Federal Court of Australia

Thompson v Lane (No 4) [2026] FCA 1599

ORDERS

THE COURT DECLARES THAT:

1.    The administration of the bankrupt estate of Ms Emma Thompson, being Bankrupt Estate No. QLD 1717 of 2020/0, remains ongoing.

2.    The amount of $523,528.37 held by the Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Ms Emma Thompson, Mr Morgan Lane, remains vested in Mr Morgan Lane in his capacity as Trustee, notwithstanding Ms Emma Thompson’s discharge from bankruptcy.

AND THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

QUD447/2023

3.    The Originating Application lodged on 17 October 2023 in proceeding QUD447/2023 by Ms Emma Thompson be dismissed.

4.    Mr Morgan Lane recover payment of his costs of and incidental to proceeding QUD447/2023 on a solicitor-client basis out of the bankrupt estate of Ms Emma Thompson, and be paid in priority in accordance with s 109 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) from the property of the bankrupt estate of Ms Emma Thompson.

5.    Ms Emma Thompson pay the costs of Mr Morgan Lane of and incidental to proceeding QUD447/2023 on a party-party basis, such costs to be taxed if not otherwise agreed.

QUD490/2025

6.    The Interlocutory Application lodged on 12 February 2026 in proceeding QUD490/2025 be dismissed.

7.    The Interlocutory Application filed on 14 April 2025 in the Supreme Court of Queensland proceeding BS1302/25, and transferred to proceeding QUD490/2025 in the Federal Court of Australia, be dismissed.

8.    The Interlocutory Application filed on 10 April 2025 in the Supreme Court of Queensland proceeding BS1302/25, and transferred to proceeding QUD490/2025 in the Federal Court of Australia, be dismissed.

9.    The Claim filed on 31 March 2025 in the Supreme Court of Queensland proceeding BS1302/25, and transferred to proceeding QUD490/2025 in the Federal Court of Australia, be dismissed.

10.    Mr Morgan Lane recover payment of his costs of and incidental to proceeding QUD490/2025 on a solicitor-client basis out of the bankrupt estate of Ms Emma Thompson, and be paid in priority in accordance with s 109 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) from the property of the bankrupt estate of Ms Emma Thompson.

11.    Ms Emma Thompson pay the costs of Mr Morgan Lane of and incidental to proceeding QUD490/2025 on a party-party basis, such costs to be taxed if not otherwise agreed.

QUD176/2024

12.    The Originating Application lodged on 5 April 2024 in proceeding QUD176/2024 be allowed.

13.    By 11.59pm on 13 November 2026, Ms Emma Thompson (and any other occupants):

(a)    vacate the property situated at Unit 3, 40 Glen Road, Toowong in the State of Queensland, being the whole of the land comprised in Indefeasible Title 14879015 Lot 3 BUP 851 (Property);

(b)    deliver all keys for any buildings on the Property to Mr Morgan Lane; and

(c)    give possession of the Property to Mr Morgan Lane.

14.    A warrant of possession be issued forthwith substantially in the form of Annexure 1 to these Orders, with such warrant to lie in the Registry of the Federal Court of Australia and not be acted upon unless Mr Morgan Lane (or his solicitors) file an affidavit deposing that:

(a)    Ms Emma Thompson has not complied with all of Order 13 of these Orders; and

(b)    Mr Morgan Lane does not have possession of the Property.

15.    Upon Mr Morgan Lane taking possession of the Property, Ms Emma Thompson, her servants and agents be restrained from:

(a)    entering on or remaining on the Property;

(b)    going within 30 metres of the Property; and

(c)    hindering the sale of the Property by Mr Morgan Lane.

16.    By 11.59pm on 13 November 2026, Ms Emma Thompson (and any other occupants) remove from the Property all vehicles, rubbish and chattels which have not vested in Mr Morgan Lane in his capacity as Trustee of the bankrupt estate of Ms Emma Thompson (Personal Property).

17.    If Ms Emma Thompson (and any other occupants) fails to comply with Order 16 of these Orders, Mr Morgan Lane is empowered to remove and dispose of any Personal Property left on the Property (Unremoved Personal Property) as he sees fit, without being required to account to Ms Emma Thompson or any other person.

18.    The costs of removal and disposal of any Unremoved Personal Property by Mr Morgan Lane pursuant to Order 17 of these Orders be paid from the bankrupt estate of Ms Emma Thompson.

19.    Mr Morgan Lane be at liberty to sell the Property and to sell any Unremoved Personal Property, and receive the net proceeds of sale into the bankrupt estate of Ms Emma Thompson.

20.    Mr Morgan Lane recover payment of his costs of and incidental to proceeding QUD176/2024 on a solicitor-client basis out of the bankrupt estate of Ms Emma Thompson, and be paid in priority in accordance with s 109 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) from the property of the bankrupt estate of Ms Emma Thompson.

21.    Ms Emma Thompson pay Mr Morgan Lane’s costs of and incidental to proceeding QUD176/2024 on a party-party basis, to be taxed if not otherwise agreed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

ANNEXURE 1

Warrant of Possession

QUD 176 of 2024

Federal Court of Australia

District Registry: Queensland

Division: General

MORGAN GERARD JAMES LANE AS TRUSTEE OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF EMMA NARELLE CATHRYN THOMPSON

Applicant

EMMA NARELLE CATHRYN THOMPSON

Respondent

TO THE ENFORCEMENT OFFICER:

In respect of the order dated 30 October 2026. by which it was adjudged that the Applicant recover possession of the land described in the Schedule, enter the land and cause the Applicant to have possession of it, and indorse on the warrant immediately after you have performed all your obligations under it a statement of the date, time and place at which you have executed or attempted to execute the warrant and the results of the execution and send a copy of the statement to the Applicant.

SCHEDULE

Unit 3, 40 Glen Road, Toowong in the State of Queensland being the whole of the land comprised in Indefeasible Title 14879015 Lot 3 BUP 851 (Property).

Issued:

By the Court

REGISTRAR

Issued at the request of the Applicant.

The last known address of the Respondent is the Property.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

COLLIER ACJ:

1    Before the Court are three originating processes in proceedings QUD447/2023, QUD176/2024 and QUD490/2025 (collectively, the proceedings). On 13 November 2024 and 27 August 2025 respectively, I made Orders to the effect that proceeding QUD176/2024 and proceeding QUD490/2025 be heard together with proceeding QUD447/2023.

2    The applicant in QUD447/2023 and QUD490/2025, and the respondent in QUD176/2024, is Ms Emma Thompson. The respondent in QUD447/2023 and QUD490/2025, and the applicant in QUD176/2024, is Mr Morgan Lane.

3    Mr Lane, a principal of Worrells Solvency Accountants, was appointed the trustee of Ms Thompson’s bankrupt estate on 1 July 2020. Ms Thompson was discharged from bankruptcy on 2 July 2023. The disputes between the parties have arisen out of Mr Lane’s administration of Ms Thompson’s bankrupt estate.

4    Ms Thompson has filed a significant number of interlocutory processes in these proceedings. As a result, the final determination of the originating processes have been delayed. I note that I have published a total of three judgments dealing with interlocutory processes in these proceedings. These are:

    Thompson v Lane [2024] FCA 1234 (the first Judgment);

    Thompson v Lane (No 2) [2026] FCA 86 (the second Judgment); and

    Thompson v Lane (No 3) [2026] FCA 766 (the third Judgment).

5    Before resolving the originating processes, it is necessary to set out in detail the background of the dispute and the procedural history of these proceedings.

Background

Bankruptcy and QUD447/2023

6    The overall dispute between Ms Thompson and Mr Lane has a substantial procedural history in the Federal Court of Australia. In particular, I note the below summary, written by Logan J in Thompson v Lane (Trustee) (No 3) [2022] FCA 128, and previously adopted by me in the first and second Judgments, of events which led to Ms Thompson’s bankruptcy:

1.    Pursuant to s 55(4A) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (Bankruptcy Act), Ms Emma Narelle Cathryn Thompson became a bankrupt on 1 July 2020 upon the acceptance (and endorsement accordingly) by the Official Receiver of a debtor’s petition presented by her on 26 June 2020. She has applied, pursuant to s 153B(1) and (2) of the Bankruptcy Act, for an order that her bankruptcy be annulled.

2.    …

3.    The grounds of Ms Thompson’s application are that her “Debtor’s Petition ought not to have been presented and ought not to have been accepted by the Official Receiver, and that the Sequestration Order made on 1 July 2020 should not have been made”.

4.    The last mentioned of these grounds may be disposed of shortly. Ms Thompson became a bankrupt not by virtue of the making of a sequestration order but rather, as mentioned, pursuant to statute upon the acceptance (and related endorsement) of her debtor’s petition. At the time when this occurred, a creditor’s petition presented by the Body Corporate Arila Lodge CTS 14237 (BCAL) was then pending hearing in the then Federal Circuit Court of Australia. Section 153B of the Bankruptcy Act does permit the annulment of a bankruptcy in circumstances where a sequestration order ought not to have been made. However, no such order was made in her case on the creditor’s petition. Rather, what occurred was that, on 2 (not 1) July 2020, the Federal Circuit ordered that BCAL’s petition be dismissed and that its costs of those proceedings (including reserved costs) as agreed or taxed be paid from Ms Thompson’s by then bankrupt estate in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act with the same priority as if a sequestration order had been made pursuant to its petition. The fate of BCAL’s creditor’s petition was dictated by Ms Thompson’s prior presentation and the related acceptance of her debtor’s petition.

5.    The trustee of Ms Thompson’s bankrupt estate is Mr Morgan Lane of the insolvency firm Worrells. Mr Lane has not opposed the making of an annulment order but rather adopted the stance of abiding such order as the Court may make. He has furnished a report to the Court concerning his administration of Ms Thompson’s estate and expressed an opinion as to her solvency (of which more below). Two creditors, BCAL and Mahoneys, a law firm, have opposed the making of an annulment order. Mahoneys adopted the submissions made on behalf of BCAL.

7    On 18 February 2022 Logan J dismissed the application for annulment by Ms Thompson which was before his Honour. The events immediately following the dismissal of that application were summarised by me in the first Judgment, Thompson v Lane [2024] FCA 1234 as follows:

7.    Ms Thompson appealed Logan J’s decision. The appeal was dismissed by the Full Court on 10 March 2023 in Thompson v Lane (Trustee) [2023] FCAFC 32.

8.    Ms Thompson was discharged from bankruptcy on 2 July 2023, pursuant to s 149 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (Bankruptcy Act). She was informed of this by letter dated 3 July 2023 sent on behalf of the trustee in bankruptcy. Materially, that letter read:

…

As you are aware you were declared bankrupt on 1 July 2020.

A bankrupt is automatically discharged from bankruptcy three years after the filing of their Statement of Affairs with the Australian Financial Security Authority (AFSA). Your three years has now expired and consequently you have been discharged from bankruptcy, with the effective date of discharge being 2 July 2023.

It is important to note that whilst you no longer need to refer to yourself as a bankrupt, the administration of your bankrupt estate is ongoing.

There are several reasons why the bankrupt estate can continue after discharge, for example:

•    Where your final income contribution assessment is yet to be made (Schedule A)

•    Where there are assets to be dealt with by your trustee (Schedule B)

•    Assets that vested in your trustee in bankruptcy remain vested in your trustee (section 129AA)

•    Where a request for information is required still to finalise outstanding matters (Schedule C)

In those circumstances, whilst you are a discharged bankrupt some residual obligations to assist your trustee still exist. If you need clarity on what you can and can't do, please feel free to contact my office.

This letter should be sufficient to evidence that you have been discharged from bankruptcy, but if you would like a certificate of your discharge, please conduct a search of the bankruptcy register at www.afsa.gov.au.

THE PRESENT PROCEEDINGS

9.    On 17 October 2023 Ms Thompson filed an originating application pursuant to ss 19 and 149 of the Bankruptcy Act, and sch 2 ss 42-60, 65-25 and 70-56 of the Bankruptcy Act. Ms Thompson sought the following orders:

The Applicant seeks an Order that the respondent cease to act as trustee of the bankrupt Estate of Emma Narelle Cathryn Thompson.

Additionally, the Applicant seeks an Interim Order that …

…        

8    The originating application filed by Ms Thompson on 17 October 2023, as referred to above, became proceeding QUD447/2023.

The Toowong Apartment and QUD176/2024

9    On 5 April 2024, Mr Lane lodged an application under the Federal Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2016 (Cth) that became proceeding QUD176/2024. I will reproduce the orders sought by Mr Lane in their entirety later in this Judgment. However, in essence Mr Lane’s application sought possession of Unit 3, 40 Glen Road, Toowong (the Toowong Apartment) pursuant to s 30(1)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (Bankruptcy Act).

10    I understand that the complex at 40 Glen Road, Toowong is known as “Arila Lodge” and that the parties have referred to the Body Corporate for Arila Lodge at various times throughout these proceedings.

11    I note that it was not until 13 November 2024 that proceeding QUD176/2024 was ordered to be heard together with QUD447/2023.

Determination of interim relief in QUD447/2023

12    After the filing of QUD176/2024 but before that matter was ordered to be heard together with QUD447/2023, I published the first Judgment, Thompson v Lane [2024] FCA 1234.

13    The interim relief sought by Ms Thompson in the originating application in proceeding QUD447/2023, alongside an interim application lodged on 13 December 2023 and further relief that Ms Thompson particularised in written submissions lodged on 6 February 2024, were the subject of determination in the first Judgment. This was set out in my third Judgment, Thompson v Lane (No 3) [2026] FCA 766 as follows:

8.    On 24 October 2024, I delivered judgment in Thompson v Lane [2024] FCA 1234 (the 2024 decision). In that decision I made the following orders:

1.    The interim order sought by the applicant in the originating application filed on 17 October 2023 be refused.

2.    The interim application filed on 13 December 2023 be dismissed.

3.    The further relief sought by the applicant pursuant to submissions filed on 6 February 2024 be refused.

4.    The applicant pay the costs of the respondent of and incidental to these interlocutory proceedings on a party-party basis.

9.    Ms Thompson sought an extension of time to appeal, and leave to appeal, the 2024 decision. Both applications were refused by the Court in Thompson v Lane (No 2) [2025] FCA 951, for reasons that included that there was no reasonable prospect of success in respect of her grounds of appeal.

14    As indicated above, I refused the interim relief sought by Ms Thompson in the originating application in QUD447/2023. Leave to appeal the first Judgment was refused by Vandongen J in Thompson v Lane (No 2) [2025] FCA 951.

The Toowong Apartment and QUD490/2025

15    After publication of my first Judgment, but before leave to appeal was refused, on 31 March 2025 Ms Thompson filed a Claim and Statement of Claim in the Supreme Court of Queensland that became proceeding BS1302/25 in that Court. In that proceeding, Ms Thompson sought orders to the effect that Mr Lane transfer the title of the Toowong Apartment into the name of Ms Thompson.

16    By Orders dated 6 June 2025, proceeding BS1302/25 was transferred to the Federal Court of Australia. The transfer was completed on 17 July 2025 and became proceeding QUD490/2025 which was subsequently allocated to my docket.

17    On 27 August 2025 I ordered that proceeding QUD490/2025 be listed together with proceedings QUD176/2024 and QUD447/2023.

Interlocutory applications for recusal

18    Ms Thompson then pursued a number of further interlocutory applications, across the three proceedings on my docket, seeking that I recuse myself from hearing them. I dealt with these applications in my second Judgment.

19    I note that Vandongen J’s Judgment, dealing with Ms Thompson’s application for extension of time and leave to appeal from my first Judgment, is published by the Court as Thompson v Lane (No 2) [2025] FCA 951. My second Judgment dealing with recusal is published under the same name but with a different citation as Thompson v Lane (No 2) [2026] FCA 86.

20    The determination of the recusal applications was set out in the following paragraph of the third Judgment:

10.    On 10 September 2025, Ms Thompson filed interlocutory applications in QUD 447 of 2023, QUD 176 of 2024 and QUD 490 of 2025 which sought that I recuse myself from all three proceedings on the basis of actual and/or apprehended bias, and that the 2024 decision [Thompson v Lane [2024] FCA 1234] be set aside. I delivered judgment (Thompson v Lane (No 2) [2026] FCA 86) on 13 February 2026. I made the following orders:

1.    The interlocutory applications lodged by Ms Thompson on 10 September 2025 in proceedings QUD 447 of 2023, QUD 176 of 2024 and QUD 490 of 2025 (interlocutory applications) be dismissed.

2.    Ms Thompson pay the costs of the respondent to the interlocutory applications of and incidental to the interlocutory applications, such costs to be taxed if not otherwise agreed.

Timetabling to trial

21    On 2 March 2026, I made the following case management Orders in all three proceedings with a view of timetabling them to a final hearing.

1.    By 4.00pm on 20 March 2026 (Brisbane time), Ms Thompson file any further affidavit material in relation to all three proceedings.

2.    By 4:00pm on 2 April 2026 (Brisbane time), Mr Lane file any further affidavit material in relation to all three proceedings.

3.    By 4:00pm on 10 April 2026 (Brisbane time), Ms Thompson file single submissions in relation to all three proceedings (limited to 10 pages).

4.    By 4:00pm on 21 April 2026 (Brisbane time), Mr Lane file single submissions in relation to all proceedings (limited to 10 pages).

5.    By 4:00pm on 28 April 2026 (Brisbane time), Ms Thompson file single submissions in reply in relation to all proceedings (limited to 5 pages).

6.    All matters be listed together for a one (1) day hearing at the earliest available date after 28 April 2026, to be administratively advised. Costs be reserved.

22    The proceedings were subsequently listed for trial on 16 July 2026.

Further interlocutory application

23    Ms Thompson lodged another interlocutory application in QUD447/2023, QUD176/2024 and QUD490/2025 on 3 June 2026. That application, which was the subject of determination by me in the third Judgment Thompson v Lane (No 3) [2026] FCA 766, in substance sought to ventilate and reopen issues that had already been before the Court and determined.

24    Specifically I note the following paragraphs of my third Judgment:

4    In the interlocutory application Ms Thompson sought both interim and final relief.

5    The interim relief which Ms Thompson sought was as follows:

(1)    That the substantive proceeding QUD447 of 2023, and the associated proceedings QUD176 of 2024 and QUD490 of 2025, be delisted and stayed until the final determination of this set aside application.

(2)    That a judge of the Federal Court that is independent of the primary judge decision maker determine this Application.

6    The final relief which Ms Thompson sought was as follows:

(3)    The Interlocutory Decision of Thompson v Lane [2024] FCA 1234 is set aside.

(4)    Order 1 in Thompson v Lane [2024] FCA 1234 is set aside.

(5)    Order 2 in Thompson v Lane [2024] FCA 1234 is set aside.

(6)    Order 3 in Thompson v Lane [2024] FCA 1234 is set aside.

(7)    Order 4 in Thompson v Lane [2024] FCA 1234 is set aside.

(8)    An Order that the respondent is to cease to act, or purport to act, as the trustee of the Applicant’s estate or to undertake an administration pertaining thereto.

(9)    An Order that the Federal Court determine the proven debts in the Applicant’s bankrupt estate as of the date of the Applicant’s bankruptcy.

(10)    An Order that within 7 days of the decision the respondent is to;

(a)    cause the transfer back into the Applicant’s name, of the Title of the real property at 3/40 Glen Road, Toowong in the State of Queensland; and

(b)    transfer the $523,528 held in trust since 2 July 2023 into the Applicant’s nominated bank account; and

(c)    provide in writing to the Applicant, pursuant to s.65-25 and 70‐56 of Schedule 2 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966:

(i)    copies of all written communications, and File Notes of all oral communications, to and from, all creditors and all other persons, pertaining to the Applicant’s bankruptcy; and

(ii)    evidence of all steps taken to administer the Applicant’s bankrupt estate as efficiently as possible by avoiding unnecessary and unreasonable expenses; and

(iii)    a comprehensive settlement statement and account to the Applicant for the proceeds of sale of the property at 16 Aaron Avenue, Hawthorne in the State of Queensland and all steps taken prior to the sale to determine if there was a debt to be paid from the sale proceeds; and

(iv)    evidence of the respondent’s determination of all amounts paid from funds held in trust; and

(v)    evidence (receipts) of all payments made from the bankrupt’s estate.

(11)    An Order that the Federal Court conduct a review of the trustee’s administration of the Applicant’s bankrupt estate.

(12)    Further Orders that the Honourable Court deems fit.

(13)    Costs of the proceeding.

25    I dismissed Ms Thompson’s interlocutory application lodged on 3 June 2026 with costs and published my reasons for doing so on 17 June 2026. Relevantly, the Orders of the Court, which included an Order that no further material be accepted for filing without leave (the no filing without leave Order), are as follows:

1.     The interlocutory application lodged by Ms Emma Thompson on 3 June 2026 be dismissed with costs.

2.     Pursuant to s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), no further material be accepted for filing without leave by any party to QUD 447 of 2023, QUD 176 of 2024 and QUD 490 of 2025 until further order of the Court.

Attempted application for stay

26    At 2.28pm on 15 July 2026, less than 24 hours before the final hearing in these proceedings, Ms Thompson sent an email to the Queensland Registry in the following terms:

Dear Registrar

Please find attached:

1.    An application filed 14 July 2026, to set aside the Full Court decision in QUD 86 of 2022;

2.    Affidavit of Ms Thompson 14 July 2026;

3.    Screenshot evidence of filing, waiting on stamped documents

4.    Interlucatory [sic] application filed 15 July 2026 seeking to stay the proceedings listed for 16 July 2026 pending the outcome of the reopen application in the Full Court decision.

5.    Screenshot evidence of filing interlucatory [sic] application.

Please provided my email and attached documents to Her Honour Justice Collier in preparation for the hearing tomorrow. The respondents are copied.

Kind regards

Emma Thompson

27    Attached to Ms Thompson’s email were a number of documents including, relevantly, an interlocutory application (proposed stay application) in the present proceedings seeking the following relief:

1.     Pursuant to r 1.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) and or s 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth):

(a)     the hearing listed 16 July 2026 is delisted;

(b)     the proceedings QUD447 of 2023, QUD176 of 2024 and QUD490 of 2025 are stayed until the final determination of the Full Court application in proceeding QUD 86 of 2022.

