Federal Court of Australia

Hudson Global Investments Pty Ltd v Elkerton [2026] FCA 1577

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

Leave application

1.    The interlocutory application filed by Mr Hudson on 30 June 2026 (Leave Application) be dismissed.

2.    Mr Hudson pay the defendant’s costs of the Leave Application.

3.    Mr Hudson not be permitted to represent the plaintiff in the proceeding.

Security application

4.    The plaintiff provide security for the defendant’s costs of the proceeding in the amount of $36,000 by payment into Court by 4:00 pm on 12 November 2026.

5.    If security is not provided in accordance with Order 4, the proceeding against the defendant be stayed until such security is provided.

6.    The interlocutory application filed by the defendant on 16 June 2026 (Security Application) otherwise be dismissed.

7.    The plaintiff pay the defendant’s costs of the Security Application.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MOORE J:

1    The plaintiff, Hudson Global Investments Pty Ltd (Hudson Global), wishes to overturn a decision of the defendant, Mr Anthony Elkerton, in his capacity as liquidator of Gold Quarters Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (the Company), to reject Hudson Global’s proof of debt in the amount of $405,893.44 (the POD). Hudson Global alleges that it is a creditor of the Company and lodged the POD on 16 March 2026 in the Company’s liquidation. Mr Elkerton rejected this POD on 24 March 2026.

2    By originating process filed 17 April 2026, Hudson Global made an application under s 1321 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act) seeking that Mr Elkerton’s decision to reject the POD be set aside. Hudson Global also seeks orders that the POD be admitted or alternatively that the matter be remitted to the defendant for reconsideration according to law.

3    Hudson Global is not represented by a lawyer in this proceeding. Rather, Mr Gregory Hudson, who is the sole director and sole shareholder of Hudson Global, has purported to act for Hudson Global and has taken the physical steps to commence the proceeding on behalf of Hudson Global.

4    During the first case management hearing before the Court on 12 June 2026, Mr Hudson indicated that he was seeking leave to represent Hudson Global. This application was opposed by the defendant. Mr Hudson subsequently lodged an interlocutory application for leave to appear on behalf of Hudson Global in this proceeding, which was accepted for filing on 30 June 2026 (Leave Application).

5    Mr Elkerton has also lodged an interlocutory application, accepted for filing on 16 June 2026, by which he seeks security for costs in the sum of $44,000 from Hudson Global (Security Application). By the Security Application, Mr Elkerton also seeks an order to the effect that if this security for costs is not provided within 14 days from the date any such security is ordered, the proceeding be dismissed with costs and without further order. Mr Elkerton also seeks his costs of and incidental to the Security Application.

6    Both applications were heard on 6 August 2026. I permitted Mr Hudson to appear for Hudson Global for the limited purpose of dealing with the Leave Application and the Security Application. These are my reasons with respect to the Leave Application and Security Application.

A procedural pause

7    At the hearing of the two applications, one issue that was explored (relevant to both the Leave Application and the Security Application) was the utility of the substantive application by Hudson Global, particularly in circumstances where the evidence before the Court was that the Company was likely to have insufficient assets to pay any dividend to creditors. The defendant also informed the Court that the Company had only $85.92 in its bank account as at 20 July 2026.

8    In the course of exploring that issue, it became evident (and I find) that Mr Hudson’s purpose in taking steps to commence the substantive proceeding in the name of Hudson Global was to offset a potential claim that the Company (through Mr Elkerton as liquidator) had made against him personally in respect of an alleged director’s loan. That claim was made on 3 March 2026 and was for the sum of $523,108.29. In other words, the purpose of the substantive proceeding was so that, in the event that Mr Hudson was pursued for $523,108.29, he would have the benefit of a claim by Hudson Global against the Company for $405,893.44, the value of which would flow to Mr Hudson as sole shareholder. Put another way, Mr Hudson’s actions in causing Hudson Global to lodge a POD and to commence the present proceeding were defensive in nature against a possible claim against Mr Hudson personally.

9    The solicitor for Mr Elkerton clarified during the hearing that Mr Elkerton had since withdrawn the demand against Mr Hudson and had no intention of pursuing Mr Hudson for it.

10    Mr Hudson had not mentioned the purpose of pursuing the proceeding to the solicitors for Mr Elkerton prior to the interlocutory hearing.

