Federal Court of Australia

Balbir Singh v Western Australian General Practice Education and Training Ltd [2026] FCA 1626

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The time for the applicant to file an application for leave to appeal be extended to the time that the applicant filed her application for an extension of time to file an application for leave to appeal.

2.    Leave to appeal be refused.

3.    There be no order as to costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

STEWART J:

Background

1    The applicant is a qualified medical practitioner. She is unrepresented in this proceeding, as she was in the proceeding before the primary judge.

2    In November 2021, a delegate of the President of the Australian Human Rights Commission terminated a complaint that had been made by the applicant against the respondent, Western Australian General Practice Education & Training Ltd (WAGPET), and the Commonwealth of Australia (Department of Health) alleging discrimination under the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DDA) as well as under other anti-discrimination statutes. The complaint was accepted as valid only to the extent that it was based on the DDA. It was terminated on the basis that there was no reasonable prospect of the matter being settled by conciliation.

3    The applicant thereafter commenced separate proceedings against WAGPET and the Commonwealth in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (Circuit Court). The case against the Commonwealth was dealt with separately in the Circuit Court, and the application for an extension of time for leave to appeal and the consequent application for leave to appeal are being dealt with separately in this Court.

4    As identified in the reasons for judgment in Balbir Singh v Western Australian General Practice Education and Training Ltd [2025] FedCFamC2G 655 at [4], the applicant sought relief under the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) in relation to decisions made in November and December 2019 to terminate the applicant’s involvement in the Australian General Practice Training (AGPT) program. WAGPET was the training provider for the AGPT program which was funded by the Commonwealth Department of Health. One of the conditions for participation in the program was continuing employment at a hospital in Western Australia. The applicant failed to fulfil that condition after her employment at a particular hospital was terminated in October 2019 part way through her three-month period of probationary employment.

5    The letter from WAGPET to the applicant explaining why she was being withdrawn from the AGPT program explained as follows:

WAGPET is aware of your personal circumstances that have had an impact on your ability to comply with your AGPT training obligations. Unfortunately, despite extensions, extensive support and a written warning you have been unable to confirm your placements for Semester 1 and 2, 2020 or the remainder of this year. All GP registrars were to confirm their placements by 31 August 2019 and you were provided with a further nine weeks after this deadline to arrange your placements for next year, in recognition of your circumstances.

The Joondalup Health Campus have confirmed that your last date of employment was 6 October 2019 and you will not be returning there. Your approved Category 2 leave concludes as of 1 November, and as you have been unable to confirm any further placements we have determined that you are unable to comply with your ongoing training requirements.

As a result, from 1 November 2019 you will be withdrawn from the AGPT Program in accordance with the AGPT Withdrawal Policy 2019.

6    The reasons for judgment referred at [4] above dealt with the applicant’s application for an extension of time to commence her proceeding against WAGPET – she was granted such an extension on reasoning that included that “there are possible contraventions of ss 22(2) and 29 of the DD Act which have sufficient arguable merit” (at [158]). She was denied an extension of time in respect of her claims under other anti-discrimination statutes. The broad factual basis to the claims of alleged disability discrimination were identified as follows (at [117]):

(1)    on 1 November 2019, the decision to remove the applicant from the AGPT program was made by WAGPET as the relevant training provider on the basis of an alleged failure to comply with the employment requirement of the AGPT program;

(2)    the removal decision was confirmed by WAGPET following an internal review process;

(3)    the confirmation decision was then appealed by the applicant to the Department on 4 February 2020; and

(4)    on 28 April 2020, the Department determined to uphold WAGPET’s decision to remove the applicant from the AGPT program on the basis that WAGPET’s decision was properly made and complied with the applicable policy.

7    Steps (3) and (4) above are the basis for the claim against the Commonwealth which, as mentioned, is being pursued by the applicant in a separate proceeding.