2.     Costs reserved.

28    Despite Ms Thompson’s assertion that she had filed the proposed stay application, the Registry in fact had not accepted that application for filing. I understand that, upon confirmation that the no filing without leave Order remained in place, the Registry rejected the filing of the proposed stay application.

29    At 8.50pm on 15 July 2026 Ms Thompson sent a further email to the Queensland Registry in the following terms:

Hello

Please find attached draft Orders for the Hearing listed on 16 July 2026.

kind regards,

Emma Thompson

30    Attached to the email was a draft minute of orders that replicated the orders sought by Ms Thompson in her proposed stay application in identical terms.

Oral application for stay at the hearing

31    At the start of the hearing on 16 July 2026 the following exchange took place:

HER HONOUR: Good morning, Ms Thompson. All right. So we have three applications for hearing today.

MS THOMPSON: No, your Honour. On 14 July, I uploaded to the court portal an application and supporting affidavit pertaining to proceeding QUD 86 of 2023. That application seeks to set aside and reopen the decisions made because of the gross miscarriages of justice that have occurred since those – that decision was made. Therefore, these three proceedings must be stayed, as – in accordance with the draft order that I emailed to the court and the other parties last night, until the proceeding that I just identified that was uploaded to the court portal on 14 July 2026 is determined.

HER HONOUR: Right. You say you’ve uploaded. Nothing has been accepted for filing.

MS THOMPSON: Well, it has been uploaded and I have a receipt confirming it has been uploaded.

HER HONOUR: It’s not on the court file. Be aware.

MS THOMPSON: That’s likely, then, an administrative error on the court’s part because it is uploaded and I have the receipt for it.

HER HONOUR: Well, it’s not on this file. So let me get this right: you’re seeking an adjournment of today - - -

MS THOMPSON: I’m seeking for this proceeding today to be stayed, delisted or whichever other terminology is applicable, until the proceeding that was uploaded to the court portal on 14 July 2026 is determined.

HER HONOUR: All right. Let me just ask Ms Philippou. Ms Philippou, do you know anything about this?

MS PHILIPPOU: Yes, we oppose any adjournment of today, your Honour.

HER HONOUR: And why is that?

MS PHILIPPOU: Prejudice to the trustee primarily.

HER HONOUR: Well, I just need a bit more information about what’s happening before I can hear this adjournment application properly.

(transcript 16 July 2026 pp 2-3)

32    Ms Thompson proceeded to address the Court regarding the materials that she lodged the day before. It became apparent that Ms Thompson wanted to make an oral application to adjourn or stay the three proceedings before me (oral stay application). As recorded in the transcript:

HER HONOUR: … well, the key issue is if you had had an issue with the Full Court decision, you could have sought leave to appeal to the High Court. I’m not sure if you did.

MS THOMPSON: That is fully explained in my affidavit. That is – is made in support of that application, QUD – pertaining to the proceeding QUD 86 of 2022, which underpins this proceeding. These three proceedings would not be before the court today but for the gross miscarriage of justice that is encapsulated in that decision. Therefore, this court must stay the proceedings listed for hearing today until that application is determined.

HER HONOUR: You are applying to the Full Court of the Federal Court to set aside a decision it made three years ago.

MS THOMPSON: For gross miscarriages of justice, and delay is fully explained in the affidavit.

HER HONOUR: Right.

MS THOMPSON: And the circumstances are exceptional and warrant the setting aside of that decision prior to when further errors are made by this court that will require further appeal proceedings to undo.

HER HONOUR: So I’m just looking at the explanatory chronology of the delay, paragraph 18. You refer to the decision of Logan J in 2022 which you said contained errors of law.

MS THOMPSON: And it does.

HER HONOUR: Well, I’m just saying what you say. And you talk about your emotional and psychological concerns. And then you refer to your endeavours to obtain legal representation.

MS THOMPSON: And the trustee’s attempts to stifle and to cause a miscarriage of justice, because he took active steps to prevent me obtaining legal representation, which are evidenced in exhibits to my affidavit.

HER HONOUR: I see. And you also – here we are. You went to the Full Court to appeal Logan J; is that correct? You say at paragraph 28 you were deeply disappointed your appeal had been dismissed and believe your arguments have not been accepted. You found it difficult to cope emotionally.

MS THOMPSON: Yes, I had several breakdowns. There is a full medical transcript available of that period.

HER HONOUR: You talk about your financial hardship.

MS THOMPSON: Because the trustee has withheld from me $523,528 since 2 July 2023, absent any legal valid basis, because there is no determined debt and because paragraphs 37 and 38 of the Logan decision rely upon there being debts of 1.332934. That is an error, and there is actually no evidence exhibited before the court in any proceeding of any valid debts and, in fact, nil – nil dollars.

HER HONOUR: Right.

MS THOMPSON: And there is certainly not evidence of $1,332,934 as is stated in the reasons for Logan’s decision in paragraphs 37 and 38. That is a gross miscarriage of justice - - -

…

HER HONOUR: … So what I have – my associates have managed to find for me is an interlocutory application, QUD 86 of 2022, and you seek to reopen the decision in Thompson v Lane [2023] FCAFC 32 – the decision of Thompson v Lane set aside – the decision of Logan J to be set aside. Right. That’s your interlocutory application? Right. Ms Thompson, I am not prepared to adjourn today’s hearing on the basis of that interlocutory application.

MS THOMPSON: Then I am asking again that the court must, because that proceeding is the basis of these proceedings.

HER HONOUR: Yes.

MS THOMPSON: And you will be denying me my legal rights if you proceed today, and I will also be obviously appealing this decision. So I seek your written reasons, and I also seek a transcript of what has happened today. I also need the proceeding to be stood down because I don’t have documents and I’ve not prepared cross-examination questions because this should not be proceeding today. This is a denial of procedural fairness. And just yesterday on the TV, I listened to an interview that Michael Kirby gave and he spoke about how the court must act in accordance with law. I thought, “Wow, this court does not act in accordance with law.” But the court must act in accordance with law. So I will be appealing.

And I’m also drawing to your attention that the lists of documents filed in these proceedings is not complete. It’s incorrect. And I’ve been denied proper opportunity to prepare because I don’t even know what documents are filed in these proceedings because I can’t access those lists. And I’ve had email communication with the registry. I think I’m up to about seven emails now, and I still haven’t been provided the lists of documents. So I have been unable to properly prepare, but this proceeding must be stood down because of the application that you’ve just referred to to reopen, set aside the decision made in proceeding QUD 86 of 2022 because of the gross miscarriage of justice and the errors encapsulated, including that there is no determined debt.

(transcript 16 July 2026 pp 4-6)

33    Having heard Ms Thompson, I refused the oral stay application and gave my reasons in the transcript as follows:

HER HONOUR: All right. Ms Thompson, no, I’m not adjourning today. The reasons I’m not adjourning today – the key reason I’m not adjourning today is because I see no merit at this stage in the interlocutory application which I have here, which I now – in which you are seeking to have the Full Court of the Federal Court set aside its earlier decision…

Ms Thompson, (1) the relief which you are seeking in your interlocutory application which I have here is headed QUD 86 of 2022, which is dated 14 July 2026. As I said, the relief you seek: (1) reopen the decision of Thompson v Lane (Trustee) [2023] FCAFC 32; (2) the decision of Thompson v Lane (Trustee) [2023] FCAFC 32 is set aside; (3) the decision of Thompson v Lane (Trustee) (No. 3) [2022] FCA 128 is set aside; (4) the court orders that the relief sought in this application is granted, the bankruptcy is annulled; (5) further orders that the honourable court deems fit; (6) costs of the proceeding.

Your affidavit is also here in front of me. I see the details of your claim. You claim there has been a gross miscarriage of justice in respect of the decision of the Full Court in Thompson v Lane [2023] FCAFC 32. If you had concerns about the decision of the Full Court, you could have sought leave to appeal to the High Court. I have gone through your affidavit and note that you’ve said you have suffered serious emotional and psychological issues. However - - -

MS THOMPSON: What you’ve just said is akin to, “If auntie had balls, she would be uncle.” You are asking me to do an impossible task. You are asking me to seek leave of the High Court without legal representation when I don’t have the skills to do that. That is absolutely an appealable reason. You are asking me to do impossible, whereas you need to determine this in accordance with law. That is very possible for you to do - - -

HER HONOUR: Ms Thompson - - -

MS THOMPSON: - - - but you are not doing that.

…

HER HONOUR: … I have just gone through the relief which is being sought in an interlocutory application which Ms Thompson says she has endeavoured to file. In my view, the relief which is sought in the interlocutory application which is headed QUD 86 of 2022 has no discernible merit. The fact is if a litigant has concerns about a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia, the appropriate avenue is to seek leave to appeal to the High Court, and the High Court will grant leave if they consider that it is appropriate to do so. The likelihood, in my opinion, that the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia would set aside its own decision of three years ago because essentially the unsuccessful appellant was dissatisfied with that decision - - -

MS THOMPSON: I’m not dissatisfied.

HER HONOUR: - - - is extremely remote - - -

MS THOMPSON: It contains errors of fact and errors of law.

HER HONOUR: - - - all because - - -

MS THOMPSON: It’s not about dissatisfaction.

HER HONOUR: - - - the dissatisfied appellant is of the view that the reasons of the court contain errors of law.

MS THOMPSON: And fact.

HER HONOUR: In my view - - -

MS THOMPSON: And fact.

HER HONOUR: In my view, the interlocutory application which Ms Thompson is proposing to file should not preclude this court from proceeding to hear and determine the three applications which are currently before the court. I further take this view in light of the prejudice to the respondents who oppose any adjournment.

MS THOMPSON: There is no prejudice to the respondent. There is no evidence of any prejudice to the respondent. That is again something that is incorrect.

HER HONOUR: Thank you for interjecting. Thirdly, I note Ms Thompson’s submission this morning that she is not in a position to address these applications currently before the court. However, these matters have been before the court for some time. Case management orders have been made. My understanding is the parties have filed their submissions and are ready to go today. So - - -

MS THOMPSON: No, I’m not ready to go today. I’ve already said that.

HER HONOUR: Are otherwise ready to go today. So the application for adjournment is refused. The court will proceed to hear these three applications.

(transcript 16 July 2026 pp 6-8)

34    The following Orders were made to give effect to my decision to refuse Ms Thompson’s oral stay application:

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

1.     The Interlocutory Application lodged by the applicant on 15 July 2026 in matter QUD 447 of 2023 was rejected for filing by the registry.

AND THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

2.     The oral application for adjournment and stay of the proceedings QUD 447 of 2023, QUD176 of 2024, and QUD 490 of 2025 made by the applicant at the hearing on 16 July 2026 be refused.

35    I note that (as will be seen later) for reasons of procedural fairness the Court further ordered that Ms Thompson be provided with a copy of that transcript.

36    Following the refusal of the oral stay application, the Court proceeded to hear the substantive issues in dispute in the originating processes before the Court.

Substantive Hearing

37    After the Court indicated that it would proceed to hear the substantive issues in dispute in the originating processes before the Court, Ms Thompson indicated to the Court that she was not “ready to go today”, and that she required an adjournment “to at least go and get my documents and to prepare cross-examination questions”.

38    In accordance with Ms Thompson’s request, the Court adjourned early for an extended lunch break to allow Ms Thompson an opportunity to do further preparation for the hearing. Following the lunch adjournment, Ms Thompson made the following remarks as to why she was not ready to proceed with the Court hearing the substantive issues:

MS THOMPSON: So, as I said to your Honour earlier, I have been unable to access the court files so I can’t identify which of my documents have been filed and which have not been filed. So I have some 14 affidavits, I believe. I’m not sure which of those have been filed. I have submissions. I’m not sure which of those have been filed. But I want to rely upon all my documents, including a document stating grounds of opposition to the application QUD176 of 2024.

(Transcript 16 July 2026 p 13)

39    I reminded Ms Thompson that case management orders timetabling the originating processes to trial were made on 2 March 2026 and that Ms Thompson had had ample opportunity to prepare for the substantive hearing since that date.

40    The substantive hearing then proceeded and included the examination of Mr Lane as a witness. While cross-examining Mr Lane, Ms Thompson indicated to the Court that she was not in a position to make oral closing submissions on the day of the hearing:

MS THOMPSON: Okay. I don’t think I’m in any way, shape or form able to make oral submissions but I would like just a reasonable amount of time after I look at the transcript to make written submissions because I don’t have the benefit of anyone sitting beside me and helping me like Ms Philippou does.

HER HONOUR: Exactly how long do you need?

MS THOMPSON: I would like seven days after I get the transcript. That would be – I would appreciate that. I don’t even know what I’ve said here today. Got no idea some of what I’ve said.

(Transcript 16 July 2026 p 49)

41    Following the conclusion of Mr Lane’s evidence, the Court discussed with the parties as to the filing of additional written submissions in lieu of oral closing submissions. As a result of these discussions, and noting that the cost of a transcript is likely prohibitive for Ms Thompson, I made the following additional Orders in the proceedings:

1.     A copy of the transcript from the hearing on 16 July 2026 be provided to both parties as soon as it is made available to the Court.

2.     The parties have leave to file and serve written submissions limited to five (5) pages by 4.00 pm on 30 July 2026.

3.     Notwithstanding the Order of the Court in paragraph 2 of these orders, Order 2 of the orders of this Court on 17 June 2026 continues to apply.

4.     Judgment in respect of the applications filed by the Applicant in QUD447 of 2023, QUD176 of 2024 and QUD490 of 2025 stand reserved as at 4.00 pm on 30 July 2026.

5.     Costs be reserved.

Submissions of the Parties

42    In setting out the background I have already briefly discussed the relief sought in each of the three proceedings currently before the Court. Nevertheless, I repeat and adopt the following paragraphs from my second Judgment, Thompson v Lane (No 2) [2026] FCA 86, by way of summary of the relief sought in these proceedings:

2.    The first proceeding, QUD 447 of 2023, is an application by Ms Thompson pursuant to the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) that Mr Lane cease to act as trustee of the bankrupt estate of Ms Thompson.

3.    The second proceeding, QUD 176 of 2024, is an application by Mr Lane as the trustee of the bankrupt estate of Ms Thompson pursuant to s 30(1)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act, seeking the vacation of the property Unit 3, 40 Glen Road, Toowong (the property) by Ms Thompson.

4.    The third proceeding, QUD 490 of 2025, is an application by Ms Thompson, originally filed in the Supreme Court of Queensland, for the property to be transferred into Ms Thompson’s name.

43    As stated earlier, I will refer to the property at Unit 3, 40 Glen Road, Toowong as the Toowong Apartment in this Judgment.

Substantive issues in dispute

44    At the hearing, Counsel for Mr Lane submitted that there were three substantive issues in dispute as between the parties in the proceedings.

MS PHILIPPOU: … So all the applications are effectively heard somewhat simultaneously with Mr Lane’s potential removal application – or Ms Thompson’s potential application for Mr Lane’s removal, or in the alternative, Mr Lane’s application for a warrant for possession to proceed separately. So the key issues are ultimately, firstly, whether Mr Lane remains appointed post annulment; secondly, if that is the case, whether the unit and the funds held in trust remain vested in him. So once those matters have been discussed and perhaps subject to submissions, then the issue arises, firstly, if Mr Lane does remain appointed post annulment, whether he should be removed – sorry, I misspoke. I withdraw that. Whether Mr Lane remains appointed post discharge, not annulment - - -

HER HONOUR: Excuse me, associate. Keep going.

MS PHILIPPOU: And if he does – whether he is to be removed or not, which is Ms Thompson’s application for his removal. And then finally, if Mr Lane’s position remains as trustee, whether his application for possession of the property should be - - -

HER HONOUR: So are they the key issues?

MS PHILIPPOU: Yes.

(transcript 16 July 2026 p 9, emphasis added)

45    I note Counsel’s reference to “the funds held in trust” to which I will come back shortly.

46    Ms Thompson relevantly submitted:

HER HONOUR: All right. Thank you. Ms Thompson, do you have anything you wish to say about that?

MS THOMPSON: I haven’t – sorry, I’m going to repeat. I haven’t had time to properly consider this because this proceeding must be stayed today, and it is - - -

HER HONOUR: Right. It’s not going to be. Keep going.

MS THOMPSON: And that will be appealed, that point. So everything that happens from this point on is subject to appeal, because you are denying me my legal rights.

(transcript 16 July 2026 p 9)

47    Relevantly the originating application lodged by Ms Thompson on 17 October 2023 in QUD447/2023 provides:

Orders sought

The Applicant seeks an Order that the respondent cease to act as trustee of the bankrupt Estate of Emma Narelle Cathryn Thompson.

Additionally, the Applicant seeks an Interim Order that forthwith and until this Application is determined, the respondent cease to act as trustee of the Applicant's bankrupt Estate; and that forthwith, the respondent pay to Emma Narelle Cathryn Thompson the amount of $334,213.88 being the funds in the Worrells File Account on 13 October 2023.

(emphasis added)

48    I note again that the Court heard and determined the issues referable to the interim orders sought by Ms Thompson in the originating application in QUD447/2023 in the first Judgment, Thompson v Lane [2024] FCA 1234. The Orders accompanying the first Judgment were:

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The interim order sought by the applicant in the originating application filed on 17 October 2023 be refused.

2.    The interim application filed on 13 December 2023 be dismissed.

3.    The further relief sought by the applicant pursuant to submissions filed on 6 February 2024 be refused.

4.    The applicant pay the costs of the respondent of and incidental to these interlocutory proceedings on a party-party basis.

49    The concise statement (lodged on 5 December 2023 by Ms Thompson) that accompanied the originating application in QUD447/2023, however, states that:

Orders sought

1.     Morgan Lane cease to act as trustee of the bankrupt Estate of Emma Narelle Cathryn Thompson; and

2.    Morgan Lane pay into Emma Narelle Cathryn Thompson nominated person bank account the amount of $523,528.37.

50    The concise statement in QUD447/2023 sought relief which is wider than that claimed in Ms Thompson’s originating application in that matter. This is, prima facie, contrary to r 16.02(4) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (FCR) which provides:

16.02 Content of pleadings—general

…

(4)    A party is not entitled to seek any additional relief to the relief that is claimed in the originating application.

…

51    However, and notwithstanding r 16.02(4), this Court has a general power, pursuant to rr 1.32 and 1.34 of the FCR, to make any order that the Court considers appropriate in the interests of justice and to dispense with compliance with any of the FCR.

52    In this case I note that:

    Ms Thompson represents herself;

    it is sufficiently clear from the materials before the Court that the nature of the relief claimed by Ms Thompson encompasses the transfer of property in her bankrupt estate to her;

    the other party to these proceedings, Mr Lane, has met the case put by Ms Thompson in this respect and has made detailed submissions addressing whether an amount of approximately $523,528 (liquidated amount) should be returned to Ms Thompson; and

    requiring Ms Thompson now to amend her originating processes will unnecessarily prolong the present proceedings which have been on foot for almost 4 years.

53    I am prepared to treat the pleadings in a holistic manner in the interests of justice and determine, as part of this decision, the issue whether Mr Lane is entitled to the liquidated amount in his capacity as trustee: see generally Mpinda v Fair Work Commission [2022] FCA 1111 at [68].

54    The originating application lodged by Mr Lane on 5 April 2024 in QUD176/2024 provides:

Details of claim

Pursuant to section 30(1)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), the Applicant claims:

1.     An order that the Respondent (and any other occupants):

(a)     vacate the property situated at Unit 3, 40 Glen Road, Toowong in the State of Queensland being the whole of the land comprised in Indefeasible Title 14879015 being Lot 3 BUP 851 (Property);

(b)     deliver all keys for any buildings on the Property to the Applicant; and

(c)     give possession of the Property to the Applicant.

2.     A warrant of possession be issued forthwith substantially in the form exhibited to the affidavit of Morgan Lane filed herewith, with such warrant to lie in the Registry and not be acted upon unless the Applicant (or his solicitors) file an affidavit deposing that:

(a)     the Respondent has not complied with all of order 1; and

(b)     the Applicant does not have possession of the Property.

3.     An order that upon the Applicant or the Bailiff taking possession of the Property, the Respondent, her servants and agents be restrained from:

(a)     entering on or remaining on the Property;

(b)     going within 30 metres of the Property; and

(c)     hindering the sale of the Property by the Applicant.

4.     An order that the Respondent (and any other occupants) remove from the Property all vehicles, rubbish and chattels which have not vested in the Applicant in his capacity as Trustee of the bankrupt estate of the Respondent (Personal Property).

5.     An order that, if the Respondent fails to comply with Order 4, the Applicant is empowered to remove and dispose of any Personal Property on the Property as he sees fit, without being required to account to the Respondent.

6.     The costs of removal and disposal of any Personal Property by the Applicant pursuant to Order 5 be paid from the bankrupt estate of the Respondent.

7.     The Applicant be at liberty to sell the Property and to sell any Personal Property and receive the net proceeds of sale.

8.     The Applicant obtain payment of his costs of and incidental to this application on a solicitor-client basis out of the bankrupt estate of the Respondent and be paid in priority in accordance with section 109 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) from the property of the bankrupt estate of the Respondent.

9.     The Respondent pay the Applicant's costs of and incidental to this application on a party-party basis, to be fixed by a Registrar on a lump-sum basis.

(emphasis added)

55    Lastly, the Claim lodged by Ms Thompson in the Supreme Court of Queensland on 31 March 2025 (which became QUD490/2025) provides:

The plaintiff claims:

relief pursuant to s.188 and 188A of the Lands Title Act 1994 and the Uniform Civil Procedure Rule Reg.156, namely that the defendant organise for the Title of lot 3 at 40 Glen Road, Toowong to be transferred, forthwith, into the name of the Plaintiff; and

an Order for Substituted Service via email to commence this proceeding, for the reason that the parties have accepted service via email in other proceedings afoot in the Federal Court.

(emphasis added)

56    I understand that Mr Lane has, on 25 August 2025, filed a Notice of Address for Service in proceeding QUD490/2025. The filing of the Notice of Address for Service amounted to deemed service for the purposes of r 10.11 of the FCR. As such, the need for an Order for substituted service in that proceeding has fallen away.

