Federal Court of Australia

Estate of the late Hartikainen v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission [2026] FCA 1605

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The applicant is granted leave to further amend the originating application filed 30 January 2026 to include reference, in paragraph 2 of the relief sought, to s 26 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation (Defence-related Claims) Act 1988 (Cth) and s 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (second further amended originating application).

2.    The second further amended originating application is dismissed.

3.    I will hear the parties as to costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

LONGBOTTOM J:

OVERVIEW

1    At issue in this proceeding is the power of the Federal Court to make an order for interest in respect of a decision of the Administrative Review Tribunal awarding compensation to a member of the Defence Force under s 24 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation (Defence-related Claims) Act 1988 (Cth) (DRCA) for an injury resulting in permanent impairment.

2    The decision was made by the Tribunal on 7 August 2025 (ART decision). It concerned a proceeding initiated by the Estate of the late Judith Hartikainen. The Estate sought a review of a reviewable decision dated 31 March 2022 (the reviewable decision) which affirmed a determination dated 5 January 2022 that compensation was payable to the late Mrs Hartikainen under s 24 of the DRCA (the s 24 determination). Section 24 renders the Commonwealth liable to pay compensation where an injury to a member of the Defence Force results in their permanent impairment: see also, DRCA, s 4 (“employee”).

3    The ART decision awarded the Estate “additional compensation” in respect of Mrs Hartikainen’s injury. It gave effect to the terms of a written agreement dated 24 July 2025 and signed on behalf of the respondent (Commission) and the Executor: Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth), s 103. While not stated in the ART decision, it is not in issue that the amount of the additional compensation was $47,086.94.

4    The additional compensation was paid on or around 24 September 2025 into an account in the name of “Judith Hartikainen” (first account). It was not, however, the specific account that the Executor had asked that the money be paid into (second account). The Commission caused the money to be recalled from the first account and repaid into the second account, which did not occur until 26 February 2026.

5    In the intervening period, on 30 January 2026, the Executor commenced a proceeding in the Federal Court. The originating application sought a writ of mandamus under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), directing the Commission to give effect to the ART decision, together with an order for interest under s 51A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and costs on an indemnity basis.

6    On 28 May 2026, the Executor amended the originating application, following payment of the additional compensation into the second account. The amended originating application removed the claim for a writ of mandamus, but the Executor presses the claim for interest (until 26 February 2026) and costs.

7    For the following reasons, I am not satisfied that the Court has the power or, if I am wrong, that I ought to exercise the discretion, to make an order that the Commission pay interest on the additional compensation. I will, therefore, refuse that aspect of the relief sought by the Executor and give the parties an opportunity to make submissions with respect to the question of costs.

Amendment application

8    On the eve of the hearing, the Executor filed an interlocutory application seeking leave to rely on s 26 of the DRCA and s 23 of the Federal Court Act as the source of the Court’s power to make an order for the payment of interest. The application was treated as an application to further amend the originating application.

9    The application was made in the context of a concession, foreshadowed in the Executor’s reply submissions, but explicitly stated at the hearing, that the Court does not have power under s 51A of the Federal Court Act to make an order for the payment of interest in respect of the “additional compensation”. That is because, as the Commission stated in their written submissions, interest cannot be awarded under s 51A of the Federal Court Act in a proceeding brought for judicial review, as it is not a proceeding “for the recovery of … money”: Comptroller-General of Customs v Kawasaki Motors Pty Ltd (No 2) (1991) 32 FCR 243 at pp 266-267 (Hill and Heerey JJ); cf, Beaumont J at pp 254-255. Consistent with that concession, at the hearing the Executor sought, the Commission did not oppose, and I granted leave to further amend the originating application to remove the reference to s 51A of the Federal Court Act.

10    The Commission opposes the Executor being granted leave to further amend the originating application. The Commission characterises the contention the Court has power under either s 26 of the DRCA or s 23 of the Federal Court Act to make an order for interest as hopeless and bound to fail and contends that the application to amend the originating application should be refused on that ground. However, the Commission did not contend that it was prejudiced by the late application to amend.

leave to amend

Relevant principles

11    An applicant may apply under r 8.21(1) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) for leave to amend an originating application for any reason, including to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings (r 8.21(1)(b)) and to substitute a new foundation in law for a claim for relief that arises out of the same facts as those already pleaded to support an existing claim (r 8.21(1)(g)(i)).