8    On 9 June 2025, orders were made in the Circuit Court requiring the applicant to serve a statement of claim by 31 July 2025, and that the statement of claim include particulars of six specified matters. The applicant filed a document on 31 July 2025, described as “Submission of Appellant”. WAGPET then applied for the summary dismissal of the proceeding against it or, alternatively, the striking out of the purported statement of claim. The applicant then served a further document, dated 19 August 2025 and titled “Submission of Appellant Statement of Claim”, and sought leave to file it as her amended statement of claim.

9    The competing applications of WAGPET and the applicant came before the Circuit Court for hearing on 19 January 2026. The primary judge dealt with both together. His Honour published reasons and made orders on 17 March 2026 in which he:

(1)    Summarily dismissed the proceeding under s 143 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) (FCAFCA Act) and r 23.08 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth);

(2)    Dismissed the applicant’s oral application for leave to amend;

(3)    Declined to make any order for costs; and

(4)    Noted that the “proceedings” (presumably, in context, “statement of claim” was intended) would otherwise have been struck out under r 192 of the FCAFCA Act.

10    Any application for leave to appeal against those orders was required to have been filed by 31 March 2026. The applicant made several attempts to file notices of appeal and then applications for leave to appeal, starting on 21 March 2026, which were rejected by this Court’s Western Australia registry. Ultimately, on 16 April 2026, an application for an extension of time to file an application for leave to appeal was accepted for filing, it being taken to have been filed on 14 April 2026.

11    The upshot is that the application for leave to appeal was 14 days late, but the applicant has a reasonable explanation for why that is so including that she made efforts within her capabilities as a litigant in person to file documents within the time allowed but they were rejected on account of various defects. WAGPET accepts that it faces no particular prejudice as a consequence of the delay, but opposes the extension of time on the basis that the prospects of success on any application for leave to appeal do not warrant such an extension. In the alternative, it opposes leave to appeal being granted.

12    The proceeding was programmed to deal with the application for an extension of time and the application for leave to appeal, if an extension is granted, together.

13    The applicant’s proposed amended statement of claim makes very little by way of identifiable factual allegations against WAGPET. It fails quite hopelessly to provide the particulars required by the orders referred to above, and it fails in nearly every way to meet the formal requirements of such a document as specified in the applicable rules of court. The document is characterised by sweeping conclusionary restatements such as “[m]y whole life/health/reputation/economy/time/fertility/wellbeing has been destroyed and damaged beyond repair”, “[m]y injuries are as a result of the decisions/actions/activities of others against me” and “[i]nstead of receiving support, compassion, empathy and reasonable adjustments from WAGPET, this Agency discriminated against me, and completely failed to provide me with any reasonable timely adjustments or assistance”. As a further example, it is said that WAGPET “is also a very corrupt entity which keeps promoting fraud/corruption, keeps changing my cases/claims from one type to another to cause me losses, assisting all of the instigators/perpetrators against me, is promoting fraudulent corrupt substandard healthcare for me at times and is encouraging the decrease/embezzlement of my injury compensation funds from both Australia and New Zealand”. No factual allegations are made as a possible foundation to those sweeping conclusions.

14    The document claims losses of more than $50,000,000.

15    Putting it at its highest, the proposed amended statement of claim might be said to advance a claim that WAGPET knew that the applicant was unwell and suffering from disabilities and other traumatic circumstances; nevertheless required her to negotiate its processes without sufficient adjustment or assistance; regarded the medical information she supplied as insufficient; failed to seek clarification from her treating practitioners; and then withdrew her from training. Nevertheless, the document is hopelessly deficient, vague and embarrassing and prejudicial, and it fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The primary judgment

16    The primary judgment is published as Balbir Singh v Western Australian General Practice Education and Training Ltd (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC2G 409. His Honour identified the relevant statutory provisions and legal principles from the authorities dealing with disability discrimination, summary dismissal and strike out. His Honour then identified that the statement of claim and amended statement of claim are clearly embarrassing and disclose no arguable case of contravention of either provision relied on by the applicant, namely ss 22(2) and 29 of the DDA (at [38]).