57    Accordingly, the questions that this Court must determine are:

    whether Mr Lane remained appointed as Ms Thompson’s bankruptcy trustee following the discharge of Ms Thompson from bankruptcy on 2 July 2023;

    if so, whether Mr Lane is to be removed as Ms Thompson’s bankruptcy trustee;

    if Mr Lane remains as Ms Thompson’s bankruptcy trustee, whether Mr Lane is entitled to an Order granting him possession of the Toowong Apartment in his capacity as trustee or in the alternative, whether Ms Thompson is entitled to an Order transferring the legal title of the Toowong Apartment to her; and

    if Mr Lane remains as Ms Thompson’s bankruptcy trustee, whether Mr Lane is entitled to an amount of approximately $523,528 held in trust (ie the liquidated amount) in his capacity as trustee, or in the alternative, whether Ms Thompson is entitled to an Order requiring Mr Lane to pay the liquidated amount to her.

Initial Submissions of Ms Thompson

58    In relation to the joint proceedings Ms Thompson submits in summary that:

    The Dictionary in sch 2 of the Bankruptcy Act defines the “end of an administration” as, relevantly, “in the case of a bankruptcy – the day on which the bankrupt is discharged or the bankruptcy is annulled, whichever happens first”.

    Ms Thompson was discharged from bankruptcy on 2 July 2023 and for that reason, 2 July 2023 was the date of the end of Mr Lane’s administration.

    It is uncontroversial that Ms Thompson has been discharged from bankruptcy and that no objection to that discharge was filed by the trustee.

    The Worrells File Info dated 19 March 2026, annexed to Ms Thompson’s affidavit dated 20 March 2026:

•    confirms that there are “no reasons for the administration”;

•    confirms that Mr Lane had not determined that any proof of debt claim made since 2020 is a valid debt payable by Ms Thompson or her bankrupt estate, and;

•    does not identify any “ongoing and incomplete administration” of Ms Thompson’s estate.

    The affidavit evidence of Mr Lane does not exhibit evidence of ongoing and incomplete administration of Ms Thompson’s estate by Mr Lane since Ms Thompson was discharged from bankruptcy on 2 July 2023 pertaining to:

•    any of the categories identified in s 149D of the Bankruptcy Act;

•    “pursuant to the Bankruptcy Act”;

•    “ongoing and incomplete administration pertaining to determination of proof of debt claims made since [Mr Lane] was appointed as bankruptcy trustee on 1 July 2020”;

•    “[Mr Lane] providing the information that [Ms Thompson] had reasonably requested”; or

•    “[Mr Lane’s] determination that each payment made from the funds held in trust is a ‘payment made in accordance with the Act’”.

59    Ms Thompson then made detailed submissions regarding affidavit evidence of Mr Lane:

    In relation to Mr Lane’s Affidavit dated 25 January 2024:

•    the emails annexed by Mr Lane do not evidence that Mr Lane provided the information requested by Ms Thompson;

•    the assertion, in one of the emails exhibited, that “Communications between [Mr Lane] and [Mr Lane’s legal representatives] are the subject of legal professional privilege” is incorrect as legal professional privilege does not cover all communications between a person and their legal representatives;

•    the assertion, in one of the emails exhibited, that “[Mr Lane] will not be challenging the legal basis for that claim and will not engage in any further communication with you about past actions of [the Body Corporate for Arila Lodge]”, is unreasonable and inconsistent with a trustee’s obligation (as asserted by Ms Thompson) to consider whether there is a “real debt” even when a Court order is in place;

•    the reference, in one of the emails exhibited, to an ATO Clearance Certificate does not identify Ms Thompson’s provision of material on 11 January 2021 to Worrells for the obtaining of such a certificate, and does not explain the statement that “[Mr Lane] did not apply for an ATO clearance certificate because he had no standing to do so”;

•    in 2021 Mr Lane caused the Court to make an Order to name Mr Lane personally in proceeding QUD113/2021; and

•    the costs agreement, fact sheet and email exhibited on pages 46-53 of that affidavit pertains to an agreement between the law firm Shand Taylor and Worrells, and identifies the “estimate of professional fees and disbursements” to be “between $5000.00 and $25,000.00 plus GST”.

    In relation to Mr Lane’s affidavit dated 15 February 2024, that affidavit:

•    confirms that Ms Thompson was discharged from bankruptcy on 2 July 2023;

•    does not identify any order made for Mr Lane to undertake administration work after 2 July 2023;

•    does not identify any ongoing administration work undertaken by Mr Lane pertaining to proof of debt claims;

•    does not identify that on 2 July 2023, on discharge from bankruptcy, s 153(1) of the Bankruptcy Act relieved Ms Thompson of paying the proofs of debt claims made;

•    confirms that Mr Lane has not adjudicated on any proofs of debt and thus there is no determined debt that is required to be paid from Mr Lane’s “intention to realise” the Toowong apartment;

•    contains exhibited evidence that shows that Mr Lane was required to determine proof of debt claims prior to 29 July 2020 or 26 August 2020; and

•    does not identify any legal basis for Mr Lane’s administration, including pertaining to proof of debt claims, to continue after 2 July 2023 or any basis to make the orders sought by Mr Lane.

    In relation to Mr Lane’s affidavit dated 5 April 2024, that affidavit:

•    does not identify a legal basis for the Court to make the Orders sought in QUD176/2024;

•    contains an exhibit MGL-2 which is the Debtor’s Petition signed by Ms Thompson showing net assets of $2,500,000;

•    does not exhibit any evidence of why Mr Lane did not take steps to cause Ms Thompson’s estate to be annulled in circumstances where the debt under Bankruptcy Notice BN245469 was $79,964, the amount of $523,528 was held in trust prior to Ms Thompson’s discharge on 2 July 2023, and Mr Lane had not accounted to Ms Thompson for the difference between the sale price of Ms Thompson’s real property at 16 Aaron Avenue, Hawthone of $2,790,000 and the amount received into trust;

•    does not identify any legal basis for the Toowong apartment to remain vested in Mr Lane after the administration of Ms Thompson’s estate ended on 2 July 2023;

•    does not identify the purpose of the vesting provisions in the Bankruptcy Act or the fact that Mr Lane did not determine any proof of debt claim to be a valid debt payable by Ms Thompson prior to her discharge from bankruptcy on 2 July 2023

•    did not identify any legal basis for Mr Lane’s administration to continue after 2 July 2023, for the title of the Toowong apartment to be transferred from Ms Thompson’s name on or about 23 February 2024, for any of Ms Thompson’s assets to remain vested in Mr Lane after 2 July 2023, or for the Court to make a warrant of possession with respect to the Toowong apartment.

    In relation to Mr Lane’s affidavit dated 2 April 2026, that affidavit:

•    does not identify a legal basis for the Court to make the Orders sought in QUD176/2024;

•    identifies that the Body Corporate for Arila Lodge “cancelled” Ms Thompson’s “electronic access to the building” at 40 Glen Road, Toowong, as well as Ms Thompson’s access to the Toowong apartment prior to March 2025;

•    does not identify that the Supreme Court relied upon the transfer of the title of the Toowong apartment caused by Mr Lane;

•    does not identify that Mr Lane caused Ms Thompson to be denied access to the Toowong apartment and her personal possessions, and to be effectively “homeless” since March 2025;

•    identifies that Ms Thompson sought to engage a solicitor to act in a family law proceeding and that the solicitor sought to, but did not, access documents in the Toowong Apartment;

•    identifies that a letter pertaining to fire inspection was issued in March 2026 when the previous annual fire inspection was undertaken in August;

•    identifies that Mr Lane did not have access to the Toowong Apartment prior to 4 March 2026 when Mr Lane caused “fobs for access” to be provided;

•    identifies that Mr Lane attempted to enter the Toowong Apartment on 2 April 2026 without “any valid authority or [Ms Thompson’s] consent”;

•    identifies that Ms Thompson’s personal items remain in the Toowong Apartment;

•    identifies that Mr Lane has not derived any financial benefit for Ms Thompson’s estate “from renting” the Toowong Apartment;

•    identifies multiple demands for possession by Mr Lane of the Toowong apartment (noting that none of the demands identify any valid legal basis for making the demands);

•    incorrectly states that Mr Lane is “incurring ongoing expenses as the registered owner of the [Toowong Apartment], including the payment of rates” when in fact Ms Thompson had made multiple payments of the Toowong Apartment’s rates;

•    does not identify any legal basis for Mr Lane’s administration to continue after 2 July 2023, or for the Court to make any Orders sought by Mr Lane.

60    In response to the submissions of Mr Lane, Ms Thompson submitted (beyond what Ms Thompson had already submitted), in summary, that:

     The affidavit material and submissions of Mr Lane did not identify any basis:

•    for Mr Lane’s administration to continue after 2 July 2023;

•    for any of Ms Thompson’s assets to remain vested in Mr Lane after 2 July 2023; or

•    to support the contention that Ms Thompson was ever insolvent.

    Ms Thompson’s Debtor's Petition showed assets far exceeding Mr Lane’s "opinion" of debt identified in [37]-[38] of Thompson v Lane (Trustee) (No 3) [2022] FCA 128.

    There is no exhibited evidence of any administration work undertaken by Mr Lane in accordance with the grounds in s 149B of the Bankruptcy Act for extending administration work after 2 July 2023, being the date Ms Thompson was discharged.

    Ms Thompson’s property vested only for the purpose of paying valid debts, and Mr Lane has not determined that there are any valid debts.

    There is not an unlimited time for Mr Lane to determine debts: Moses v Harris, in the matter of Harris [2026] FCA 254 at [10].

    The case of Pegler v Dale [1975] 1 NSWLR 265, on which Mr Lane relies, can be distinguished from the present matter because it involved property that vested in the trustee by virtue of a deed of assignment, a sequestration order and money paid into Court by the first mortgagee "for the benefit of creditors in that bankruptcy whose debts remain unsatisfied", but there are no debts determined to be debts payable from the bankrupt estate in this matter, a deed of assignment was not entered into, and a sequestration order was not made.

    Pegler identifies the text of s 153(1) of the Bankruptcy Act which confirms that there is no basis for Ms Thompson’s assets to remain vested in the trustee after discharge.

    The case of Daemar v Industrial Commission of New South Wales (No 2) (1990) 22 NSWLR 178, on which Mr Lane relies, can be distinguished from the present matter because it involved an “action” within the meaning of s 60(2) of the Bankruptcy Act.

    Daemar identifies that “a number of decisions either expressly, or by implication, suggest that the "action" stayed during bankruptcy will, … be available to the former bankrupt to prosecute, once he or she is discharged from bankruptcy”.

    The case of Gosden v Dixon (1992) 107 ALR 329 on which Mr Lane relies, can be distinguished from the present matter because that decision pertains to there being proceeds to be distributed “between creditors”, but in the present case there are no debts determined to be debts payable from the bankrupt estate.

    The legislative intention behind the Bankruptcy Act, in relation to “bankrupts who are the victims of misfortune”, is for them to “receive a discharge with the minimum of trouble and expense”. The second reading speech of the Bankruptcy Bill 1966 (Cth) on 20 April 1966 does not identify “any authority or intention for a bankruptcy trustee to continue to undertake administration after a bankrupt is discharged” or “any authority or intention for a bankruptcy trustee to transfer the Title of a real property nine months after discharge and in absence of there being any determined debt to be paid”.

    While Mr Lane claims that he has received “14 proofs of debt tolling $1,364,046”, there is no exhibited evidence of those proofs of debt and the Worrells File Info, annexed to Ms Thompson’s affidavit dated 20 March 2026, confirms that there is no determined or admitted proof of debt claim.

    In absence of there being any determined debt payable by Ms Thompson, Ms Thompson’s property that vested in Mr Lane must be returned to Ms Thompson as Mr Lane is not permitted to make a profit from the administration.

    Mr Lane caused the title of the Toowong Apartment to be transferred “into the name of a non-entity”, “the Trustee of the property of Emma Thompson, a bankrupt” on 23 February 2024, some nine months after 2 July 2023.

    At the time of the transfer, Ms Thompson was not a bankrupt and there was no one who had the legal authority to act as trustee.

    Ms Thompson had an “interest” in the Toowong Apartment, and was “deprived” of her “interest” for the reasons “identified in ss 188(1) and/or 188(A)(a) [sic]” of the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld), because the Toowong Apartment only vested in Mr Lane for the purpose of paying creditors, and the title was transferred in the absence of determined debts to be paid to creditors and after 2 July 2023.

    The cases relied on by Mr Lane, Coshott v Prentice [2014] FCAFC 88; (2014) 221 FCR 450 and Horne (as trustee of the bankrupt estate of Sekulovksi) v Sekulovski [2009] FCA 1164, can be distinguished from the present case because Ms Thompson was discharged from bankruptcy on 2 July 2023 and there is no evidence before the Court of any determined and accepted debts to be paid “from any sale proceeds”.

    The continuation of the administration is an abuse of process. Mr Lane should be “condemned by the Court for his conduct relating to the mismanagement of the estate and hardship caused to [Ms Thompson]”.

Initial Submissions of Mr Lane

61    In relation to the joint proceedings Mr Lane submits in summary that:

    On 1 July 2020, the property of Ms Thompson vested in Mr Lane, pursuant to s 58 of the Bankruptcy Act, following the acceptance, by the Official Trustee, of a debtor’s petition lodged by Ms Thompson and the appointment of Mr Lane as the trustee of the bankrupt estate of Ms Thompson.

    On 2 July 2023 Ms Thompson was discharged from bankruptcy pursuant to s 149 of the Bankruptcy Act.

    Although discharged from bankruptcy, the administration of Ms Thompson’s estate continues because Mr Lane has not recovered possession of the Toowong Apartment, and because, as at February 2024, Mr Lane had received 14 proofs of debt tolling $1,364,046 which have not been adjudicated upon.

    The operation of s 153 of the Bankruptcy Act, in discharging a bankrupt from all debts provable in the bankruptcy, cannot have the effect of revesting in a bankrupt the property which was, under the sequestration order, vested in the trustee: Pegler.

    Pegler was followed, in the context of an action vested in a trustee under s 60(2) of the Bankruptcy Act, in Daemar. It was held in Daemar that the Bankruptcy Act does not have the effect of re-vesting in the bankrupt which had earlier vested in the trustee by virtue of the Bankruptcy Act.

    A discharge from bankruptcy does not cause any property vested in the trustee prior to discharge to be revested, and the trustee remains bound to collect, realise it and distribute the proceeds between creditors: Gosden at 331-2.

    In light of the authorities, Mr Lane remains appointed to conduct the administration of Ms Thompson’s bankrupt estate. There appears to be no basis for Ms Thompson to assert that the property subject to the administration has, or could, revest in her upon discharge from bankruptcy.

    Mr Lane is unaware of any basis or authority which supports Ms Thompson’s application to remove him as trustee, and will otherwise abide by the decision of the Court.

    Ms Thompson, in proceeding QUD490/2025, claims relief pursuant to ss 188, 188A of the Land Title Act. To succeed, Ms Thompson must demonstrate that she (a) has “interest” and/or “interest in a lot”; (b) was “deprived of an interest in a lot”; and (c) was deprived of an interest in a lot “because of” one of the reasons identified in ss 188(1) or 188A(1).

    Under s 188A of the Land Title Act, a person may be entitled to compensation from the State for loss and damage arising from specific circumstances identified therein. The State of Queensland is not a party to the proceeding and the circumstances within s188A(1) are not pleaded in the statement of claim. Ms Thompson does not plead to causation and the reasons for deprivation as outlined in ss 188(1), 188A(1).

    As to Mr Lane’s application for possession of the Toowong Apartment, s 77(1)(e) of the Bankruptcy Act requires Ms Thompson to execute such instruments and generally do all such acts and things in relation to her property and its realisation as are required by the Bankruptcy Act, by the trustee, or by Order of the Court upon the application of the trustee. Section 77(1)(g) requires Ms Thompson to aid to the utmost of her power in the administration of her estate.

    Section 30 of the Bankruptcy Act empowers the Court to make orders against a bankrupt for the vacation of property, issuing a warrant of possession and for the sale of a property in circumstances where the bankrupt is not complying with his or her obligations under the Act: Coshott at [94]; see also Horne at [8].

    Between March 2022 and April 2026 Mr Lane has made numerous demands for Ms Thompson to deliver up possession of the Toowong Apartment.

    From around March 2025 Ms Thompson has apparently been denied access to the Toowong Apartment as the Body Corporate cancelled her access to the lift and common property. Various applications have been made contesting the Body Corporate’s actions, which have been dismissed.

    On 2 April 2026 Mr Lane attended the Toowong Apartment for the purposes of a fire safety inspection. While Mr Lane was unable to access the Toowong Apartment due to a locked security screen, he observed that furniture and possessions remained in the Toowong Apartment.

    Ms Thompson remains in possession of the Toowong Apartment by her belongings remaining within the Toowong Apartment. Mr Lane does not have the keys to the security screen restricting physical access. The presence of possessions within the Toowong Apartment prevents the Trustee delivering vacant possession to an incoming purchaser.

    Ultimately, Mr Lane remains appointed as the trustee of Ms Thompson's bankrupt estate for the purpose of the administration of Ms Thompson’s assets which vested in the Trustee upon Ms Thompson's bankruptcy, despite her discharge from bankruptcy. The Toowong apartment, and the liquidated amount, both vested in Mr Lane on 1 July 2020 and remains vested in Mr Lane subsequent to Ms Thompson’s discharge from bankruptcy.

Supplementary Submissions of Mr Lane

62    In accordance with Order 3 of the Orders made on 16 July 2026, Mr Lane filed five pages of written supplementary submissions on 29 July 2026 in lieu of closing oral submissions.

63    In summary Mr Lane submitted that:

    Ms Thompson’s principal argument in support of her applications appears to be that upon discharge, the administration must end. Reliance is placed on the definition of end of an administration in section 5-5 of sch 2 of the Bankruptcy Act, which contains the Dictionary for the purposes of the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Bankruptcy).

    The precise term end of an administration is not otherwise used within the Bankruptcy Act. There is no direct application of the definition in sch 2, s 5-5 (in the Bankruptcy Act or elsewhere) to the administration of a bankrupt estate and the consequences of discharge. The definition for “end of an administration of an estate” in sch 2, s 5-5 applied only for the purposes of sch 2: Pekar v Jess (Trustee) [2022] FCA 1367.

    The effect of a discharge from bankruptcy is to release a bankrupt from all debts provable in the bankruptcy except the debts mentioned in s 153(2). The discharge “does not put an end to the bankruptcy regarded as a series of judicial and administrative acts and rights and powers”. The trustee of a bankrupt’s estate is still bound to collect, realise and distribute such of the bankrupt’s property as was vested before discharge in the trustee. A bankrupt is entitled to any surplus remaining after payment in full of the costs, charges and expenses of the administration of the bankruptcy; all debts that have been proved in the bankruptcy; and interest on interest bearing debts that have been proved in the bankruptcy: Re Balhorn; Ex parte Balhorn & Official Trustee [1981] FCA 176; (1981) 39 ALR 223 at 226.

    It is submitted by Ms Thompson that upon her annulment, the assets of the bankrupt estate should revest in her. As a matter of law, all property vested in the Trustee pursuant to section 58 of the Bankruptcy Act remains vested in the trustee, who must continue to administer property for the benefit of creditors of the estate.

    The issues of solvency and Ms Thompson’s challenge to the validity of her debts is not a relevant consideration for the questions before the Court in these proceedings. Those issues have been heard and decided by Logan J in Thompson v Lane (Trustee) (No 3) [2022] FCA 128 and the Full Court in Thompson v Lane (Trustee) [2023] FCAFC 32.

    In proceeding QUD490/2025:

•    the originating process seeks relief under the Land Title Act;

•    the interlocutory application lodged by Ms Thompson on 12 February 2026 seeks a mandatory injunction to restore access to the Toowong Apartment;

•    two applications for summary judgment remain on foot, one filed for each party when the proceedings were before the Supreme Court of Queensland. Given the final relief is being determined on the merits, those applications ought to be dismissed with costs in the cause.

    Each of Ms Thompson’s applications in QUD490/2025 is premised on a claim for wrongful deprivation of possession to the Toowong Apartment. As the Toowong Apartment forms part of the bankrupt estate, it is an asset for Mr Lane to administer.

    A claim under ss 188, 188A of the Land Title Act is premised on a person who has been deprived of a lot for the reasons set out in those provisions. Section 188(2) confirms the remedy as compensation from the State. The State is not a party to the proceeding and no evidence of service on the state is before the Court. This is not a cause of action that Ms Thompson can advance against Mr Lane as trustee.

    It is not disputed that, “prior to her registration”, Ms Thompson had an interest in the Toowong Apartment. However, at the time Mr Lane was appointed, the Toowong Apartment was not registered in Ms Thompson’s name, and so the principle of indefeasibility under ss 181 and 184 did not apply. Nevertheless, an action under s 188 may be brought in relation to both legal and equitable interest, and Ms Thompson held an equitable interest in the Toowong Apartment.

    Ms Thompson’s substantive application in QUD490/2025 should be dismissed as there is no disclosed cause of action against Mr Lane, and further or alternatively, dismissed on its merits as the evidence does not demonstrate that Ms Thompson has been deprived of an interest in a lot because of the exhaustive reasons set out in ss 188 and 188A.

    In relation to Ms Thompson’s interlocutory application for a mandatory injunction lodged on 12 February 2026, Ms Thompson must demonstrate a legal or equitable right which was to be determined at trial in respect of which final relief was sought. Given Mr Lane’s submissions that Ms Thompson’s originating process for final relief must fail, there is no basis upon which she could succeed on her application for a mandatory injunction.

    The administration of Ms Thompson’s bankrupt estate necessarily requires the Toowong Apartment to be sold for the payment of administration expenses and creditors. Mr Lane relies on his initial written submissions to seek orders for the possession of the Toowong Apartment.

Supplementary Submissions of Ms Thompson

64    On 30 July 2026, Ms Thompson filed 13 pages of supplementary written submissions in lieu of closing oral submissions. While I note that Ms Thompson’s supplementary written submissions were well over the five-page limit specified in Order 3 of the Orders made on 16 July 2026, I will nonetheless have regard to these submissions in the interests of justice.

65    In summary Ms Thompson submits that:

    The Bankruptcy Act establishes a finite statutory regime for the orderly administration of an insolvent estate. The powers conferred upon a trustee are entirely statutory, exist only for the purposes prescribed by the Bankruptcy Act, and may not be exercised beyond those purposes.