12    The onus is on the party seeking leave to amend to persuade the Court that such leave should be given: Dye v Commonwealth Securities Limited (No 2) [2010] FCAFC 118 at [17] (Marshall, Rares and Flick JJ).

13    The Court’s discretionary power under r 8.21(1) of the Rules is broad. That power must, however, be exercised in accordance with the overarching purpose set out in s 37M of the Federal Court Act, being to facilitate the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible. That “overarching purpose includes, as objectives, the efficient use of the judicial and administrative resources of the Court, the efficient disposal of the Court’s overall caseload, and the disposal of proceedings in a timely manner”: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Cassimatis (No 6) [2016] FCA 622 at [8] (Edelman J).

14    The considerations identified in Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27; (2009) 239 CLR 175 are material in that respect: see Tamaya Resources Limited (in liq) v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (A Firm) [2015] FCA 1098 at [127] (Gleeson J), as cited with approval by the Full Court in Tamaya Resources Limited (in liq) v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (A Firm) [2016] FCAFC 2; (2016) 332 ALR 199 at [125] (Gilmour, Perram and Beach JJ).

15    Justice Gleeson identified those considerations in Tamaya Resources at [127], as follows:

(1)    The nature and importance of the amendment to the party applying for it: Aon at [102];

(2)    The extent of the delay and the costs associated with the amendment: Aon at [102];

(3)    The prejudice that might be assumed to follow from the amendment, and that which is shown: Aon at [5], [100] and [102];

(4)    The explanation for any delay in applying for that leave: Aon at [108]; and

(5)    The parties’ choices to date in the litigation and the consequences of those choices: Aon at [112] and Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink [2015] FCAFC 75 (“Luck”) at [44];

(6)    The detriment to other litigants in the Court: Aon at [93], [95] and [114] and Luck at [44]; and

(7)    Potential loss of public confidence in the legal system which can arise where a court is seen to accede to applications made without adequate explanation or justification: Aon at [5], [24] and [30].

16    It has been observed in the context of an application for leave to amend a pleading under r 16.53 of the Rules, that the “starting point [is] that all amendments should be made and allowed that are necessary to ensure the real questions in controversy between the parties are decided”: Oswal v Apache Corporation (No 3) [2014] FCA 835 at [5] (Gilmour J). On the other hand, it has also been said that leave to amend should not be granted if the pleaded case as amended would be hopeless, such that the pleadings would be liable to be struck out or summarily dismissed: Firew v Services Australia [2026] FCA 305 at [37] (Bromwich J) and the authorities there cited.

Consideration

17    The application to further amend the originating application engages with r 8.21(1)(g)(i) of the Rules in that, while the Executor has not “pleaded” facts, in effect, what is sought is to substitute a new foundation in law for the claim for interest on the basis of the facts currently in evidence, which facts are not relevantly in dispute.

18    The Commission does not point to any prejudice that would follow from the grant of leave to amend the originating application. At the hearing, the Commission addressed both its contention that s 26 of the DRCA and s 23 of the Federal Court Act do not provide a foundation in law for the relief sought and, if that submission was not accepted, why interest should not be awarded in any event. Given the absence of prejudice, and the fact that there has already been substantive argument on the relief sought by the Executor, I consider that the overarching purpose set out in s 37M of the Federal Court Act is best served by granting leave to further amend the originating application so that all matters in controversy between the parties may be completely and finally determined.

19    I will, therefore, grant the Executor leave to further amend the originating application to include reference to s 26 of the DRCA and s 23 of the Federal Court Act, but reserve the costs of the application.

power

Does the Court have power under s 26 of the DRCA to award interest in respect of the additional compensation?

20    Dealing then with the first provision on which the Executor relies, s26 of the DRCA (current s 26) provides as follows:

26    Payment of compensation

(1)    Subject to this section, an amount of compensation payable to an employee under section 24 or 25, shall be paid to the employee within 30 days after the date of the assessment of the amount.