17    Section 22 of the DDA provides that it is unlawful for an “educational authority” to discriminate against a student on the ground of the student’s disability by denying or limiting the student’s access to any benefits provided by the authority, by expelling the student or by subjecting the student to any other detriment. Section 29 provides that it is unlawful for a person who performs any function or exercises any power under a Commonwealth law or for the purposes of a Commonwealth program, or has any other responsibility for the administration of a Commonwealth law or the conduct of a Commonwealth program, to discriminate against another person on the ground of the other person’s disability in the performance of that function, the exercise of that power or the fulfilment of that responsibility.

18    His Honour then turned to consider whether there would be any utility in giving the applicant leave to file a further amended statement of claim.

19    His Honour reasoned that the condition that the applicant obtain employment by a relevant WA hospital was one that applied under the AGPT program to all doctors, and it cannot be said that the applicant was treated differently to other doctors in respect of the application of that condition. His Honour reasoned that the condition, on its face, was one in relation to a training program that required compliance by the trainee doctor and agreement to employment by a third party. That meant that there was no apparent causal nexus between the disability and the adjustment of the condition as it was not within the control of WAGPET (at [38]).

20    His Honour found there to be no arguable evidentiary basis for the alleged contraventions by WAGPET of ss 22(2) and 29 of the DDA (at [49]-[50]). It was reasoned that there is no proper basis to conclude that WAGPET discriminated against the applicant on the ground of the applicant’s disability in the performance of the functions of the Commonwealth program administered by WAGPET as WAGPET was not in control of the applicant’s employment (at [50]).

21    His Honour noted that the applicant was unrepresented and the need for caution to be exercised in effectively bringing the applicant’s case to an end by refusing leave to amend (at [51]). His Honour was nevertheless “clearly satisfied that the applicant’s case is doomed to failure” and that it was a proper case to exercise the Court’s powers of summary dismissal (at [51]).

The proposed grounds of appeal

22    The applicant served a draft notice of appeal as required. She has also articulated certain criticisms of the primary judgment in a document titled “Statement of Facts For Appeal” and in her written submissions. The various complaints that she makes can conveniently be grouped as follows (the numbering of the grounds being with reference to the applicant’s written submissions):

(1)    Denial of procedural fairness (grounds 1, 4, 7 and 8);

(2)    Bad faith, fraud and corruption by the primary judge (grounds 2 and 3);

(3)    Actual or apprehended bias of the primary judge (grounds 3 and 8); and

(4)    Having regard to irrelevant information and disregarding relevant evidence (grounds 2, 4, 5 and 6).

23    The applicant also articulated at ground 9 that the merits of her case have national and international implications regarding human rights. However, this ground does not identify a complaint against the primary judgment.

The approach to be taken on the extension of time and leave to appeal

24    A decision to summarily dismiss a proceeding on the basis that it is has no reasonable prospects of success is an interlocutory decision: Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 117; 178 FCR 401 at [42]-[43]. The applicant thus requires leave to appeal: s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1979 (Cth).

25    With reference to BQQ15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 218 at [33] per Yates, Wheelahan and O’Bryan JJ, the principles applicable to an application for an extension of time within which to file an application for leave to appeal can be identified as follows:

(a)     Applications for an extension of time are not to be granted unless it is proper to do so; the legislated time limits are not to be ignored.

(b)     There must be some acceptable explanation for the delay.

(c)     Any prejudice to the respondent in defending the proceedings that is caused by the delay is a material factor militating against the grant of an extension.

(d)     The mere absence of prejudice to the respondent is not enough to justify the grant of an extension.

(e)     The merits of the substantial application are to be taken into account in considering whether an extension is to be granted. Leave will not be granted where there are no reasonable prospects of success on the appeal: Kalanje v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 1618 at [5]. The applicant will have no real prospects of success where the case is devoid of merit or clearly fails; is hopeless; or is unarguable. In making an assessment the Court is not required to go into too great a detail, but is to “assess the merits in a fairly rough and ready way”: Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516 at [7]-[9].