11    In those circumstances, given that the point of the proceeding appeared to be to confer an economic benefit on Mr Hudson personally for the purpose of offsetting a claim against Mr Hudson that was not now being pursued, there was discussion about whether it was sensible to see if the two claims could be resolved without the need to determine the Leave Application and the Security Application. I indicated to the parties that, considering Mr Hudson’s concession and to reduce the costs ultimately incurred by the parties, they should confer with a view to resolving the proceeding. I therefore asked the parties to indicate to my Chambers within 14 days whether the proceeding had been resolved. I also indicated that I would not begin considering the two applications until I had been informed of the result of the parties’ conferral.

12    On 25 August 2026, my Chambers received an email from the defendant’s solicitors indicating that the parties were unable to reach a resolution of the proceeding. They stated that Mr Hudson had provided them with a without prejudice offer and that they had made an open offer to Mr Hudson on 17 August 2026. The defendant’s open offer was on the following terms:

(a)    Hudson Global would discontinue the proceeding by consent;

(b)    the parties would enter into a deed of settlement and release pursuant to which:

(i)    the proceeding is resolved;

(ii)    Hudson Global and Gregory Hudson release any claims arising out of the subject matter of the proceeding; and

(iii)    the liquidator (Mr Elkerton) provides Mr Hudson with a release in respect of any claim arising from the matters referred to in the demand dated 3 March 2026.

(c)    Mr Hudson would pay $20,000 towards the liquidator’s legal costs of the proceeding.

13    On the same day, and in response to this email, Mr Hudson also sent an open offer to the defendant. Mr Hudson’s open offer was on the following terms:

(a)    Hudson Global would discontinue the proceeding by consent;

(b)    Hudson Global would make no further claim in the liquidation in respect of its POD;

(c)    the liquidator (Mr Elkerton) and the Company would provide Mr Hudson with a full and final release from the personal claim made against him of $523,108.29 and “from any claim arising from or based upon the same director/intercompany loan account, transactions or balances, whether presently asserted, subsequently recalculated, reconstructed or otherwise characterised”;

(d)    Hudson Global and Mr Hudson would provide “releases confined to the matters expressly compromised by the settlement and subject matter of the proceeding”;

(e)    each party would bear its own costs of the proceeding, including the interlocutory applications, with no order as to costs; and

(f)    the settlement would be without admissions and the parties would execute an appropriate deed of release as well as consent orders necessary to give effect to the settlement.

14    Following the provision of Mr Hudson’s offer, on 2 September 2026 the defendant’s solicitors communicated to my Chambers that Mr Hudson’s open offer was not accepted and that the defendant’s open offer had since lapsed. The parties therefore informed the Court that the parties had been unable to reach a resolution with respect to the proceeding.

Evidence

15    The plaintiff relies on three affidavits, being the affidavits of Gregory Hudson dated 16 April 2026, 16 June 2026 and 1 July 2026. The defendant relies on two affidavits, being the affidavit of Tean Kerr dated 15 June 2026 and the affidavit of Belinda Aoude dated 31 July 2026. Any exhibits to these affidavits were also tendered as exhibits on both applications.

16    A statutory report by Mr Elkerton, as liquidator of the Company, dated 4 March 2026, which demonstrates that the liquidation has insufficient assets and is unlikely to pay a dividend to any class of creditor, was also tendered as Exhibit A on both applications.

17    No objection was raised by either party to this evidence, and the evidence has therefore been read on the Leave Application and Security Application.

Leave Application

18    By his Leave Application, Mr Hudson seeks dispensation from r 4.01(2) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (FCR), which provides that a corporation must not proceed in the Court other than by a lawyer. The purpose of r 4.01(2) was explained by the Full Court in Flightdeck Geelong Pty Ltd v All Options Pty Ltd (2020) 280 FCR 479; [2020] FCAFC 138 (Markovic, Derrington and Anastassiou JJ) (Flightdeck) at [116]:

The foundation for the rule is that persons ought not to be represented before the superior courts other than by legally qualified representatives who possess the skill to conduct litigation and whom are bound by strict obligations to the court itself…

19    The Court has a discretion to dispense with this requirement pursuant to r 1.34 of the FCR. The application of the dispensing power necessarily requires that the party seeking the dispensation show some sufficient reason as to why the general prohibition ought not apply in their case: Flightdeck at [116]. Generally speaking, the Court should be cautious before granting leave for a non-lawyer to represent a corporation, but the guiding principle is the attainment of justice: Southcorp Brands Pty Ltd v Australia Rush Rich Winery Pty Ltd (2019) 369 ALR 299; [2019] FCA 720 at [82] per Beach J (Southcorp).

