Federal Court of Australia

US1 Critical Minerals Limited (Formerly Gladiator Resources Limited) v Price (No 2) [2026] FCA 1583

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    Pursuant to r 8.21 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), the applicant be granted leave to change its party name to ‘US1 Critical Minerals Limited (ACN 101 026 859)’.

2.    The applicant’s interlocutory application dated 9 June 2026 be dismissed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ABRAHAM J:

1    By interlocutory application dated 9 June 2026 the applicant, US1 Critical Minerals Limited (formerly Gladiator Resources Limited) (ACN 101 026 859), seeks an interim injunction, until the conclusion of this proceeding or further order, restraining the respondent, Mr Andrew Price, from publishing any statement concerning:

(1)    this proceeding (order 1(a));

(2)    the subject matter of this proceeding (order 1(b));

(3)    the applicant or its business, operations, affairs or financial position (order 1(c));

(4)    any director, officer, agent or related entity of the applicant, including the applicant’s chair, Mr Matthew Boysen, and the members of his family (order 1(d)); and

(5)    any other person involved in this proceeding (including Gadens Lawyers and any solicitor, counsel or witness appearing or giving evidence in the proceeding) in an adverse or critical way (order 1(e)).

2    The applicant also seeks, within seven days of the Court making the orders sought, that Mr Price take all reasonable steps within his power to remove or cause to be removed from X (formerly, Twitter) and any other online platform under his control, any publication made by him after 26 June 2025 of a kind falling within the orders listed above.

3    The applicant also seeks, pursuant to r 30.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (Rules), that the question of the applicant’s entitlement to the final injunctive relief sought at [36] and [37] of the amended statement of claim filed 5 June 2026 (ASOC) be heard and determined separate from, and in advance of, the balance of the proceeding.

4    In support of its application, the applicant relied on the affidavits of its solicitor Ms Marina Olsen affirmed 19 February 2026, 14 April 2026, and 9 June 2026, the affidavit of Mr Boysen sworn 9 June 2026, the affidavit of Mr Peter Tsegas (non-executive director of US1) sworn 15 June 2026, and an aide memoire filed with the Court on 28 June 2026.

5    Mr Price submitted that the applicant has not established a proper basis for the orders sought. Mr Price relied on the affidavit of his solicitor, Mr Mark Lazarus, affirmed on 16 June 2026, and an exhibit attached thereto.

6    For the reasons below the application is dismissed.

Factual Overview

7    This proceeding commenced on 24 June 2025 by originating application and associated statement of claim. The applicant is a mining company that has been listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) since 22 June 2006. An amended statement of claim (ASOC) was filed on 5 June 2026. The applicant alleges Mr Price has engaged in a campaign of publications about the applicant that are false, misleading or deceptive pursuant to ss 1041E(1) and 1041H of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act) and which constitute injurious falsehoods.

8    The publications which found those claims are listed in Schedule A to the ASOC. The publications are summarised by the applicant as falling within the following categories: that the applicant (1) is a fraudulent company and is not a legitimate business; (2) is involved in illegal practices and criminal activity; (3) is the subject of regulatory or criminal investigations; (4) its shares are the subject of “pump and dump” practices; (5) is in financial distress; (6) does not comply with its obligations under the Corporations Act and/or the ASX Listing Rules; (7) its board (including the Chair, Mr Boysen) is not competent; and (8) its non-executive director and Chair, Mr Boysen, is under regulatory investigation and has engaged in corporate misconduct and corporate crime.

9    The applicant pleads that in publishing or causing to be published each of the posts in Schedule A, Mr Price intended to injure the applicant without just cause. In that regard, the applicant alleges Mr Price has published a series of posts concerning Mr Boysen and his family on X, which are identified in Schedule B to the ASOC. The applicant alleges Mr Price has an unstable and personally hostile obsession with Mr Boysen, such that he regularly makes threatening and intimidatory posts.

10    The final orders sought by the applicant are compensation on the basis that it has suffered reputational and financial loss because of Mr Price’s conduct, and an order restraining Mr Price from making statements of the nature alleged in Schedule A. In respect to the financial loss, the applicant claims Mr Price’s posts have prevented it from being able to pursue certain commercial and business transactions.

11    In Mr Price’s amended defence, he, inter alia, denies or does not admit the assertions made in the ASOC, and pleads that the posts in Schedule A were expressions of, and informed by, genuinely held opinions.

Injunction application

Applicant’s Submissions

12    The applicant submitted the Court has power to grant an interim injunction in this case on three bases: pursuant to s 1324(4) of the Corporations Act in aid of s 1324(1); the Court’s equitable jurisdiction in respect to its injurious falsehood claim; and/or the implied power to protect the integrity of its own processes under s 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act).

13    The applicant submitted that, since the commencement of this proceeding over a year ago, Mr Price has engaged in a sustained campaign of publications concerning the applicant, its officers, this proceeding and persons associated with it (New Posts). The applicant submitted that the posts are a part of a course of conduct having a cumulative effect, as Mr Price has engaged in sustained and prolific posting since 2022, “up to just a matter of days ago about US1 and Mr Boysen”. In letters sent in October 2025, April 2026 and May 2026, the applicant’s solicitors requested Mr Price cease publishing such material. In particular, the applicant emphasised that in the letter dated 26 May 2026 its request that Mr Price cease his conduct and the proceeding be expedited for separate determination went unanswered. Since the commencement of this proceeding, it was said Mr Price has published more than 100 further posts of the character identified above. The applicant submitted that unless Mr Price is restrained, he is likely to continue publishing material of that kind, pending final determination of the proceeding.

14    The applicant sought an injunction on two principal bases. First, Mr Price’s publications are likely to continue to cause the applicant commercial harm. Second, Mr Price’s publications concerning the proceeding, its participants and anticipated evidence to be adduced create a risk of interference with the administration of justice and the proper conduct of the proceeding.

15    As to commercial harm, the applicant submitted there is a strong prima facie case that at least some of the publications in Schedule A of the ASOC convey false or misleading representations that have caused commercial harm. The applicant submitted there is evidence the allegations it is a fraudulent or illegitimate company are false. The applicant also relied on the evidence of Mr Tsegas that, since Mr Price commenced posting about Gladiator, 48 of the applicant’s shareholders have asked whether the applicant: was a fraudulent company; owned its ground; and had genuine solicitors. Mr Tsegas also provided evidence concerning a proposed transaction between the applicant’s wholly-owned subsidiary, Zeus, and Mantra Tanzania Limited (Mantra) involving uranium assets in Tanzania with an approximate value of USD $30 million. Mr Tsegas’ evidence was that Mantra’s concerns about Mr Price’s allegations with respect to the applicant materially contributed to Mantra pulling out of the proposed transaction.

