Federal Court of Australia

Balbir Singh v Commonwealth of Australia [2026] FCA 1627

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The time for the applicant to file an application for leave to appeal be extended to the time that the applicant filed her application for an extension of time to file an application for leave to appeal.

2.    Leave to appeal be refused.

3.    There be no order as to costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

STEWART J:

1    The applicant is a qualified medical practitioner. She has been unrepresented throughout the proceeding below and before this Court.

2    The applicant brought a proceeding in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (Circuit Court) against the Commonwealth Department of Health alleging unlawful discrimination under the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DDA), the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) and the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth). The claims of unlawful discrimination, which were subsequently limited by partial summary dismissal orders to claims for disability discrimination, were made in relation to the applicant’s participation in the Australian General Practitioner Training Program (AGPT Program). The applicant claimed $36 million for “losses and damages” and injunctions against “any further sexual harassment, defamation, fraud, hate crimes, breaches of privacy, abuse, fraudulent healthcare, degradation, violations, humiliation, corruption or discrimination against [her], in all areas of [her] life, managed by the Australian Department of Health and the Commonwealth of Australia”.

3    The applicant also commenced a proceeding in the Circuit Court against the Western Australian General Practitioner Education and Training (WAGPET) which was the training provider of the AGPT Program in Western Australia. There is a parallel application in relation to that matter in this Court, but it is being dealt with separately.

4    In the reasons for judgment dealing with the summary dismissal of the applicant’s non-DDA claims, the discrimination claims were characterised as follows (Balbir Singh v Commonwealth of Australia (Department of Health and Aged Care) [2025] FedCFamC2G 637 at [106]):

(1)    on 1 November 2019, the decision to remove the applicant from the AGPT Program was made by WAGPET as the relevant training provider on the basis of an alleged failure to comply with the requirements of the program;

(2)    the removal decision was confirmed by WAGPET following an internal review process;

(3)    the confirmation decision was then appealed by the applicant to the Department on 4 February 2020; and

(4)    on 28 April 2020, the Department determined to uphold WAGPET’s decision to remove the applicant from the AGPT Program on the basis that WAGPET’s decision was properly made and complied with the applicable policy.

5    The decisions in (1) and (2) are the subject of the proceeding against WAGPET, whereas the decision in (3) and (4) are the subject of the proceeding against the Commonwealth.

6    Following the summary dismissal of the non-DDA claims, orders were made requiring the applicant to file and serve a further statement of claim by 31 July 2025. Those orders included specific and detailed requirements with regard to the particulars that the statement of claim was to include, namely:

(a)     the disability or disabilities which formed the basis or part of the basis of the alleged act or acts of unlawful discrimination by the Respondent and how the disability or disabilities fall within the interpretation of “disability” under s 3(1) of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DD Act);

(b)     how s 22(2) the DD Act (discrimination in Education) applies to the Applicant in her claim against the Respondent;

(c)     how s 29 of the DD Act (discrimination in Administration of Commonwealth laws and programs) applies to the Applicant in her claim against the Respondent;

(d)     each alleged act or acts taken by the Respondent which are alleged to constitute unlawful discrimination under s 22(2) (discrimination in Education) of the DD Act;

(e)     each alleged act or acts taken by the Respondent which are alleged to constitute unlawful discrimination under s 29 (discrimination in Administration of Commonwealth Laws and Programs); and

(f)    the Applicant's alleged loss arising from the alleged breaches of ss 22(2) and 29 of the DD Act, and how the applicant calculates the alleged loss.

7    The applicant filed a document in time but the document was non-compliant with various of the requirements. By orders on 27 August 2025, the applicant was given a further opportunity until 5 September 2025 to file a statement of claim that complied with the above requirements. The applicant lodged a further document in time but the respondent contended that it too was non-compliant.

8    The respondent then filed an interlocutory application seeking the dismissal of the proceeding under s 192(4)(a) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) (FCAFCA Act) and r 23.08 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (GFL Rules).

