Federal Court of Australia

Jahani v Qiu, in the matter of Ralan Property Services Pty Ltd (receivers and managers appointed) (in liq) (non-party application) [2026] FCA 1619

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    Suichun Lin is not required to file an interlocutory application in respect of the request determined by these orders.

2.    Ms Lin’s request for leave to be heard or participate in the proceeding by advancing the statement and attachments circulated by her on 6 September 2026 is refused.

3.    In relation to that statement and those attachments:

(a)    leave to tender the materials is refused; and

(b)    the material is not received as a submission by Ms Lin as a non-party.

4.    There be no order as to costs of Ms Lin’s request.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

CHEESEMAN J:

INTRODUCTION

1    Suichun Lin, also known as Erin Lin, seeks permission to place written material before the Court in this corporate insolvency proceeding. The liquidators and corporate plaintiffs seek relief concerning alleged voidable transactions and involvement in breaches of directors’ duties associated with the release and use of purchaser deposits within the Ralan Group together with payments and property transfers to the defendants. I described the substantive dispute in Jahani v Qiu, in the matter of Ralan Property Services Pty Ltd (receivers and managers appointed) (in liq) (leave to amend pleadings) [2026] FCA 398 at [3]-[5] and [28]-[36]. I use “Ralan Group” in the same sense as in that judgment. The final hearing is listed to commence on 1 February 2027, following vacation of the hearing previously listed to commence on 28 September 2026: Jahani v Qiu, in the matter of Ralan Property Services Pty Ltd (receivers and managers appointed) (in liq) (costs) [2026] FCA 1419 at [1]-[4].

2    The effects of the Ralan Group collapse extend beyond the parties to this proceeding. That context does not dispense with the need to identify how proposed participation would assist the Court to determine the pleaded claims on admissible evidence.

3    Ms Lin describes herself as an affected off-the-plan purchaser and unsecured creditor. Her request has evolved. On 20 August 2026, she sought guidance about participation by affected purchasers and creditors as interested persons. On 26 August 2026, she filed a notice of appearance describing herself as an unsecured creditor of Ralan Group companies for $179,500, without identifying the particular company indebted to her.

4    On 3 September 2026, Ms Lin explained that the Committee of the Ralan Purchasers’ Rights Alliance had decided that she should seek permission to speak on its behalf, rather than have several purchasers and creditors appear separately. She proposed that she make a short oral presentation or provide a written submission with supporting material, without advancing a separate claim, cross-examining witnesses, interfering with the plaintiffs’ case or duplicating the parties’ submissions. She wished to proceed only if neither she nor the Alliance would face adverse costs exposure and sought protection against that possibility at the outset.

5    On 4 September 2026, my Associate communicated my decision not to grant Ms Lin leave to appear or make oral submissions on behalf of the Alliance. She was informed that she could prepare and serve the proposed document and ascertain whether the parties consented to its receipt into evidence, should the Court determine that it was relevant. By that communication, I neither granted leave to participate nor determined admissibility.

6    On 6 September 2026, Ms Lin circulated her proposed statement and attachments. She did so in her personal capacity. She disclaimed representation of others, did not seek to be joined as a party, did not seek relief against the defendants and said that she would not make submissions on the defendants’ liability. She asked the Court to receive the documents to the extent that they were relevant and admissible, leaving their permissible use and weight to be determined by the Court.

7    The plaintiffs neither consent to nor oppose the Court’s consideration of Ms Lin’s statement. Their neutrality does not amount to consent to admission of the material or acceptance of the propositions made in it. The defendants indicated that they oppose the Court relying on any of the material provided by Ms Lin. They have not, and were not required to, develop the particular grounds on which they rely in support of their objection.

8    Rule 2.13(1) of the Federal Court (Corporations) Rules 2000 (Cth) (Corporations Rules) permits the Court to grant leave to a person who is, or claims to be, a creditor of a corporation, or another interested person, to be heard without becoming a party. Eligibility to seek leave does not establish an entitlement to participate. The Court must exercise the discretion in the way that best promotes the overarching purpose in s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth): the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible. Relevant considerations may include the connection between the asserted interest and the issues, the assistance proposed participation would provide, and its consequences for the timely and proportionate conduct of the proceeding.

