and consider, on that basis, that the impugned wording should be removed. I note that this was done on an interim basis by my orders made on 9 July 2026. The confirmed condition will continue in the form it has been since 9 July 2026.

125    As so varied, the requirement imposed on Mr Zahab is limited, and I am satisfied it is reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted for the purposes mentioned in s 104.4(1)(d)(iii) to (v).

126    Condition 7 (Communication): Condition 7 places restrictions on who Mr Zahab can communicate with, including persons detained in correctional facilities and persons known or suspected to be a member of Islamic State or another terrorist organisation.

127    Mr Zahab partly opposes this condition in the alternative to opposing any control order or conditions, in so far as specific persons are named. Mr Zahab says one of the identified names should be removed because there is no evidence before the Court that Mr Zahab has any knowledge of that person. I considered this point was well made at the confirmation hearing and so there was no continuing need for the condition to refer to specific persons. The condition was varied to remove the reference to that person. With that aspect removed, as it has been since 9 July 2026, the restriction on Mr Zahab is limited, and I am satisfied it is reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted for the purposes mentioned in s 104.4(1)(d)(iii) to (v). The condition will continue in the varied form it has had since 9 July 2026.

128    Condition 8 (Employment and Education): Condition 8 would require Mr Zahab to give information to the AFP Superintendent about any job, volunteer work, vocational training, or education as directed.

129    DS Staunton says the purpose of the condition is not to impede Mr Zahab’s access to employment but to provide insight into his whereabouts and activities. It is said it will allow the AFP to monitor exposure to occupations, activities, programs, and work that could indicate an escalation in risk.

130    Mr Zahab partly opposes this condition in the alternative to opposing any control order or conditions. Mr Zahab says that its drafting creates an unfettered ability for the AFP to request information about his job, voluntary work, vocational training, or education, and Mr Zahab is concerned in the context of employment that this will burden his employer and thereby be a barrier to accessing employment. Mr Zahab proposes that the condition be amended to include specific information that can be requested by the AFP Superintendent, namely the name of employers, job title and role description, location and hours of work, and descriptions of tools and supplies accessible in employment.

131    I did not accede to that precise change, but did so in substance by varying the condition so as to remove the word “job” from the existing condition which includes volunteer work, training or education, and added a sub-condition applying to his job only so as to limit the information which could be requested to the above-mentioned categories of information. As so varied, I am satisfied the condition is reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted for the purposes mentioned in s 104.4(1)(d)(iii) to (v). The condition will continue in the varied form it has had since 9 July 2026.

132    Condition 9 (Groups): Condition 9 would prevent Mr Zahab from joining or associating with certain groups, clubs, or organisations including those which discuss violent extremist material, or are related to terrorist organisations. In the alternative that the ICO is confirmed, Mr Zahab does not oppose this condition.

133    DS Staunton says this condition is necessary due to the context of Mr Zahab’s offending, and to mitigate the risk he will reengage with online propaganda, and communication which could contribute to radicalisation. I accept that this condition is related to the nature of Mr Zahab’s offending, and the risk identified and sought to be addressed by the ICO. Mr Zahab’s offending occurred in the context of communicating with online persons and groups about Islamic State. I am satisfied the condition is reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted for the purposes mentioned in s 104.4(1)(d)(iii) to (v).

134    Condition 10 (Prohibited items): Condition 10 would prevent Mr Zahab from buying, making, possessing, or using certain items, including knives and firearms.

135    DS Staunton says this condition is sought to prevent Mr Zahab in utilising the prohibited items in preparing, planning for, or conducting a terrorist act, constructing items that could be put to such use, or equipping others for such use. DS Staunton opines it is not unduly restrictive because none of the prohibited items are typically used by the general population in their private lives or on a day-to-day basis.

136    Mr Zahab partly opposes this condition in the alternative to opposing any control order or conditions, in so far as it restricts knifes and firearms. Mr Zahab says that he is already subject to restrictions to buy or possess firearms, and this is therefore a duplication. Mr Zahab says that there is no evidence that correlates knives to the risk sought to be addressed, and his offending did not relate to knives. Mr Zahab says living on a farm requires him to use knives, as does his hobby fishing. Possession of certain knives is restricted by other New South Wales laws. This condition was varied by my interim orders made on 9 July 2026, to an extent that I considered sufficiently addressed Mr Zahab’s concerns, by adding an exception for tools reasonably necessary for farming or fishing. I remain of that view and as varied I am satisfied the condition is reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted for the purposes mentioned in s 104.4(1)(d)(iii) to (v). The condition will continue in the varied form it has had since 9 July 2026.

137    Condition 11 (Prohibited places): Condition 11 would restrain Mr Zahab from going to certain locations including correctional facilities, airports, firearms stores, and other places so designated by the AFP. Mr Zahab does not oppose this condition in the alternative to opposing any control order or conditions, but considers that it does not permit the AFP to request an itinerary when approving a request under Condition 1 to be absent from his normal place of residence. While I agree that obligation is not imposed by this condition, refusing to provide an itinerary is a somewhat impractical stance to take. Provision of an itinerary for the purposes of making a request to be absent from his normal place of residence may well be the best and most effective way to get a request approved. I have difficulty understanding why requesting an itinerary in order to evaluate a request and considering granting it is unreasonable.

138    DS Staunton says this condition will minimise opportunities for Mr Zahab to communicate with persons who are of security concern and restrict access to places that could expose Mr Zahab to situations restricted by the other conditions to the ICO (for example, by restricting his ability to go to places selling firearms, thereby complementing Condition 10).

