Federal Court of Australia

St Clair v Irwin Mitchell LLP, in the matter of St Clair [2026] FCA 1526

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The application for review filed on 23 July 2026 be dismissed.

2.    The orders made by Judicial Registrar Young on 16 July 2026 be affirmed.

3.    The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

GOODMAN J:

A.    Introduction

1    The applicant, Ms St Clair, seeks review pursuant to s 35A(5) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) of the exercise of power by Judicial Registrar Young of this Court on 16 July 2026 concerning a bankruptcy notice issued on 19 January 2026 at the request of the respondent, Irwin Mitchell LLP.

2    For the reasons developed below, the application for review should be dismissed and the Judicial Registrar’s orders should be affirmed.

B.    Background

3    During 2021, Irwin Mitchell carried out legal work on behalf of Ms St Clair, however a dispute arose between them concerning payment of legal fees and disbursements.

4    On 15 November 2021, Irwin Mitchell commenced a proceeding in the County Court in the United Kingdom (County Court proceeding) by filing a Claim Form and a Notice for Service out of the Jurisdiction. By that Claim Form, Irwin Mitchell sought recovery from Ms St Clair of unpaid legal fees, costs and disbursements, together with interest.

5    On 6 December 2021, the County Court issued the Claim Form and returned a sealed copy to Irwin Mitchell for the purposes of service upon Ms St Clair.

6    On 25 January 2022, on Irwin Mitchell’s version of events, the Claim Form was served upon Ms St Clair in New South Wales. Ms St Clair disputes that such service occurred.

7    On 6 May 2022, Irwin Mitchell applied to the County Court for default judgment.

8    On 19 January 2023, Deputy District Judge Henley of the County Court made an order for default judgment against Ms St Clair in the sum of £14,282.39 (County Court judgment).

9    On or about 25 October 2023, Irwin Mitchell commenced a proceeding in the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Supreme Court proceeding) seeking, inter alia, an order for the registration of the County Court judgment, pursuant to the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth).

10    On 8 August 2024, Registrar Kenna in the Supreme Court made orders in the Supreme Court proceeding for the registration of the County Court judgment pursuant to the Foreign Judgments Act, and providing an opportunity for Ms St Clair to apply, within 28 days after service on her of notice of such registration, to: (1) set aside the registration; and (2) stay the enforcement of the registered judgment. I will refer to the registered judgment as the Supreme Court judgment.

11    On 10 October 2024, Ms St Clair was provided with, inter alia, a copy of the 8 August 2024 orders.

12    On 4 November 2024, Ms St Clair filed a notice of motion in the Supreme Court proceeding. That notice of motion was superseded on 6 January 2025, when Ms St Clair filed an amended notice of motion in the following form:

1.    An Order to set aside the registration for reasons listed by the plaintiff in her amended affidavit. IM may lodge their claim again, but they must include service to the plaintiff.

2.     A Stay of Execution so that CNBC can examine the plaintiff’s defence and evidence, [H47YY255 Defence] against Irwin Mitchell’s H47YY255 Claim and determine whether their 19-1-2023 judgment should be set aside.

(bold and underline emphasis in original)

13    On 5 February 2025, Registrar Hedge made orders including the following orders in the Supreme Court proceeding:

1.     ORDER that [Ms St Clair] must take any steps to set aside the judgment made on 19 January 2023 in the County Court Money Claims Centre Claim No. H47YY255 (UK Judgment) by no later than Friday 14 February 2025 and file and serve any affidavit confirming steps taken by 24 February 2025.

2.     ORDER [Irwin Mitchell] will take no further action to enforce the UK Judgment until further order of the Court.

…

14    On or about 12 February 2025, Ms St Clair commenced an appeal against the County Court judgment.

15    On 14 July 2025, Ms St Clair’s amended notice of motion in the Supreme Court proceeding was heard in part by Justice Adams (as the Chief Judge in Common Law of the Supreme Court then was) in her capacity as Duty Judge. Her Honour adjourned the remainder of the hearing to 15 September 2025.