9    Section 192(4)(a) of the FCAFCA Act provides that the Court may dismiss a proceeding in whole or in part if a party fails to comply with a direction. Rule 23.08 of the GFL Rules provides that the Court may order that judgment be given against a party if the Court is satisfied, amongst other things, that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or part of the proceeding, if the proceeding is frivolous or vexatious or if no reasonable cause of action is disclosed. It is in effect ancillary to s 143 of the FCAFCA Act which itself provides for the summary dismissal of a proceeding or part of a proceeding if the Court is satisfied that there are no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or part of the proceeding. It is made explicit in s 143(3) that a proceeding need not be hopeless or bound to fail for it to have no reasonable prospect of success.

10    The respondent’s application was heard in an oral hearing whereafter judgment was reserved. Reasons for judgment were published and orders were made some five weeks later on 17 March 2026: Balbir Singh v Commonwealth of Australia (Department of Health and Aged Care) (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC2G 408. The primary judge dismissed the proceeding under s 192(4) of the FCAFCA Act and dismissed the applicant’s oral application made during the hearing for leave to amend and to adjourn the hearing. The primary judge declined to make any costs order and noted that the proceeding would otherwise have been summarily dismissed under s 143 of the FCAFCA Act and r 23.08 of the GFL Rules.

11    The primary judge identified the applicable principles governing the summary dismissal of a proceeding (at [27]-[30]) and whether a pleading discloses a reasonable cause of action (at [31]-[38]).

12    The primary judge acknowledged that he took into account that the applicant is a layperson, and the caution and clarity required to be exercised in relation to summarily determining proceedings (at [39] and [48]). The primary judge found that the applicant had been given a reasonable opportunity to comply with the Court’s prior orders to file a proper statement of claim but had been unable to do so (at [40] and [49]). His Honour was also satisfied that an adjournment or leave to replead would be a futile exercise and not in the interests of the administration of justice (at [40] and [52]).

13    The primary judge was satisfied that the reason the applicant had not filed a proper statement of claim was because there is no proper case that can be identified by the applicant in respect of the alleged contraventions of ss 22(2) and 29 of the DDA (at [41]).

14    The primary judge was satisfied that the pursuit of the proceeding by the applicant would incur an unnecessary waste of public and private resources in circumstances where the applicant has no reasonable prospect of success (at [50]). The primary judge further found that the applicant’s claim is illogical, irrational and vexatious (at [50]).

15    For those reasons, the primary judge made the orders that he made (at [54]).

16    Any application for leave to appeal from the primary judge’s orders was required to have been made within 14 days (r 35.13 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)), which is to say by 31 March 2026. After having tried several times to file an application for leave to appeal in this Court’s Western Australia registry but it having been rejected for various reasons, the applicant filed an application for an extension of time and leave to appeal in the NSW registry on 13 April 2026. In light of the applicant being unrepresented, the short period of time in question and her explanation for the lateness including her earlier unsuccessful attempts to file an application for leave to appeal, the respondent does not oppose the applicant being granted an extension of time. On that basis, I am satisfied that an extension should be granted.

17    The question now is whether the applicant should be granted leave to appeal from the orders of the primary judge. It is not controversial that for leave to appeal to be granted, the Court must be satisfied that:

(1)    the primary judge’s judgment is attended with sufficient doubt such that reconsideration of it in an appeal is warranted; and

(2)    substantial or serious injustice would result if leave to appeal were refused.

(Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; 33 FCR 397 at 398 per Sheppard, Burchett and Heerey JJ.)

18    On the hypothesis that the applicant otherwise has a good claim for unlawful discrimination as sought to be advanced by her in the Circuit Court, and that she has reasonable prospects of successfully appealing against the dismissal of the proceeding, I am satisfied that refusal of leave to appeal would result in substantial or serious injustice to her. That is because her otherwise good claim which is very significant to her would remain summarily dismissed. The second requirement is accordingly established.

19    The focus of the application for leave to appeal is thus on whether the primary judgment is attended with sufficient doubt such as to warrant its reconsideration on appeal. In that regard, it is relevant that the primary judge’s decision was a discretionary decision.

20    The applicant’s draft notice of appeal, omitting the particulars, identifies six proposed grounds of appeal, namely:

(1)    denial of procedural fairness;

(2)    fraud, bad faith and corruption;

(3)    significant apprehension of bias;

(4)    error of law;

(5)    an improper exercise of power; and

(6)    errors of law and jurisdictional errors.