    The vesting provisions facilitate the administration of the estate for the benefit of creditors. Upon discharge, bankruptcy comes to an end, subject only to those powers expressly preserved by the Bankruptcy Act. A trustee has no indefinite authority to retain control of property or continue administering an estate after the statutory purposes of the administration have been fulfilled.

    The central statutory question is “What statutory purpose remained after the Applicant's discharge that authorised the Respondent to continue exercising the powers of a trustee in bankruptcy?” Mr Lane has identified no continuing statutory purpose authorised by the Bankruptcy Act.

    A trustee's statutory powers endure only while those statutory purposes remain to be performed. Once those purposes have been fulfilled, or are no longer capable of being fulfilled, the statutory foundation for the continued exercise of those powers comes to an end. The administration of a bankrupt estate is directed to determining, admitting and paying provable debts from realised property. The existence of admitted provable debts is central to the statutory purpose of the administration.

    Mr Lane’s reliance upon Balhorn is misplaced because that case concerned the Official Trustee's entitlement to obtain possession of title deeds forming part of an estate that remained subject to administration for the purposes of collecting, realising and distributing property in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act.

    Once the statutory purposes of the administration have been fulfilled, there is no continuing statutory authority to maintain an active bankruptcy administration merely because the trustee has not completed administrative processes or performed outstanding statutory functions. Any remaining administrative steps are merely incidental to bringing the administration to its lawful conclusion.

    Moses confirms that provable debts must be established in accordance with ss 82 and 84 of the Bankruptcy Act, and that trustees are required to administer bankrupt estates efficiently and without unnecessary expense.

    The authorities relied on by Mr Lane, including Pegler, Daemar, Gosden, Coshott, and Horne, do not establish that a trustee may continue exercising statutory powers indefinitely after discharge merely because administrative functions remain outstanding.

    In the present case, the trustee has not determined any additional provable debts, has identified no creditors with admitted unsatisfied claims, and has identified no continuing statutory purpose authorising the administration to continue.

    “The gravamen of [Mr Lane’s] position is that, because the Applicant's property vested in the trustee upon bankruptcy, and because establishes [sic] that such property does not automatically revest upon discharge, the trustee is entitled to retain and control that property indefinitely unless and until the trustee elects otherwise.”

    The Respondent’s position, that the trustee may retain and control that property until he determines that the administration is completed indefinitely, is inconsistent with the text, structure and purpose of the Bankruptcy Act. The Respondent’s construction impermissibly equates the continued vesting of legal title with the continued existence of every statutory power associated with the administration.

    The Bankruptcy Act must be construed as a coherent statutory scheme having regard to its text, context and purpose. The vesting provisions cannot be read in isolation from the provisions governing proof of debts, distributions, discharge and the completion of the administration. The Respondent's construction isolates the vesting provisions from the remainder of the Bankruptcy Act. Parliament is not to be taken to have intended that the vesting provisions operate independently of the statutory purposes they were enacted to serve.

    Mr Lane cannot rely upon legal or administrative costs incurred during the bankruptcy as an independent justification for the continued administration of the estate. The trustee's powers, remuneration and entitlement to reimbursement arise only under the Bankruptcy Act and the Insolvency Practice Schedule. The entitlement to remuneration is dependent upon the lawful exercise of the trustee's statutory functions and is not an independent source of statutory authority.

    Mr Lane has failed to demonstrate either that the continued administration served any continuing statutory purpose authorised by the Bankruptcy Act, or that the legal costs incurred after the statutory purposes of the administration had been fulfilled were properly incurred in carrying out the trustee's statutory functions.

    In circumstances where no proof of debt had been admitted as payable by Ms Thompson, Mr Lane had realised $523,528 from Ms Thompson’s estate, Mr Lane identified no continuing statutory purpose requiring the administration to continue, and Mr Lane relied upon alleged creditor claims that had not been determined in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act, there is no reason for the administration to continue, or for Ms Thompson’s assets to remain vested after 2 July 2023.

    The authorities relied upon by Mr Lane establish that property does not automatically revest upon discharge. They do not determine the distinct question raised in these proceedings which is whether the Bankruptcy Act authorises the continued exercise of trustee powers where no continuing statutory purpose remains.

66    I note also that there were some further submissions from Ms Thompson regarding my purported dismissal of her application “in proceeding QUD86 of 2023 [sic] seeking to reopen and set aside the Full Court's decision in Thompson v Lane (Trustee) [2023] FCFCA 32”.

67    However, I have not dismissed such an application. Rather, my understanding is that the Registry rejected Ms Thompson’s lodgment for filing, such that the application never came before me or another Judge of the Court. In any event, any purported application by Ms Thompson to “reopen and set aside the Full Court's decision in Thompson v Lane (Trustee) [2023] FCFCA 32” (reopen application) is not an issue in dispute for me to determine in proceedings QUD447/2023, QUD176/2024 or QUD490/2025.

68    For that reason, I simply note the existence of submissions referable to the reopen application but will not have regard to them for the purposes of determining the present proceedings.

69    In a section titled “Annexure A” to her supplementary written submissions Ms Thompson makes the following additional submissions referable to the evidence of Mr Lane under cross-examination:

    Questions were put, by Ms Thompson, to Mr Lane under cross-examination on 16 July 2026 asking if there is exhibited evidence of Ms Thompson’s insolvency and of a debt that Ms Thompson was unable to pay.

    The only administration work identified by Mr Lane in oral evidence is the sending of letters seeking for the Applicant to “voluntarily vacate her possessions” from the Toowong Apartment.

    There is no exhibited evidence proving any debts in the administration as at the date of the bankruptcy for Mr Lane’s administration to continue after 2 July 2023 or for Ms Thompson’s assets to remain vested in Mr Lane after 2 July 2023.

    There is no exhibited evidence of Mr Lane acting lawfully since 2 July 2023.

Consideration

70    I have previously observed that there are four issues for determination. I will consider each of issue in turn.

Does Mr Lane remain appointed as Ms Thompson’s bankruptcy trustee?

71    This question must be answered in the affirmative for the following reasons.

Relevant principles

72    First, as Lockhart J held in Balhorn (at 226), a discharge from bankruptcy “does not put an end to the bankruptcy regarded as a series of judicial and administrative acts and rights and powers”. Property vested in a trustee during a bankruptcy continues to be vested in the trustee after discharge of the bankrupt from bankruptcy if the administration of the bankrupt estate is otherwise ongoing: Pegler at 266-7, cited in Daemar at 182-3.

Whether Balhorn or Pegler distinguishable

73    Second, to the extent that Ms Thompson submitted that reliance on Balhorn and Pegler was misplaced, I do not accept that submission. The essence of Ms Thompson’s submission is that the facts of Balhorn and Pegler are distinguishable from the present case, because:

    Balhorn concerned the Official Trustee's entitlement to obtain possession of title deeds forming part of an estate that remained subject to administration for the purposes of collecting, realising and distributing property in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act; and

    Pegler involved a bankruptcy by sequestration order, a deed of assignment, and money paid into Court “for the benefit of creditors whose debts remain unsatisfied”.

74    At the outset, I do not consider Pegler to be distinguishable on the basis that it involved a sequestration order or a deed of assignment. The principle in Pegler is one that applies to all bankruptcies, whether initiated by a sequestration order or a debtor’s petition. I also fail to see how the principle in Pegler is affected by the use of a deed of assignment, which is simply a means to transfer property.

75    Ms Thompson contended that her estate is not one that “remained subject to administration” or one with creditors “whose debt remain unsatisfied” because:

    there is no legal basis for the continued administration of her estate when sch 2 of the Bankruptcy Act defines the “end of an administration” as “the day on which the bankrupt is discharged or the bankruptcy is annulled, whichever happens first”; and

    the statutory purposes of the administration, namely to determine, admit and pay provable debts from realised property, either do not exist or have been fulfilled in circumstances where “no proofs of debt had been admitted, no debtors remained to be collected, and no continuing administrative function was identified”.

76    The first of Ms Thompson’s contentions is misconceived. To the extent that Ms Thompson relies on the definition of “end of an administration” in sch 2 of the Bankruptcy Act to support her contention, that exact argument was considered and rejected by Hespe J in the decision of Pekar. Relevantly her Honour said:

[44]     Mr Pekar submitted that the Act clearly declares that the bankruptcy arising from personal insolvency is in force for three years and that no debts can be admitted after the bankruptcy is discharged and at the end of the administration of the estate. This submission is misconceived for the following reasons:

(1)    Nothing in the terms of s 82 prevents the trustee in bankruptcy from admitting, after the discharge of bankruptcy, a proof of a debt to which a bankrupt was subject at the date of bankruptcy.

(2)    The expression “end of an administration of an estate” is relevantly defined in s 5–5 of Schedule 2 (“the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Bankruptcy)”) in the following terms:

In this Schedule:

…

“end of an administration” of a regulated debtor’s estate means:

(a)    in the case of a bankruptcy — the day on which the bankrupt is discharged or the bankruptcy is annulled, whichever happens first…

The definition applies only for the purposes of Schedule 2. It is relevant to the requirements imposed by that Schedule on trustees to maintain records. Section 70–35 of Schedule 2 requires a trustee to retain all books relating to the administration of the estate for a period of “7 years from the end of the administration”. The definition has no application outside of Schedule 2.

(3)    As Moshinsky J held in Pekar [2019] FCA 442 at [70], property vested in a trustee in bankruptcy continues to be so vested after the discharge of the bankrupt and remains subject to creditors’ provable and proven debts. The discharge relates to the bankrupt personally and not to his estate: Daemar v Industrial Commission of New South Wales (No 2) (1990) 22 NSWLR 178 at 182 (Kirby P, Clarke and Meagher JJA).

(4)    Section 129AA provides for the revesting of property in the bankrupt on the sixth anniversary of the date on which the bankrupt is discharged, unless a valid extension notice is given pursuant to s 129AA(4). There is no suggestion that the six year anniversary has been reached.

(emphasis added)

77    I further note, for completeness, that the phrase “end of an administration” is not defined in s 5 of the Bankruptcy Act which contains the dictionary for the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act.

78    The second of Ms Thompson’s contentions, namely that there is no continuing statutory purpose for the ongoing administration of her bankrupt estate, is not made out on the facts. In his 2 April 2026 affidavit Mr Lane gave the following evidence:

22.     As I am still yet to convert all of Ms Thompson's former assets into cash (namely the Unit) and I am incurring ongoing expenses in addressing the matters identified above, I have not yet been required to adjudicate upon the proofs of debt received by the respondents creditors, declared any dividends or paid all of the expenses of the administration.

23.     I have to date received 14 proofs of debt totalling $1,364,046.00 from parties claiming as creditors of the respondent. For the purpose of preparing affidavit material in relation to the respondent 's annulment application in August 2021, I estimated a likely return to unsecured creditors based on proofs of debt received to that time in the range of $0.17 - $0.4241 per dollar. As I have incurred additional costs since that time in administering the respondent's bankrupt estate, it is likely the return to unsecured creditors will be less than that amount.

24.     At the date of this affidavit, the respondent has failed to comply with any of the requests or demands for vacant possession. While it appears from my recent inspection of the unit that she is not currently in physical occupation of the Unit a number of her possessions remain in the Unit. She has ignored my multiple invitations to arrange a cooperative handover.

(emphasis added)

79    Noting that certain attempted filings have been rejected by the Registry in these matters, there is one further affidavit from Ms Thompson on the Court file following the filing of Mr Lane’s 2 April 2026 affidavit. In this affidavit sworn on 26 May 2026 Ms Thompson stated:

24.     I was discharged from bankruptcy on 2 July 2023.

…

25.     I am aware the respondent must determine proof of debt claims within 14 days as required, which is well before when I was discharged on 2 July 2023.

26.     The respondent did not determine any debts prior to when I was discharged.

…

SINCE 2 JULY 2023

22.     The respondent did not make Application to continue to administer my estate after I was discharged from bankruptcy on 2 July 2023.

23.     There is no evidence before the Federal Court to show;

(a)     any ongoing administration after 2 July 2023; or

(b)     any determined proof of debt claim.

24.     The Worrells File Info dated 3 July 2023 (Exhibit ET-4 pages 31 to 35 to this affidavit) shows the amount of $523,528.37 held in trust (on page 33) and states "no reason for administration" (on page 32).

…

31.     Emails sent since 9 July 2026 by the respondent’s solicitor Rod O’Sullivan confirm that the respondent;

(a)     has not updated my financial position since I was discharged on 2 July 2023; and

(b)     has not determined any proof of debt claims; and

(c)     does not have evidence that I was ever insolvent; and

(d)     has not accessed into or leased 3/40 Glen Road, Toowong; and

(e)     had no legal basis to cause the Title of 3/40 Glen Road, Toowong to be transferred from my name on (or about) 23 February 2024.

(errors in numbering in original)

80    Ms Thompson had an opportunity to cross-examine Mr Lane at the hearing on 16 July 2026 and did so. As to the existence and adjudication of proof of debt claims, the relevant parts of the transcript are as follows:

MS THOMPSON: … My second question is further down. It shows under number of proof of debt claimed – proof of debts claimed. It shows zero admitted. So it’s two questions. One is no debtors to collect on this file and no proof of debt claims admitted. It’s on page 14?---Yes. Yes. There are no debtors that I’m aware of.

So, do you accept that there’s no reason for my assets to remain vested in you when there is – your administration ended on 2 July as you’ve – 2023 – as you’ve confirmed and there are no proof of debt claims to be determined?---I don’t agree.

Can you take me to anything that is exhibited to an affidavit that provides an order to extend administration of your bankrupt – my bankrupt estate past 2 July 2023?---There is no order but the Act - - -

Thank you. Thank you. No order to extend administration of your estate…

(emphasis added, transcript 16 July 2026 p 31)

…

MS THOMPSON: … Sorry, you might have already clearly answered this but I just – I’m asking. Did you determine any proof of debt claims prior 2 July 2023?---No.

Is there any evidence exhibited of any proof of debt claim you determined?---No.

That includes since 2 July 2023?---Not be necessary.

Do you agree I was always solvent and able to pay valid debts?---No.

Can you take me to any valid debt – any evidence of any valid debt I wasn’t able to pay?---There was proof of debt in your bankrupt estate.

Can you take me to any valid, as in determined, debt that I was not able to pay?---I don’t. I understand what you’re saying is determined.

(emphasis added, transcript 16 July 2026 p 35)

…

MS THOMPSON: It identifies that there isn’t an unlimited time to determine proof of debt claims. So can you take me to any valid determined debt that I was unable to pay? Any evidence of any valid determined by you debt that I was unable to pay?---I have the ..... dividend.

Okay. I’m going to ask again. Can you take me to any - - -

MS PHILIPPOU: Objection.

MS THOMPSON: - - - valid determined debt - - -

HER HONOUR: I’m sorry. It’s an objection.

MS PHILIPPOU: Mr Lane was asked if he had determined and proofs of debt. He said, “No”.

MS THOMPSON: So I’m asking, is there any valid debt that I was unable to pay?---Your proofs of debt.

HER HONOUR: All right. I’m not sure – you’re just asking the same question over and over again and Mr Lane has answered. It’s not exactly the answer you want but he has answered the question.

MS THOMPSON: It’s not about the answer I want, I don’t think, but - - -

HER HONOUR: Isn’t this?…

HER HONOUR: I’m very much aware that that is your position. I will simply allow this question for the moment but you can’t keep asking the question over and over and over again because somebody doesn’t give you the answer that you want. I think you’ve already asked this question about three times. I will allow you to ask it one more time.

MS THOMPSON: Can you answer yes or no.

HER HONOUR: Perhaps you can rephrase it.

MS THOMPSON: Is there any exhibited evidence of any debt I have been unable to pay?---Yes. Your proof of debt.

HER HONOUR: All right.

MS THOMPSON: Yes or no. Which proof of debt are you saying I was unable to pay?---All of the – yes, all of them. Yes.

All of them?---Yes.

So I’m going to take you to the proof of debt claim for $186,221 that was made by the executor of the estate of my father. It was determined in preceding BD 1202 of ‘17. The decision was made that that was statute barred. It’s not a valid debt. Are you including that?---No. No.

As a debt that I was unable to pay?---Not as a – no. It was a debt in the bankrupt estate. It is not a debt that can be necessarily enforced in your bankrupt estate.

Okay. Is there any debt in my bankrupt estate that can be enforced and I was unable to pay that debt?---Yes.

Which debt can be enforced and I was unable to pay it?---All creditors who have got judgement debts. That’s to start with.

Well, no. We’ve already established that a duty of a trustee is to go behind the orders and that is confirmed in the legal advice from Charles Londy to you. You need – even if there is an order – you need to go behind and establish if there is a real debt. That is in the legal advice provided to you.

MS PHILIPPOU: Objection, your Honour. It has been Mr Lane his duty to do that. He has answered the question a number of times already. If there’s a question coming from this – but at the moment it’s hard to follow what the question is.

HER HONOUR: So, thank you, Ms Philippou. Ms Thompson, you have asked Mr Lane this question a number of times already, namely whether it is he accepts that it is his duty as a trustee in bankruptcy to go behind debts.

MS THOMPSON: Yes.

HER HONOUR: You’ve already asked him that multiple times.

MS THOMPSON: So, he previously answered all proof of debt claims.

HER HONOUR: That wasn’t the answer to that question.

MS THOMPSON: And I know that that amount of $186,221 was a proof of debt claim. So I’m seeking clarification now. Is it all proof of debt claims made or is it only some of the proof of debt claims or is it only some parts of some of the proof of debt claims.

HER HONOUR: Mr Lane has already answered and said they were enforceable. Enforceable debts.

MS THOMPSON: Which ones are enforceable because none of the orders are final orders.

They all have appeal rights applicable to them and none of them are final orders upon which a bankruptcy notice could issue validly and none of them are validly determined debts that I was unable to pay.

HER HONOUR: You’re now asking Mr Lane to – sorry, Ms Philippou.

MS PHILIPPOU: I just want to note that Mr Lane has deposed that he has not adjudicated on the proofs of debts. He has already said that once in cross-examination.

HER HONOUR: Thank you.

MS THOMPSON: So, you’ve not determined any debts. There is no determined valid debt that I could not pay. I’m asking you again. What basis are you stating I was not solvent?---Proofs of debt are ruled on when a dividend is declared. It is that – after that point – or at that point where I determine the actual quantifiable amount of each debt.

(emphasis added, transcript 16 July 2026 pp 36-38)

81    As to the progress of the administration of Ms Thompson’s bankrupt estate the relevant evidence in cross-examination is as follows:

MS THOMPSON: Can you take me to any evidence of any prejudice you will suffer if the court does not make the orders you seek in preceding QUD 176 of 2024?---Well I’ve still got to carry out the valid administration of the estate.

What valid administration have you undertaken thus far?---Well, you’ve been suing me for so long.

No. I didn’t start a claim against you for nine months after you were appointed after my real property at 16 Aaron Ave, Hawthorne was sold for some $2.79 million.

MS PHILIPPOU: Objection.

MS THOMPSON: What valid administration have you undertaken? You haven’t determined any debts. What have you done that’s valid administration?---I am not in a position to declare a dividend.

You don’t get an unlimited amount of time. You don’t keep me trapped in bankruptcy forever?---You’re discharged.

I’m discharged but you are – your actions are causing me to be homeless. I can’t even live in my apartment home because of your actions indirectly and directly.

MS PHILIPPOU: Objection, your Honour. Mr Thompson is supposed to ask questions not shout at the witness.

(emphasis added, transcript 16 July 2026 pp 44-45)

…

MS THOMPSON: So you previously in a response to a question I asked said you couldn’t do any administration because you – because I made claims against you. Is that correct? You couldn’t do any administration?---For the first part of the administration I had not funds. Then you have – because you have made an application for annulment it was decided that we should slow down the administration. Not cease it. Slow it down.

So, paragraph 14 of your affidavit says:

while the plaintiff’s annulment application associate appeal were ongoing, I minimised the work I undertook in administering the bankrupt estate including any dealings with the property.

So you continue to do work, you minimise the work. What is the position?---Well, minimise yes.

But you continued to do administration?---Yes, because you were – the bankrupt estate still continued.

What administration did you undertake in absence of having any funds, as you’ve just said?---I went out and got some advices, you know, and I – and I got them on a speculative basis.

Speculative basis you got legal advices. Did you rely upon the legal advices you were given?---I still haven’t ruled on the proofs of debt.

(emphasis added, transcript 16 July 2026 pp 46-47)

…

MS THOMPSON: Well, legal outlays and legal expenses. What is the total amount you’ve paid out of the funds you’ve held in trust and a bare trust since 2 July 2023 – what amount have you paid out for legal costs in Globo?---Well, it says it’s over 400,000 for .....

Right. So you agree there’s more than – you have paid more than $400,000 for legal advice to continue to maintain these proceedings against me but you haven’t yet determined that there’s any valid debt and we are now more than six years after I was – you were appointed as the bankruptcy trustee. So, that’s correct?---Because you keep suing me.

No. Just is that correct that you have paid or authorised to be paid more than $400,000 from the $523,528 you held in trust in a bare trust from 2 July 2023 and you have - - -

HER HONOUR: That is question number 1. The answer is yes?---No.

Sorry, it’s not? No?---I don’t hold them in bare trust.

Right?---I hold them as a trustee in bankruptcy.

Right.

(emphasis added, transcript 16 July 2026 p 48)

82    I note, for completeness, that Ms Thompson indicated her intention to cross-examine Mr Lane in an email sent to the Queensland Registry, extracted below, on 2 March 2026:

Hello

Morgan Lane will be required for cross-examination.

Additionally, it will be necessary for others to attend and for disclosure of relevant documents to be made.

kind regards,

Emma

83    I am satisfied that any contention by Ms Thompson that she was not afforded procedural fairness to prepare for the cross-examination should be rejected.