9    Leave to be heard does not dispense with the rules of evidence. Section 91(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) excludes evidence of a decision or finding of fact in another proceeding when tendered to prove the existence of a fact that was in issue in that proceeding. Section 91(2) prevents evidence that is inadmissible under Pt 3.5 from being used to prove that fact even if the evidence is relevant for another purpose.

10    For the reasons that follow, I refuse Ms Lin leave to be heard or otherwise participate in the proceeding, and decline to receive her statement and the attachments to it into evidence.

CONSIDERATION

11    Ms Lin describes two off-the-plan purchase contracts with Ralan Paradise No. 2 Pty Ltd (the ninth plaintiff in this proceeding) and Ralan Paradise No. 3 Pty Ltd (the tenth plaintiff in this proceeding). She states that Ralan Property Services QLD Pty Ltd (the fourth plaintiff in this proceeding) (Ralan Qld) acted as agent and deposit holder. The deposits totalled $179,500. Under side agreements, $179,300 was to be transferred to Ralan Capital Investment Pty Ltd (the eighth plaintiff in this proceeding) and treated as loans, leaving $100 of each deposit: Lin v Chief Executive, Department of Justice and Attorney-General, Office of Fair Trading & Ors [2024] QCAT 371 at [8]-[14], [18]-[24], [28] (Member Lumb).

12    Ms Lin states that the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) allowed her claim against the “Claim Fund” wholly, assessed her financial loss at $179,300 and identified Ralan Qld as liable for that loss: Lin v Chief Executive at [86]-[93], [115]-[116]. She also states that she received her principal Claim Fund entitlement of $179,300 in November 2024.

13    Her material does not identify the company against which she now maintains a creditor claim, its basis or the amount remaining unpaid. Nor does it explain the effect of the QCAT orders and payment on her asserted interest. I do not infer that the payment extinguished every possible claim or interest. Equally, the amount of her original deposits does not establish her present creditor interest or explain how the outcome of this proceeding would affect any remaining entitlement.

14    I need not decide whether those deficiencies preclude Ms Lin from being an interested person under r 2.13 of the Corporations Rules. I assume in her favour that she could establish a sufficient connection to seek leave. On that assumption, the question is whether her proposed participation would assist the determination of this proceeding consistently with the overarching purpose.

15    Ms Lin relies on her participation in the proceeding determined by Farrell J in Jahani, in the matter of Ralan Group Pty Ltd (in liquidation) [2022] FCA 107. That application concerned money remaining in the statutory trust account of Ralan Qld and the liquidators’ entitlement to remuneration and expenses secured by an equitable lien over it. Ms Lin was among the depositors granted leave to be heard on the application: at [21]-[24], [89]. Their asserted interests in the fund were directly affected by the orders sought. This proceeding does not concern distribution of that fund or determination of Ms Lin’s entitlement to it. The earlier leave therefore does not establish a basis for participation here.

16    Ms Lin also relies on the liquidators’ recorded position in that proceeding that the release of funds under side letters caused loss to depositors rather than Ralan Qld: at [27(e)]. Although Farrell J accepted the liquidators’ explanations recorded at [27], the decision did not determine whether any plaintiff in this proceeding suffered loss in connection with a particular deposit-release transaction: at [125] and [133]. Whether a plaintiff suffered recoverable loss here requires examination of the particular company, transaction and cause of action. Ms Lin does not identify a pleaded allegation to which the earlier position applies or otherwise explain its relevance.

17    The later decision of Stewart J in Jahani, in the matter of Ralan Property Services Pty Ltd (receivers and managers appointed) (in liq) [2023] FCA 738 concerned applications for approval of three litigation funding agreements and three retainer agreements, together with directions concerning the use of one company’s funds to finance recovery proceedings and the pursuit of claims that might fall within secured creditors’ security interests. It recognised that recoveries might benefit creditors of the plaintiff companies and, through inter-company indebtedness, other Ralan companies, subject to the possible effect of secured creditors’ interests. The application did not determine the defendants’ liability in the recovery proceedings. Although creditors of the company plaintiffs were notified, none sought leave to be heard. That context does not identify Ms Lin’s present claim or demonstrate the utility of granting her leave to participate in this proceeding in the way in which she now seeks to do.

18    Ms Lin’s statement combines her account of transactions, findings in other proceedings, statutory material and propositions about the deposit-release arrangements. Despite disclaiming an intention to make submissions on the defendants’ ultimate liability, she contends that QCAT has determined the illegality of the arrangements and that the consumer-protection framework is central to this proceeding. Those are substantive propositions, not merely an account of her circumstances.