16    As to the administration of justice, the applicant submitted the authorities recognise that a sustained public campaign concerning pending litigation may, depending on its nature and purpose, justify interlocutory intervention where it creates a real risk of interference with the proceeding or the administration of justice, referring to Registered Clubs Association of New South Wales v Stolz (No 2) [2021] FCA 1418 (Stolz) at [136]; Basetec Services Pty Ltd v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCA 762; (2015) 236 FCR 432 (Basetec) at [31]-[34]; Y v W [2007] NSWCA 329; (2007) 70 NSWLR 377 (Y v W) at [35]. In cases involving alleged pressure upon a litigant, the law’s concern is to protect a party’s freedom to commence, continue or discontinue litigation according to law and free from improper external interference: see e.g. Bhagat v Global Custodians Ltd [2002] NSWCA 160 at [36]-[39]. The question is, then, whether Mr Price’s conduct has a real tendency to interfere with the administration of justice or the applicant’s freedom to conduct the proceeding according to law.

17    In this respect, the applicant advanced three propositions. First, the publications are directed not merely to the subject matter of the dispute but to the conduct of the litigation. The publications identify anticipated witnesses, evidence, legal representatives, disclosure processes and future court hearings. The publications encourage issues arising in the proceeding to be fought in a public forum rather than determined according to the ordinary processes of the Court, and attempt to pressure the applicant by public accusation, ridicule, threat and insinuation. Second, the publications are capable of exerting improper pressure upon persons associated with the applicant and discouraging participation in the proceeding. Mr Price has asserted that he has identified persons connected with the applicant, obtained information concerning them, and intends to reveal or deploy that information. By Mr Price’s own admission, he has contravened a personal safety order obtained by Mr Poullas (said by Mr Boysen to be a shareholder and corporate advisor of US1) that prohibited him from posting messages about Mr Poullas online. Third, as Mr Price has not acknowledged the wrongfulness of his conduct or exhibited a willingness to modify his conduct, there is a substantial risk of him continuing the conduct complained of.

18    The applicant advanced the following as to why the balance of convenience favours granting the interim injunction. First, there is a substantial risk of continued publication absent restraint. Second, the interim relief sought is of limited duration. The applicant seeks an expedited hearing and separate determination of its claim for permanent injunctive relief within approximately three months, such that the orders sought now are directed to preserving the position only until then. Third, the harm is ongoing, and the evidence establishes that the publications have affected the willingness of investors, counterparties, consultants and contractors to engage with the applicant. Fourth, damages would not be an adequate remedy in the present case, as the publications may have a ‘grapevine effect’: see Webster v Brewer (No 3) [2020] FCA 1343 at [44]. Fifth, the prejudice to Mr Price is limited when weighed against the continuing harm.

Respondent’s Submissions

19    In summary, Mr Price submitted the applicant has not established a prima facie case that the posts in Schedule A are false, or that there is a reasonable probability of damage arising from the publications that sufficiently justifies the breadth of the injunction sought. Mr Price emphasised there is no evidence the posts made after the commencement of the proceeding in relation to the applicant, which prompted this application, are false.

20    On commercial harm, whilst Mr Price conceded that some of the posts may rightly be perceived as distasteful, offensive or irritating, he submitted they are not capable of giving rise to commercial harm or impeding the proper administration of justice. It is not necessary to detail that submission in full. Suffice to say, Mr Price submitted that the applicant has led no evidence to establish either that the imputations purportedly conveyed by the Schedule A posts are false, or that the publication of those posts was animated by malice in the sense of an intention to inflict harm on the applicant. He submitted Mr Boysen’s evidence does not demonstrate actual harm arising from the posts, or future posts, to the applicant. In respect to the applicant’s first example of commercial harm, being that it has been asked questions by shareholders about the truth of the publications, Mr Price submitted this evidence goes no higher than establishing Mr Tsegas has had “awkward social interactions with colleagues as a result of [Mr Price’s] posts”. Mr Price also submitted the applicant has not established a causal connection between his posts and the deal with Mantra falling through. Even if causation is established between Mr Price’s posts and this harm, this does not establish a reasonable probability of continuing or future commercial harm. Mr Price submitted that the balance of convenience does not come into play, because no reasonable probability of actual damage has been established.

21    As for the administration of justice, Mr Price submitted the posts are in respect to the operation of the company and not directed to intimidating potential witnesses. Mr Price submitted the only evidence in this respect was a “vaguely” worded assertion by Mr Boysen. Rather, Mr Price submitted this highlights an ordinary incident of litigation, namely, that a range of different circumstances might cause individuals to have “varying levels of enthusiasm about being ensnared” in litigation. He further submitted that if the applicant genuinely believes potential witnesses will be deterred, it is open to it to express it will support its officers and employees, including by funding them in defending themselves from defamatory publications. There being no evidence that such support has been offered, in Mr Price’s submission, leads to an inference that the risk of deterrence is hypothetical.

22    Mr Price also submitted the breadth of the orders sought goes far beyond the injunctive relief available in respect to the underlying claims for the following reasons.

23    First, in respect to orders 1(a) and 1(b), which are addressed to the proceeding and its subject matter, Mr Price submitted these orders are overly broad, given the applicant has made ASX announcements about the proceeding criticising him, and that none of his impugned posts give rise to even a prima facie contempt (nor has any such contempt been alleged).

24    Second, order 1(d) seeks to restrain Mr Price from posting about “any director, officer, agent or related entity of the Applicant, including Mr Boysen and the members of his family”, which relate to the Schedule B posts. Mr Price submitted the application is intended to prevent him from making any public statement about Mr Boysen, regardless of the connection with the applicant, and that this proceeding is being used as a vehicle for ventilating complaints by Mr Boysen of defamation or harassment, under the guise of a suit to prevent commercial harm through a claim for injurious falsehood. That is, the nature of the claim brought by the applicant is not suited to the nature of the publications it seeks to have restrained.

25    Third, order 1(e) sought orders in respect to publications about the applicant’s legal representatives. While Mr Price conceded that five of the posts after the proceeding was commenced contain actual or attempted ‘tags’ for Gadens, they do not contain any adverse representation about Gadens or their conduct of the proceeding, nor do they appear to be capable of inflicting commercial harm on the applicant. Rather, each of these posts conveys a statement expressing Mr Price’s view about the proceeding generally. Further, he submitted the applicant has not identified any way in which the conduct of the proceeding is affected by these posts.

26    Mr Price also submitted he has been the subject of adverse public commentary by reason of his involvement in this proceeding, and that an injunction would prevent him from publicly addressing assertions that he is, among other things, “a malicious liar”. Mr Price referred to various publications (including ASX announcements by the applicant) about the proceeding and online posts that are said to have been made by the applicant’s shareholders, persons with a close association with the applicant, or pseudonymous accounts held by Mr Boysen.