21    In relation to denial of procedural fairness, the applicant complains that a breach of the rules of natural justice occurred in connection with the making of the decision by the primary judge. She says that examples include that the hearing was not conducted in a fair manner and that previous submissions “such as Judges recusal documents” were not processed in a timely manner by the Court’s Perth registry. The applicant has failed to further identify in what way it is said that the hearing was not conducted in a fair manner. I have carefully considered the transcript of the hearing before the primary judge, and I can discern no basis within it, or in the record of the proceeding more broadly, for the applicant’s claim of denial of procedural fairness.

22    There is also no substance to the claim with reference to “recusal documents”, whatever they may be. Nor is it apparent how any error by the registry in that regard could have had any consequence in so far as the primary judge’s orders are concerned. If the applicant means that she wished to apply for the primary judge to disqualify himself, she could have raised that at any stage of the hearing but failed to do so

23    In relation to “fraud, bad faith and corruption”, the applicant says that the primary judge did not consider all the information provided to him. She also says that she was not aware of the level of “ongoing Fraud, Racism and Corruption involved in her cases years ago, because she has only gained insight about this recently”. It is not apparent what information it is said that the primary judge overlooked, or what difference that might have had on the outcome. The applicant had the opportunity during the hearing to draw to the primary judge’s attention to any information that she considered to be important or that he should consider. There is also no basis in the evidence to the allegations of fraud, etc.

24    In relation to apprehension of bias, the applicant says that discretionary powers “may have been exercised”, and that it is “very possible” that they were exercised, in bad faith “because of the wrongful unsavoury rumours spread about [the applicant] everywhere by a corrupt agency”. However, there is no evidence of those rumours, let alone that they reached the primary judge prior to him making a decision, and still less that they influenced him in any way. The “agency” in question is the Department of Health. Before me the applicant explained that the Commonwealth is an extremely powerful body with “tentacles everywhere” and that it could have spread unsavoury rumours about her to the primary judge. The possibility that the applicant refers to does not rise to the level required for an appeal court to intervene, and in any event there is no evidence to establish even the possibility. Needless to say, the applicant’s firm belief in the conspiracy theory that she advances is insufficient for the Court to act – it is required to act on evidence and the applicant has adduced none of any relevance in support of the theory.

25    I have carefully considered the applicant’s written and oral submissions. The applicant has not been able to identify any error of law in the approach adopted by the primary judge, or any jurisdictional error. The applicant says that the primary judge does not appear to have read the appellant’s submissions or health reports. There is no evidential basis for that. In particular, the primary judge did not doubt the claims made by the applicant about her health. His Honour’s conclusion with regard to the poor prospects of her claim related to other elements of the claim which the applicant was unable to identify, let alone show that there was some prospect that she may prove them. I am thus not satisfied that there is such a sufficiently arguable error of law or jurisdictional error ground of appeal as to warrant leave being granted.

26    It has not been possible to discern or identify any reasonable cause of action in the many documents and submissions filed and advanced by the applicant. As explained by the primary judge, the applicant’s documents and oral submissions engage in generalised rhetoric and fail to relevantly address, or even identify, the requisite elements of her proposed claim. She engages instead in grand conspiracy theories without evidential foundation – for example, that New Zealand tried to kill her and then Australia continued that legacy and has been attempting to murder her. I am not satisfied that there is sufficient doubt about the correctness of the primary judge’s conclusion that the applicant has no reasonably arguable cause of action such as to warrant leave to appeal being granted.

27    After the hearing of the application, the applicant sent further submissions and material to my chambers asking the documents to be taken into account. In the interests of ensuring that the applicant had had every opportunity to put before the Court whatever she considered relevant, including taking into account that she is a litigant in person and claims various disabilities, I allowed those documents as submissions. That led to the respondent submitting further submissions, and the applicant then submitting yet a further submission with annexures in response. They do not change anything.

28    In the circumstances, leave to appeal must be refused. The respondent did not seek costs.

Associate:

Dated:    30 October 2026