19    The present claims concern commissions, property transfers and alleged assistance in breaches of duties owed by the first defendant to particular companies. The claims must be determined by reference to the respective pleaded elements, the applicable law and the evidence. Ms Lin makes general assertions that the same scheme, trust account and class of purchasers are involved, but does not connect her material with a particular transaction, duty, allegation of knowledge, act of assistance or item of company loss requiring determination in this proceeding. Nor does she identify a gap in the parties’ evidence or submissions that her material will address. The plaintiffs already address the Queensland deposit protections and deposit-release arrangements. She has not demonstrated that her material would add anything other than being an illustration of the broader circumstances.

20    Ms Lin’s proposed reliance on QCAT’s findings presents a separate difficulty. QCAT made those findings in an administrative review proceeding concerning her Claim Fund claim: Lin v Chief Executive at [1]-[6]. That character does not place the findings outside s 91 of the Evidence Act. To the extent that Ms Lin seeks to prove disputed facts concerning trust-account payments, misapplication of her property or participation in the scheme by relying on those findings, s 91(1) prohibits that use. Describing them as supporting context does not avoid the prohibition. The decision’s legal reasoning, or the existence and legal effect of its orders, may raise different questions, but her request does not adequately distinguish those uses from proof of the facts found.

21    The proposed use of an ASIC media release concerning the criminal prosecution of William O’Dwyer is similarly unexplained. Ms Lin acknowledges that the criminal prosecution concerned deception of lenders and did not determine the Queensland trust-account contraventions concerning her deposits. She nevertheless offers it as “independent supporting context” for the broader arrangements, without identifying the fact in issue it would prove or any permissible evidentiary basis for the proposed use.

22    I have considered the substance of Ms Lin’s request without requiring technical precision. Nevertheless, relevance and admissibility cannot remain unresolved when a non-party seeks to introduce factual material into contested litigation. Her statement does not adequately distinguish evidence from legal argument, identify the permissible use of each attachment or address the evidentiary obstacles.

23    Ms Lin’s personal connection with the arrangements, the confinement of her request to written material and her assertion that she does not seek separate relief or seek to cross-examine favour consideration of the request. Her wish to place affected purchasers’ circumstances before the Court is understandable. Those matters do not, however, establish that her participation will assist in the determination of the claims advanced in this proceeding. Receipt of the material risks extending the dispute to select purchaser-specific transactions, QCAT’s findings, Claim Fund payments and separate criminal proceedings. The parties would require a fair opportunity to address those matters if they were to bear on liability. Ms Lin has not demonstrated utility sufficient to justify that burden.

24    Ms Lin’s wish to avoid adverse costs exposure does not itself warrant refusal. However, she has stated that she will only proceed if neither she nor the Alliance is exposed to any risk of an adverse costs order, and sought guidance as to a course by which that could be achieved, including whether there should be no order as to costs in relation to her participation. Rule 2.13(2) expressly contemplates orders concerning additional costs caused by the attendance of a person granted leave. If her participation served to broaden the dispute and occasion additional costs, I would not consider it appropriate to foreclose the possibility of an adverse costs order at this stage. That question should remain for consideration at the conclusion of the hearing in light of the circumstances then existing. The condition Ms Lin has attached to her participation therefore weighs against leave.

25    I have considered more confined participation. The difficulty is not simply the material’s length or form, but the absence of an identified issue and permissible use. It is not the Court’s role to formulate a basis for Ms Lin’s participation which she has not identified. In applying the overarching purpose, I must consider justice according to law as well as efficiency. I do not refuse the request merely to expedite the proceeding. I refuse it because Ms Lin has not demonstrated how her participation would assist in determining the pleaded claims, has not addressed the evidentiary difficulties and proposes material that risks extending the dispute into collateral matters without demonstrating any corresponding assistance to the Court.

CONCLUSION

26    Ms Lin’s request for leave to tender her statement and supporting material, or for the Court to receive that material by way of a submission, is refused. I make no order as to costs of the request. This decision does not determine any claim Ms Lin may have against a Ralan Group company. Nor does it determine any question of the defendants’ liability, which remains for determination at the substantive hearing.

Associate:

Dated:    28 October 2026

SCHEDULE OF PARTIES