Consideration

27    The principles for the grant of an interim injunction are well established and are unnecessary to repeat here. Suffice to say the applicant must demonstrate a prima facie case and the balance of convenience must favour the grant of an injunction: see e.g. Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill [2006] HCA 46; (2006) 227 CLR 57 (O’Neill) at [65]; Samsung Electronics Company Ltd v Apple Inc [2011] FCAFC 156; (2011) 217 FCR 238. As to a prima facie case, it is not necessary for the applicant to establish that it is more probable than not that it will succeed at trial, but rather it is enough it shows a sufficient likelihood of success to justify in the circumstances the preservation of the status quo pending trial: O’Neill at [65].

Misleading and deceptive conduct / injurious falsehood

28    The first issue is whether the applicant has established a prima facie case of the underlying claims. I note there has been no application by Mr Price for the proceeding to be summarily dismissed on account of a lack of prospects of success. Nor has Mr Price relied on evidence challenging Mr Boysen’s and Mr Tsegas’ evidence as to the falsity, misleading and deceptive nature of the Schedule A posts.

29    The applicant does not need to establish a prima facie case in respect to all the avenues it relied on for an injunction. It is appropriate at the outset to focus on what the applicant described as the two principal bases which relate to this proceeding (the first and second basis in [12] above), being the claims for false, misleading and deceptive conduct pursuant to ss 1041E(1) and 1041H of the Corporations Act, and injurious falsehood, before addressing the third basis of the application. Mr Price challenged both whether a prima facie case had been established in relation to the falsity of the publications, and the harm said to arise from them. As the applicant contends, the posts are not to be considered in isolation, and some of Mr Price’s submissions suffer from that vice. Although the individual posts the subject of the claims must be considered, it is necessary to consider them in the context in which they appear, as part of a series of posts or course of conduct. But being part of a course of conduct does not avoid the need to consider the posts individually. I return to the nature of the posts below.

30    The following consideration is based on the claims as pleaded and the evidence relied on. I have not considered in this assessment any posts made since the commencement of the proceeding not pleaded. I note that in correspondence from the applicant to the respondent (dated 21 October 2025, 8 April 2026 and 26 May 2026) it identifies some posts by Mr Price made since the commencement of the proceeding and asserts they will be relied on as additional particulars in relation to Schedules A and B, without identifying which schedule they were said to relate to. However, in that regard, the ASOC was filed on 5 June 2026, and there are no additional posts identified as relied on in respect to Schedule A, and five additional posts in Schedule B.

31    I am satisfied on the material before me that, in respect to at least some of Mr Price’s posts in Schedule A, a prima facie case has been established for false, misleading or deceptive conduct within the meaning of ss 1041E and 1041H of the Corporations Act. It is not necessary to set out those posts. The applicant described that, in summary, the posts allege it is a fraudulent or illegitimate company, has engaged in unlawful or improper conduct, has misled investors or shareholders, is financially distressed or approaching insolvency, and that its directors and officers have engaged in misconduct. The applicant denied their truth. The applicant relied on the content of the Schedule A posts, and evidence from Mr Boysen and Mr Tsegas, to establish that the posts are false, misleading or deceptive and pointed to evidence, inter alia, that it is an ASX-listed company, is audited, has not been investigated by ASIC, and lost a deal in 2024 because of Mr Price’s posts. I note in respect to that last allegation, the evidence before me can only rise to the level of the witness’ belief. I also note, as the applicant submitted, that in relation to an injunction pursuant to s 1324 of the Corporations Act in relation to the statutory claims it is not necessary to establish loss.

32    As to the claim of injurious falsehood, that requires proof of, amongst other things, a statement of or concerning the applicant’s goods or business, the falsity of the pleaded statements, that malice animated their making, and that actual damage arose as a consequence: see Ratcliffe v Evans [1892] 2 QB 524 at 527-8; Palmer Bruyn & Parker Pty Ltd v Parsons [2001] HCA 69; (2001) 208 CLR 388 (Palmer Bruyn) at [52], [114]. As with the statutory claim, I am satisfied there is a prima facie case that at least some of the publications in Schedule A are false.

33    On the question of malice, it was submitted that the Court may infer this from the fact Mr Price had a “hostile obsession” with Mr Boysen, based on the posts in Schedule B to the ASOC. In my reasons on a suppression order application made by the applicant on 1 October 2025, I observed that although the applicant takes these posts to relate to Mr Boysen’s family, that is not apparent on the face of (at least some of) the posts: Gladiator Resources Limited v Price [2025] FCA 1566 (Gladiator) at [36]. That said, some of these posts (which now appear in Schedule B of the ASOC) are identifiable as relating to Mr Boysen and his family. It is sufficient for the purposes of this application that some of the posts, considered in their context as part of a series of posts, prima facie support an inference Mr Price is motivated, at least in part, by malice. Given this is an interlocutory hearing, it is unnecessary and inappropriate to address that matter further.

34    The question of whether it has been established actual harm has arisen as a consequence of the publications was challenged by Mr Price, given the generality of the evidence relied on by the applicant in this interlocutory application. Mr Price also relied on Mr Lazarus’ affidavit that, in September 2025, US1 (then GLA) raised $1 million from new share placements (announced to the ASX on 31 October 2025), and in April 2026 raised a further $1 million from new share placements (announced to the ASX on 28 April 2026). As Mr Price submitted, in a proceeding for injurious falsehood, the grant of an injunction “to restrain a threatened publication”, even on an interlocutory basis, requires the applicant for relief to establish a reasonable probability of loss arising from such publication: AMI Australia Holdings Pty Ltd v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1395 at [38]–[39]; Swimsure (Laboratories) Pty Ltd v McDonald [1979] 2 NSWLR 796 at 800; Neville Mahon v Mach 1 Financial Services Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 651 at [22]. I note that the evidence of Mr Tsegas and Mr Boysen for establishing harm, as summarised above, is at a general level. I also accept that the applicant has raised funds by share placements in 2025 and 2026. That said, as at this stage the question is decided at a prima facie level, I am satisfied that harm has likely been caused by some of the posts. The applicant should not assume, however, such general evidence would necessarily suffice at any trial, as the threshold is lower at this juncture than what is required at trial.

35    I will address the third basis of the injunction, the interference with administration of justice, below.

36    Whilst I am satisfied of a prima facie case in respect to the applicant’s underlying claims, it does not follow that it is appropriate to grant an interim injunction in the form sought. The applicant must establish the basis for the relief in the terms sought. At this stage it is appropriate to make some observations in relation to that topic.