139    I am satisfied the condition is reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted for the purposes mentioned in s 104.4(1)(d)(iii) to (v).

140    Condition 12, 13, 14 and 15 (Technology and devices): These conditions would impose restrictions on Mr Zahab’s use of technology and devices and allow relevant monitoring of those devices and Mr Zahab’s online activities.

141    DS Staunton says that the conditions are broadly intended to limit opportunities for Mr Zahab to access, publish, or share prohibited materials using telecommunications technology, and allow investigators to monitor, disrupt, or prevent any future radicalisation.

142    The conditions are relevant and appropriate to the nature of the offending, in the context where Mr Zahab’s radicalisation occurred as a result of online propaganda and in communication or association with extremist individuals and discourse. This is especially apt in circumstances where the primary concern informing the risk assessment is that Mr Zahab will re-engage with online groups, individuals, or materials that will expose him to extremist ideology. Condition 15 requires Mr Zahab to obtain approval to download programs, applications and data. It appears that this condition is being applied flexibly, as there is information included in DS Staunton’s affidavit of June 2026 about the various exemptions granted to Mr Zahab under this condition.

143    Having regard to the nature of the offending and identified risk, I am satisfied that these controls are reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted for the purposes mentioned in s 104.4(1)(d)(iii) to (v).

144    Condition 16 and 17 (possession and sharing of certain documents and media): Conditions 16 and 17 restrict possession and sharing of documents including those that relate to propaganda or activities of terrorist organisations, or are connected with, the subject matter of his former offending. There is an exception for Mr Zahab to access content produced by mainstream broadcasting organisations and streaming services. In the alternative that the ICO is confirmed, Mr Zahab does not oppose these conditions.

145    The purpose or relevance of these conditions is similar to that of Conditions 12 to 15. It is relevant to the nature and context of Mr Zahab’s offending, and DS Staunton says it will manage the risk of interaction or engagement with extremist material that could escalate the risk.

146    I consider the impact to Mr Zahab is limited. Having regard to the nature of the offending and identified risk, I am satisfied that this control is reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted for the purposes mentioned in s 104.4(1)(d)(iii) to (v).

147    Condition 18 (access to accounts and devices): Condition 18 would require Mr Zahab to enable the AFP to access his devices and accounts. Mr Zahab considers this condition should be subject to a limitation on when and how the AFP can use the power, for example, limited to once per calendar month.

148    DS Staunton says this condition is necessary to ensure timely access to Mr Zahab’s devices, and to limit opportunities for him to conceal or destroy evidence that could otherwise be examined if access were given.

149    Mr Zahab previously took steps to conceal and destroy evidence, or to otherwise conceal his behaviour. Mr Zahab’s behaviour in this regard contributes to the assessment of risk. When regard is had to his previous offending, and the nature of the risk said to be posed by Mr Zahab, I am satisfied that this control is reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted for the purposes mentioned in s 104.4(1)(d)(iii) to (v). I appreciate that this is a not insignificant limitation on Mr Zahab, however it is proportionate and reasonable in the circumstances.

150    Condition 19 (reasonable directions): Condition 19 requires Mr Zahab to comply with any reasonable direction given by the AFP superintendent in connection with the other conditions of the ICO. In the alternative that the ICO is confirmed, Mr Zahab does not oppose this condition.

151    DS Staunton says this condition will complement the substantive conditions and provide necessary flexibility to allow the ICO to remain fit for purpose over time.

152    I consider the impact and burden to Mr Zahab to be limited, and I am satisfied that it is reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted for the purposes mentioned in s 104.4(1)(d)(iii) to (v).

153    Condition 20 and 21 (obtaining exemptions or approvals): Conditions 20 and 21 provide for the AFP to grant temporary exemptions to and approvals under the ICO conditions, and the process by which this is to occur. In the alternative that the ICO is confirmed, Mr Zahab does not oppose this condition.

154    I consider this condition to permit appropriate flexibility, which is required to enable the ICO to respond to changing circumstances that are not contemplated by the current conditions. I consider the impact and burden to Mr Zahab is limited, and I am satisfied that it is reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted for the purposes mentioned in s 104.4(1)(d)(iii) to (v).

155    Condition 22 (attempting or causing contraventions): Condition 22 prohibits Mr Zahab from attempting to breach the conditions or causing a third party to do something on his behalf that would constitute a breach of the conditions of the ICO. In the alternative that the ICO is confirmed, Mr Zahab does not oppose this condition.

156    I consider the impact and burden to Mr Zahab is limited, and I am satisfied that it is reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted for the purposes mentioned in s 104.4(1)(d)(iii) to (v).

Conditions considered as a whole

157    I have considered all of the conditions addressed above collectively, subject to the variations that I have indicated are required (and were made on 9 July 2026 on an interim basis). The combined effect is necessarily greater than the individual conditions. But many of them also operate quite independently, while others are more likely to interact and even complement. Taken as a whole, and having regard to both their independent and interactive operation, I am satisfied that collectively they are reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted for the purposes mentioned in s 104.4(1)(d)(iii) to (v).

Conclusion

158    For the foregoing reasons, I am satisfied that:

(a)    the ICO should be confirmed; and

(b)    the conditions in the ICO, as previously varied and as further varied as described above, should be imposed.

159    There are no additional variations to the conditions as varied on 9 July 2026, and the confirmed conditions therefore continue as were varied at that time.

Associate:

Dated:    30 October 2026