(2)    Where an amount of compensation is not paid to an employee in accordance with subsection (1), interest is payable to the employee on that amount in respect of the period commencing on the expiration of the period of 30 days referred to in that subsection and ending on the day on which the amount is paid.

(3)    Interest payable under subsection (2) shall be paid at such rate as is from time to time specified by the Minister for the purposes of this section by legislative instrument.

(4)    This section does not apply if an application for review of the determination under section 24 or 25 has been made under Part 4 of Chapter 8 of the MRCA (see section 62 of this Act).

21    The Executor submits that he is entitled to interest on the additional compensation under the current s 26. That is because the amount of additional compensation was not paid within 30 days and the exception in s 26(4) of the DRCA does not apply. Subsection 26(4) refers to a review of a “determination” under Part 4 of Ch 8 of the Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2004 (Cth): DRCA, s 4 (“MRCA”). Part 4 of Ch 8 of the MRCA provides for a “claimant” to make an application to the Veterans’ Review Board for a review of a determination s 24 of the DRCA if the criteria stated in s 62 of the DRCA are met: MRCA, s 5 (“Board”) and s 352A.

22    The Commission says that the current s 26 does not govern the right to interest in respect of the additional compensation. Rather, the Commission relies on s 26 of the DRCA as in force at the time the s 24 determination and the reviewable decision was made (former s 26), which provides as follows:

26    Payment of compensation

(1)     Subject to this section, an amount of compensation payable to an employee under section 24 or 25, shall be paid to the employee within 30 days after the date of the assessment of the amount.

(2)    Where an amount of compensation is not paid to an employee in accordance with subsection (1), interest is payable to the employee on that amount in respect of the period commencing on the expiration of the period of 30 days referred to in that subsection and ending on the day on which the amount is paid.

(3)    Interest payable under subsection (2) shall be paid at such rate as is from time to time specified by the Minister for the purposes of this section by legislative instrument.

(4)    This section does not apply where:

(a)    the MRCC has been requested under Part VI to reconsider a determination under section 24 or 25, as the case may be; or

(b)    a proceeding in respect of such a determination has been instituted under Part VI.

23    The acronym “MRCC” was defined by the former s 4 of the DRCA to mean the Commission. In these reasons, I will use “former” to denote the DRCA as in force at the time the s 24 determination and the reviewable decision was made and “current” to denote the DRCA as in force at the time the ART decision was made.

24    The Commission contends that the Executor does not have a statutory entitlement to interest on the additional compensation under the former s 26 as a proceeding in respect of the reviewable decision was instituted under Part VI, thereby engaging the exception in former s 26(4)(b) of the DRCA.

25    The Executor disputes that the former s 26 applies to the additional compensation. But, in any event, he submits that the expression “determination” in the former s 26(4)(b) is not engaged. That is because, “a proceeding in respect of such a determination” refers to a proceeding challenging a decision by the Tribunal, such as the ART decision, and not a proceeding instituted in the Tribunal to challenge a reviewable decision with respect to a s 24 determination.

Consideration

26    For the following reasons, I consider that the former s 26 applies to the additional compensation the subject of the ART decision, with the consequence that it does not provide a legal foundation for an award of interest.

How is the former s 26(4)(b) to be construed?

27    The former s 26(4)(b) refers to a proceeding instituted under Part VI in respect of such a determination. The use of the word “such” makes evident that the determination referred to is of a kind already mentioned in the section, being a determination under either s 24 or s 25 of the former DRCA.

28    Part VI of the former DRCA concerned the reconsideration and review of determinations. The expression “determination” was relevantly defined in Part VI to include one made under s 24: former DRCA, s 60. Part VI provided in respect of such a determination for:

(a)    A “claimant” to request that a “determining authority” reconsider the determination: former DRCA, s 62(2)(a); see also, s 63. A “claimant” was defined as the person in respect of whom a determination is made and “determining authority” as the person who made the determination: former DRCA, s 62; and

(b)    A claimant to apply to the Tribunal for a review of a “reviewable decision”, which was relevantly defined as a decision made under s 62: former s 60 (“reviewable decision”).