16    The events of that day were subsequently described by her Honour in Irwin Mitchell LLP v St Clair [2025] NSWSC 1086 at [2] to [4]:

2    The matter came before me in my capacity as Duty Judge on 14 July 2025. On that day, I heard oral submissions from both Ms St Clair and Ms Hutchison who appeared on behalf of the judgment creditor, Irwin Mitchell LLP (“Irwin Mitchell).

3    It is unnecessary to detail all of the submissions that were made that day. Significantly, it was apparent that Ms St Clair contended that she had been attempting to appeal the default judgment that was entered against her in the United Kingdom. The significance of that is that s 8(1) of the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) provides that, “If the court in which a judgment is registered is satisfied that the judgment debtor has appealed, or is entitled and intends to appeal, against the judgment, the court may order that enforcement of the judgment be stayed pending the final determination of the appeal, until a specified day or for a specified period.”

4    There was conflicting evidence before the Court on 14 July 2025 as to whether an appeal had in fact been lodged by Ms St Clair. One of the disputes was whether her filing fee had been waived. The information received on behalf of the judgment creditor, Irwin Mitchell, was that the appeal had been lodged and that would be confirmed in 16 weeks from a specified date. In those circumstances, Ms Hutchison, who appeared for the judgment creditor, adopted the sensible approach of agreeing that these proceedings be adjourned until the question of whether that appeal had in fact been lodged could be determined. The matter was stood over until [15 September 2025].

(italic emphasis in original)

17    On 11 August 2025, Deputy District Judge Ramsden of the County Court dismissed Ms St Clair’s appeal against the County Court judgment, and ordered that “[t]he judgment stands”. Ms St Clair has asserted that she was unable to attend that hearing because she received notification of it at a time that was too late to organise an appearance by video.

18    On 15 September 2025, the hearing of Ms St Clair’s amended notice of motion in the Supreme Court proceeding resumed before Justice Adams. Ms St Clair did not appear. Her Honour dismissed the amended notice of motion, with costs. Her Honour’s reasons for doing so are published as part of Irwin Mitchell LLP v St Clair. In the course of her reasons, Justice Adams stated at [5] to [24]:

5    Ms Chambers appears on behalf of the judgment creditor today. At 10:00am, there was no appearance by Ms St Clair, who is self-represented. I waited until 10:05am to come on to the Bench. When I came on to the Bench at 10:05am, there was still no appearance by Ms St Clair. My associate went outside the courtroom and called Ms St Clair’s name three times. There was no appearance by Ms St Clair.

6    I enquired of Ms Chambers as to whether she has had any communication with Ms St Clair since this matter was last in Court on 14 July 2025. Ms Chambers informed the Court that the last contact she had with Ms St Clair was in August. Ms Chambers’ instructions are that on 13 August 2025 Ms St Clair’s appeal against the judgment in the United Kingdom was dismissed.

7    I am satisfied, based on what Ms Chambers has informed the Court, that Ms St Clair is aware that her appeal in the United Kingdom was unsuccessful. I am also satisfied that Ms St Clair is aware of today’s proceedings because she was in Court on 14 July 2025 when I adjourned her motion part heard until today.

8    In the circumstances, I propose to dismiss Ms St Clair's notice of motion. I will, however, provide some background and further reasons for doing so.

9    In addition to the six affidavits sworn by the applicant, the respondent also relied upon affidavits on this motion as follows: an amended affidavit of Jacob Carswell-Doherty affirmed on 30 July 2024; an affidavit of service of Teigan Hutchison affirmed 26 November 2024; and an affidavit of Kelly Griffiths affirmed 17 March 2024.

10    I have read all of those affidavits and the chronology of these proceedings taken from those documents is as follows.

11    The applicant is a resident of New South Wales, and the respondent is a legal practitioner in the United Kingdom. By email dated 11 September 2014, the applicant sought to engage the respondent to represent her in relation to what she described as a “contentious probate case”. The next-in-time document before the Court was an email dated 28 June 2021 sent to Ms St Clair from a solicitor, Michael Walsh, on behalf of Irwin Mitchell. It enclosed a letter of engagement, terms and conditions, and other documents. Ms St Clair signed that document stating that she had read and accepted the terms and conditions set out in that letter, including the relevant fees, on 1 July 2021. A “without prejudice” letter dated 18 August 2021, which was rejected, was also relied upon by Ms St Clair.

