Federal Court of Australia

Raniga v Charter Keck Cramer Pty Ltd [2026] FCA 1551

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    Until 7 days after the mediation process is terminated, pursuant to ss 37AF and 37AG(1)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), on the ground that it is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, there is to be no disclosure (by publication or otherwise) of the following passages, and they are to be ordered confidential within the meaning of r 2.32(1)(b) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth):

(a)    of the Concise Statement filed on 10 July 2026:

(i)    paragraph [2] (from second line, “Charter” onwards);

(ii)    paragraph [3];

(iii)    paragraph [5] (from (i) onwards until before “, and (v)”);

(iv)    paragraph [6] (in relation to (i) from the second “which” to the end of that first sentence, in relation to (ii) from “about” until the semi-colon, in relation to (iii), from “that” to the end of the semi-colon, in relation to (iv), from “employees” until the end of that sentence);

(v)    paragraph [7] (from “asking” onwards);

(vi)    paragraph [9(b)];

(vii)    paragraph [9(e)] (from “Hutchins” onwards);

(viii)    paragraph [9(j)];

(ix)    paragraph [9(m)];

(x)    paragraph [11] (from third line, “was” onwards); and

(xi)    paragraph [12] (from third line, “vis-à-vis” onwards);

(b)    of the Affidavit of Suzanne Emma Craig filed on 11 August 2026:

(i)    paragraphs [7(b)] and [7(c)]; and

(ii)    paragraphs [14] and [15] (and the corresponding heading);

(c)    of the Respondents’ unredacted written submissions filed on 27 August 2026:

(i)    paragraph [11] (from first “and” until end of first sentence); and

(ii)    paragraph [16(a)] (final sentence);

(d)    of the Applicant’s written submissions filed on 2 September 2026, paragraph [19(c)], [19(d)] and [19(e)].

2.    Order 1 does not prevent disclosure to the Court, between the parties and their legal representatives and staff, including counsel, or to any mediator appointed by the parties in respect of these proceedings.

3.    By 4.00pm on 23 October 2026, the respondents are to provide the Court Registry and serve the applicant with a redacted version of each of the documents referred to in order 1, redacting the portions referred to therein, which can be made available for inspection under r 2.32 of the Rules.

4.    By 4.00pm on 23 October 2026, the parties are to notify the Court if they wish to make submissions in respect of costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

STELLIOS J:

1    By originating application filed on 10 July 2026, the applicant, Ms Raniga, seeks relief for alleged contraventions of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (alleging adverse action under s 340) and the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (alleging contraventions of the protections for whistleblowers). Ms Raniga filed a concise statement with the originating application.

2    On 11 August 2026, the respondents, Charter Keck Cramer Pty Ltd and its Chief Executive Officer, Mr Hutchins, lodged an interlocutory application seeking suppression and non-publication orders pursuant to s 37AF(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and confidentiality orders under r 2.32(1)(b) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) over certain documents filed in the proceeding until 7 days after the termination of any mediation. On 19 August 2026, I made orders referring the proceeding to mediation, to commence no later than 30 October 2026.

3    For the following reasons, I make suppression, non-publication and confidentiality orders under s 37AF(1) of the Federal Court Act and r 2.32(1)(b) of the Rules (s 37AF orders), but in narrower terms than what was sought by the respondents.

the interlocutory application

4    The interlocutory application sought both interim and final suppression, non-publication and confidentiality orders. On 14 September 2026, a Registrar of the Court made interim orders under s 37AI of the Federal Court Act in the following terms:

1. Pursuant to s37AI of Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the Act), until further order of the Court, there is to be no disclosure (by publication or otherwise) of the following documents:

a. Originating Application filed on 10 July 2026;

b. Concise Statement filed on 10 July 2026;

c. Interlocutory Application filed on 11 August 2026;

d. Affidavit of Suzanne Emma Craig filed on 11 August 2026;

e. Respondents’ submissions filed on 27 August 2026; and

f. Applicant’s submissions filed on 2 September 2026.

2. Order 1 does not prevent the disclosure to and between the legal representatives, and their staff, including counsel, of the parties in these proceedings.