20    In Southcorp (at [82]), Beach J identified the following non-exhaustive list of matters which may bear upon the exercise of the discretion:

(a)    the financial capacity of the company and those standing behind it; in this respect, the identity of the shareholders and the spread of the shareholding is relevant;

(b)    the capacity of the proposed representative to conduct the case effectively having regard to the skills, qualifications and experience of that representative;

(c)    in assessing the capacity of the proposed representative, whether they have any real understanding of Court processes and whether they have any language difficulties which may impede their effective conduct of the case;

(d)    the complexities of the case; for example, if the proceeding involves difficult questions of law, leave may not be granted;

(e)    whether the overarching purpose prescribed by s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) would be promoted by the grant of dispensation;

(f)    whether a lack of disciplinary measures available against the proposed representative may affect the administration of justice;

(g)    the manner in which the case has progressed to date and the manner in which it may progress without the company having legal representation; and

(h)    whether the proposed representative is also a witness and, if so, whether they will properly be able to conduct the case of the company whilst also being a witness.

21    This list was based on the list in the earlier decision of Basetec Services Pty Ltd v CPB Contractors Pty Ltd (formerly Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd) [2017] FCA 510 (White J) at [8], where his Honour also referred to:

(a)    the factual (not just the legal) complexities of the case, in relation to whether the proposed representative has the capacity to conduct it effectively having regard to his or her skills, qualifications, training and experience;

(b)    the ability of the proposed representative to exercise the objectivity expected of a legal practitioner; and

(c)    the circumstance that leave might more readily be granted if the company is a respondent rather than an applicant.

22    See also Flightdeck at [116].

Submissions of the parties

23    Mr Hudson submits that this case is an appropriate one for the Court to exercise its discretion to allow him, as sole director and shareholder of Hudson Global, to conduct the proceeding on its behalf. In this respect, he first emphasises that Hudson Global does not have sufficient funds available to retain legal representatives to conduct this proceeding.

24    Mr Hudson also contends that, in any event, he should be granted leave to represent Hudson Global because no other person possesses equivalent knowledge of the transactions and documentary history the subject of this proceeding. He submits that, given he is the one who has produced and maintained many of the relevant contemporaneous materials (including accounting records, loan transactions and financial statements of Hudson Global) and has intimate knowledge of the purpose of its transactions, he should be granted leave to appear personally. He also submits that refusing leave would substantially impair the plaintiff’s ability to pursue its claims.

25    During oral submissions, Mr Hudson also emphasised that this proceeding involves substantial documentation of an accounting nature and that he is experienced in this area as he is a chartered accountant. He also contends that his conduct to date in the proceeding (including the fact he has been able to file and serve documents, comply with directions in the proceeding to date and otherwise actively manage the proceeding) shows that he is familiar with the Court’s processes and procedural requirements.

26    Mr Elkerton submits that the balance of discretionary considerations weighs decisively against the Court granting leave for Mr Hudson to appear. He makes a number of submissions, as follows:

(a)    Mr Hudson’s conduct in conducting the proceeding demonstrates that granting leave for him to appear would not promote the administration of justice or the overarching purpose of s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act), including because Mr Hudson has conducted the proceeding thus far in an inappropriate and inefficient manner (including because he initially declined to provide the defendants with financial information relevant to the Security Application, only to eventually provide that information following the defendant filing an interlocutory application and issuing a notice to produce). It is also submitted that Mr Hudson relied in his written submissions on an authority which was unable to be located and that this incident illustrates the importance of “the safeguards ordinarily provided by legal representation”;

(b)    Hudson Global is the plaintiff in this proceeding, and thus does not have the benefit of the more liberal approach afforded to defendants in relation to leave applications;

(c)    Mr Hudson is likely to be a material witness in the proceeding, as he is the sole director and shareholder and, on his own case, is the person with the detailed knowledge of the facts, documents and transactions relevant to the case. As such, granting leave would place him in the untenable position of representing Hudson Global while also being the principal witness in the proceeding;

(d)    the proceeding is forensically complex and requires approximately 15 years of financial records to be reviewed, with Mr Hudson foreshadowing putting on significant further materials;

(e)    the Company currently does not have sufficient funds, meaning that a dividend will not likely be payable in the liquidation, which is relevant to whether the interests of justice dictate that Mr Hudson represent Hudson Global; and

(f)    having regard to the evidence given in the proceeding as to his personal interest in the proceeding, Mr Hudson is in a position of conflict and cannot properly represent the interests of Hudson Global, and it would be inappropriate for him to represent Hudson Global.