84    As can be seen from the materials extracted above, in support of her contention that there is no ongoing statutory purpose Ms Thompson places considerable weight on the fact that “no proofs of debt had been admitted” by Mr Lane. Relevantly, the admission of proofs of debt is governed by s 102 of the Bankruptcy Act which provides:

102 Admission or rejection of proofs

(1)     The trustee shall examine each proof of debt and the grounds of the debt sought to be proved and, subject to the power of the Court to extend the time, shall, not later than 14 days after the expiration of the period specified in the notice of intention to declare a dividend as the period within which creditors may lodge their proofs of debt, either:

(a)     admit the proof of debt in whole;

(b)    admit it in part and reject it in part;

(c)     reject it in whole; or

(d)     require further evidence in support of it.

…

(emphasis added)

85    Ultimately, on an assessment of the affidavit and oral evidence given in these proceedings, I am satisfied that:

    There is a continuing statutory purpose for the ongoing administration of Ms Thompson’s bankrupt estate, namely the adjudication of proof of debts from parties claiming to be creditors of Ms Thompson and the declaration of dividends to creditors with enforceable debts.

    Mr Lane has received 14 proofs of debt totalling over $1.3 million from parties claiming to be creditors of Ms Thompson. Mr Lane has not yet ruled on these proofs of debts.

    In accordance with s 102 of the Bankruptcy Act, the reason why Mr Lane has not yet ruled on these proofs of debts is because he has not yet declared a dividend from the bankrupt estate pursuant to pt VI, div 5.

    Mr Lane has not declared a dividend because he has not yet realised all of the assets, including but not limited to the Toowong Apartment, in Ms Thompson’s bankrupt estate.

86    I accept Mr Lane’s evidence that a reason why the administration of Ms Thompson’s bankrupt estate has taken over six years is because:

For the first part of the administration I had not funds. Then you have – because you have made an application for annulment it was decided that we should slow down the administration. Not cease it. Slow it down.

(transcript 16 July 2026 p 46)

(I note that the application for annulment was the subject of proceeding QUD113/2021 before Justice Logan which was subsequently unsuccessfully appealed before the Full Court).

87    For the reasons I have given, I do not accept that there is no continuing statutory purpose for the ongoing administration of Ms Thompson’s bankrupt estate. It follows that Ms Thompson’s submission, that this Court should not rely on the principle enunciated in Balhorn because that case is distinguishable on the facts, is not made out.

“Bare Trust” and District Court Judgment

88    Third, as seen in the transcript extracted above, Ms Thompson refers to Mr Lane holding properties of her bankrupt estate on a “bare trust”. This is a reference to Ms Thompson’s submission that the ex tempore Judgment of his Honour Judge Barlow KC, in the District Court of Queensland proceeding BD2250/2025 on 30 March 2026 (QDC Judgment), supports a finding that Mr Lane’s administration of Ms Thompson’s bankrupt estate has or should have come to an end on 2 July 2023.

89    In her written reply submissions dated 28 April 2026, Ms Thompson quotes and relies on the following passages from the QDC Judgment (which is exhibit ET-9 to Ms Thompson’s affidavit in QUD447/2023 sworn 26 May 2026) in support of her submission:

… an administration of a bankrupt's estate ends upon the day on which the bankrupt is discharged, as defined in the dictionary to the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).

(QDC Judgment p 1-2 lines 22-24, the First Passage)

… there is no evidence that the estate of Ms Thompson has been and continues to be administered by the former trustee in bankruptcy. It would be astonishing, to my mind, if the administration were properly continuing. …

(QDC Judgment p 1-3 lines 18-20, the Second Passage)

But it may well be that the assets that apparently remain vested in the trustee in bankruptcy are held by him simply on a bare trust, if the administration is properly at an end or even perhaps if it has not been properly administered. If it is held on a bare trust and Ms Thompson is entitled to demand the re-vesting in her of any of the remaining assets of the estate, then any question of her standing to bring this proceeding would be determined…

(QDC Judgment p 1-3 lines 25-30, the Third Passage)

90    I do not accept Ms Thompson’s submission that the QDC Judgment supports a finding that Mr Lane’s administration of Ms Thompson’s bankrupt estate has or should have come to an end on 2 July 2023.

91    On the face of the QDC Judgment, which is in the format of a transcript by its ex tempore nature, proceeding BD2250/2025 was a proceeding between Ms Thompson as the plaintiff, and Robinson Locke Litigation Lawyers as the defendant. As the learned Judge made clear at the outset, the QDC Judgment concerned an application for summary judgment by the defendant on principally two bases:

    first, that Ms Thompson had no standing because “while her bankruptcy was discharged automatically by the effluxion of time in 2023, the causes of action have not re-vested in her, either automatically or by some re-vesting document on the part of the trustee in bankruptcy”, and

    second, that “the causes of action, as pleaded, all arose more than six years before this proceeding was commenced”.

92    The question whether Mr Lane remains the trustee of Ms Thompson’s bankrupt estate was not a question before the District Court of Queensland. In ruling in Ms Thompson’s favour and dismissing the application for summary judgment, the learned Judge could not, and in fact did not, make any ruling about whether Mr Lane remained appointed as Ms Thompson’s bankruptcy trustee.

93    In fact as his Honour rightfully pointed out in the Judgment:

This is not an application that relies upon there being no cause of action. It relies upon the plaintiff having no standing, because the causes of action remain vested in the trustee of the former bankrupt estate.

It seems to me that, in the absence of any information or evidence that the administration of the estate is properly continuing, and that would result in Ms Thompson not having a right to have the causes of action re-vested in her, then there are arguable defences to the claim and the position of the plaintiffs standing is arguable. It is not so clear that the defendant ought have summary judgment. At the very least, that argument may be determined, although technically not between the plaintiff and the defendant in this proceeding, in the proceeding that I am informed exists in the Federal Court, which will determine whether the administration is at an end or otherwise.

In the circumstances, it seems to me that it is not so clear that the plaintiff has no standing to bring this proceeding…

(emphasis added, QDC Judgment p 1-3 lines 34-49)

94    Furthermore, in relation to the specific passages quoted by Ms Thompson I make the following observations:

    The First Passage appears to be a restatement of sch 2 s 5-5 of the Bankruptcy Act. I have addressed the applicability of that section earlier in these reasons.

    The Second Passage was taken out of context by omitting the sentence that immediately follows the quoted part. The full passage reads:

But, even if it is the case that the administration of a bankrupt estate can continue beyond the end of the bankruptcy, there must be a limit to what can happen. In any event, in this case there is no evidence that the estate of Ms Thompson has been and continues to be administered by the former trustee in bankruptcy. It would be astonishing, to my mind, if the administration were properly continuing. That, apparently, is a matter that is going to be decided by the Federal Court of Australia in a proceeding that is on foot between Ms Thompson and the bankruptcy trustee, Mr Lang [sic].

(emphasis added, QDC Judgment p 1-3 lines 16-23)

    The Third Passage, through the phrases “it may well be” and “if”, clearly indicates that his Honour was engaging with a hypothetical scenario and was not making a ruling.

95    I do not accept that the QDC Judgment has any bearing on the question of whether Mr Lane remains appointed as Ms Thompson’s trustee in bankruptcy.

Context and structure of the Bankruptcy Act

96    Fourth, the notion that the administration of a bankrupt estate can continue after the bankrupt is discharged is supported by the ongoing duties of a discharged bankrupt to assist a trustee after discharge from bankruptcy. Relevantly s 152 of the Bankruptcy Act provides that:

Division 4—Provisions applicable to all discharges

152 Discharged bankrupt to give assistance

A discharged bankrupt must, even though discharged, give such assistance as the trustee reasonably requires in the realization and distribution of such of his or her property as is vested in the trustee.

Penalty: Imprisonment for 6 months.

97    Section 152 implicitly contemplates the possibility that a person may be discharged from bankruptcy while administration of that person’s bankrupt estate is still ongoing.

98    Fifth, the notion that the administration of a bankrupt estate can continue after the discharge of bankruptcy is supported by s 129AA of the Bankruptcy Act. Section 129AA, which expressly governs the revesting of non-cash property in a bankrupt estate back to a bankrupt, provides that:

129AA Time limit for realising property

(1)     This section applies only to:

(a)     property (other than cash) that was disclosed in the bankrupt’s statement of affairs; and

(b)    after‑acquired property (other than cash) that the bankrupt discloses in writing to the trustee within 14 days after the bankrupt becomes aware that the property devolved on, or was acquired by, the bankrupt.

In this subsection, cash includes amounts standing to the credit of a bank account or similar account.

(2)     If any such property is still vested in the trustee immediately before the revesting time, then it becomes vested in the bankrupt at the revesting time by force of this section.

(3)     Initially, the revesting time for property is:

(a)     for property disclosed in the statement of affairs—the beginning of the day that is the sixth anniversary of the day on which the bankrupt is discharged from the bankruptcy; and

(b)     for after‑acquired property that is disclosed before the bankrupt is discharged from the bankruptcy—the beginning of the day that is the sixth anniversary of the day on which the bankrupt is discharged; and

(c)     for after‑acquired property that is disclosed after the bankrupt is discharged from the bankruptcy—the beginning of the day that is the sixth anniversary of the day on which the bankrupt disclosed the property to the trustee.

(4)     If the trustee, before the current revesting time, gives the bankrupt a written notice (an extension notice) stating that a later revesting time applies to particular property, then that later time becomes the revesting time for that property.

(5)     There is no limit on the number of extension notices that the trustee may give (either generally or in relation to particular property).

(6)    The time specified in an extension notice must be either:

(a)     a specified time that is not more than 3 years after the current revesting time; or

(b)     a time that is reckoned by reference to a specified event (for example, the death of a life tenant), but is not more than 3 years after the happening of that event.

(7)     Any property that becomes vested in the bankrupt under this section thereupon ceases to be subject to section 127.

99    Section 129AA expressly contemplates the ongoing administration of a person’s bankrupt estate following, and notwithstanding, their discharge from bankruptcy.

Conclusion

100    Ultimately, for the reasons I have given, Mr Lane remains as Ms Thompson’s trustee in bankruptcy. I repeat my observations, in paragraph 25 of my First Judgment, that although a discharge from bankruptcy means that “the bankrupt [is] freed from indebtedness and able to start afresh” (Hudson Jnr v Whalan [1998] FCA 1064), it does not mean that an ongoing and incomplete administration of the bankrupt estate is halted.

101    I now turn to the question whether Mr Lane should be removed from his position as Ms Thompson’s trustee in bankruptcy.

Should Mr Lane be removed from his position as Ms Thompson’s trustee in bankruptcy?

102    This question must be answered in the negative for the following reasons.

Court’s power and standing

103    I accept that this Court has the power to make an order to the effect that Mr Lane cease acting as Ms Thompson’s trustee in bankruptcy, and that Ms Thompson has standing to bring an application to that effect before this Court.

104    Until 2016, the Bankruptcy Act included ss 178 and 179 which read as follows:

178 Appeal to Court against trustee’s decision etc.

(1)     If the bankrupt, a creditor or any other person is affected by an act, omission or decision of the trustee, he or she may apply to the Court, and the Court may make such order in the matter as it thinks just and equitable.

(2)     The application must be made not later than 60 days after the day on which the person became aware of the trustee’s act, omission or decision.

179 Control of trustees by the Court

(1)     The Court may, on the application of the Inspector-General, a creditor or the bankrupt, inquire into the conduct of a trustee in relation to a bankruptcy and may do one or both of the following:

(a)     remove the trustee from office; and

(b)     make such order as it thinks proper.

 (2)     The Inspector-General or a creditor may at any time require a trustee to answer an inquiry in relation to the bankrupt’s estate or affairs.

(see such cases as McGoldrick v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [1993] FCA 961; (1993) 47 FCR 547, and Trkulja v Morton (No 2) [2005] FCA 1044; (2005) 146 FCR 339).

105    Sections 178 and 179 were both repealed by sch 1, s 54 of the Insolvency Law Reform Act 2016 (Cth). At the same time, the Insolvency Law Reform Act inserted the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Bankruptcy) (IP Schedule) into sch 2 of the Bankruptcy Act. The IP Schedule, in current form, contains ss 90-15 and 90-20 which provides:

90‑15 Court may make orders in relation to estate administration

Court may make orders

(1)     The Court may make such orders as it thinks fit in relation to the administration of a regulated debtor’s estate.

Orders on own initiative or on application

(2)     The Court may exercise the power under subsection (1):

(a)     on its own initiative, during proceedings before the Court; or

(b)     on application under section 90‑20.

Examples of orders that may be made

(3)     Without limiting subsection (1), those orders may include any one or more of the following:

…

(b)    an order that a person cease to be the trustee of the estate;

…

Matters that may be taken into account

(4)     Without limiting the matters which the Court may take into account when making orders, the Court may take into account:

(a)     whether the trustee has faithfully performed, or is faithfully performing, the trustee’s duties; and

(b)     whether an action or failure to act by the trustee is in compliance with this Act and the Insolvency Practice Rules; and

(c)     whether an action or failure to act by the trustee is in compliance with an order of the Court; and

(d)     whether the regulated debtor’s estate or any person has suffered, or is likely to suffer, loss or damage because of an action or failure to act by the trustee; and

(e)     the seriousness of the consequences of any action or failure to act by the trustee, including the effect of that action or failure to act on public confidence in registered trustees as a group.

…

Section does not limit Court’s powers

(7)     This section does not limit the Court’s powers under any other provision of this Act, or under any other law.

90‑20 Application for Court order

(1)     Each of the following persons may apply for an order under section 90‑15:

(a)     a person with a financial interest in the administration of the regulated debtor’s estate;

…

…

106    A “regulated debtor” is defined in the IP Schedule as including a bankrupt: s 5-15(a), and the regulated debtor has a financial interest in the administration of the regulated debtor’s estate: s 5-30(a)(i).

107    On the materials before me, I am satisfied that Ms Thompson is a regulated debtor. Although s 5-15(a) of the IP Schedule is couched in terms of a person who “is” a bankrupt in the present tense, in circumstances where (as I have already found) the Bankruptcy Act allows for the ongoing administration of a bankrupt estate beyond the discharge of the bankrupt, it could not have been the legislature’s intention to limit standing to bring an application under s 90-15 to current but not former bankrupts.

108    I also note the Court’s general supervisory power under s 45-1 of the IP Schedule which provides:

Division 45 -- Court oversight of registered trustees

45-1 Court may make orders in relation to registered trustees

(1)     The Court may make such orders as it thinks fit in relation to a registered trustee.

(2)     The Court may exercise the power under subsection (1):

(a)     on its own initiative, during proceedings before the Court; or

(b)     on application under subsection (3).

(3)     Each of the following persons may apply for an order under subsection (1):

(a)     the registered trustee;

(b)     the Inspector-General.

(4)     Without limiting the matters which the Court may take into account when making orders, the Court may take into account:

(a)     whether the registered trustee has faithfully performed, or is faithfully performing, the registered trustee's duties; and

(b)     whether an action or failure to act by the registered trustee is in compliance with this Act and the Insolvency Practice Rules; and

(c)     whether an action or failure to act by the registered trustee is in compliance with an order of the Court; and

(d)     whether any person has suffered, or is likely to suffer, loss or damage because of an action or failure to act by the registered trustee; and

(e)     the seriousness of the consequences of any action or failure to act by the registered trustee, including the effect of that action or failure to act on public confidence in registered trustees as a group.

(5)     This section does not limit the Court's powers under any other provision of this Act, or under any other law.

109    Further, as the sixth edition of the McDonald, Henry and Meek Australian Bankruptcy Law and Practice helpfully explains:

[SCH 2 45-1.1.10] Examples of decisions under s 45-1

In Pekar v Holden (Trustee) (No 2) [2019] FCA 1212 at [17] Moshinsky J said about 45-1:

This provision replaces former s 178 of the Bankruptcy Act. The principles developed in relation to s 178, in cases such as McGoldrick v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1993) 47 FCR 547, Re Tyndall (1977) and Macchia v Nilant (2001) 100 FCR 101, remain relevant in relation to the new provision. As indicated by the cases in relation to the former provision, the section confers on the Court a very wide discretion: McGoldrick v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1993) 47 FCR 547, at 552; Re Tyndall (1977) 30 FLR 6 at 9-10.

In the case before him, Moshinsky J considered that he could, and “if it were necessary to do so… would make an order pursuant to s 45-1 requiring” a trustee to repay to the bankrupt the funds remaining of a sum paid to the trustee by the bankrupt pursuant to an agreement to resolve the bankruptcy which had not been abided by: Pekar v Holden (Trustee) (No 2) [2019] FCA 1212 at [18] (Moshinsky J).

110    It follows that Ms Thompson has standing to bring an application for the removal of Mr Lane as her trustee in bankruptcy under s 90-15 of the IP Schedule.

111    Alternatively, I am prepared to exercise the Court’s supervisory jurisdiction, on the Court’s own initiative, to consider Ms Thompson’s application for the removal of Mr Lane pursuant to s 45-1 of the IP Schedule. I note in passing that Ms Thompson lacks standing to bring an application under s 45-1 because she is not the registered trustee or the Inspector-General.

Relevant principles

112    Based on the submissions before me I understand that Ms Thompson now seeks removal of Mr Lane on the basis of the following contentions:

    there is no legal basis for the ongoing administration of her bankrupt estate after 2 July 2023, being the date of her discharge from bankruptcy;

    the ongoing administration of her bankrupt estate serves no statutory purpose;

    Mr Lane has engaged in significant misconduct in the administration of her bankrupt estate, including failures to provide information reasonably requested by Ms Thompson and improper payments of monies out of the funds held in trust; or

    the Bankruptcy Act requires trustees to administer bankrupt estates efficiently, and Mr Lane has failed to meet his obligations in this respect.

113    Mr Lane does not appear to take an active role in the litigation of this issue and submits, at [23] of his written submissions filed 21 April 2026, that:

The Trustee is unaware of any basis or authority which supports Ms Thompson’s application to remove him as trustee, and will otherwise abide by the decision of the Court.

114    I note that Ms Thompson has the onus of establishing why Mr Lane should be removed: Shaw v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2026] FCAFC 32 at [66] (Shaw Full Court).

115    In Mokhtar v Piscopo [2024] FCA 493 at [28]-[42] Perry J summarised the relevant principles governing the exercise of the discretion in s 90-15. In summary her Honour found:

(1)    The general duties of the trustee in bankruptcy and the limited role of the Court provide important context against which to consider the matters raised by an applicant. A great deal of discretion and judgment is required to be exercised by the trustee in performing its role of achieving the maximum return form the assets to satisfy the claims of the creditors and to provide the best surplus possible for the bankrupt: Shaw v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (No 3) [2021] FCA 1569 at [27] (Shaw First Instance), citing Adsett v Berlouis [1992] FCA 549; (1992) 37 FCR 201 at 209. There is a “well-established policy” under bankruptcy legislation that the Court should not unduly interfere with the day-to-day administration of a bankrupt’s estate by a trustee: Re Tyndall [1977] FCA 72; (1977) 30 FLR 6 at 10. See also Patel v Ruhe [2016] FCA 520 at [33]; Frigger v Trenfield (No 10) [2021] FCA 1500 at [553].

(2)    Section 90-15 of the IP Schedule replaced s 179 of the Bankruptcy Act. Under the former provision, removal could occur only following a two-part process. An applicant had to first establish grounds for an inquiry into the conduct of the trustee before a Court could order the trustee’s removal. That is no longer a requirement under s 90-15 of the IP Schedule. However, there may still be cases where it is nonetheless appropriate to embark on a two-stage process similar to that under s 179 of the Bankruptcy Act. Such an approach may be appropriate where the orders sought by the applicant are based on broad allegations of misfeasance, neglect or other error in the conduct of the administration of the estate by the trustee, particularly where those allegations effectively encompass almost every aspect of the administration of the estate: Shaw First Instance at [21].

(3)    The enactment of s 90-15 of the IP Schedule more closely aligned the rules for the removal of trustees in personal bankruptcies with those for the removal of liquidators in corporate insolvencies: Pioneer Australia Pty Ltd v Bettles as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Quinn [2020] FCA 1788 at [30]; Borg v de Vries (Trustee), in the matter of the Bankrupt Estate of Bertram [2018] FCA 2116 at [26].

(4)    The Court’s power to remove a liquidator (and, by analogy, a bankrupt) is not limited to matters relating to the unfitness of the liquidator to hold office: Domino Hire Pty Ltd v Pioneer Park Pty Ltd (in liq) [2003] NSWSC 496 at [58]. Rather, it is open to the applicant for removal to point to any conduct or inactivity on the liquidator’s part that provides a basis for the conclusion that he or she should be removed, ranging from moral turpitude, to bias or partiality, lack of independence, incompetence or other unfitness for office: Domino at [58]. The Court should exercise the power to remove and replace a trustee in bankruptcy in a manner which best advances the interests of the bankruptcy, having regard to the objects of the Bankruptcy Act: see generally Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Franklin [2014] FCAFC 85; (2014) 223 FCR 204 at [55].

(5)    where the relationship between the trustee and the bankrupt “has totally broken down; that, in many cases, is a sufficient reason for the trustee to be removed”: Doolan v Dare [2004] FCA 682 at [49]; see also Trkulja v Morton [2005] FCA 659 at [4].

(6)    However, the mere breakdown in a relationship between the trustee and bankrupt will not always justify removal of the trustee. A bankrupt should not be allowed, by an assiduous pattern of resistance to the trustee of his estate, to generate and then rely upon a suggested reason for removal thereby created. It is clearly an insufficient ground for removal of a trustee that a bankrupt resists the proper administration of his estate or sets out to frustrate a trustee in the proper performance of his duties: Boensch v Pascoe [2007] FCA 1977 at [92]-[93].

(7)    The duties of the bankrupt enumerated in s 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, and any non-compliance by the bankrupt, are also relevant considerations.

(8)    The ultimate question for the Court is whether removal would be in the best interests of the administration of the bankrupt estate.

116    For the reasons that follow, I am not satisfied that the removal of Mr Lane is in the best interests of the administration of the bankrupt estate of Ms Thompson.

Legal basis and statutory purpose of the administration

117    First, I reject any contention that Mr Lane’s administration of the bankrupt estate of Ms Thompson lacked legal basis or statutory purpose.

118    As I have already found, there is plainly a legal basis for the continuation of the administration of the bankrupt estate of Ms Thompson after 2 July 2023. The proposition that a discharge from bankruptcy does not halt the administration of the estate of the formerly bankrupt is strongly supported by the case law as well as the context and structure of the Bankruptcy Act.