5    The Registrar declined to include in the scope of the s 37AI orders any concise statement in response filed by the respondents, as no such document has yet been filed in the proceeding.

6    The balance of the interlocutory application, concerning the application for s 37AF orders, was heard before me on 28 September 2026. While the Australian Financial Review (AFR) had stated at a case management hearing (on 19 August 2026) its desire to appear at the hearing of the interlocutory application pursuant to s 37AH(2) of the Federal Court Act, and orders were made giving leave for that to occur, the AFR subsequently informed the parties on 2 September 2026 that it did not intend to appear or be heard at the hearing. As it transpired, the AFR did not appear or make submissions. It is also of relevance that, on 25 September 2026, the AFR published an article concerning Ms Raniga and the respondents.

7    Section 37AF orders were sought on the ground that they are necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice: Federal Court Act s 37AG(1)(a). The application was accompanied by two affidavits of Suzanne Emma Craig, solicitor for the respondents, dated 11 August 2026 (Craig affidavit) and 28 September 2026.

8    The scope of the s 37AF orders sought by the respondents was amended subsequent to the making of the s 37AI orders to exclude the originating application and interlocutory application from the application. The amended form of orders sought was annexed to the respondents’ submissions filed on 27 August 2026 and encompassed the entirety of:

(1)    the Craig affidavit;

(2)    any submissions filed in respect of the interlocutory application;

(3)    the concise statement, except in the redacted form prepared by the respondents for the purposes of the interlocutory application; and

(4)    any concise statement in response (albeit that one had not yet been filed);

(collectively, the Documents).

9    During the hearing, the scope of application further narrowed considerably. I will deal with these changes below when considering the application for s 37AF orders in relation to each of the Documents.

submissions

Respondents

10    Counsel for the respondents submitted, with reference to the overarching purpose in s 37M of the Federal Court Act, that there is an important public interest in facilitating settlement of litigation, relying in particular on the decisions in Patterson v Westpac Banking Corporation [2024] FCA 629 (Raper J) and Saw v Seven Network (Operations) Ltd [2024] FCA 1210; 305 FCR 340 (Perram J).

11     Counsel for the respondents contended that:

(1)    In circumstances where orders have been made by consent referring the proceeding to mediation, there is a real risk that the disclosure or publication of allegations made against the respondents will jeopardise the prospects of a resolution being reached at mediation.

(2)    That is particularly because:

(a)    there has been media interest in the proceeding, with media requests to access documents filed in the proceeding and the AFR’s subsequent publication of an article concerning the applicant and the respondents;

(b)    the nature of the allegations is serious; and

(c)    there is a real concern that the allegations may cause significant financial and reputational harm to the first respondent and, if that harm materialises, it would significantly jeopardise the prospects of reaching early settlement as the respondents will feel a compulsion to defend the proceedings publicly with a view to publicly exonerating themselves and restoring any reputational damage, having the effect of making the proceedings more acrimonious.

(3)    The concise statement is poorly pleaded and contains a number of deficiencies, including that a number of serious allegations are made without sufficient detail or particularity, and a number of allegations are scandalous, frivolous and/or vexatious, and are liable to be struck out. It is open to the respondents to reagitate their previous application for pleadings by way of statement of claim or seek further interlocutory relief, including a strike out application.

(4)    The respondents have not yet filed any defences. Further, there is the prospect, accepted by the applicant, of a further claim being filed in the Court following an unsuccessful conciliation process before the Fair Work Commission in relation to a general protections dismissal application. Counsel for the applicant appeared to accept that the further claim would be pursued by statement of claim alongside this proceeding. Accordingly, the concise statement in its current form would not be the final form of the claim.

(5)    While the respondents deny the allegations, the settlement of the proceeding on confidential terms is likely to be a significant consideration for the respondents for the purpose of the mediation.

(6)    In these circumstances, the respondents should not be required to publicly defend their position or mitigate the financial and reputational damage should the allegations be made public.

(7)    The orders are temporary in duration and directed to the imminent mediation.