37    First, the basis of this application, as explained in Ms Olsen’s affidavit of 9 June 2026, is that Mr Price “continues to regularly publish social media posts containing material of the very kind that has caused the Applicant to commence this proceeding against him, including material about the Applicant, officers of the Applicant, individuals connected with the Applicant, parties involved in this proceeding (including [Gadens]) and/or the proceeding itself”. It is said that a “review has identified more than 100 further posts published by [Mr Price] since that date containing material concerning the Applicant, officers of the Applicant, individuals connected with the Applicant, parties involved in this proceeding (including [Gadens]) and/or the proceeding itself”. As referred to above, the applicant submitted that there have been sustained and prolific posts “up to just a matter of days ago about US1 and Mr Boysen”. Rather than provide all those further posts to the Court, the applicant has only provided what are said to be examples of those posts (although they did not provide a list of those examples, but rather referred to various items of correspondence with the respondent in which there is reference to various posts). Although, as explained above, it may be accepted that the publications are not to be considered in isolation in assessing its submission in relation to the continued conduct for the purposes of this application, the focus is on the posts made after the proceeding commenced as it is those posts that found this application, and it is them that provide the basis for why it is said the injunction is needed – being that Mr Price continues to post. That much is apparent from the wording of the orders sought. The content of the posts can only be adjudged by those examples that the applicant has put before the Court. I have no information about the content of the remaining posts said to have been made after the commencement of this proceeding which would enable them to be relied on in this application.

38    The issue in this application is not the number of posts published since the proceeding began that are said to concern the applicant, its officers, individuals connected with it, parties involved in this proceeding (including Gadens) and/or the proceeding itself. Nor is it whether the publications are of a kind that caused the applicant to commence this proceeding against Mr Price. Rather, given the basis of the application, for an injunction in the terms sought, the applicant must establish, inter alia, that the posts made after the commencement of this proceeding are of a type that falls within the claims brought. It is not a question of whether the posts can be described as Mr Price harassing the applicant, Mr Boysen, his family and others associated with the applicant; the claims in this proceeding are of false, and misleading or deceptive conduct contrary to ss 1041H and 1041E of the Corporations Act, and of the tort of injurious falsehood. They are causes of action addressed to allegations that relate to the applicant, US1.

39    Mr Price compiled a list of the examples relied on by the applicant and analysed the content of some. The applicant did not address this submission. Mr Price submitted that of “the 47 New Posts, 42 are posts on ‘X’ from [Mr Price]’s X account. The remaining five New Posts (posts #43-#47) were published on HotCopper, an online forum for commentary on the share market, being posts by an unknown user with the pseudonym ‘emugrasshopper’”. At its highest, Mr Boysen’s evidence is that he is “concerned that Mr Price is operating or otherwise associated with the account "emugrasshopper" on the third-party HotCopper forum”. The applicant did not address the posts on HotCopper, this evidence of Mr Boysen, or respond to Mr Price’s submission that Mr Boysen’s evidence is no more than speculation. I do not consider Mr Boysen’s evidence establishes the authorship of those New Posts for the purpose of this application. Mr Price also submitted that only 15 of the New Posts refer to the applicant, either by its current name US1, previous name Gladiator, or previous stock exchange designation GLA. That submission was not challenged. Having considered the posts, that appears to be correct (with two being posts of court orders, and some others relating to the court proceeding). Irrespective of whether the numbers or characterisation of the posts is correct, it can be accepted that only a limited number directly refer to the applicant.

40    More particularly, Mr Price accepted that a small number of the New Posts “appear to touch on themes similar to those addressed in the GLA Posts” (being Schedule A posts). Four are given as examples: #24, #25, #26, #27. The applicant, in an aide memoire of “impugned statements and their falsity”, in relation to the New Posts, referred to those four posts. Apart from two posts from "emugrasshopper", whose authorship has not been established, the four posts appear to be the extent of the posts made after the commencement of this proceeding of the nature of those in Schedule A. They were posted between 22 January 2026 and 10 March 2026. The only other post the applicant refers to in the aide memoire is one on 7 April 2026, which does not expressly refer to the applicant but refers to Mr Boysen, stating “I know you keep going to ASIC under foi... Try going ASX on what I've handed them". Accepting there may be other posts, the number relied on is limited when contrasted with the posts of a personal nature provided by the applicant (which includes posts in relation to the proceeding), which form the majority of the examples before the Court. I note, as explained above, no posts after the proceeding was commenced were included in Schedule A in the ASOC. I note also that the latest post in Schedule A is 3 May 2025. I return to this below.

41    Suffice to say that in relation to those New Posts the applicant did not lead any evidence directly related to establishing they were misleading, deceptive or false. Rather, as apparent from the aide memoire, the applicant only relied on the general evidence of Mr Boysen and Mr Tsegas. The terms of these posts - which includes references, for example, to the amount of the applicant’s financial losses and that the Directors were paid, referring to company reports – are such that they could have readily been contradicted by Mr Boysen and Mr Tsegas, and financial records. No such evidence was produced. Further, the evidence in respect to harm is general, with Mr Tsegas referring, for example to repeatedly being asked questions by a group of shareholders about whether US1 is a fraud, but does not draw any distinction between when questions have been raised. I note this is in a context where there were two share placements since the commencement of the proceeding.

42    Second, and relatedly, the terms of the orders sought are very broad. For example, order 1(d) includes any director, officer, agent or related entity of the applicant, including Mr Boysen and members of his family. Apart from the breadth of the identity of the persons encompassed by that order, it is not confined to publications related to the applicant, but is at large. In respect to the posts regarding Mr Boysen and his family, it was suggested this breadth is necessary and relates to this proceeding, as Mr Boysen is being used as a vehicle to attack the applicant. The applicant submitted, in effect, that the ordinary reasonable person would not separate him from the company. The applicant submitted that it is “not personal attacks on Mr Boysen, it is a sustained campaign against US1 and the vehicle through which he makes that campaign is Mr Boysen”. That explanation does not sit with the breadth of the orders sought, which expressly extends to including Mr Boysen’s family, nor the nature of the personal posts relied on in this application. The applicant accepted, however, that “attacking Mr Boysen’s wife for having an affair or attacking [his] children for going to a particular school” is not “strictly” relevant to the applicant. The posts relied on also include several where Mr Price is denigrating the appearance of Mr Boysen’s wife. These illustrate the personal nature of the posts and reflect on the purpose of the orders sought. In response to a question from the Court about the breadth of the orders, the applicant accepted they could be narrowed but submitted that, if they were narrower, “Mr Price would then be able to antagonise Mr Boysen’s family and that creates a very difficult distinction to draw for the purposes of restraining Mr Price from continuing on the course of conduct that he is engaging in, in relation to US1”. That submission illustrates that at least part of this application is directed to obtaining an order which would have the effect of stopping purported personal attacks on Mr Boysen and his family. Mr Boysen deposes that Mr Price’s public assertion that he is able to identify Mr Boysen as the operator of anonymous online accounts “has caused [Mr Boysen] considerable personal concern”. Such evidence also supports the personal nature of the attacks, Mr Boysen’s concerns, and that the application for the orders sought is, at least in part, to prevent the harassment of Mr Boysen and his family. This is also reflected by the fact that, as explained above, only a very limited number of the posts provided as examples of Mr Price’s ongoing conduct are posts of the type in Schedule A. Similarly, Mr Boysen’s evidence is that he is informed that officers and other persons employed or associated with the applicant have been concerned about harassment by Mr Price. I return to this evidence below.