119    Similarly, I have also already found that the statutory purpose of the administration of the bankrupt estate of Ms Thompson has not yet been exhausted – particularly in relation to the adjudication of proof of debts from parties claiming to be Ms Thompson’s creditors, and the declaration of dividends to creditors with enforceable debts.

120    I further note in passing that, insofar as Ms Thompson claims to be a victim of misfortune (being an expression referred to in the second reading speech of the Bill which became the Bankruptcy Act), I do not accept that contention. Ms Thompson became a bankrupt upon her signing and lodging a debtor’s petition that was subsequently accepted. I note especially paragraph 32 of Thompson v Lane (Trustee) (No 3) [2022] FCA 128:

"Given what was declared, Ms Thompson's case may just possibly have been one where, within a reasonable time she could have paid her debts and where she was unwilling to pay debts to particular creditors".

Trustee discretion and allegations of misconduct

121    Second, as Wigney J stated in Shaw First Instance at [21], a two-stage approach of ascertaining first that there are proper grounds for conducting an inquiry into the administration of the bankrupt estate before embarking on a full consideration of a case involving allegations of breaches of duty may be appropriate:

… where the orders sought by the applicant are based on broad allegations of misfeasance, neglect or other error in the conduct of the administration of the estate by the trustee, particularly where those allegations effectively encompass almost every aspect of the administration of the estate.

(emphasis added)

122    Wigney J then explained the rationale for adopting a two-stage process as follows:

[22]     The reason that a two-stage process may be appropriate in those types of cases is that, while s 90–15 of the Schedule is in different terms to the former s 179 of the Bankruptcy Act, it nonetheless remains the case that, as a matter of principle, the Court should not unduly interfere with the trustee’s day-to-day administration of a bankrupt’s estate. Nor should the Court put a trustee and possibly the creditors to the trouble and expense of what would, in effect, amount to an inquiry into the trustee’s administration of the estate unless the Court is first satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that the trustee had erred in its administration of the estate and that an inquiry, if conducted, would reveal misconduct: see Borg de Vries at [33].

[23]     There could be no doubt that Mr Shaw’s case was built on claims and allegations of breach of duty by the Trustee in the administration of his estate. Moreover, Mr Shaw’s claims and allegations encompass just about every aspect of the Trustee’s administration of the estate. A hearing involving the consideration and determination of those claims and allegations on a final basis would amount, in effect, to a detailed inquiry into the Trustee’s administration of Mr Shaw’s estate over a number of years. There is much to be said for the proposition that the Court should not put the Trustee to the trouble and expense of such an inquiry unless Mr Shaw is first able to demonstrate that such an inquiry is warranted, and that there are substantial grounds for believing that the Trustee erred in his administration of the estate. That is all the more so given Mr Shaw’s apparent begrudging concession or acknowledgment, referred to earlier, that such an approach may be appropriate and was probably to his advantage in all the circumstances.

[24]     Ultimately, however, it makes little, if any, difference whether the Court approaches Mr Shaw’s application by way of a two-stage process, or instead embarks on a consideration of whether Mr Shaw had made out his case that the Trustee had acted negligently or had otherwise breached or failed to perform its statutory duties in respect of the administration of Mr Shaw’s estate. That is because, as has already been noted, Mr Shaw was given every opportunity to adduce evidence in support of his case against the Trustee. He was also given every opportunity to advance submissions in support of his case. The evidence and submissions relied on by Mr Shaw fail to demonstrate any misfeasance, neglect or other error in the conduct of the administration of the estate by the Trustee, or even that there are any grounds for believing that the Trustee so erred in the conduct of the administration. Mr Shaw’s case fails whether it is approached as a two-stage process, or whether full and detailed consideration is given to all the evidence, for the purpose of determining whether Mr Shaw has made out his case.

(emphasis added)

123    Wigney J proceeded to apply the two-stage approach and concluded that the applicant in that case, Mr Shaw, had not established a proper basis for an inquiry into the trustee’s conduct: Shaw First Instance at [190]-[194]. Still, recognising that Mr Shaw did not unequivocally accept that a two-stage procedure was appropriate, his Honour continued to consider the question whether any of the relief sought by Mr Shaw was supported by the evidence. His Honour answered that question in the negative: Shaw First Instance at [195]-[196].

124    The primary Judge’s decision in Shaw First Instance to apply the two-stage approach was (among other things) the subject of an appeal before the Full Court. In Shaw Full Court the appeal on this point was addressed in the following paragraphs:

Complaint as to approach to determine whether to order an inquiry

[57]     The threshold question raised is whether Wigney J correctly identified and applied the statutory framework when exercising the discretionary supervisory power under s 90-15 of the IPSB to decline to direct an inquiry into the conduct of the Trustee.

[58]     Mr Shaw essentially contends that Wigney J erred in approaching his application under s 90-15 by reference to a “two-stage” process: first, determining whether there were substantial grounds warranting an inquiry into the Trustee’s administration; and — only if that threshold was met — proceeding to the inquiry itself and the making of any appropriate orders.

[59]     Wigney J was cognisant that the terms of ss 90-10 and 90-15 do not expressly require a two-stage process, and that there may be cases in which orders under s 90-15 may be made without any inquiry (or any broad inquiry) into the Trustee’s administration: Shaw v OT (No 3) at [20].

[60]     The approach taken by Wigney J was premised on recognising that in an appropriate case a “two-stage” approach to an application under s 90-15 may be warranted. His Honour observed that although ss 90-10 and 90-15 do not require a two-stage process, in some cases the Court may first require the applicant to demonstrate that an inquiry is warranted before embarking on a full merits hearing: Shaw v OT (No 3) at [21].

[61]     Wigney J considered that to approach the exercise of the discretion by first ascertaining whether the applicant had established substantial grounds for believing the Trustee has erred and that an inquiry would reveal misconduct was consistent with the long-standing policy that the Court should not unduly interfere with a trustee’s day-to-day administration, and should not put a trustee (and potentially creditors) to the trouble and expense of what would in effect be an inquiry unless satisfied as to the threshold issue: Shaw v OT (No 3) at [22].

[62]     In the present case, Wigney J correctly recognised that Mr Shaw’s allegations were broad-ranging, encompassing “just about every aspect” of the Trustee’s administration and that it was conceivable that a final determination of Mr Shaw’s allegations would effectively amount to a detailed inquiry over years. Accordingly, Wigney J concluded that there was “much to be said” for not putting the Trustee to that burden unless Mr Shaw first demonstrated that an inquiry was warranted — particularly given Mr Shaw’s own acknowledgement that the two-stage approach was practical and to his advantage: Shaw v OT (No 3) at [23].

[63]     No error of law is established by Mr Shaw’s complaint about Wigney J’s approach. The powers conferred by ss 90-10 and 90-15 of the IPSB are broad but discretionary and are directed to the Court’s supervisory function in relation to the administration of a bankrupt estate. Where the conduct relied upon has been fully ventilated in the proceeding, and the factual foundation for complaint has been rejected, the ordering of an inquiry would serve no proper supervisory purpose. Accordingly, it would not be an appropriate exercise of the powers under ss 90-10 and 90-15 of the IPSB to proceed to an inquiry. Approaching the issue by first ascertaining whether there is a proper basis for the Court’s intervention is orthodox: see the comprehensive canvas of the relevant authorities on the antecedent provision, being s 536 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (repealed), and ss 90-10 and 90-15 of the IPSB in Djordjevich v Rohrt (in his capacity as liquidator of ACN 091 518 302 Pty Ltd (in liq)) [2022] VSCA 84; 67 VR 161 (Kennedy and Whelan JJA, sitting as an appellate bench of two), at [44] citing Leslie, in the matter of the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 1976 v Hennessy [2001] FCA 371 (Ryan, Dowsett and Hely JJ); see also ACN 153 364 491 Ltd (in liq) v GP No 1 Pty Ltd (in liq), in the matter of GP No 1 Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 3) [2020] FCA 694 at [40]–[44] (Charlesworth J) citing Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Macks (No 2) [2019] SASC 17; 133 SASR 251 at [52] (Doyle J).

[64]     In circumstances such as here where the allegations made are wide ranging and the inquiry sought is broad in nature, the Court does not embark upon an inquiry into a trustee’s conduct merely because allegations have been made. The Court must first be satisfied as to the threshold question, namely that there is material which establishes a sufficient basis to warrant the exercise of the Court’s supervisory jurisdiction.

[65]     It bears emphasis that Wigney J further concluded that in the particular circumstances before him it made little (if any) difference whether the matter was approached as two stages or as a full merits hearing. That was because Mr Shaw was required to demonstrate substantial grounds for believing that the Trustee had erred in the administration of his estate and he had every opportunity to adduce evidence and submissions but failed to do so. For that reason, Wigney J concluded that the application would have failed even if the matter had proceeded directly to an inquiry: Shaw v OT (No 3) at [24].

[66]     A recurrent theme in Mr Shaw’s submissions before Wigney J, which he reprised on appeal, was that his application for relief under ss 90-10 and 90-15 operated as a species of reverse-onus or “show cause” exercise, requiring the Trustee to justify the administration of the estate in all respects. That approach was misconceived. Where the application was directed to broad-ranging allegations effectively encompassing the whole of the Trustee’s administration, it was appropriate first to assess whether Mr Shaw had established substantial grounds warranting the Court to embark upon an inquiry. To proceed otherwise would invert the statutory task and impose on the Trustee (and indirectly the estate) the burden and expense of an inquiry, with the attendant risk of undue interference in the administration of the estate, absent any demonstrated basis for doing so.

[67]     Mr Shaw has not demonstrated any error in relation to Wigney J’s conclusion that Mr Shaw’s evidence and submissions failed “to demonstrate any misfeasance, neglect or other error in the conduct of the administration of the estate by the Trustee, or even that there are grounds for believing that the Trustee so erred in the conduct of the administration”, and that “Mr Shaw’s allegations of maladministration, breach of trust and negligence on the part of the Trustee were entirely unsupported by the evidence”: Shaw v OT (No 3) at [24], [192].

(emphasis added)

125    Turning to the present case, Ms Thompson makes broad allegations of misconduct against Mr Lane in his capacity as Ms Thompson’s trustee in bankruptcy. I am satisfied that the allegations made by Ms Thompson against Mr Lane are so broad-ranging that they effectively encompass almost every aspect of the administration of the estate. By way of example of the extent of these allegations, I extract the following paragraphs from two affidavits of Ms Thompson:

28.     Since 2 July 2023 the actions and inactions of the respondent have;

(a) denied my legal rights; and

(b) denied the quiet enjoyment of life I am entitled to experience; and

(c) denied access to my apartment home 3/40 Glen Road, Toowong and I have become homeless; and

(d) denied access to monies and property, including the minimum sum of $523,528 held in trust on 2 July 2023; noting I have also been denied a full reconciliation from the sale of my real property at [ADDRESS REMOVED].

(emphasis added, affidavit of Emma Thompson in QUD447/2023 affirmed 26 May 2026 p 7)

…

40.     Additionally, as identified in my affidavits and exhibited evidence previously filed, the respondent has failed to act in accordance with the duties of a bankruptcy trustee, as identified in;

a)     the Bankruptcy Act 1966, including section 19(1); and

b)     the Bankruptcy Regulations 2021; and

c)     the Insolvency Practice Rules (Bankruptcy), including section s.42-10, 42-15, 42-60, 65-25 and s.70-56.

41.     And, the respondent has failed to act in accordance with his fiduciary duties owed to me as identified in my affidavits and exhibited evidence previously filed, including documents that confirm;

a)     the respondent's communications with representatives/ lot owners of the Body Corporate of Arila Lodge CTS 14237 that have denied me my legal rights, including access to my apartment home since February 2025; and

b)     the respondent's failure to take appropriate steps to stop the sale of my real property 16 Aaron Avenue, Hawthorne, that was sold on 19 December 2020 for significantly less than market value, and less that other offers to purchase made to the Applicant, whilst the market was experiencing boom conditions; and

c)     the respondent's actions that denied me the ability to earn income exceeding $250,000 per annum, including by using my QBCC Open Builder License that the respondent caused to be cancelled after he should have been aware that there were no valid debts payable by me; and

d)     the payments made from the $523,528 funds withheld from me since 2 July 2023; and

e)     the respondent's description of me to third parties as being a bankrupt after he was aware there was no valid debt to be paid by me or from my estate; and

f)     the "deals" that the respondent made with persons contrary to his fiduciary duties and duties as bankruptcy trustee.

42.     Rule 40.06 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 provides for costs improperly, unreasonably or negligently incurred to be disallowed; noting that the respondent's legal representatives failed to comply with requirements of legislation, including;

a)     Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld); including s.308, s.315, s.340 and s.341; and

b)     Legal Profession Regulation 2017 (Qld); including s.69; and

c)     Australian Solicitors Conduct rules 2012 (Qld); including Rules 3, 5 and 19; and

d)     Federal Court Rules 2011.

(emphasis added, affidavit of Emma Thompson in QUD447/2023 affirmed 20 March 2026 pp 9-10)

126    I am satisfied that I should approach the removal of Mr Lane using the two-stage process applied in Shaw First Instance and upheld in Shaw Full Court.

127    On the materials before me, I am not satisfied that there are proper grounds for conducting an inquiry into Mr Lane’s administration of the bankrupt estate of Ms Thompson .

128    As the authorities demonstrate, the discretion of a trustee in bankruptcy will not lightly be the subject of interference by the Court: see, eg, Shaw Full Court at [61], Shaw First Instance at [22], Mokhtar at [29], Adsett at 209. In order to demonstrate that an inquiry into the conduct of the trustee is warranted, it is incumbent upon Ms Thompson to establish substantial grounds that the trustee erred in the administration of the estate or had engaged in misconduct: Shaw First Instance at [191]. Further, the Court should be mindful of the policy that the Court should not unduly interfere in the trustee’s day-to-day administration of a bankrupt estate, and must have regard to the likely utility of an inquiry and whether there is a likelihood that the trustee should be held to account for the conduct of the administration which has affected the bankrupt in some way: Shaw First Instance at [191].

Failure to disclose information

129    To the extent that Ms Thompson alleges misconduct on the part of the trustee on the basis that Mr Lane had failed to answer reasonable requests for information, I note the below paragraphs of the affidavit of Mr Lane in proceeding QUD447/2023 affirmed 15 February 2024:

Provision of information to the applicant

9.     As identified in my August 2021 affidavit, the applicant has played an active role in questioning and challenging the administration of her estate and has since the commencement of her bankruptcy sent hundreds of emails to my office and to my legal representatives.

10.     My January 2024 affidavit exhibits some of those communications. By way of further example:

(a)     Annexure ML-C to this affidavit is an email exchange I had with Ms Thompson in February 2022 responding to various information requests made by her.

(b)     As identified in my August 2021 affidavit, a copy of my file (save for documents subject to legal professional privilege and my own internal documents) up to August 2021 (comprising 2.43GB on a USB stick) was provided to the applicant in August 2021. In response to further requests made by the applicant (which are exhibited to my January 2024 affidavit) I provided a further USB stick to the applicant on or about 31 March 2023 containing my file (save for documents subject to legal professional privilege and my own internal documents) for the period August 2021 to March 2023.

(c)     Annexed to my January 2024 affidavit (at pages 36-41 of the annexures) is an email sent by my lawyers to the applicant on 17 April 2023 responding to a further request for information, whereby my lawyers requested the applicant (as contemplated by section 70-17(5) of the Insolvency Practice Rules (Bankruptcy) 2016 (Cth)) agree to bear the costs of complying with ongoing requests for information and pay an amount of $5,000.00 into my lawyers trust account as security for the cost of complying with those requests. I am informed by my lawyers and verily believe that the applicant has not agreed to bear the cost of complying with any future information requests and has not made any payment into my lawyers' trust account.

11.     Since the commencement of the applicant's bankruptcy I (and my lawyers) have received and responded to multiple requests for information made by the bankrupt. Many of those requests have been broad ranging and repetitive. Dealing with these requests has significantly increased the cost of the administration of the applicant's bankrupt estate.

…

13.     I consider that the applicant already has access to all information relevant to the administration of her bankrupt estate (save for privileged communications and my internal documents) and I cannot identify any further relevant information currently available that I can provide. I remain prepared to comply with any reasonable requests for information the applicant may make in the future provided she agrees to meet the costs of doing so and provides appropriate security in that regard.

130    Ms Thompson’s submissions relating to this allegation of misconduct is that Mr Lane has not provided the information requested, noting that “the Plaintiff’s affidavit dated 24 April 2025 exhibits multiple emails showing relevant requests for information that the Respondent has not responded to”. Importantly, Ms Thompson does not address [9]-[13] of Mr Lane’s affidavit in her submissions to the Court. Ms Thompson states, at [4] of her affidavit in QUD490/2025 sworn 16 September 2025, that:

Exhibit pages 7 to 108 are some of the approximately 100 emails that I sent to Morgan Lane, requesting information and documents, that were not responded to/ not provided to the Applicant (due to lack of time, additional emails will be exhibited to subsequent affidavit(s);

…

131    This statement does not however address Mr Lane’s evidence that Ms Thompson already had “access to all information relevant to the administration of her bankrupt estate”.

Improper payments out of estate

132    Similarly, to the extent that Ms Thompson alleges misconduct on the part of the trustee on the basis that Mr Lane had improperly made payments out of Ms Thompson’s bankrupt estate, I note the following paragraphs of the affidavit of Mr Lane in proceeding QUD447/2023 affirmed 15 February 2024:

Costs and expenses of the administration

14.     My July 2021 and August 2021 affidavits provide detail of the costs incurred in administering the applicant's bankrupt estate to that time.

15.     The website of my firm Worrells Solvency and Forensic Accountants also includes a "File Information" section accessible by the applicant and creditors. This section includes real-time reporting of time, costs and outlays incurred by me in the administration of the bankrupt estate. I am aware from the applicant's affidavit filed 18 October 2023 in these proceedings and from communications I have had with the applicant that the applicant has accessed this information.

16.     In an email from my lawyers to the applicant sent 30 November 2023 (a copy of which is annexed to my January 2024 affidavit at pages 99-109 of the annexures) details were provided to the applicant of the legal fees that had been incurred in the administration of her estate. Further payments in respect of legal fees and other administration expenses have been made since 30 November 2023 as follows:

[TABLE OMITTED]

17.     By resolution of creditors made 21 August 2020, my fees were approved up to an amount of $26,617.01. A copy of the Certificate of Resolution dated 26 August 2020 is annexure ML-E to this affidavit. In reliance upon that resolution, I have to date drawn the amount of $691.24. I have not otherwise drawn any amounts in payment of my fees. It is my intention to continue to comply with my obligations under the Bankruptcy Act, the Bankruptcy Regulations and all applicable guidelines in relation to the recovery of my remuneration.

133    Ms Thompson’s submissions relating to this allegation of misconduct, at [7] of her written submissions dated 10 April 2026, are that:

… the Worrells File Info dated 19 March 2026 file Info does not identify that the Respondent has determined that each payment made from the funds held in trust is a “payment made in accordance with the Act”; including no evidence of any invoice authorised by the Respondent for payment to his legal representatives.

134    Again, Ms Thompson does not address [14]-[17] of Mr Lane’s above affidavit in submissions to the Court.

Failure to administer efficiently

135    Ms Thompson further submitted, in essence, that the Bankruptcy Act establishes an exclusive statutory regime directed at the orderly administration of the estate of a bankrupt to enable the bankrupt to “ultimately obtain a fresh start”. Ms Thompson relied on the recent decision of Moses for the proposition that trustees are required to administer bankrupt estates efficiently and without unnecessary expense, and contended that Mr Lane has failed to administer the bankrupt estate of Ms Thompson efficiently.

136    While I accept, as a matter of general principle and as expressly provided in s 19(1)(j) of the Bankruptcy Act, that trustees should administer bankrupt estates efficiently and without unnecessary expense, I have a number of difficulties with Ms Thompson’s submissions.

137    As a preliminary matter Ms Thompson’s submission referable to Moses is put in the following terms in her supplementary written submissions:

23.     The recent decision in Moses v Harris [[2026] FCA 254] confirms that provable debts must be established in accordance with ss 82 and 84 of the Act, and that trustees are required to administer bankrupt estates efficiently and without unnecessary expense pursuant to s 19(1)(f), (g) and (j).

138    Without speculating as to how Ms Thompson drafted these submissions, I note that Moses did not refer to s 19 of the Bankruptcy Act in any way.

139    In any event, the bigger issue with Ms Thompson’s submission is that, in this case, there is no evidence to suggest that Mr Lane has not administered the bankrupt estate of Ms Thompson efficiently and without unnecessary expense. As I noted earlier in this judgment, Mr Lane’s evidence under cross-examination as to the progress of the administration included the following:

MS THOMPSON: So you previously in a response to a question I asked said you couldn’t do any administration because you – because I made claims against you. Is that correct? You couldn’t do any administration?---For the first part of the administration I had not funds. Then you have – because you have made an application for annulment it was decided that we should slow down the administration. Not cease it. Slow it down.

So, paragraph 14 of your affidavit says:

while the plaintiff’s annulment application associate appeal were ongoing, I minimised the work I undertook in administering the bankrupt estate including any dealings with the property.

So you continue to do work, you minimise the work. What is the position?---Well, minimise yes.

But you continued to do administration?---Yes, because you were – the bankrupt estate still continued.

What administration did you undertake in absence of having any funds, as you’ve just said?---I went out and got some advices, you know, and I – and I got them on a speculative basis.

Speculative basis you got legal advices. Did you rely upon the legal advices you were given?---I still haven’t ruled on the proofs of debt.

(transcript 16 July 2026 pp 46-47)

140    Ms Thompson did not address this evidence of Mr Lane in her supplementary submissions filed after the final hearing.

141    Ultimately, in relation to the issue of whether Ms Thompson’s allegation of misconduct on the part of Mr Lane warrants his removal as trustee, my findings are:

    the allegations made by Ms Thompson against Mr Lane are so broad-ranging that they effectively encompass almost every aspect of the administration of the estate;

    the question of removal is to be assessed on the basis of the two-stage process applied in Shaw First Instance and upheld in Shaw Full Court;

    Ms Thompson has not adequately answered Mr Lane’s evidence to the effect that he had administered Ms Thompson’s bankrupt estate according to law;

    Ms Thompson has not established substantial grounds that Mr Lane erred in the administration of the estate or had engaged in misconduct; and

    for that reason, there are no proper grounds for conducting an inquiry into Mr Lane’s administration of the bankrupt estate of Ms Thompson, and the first stage of the two-stage process has not been met.