Applicant

12    Counsel for Ms Raniga did not oppose the interlocutory application in its entirety but, instead, sought to narrow the coverage of the orders. It is fair to say that Ms Raniga’s position is that she does not oppose the making of an order on the basis of s 37AG(1)(a), but that the coverage of the s 37AF orders proposed by the respondents was too broad.

13    Counsel for Ms Raniga drew attention to the following passage in the judgment of Lee J in Forrest v Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions [2026] FCAFC 69; 316 FCR 516 at [68] (with Abraham and Vandongen JJ agreeing):

Part VAA of the FCA Act relevantly provides for the making a suppression or non-publication order in relation to “information that comprises evidence or information about evidence” (s 37AF(1)(b)(i)). Any such order should go no further than suppressing that part of the information or that part of the evidence that is necessary and be formulated with “sufficient particularity to ensure” that the order is limited to achieving the purpose for which the order is made” (s 37AH(5)). It necessarily follows that if it is only necessary to suppress some representations contained in a document, the order should be calibrated to ensure that it is only that part of the document that is the subject of suppression.

14    I was also referred to what Lee J said in Johnson v H&M Hennes & Mauritz Pty Ltd [2026] FCA 834 at [11]–[12]:

It might be thought superficially that the filing of the application was not unusual. There have been several decisions of this Court in which judges of the Court have been persuaded to make final suppression or non-publication orders pending the conduct of an early mediation. Properly understood, the common thread running through those cases is that, by reason of the nature of the allegations made in the proceeding, there was a perception that the prospect of settlement on a confidential basis at mediation would be destroyed (or at least materially diminished) if the allegations aired in the filed initiating documents became the subject of pre-mediation publicity.

But, as can be seen from the nature of the allegations in this proceeding, the allegations in the present case are a world away from the nature of the allegations made in cases where such orders have been made. The material sought to be suppressed is, on its face, far from scandalous or salacious; nor does it involve confidential information in any ordinary sense; nor does it involve any other type of material one could conceive of as being necessary to suppress for the purposes of the administration of justice.

15    The passage in Johnson at [11] was also set out by his Honour in Berryman v NextDC Limited [2026] FCA 1065 at [19] when considering the decision in Patterson.

Consideration

General principles

16    Section 37AF(1) of the Federal Court Act empowers the Court to make a suppression or non-publication order on grounds permitted by Part VAA of that Act. Such an order operates to prohibit or restrict the publication or other disclosure of certain information, including “information that relates to a proceeding before the Court and is … information that comprises evidence or information about evidence” (s 37AF(1)(b)(i)) or “information lodged with or filed in the Court” (s 37AF(1)(b)(iv)).

17    The grounds for making such an order are set out in s 37AG(1) of the Federal Court Act. Relevantly, they include where “the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice”: s 37AG(1)(a).

18    The way in which the power is to be exercised is guided by the text of various sections in Part VAA of the Federal Court Act. For the purposes of this case, the following observations may be made about the application of the power to the facts in this case.

19    First, s 37AE provides that “[i]n deciding whether to make a suppression order or non-publication order, the Court must take into account that a primary objective of the administration of justice is to safeguard the public interest in open justice” (emphasis added): see Patterson at [6]. In the identification of open justice as a primary objective, the text of the provision necessarily recognises that “there are other primary objectives, including those in s 37M of the [Federal] Court Act to facilitate the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible”: Porter v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2021] FCA 863 at [83] (Jagot J). As a Full Court (Allsop CJ, Wigney and Abraham JJ) said in The Country Care Group Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (No 2) [2020] FCAFC 44; 275 FCR 377 at [8], “[t]he paramount consideration is the need to do justice” and, in my view, the demands of open justice must accommodate the grounds for the making of an order stated in s 37AG(1) in order to do justice in the case.

20    Secondly, the text of the grounds in s 37AG(1) specifies how the accommodation is to be made. Open justice, as a primary objective, will give way only where the order is necessary to give effect to the objective identified in the grounds. Thus, in this case, the order can only be made if it is “necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice”. As the Full Court said in Country Care Group at [9], “[t]he word ‘necessary’ … is a ‘strong word’”, but it is “not to be given an unduly narrow construction” and “will depend on the particular circumstances of the case”. The outworking of these provisions is that “[s]uppression or non-publication orders should only be made in exceptional circumstances”: Country Care Group at [8].

