Federal Court of Australia

Randall v Woodside Energy Ltd [2026] FCA 1630

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The applicant’s application for leave to amend the originating application and statement of claim in the forms annexed to the interlocutory application filed on 21 October 2025 be dismissed.

2.    The applicant’s application for interlocutory injunctive relief filed on 14 October 2025 be dismissed.

3.    The costs of the applications referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of these orders be reserved.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

FEUTRILL J

1    In the originating application and statement of claim filed in this proceeding the applicant (Mr Randall) claims declaratory, compensatory and other relief for alleged contraventions of the general protection provisions of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) by the first respondent (Woodside) and the alleged involvement of the other respondents (individual employees of Woodside) in those contraventions. As a consequence of the respondents applying for summary dismissal, the matter was referred to a confidential conference before a Registrar of the Court for the purpose of seeking to identify the agreed facts, disputed facts, and the real factual and legal issues for determination in the proceeding. That process resulted in Mr Randall and the respondents filing competing versions of a document entitled ‘Statement of Applicant’s Claim and Agreed List of Legal Issues for Determination’. While the respondents no longer pursue summary relief, the extent to which the facts and law are in dispute or agreed remains unclear.

2    Further, after the confidential conference process commenced, Mr Randall lodged interlocutory applications, in effect, to amend his originating application and for interlocutory injunctive relief. The respondents opposed those applications. It appears that part of Mr Randall’s reluctance to reach agreement on the form of the document identifying agreed or disputed facts and law centres on his desire to amend his claim and obtain interlocutory injunctive relief. These reasons concern the resolution of Mr Randall’s interlocutory applications.

3    Mr Randall suffered a workplace injury on an offshore petroleum platform operated by Woodside and received compensation payments under the provisions of the Workers Compensation and Injury Management Act 2023 (WA). A core aspect of Mr Randall’s current claim in the proceeding is that he was subjected to adverse action under the Fair Work Act following the exercise of workplace rights in connection with his injury. By his interlocutory applications Mr Randall seeks to amend the originating application to introduce a claim to the effect that compensation and other entitlements for his workplace injury were payable under the provisions of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) and that, by s 109 of the Constitution, the WA Compensation Act is inoperative due to an inconsistency with the Commonwealth Compensation Act. Separately, the proposed amendments seek to introduce a claim for declaratory and other relief in respect of alleged contraventions of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth). In reliance on these contentions, Mr Randall also seeks orders under s 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and s 545(2) of the Fair Work Act restraining the respondents from relying on the WA Compensation Act and requiring Woodside to pay Mr Randall compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Commonwealth Compensation Act. Thus, there are two matters for consideration on these interlocutory applications: (1) whether Mr Randall should be granted leave to amend his originating application and statement of claim; and (2) if so, whether an interlocutory injunction should be granted.

Should the applicant have leave to amend his originating process and statement of claim?

4    The power to grant or refuse leave to amend under r 8.21 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) must be exercised in a way that best promotes the Court’s overarching purpose to facilitate the just resolution of disputes according to law as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible: s 37M(1), s 37M(3) of the Federal Court Act; Caason Investments Pty Ltd v Cao [2015] FCAFC 94; 236 FCR 322 at [19] (Gilmour, Foster and Edelman JJ); Rush v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] FCA 550 at [25] (Wigney J). The power is remedial and directed towards the cure of any defect in a pleading to ensure that the real issues in controversy are properly agitated and to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings. Generally, leave to amend should be granted unless the proposed amendment is futile such that the issue sought to be added is unlikely to succeed, the amendment is liable to be struck out, or the amendment would cause substantial prejudice or injustice to the opposing party: Caason Investments at [20]-[21]. An amendment may not be allowed where the proposed amendment is misconceived in point of law: Research in Motion Ltd v Samsung Electronics Australia Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 320; 176 FCR 66 at [21]-[22] (Kenny J). The onus is on the party seeking leave to amend to persuade the Court that such leave should be given: University of Sydney v ObjectiVision Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 1199 at [62] (Burley J).

5    The Commonwealth Compensation Act imposes an obligation on Comcare to pay compensation in respect of an injury suffered by an ‘employee’ if the injury results in death, incapacity for work, or impairment: s 14(1). An ‘employee’ is a person employed by the Commonwealth or by a Commonwealth authority or a person who is employed by a licensed corporation: s 5(1). A ‘licensed corporation’ means a corporation that is the holder of a licence that is in force under Pt VIII. Part VIII makes provision for the grant of a licence to a corporation. The Minister must first declare a corporation eligible to be granted a license: s 100(1). Following that declaration a company may make an application for grant of a license: s 102. A licence may then be granted: s 103.

6    Woodside adduced unchallenged affidavit evidence to the effect that Woodside is not, and has never been, a ‘licensed corporation’ within the meaning of the Commonwealth Compensation Act and has never had the authority to self-insure its workers compensation and (or) claims management under the Commonwealth Act. That affidavit annexes an extract of current and former self-insured licensees under the Commonwealth Act. Woodside is not named as either a current or former self-insured licensee. As Woodside is none of the Commonwealth, a Commonwealth agency, or licensed corporation, Mr Randall has no reasonable prospect of establishing that he is (or was) an ‘employee’ within the meaning of the Commonwealth Act. Therefore, Mr Randall has no reasonable prospect of demonstrating that the Commonwealth Act applies to his workplace injury and workers’ compensation claim.

7    The proposed amendments to introduce claims under the Disability Discrimination Act were not the subject of any written or oral submissions. In the absence of any submissions, it is not possible to decipher the nature of any claim under that Act.

8    For the forgoing reasons, Mr Randall’s interlocutory application for leave to amend his originating application and statement of claim should be dismissed.

Should interlocutory injunctive relief be granted?

9    The principles concerning interlocutory injunctive relief are well established and were not in dispute. Where relief is sought in respect of private rights, it is necessary to identify the legal or equitable rights that are to be determined at trial and in respect of which final relief is sought. Once identified, the applicant must establish a prima facie case, in the sense that if the evidence remains as it is there is a probability that at trial the applicant will be held entitled to relief in respect of the alleged infringed right, that the applicant will suffer irreparable injury for which damages will not be an adequate compensation, and that the balance of convenience favours the grant of an injunction to preserve that right: Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc [2011] FCAFC 156; 217 FCR 238 at [52]-[53] (Dowsett, Foster and Yates JJ).

10    For the reasons already given, Mr Randall has not demonstrated a prima facie case to any entitlement to be paid compensation under the Commonwealth Compensation Act. Therefore, the application for an interlocutory injunction should also be dismissed.

Disposition

11    Each of the interlocutory applications should be dismissed. Although the discretion of the Court to award costs is affected by the operation of s 570 of the Fair Work Act, due to the manifest absence of merit in these applications, costs will be reserved.

Associate:

Dated:    30 October 2026

SCHEDULE OF PARTIES