142    For the reasons I have given, Ms Thompson’s allegations of misconduct on the part of Mr Lane do not weigh in favour of the removal of the trustee.

Breakdown of relationship between Mr Lane and Ms Thompson

143    Third, while the parties have not expressly made submissions addressing this factor, I note that a breakdown in the relationship between a bankrupt and his or her trustee in bankruptcy is relevant to the question whether a trustee should be removed. I further note that the Court has power to inquire into the administration of a bankrupt estate on its own initiative during proceedings before the Court: s 90-5 IP Schedule.

144    I do not doubt that the relationship between Mr Lane and Ms Thompson has broken down. This was particularly apparent at the hearing on 16 July 2026 where the following occurred:

MS THOMPSON: Do you accept that the court should make an order declaring you cease to be the trustee?

MS PHILIPPOU: Objection. Legal question.

MS THOMPSON: Can you take me to any evidence of any prejudice you will suffer if the court does not make the orders you seek in preceding QUD 176 of 2024?---Well I’ve still got to carry out the valid administration of the estate.

What valid administration have you undertaken thus far?---Well, you’ve been suing me for so long.

No. I didn’t start a claim against you for nine months after you were appointed after my real property at 16 Aaron Ave, Hawthorne was sold for some $2.79 million.

MS PHILIPPOU: Objection.

MS THOMPSON: What valid administration have you undertaken? You haven’t determined any debts. What have you done that’s valid administration?---I am not in a position to declare a dividend.

You don’t get an unlimited amount of time. You don’t keep me trapped in bankruptcy forever?---You’re discharged.

I’m discharged but you are – your actions are causing me to be homeless. I can’t even live in my apartment home because of your actions indirectly and directly.

MS PHILIPPOU: Objection, your Honour. Mr Thompson is supposed to ask questions not shout at the witness.

HER HONOUR: Mr. Thompson.

MS THOMPSON: What steps have you taken to restore my access to my home, 3/40 Glen Road, Toowong?---It’s a property of the bankrupt estate.

What steps have you taken to restore my access? Yes, it is any – is there any step you’ve taken whence you still haven’t determined any debt is payable?---It’s not your property. It’s property of the bankrupt estate.

The bankrupt estate as determined by his Honour Judge Barlow.

MS PHILIPPOU: Objection.

MS THOMPSON: The administration ended on 2 July 2023.

HER HONOUR: All right. This is going around and around in circles, Ms Thompson. We’re not making – I think – do you have any further questions for this witness which you haven’t already asked him? Please. Otherwise I will have to excuse Mr Lane. It’s the same themes. I understand but it’s the same themes of questions.

(emphasis added, transcript 16 July 2026 pp 44-45)

145    It is true that there are authorities to the effect that the total breakdown of the relationship between a trustee and a bankrupt may amount to a sufficient reason for the trustee to be removed: see, eg, Mokhtar at [37] citing Doolan at [49] and Trkulja at [4]. However, this proposition is further qualified by the principle that a bankrupt “cannot, by their own conduct in not cooperating with the trustee, cause a complete breakdown in their relationship, and then rely upon the breakdown as a basis upon which to remove the trustee”: Mokhtar at [38] citing Boensch at [92]-[93] and Trkulja at [62].

146    The questions whether there has been an irretrievable breakdown in the relationship between the trustee and the bankrupt, and whether any such breakdown is attributable to the unreasonable conduct of the bankrupt, were considered by Perry J in Mokhtar. Relevantly her Honour said:

[229]     While Mr Mokhtar submits that there has been an irretrievable breakdown in his relationship with the Trustee, the Trustee submits only that “a degree of antagonism” has arisen. The Trustee contends that this occurs in many bankruptcy administrations and that the antagonism between him and Mr Mokhtar has not risen to the level of an irreparable breakdown in the relationship.

[230]     As to Mr Mokhtar, I accept that there has been a genuine loss of trust in the Trustee and a very strong feeling that he has been aggrieved. There is no doubt that Mr Mokhtar’s sense of aggrievement is in part attributable to his repeated failure to grasp or comply with basic aspects of his obligations as a bankrupt. An example is his patently wrong view that the stock options remained his and the money from their sale after the bankruptcy was his to gamble away. The Trustee was plainly correct to pursue those monies and require them to be accounted for to the estate in bankruptcy.

[231]     However, I also accept Mr Mokhtar’s evidence that the turning point in the relationship for him was the 3 May letter and calculator from the Trustee, coupled with his failure to be discharged from bankruptcy following the sale of the Strauss Road property. The Trustee must bear responsibility to this extent for the breakdown in the relationship insofar as his letter led to the misunderstanding, which was not an unreasonable one. Subsequent conduct in the administration of the bankruptcy has compounded the breakdown including the filing of 17 notices of objection. Nor, as counsel for Mr Mokhtar submitted, has the flow of objection notices abated, with a further two objection notices filed since these proceedings were instituted.

[232]     It is also evident from the Trustee’s evidence, submissions and conduct since December 2021 that he had no trust in Mr Mokhtar’s truthfulness or his ability to comply with his obligations as a bankrupt. Indeed, the evidence has established that there is substantial justification for those views. What is more relevant, however, is the question of whether the Trustee has lost the objectivity demanded of him as a trustee in bankruptcy. I accept the applicant’s submission that the evidence establishes that objectivity has been lost. The impression which the Trustee’s evidence conveyed was that he felt betrayed by Mr Mokhtar to whom he believes that he extended an unusual degree of latitude in the first three years of the bankruptcy. As an aspect of this, when challenged on aspects of his conduct of the bankruptcy, the Trustee was defensive and categorical. He did not admit to any possibility of misjudgement or misunderstanding. An illustration of this is his position with respect to the possibility that the calculator, accompanying email, and 3 May letter might have been misunderstood. This is also evidenced by the tone of some of the correspondence from the Trustee to Mr Mokhtar, Mr E Seyfarth and Mr Mokhtar’s former spouse, to which I have already referred.

(emphasis added)

147    I understand that the “3 May letter” referred to in her Honour’s Judgment was a letter sent from the trustee to the bankrupt in that case which suggested that the bankrupt would be discharged from the bankruptcy upon the payment of a sum of money, and that the “calculator” was a spreadsheet that appeared to confirm the sum referred to in the letter.

148    Turning to the present facts, I am satisfied that the breakdown in the relationship between Ms Thompson and Mr Lane is attributable to the conduct of Ms Thompson. In particular I note that:

    Mr Thompson’s sense of aggrievement is attributable to her ongoing misunderstanding of the nature of her bankruptcy and subsequent discharge, and her repeated refusal to accept that she has so misunderstood. An example is her plainly wrong belief that the administration of her bankrupt estate ends on the day of her discharge from bankruptcy, and that the properties of her bankrupt estate revest in her upon her discharge.

    Unlike Mokhtar, there is no evidence before me that Mr Lane had, in his administration of Ms Thompson’s estate, caused a misunderstanding in Ms Thompson on which she relied to her detriment.

    Unlike Mokhtar, it is uncontroversial that Mr Lane did not object to the discharge of Ms Thompson from bankruptcy.

    Mr Lane has, in my view, not lost the objectivity demanded of him as a trustee in bankruptcy. In cross-examination Mr Lane remained composed and gave reasonable and satisfactory answers as to the progress of the administration, the steps he has taken thus far, and the reasons why certain steps have not yet been taken.

149    As I am satisfied that the breakdown of the relationship between Ms Thompson and Mr Lane is attributable to the conduct of Ms Thompson, it does not weigh in favour of Mr Lane’s removal as trustee.

Ms Thompson’s performance of her duties as a bankrupt

150    Fourth, a further factor that was identified in Mokhtar as relevant to the question of removal is whether the bankrupt had adequately discharged his or her duties under s 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. That factor was relevant in Mokhtar because, as her Honour explained in that case (at [40]):

the Trustee’s case largely centred on the multiple respects in which he alleged that Mr Mokhtar had failed to comply with those duties.

151    It cannot be controversial that Ms Thompson was bound by the duties enumerated in s 77 of the Bankruptcy Act before the date of her discharge. Nevertheless, in the present case, Mr Lane has not pursued a case whereby he alleges breaches of these duties by Ms Thompson. Furthermore, neither party has made any submissions about whether Ms Thompson had, or had not, complied with any of the s 77 duties.

152    In these circumstances, I find that this factor is not applicable in the present case.

Interests of the Administration generally

153    Fifth, I am not satisfied that the removal of Mr Lane is in the best interests of the administration of the bankrupt estate of Ms Thompson.

154    Throughout these proceedings, Ms Thompson appears to be labouring under the assumption that, if she is successful in her application to remove Mr Lane as the trustee of her bankrupt estate, then the administration of her bankrupt estate would come to an end, and the property currently held in the bankrupt estate of Ms Thompson would revest to her.

155    However, and as I have already addressed earlier in these reasons, the removal of Mr Lane as Ms Thompson’s trustee in bankruptcy does not halt the ongoing administration of the bankrupt estate of Ms Thompson. Instead, if the Court orders that Mr Lane be removed, the role of trustee would be filled in the interim by the Official Trustee until such time that Ms Thompson’s creditors met to fill the vacancy. This is provided for by ss 159-160 of the Bankruptcy Act:

159 Vacancy in office of trustee

(1)     The creditors may, at a meeting of the creditors, fill any vacancy in the office of trustee.

(2)     An Official Receiver shall, on the requisition of a creditor, summon a meeting of creditors for the purpose of filling such a vacancy.

(3)     For the purposes of this section, an office of trustee shall be deemed to be vacant notwithstanding that it is for the time being filled by the Official Trustee by reason of the operation of section 160.

(4)     The provisions of sections 157 and 158 apply, so far as they are capable of application, to and in relation to the appointment of a new trustee under this section.

160 Official Trustee to be trustee when no registered trustee is trustee

If at any time there is no registered trustee who is the trustee of the estate of a bankrupt, the Official Trustee shall, by force of this section, be the trustee of the estate.

156    The evidence of Mr Lane under cross-examination was that he had already obtained some legal advice, referable to the determination of proof of debts against the bankrupt estate of Ms Thompson, on a preliminary and speculative basis. Even leaving aside issues of confidentiality and legal professional privilege, it is possible that a new trustee would not be prepared to rely on and act upon these legal advices. The removal of Mr Lane would result in a duplication of legal work and additional expenses for the bankrupt estate, to the detriment of the creditors and Ms Thompson.

Conclusion

157    For the reasons I have given, I am not prepared to order the removal of Mr Lane from his position as Ms Thompson’s trustee in bankruptcy pursuant to either s 90-15 or s 45-1 of the IP Schedule.

158    The trustee has been entirely successful in defending proceeding QUD447/2023. It is appropriate that that originating application be dismissed with costs. For the avoidance of doubt, I will also make a declaration to the effect that the administration of the bankrupt estate of Ms Thompson remains ongoing.

Is Mr Lane is entitled to an Order granting him possession of the Toowong Apartment in his capacity as trustee?

159    This question must be answered in the affirmative for the following reasons.

Initial vesting in Mr Lane

160    First, it cannot be controversial, and I understand that Ms Thompson does not seriously dispute, that Ms Thompson’s property (including the Toowong Apartment) vested in Mr Lane in his capacity as the trustee of the bankrupt estate of Ms Thompson on the day of Mr Lane’s appointment. Relevantly ss 58 and 132 of the Bankruptcy Act provides:

58 Vesting of property upon bankruptcy—general rule

(1)     Subject to this Act, where a debtor becomes a bankrupt:

(a)     the property of the bankrupt, not being after‑acquired property, vests forthwith in the Official Trustee or, if, at the time when the debtor becomes a bankrupt, a registered trustee becomes the trustee of the estate of the bankrupt by virtue of section 156A, in that registered trustee; and

(b)     after‑acquired property of the bankrupt vests, as soon as it is acquired by, or devolves on, the bankrupt, in the Official Trustee or, if a registered trustee is the trustee of the estate of the bankrupt, in that registered trustee.

…

(2)     Where a law of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory requires the transmission of property to be registered and enables the trustee of the estate of a bankrupt to be registered as the owner of any such property that is part of the property of the bankrupt, that property, notwithstanding that it vests in equity in the trustee by virtue of this section, does not so vest at law until the requirements of that law have been complied with.

…

(6)     In this section, after‑acquired property, in relation to a bankrupt, means property that is acquired by, or devolves on, the bankrupt on or after the date of the bankruptcy, being property that is divisible amongst the creditors of the bankrupt.

132 Vesting and transfer of property

(1)     Subject to this section, and to section 158, where a trustee is appointed by the creditors, the property of the bankrupt passes to and vests in the trustee so appointed on the day on which the appointment takes effect.

(2)     Subject to this section, the property of the bankrupt passes from trustee to trustee and vests in the trustee for the time being during his or her continuance in office or, if the Official Trustee becomes the trustee, in the Official Trustee, without any conveyance, assignment or transfer.

(3)     Where a law of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory requires the transmission of property to be registered, and enables the trustee to be registered as the owner of any such property that is part of the property of the bankrupt, that property, notwithstanding that it vests in equity in the trustee by virtue of this section, does not vest in the trustee at law until the requirements of that law have been complied with.

161    As the Toowong Apartment is real property subject to Torrens title pursuant to the Land Title Act, a further complication that arises is the fact that the Toowong Apartment was not registered in Ms Thompson’s name on the day of Mr Lane’s appointment.

162    Noting that Ms Thompson is the respondent in QUD176/2024, Mr Lane gave the following evidence in his affidavit affirmed 5 April 2024 in proceeding QUD176/2024:

The Property

4.     In the [Statement of Affairs completed by Ms Thompson dated 26 June 2020], the respondent indicated she was the owner of and resided at the [Toowong Apartment].

5.     My enquiries into the respondent's ownership of the property revealed:

(a)     The registered owner of the Property was [redacted];

(b)     I made enquiries with [the registered owner] and he advised me that:

(i)    he sold the Property to the respondent by contract made 21 February 2014;

(ii)     the respondent represented herself for the conveyance of the property;

(iii)     settlement occurred on 24 March 2014 at which time the respondent delivered a bank cheque for the settlement sum and his solicitors provided the respondent with a fully executed Form 1 Transfer and Form 3 Release of the mortgage over the Property and arranged for the keys to the Property to be provided to the respondent;

(iv)     he expected that the respondent would attend to the registration of the Transfer, but subsequently became aware that the Transfer had not been registered;

(v)     he considered he had completed the sale of the Property to the respondent and that he no longer held any legal or equitable interest in the Property.

(c)     In response to my requests for information from the respondent about her ownership of the Property, on 5 August 2020 the respondent provided me with copies of:

(i)     The stamped purchase contract;

(ii)     Executed Form 1 - Transfer; and

(iii)     Release of mortgage.

Appearing at Annexure MGL-3 are true and correct copies of those documents.

6.     By reason of these matters, I formed the view that the respondent was the legal and equitable owner of the Property as at the date of her bankruptcy and as a result, the Property vested in me as her trustee pursuant to section 58 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966.

7.     Although the respondent had emailed me scanned copies of the documents relating to her ownership of the Property, including the Transfer, she did not provide the original Form 1 Transfer.

8.     On 18 October 2023 I instructed my lawyer, Rod O'Sullivan of Shand Taylor Lawyers to issue a further request to Ms Thompson to produce the originals of:

(a)     The stamped Form 1 Transfer;

(b)     The Form 24 - parts A and B (collectively the Transfer Documents); and

(c)     The Form 3 Release of Mortgage,

and/or to advise if she no longer held the originals of those documents. Annexure MGL-4 is a copy of that email.

9.     I am informed by Mr O'Sullivan and verily believe that Ms Thompson did not respond to that email and did not provide the original documents to Shand Taylor Lawyers. As a result, my solicitors made a request to the Registrar of Titles to accept an electronic version of the Transfer. The Registrar of Titles approved this request and the transfer was processed, which allowed me to lodge a Form 14 Request to Record Transmission by Bankruptcy and I am now recorded as the registered owner of the Property. Appearing at Annexure MGL-5 is a current title search of the Property confirming I am the sole proprietor of the Property.

163    Ms Thompson does not appear to dispute this account of events from Mr Lane. However, Ms Thompson takes issue with Mr Lane’s registration of the title in the Toowong Apartment in his name, which took place some time after Ms Thompson was discharged from bankruptcy. Noting that Ms Thompson identifies herself as the “plaintiff” and Mr Lane as the “respondent”, in her written submissions dated 10 April 2026 Ms Thompson submitted:

25.     Paragraphs 3 to 6 of [Mr Lane’s affidavit affirmed 5 April 2024 in proceeding QUD176/2024] detail the steps the Defendant took to form the view that the Plaintiff is “the legal and equitable owner” of the real property 3/40 Glen Road, Toowong purchased by Contract dated 21 February 2014.

…

28.     On 5 April 2024, nine months after the Plaintiff was discharged from bankruptcy and the Respondent’s administration ended, the Respondent had no authority to cause the Title of the Plaintiff’s real property 3/40 Glen Road, Toowong to be transferred as stated in paragraph 9.

29.    Annexure MGL-5 to [Mr Lane’s affidavit affirmed 5 April 2024 in proceeding QUD176/2024], shows the Title of the Plaintiff’s real property 3/40 Glen Road, Toowong that the Respondent caused to be registered in the name of;

THE TRUSTEE OF THE PROPERTY OF EMMA THOMPSON, A BANKRUPT

on, or about 23 February 2024, more than nine months after the Plaintiff was discharged from bankruptcy on 2 July 2023, and thus was no longer a bankrupt.

164    In her reply written submissions dated 28 April 2026 Ms Thompson further submits:

21.     Paragraph 8 of the respondent's Submissions identifies that on 23 February 2023 [sic], some nine months after the respondent's administration ended on 2 July 2023, and after the respondent retired, the respondent caused the Title of the Applicant's real property 3/40 Glen Road, Toowong, to be transferred into the name of a non-entity; The trustee of the property of Emma Thompson, a bankrupt.

22.     On 23 February 2023, when the Title was transferred, the Applicant was not a bankrupt and there was no one who had legal authority to act as the trustee.

165    As I noted earlier in these reasons, the administration of Ms Thompson’s bankrupt estate can continue, and in fact has continued, following the discharge of Ms Thompson from bankruptcy. For that reason, any complaints of Ms Thompson referable to the registration of the Toowong Apartment in the name of “The Trustee of the Property of Emma Thompson, A Bankrupt” or in her words, a “non-entity”, has no merit and must be dismissed.

166    In relation to the non-registration of transfer documents as between Ms Thompson and the former registered owner of the Toowong Apartment, ss 181-3 of the Land Title Act relevantly provide:

181 Interest in a lot not transferred or created until registration

An instrument does not transfer or create an interest in a lot at law until it is registered.

182 Effect of registration on interest

On registration of an instrument that is expressed to transfer or create an interest in a lot, the interest—

(a)    is transferred or created in accordance with the instrument; and

(b)    is registered; and

(c)    vests in the person identified in the instrument as the person entitled to the interest.

183 Right to have interest registered

A person to whom an interest is to be transferred or in whom an interest has been created has a right to have the instrument transferring or creating the interest registered if—

(a)    the instrument has been executed; and

(b)    the person lodges the instrument and any documents required by the registrar to effect registration of the instrument; and

(c)    the person has otherwise complied with this Act in relation to the registration of the instrument.

167    Reading together ss 181-3 of the Land Title Act and ss 58(2) and 132(3) of the Bankruptcy Act, and in view of the parties’ evidence and submissions, I am satisfied that:

    Ms Thompson held an equitable interest in the Toowong Apartment on the day of Mr Lane’s appointment;

    the nature of Ms Thompson’s equitable interest was such that she was entitled to be registered as the legal owner of the Toowong Apartment;

    that equitable interest vested in Mr Lane in his capacity as trustee on the day of his appointment by operation of ss 58 and 132 of the Bankruptcy Act; and

    in the absence of any defeat of that equitable interest, Mr Lane was entitled to cause the Toowong Apartment to be registered in the name of “the Trustee of the Property of Emma Thompson, A Bankrupt” even following Ms Thompson’s discharge from bankruptcy.

No revesting in Ms Thompson upon discharge

168    Second, as I have already observed, property vested in a trustee in bankruptcy during that bankruptcy continues to be vested in the trustee after discharge of the bankrupt from bankruptcy, if the administration of the bankrupt estate remains ongoing notwithstanding the bankrupt’s discharge: Pegler at 266-7, cited in Daemar at 182-3.

169    The proposition that property vested in a trustee during a bankruptcy does not automatically revest in the discharged bankrupt upon discharge is further supported by ss 127 and 129AA of the Bankruptcy Act. Section 127 clearly contemplates the possibility that a trustee may make a claim to a bankrupt’s property for up to 20 years from the date on which the person became a bankrupt:

127 Limitation of time for making claims by trustee etc.

(1)     After the expiration of 20 years from the date on which a person became a bankrupt, a claim shall not be made by the trustee in the bankruptcy to any property of the bankrupt, and that property shall, subject to the rights, if any, of a person other than the trustee in respect of the property, be deemed to be vested in the bankrupt, or a person claiming through or under him or her, as the case may be.

…

170    Section 129AA, which was reproduced in full earlier in this judgment, imposes (inter alia) an extendable six-year time limit for a trustee in bankruptcy to realise any non-cash property disclosed in a bankrupt’s statement of affairs. Subject to the right of a trustee to extend the time limit, s 129AA(2) provides for the revesting of any non-cash property in the bankrupt after the relevant time limit lapses.

Statutory purpose of administration not exhausted

171    Third, Ms Thompson, in her supplementary written submissions (at [28]), appeared to accept the principle in Daemar to a limited extent. However she further contended that:

27.     The gravamen of the Respondent's position is that, because the Applicant's property vested in the trustee upon bankruptcy, and because establishes that such property does not automatically revest upon discharge, the trustee is entitled to retain and control that property indefinitely unless and until the trustee elects otherwise.