21    Thirdly, as for the duration of an order, s 37AJ(2) provides that “the Court is to ensure that the order operates for no longer than is reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose for which it is made”.

Application

22    To commence the analysis, I accept that the early settlement of proceedings through an effective mediation process is an important feature of the administration of justice. As Raper J said in Patterson at [20], “[t]here is undoubtedly a very significant public interest in the settlement of proceedings, particularly at an early stage (which is an outcome the Court strives to achieve)”: see also Berryman at [14]; Saw at [10]. Accordingly, I accept that “when determining the necessity of preventing prejudice to the proper administration of justice, account may be taken of the fact that the lack of access [to Court documents], may enhance the prospects of the parties’ negotiations”: Patterson at [21].

23    However, it must also be established that each part of a suppression and non-publication order is “necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice”, by reason of the detrimental effect of the suppressed information on the prospects of a successful mediation. I will now address each of the Documents.

Concise statement

24    While the proposed orders initially sought suppression and non-publication of the entire concise statement, the respondents filed a redacted concise statement ahead of the hearing of the interlocutory application. Ms Raniga took issue with some of the proposed redactions and, ultimately, over the course of the hearing, the respondents accepted that the proposed redactions should be further narrowed.

25    The remaining proposed redactions concern the particular allegations that have been made by Ms Raniga against the respondents and their factual foundation. The passages subject to ongoing dispute relate to the redactions in paragraphs [7], [9(b)], [9(j)] and [9(m)] of the concise statement.

26    Leaving aside the contested passages to which I will return, for the following reasons, I am satisfied that the proposed redactions, which contain particular allegations of wrongdoing by the respondents in their conduct towards Ms Raniga, should be the subject of the suppression and non-publication orders.

27    First, whether a suppression or non-publication order is warranted will “depend on the nature of the allegations made and how necessary suppression may be to a resolution on the evidence adduced”: Berryman at [14]. As Lee J recognised in Johnson at [11], an order may be warranted where:

… by reason of the nature of the allegations made in the proceeding, there was a perception that the prospect of settlement on a confidential basis at mediation would be destroyed (or at least materially diminished) if the allegations aired in the filed initiating documents became the subject of pre-mediation publicity.

28    The allegations sought to be covered by the orders in this case are either of a serious nature or are of a kind that are likely to have contributed to the evidently acrimonious relationship between Ms Raniga and the respondents. The confidentiality of the allegations may well be an important ingredient in settlement negotiations: see Saw at [14]. In any event, the goodwill desirable for an effective mediation is unlikely to be promoted by the public disclosure of such allegations before the mediation.

29    Secondly, by order of the Court, the mediation is to commence no later than 30 October 2026. This is not a situation where the duration of the orders will be temporally unascertainable or protracted. The departure from open justice is temporally confined.

30    Thirdly, I consider it relevant that the pleadings might not yet be in final form because the respondents have sought (and may in future seek again) that the proceeding proceed by way of statement of claim, and also because the claims against the respondents may yet evolve. The desirability of an early resolution of the claims is thereby sharpened to avoid the protraction of these interlocutory steps.

31    Fourthly, the evidence of Ms Craig is that the respondents consider that “there is an increased likelihood that a settlement outcome may be achieved at a future mediation if the matters … remain confidential”. While this fact alone might not provide a justification for suppressing the Documents in their entirety, the posture of (at least) one side of the litigation in favour of settlement through mediation is a relevant consideration in favour of making a more limited suppression order: see Saw at [9].

32    Fifthly, the publication of the article in the AFR is evidence that there is media interest in the proceeding and the disclosure of the allegations is likely to lead to further media interest: see Saw at [13]. I accept the respondents’ submission that there is a real and immediate risk of publication if the orders are not made.

33    Sixthly, while it is for the Court to be satisfied that the orders are warranted, Ms Raniga has not opposed the making of the orders (leaving aside the contested passages to which I will now turn) and, with the AFR failing to appear, there is an absence of a strongly articulated case against the making of the orders.