43    If what is sought are orders to prevent publications that personally address Mr Boysen and his family, this proceeding is not the correct vehicle to do so. It is important to focus on the claims made by the applicant, being allegations that relate to the applicant as a company. Injurious falsehood “protects proprietary and commercial rather than personal interests”: Palmer Bruyn at [58]; and see Cvek v Mihailescu [2019] VSC 679 at [32] and [37]; Agustin-Bunch v Smith [2021] VSC 158 at [137].

44    In reasons given on the non-publication application, I described that “[s]ome posts [by Mr Price] are plainly distasteful and offensive”, and that “it was understandable how [Mr Boysen] and his family may feel harassed by them”: Gladiator at [36] (these being posts now in Schedule B to the ASOC). That description is equally apt in relation to some of the posts the subject of this application which have been made after the proceeding commenced. Mr Price’s counsel acknowledged that “several of Mr Price’s social media posts were … distasteful and offensive”. They are rather puerile. However, their distasteful and offensive nature is not sufficient in and of itself to establish the basis for the interim relief sought, given the nature of the claims in this case.

45    I note that the final injunctive orders sought by the applicant, as detailed in the amended originating application of 5 June 2026, are as follows:

An order pursuant to section 1324(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) restraining the Respondent from making the statements in the column headed ‘Imputed meaning or representation conveyed by post’ in Schedule A to the Amended Statement of Claim, or any statements that do not differ in substance.

Further or alternatively, an order pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the Court restraining the Respondent from making the statements in the column headed ‘Imputed meaning or representation conveyed by post’ in Schedule A to the Amended Statement of Claim, or any statements that do not differ in substance.

46    That these relate to Schedule A of the ASOC, which contains posts about the applicant, is properly reflective of the nature of the claims. They do not encompass posts of the personal nature that are contained in Schedule B of the ASOC but rather are in keeping with the nature of the claims. However, the consequence is that, if the applicant succeeds in establishing liability, the final injunctions sought would not cover much of what is sought to be covered by the interim orders. Much of the basis of this application is personal posts relating to Mr Boysen and his family, and the effect they are personally having on him.

47    Third, it is appropriate to also address other aspects of the breadth of the orders sought. As already explained, the breadth of order 1(d) also extends to “any director, officer, agent or related entity of the applicant”. As explained above, Mr Boysen’s evidence is that he is informed that officers and other persons employed or associated with the applicant have been concerned about harassment by Mr Price. In that context, Mr Boysen deposes that he is informed that officers and other persons employed by or associated with the applicant have obtained Apprehended Violence Orders (AVO) against Mr Price in respect to his conduct towards them. Mr Boysen cites two incidents. First, involving himself, where in November 2023 he obtained an interim Personal Safety Intervention Order (PSIO) against Mr Price in the Melbourne Magistrates Court on the basis of stalking and intimidation. Mr Lazarus’ affidavit states he is informed that order was not contested and lapsed on 17 December 2024 and that Mr Boysen has not since made any application for a similar order. That description was not challenged. At best, the evidence reflects that Mr Boysen, by applying for the order, acted on his concerns, which are expressed in his affidavit. However, there is no evidence that after the order lapsed that a further order was sought. Rather, apart from referring to the order sought, Mr Boysen provides no further evidence about it. The second example relates to Mr Poullas (who is said by Mr Boysen to be a shareholder and corporate advisor of US1) where an AVO prohibited Mr Price from placing messages about Mr Poullas online, which Mr Price admitted to breaching and for which he was sentenced on 24 June 2025. There is no evidence that the basis of the AVO related to posts in respect to the applicant. In any event, that the applicant referred to these illustrates the personal nature of the concerns with Mr Price’s publications. Mr Tsegas also deposes that some of Mr Price’s posts directly refer to him, although the examples provided all relate to posts prior to the commencement of the proceeding. Therefore, apart from Mr Boysen’s evidence about him and his family, there is no evidence in relation to any other person associated with the company being the subject of posts after the commencement of this proceeding, yet the orders sought extend to any director, officer, agent or related entity of the applicant. That is, there is no apparent evidential basis for the breadth of the order, or its necessity. Nor, as explained above, is the order sought confined to publications about those persons being in relation to the applicant.

48    In this context I note also order 1(e) extends to “any other person involved in this proceeding” including the applicant’s lawyers. As explained below, although Gadens is tagged in five of the posts, I accept there is no adverse comment made about them. There is no evidence from the applicant’s lawyers to found this aspect of the order. It is not suggested that such posts need to be restrained to protect the status quo of the proceeding, or that they are capable of inflicting commercial harm on the applicant. I return to this topic below.

49    Fourth, the evidence of Mr Lazarus attempts to characterise Mr Price’s posts as part of a broader course of interactions with persons who are said to be associated with the applicant, and as responsive to conduct directed at him. It was submitted that Mr Price has been the subject of significant adverse public commentary by reason of his involvement in this proceeding and is concerned about the effect of such posts on his family.

50    The applicant submitted that material does not answer its case. It submitted that the causes of action under ss 1041E and 1041H are concerned with the objective character and effect of Mr Price’s own publications; neither provocation nor the existence of a wider dispute is an answer to the statutory claims, nor to injurious falsehood. It was said that at its highest, Mr Price’s evidence identifies matters for trial; it does not displace the applicant’s prima facie case or alter where the balance of convenience lies. It will be a matter for trial whether the conduct relied on by the applicant is sufficient to establish the elements of its claims. That Mr Price is concerned about negative publications that purportedly relate to him and his family does not justify or explain the personal posts being made in relation to Mr Boysen and his family, or Mr Price’s continuation of them. This is all the more so given his submission he is concerned about the effect of posts on his own family, and complaining of the inappropriateness of them. I make no finding about the assertion that Mr Price believes the posts about him are from or associated with the applicant. For the same reasons as given in relation to the HotCopper posts referred to above, the evidence is insufficient. That both parties may be acting in an unseemly manner is not a justification for the posts.