12    The material shows that invoices for the legal services provided by Irwin Mitchell were sent to Ms St Clair at her address at 8 Boronia Road, Bullaburra New South Wales 2784. Those invoices were not paid by the plaintiff. On 7 October 2021, Irwin Mitchell rendered a bill in the amount of £12,927.45. That amount was not paid. By letter dated 6 December 2021, the County Court Money Claims Centre (“CCMCC”) advised Irwin Mitchell as to how to obtain payment outside the jurisdiction. A claim form was prepared and sent to Ms St Clair.

13    Robert Vassallo, a licensed process server, swore an affidavit on 16 February 2022 that on 25 January 2022 he served Ms St Clair with documents advising her that Irwin Mitchell had brought proceedings in the CCMCC seeking payment of the amounts outstanding.

14    At [3] of his affidavit, Mr Vassallo stated that when he served Ms St Clair he asked her whether her name was Anna M St Clair, and she replied that it was. On 18 March 2022, that affidavit of service was filed at the CCMCC. The applicant did not file any response to that claim and default judgment was subsequently entered.

15    Notice of that default judgment was sent to Ms St Clair at that same postal address on 30 January 2023 and notice of the default judgment was sent to her at her email address which appears to have remained the same throughout these proceedings.

16    Irwin Mitchell subsequently engaged the services of a Sydney lawyer in relation to registration of the judgment debt in New South Wales. Under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (“UCPR”) r 53.2(3), there is no requirement to give notice to a judgment debtor that a judgment will be registered.

17    On 8 August 2024, that judgment debt was registered in this Court pursuant to the Foreign Judgments Act.

18    On 9 October 2024, the judgment creditor’s office undertook a search of the Australian Electoral Roll which confirmed that Ms St Clair still resided at 8 Boronia Road, Bullaburra, and the following day they emailed her at her Hotmail address informing her that the judgment debt had been registered.

19    On 10 October 2024, Mr Sanchit Paul sent a letter to Ms St Clair by way of email advising her that she was indebted in the amount of $28,202.82 converted from pounds sterling. She was also advised of the accrual of interest. At the same time that that email was sent, a letter was sent by Express Post, including the relevant updated information.

20    Ms St Clair contacted Mr Paul on 24 October and again on 5 November 2024. On that same day, 5 November 2024, Ms St Clair emailed Teigan Hutchison, the solicitor who then had carriage of the matter at Irwin Mitchell’s Sydney law firm, seeking a stay of enforcement of the judgment debt in New South Wales until such time as a court in the United Kingdom considered her defence against the default judgment.

21    Although there was a significant degree of repetition in Ms St Clair’s affidavits, the nub of her complaint was that she denied ever being personally served with the original claim. She asserted that the process server was lying in his affidavit and made a number of other claims in relation to the propriety of actions of her former lawyers. She asserted that, contrary to her signing the fee arrangement, that it was in fact a “no win no fee” agreement. She made a number of complaints about the quality of the legal service provided to her, including that a settlement offer was made without her authorisation. Although she raised a number of matters she said she would rely upon in her defence of the proceedings in the United Kingdom, her main argument was that she had not been served.

22    Ms St Clair filed her amended motion before the Court on 6 January 2025. As I have already indicated, the orders she sought were that the registration be set aside and that there be a stay of execution so that she could defend the proceedings in the United Kingdom.

23    In relation to her argument that she had a defence in her proceedings in the United Kingdom, those proceedings were heard and dismissed. That event means that Ms St Clair's main argument in support of the orders she sought no longer applies.