(f)     The discretion to extend time is given for the purpose of enabling the Court to do justice between the parties.

26    For leave to appeal to be granted, the Court must be satisfied that:

(1)    the primary judge’s judgment is attended with sufficient doubt such that reconsideration of it in an appeal is warranted; and

(2)    substantial or serious injustice would result if leave to appeal were refused.

(Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; 33 FCR 397 at 398 per Sheppard, Burchett and Heerey JJ.)

27    I accept that if the applicant has a good claim for disability discrimination against WAGPET, which is a claim that is very significant to her, and that she has reasonable prospects of successfully appealing against the dismissal of that claim, she will face significant prejudice if that claim falters now on account of her application for leave to appeal having been filed only 14 days late, and her having a reasonable explanation for that delay. Similarly, to be denied leave to appeal if the claim is otherwise a good claim would cause her serious injustice. I also accept that the 14 days of itself caused no meaningful prejudice to WAGPET.

28    As accepted by counsel for WAGPET, because of the short delay and the explanation for it, the key factor in respect of the discretionary decision to extend time is the Court’s assessment of the prospects of success in the application for leave to appeal and hence in the proposed appeal. I will accordingly turn to that issue by considering each proposed ground of appeal as identified above.

Denial of procedural fairness

29    The applicant alleges that she was denied procedural fairness because:

(1)    previous “submissions such as Judges recusal documents were not processed in a timely manner by the Perth Registry” (ground 1);

(2)    the primary judge repeatedly told the applicant that her submissions and evidence were vexatious and regularly interrupted her, and she was not permitted to make submissions (grounds 1 and 8);

(3)    there was “no respect provided to” the applicant as an “injured female” (grounds 1 and 4); and

(4)    the primary judge failed to consider that the applicant was “seriously injured” and a self-represented litigant (ground 7).

30    The transcript of the hearing before the primary judge is before me. The hearing lasted two hours including a short break that was requested by the applicant (T26:8-20). Of the 28 pages of transcript of the parties’ submissions (as opposed to five pages of preliminaries and formalities), around two pages record the submissions on behalf of WAGPET (T7:19 – 8:16; 33:36 – 35:1) and 25 pages record the submissions of the applicant (T8:20 – 33:29). It is apparent from the transcript that the applicant had ample opportunity in the hearing to raise whatever matters she wished to raise.

31    It is not apparent what “Judges recusal documents” the applicant refers to. If she wished to make a disqualification application in the hearing, it was open for her to do so. She did not.

32    The transcript does not support any submission that the applicant was repeatedly interrupted, impeded in presenting her case or treated rudely or inappropriately. The primary judge stopped the applicant making submissions in support of a sexual harassment and racial discrimination case on the basis that she had previously been granted an extension of time only in respect of the disability discrimination case. The applicant accepted that and then continued with her submissions on disability discrimination (T14:7-16). The word “vexatious” appears in the transcript only once, and it was spoken by the applicant and not by the judge (T14:5).

33    The transcript does not support the contention that the applicant was shown no respect, or that she was shown no respect “as an injured female”.

34    There is simply no apparent basis to the applicant’s contention that she was denied procedural fairness in the proceeding before the primary judge. This proposed ground of appeal has no prospect of succeeding.

Bad faith, fraud and corruption by the primary judge

35    On this ground, the applicant contends that the primary judge “did not consider all the information provided to him”. She also says that she “was not aware of the level of ongoing Fraud, Racism and Corruption involved in her cases years ago, because she has only gained insight about this recently” and that the “fraud and corruption against [her] is extensive, promoting negative outcomes against her”.

36    None of these very serious contentions is particularised, and no evidence is offered in support of them. They have no prospect of succeeding in the proposed appeal.