51    Relatedly, Mr Price complains that at the commencement of this proceeding an announcement was published to the ASX announcing the proceeding and describing Mr Price’s publications as “false and malicious”, “misleading and deceptive”, and “targeted and malicious actions”. Mr Price also complains that similar statements appear to have been made in every quarterly market update and annual report issued by the applicant since the commencement of the proceeding, using the same text with minor variations. Although Mr Price complains about those publications, it is not suggested that they inaccurately describe the proceeding. Those statements reflect the nature of the proceeding brought by the applicant, with allegations of misleading and deceptive conduct forming the basis of its statutory claims, and malice alleged as part of injurious falsehood. Rather, Mr Price takes issue with the correctness of the assertions underlying the claims in the proceeding.

52    Mr Price submitted that he was entitled to respond to the applicant’s press releases issued on the commencement of the proceeding. However, that could have simply been done by issuing a statement denying the allegations. The applicant’s claims would then be determined through judicial proceedings. That is not the approach taken by Mr Price, who chose rather to continue to make publications on matters in relation to the applicant, Mr Boysen, and his family.

53    That said, the import of Mr Price’s submission is that only one party is sought to be restrained. That is, if restrained he will not be able to respond.

54    Finally, I note the first and second orders sought seek to prevent future publications, and require Mr Price to take all reasonable steps within his power to remove or cause to be removed from the X platform and any other online platform under his control any publication made by him after 26 June 2025 (the commencement of the proceeding), of a kind falling within the terms of the order sought. It follows that posts made prior to the commencement of the proceeding would remain in the public domain even if the interlocutory orders sought were granted. In that context, I note also the applicant did not provide any submission as to why, if the injunction is made, it should include an order for the removal of posts after the commencement of the proceeding, and there should be a takedown order for posts after 26 June 2025. I note also in this context that the examples of posts provided include posts where Mr Price republishes third-party content about the applicant. Those original posts would remain in the public domain.

55    For reasons explained above, I am not satisfied in relation to the two primary bases for the injunction, that the applicant has established the factual basis for the relief in the terms sought.

56    The breadth of the orders sought is expansive, covering posts which would not be covered by the final injunction sought (which only covers the Schedule A posts) and also include persons and entities where there is no evidence that since the commencement of the proceeding they have been the subject of the conduct the applicant complains of. Mr Boysen is concerned about himself and his family being harassed or antagonised. The applicant’s submission that if the orders were more limited Mr Price would still be able to antagonise Mr Boysen, is telling. So too that the orders include Mr Boysen’s family. Those concerns may be understandable, but these claims are for misleading and deceptive conduct, and injurious falsehood in relation to the applicant, US1.

57    In any event, on the material before me, I am not persuaded that the sustained pattern of behaviour by Mr Price on which the applicant relied relates to matters the subject of the claim such as to found the orders sought. As explained above at [40], on the posts that have been provided, there is a relatively limited number similar to those in Schedule A, posted over a limited period (noting that this application was made a year after the proceeding was filed). Rather, most of the examples provided in support of this application were based on the personal posts related to Mr Boysen and his family, and the court proceeding (which are consistent with the personal posts, and are discussed further below). As earlier explained, I can only rely on the posts put before the Court. The posts relied on which are similar to those in Schedule A do not provide a basis for an order in the terms sought.

58    In respect to the primary bases for the injunction, although a prima facie case has been established in relation to the underlying claims, the applicant has not established the basis for an order being made in the terms sought.

59    Given that conclusion, the issue of whether the balance of convenience favours the granting of the order in the terms sought does not arise.

Interference with the administration of justice

60    Against that background I turn to the applicant’s complaint about Mr Price’s posts about this proceeding. It is said the conduct is such as to warrant an injunction on the basis of interference with the administration of justice. The applicant submitted the publications are directed not merely to the subject matter of the dispute but to the conduct of the litigation itself. The publications repeatedly identify anticipated witnesses, evidence, legal representatives, disclosure processes and future court hearings. It was said that in substance, the publications encourage issues arising in the proceeding to be fought in a public forum rather than determined according to the ordinary processes of the Court, and attempt to pressure the applicant by public accusation, ridicule, threat and insinuation directed to matters in issue in the litigation. The publications have impacted the applicant’s decision-making when considering the conduct of this proceeding. The applicant submitted that this is the type of collateral pressure with which the authorities are concerned, referring in particular to Stolz. The applicant also relied on Basetec at [31]-[34], and Y v W at [35] in support of this limb.

61    A point of distinction with those cases is that, in each, the basis of the application for an injunction was to prevent a threatened contempt. This application is not put so highly. Here the applicant expressly disavows any allegation Mr Price has engaged in conduct which might answer the description of actual or threatened contempt. The applicant submitted that:

The Court’s power to protect the administration of justice extends beyond cases of established contempt. The Court has jurisdiction to grant an interlocutory injunction to restrain conduct which amounts, or threatens to amount, to an interference with the due administration of justice.  Importantly, the authorities recognise that a sustained public campaign concerning pending litigation may, depending on its nature and purpose, justify interlocutory intervention where it creates a real risk of interference with the proceeding or the administration of justice.

62    The applicant also submitted orally:

To make it clear, we do not suggest that there has been a threatened contempt of court or that there is a contempt application here today.

….

Just to be clear [we are] not bringing a contempt application. We are saying that Mr Price’s conduct is having – has a tendency to interfere in a way with which this particular case is being run…

63    The reference in that submission to the sustained campaign relies in particular on Stolz at [171] and [174]. Those paragraphs must be understood in their context. In Stolz, Yates J considered the relevant principles at [124]-[155], which address an application for an injunction to restrain a threatened contempt. These included a reference to White J’s observations in Basetec at [34] that “…it [is] appropriate to proceed on the basis that the court should have a strong feeling of persuasion that [the respondent’s] conduct may constitute a contempt”: Stolz at [139]. As Stolz was considering threatened contempt of court, Yates J considered whether the applicant had established a prima facie case for contempt, concluding at [158]:

I am satisfied that, based on Mr Stolz’s past conduct, the applicant has demonstrated a real threat that Mr Stolz will, unless restrained, continue to engage in that conduct or conduct of substantially the same kind. I am satisfied that the applicant has established a prima facie case (in the sense explained in Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 618) that such conduct, if engaged in, would be a contempt of court. I am further satisfied that, on the state of the present evidence, that case has sufficient prospects of success to warrant the grant of interlocutory injunctive relief and that, on the balance of convenience, such relief should be granted, in an appropriate form. To adopt White J’s formulation in Basetec at [34], I have a strong feeling of persuasion that Mr Stolz’s conduct may constitute contempt.