Consideration

27    The Leave Application can be dealt with relatively shortly. It is not appropriate that Mr Hudson be given leave to represent Hudson Global.

28    First, Mr Hudson has a conflict of interest. He has brought this matter in the name of Hudson Global, exposing Hudson Global inter alia to legal costs, as a defensive measure against the Company’s claim against him personally. Mr Hudson is very unlikely to be able to act objectively in the interests of Hudson Global in these circumstances. Mr Hudson’s collateral purpose in bringing this proceeding is also inappropriate.

29    Secondly, Mr Hudson is likely to be the key witness for Hudson Global in the proceeding. It will be difficult for Mr Hudson to fulfil that role and also fulfil his role as representative of Hudson Global.

30    Thirdly, Mr Hudson has no relevant training in legal matters, and his conduct in the proceeding to date (including the use of a hallucinated authority, and the commencement of a proceeding for his own personal benefit) does not give any confidence that he will be able properly to carry out the role of a representative of Hudson Global. It is also relevant in this regard that the proceeding is likely to involve issues of some complexity.

31    Fourthly, Hudson Global is a plaintiff. It chose (or rather Mr Hudson chose) to commence this proceeding without the legal representation which is a requirement of the Federal Court Rules.

32    Fifthly, although the impecuniosity of Hudson Global would ordinarily be a factor in favour of having a non-lawyer represent it, this factor is weaker in the present case in circumstances where there appears to be little utility in the proceeding for Hudson Global, with the only real utility being for Mr Hudson personally. In any event, it does not support the conclusion that Mr Hudson, as opposed to some other person, should represent Hudson Global.

33    It cannot be said that permitting Mr Hudson to represent Hudson Global in all these circumstances would promote the overarching purposes in s 37M of the FCA Act.

34    Consequently, Mr Hudson is refused leave to act as the representative of Hudson Global. The Leave Application should be dismissed, with costs.

Security Application

35    The second application is the Security Application by the defendant seeking orders that Hudson Global pay him $44,000 in security for costs pursuant to s 1335 of the Corporations Act, s 56 of the FCA Act and r 19.01 of the FCR.

36    The Court has a broad and unfettered discretion to order that a plaintiff give security for costs in such manner and form as it directs, save that the discretion must be exercised judicially: Bell Wholesale Co Ltd v Gates Export Corporation (No 2) (1984) 2 FCR 1; [1984] FCA 34 (Bell Wholesale) at 3 (Sheppard, Morling and Neaves JJ).

37    In The Advanced Technology Group Pty Ltd v Foxtel Cable Television Pty Ltd [2025] FCA 408, I summarised the principles applicable where the plaintiff asserts that the proceeding will be stultified. In Bell Wholesale at 4, the Full Court observed:

In our opinion a court is not justified in declining to order security on the ground that to do so will frustrate the litigation unless a company in the position of the appellant here establishes that those who stand behind it and who will benefit from the litigation if it is successful (whether they be shareholders or creditors or, as in this case, beneficiaries under a trust) are also without means. It is not for the party seeking security to raise the matter; it is an essential part of the case of a company seeking to resist an order for security on the ground that the granting of security will frustrate the litigation to raise the issue of the impecuniosity of those whom the litigation will benefit and prove the necessary facts.

38    As to quantum, an order for security is not intended to be a complete and certain indemnity for the costs actually incurred by the party having the benefit of the security: Brundza v Robbie & Co (No 2) (1952) 88 CLR 171; [1952] HCA 49 at 175 (Fullagar J); CIP Group Pty Ltd v So (No 4) [2024] FCA 1372 at [38] (Derrington J).

39    It is not disputed by Hudson Global in the present case that it is impecunious. Hudson Global has led evidence of its own financial hardship and lack of funds, particularly in support of the Leave Application, including evidence that:

(a)    Hudson Global does not presently have sufficient liquid funds available to retain solicitors and counsel;

(b)    filing fees payable in this proceeding were waived by the Court following Hudson Global’s application based upon financial hardship;

(c)    the existence of the other winding up proceeding in relation to Hudson Global has “significantly affected [Hudson Global’s] ability to obtain finance or refinance against its assets”. Mr Hudson has since deposed that the debt the subject of these winding up proceeding has now been satisfied, following Mr Hudson taking steps to apply for the early release of his own superannuation benefits to facilitate payment of this debt, although Mr Elkerton submits that the costs order of $7,497 arising from this proceeding has still not been paid; and

(d)    as at 30 June 2026, the balance of Hudson Global’s bank account was $319.84.