29    Thus, it can be seen that the former Part VI provided a mechanism for:

(a)    an internal review of a determination made under s 24 by the determining authority (here the Commission) at the request of a person in respect of whom a determination is made, the outcome of which was defined as a “reviewable decision”; and

(b)    an application to the Tribunal for a review of a reviewable decision by the person in respect of whom the determination under the former s 24 was made.

30    The former Part VI went on to make provision with respect to the evidence that may be adduced in proceedings “instituted” in the Tribunal (s 66) and the costs of each party with respect to proceedings “instituted” in that forum (s 67). The only reference in the former Part VI to the “institution” of a “proceeding” is to the Tribunal.

31    The text of the former s 26, considered in the context of the provisions detailed above, makes plain that s 26(4) is engaged, and the statutory entitlement to interest on compensation does not arise, if either the Commission has been requested to reconsider a determination made under s 24, or a proceeding has been instituted in the Tribunal seeking a review of the resulting “reviewable decision” : cf, SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; (2017) 262 CLR 362; at [14] (Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ).

32    That construction gives effect both to the use of the word “such” in the former s 26(4) and the provisions of the former Part VI, which establish a mechanism for an internal review of a determination under s 24 (resulting in a “reviewable decision”), in respect of which a claimant can then institute proceedings in the Tribunal for a further review: former DRCA, ss 60, 62 and 64. It is also consistent with the former s 4(12) which deals with interpretation of the statute and provides:

A reference in this Act to the institution of a proceeding under Part VI in respect of a reviewable decision is a reference to the making of an application to the [Tribunal] for a review of that decision.

33    Finally, there is nothing in the former Part VI which supports the argument advanced by the Executor that the proceeding to which the former s 26(4) refers is one instituted in respect of a decision by the Tribunal. The former Part VI governs aspects of a proceeding before the Tribunal, but does not deal with the rights of a party seeking a review of the decision the Tribunal makes. The right to appeal a decision made by the Tribunal either to a guidance and appeals panel or the Federal Court is dealt with in Parts 5 and 7 of the Tribunal Act, respectively.

34    It follows that I am satisfied that “a proceeding in respect of … a determination” in the former s 26(4)(b) of the DRCA is a proceeding in the Tribunal seeking a review of a “determination” under s 24 that has been the subject of a reviewable decision. That is, it engages the reviewable decision.

35    If the former, rather than the current, s 26 applies, that has the necessary consequence that it does not provide an entitlement to interest in respect of the “additional compensation”. That is because, as the Commission submits, the former s 26(4) expressly carves out an entitlement to interest where, as here, a proceeding has been instituted in the Tribunal in respect of a reviewable decision.

Does the former s 26 or the current s 26 apply to the additional compensation the subject of the ART decision?

36    The current s 26 was introduced by Part 1 of Sch 3 of the Veterans’ Entitlements, Treatment and Support (Simplification and Harmonisation) Act 2025 (Cth). Part 1 of Sch 3 of the Simplification Act also omitted the former Part VI of the DRCA.

37    The consequences of the amendment to the DRCA to include the current s 26 are addressed in the Military Rehabilitation and Compensation (Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Act 2004 (Cth).

38    Section 27 of the Transitional Provisions Act provides:

27    Determinations under the DRCA

(1)    Subject to this Part, the amendments of the DRCA made by Part 1 of Schedule 3 to the Simplification Act apply in relation to a determination that is made under the DRCA on or after the review pathway commencement day, whether the claim to which the determination relates was made before, on or after that day.

(2)    Subject to this Part, the old DRCA continues to apply on and after the review pathway commencement day in relation to a determination that was made under the DRCA before that day.

Note:    See Division 5 of this Part for other transitional provisions relating to the review of determinations made under the DRCA.

(Emphasis added)

39    The meaning of s 27 is informed by the Simplification Act and the definitions in s 25 of the Transition Act. In summary:

(a)    The amendments made by Part 1 of Sch 3 to the Simplification Act include the repeal of the former s 26 of the DRCA and its substitution with the current s 26: Simplification Act, s 23.