64    The paragraphs from Stolz relied on formed part of the court’s reasoning underpinning those conclusions. Although the applicant submitted the power to protect the administration of justice extends beyond established contempt, the submission must be considered in that context. For example, at [171] Yates J concluded:

On the evidence before me, it is clearly arguable that Mr Stolz’s conduct has had, and if continued is likely to have, the real, clear, and definite tendency to interfere with the course of justice in this case.

65    That is a factual finding about contempt. So too the passage relied upon at [174] where Yates J concluded:

It is about specific conduct that can be seen to be calculated to interfere with the administration of justice by bringing improper pressure to bear on the applicant as a litigant, and as to how it might conduct the litigation, which does not permit, or which will have a tendency not to permit, the course of justice, as administered through the courts, to run its proper course for the orderly and just determination, according to law, of the dispute with which the litigation is involved.

66    Those paragraphs are addressing the concept of contempt, which in that case was based on interfering with the administration of justice.

67    Similarly, each of the applicant’s references to Basetec related to conduct amounting to contempt: e.g. [31]-[33]. For example, in Basetec, the applicant’s reference at [33] to the court’s formulation of the “correct test [being] to determine whether the conduct complained of amounted to improper pressure to induce a litigant to withdraw from proceedings or settle them on terms that he regarded as inadequate”, relates to establishing contempt. So too, the reference to improper pressure at [31]. The applicant does not refer to any authority where an injunction was obtained on the basis of protecting the interests of the administration of justice where the impugned conduct falls short of contempt. In that context, any power to grant an injunction for the purpose of protecting the administration of justice where the conduct falls short of contempt or threatened contempt would, if it existed, be exercised sparingly. If it were otherwise, there would be no need for the parties, as in the cases discussed, to establish that higher standard of a prima facie case for contempt or threatened contempt.

68    As explained, the applicant expressly disavowed that the conduct in this case fell within that category, or that a restraint was needed to prevent threatened contempt. Rather, as explained above, it is advanced on the basis that the interim injunction is necessary to restrain conduct which amounts, or threatens to amount, to an interference with the due administration of justice. Moreover, the course of conduct referred to in Stolz relates to the conduct directed to the litigation. The course of conduct relied on by the applicant in this case is much broader, and encompasses, inter alia, the personal posts not related to the proceeding.

69    Further, the nature of the conduct in Stolz can properly be described as more egregious, and has features including misrepresenting the court process, which is not alleged in this case.

70    In this context, Mr Boysen’s affidavit expressed concerns that, following the making of orders by this Court on 4 June 2026, Mr Price published posts on X concerning the order that the applicant pay Mr Price’s costs thrown away by reason of the amendments to its pleading. The applicant complained, inter alia, about publications that post the Court’s orders and boast about their content. Mr Boysen deposed that “Mr Price’s publication of those posts, within hours of the Court making orders in this proceeding”, reinforced his concern that Mr Price “will continue to publish material concerning the Applicant and this proceeding, including the Court’s orders and the conduct of the proceeding, unless he is restrained from doing so”. The Court’s orders are publicly available, as are the reasons for any judgment published in this proceeding. The Court’s hearings are also open to the public. It is not suggested that the Court’s orders themselves, or the result of the orders are described inaccurately in Mr Price’s publications: c.f. e.g. Stolz (No 2) at [61]. The publications reflect the orders as made. True it is that Mr Price boasted about the fact he succeeded, and costs were awarded, which can be accepted to be unpleasant and mocking, but the underlying premise is factually accurate.

71    In that context the applicant submitted during the hearing that:

There have also been posts made about the suppression judgment that was made last year and various posts that have followed that, not just one, not just two, but many posts in relation to that judgment, points made by your Honour, antagonising Mr Boysen and US1 in relation to those statements.

72    There is no evidence before me to support that submission. Rather, the posts provided are limited. The applicant’s submissions refer to six examples which all occurred in January and February 2026. Three were highlighted in particular:

a.    “Anyone know where Greg Johnson is now? Rumour, conjecture, and liable comments not to be repeated tell me had ‘an internal conflict’. Let’s keep that for the time when people with wigs are in the room and we put him on the stand” (22 January 2026)

c.    “Matthew, I don’t cower. I plot, strategise and engage with people who hate you the most. Have you told @gadenslawyers about the many accounts you think are protected via your VPN? Or shall we wait until you’re in the witness box. I had forgotten about Jeff Simpson until you mentioned it, yep traces back to you” (24 February 2026)

f.    “Just spoke to my Lawyer ‘Andrew do you want to clear the air or take all his assets and see him prosecuted. They have no idea what you have’ $RYZ $MNS $USC $GLA” (28 February 2026)

73    The applicant submitted (a) and (c) are particularly pertinent.

74    It can be assumed they are the high point of the posts in this category.

75    As to posts in relation to the proceeding where Mr Price was “gloating over the outcome of previous interlocutory skirmishes in this proceeding”, Mr Price’s counsel submitted “those posts were, at the very least, imprudent and perhaps, on one view, to put it very mildly, tacky”. Mr Price’s counsel did not “cavil with the notion that [his client] has behaved obnoxiously” and that his posts about the proceeding are “needlessly antagonistic and obnoxious”, but submitted that was not a basis for enjoining Mr Price in the manner sought. Those descriptions of the posts can readily be accepted as apt.

76    Counsel for Mr Price submitted “criticism of US1 and Mr Boysen has been in respect to their operation of the company and is plainly not directed to intimidating potential witnesses”. It was submitted that “potential witnesses might be reluctant to participate in this litigation as an unintended consequence of social media posts which have neither identified nor denigrated, let alone threatened, them, does not amount to prejudice to the orderly conduct of this proceeding”. It is difficult to understand that description of the personal posts as directed to US1 except by reason of the fact of Mr Boysen’s position. As to the submission that the posts are “plainly not directed” to intimidating potential witnesses, insofar as they relate to Mr Boysen, they were at least intended to antagonise and harass him. That is consistent with the nature of the personal posts directed to him and his family. My earlier reasons describe that they have that effect. That said, the highest the evidence goes in relation to potential witnesses is Ms Olsen’s evidence that she is concerned the respondent’s conduct may discourage officers, employees or other potential witnesses from participating openly in the proceeding or may cause them apprehension about becoming the subject of public criticism, identification or targeting by Mr Price. She deposes that at least one officer of the applicant has told her they are reluctant to give evidence in this proceeding for fear of becoming a target of the respondent's publications. The evidence is somewhat vague. This person is referred to as an officer of the company, with there being no evidence whether it is intended they would be called as a witness, and if they have declined. I accept Mr Price’s submission that the posts before the Court do not identify, denigrate or threaten any witness. That said, Mr Price’s submission that any effect on witnesses is an “unintended consequence of social media posts” could not apply to any posts after this application, as he is on notice by reason of the evidence in this application of the potential impact of his posts. On the evidence, the witness’ concerns as described by Ms Olsen do not appear to be related to anything published by Mr Price about the proceeding, but rather the general conduct of Mr Price in the personal posts about Mr Boysen and his family.