40    At [12]-[18] of Mr Hudson’s affidavit dated 1 July 2026, Mr Hudson states that Hudson Global is the trustee of the Hudson Properties Trust (of which he and his children are beneficiaries) and that this trust owns a unit located in Ultimo NSW worth approximately $220,000. Mr Hudson does not otherwise provide evidence of his own financial position, or prove that he is impecunious.

41    On 22 July 2026, the solicitors for Mr Elkerton wrote to Mr Hudson. The relevant email included the following passage:

As the individual standing behind the plaintiff, and the person who stands to benefit from the prosecution of these proceedings as its sole director and shareholder, it is our view that a personal undertaking from you to satisfy any adverse costs order made against Hudson Global may be the only practical means of protecting our client’s interests.

Please indicate if you [would] be prepared to provide such an undertaking and if so, please provide evidence of your personal financial capacity to satisfy any adverse costs order.

42    Mr Hudson responded to that email on the same day, with the relevant passage as follows:

I also note your request that I provide a personal undertaking and evidence of my personal financial capacity. That request is noted. The plaintiff’s position in relation to security for costs will be addressed before the Court in the ordinary course.

43    Mr Hudson did not proffer any personal undertaking at the hearing, or provide evidence of his capacity (or inability) to meet any costs order against Hudson Global.

Submissions of the parties

44    Mr Elkerton submits that, having regard to the circumstances of the case, the Court should be satisfied that there is credible testimony supporting the existence of a reason to believe that Hudson Global will be unable to pay the costs of Mr Elkerton if he is successful. He contends that the discretion in s 1335 of the Corporations Act is therefore enlivened and that, having regard to the discretionary factors, security should be ordered by the Court.

45    Mr Elkerton submits that the ordering of security would be plainly appropriate in the present circumstances having regard to the financial position of Hudson Global (discussed at [39] above) and considering the following discretionary considerations:

(a)    he did not delay in making the Security Application and foreshadowed it to Mr Hudson prior to the first case management hearing;

(b)    the strength of the plaintiff’s case is low, in that it faces substantial forensic difficulties in discharging its onus on a hearing de novo under s 1321 of the Corporations Act given that the evidence shows an absence of the alleged debt in contemporaneous statutory disclosures;

(c)    there is no suggestion that Hudson Global’s financial position was caused by the defendant. Further, Hudson Global itself has squarely raised the issue of its impecuniosity in filing the Leave Application and by obtaining relief from the Court’s filing fees; and

(d)    the order for security cannot be characterised as oppressive merely because it requires a corporate plaintiff, which is subject to the benefit of limited liability, to pay security and thus protect the defendant from the consequences of that limited liability.

46    Mr Elkerton also submits that Hudson Global’s initial refusal to provide financial information, security for costs or a personal guarantee from its sole director and shareholder (Mr Hudson) warrants the making of an inference against Mr Hudson. It is submitted that Mr Hudson wishes to engage in litigation at no risk to himself, where the litigation is ultimately only an “accounting exercise” for his benefit, since there is no real prospect of the liquidation resulting in any dividends being paid to creditors. Mr Elkerton also submits that, consistent with Bell Wholesale, Mr Hudson has not shown that those who will benefit from the litigation (i.e. himself) are also “without means” – particularly given he is a beneficiary of the Hudson Properties Trust.

47    Mr Elkerton therefore submits that it would not be in the interests of justice to shift the entirety of the risks of litigation onto him where, in the absence of such security, there is likely no realistic prospect of recovery from Hudson Global. Mr Elkerton submits an order for security is the only meaningful protection which would enable him to meet the case.

48    Mr Hudson submits that the Security Application should be dismissed because the proceeding is properly arguable and bona fide, in that it is not speculative and relies on contemporaneous documentary material. In this respect, Mr Hudson indicates that further contemporaneous and accounting records extending from November 2011 until the liquidation would be provided in support of the application and that the evidence currently before the Court is limited in scope.