34    In relation to the contested passages, two of those passages (paragraphs [7] and [9(b)]) contain allegations of particular conduct or statements that imply particular conduct. Counsel for Ms Raniga sought to distinguish these passages from others that were accepted by both sides to be included in the scope of the s 37AF orders by contending that there is a distinction to be drawn between, on the one hand, a description of the conduct in granular detail (which will be the subject of the orders) and, on the other hand, more generalised, high-level statements (like those contained in paragraphs [7] and [9(b)]) which are unlikely to affect the success of the mediation.

35    I do not accept the application of any such distinction to paragraphs [7] and [9(b)] which contain or imply allegations of particular conduct that is likely to have contributed to the evidently acrimonious relationship between Ms Raniga and the respondents. I do not consider that their public disclosure ahead of the mediation will provide a constructive footing for the commencement of the mediation.

36    The other two contested passages (paragraphs [9(j)] and [9(m)]) concern allegations directed to persons associated with the respondents, either through an employment or contractual relationship. I do not consider that the fact that those allegations are made against persons other than the respondents makes a difference to the analysis. In one case, the allegation is a serious one; in the other, the conduct is likely to have contributed to the acrimonious relationship between Ms Raniga and the respondents. Again, their public disclosure ahead of the mediation would not provide a constructive footing for the commencement of the mediation.

37    Accordingly, paragraphs [7], [9(b)], [9(j)] and [9(m)] of the concise statement should be subject to the orders.

Craig affidavit

38    The respondents initially sought an order for the suppression and non-publication of the whole of the Craig affidavit. However, during the course of the hearing, the passages over which a s 37AF order was sought narrowed.

39    In relation to paragraphs [1]–[8], the application was only pressed in relation to paragraphs [7(b)] and [7(c)]. The allegations are serious and I agree, for the reasons already given, that those allegations should not be publicly disclosed ahead of the mediation. I do not accept the submission by counsel for Ms Raniga that the opening parts of paragraphs [7(b)] and [7(c)] should be preserved from redaction. The opening words are suggestive of an inference of wrongdoing, and the piecemeal redaction of those paragraphs would invite the public to speculate as to what that wrongdoing might be. Accordingly, the entirety of paragraphs [7(b)] and [7(c)] should be redacted; the balance of paragraphs [1]–[8] will not be subject to the orders.

40    Paragraphs [19]–[24] are directed to the financial and reputational harm that the respondents might suffer if s 37AF orders are not made. I had some difficulty with the submission that these paragraphs should be redacted. Allegations that there have been contraventions of the Fair Work Act and the Corporations Act are publicly available in the originating application. Those allegations have some potential to impact on the respondents’ financial position and reputation, including because they might lead to speculation about the alleged conduct involved in circumstances where the allegations have been described in open court as serious and are capable of carrying significant financial and reputational consequences.

41    However, the question is whether paragraphs [19]–[24] contain information of a character that would, including by inference to be drawn, elevate the potential of that adverse impact in such a way that the utility of the mediation would be undermined.

42    The submission ultimately put by the respondents was that one of the key motivating factors for the mediation is to maintain confidentiality in relation to the allegations. It was contended that the disclosure of the information at paragraphs [19]–[24] would diminish, if not completely destroy, that motivating factor.

43    Counsel for Ms Raniga contended that a distinction is to be drawn between, on the one hand, the disclosure of issues in dispute that will make it more difficult for the parties to settle the matter and, on the other hand, evidence of a general nature that there is a concern that public airing of the substantive allegations will make settlement more difficult. It was contended that the latter category (which was said to include what is set out in paragraphs [19]–[24]), should not be the subject of confidentiality orders.

44    I accept the thrust of Ms Raniga’s submission. The paragraphs do no more than elaborate, in a very general way, on the financial or reputational harm that might result from the disclosure of the particular allegations that will be redacted. They include a denial of the allegations that have been made. They shed no light on the particular allegations (described in open court as serious), nor elevate the risk of speculation that is already inherent in the making of the allegations in the originating application. Accordingly, I am not satisfied that it is necessary to redact those paragraphs in order to preserve the utility of the mediation, and they will not be the subject of any orders.