28.     Daemar establishes only that discharge does not automatically revest property previously vested in a trustee. It does not hold that a trustee may retain and control that property indefinitely in the absence of any continuing statutory purpose.

29.     The Respondent’s position is that the trustee may retain and control that property until he determines that the administration is completed, indefinitely. That construction is inconsistent with the text, structure and purpose of the Act.

30.     Property does not vest in a trustee for the trustee’s own benefit and the Act Schedule 2 s 60-20 provides that a trustee must not derive profit or advantage from the administration of an estate. Vesting is a statutory mechanism enabling the trustee to administer the estate for the benefit of creditors. It is incidental to the statutory administration and is not an independent source of continuing or indefinite authority.

31.     The Respondent’s construction impermissibly equates the continued vesting of legal title with the continued existence of every statutory power associated with the administration. That conclusion does not follow. Continued title does not itself authorise the trustee to retain or control property after the statutory purposes of the administration have been fulfilled. No creditor purpose no administration.

32.     The issue is therefore not whether property automatically revested upon discharge, but whether the Act conferred a continuing statutory power to retain and control the property after the purposes of the administration had ended. Unless such a power can be identified, the continued exercise of control lacks statutory authority.

(formatting and emphasis in original)

172    Ms Thompson’s submission referred to s 60-20 of the IP Schedule which provides:

60‑20 Trustee must not derive profit or advantage from the administration of the estate

Deriving profit or advantage from the estate

(1)     A trustee of a regulated debtor’s estate must not directly or indirectly derive any profit or advantage from the administration of the estate.

Circumstances in which profit or advantage is taken to be derived

(2)     To avoid doubt, a trustee of a regulated debtor’s estate is taken to derive a profit or advantage from the administration of the estate if:

(a)     the trustee directly or indirectly derives a profit or advantage from a transaction (including a sale or purchase) entered into for or on account of the estate; or

(b)     the trustee directly or indirectly derives a profit or advantage from a creditor of the estate; or

(c)     a related entity of the trustee directly or indirectly derives a profit or advantage from the administration of the estate.

Exceptions

(3)     Subsection (1) does not apply to the extent that:

(a)     another provision of this Act, or of another law, requires or permits the trustee to derive the profit or advantage; or

(b)     the Court gives leave to the trustee to derive the profit or advantage.

Note:     Subsection (1) would not, for example, prevent the trustee from recovering remuneration for necessary work properly performed by the trustee in relation to the administration of the estate, as the trustee is permitted to do so under other provisions of this Act.

(4)     Despite paragraph (2)(c), subsection (1) does not apply to the extent that:

(a)     the trustee employs or engages a person to provide services in connection with the administration of the estate; and

(b)     a related entity of the trustee directly or indirectly derives a profit or advantage as a result of that employment or engagement; and

(c)     one of the following is satisfied:

(i)     the trustee does not know, and could not reasonably be expected to know, that the related entity would derive that profit or advantage;

(ii)     the creditors, by resolution, agree to the related entity deriving the profit or advantage;

(iii)     it is not reasonably practicable in all the circumstances to obtain the agreement, by resolution, of the creditors to the related entity deriving the profit or advantage and the cost of employing or engaging the person to provide the services is reasonable in all the circumstances.

(4A)     Despite paragraph (2)(c), subsection (1) does not apply to the extent that a related entity of the trustee directly or indirectly derives a profit or advantage:

(a)     from remuneration paid to the trustee in accordance with section 60‑5 of this Schedule; or

(b)     from a profit or advantage covered by subsection (4).

(5)     Subsection (1) does not apply to the extent that the profit or advantage is a payment that:

(a)     is made to the trustee by or on behalf of the Commonwealth or an agency or authority of the Commonwealth; and

(b)     is of a kind prescribed.

Offence

…

Effect of contravention of this section

(7)     A transaction or any other arrangement entered into in contravention of this section may be set aside by the Court.

173    For the reasons I have explained earlier, I do not accept that the ongoing administration of the bankrupt estate of Ms Thompson lacks statutory purpose. Furthermore, to the extent that Ms Thompson’s submission referable to s 60-20 of the IP Schedule is distinct from her submission that the administration lacks statutory purpose, I do not accept that Mr Lane has derived a benefit or profit in connection with the Toowong Apartment within the meaning of s 60-20. Consistent with the evidence before the Court, Mr Lane’s intentions with respect to the Toowong Apartment appear to be selling it and applying the proceeds of sale for the benefit of those creditors of Ms Thompson whose proofs of debts are ruled on and substantiated. This is entirely appropriate and consistent with Mr Lane’s role as the trustee of the bankrupt estate of Ms Thompson.

174    Ms Thompson further points to the trustee’s obligation to “maximise profit on apartment” and Mr Lane’s alleged failure to collect rent on the Toowong Apartment. However, I am not satisfied that Mr Lane has derived a benefit or profit by not collecting rent. The reason why Mr Lane has not collected rent – because Ms Thompson has not delivered up vacant possession – is readily apparent from the following evidence of Mr Lane:

16.    On 2 April 2026 I attended the Unit to facilitate and supervise the fire safety inspection. I had obtained a fob from the body corporate managers which gave me access to the third level of the building. Apart from a small lobby outside the lift which I understand to be common property, the Unit comprises the entirety of the third level of the building.

17.     When I arrived at the third level of the building:

(a)     There was a locked mesh security screen about 30 centimetres from the lift door. I do not hold any keys for that screen, so neither I, nor the fire services contractor … were able to access the inside of the Unit;

(b)     I was able to see inside the Unit through the mesh security screen. While there did not appear to be any person present inside the Unit, I observed furniture and appliances inside the Unit including paintings on the walls, a refrigerator, an air fryer, stacks of paperwork, filled shopping bags, a desk, a pot plant and what appeared to be building panels;

(c)     I was advised by [the fire services contractor] that the locked security door was a potential fire hazard and that he was unable to carry out the required fire safety inspection of the Unit;

(d)     I spoke with … the body corporate chairman who lives in another unit in the complex and he advised that:

(i)     he was not previously aware that a security screen had been installed between the lift and the Unit on the third level;

(ii)     he was not aware of any other units in the complex that had a security screen similarly installed;

(iii)     he was not aware of any application being made for approval to install the security screen; and

(iv)     other than accessing the Unit via the lift, the only other means of access to the units on each level was via fire stairs away from the lift entry. A fob is required to access the fire stairs from the basement or ground level, but key access is required to open the fire door on each floor.

(emphasis added, affidavit of Morgan Lane in QUD176/2024 affirmed 2 April 2026 p 4)

175    In the circumstances I reject the submission advanced by Ms Thompson that the Toowong Apartment should revest in her either because the administration lacks statutory purpose or because Mr Lane is deriving a benefit or profit from the administration.

176    I further note Ms Thompson’s submission that the QDC Judgment amounted to a ruling that Mr Lane held the Toowong Apartment on a bare trust and that the Toowong Apartment should revest in her on that basis. I reject that submission for the reasons I have set out earlier.

177    Ultimately, the title to the Toowong Apartment remains vested in Mr Lane in his capacity as the trustee of the bankrupt estate of Ms Thompson. I will now consider the various applications before the Court, including Mr Lane’s application for possession of the Toowong Apartment (being the subject of proceeding QUD176/2024) and Ms Thompson’s application for the title of the Toowong Apartment to be transferred into her name (being the subject of proceeding QUD490/2025) in light of this finding.

Applications before the Court

178    A number of applications referable to the Toowong Apartment remain before the Court, including:

    the Originating Application in proceeding QUD176/2024;

    the originating process in proceeding QUD490/2025 (being a Claim in the Supreme Court of Queensland subsequently transferred to this Court);

    an interlocutory application lodged by Ms Thompson in QUD490/2025 on 12 February 2025 seeking a mandatory injunction to restore access to the Toowong Apartment; and

    two applications for summary judgment, filed when proceeding QUD490/2025 was before the Supreme Court of Queensland.

179    I note that the two applications for summary judgment do not appear on the Federal Court file of QUD490/2025. Nevertheless, I am satisfied as to their existence. The Orders of Justice Sullivan of the Supreme Court of Queensland dated 6 June 2025, which transferred the matter to the Federal Court, referred to an “Application filed 10 April 2025” and an “Application filed 14 April 2025”.

180    In any event, it is not necessary for this Court to determine any of the interlocutory applications before the Court in QUD490/2025. As the final relief sought by Ms Thompson in that proceeding is being determined on its merits, I will dismiss all three of the interlocutory applications with costs in the cause.

QUD490/2025

181    Moving now to Ms Thompson’s substantive application in proceeding QUD490/2025, I am satisfied that that application must fail for the following reasons.

182    First, in respect of Ms Thompson’s claim pursuant to ss 188 and 188A of the Land Title Act and r 156 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR), ss 188, 188A and 188B of the Land Title Act relevantly provide:

188 Compensation for deprivation of lot or interest in lot

(1)    This section applies if a person (the claimant) is deprived of a lot, or an interest in a lot, because of—

(a)    the fraud of another person; or

(b)    the incorrect creation of an indefeasible title in the name of another person; or

(c)    incorrect registration; or

(d)    an error in an indefeasible title or in the freehold land register; or

(e)    tampering with the freehold land register; or

(f)    loss, destruction or improper use of a document deposited or lodged at the land registry or held by the land registry for safe custody; or

(g)    an omission, mistake, breach of duty, negligence or misfeasance—

(i)    of or by the registrar or a public service employee of the department performing a function or carrying out a duty under this Act; or

(ii)    of or by the titles registry operator or an employee of the operator in relation to the performance of a titles registry function under the Queensland Future Fund (Titles Registry) Act 2021; or

(h)    the exercise by the registrar of a power in relation to an application or dealing with which the person had no connection.

(2)    The claimant is entitled to compensation from the State for the deprivation.

188A Compensation for loss or damage

(1)    This section applies if a person (the claimant) suffers loss or damage because of—

(a)    the incorrect creation of an indefeasible title in the name of another person; or

(b)    incorrect registration; or

(c)    an error in an indefeasible title or in the freehold land register; or

(d)    reliance on the incorrect state of the freehold land register; or

(e)    loss, destruction or improper use of a document deposited or lodged at the land registry or held by the land registry for safe custody; or

(f)    omission, mistake, breach of duty, negligence or misfeasance—

(i)    of or by the registrar or a public service employee of the department performing a function or carrying out a duty under this Act; or

(ii)    of or by the titles registry operator or an employee of the operator in relation to the performance of a titles registry function under the Queensland Future Fund (Titles Registry) Act 2021; or

(g)    the exercise by the registrar of a power in relation to an application or dealing with which the person had no connection.

(2)    The claimant is entitled to compensation from the State for the loss or damage.

(3)    Despite anything in subsection (1) or (2), the claimant is not entitled to compensation under this section for loss or damage caused by the incorrectness of a register kept by the registrar if the registrar may correct the register under section 15.

(4)    Subsection (3) does not limit the claimant’s rights to compensation otherwise than under subsections (1) and (2).

188B Order by Supreme Court about deprivation, loss or damage

(1)    For section 188 or 188A, a claimant may apply to the Supreme Court for an order—

(a)    for compensation to be paid by the State; or

(b)    directing the registrar to take stated action.

(2)    The court may make the order it considers just.

(3)    Without limiting subsection (2), the court may by order direct the registrar to—

(a)    cancel or correct an indefeasible title or other particulars in the freehold land register; or

(b)    create a new indefeasible title; or

(c)    issue a new instrument; or

(d)    do anything else.

(4)    The court may join any other person it considers appropriate in a proceeding under this section.

183    Rule 156 of the UCPR provides:

156 General relief

The court may grant general relief or relief other than that specified in the pleadings irrespective of whether general or other relief is expressly claimed in the pleadings.

184    As provided by s 188B of the Land Title Act, ss 188 and 188A empowers a claimant to apply for compensation to be paid by the State, or for the Registrar of Titles (who is an officer of the State: s 6 Land Title Act) to take stated action. As Crowley J explained in Issa v Owens (No 2) [2023] QSC 96:

[17]     The compensation scheme under the LTA promotes the statutory object of the LTA. It implicitly recognises the primacy of registered interests above all other interests, but also recognises that deprivation of an interest in a lot, or loss or damage, may occur because of the operation of the system of title by registration created by the LTA. Although, as the prescribed circumstances within ss 188(1) and 188A(1) of the LTA specify, such deprivation, loss or damage may be caused by some act or omission on the part of a person, it is ultimately due to the operation of the system itself that compensable deprivation, loss or damage results. The compensation scheme is, in my view, intended to relieve against unfair or unjust consequences occasioned by the State’s adoption and use of a compulsory legislative scheme for the registration and transfer of titles and interests in land in Queensland.

[18]     Where, as here, due to the operation of the LTA persons have been deprived of an interest in a lot because of the fraud of another person, s 188 entitles those persons to be compensated by the State.

[19]     As I also noted in the principal judgment, pursuant to s 190 of the LTA, upon payment of compensation to the Purchasers, the State will be subrogated to the rights of the Purchasers against any other person in relation to the deprivation for which the Purchasers are compensated …

(emphasis added)

185    Plainly, the legislative scheme established by ss 188, 188A and 188B of the Land Title Act is designed to facilitate the making of claims against the State of Queensland, which has the responsibility of maintaining its land title register, in circumstances where events described in ss 188 and 188A of the Land Title Act have occurred. The State is not a party to any of the proceedings before the Court. I am not satisfied that ss 188 and 188A contemplate causes of action that Ms Thompson can maintain against Mr Lane in his capacity as trustee.

186    In any event, in order to be successful in her application, Ms Thompson must establish that she was deprived of a lot, or an interest in a lot because of one of the reasons enumerated under s 188 of the Land Title Act, or that she suffered loss or damage because of one of the reasons enumerated under s 188A of the Land Title Act.

187    In Mr Lane’s supplementary written submissions filed 29 July 2026 Mr Lane accepted that:

18.     It is not disputed that prior to her registration Ms Thompson had interest in the unit …

…

20.     The application is liable to be … dismissed on its merits as Ms Thompsons evidence does not demonstrate that she has been deprived of an interest in a lot because of the exhaustive reasons outlined in sections 188 and 188A.

188    I note Mr Lane’s acceptance that Ms Thompson had been deprived of an interest in the Toowong Apartment and accept that she would have suffered some loss or damage as a result. However, I am not satisfied that any deprivation of interest or consequential loss or damage is because of one of the reasons in ss 188 and 188A. I have already found that Mr Lane was (and continues to be) entitled to the title in the Toowong Apartment. In these circumstances:

    Section 188(1)(a) does not apply because Mr Lane obtained this title by operation of the vesting provisions in the Bankruptcy Act and not by fraud;

    Sections 188(1)(b)-(d) and 188A(1)(a)-(c) do not apply because there was no evidence of an error;

    Section 188(1)(e) does not apply because there is no evidence of tampering with the freehold land register;

    Section 188A(1)(d) does not apply because Ms Thompson did not rely on any incorrect state of the freehold land register;

    Sections 188(1)(f) and 188A(1)(e) do not apply because there is no assertion of the loss, destruction or improper use of a document at the land registry;

    Sections 188(1)(g) and 188A(1)(f) do not apply because there is no assertion of an omission, mistake, breach of duty, negligence or misfeasance on the part of the State or the State’s public service; and

    Sections 188(1)(h) and 188A(1)(g) do not apply because there is no assertion of the exercise of a power by the registrar.

189    It follows that the originating process in QUD490/2025 must be dismissed.

QUD176/2024

190    Mr Lane seeks orders for vacant possession of the Toowong Apartment, together with the issue of a warrant for possession and ancillary orders, pursuant to s 30(1)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act. Section 30 relevantly provides:

30 General powers of Courts in bankruptcy

(1)     The Court:

(a)     has full power to decide all questions, whether of law or of fact, in any case of bankruptcy or any matter under Part IX, X or XI coming within the cognizance of the Court; and

(b)     may make such orders (including declaratory orders and orders granting injunctions or other equitable remedies) as the Court considers necessary for the purposes of carrying out or giving effect to this Act in any such case or matter.

191    As Mr Lane points out in his submissions, in Coshott at [92]-[94] the Full Court held that:

[92]    As is apparent, the power to make orders under s 30(1)(b) must be exercised for the purposes of carrying out or giving effect to the Act in the particular case. Those purposes, in common with any modern system of bankruptcy law, are to provide for the appropriation and equitable distribution of the assets of the insolvent debtor, and upon this, the debtor’s release from future liability in respect of his or her existing debts: Storey v Lane (1981) 147 CLR 549 (Storey) at 556 (Gibbs CJ).

[93]    In line with these objects and the breadth of the language in s 30(1), it has been held that the provision should not be construed narrowly. As Neaves J observed in Re Bilen; Ex parte Sistrom (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, Neaves J, 11 April 1985) in a passage quoted with approval by the Full Court in Talacko v Talacko (2010) 183 FCR 311 (Talacko) at 321, s 30(1):

is a facultative provision giving the court full power, within the limits of its jurisdiction to be found elsewhere, to make such orders as it considers should be made in order to carry out and give effect to the Act. The words used are not words of limitation but of extension.

[94]     Thus, the section has been held to provide sufficient power to make orders against a bankrupt for the vacation of property, issuing a warrant of possession and for the sale of a property in circumstances where the bankrupt is not complying with his or her obligations under the Act: see, eg, Vince (Trustee), Re Sopikiotis (Bankrupt) v Sopikiotis (No 2) [2012] FCA 1298 at [4] (Bromberg J); Pattison v McKinnon [2008] FCA 1624 at [2] (Jessup J); Official Receiver v Fall (2008) 5 ABC(NS) 772 at [10]–[12] (Lucev FM (as his Honour then was)). It also expressly extends to ancillary relief such as injunctions and other equitable remedies to prevent the scheme of the Act from being defeated. Such ancillary orders are, as the Full Court observed in Talacko at 321 [17], “neither novel or unusual”: see also Storey at 557 (Gibbs CJ).

192    I note Ms Thompson’s submission that Coshott is distinguishable from the present case because Ms Thompson was discharged from bankruptcy, there is no evidence of any determined or accepted debts against Ms Thompson’s bankrupt estate, and because the property in Coshott is co-owned. However, I do not accept this submission because:

    the administration of Ms Thompson’s bankrupt estate is ongoing; and

    the above paragraphs of Coshott relate to the general nature of the Court’s power under s 30(1)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act not tied to specific facts.

193    I am satisfied that Mr Lane’s application in QUD176/2024 should be allowed. As a trustee, Mr Lane has duties under ss 19(1)(b) and (f) of the Bankruptcy Act to determine whether Ms Thompson’s bankrupt estate includes property that can be realised to pay a dividend to creditors, and to take appropriate steps to recover property for the benefit of the estate. However, the evidence before the Court, which I understand is not challenged by Ms Thompson (see written submissions of Ms Thompson dated 10 April 2026 at [37](d) and (g)) is that Mr Lane has been unable to access, and Ms Thompson has refused to deliver up possession of, the Toowong Apartment.

194    In his capacity as trustee of the bankrupt estate of Ms Thompson, Mr Lane is legally entitled to the Toowong Apartment and is bound by the Bankruptcy Act to realise it for the benefit of the estate. For that reason, Mr Lane should have the benefit of orders that facilitate him taking possession of the Toowong Apartment.

Appropriate Orders for QUD176/2024 and QUD490/2025

195    As proceeding QUD490/2025 has been determined on the merits, I will dismiss all three interlocutory applications in that proceeding with costs in the cause.

196    It is also appropriate that the originating process in QUD490/2025 be dismissed with costs.

197    Mr Lane has been successful in his originating application in proceeding QUD176/2024. Subject to the qualifications below, I am prepared to make the orders sought by Mr Lane in his originating application in QUD176/2024.

198    The first order sought by Mr Lane is an order that Ms Thompson and any other occupants vacate the Toowong apartment, deliver up all keys and give possession. However, Mr Lane does not specify a time limit by which Ms Thompson must comply with that order.

199    I consider it reasonable that Ms Thompson be required to vacate the Toowong Apartment, deliver up all keys and give possession of the Toowong Apartment to Mr Lane, within 14 days of the date of these orders.

200    Additionally, the seventh order sought by Mr Lane, in essence, is that he have liberty to sell the Toowong Apartment and any personal property left behind by Ms Thompson and to receive the proceeds of sale. For the avoidance of doubt and noting Mr Lane’s obligation not to profit from the administration, I will qualify that order by inserting after “receive the net proceeds of sale” the words “into the bankrupt estate of Ms Emma Thompson”.

Is Mr Lane entitled to the liquidated amount in his capacity as trustee?

201    This question must be answered in the affirmative. As seen in the following material extracted from Ms Thompson’s supplementary written submissions dated 30 July 2026, Ms Thompson does not dispute that the amount, described as $523,528 in Ms Thompson’s submissions (but $523.528.37 in some affidavit materials), was vested in Mr Lane in his capacity as trustee before Ms Thompson’s discharge from bankruptcy:

3.     There is no exhibited evidence proving any debts in the administration as at the date of the bankruptcy:

(a)     for the respondent’s administration to continue after 2 July 2023; or

(b)     for the Applicant’s assets to remain vested in the respondent after 2 July 2023, including the amount of $523,528 withheld from the Applicant since 2 July 2023; or

…

62.     Annexure A further demonstrates that the Respondent identified no evidentiary basis for maintaining the bankruptcy after 2 July 2023. In particular:

(a)     no proof of debt had been admitted as payable by the Applicant;

(b)     the Respondent had realised $523,528 from the sale of the Hawthorne property;

(c)     the Respondent identified no continuing statutory purpose requiring the administration to continue; and

(d)     the Respondent relied upon alleged creditor claims that had not been determined in accordance with the Act.

(emphasis added)

202    The only question that remains for this Court, therefore, is whether the liquidated amount revested in Ms Thompson upon her discharge from bankruptcy. The answer to that question is “no” for the reasons I have already given in the context of the Toowong Apartment.

Appropriate Orders

203    Mr Lane has not made any submissions referable to an Order being made in relation to the liquidated amount. As the liquidated amount is and remains vested in Mr Lane in his capacity as the trustee of the bankrupt estate of Ms Thompson, I consider it sufficient to make a declaration to that effect.

Associate:

Dated:    30 October 2026