49    Mr Hudson further submits that the proceeding raises substantial questions requiring determination, and that any order for security would have the effect of stifling the proceeding and thus preventing the plaintiff from seeking review of the defendant’s decision in relation to the POD. This is primarily because, as substantiated in support of its Leave Application, Hudson Global lacks funds and therefore cannot pay the security for costs sought by the defendant. Mr Hudson also submits that the defendant’s actions in retaining solicitors, seeking security and “continu[ing] actively to conduct this litigation” whilst asserting that the liquidation lacks sufficient funds is also a “tension” that is relevant to the Court’s assessment of the balance of justice in determining whether security should be ordered.

50    It is therefore submitted by Mr Hudson that the balance of justice favours the dismissal of the Security Application.

Consideration

51    The present situation is relatively straightforward. It is common ground that Hudson Global is impecunious and unable to meet any costs order in favour of Mr Elkerton. It is plain that the proceeding is being run for the benefit of Mr Hudson, not just in the ordinary sense that Mr Hudson is the sole shareholder of Hudson Global, but in the more direct sense that the purpose of the proceeding is to provide a practical economic balancing of a potential claim against Mr Hudson personally.

52    The Company is likewise impecunious and Mr Elkerton’s recourse to the funds of the Company is no practical protection against personal liability for legal costs. In defending the proceeding, Mr Elkerton, as liquidator of the Company, is exposed in a practical sense to unrecoverable costs if he is successful in defending the claim.

53    Hudson Global has not established that the proceeding will be stultified, in the absence of proper evidence as to the financial position of Mr Hudson, who stands to benefit from the proceeding in a direct sense. However, even if Mr Hudson was relatively impecunious, it is not appropriate that a liquidator in the position of Mr Elkerton be entirely exposed on costs in a proceeding brought by a corporate plaintiff for the purpose of benefitting Mr Hudson personally where Mr Hudson has not provided a personal guarantee or other basis by which Mr Elkerton can recover against him if the proceeding fails.

54    In relation to Mr Hudson’s contention that the fact Mr Elkerton has retained solicitors and continues to actively conduct this litigation is a matter relevant to assessing the balance of justice in determining the Security Application, I reject that contention. Hudson Global has commenced this proceeding and, as a result, the defendant has been forced to litigate. Choosing to retain solicitors and to actively participate in the proceeding, as well as pursue the Security Application, is not a factor weighing against the granting of an order for security for costs in these circumstances.

55    It is inappropriate for Hudson Global to be able to continue the proceeding for the personal benefit of Mr Hudson without providing security, or without Mr Hudson providing that security. The present case is an appropriate case for an order for security.

56    The quantification of the claim for security is set out in the affidavit of Mr Kerr, the solicitor for the defendant, of 15 June 2026. Mr Elkerton does not seek security for past costs. Mr Kerr has broken the estimated future costs into stages or tasks, and provided an estimate for each task, including the number of hours and the level of lawyer estimated to be performing the work, including the estimated costs of junior counsel. That has produced a figure of $51,900 for solicitors’ fees and $8,010 for disbursements (including counsel), being a total of $59,910. Mr Kerr has then assumed that Mr Elkerton would recover 70% of solicitors’ fees and 100% of disbursements, being a total of $44,340. The amount claimed for security has been rounded down to $44,000. All these amounts are exclusive of GST.

57    Having reviewed the evidence as to the likely costs, in my view the amounts estimated are entirely reasonable for the tasks involved. I agree that $44,340 is a reasonable estimate of recoverable future costs.

58    However, having regard to the principle that security is not ordinarily to provide a complete indemnity for costs, it is appropriate to discount this amount further. I will order that an amount of $36,000 be provided by way of security. This amount does not include any amount for GST.

59    In relation to the order sought by Mr Elkerton that the proceeding be dismissed if security is not provided by a particular time, it is not appropriate to make that particular order. I will, instead, make the usual order that the proceeding be stayed if security is not provided. If that position persists for some time, then it may be appropriate for Mr Elkerton to apply for an order that the proceeding be dismissed. However, that should be a subsequent application made and determined on the basis of circumstances at the relevant time.

Conclusion

60    The Leave Application should be dismissed, while the Security Application is allowed. Hudson Global should be ordered to provide security in the amount of $36,000, with the proceeding to be stayed if security is not provided.

61    There is no reason to disturb the ordinary rule that costs follow the event. Therefore, Mr Hudson should pay the costs of the Leave Application, and Hudson Global should pay the costs of the Security Application.

Associate:

Dated:    29 October 2026