Actual or apprehended bias of the primary judge

37    The applicant contends that there is a reasonable apprehension that the primary judge was biased against her because he did not consider her “serious health injuries or extraordinarily bad circumstances properly”. Further, she contends that the primary judge’s discretion may have been exercised against her in bad faith “because of the wrongful unsavoury rumours spread about [her] everywhere by a corrupt agency”. She says that it is “very possible” that the primary judge’s decision making was biased against her.

38    Once again, none of these very serious contentions is particularised, and no evidence is offered in support of them. There is nothing in the manner in which the primary judge conducted the proceeding before him or in his reasons for judgment that might support a case of actual or apprehended bias. Nor is there any basis for the contention that the primary judge can be faulted for not considering the applicant’s alleged serious injuries or bad circumstances.

39    The applicant’s bias contentions have no prospect of succeeding in the proposed appeal.

Having regard to irrelevant information and disregarding relevant evidence

40    The applicant contends that the primary judge “appears to have considered irrelevant information and disregarded relevant evidence”. She says that the primary judge failed to properly consider the merits of her case and instead focused on irrelevant issues, and that he failed to properly consider the serious, genuine discrimination she had described.

41    As one would expect, the primary judge’s reasons for judgment do not refer to every document and every assertion that was before him. However, that does not establish that there is material that he failed to consider. More particularly, the applicant has failed to identify any reasonably arguable error in the approach of the primary judge to the task before him or how consideration of some identified material would have led to a different result.

42    During the hearing, the applicant placed particular emphasis on the leave policy that applied to the AGPT program. She submits that rather than being withdrawn from the program, she should have been granted leave from it under one or other category of leave that may have been available to her. She does not say that she asked for that outcome, but only that it should have been offered and explained to her.

43    Category 2 leave was available for “Personal reasons” and required approval of the Department. Category 4 leave was for the deferral of the commencement of training and it was relevantly only available in “Extenuating and Unforeseen Circumstances”.

44    There is no evidence before me to support the contention that WAGPET knew that the applicant was suffering any relevant disability prior to its decision to withdraw her from the program on 1 November 2019. What contemporaneous evidence there is indicates the contrary. The correspondence between the applicant and WAGPET in the lead up to the withdrawal decision refers to the applicant having faced “traumatic circumstances” and being “homeless” but there is no particularity beyond that. WAGPET’s record of the meeting with the applicant on 1 November 2019 where an attempt was made to hand to her the letter recording the decision to withdraw her from the AGPT program (which she refused to accept), records an acknowledgement that the applicant had kept WAGPET informed of her “circumstances but no detail had been provided” and that she had “previously declined to provide any specific detail as to why she was no longer in the Anaesthetic training program”.

45    Moreover, it is apparent that the applicant was aware of the different leave categories available to her as she had applied for and been granted category 4 leave from January 2019 to July 2019, and she had thereafter had category 2 leave which concluded on 1 November 2019 (as recorded in the withdrawal letter extracted above). In those circumstances, a claim that WAGPET should have on its own initiative offered a “reasonable adjustment” in the form of proposing to the applicant that she apply for leave rather than be withdrawn from the program has poor prospects. More particularly, the applicant’s contentions with regard to her not having been offered leave from the AGPT program do not identify any error by the primary judge in the exercise of his discretion to refuse her leave to further amend her statement of claim and to summarily dismiss the proceeding.

46    This ground has poor prospects of succeeding in the proposed appeal.

Disposition

47    I have considered the following:

(1)    the applicant’s oral submissions;

(2)    the applicant’s written submissions dated 1 July 2026 and 21 August 2026;

(3)    the applicant’s affidavits dated 14 April 2026 and 8 June 2026;

(4)    the court book which includes the material before the primary judge and a transcript of the hearing before that judge.

48    In the result, for the reasons already given I am satisfied that the applicant should be granted an extension of time to file her application for leave to appeal. However, there is insufficient doubt in the correctness of the primary judgment to justify leave to appeal being granted.

49    The respondent has not sought costs.

Associate:

Dated:    30 October 2026