(b)    The “review pathway commencement date” is defined by s 25 of the Transitional Provisions Act as the day on which Part 1 of Sch 3 of the Simplification Act commences. Part 1 of Sch 3 commenced on 21 April 2025: Simplification Act, s 2.

(c)    The expression “old DRCA” is defined by s 25 of the Transitional Provisions Act as the DRCA, as in force immediately before the “review pathway commencement date”.

40    Thus, the “old DRCA continues to apply” to the s 24 determination as it was made on 5 January 2022, before the “review pathway commencement date” of 21 April 2025. The “old DRCA” includes the former s 26. As such, there is no entitlement under the DRCA to interest on the additional compensation because the exception in the former s 26(4)(b) was enlivened by the Tribunal proceedings resulting in the ART decision.

Does the Court have power under s 23 of the Federal Court Act to make an award of interest?

41    Turning to s 23 of the Federal Court Act, the Court has power under that section, in relation to matters in which it has jurisdiction, to make orders of such kinds as the Court thinks appropriate. Its effect is to equip the Court with powers arising either expressly or by implication from the statute which confers it with jurisdiction and with powers that are incidental and necessary to the exercise of the jurisdiction and the powers so conferred: Jackson v Sterling Industries Ltd [1987] HCA 23; (1987) 71 ALR 457, at p 470 (Toohey J).

42    The discretion to mould relief under s 23 of the Federal Court Act is not, however, at large. The relief which the Court is empowered to give does not extend beyond the grant of remedies “appropriate” to the protection and enforcement of the right or subject matter in issue: Sterling Industries at p 462 (Brennan J, as his Honour then was); see also, at pp 462-463 (Deane J, with whom Mason CJ substantially agreed and Wilson and Dawson JJ agreed) and at p 470 (Toohey J); see also, Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia (No 3) [1998] HCA 30; (1998) 195 CLR 1 at [27] (Brennan CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ).

43    The originating application filed by the Executor invoked the jurisdiction conferred on the Federal Court by s 39B of the Judiciary Act “with respect to any matter in which a writ of mandamus … is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth”. Section 39B does not expressly grant the Court with power to make an order for interest in respect of such a matter. For the reasons that follow, I am unpersuaded that power arises by implication under s 39B or is incidental and necessary to the exercise of the jurisdiction it confers with respect to the grant of mandamus.

44    There is limited consideration in the authorities of the power to grant interest in a proceeding seeking mandamus.

45    In ACN 005 057 349 Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue [2015] VSCA 332; (2015) 102 ATR 281, the Court of Appeal considered the power of the Supreme Court of Victoria to make an order for interest in a proceeding seeking mandamus. The appeal concerned two proceedings arising out of the refusal of the Commissioner of Taxation to issue amended assessments under s 19 of the Land Tax Act 1958 (Vic). Each concerned an asserted duplication error and refund to the taxpayer the “excess amount” with interest. In the first proceeding, the company sought an order in the nature of mandamus directing the Commissioner of Taxation to issue amended assessments and to refund the land tax said to have been overpaid for the relevant years with interest. In the second proceeding, the company sought restitution of the excess amount with interest.

46    The Court of Appeal found that the Commissioner of Taxation had a statutory duty to amend the assessments and to give effect to those amendments by way of a refund to the company. The failure to do so was, the Court of Appeal found, a refusal to perform a duty under s 19 of the Land Tax Act without good reason or justification which amounted to conscious maladministration.

47    In dealing with the claim for interest, the Court of Appeal found that while “strictly speaking the mandamus proceeding is a proceeding for the enforcement of a statutory duty, in the particular circumstances the proceeding is tantamount or analogous to a proceeding for the recovery of money”: ACN 005 057 349 at [240] (Hansen and Tate JJA and Robson AJA). Their Honours determined that it was appropriate to award compound interest given their earlier finding that the refusal to amend the assessments constituted an act of conscious maladministration: at [241].