45    The redaction of paragraphs [9]–[13] was supported on the same basis as what was advanced for paragraphs [19]–[24]. I am not satisfied that paragraph [9] should be the subject of an order. It is a general statement of belief that the respondents deny the allegations. I am also not satisfied that paragraphs [10]–[13] should be the subject of any orders. That the proceeding has been referred to mediation is evident from what was said in open court, if not from the Court’s orders. Further, that the end result of the mediation might be the settlement of the proceeding on a confidential basis is a matter that would not take anyone by surprise. Accordingly, paragraphs [9]–[13] will not be the subject of any orders.

46    Paragraphs [14]–[15] (and the corresponding heading) are referable to matters in the concise statement that will be redacted. Accordingly, I accept that those paragraphs should be the subject of the s 37AF orders.

47    The application was not pressed in relation to paragraphs [16]–[18] which are directed to the obligation of confidentiality owed under s 1317AAE(1) of the Corporations Act. Counsel for Ms Raniga confirmed that she has consented to any disclosure: see Corporations Act s 1317AAE(2)(f). Accordingly, paragraphs [16]–[18] will not be the subject of any orders.

Written submissions

48    Although the proposed orders initially sought the suppression and non-publication of the entirety of the written submissions, those claims were subsequently narrowed. Counsel for the respondents provided the Court with redacted submissions of the respondents that only sought four redactions:

(1)    Redactions were sought to the first sentence of paragraph [11]. I accept that the second part of the sentence, which refers to specific allegations, should be the subject of the s 37AF orders. The first part of the sentence, which simply states that the allegations are serious, should not be redacted. The mere identification of the allegations as being serious was a statement made in open court in support of making the suppression and non-publication orders. That statement should not be the subject of any orders.

(2)    The respondents sought to redact the whole of paragraph [12]. However, that paragraph identifies the financial and reputation harm that might occur if a suppression and non-publication order is not made. For the reasons stated above, that paragraph should not be the subject of any orders.

(3)    The second sentence of paragraph [16(a)] contains reference to a particular allegation in the concise statement that will be redacted. Accordingly, that part of paragraph [16(a)] should also be the subject of the s 37AF orders.

(4)    The reference to “financial and reputational damage” in paragraph [18] should also not be the subject of any orders for the reasons set out earlier.

49    In relation to Ms Raniga’s written submissions, the respondents at the hearing only pressed for the redaction of the second sentence of paragraph [19] along with sub-paragraphs (a) to (e). Those paragraphs correspond with statements in the concise statement. They should only be redacted consistently with the redactions to be applied to the concise statement. Accordingly, only paragraphs [19(c)], [19(d)] and [19(e)] will be the subject of the s 37AF orders. The words in the second sentence of the chapeau to paragraph [19] will not be redacted.

Any concise statement in response

50    A concise statement in response is yet to be filed. Before that is done, it is not possible to make an assessment as to whether its unknown terms should be the subject of an order under ss 37AF and 37AG(1)(a). As Lee J said in Berryman at [18], “[t]he Court should not make a suppression or non-publication order in the abstract”. I accept that position.

51    Counsel for the respondents accepted that, if I were of the view that it was not appropriate to include the concise statement in response in the order, then the claim in that respect would not be pressed at this time.

disposition

52    Suppression and non-publication orders will be made pursuant to ss 37AF(1) and 37AG(1)(a) in relation to some parts of the Documents in order to facilitate the utility of the mediation. The duration of the orders will be temporally confined by their purpose and will cease to operate 7 days after the mediation process is terminated. As the parties have agreed to mediation before a mediator of their choice, there will be a carve out in the orders to ensure the Documents can be provided to the mediator.

53    There is a question as to whether an order should be made for the filing of a concise statement in response. Given that the mediation is imminent, and there is the prospect of a new claim being made against the respondents by way of statement of claim, I consider it more efficient to await the outcome of the mediation to hear further from the parties on future timetabling orders.

54    The applicant sought an opportunity to be heard on the question of costs arising from the hearing of the interlocutory application. Mindful of s 570(1) of the Fair Work Act, the parties will be given an opportunity to indicate whether they wish to be further heard on that question.

Associate:

Dated:    20 October 2026