77    Apart from the gloating about having succeeded on an earlier interlocutory application, the essence of the posts is that he has ammunition to use against Mr Boysen in the trial, he is confident of succeeding, and he is looking forward to the trial.

78    It may be accepted it is unpleasant, but it is difficult to understand how Mr Price gloating about succeeding in an interlocutory hearing, and having costs awarded in his favour, can be said to put improper pressure on the applicant in the conduct of this proceeding.

79    The applicant submitted that since the commencement of the proceeding, Mr Price has repeatedly published material concerning the proceeding, its anticipated outcome, the applicant, its legal representatives, the applicant’s anticipated evidence and witnesses, and material that Mr Price contends he will rely upon at the final hearing. The applicant submitted that the posts have Mr Price agitating the issue in a public forum. I note, although in some of these posts Mr Price has tagged Gadens, the applicant’s solicitors, nothing is said about them. As explained above, there is no evidence in support of that aspect of the order. The applicant submitted there is a prima facie basis for concluding that continued publication creates a real risk of interference with the due administration of justice and the orderly conduct of the proceeding and that interlocutory relief is necessary to preserve the integrity of the Court’s processes pending final determination of the proceeding. However, on that submission, the applicant would need to establish a prima facie case of Mr Price bringing improper pressure to bear in the conduct of the proceeding, in circumstances where it has accepted his conduct does not amount to contempt or threatened contempt. It would also need to be established that if not restrained there is a real risk the improper conduct will continue and bring improper pressure to bear or otherwise interfere with the administration of justice. The applicant has not done so. Further, the terms of the orders are broad, and would necessarily be more confined. Even in relation to the proceeding, it is not explained why publishing a court order, or reasons for a judgment, which are publicly available should be the subject of any restriction.

80    I am not satisfied at this stage that the applicant has established this basis for an order to be made in the terms sought.

Conclusion

81    I am not persuaded that the orders sought should be made on any of the bases. That is not to suggest the posts are acceptable. Rather, the issue on this application is whether the applicant has established the basis for an injunction in the terms sought.

82    Mr Price should take no comfort from this decision. A prima facie case has been established in relation to the underlying claims. Further, I note that in light of my description of the Schedule B posts and their effect in my previous reasons, that Mr Price has chosen to continue to make such personal posts may provide the applicant further evidence of its allegation in relation to intention and malice. Any posts about the proceeding would be with the knowledge of the evidence on this application as to their effect. The posts were accepted by Mr Price’s counsel to be distasteful and offensive, with some in relation to the proceeding described as obnoxious and overly antagonistic. I described posts as puerile. They could not sensibly be seen as assisting his case. Any further publications made by Mr Price would be considered in this context.

Separate hearing

83    The applicant seeks separate determination, pursuant to r 30.01 of the Rules, of US1's entitlement to the final relief sought at [36] and [37] of the ASOC (being the injunctive relief) and that being determined on an expedited basis.

84    The power to make such orders is to be exercised having regard to the overarching purpose in ss 37M and 37P of the FCA Act, namely the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible.

85    The applicant submitted the injunctive relief issue is discrete, and while it will necessarily require the determination of substantive issues concerning liability, it will not require the parties to prepare evidence on the question of the applicant’s alleged losses. It was submitted that evidence, as it relates to the quantum of the claim, and the loss of the transactions, will be very complex and sits very distinct from proving the falsity and the misleading nature of the statements under the Corporations Act claim, and proving the falsity, malice, and the reasonable probability of the harm to US1 under the injurious falsehood claim.

86    Mr Price submitted the default position is that all issues of fact and law should be determined at one time following a trial, and that the hearing and determination of a cross-claim should take place at the same time as the principal proceeding, referring to Buurabalayji Thalami Aboriginal Corporation v Onslow Salt Pty Ltd (No 4) [2019] FCA 1275 at [19]. It was said that this reflects the position in other superior courts, where separate determination is seen as an ‘exceptional’ course of action: Street v Luna Park Sydney Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 697 at [5]. Mr Price submitted that having regard to the essential elements of injurious falsehood, the applicant must, in order to establish an entitlement to a permanent injunction, lead evidence of actual damage likely to arise from future publications. It was said that the evidence will almost be duplicative, at least in part, of evidence that will be led as part of the applicant’s damages case.

Consideration

87    It was suggested by the applicant that the hearing would only take one to two days. I assume that is because the applicant submitted that the relief issue is confined and is principally documentary in nature (being primarily Mr Price’s posts). I have difficulty with that submission. Witnesses will need to be called, at least by the applicant. I note Mr Price also pleads, inter alia, genuine opinion. On the submissions, the question of harm will be a live issue. The respondent submitted, in this application, that US1 has sought to establish ongoing harm or the reasonable probability or possibility of future harm by pointing to past damage, such as the Mantra transaction, saying that it was caused by Mr Price’s statements and then asking the court to infer that similar consequences will arise if Mr Price is not enjoined from making statements about the business of US1. That approach links the assertion of ongoing or likely future damage to the fact, or rather, the allegation, of damage having already been caused by Mr Price’s alleged misconduct.

88    Mr Price submitted therefore there will be an issue as to whether the real cause of harm was US1’s own mismanagement or the reason why proposed interlocutors or counterparties fell away was because they were not attracted to US1’s business, which is not a small inquiry. It involves an inquiry into the health of US1’s business, and the extent to which the parlous condition of that business was, in fact, possibly the trigger for any loss of commercial opportunities. It was submitted that there is no neat severance that can be achieved of the question of ongoing or future harm from the question of what actual loss has been suffered by US1. In reply, the applicant submitted that the respondent missed the point, as it accepted it would need to lead evidence as to the reasonable probability of harm and they would do that through witnesses from the company. However, I do not consider that answers the respondent’s submission. I do not accept the divide between the two issues at trial is as clear cut as the applicant contends.

89    Further, it appears that in the divided trial that witnesses may have to give evidence twice, and be cross-examined twice. That is rather unsatisfactory, particularly here where issues of credit are likely to arise.

90    I am not persuaded that the trial should first address the issue of an injunction. Nor that it requires expedition, although it ought to be conducted in a timely manner. The trial should proceed in the normal course.

Conclusion

91    The interlocutory application is dismissed.

Associate:

Dated:    23 October 2026