48    The High Court overturned ACN 005 057 349 in Commissioner of State Revenue v ACN 005 057 349 Pty Ltd [2017] HCA 6; (2017) 261 CLR 509. Justices Bell and Gordon wrote the leading judgment (with whom each of Kiefel, Keane and Gageler JJ agreed). Of present relevance, Bell and Gordon JJ found that s 19 of the Land Tax Act conferred a discretion and not a statutory duty that the Commissioner of Taxation was compelled to exercise and, in any event, that the relief sought in the mandamus proceeding was statute barred: at [61] and [72]; see also, at [35]-[45]. It followed that Bell and Gordon JJ concluded that the Victorian Court of Appeal should not have ordered relief in the nature of mandamus and compound interest on the excess amount: at [86].

49    Given the conclusions reached, it was unnecessary, and the High Court did not consider whether the Supreme Court of Victoria had the power to make an order for interest in a proceeding seeking a writ of mandamus. I have not been able to identify any other authority in which that issue has been considered. Neither the Executor nor the Commission pointed me to such a case.

50    In my view, the Federal Court does not have the power in a proceeding seeking mandamus to make an order for interest. As appears from the reasoning in ACN 005 057 349, the consideration given by the Court of Appeal to the question of power was limited to its characterisation of the proceeding being seeking mandamus being “tantamount or analogous to a proceeding for the recovery of money”: at [241]. That conclusion is at odds with Kawasaki in which Hill and Heerey JJ found that judicial review proceedings are not proceedings for the recovery of money: at pp 266-267. The present proceeding differs from Kawasaki in that it concerned a proceeding commenced under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), rather than the Judiciary Act. That distinction is not, however, material, because as with Kawasaki the present proceeding sought orders with respect to an administrative decision. Consistent with the view expressed in Kawasaki, I do not consider that s 39B of the Judiciary Act impliedly empowers the Federal Court to make an order for interest. Mandamus is a class of proceeding concerned with compelling the performance of a public duty, and not the recovery of money: cf, Randall v Northcote Corporation [1910] HCA 25; (1910) 11 CLR 100 at p 105 (Griffith CJ) and p 114 (Issacs J) and Patrick Stevedores at [27]

51    Further, as Young J (with whom Gyles and Stone JJ agreed) stated at [74] of Elsinora Global Limited v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2006] FCAFC 156; (2006) 155 FCR 413, s 23 of the Federal Court Act does not empower the Court to make an order for interest when it is not empowered to do so under s 51A of the Federal Court Act or the general law. Given that, and the view I have reached about s 39B of the Judiciary Act, I do not consider that the power to make an order for interest is incidental or necessary to the exercise of the jurisdiction to grant mandamus.

52    It follows that the Court does not have power under s 23 of the Federal Court Act to make an award of interest.

Discretion

53    If I am wrong, and the Court does have power under s 23 of the Federal Court Act to make an order for interest, then I do not consider that it is appropriate to exercise the discretion to grant that relief here.

54    As has been outlined, the Commission paid the additional compensation into the first account in the name of “Judith Hartikainen” on or around 24 September 2025. That was a little over six weeks after the ART decision was made. This was in circumstances where an email included in the evidence filed on behalf of the Commission reveals that on 5 September 2025, their legal representative advised the legal representative for the Executor, that payment of the additional compensation would “take between 4 to 6 weeks … or longer if offsetting applies”.

55    The additional compensation was paid within the timeframe advised by the legal representative for the Commission. And while the money was not paid to the specific account the Executor requested (the second account), it was, nonetheless, paid into an account in her name. The Commission did, therefore, discharge its liability under the terms of the ART decision to pay the Estate the additional compensation to which she was entitled, under s 24 of the DRCA. Given the money was paid within the timeframe advised, which period was not itself unreasonable, I do not consider it would be appropriate to exercise the discretion to make an order for interest.

Conclusion

56    The Commission indicated at the hearing that should it be successful, it may seek to file evidence and further submissions on the question of costs. I will, therefore, make the following orders:

1.    The applicant is granted leave to further amend the originating application filed 30 January 2026 to include reference, in paragraph 2 of the relief sought, to s 26 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation (Defence-related Claims) Act 1988 (Cth) and s 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (second further amended originating application).

2.    The second further amended originating application is dismissed.

3.    I will hear the parties as to costs.

Associate:

Dated:    2 November 2026