24    All of the arguments that she raised at the hearing before me on 14 July 2025, both in writing and orally, went to the strength of her defence of the proceedings in the United Kingdom. There was also an argument that she was not properly served with notice of the proceedings in Australia. As to the latter of those contentions, having regard to the material before me, I am satisfied that she was properly served, but, as I have already stated, there was no requirement for her to be given notice under the UCPR that Irwin Mitchell intended to seek registration of a foreign judgment in this Court.

(italic emphasis in original)

19    No explanation was provided on this application as to why Ms St Clair did not attend the hearing on 15 September 2025.

20    On 25 September 2025, Ms St Clair filed a further notice of motion in the Supreme Court proceeding, seeking to set aside the registration of the County Court judgment.

21    That notice of motion was listed for hearing on 31 October 2025. On that day, Justice Faulkner in the Supreme Court allowed Ms St Clair to file a further version of the notice of motion, by which she sought the following orders:

1.     The judgment registered in the Supreme Court of New South Wales on 15 Sept 2025, in respect of proceedings originating from the County Court of Brighton, England, be set aside under section 7 of the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) and the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW).

2.     The registration of the foreign judgment be stayed, pending final determination of this motion.

3.     The matter be returned to the Civil National Business Centre (CNBC) Northampton, UK, the same court of origin that issued the default judgment 19-1-2023, for proper service and adjudication on the merits.

(italic emphasis in original)

22    His Honour dismissed that notice of motion with costs. The evidence on this application does not disclose his Honour’s reasons for doing so.

23    On 19 January 2026, the bankruptcy notice was issued at the request of Irwin Mitchell.

24    On 7 or 8 March 2026, Ms St Clair was served with the bankruptcy notice.

25    On or about 30 March 2026, Ms St Clair filed an application in this proceeding seeking various orders including an order setting aside the bankruptcy notice.

26    On 8 July 2026, District Judge Sandiford of the County Court heard an application by Ms St Clair to set aside the County Court judgment. Ms St Clair participated in that hearing. Judge Sandiford dismissed the application on that day. The learned Judge’s reasons for making that order are not in evidence. However, there is in evidence a detailed report prepared by the advocate who appeared on behalf of Irwin Mitchell concerning the events of that hearing, including the arguments that were made.

27    On or about 10 July 2026, Ms St Clair lodged an application for permission to appeal against the order made by District Judge Sandiford on 8 July 2026. The proposed grounds of appeal are:

1.    Error in Law: Misapplication of CPR 6.33 and Choice of Jurisdiction

The learned District Judge erred in law by ruling that a standard contractual choice of jurisdiction clause (Clause 19.4 of the Letter of Agreement) granted the Respondent a lawful gateway under CPR 6.33 to completely bypass the mandatory, sovereign diplomatic channels of the Hague Service Convention 1965. While CPR 6.33 permits a claimant to issue a claim form out of the jurisdiction without the court’s permission, it does not permit a claimant to substitute international treaty requirements with unagreed alternative domestic service methods.

2.    Error in Law: Validation of a Deceptive Form: N510 Gateway

The learned District Judge erred in law by treating the Respondent’s Form N510 as procedurally sound. The lower court failed to recognize that the Respondent deployed a deceptive Statement of Truth on Form N510 to certify a contractual alternative domestic service exemption, that was entirely absent from the face of the contract, thereby misleading the court’s administrative automated systems in order to bypass the Hague Service Convention regulations. supported by CPR 6.40, CPR 6.42, and CPR 6.43.

3.    Error in Fact: Irrational Weight of Evidence regarding the “Competent Server”

The learned District Judge arrived at a perverse and irrational finding of fact by ruling that the independent process server, Robert Vassallo, was a “competent server’” (under Section 10b) whose standard high-volume affidavit carried conclusive weight. In doing so, the lower court completely failed to weigh, analyze, or address the corroborated, cross-sworn, and uncontroverted written evidence of the Appellant and her co-habitant witness, Paul Muldoon, which explicitly confirmed that zero physical presence or personal service occurred at the residential address on 25 January 2022 at 7.15 am.

4.    Error in Fact: Failure to Identify a Facial Timeline Anachronism

The learned District Judge erred in fact by failing to identify that the process server’s affidavit was fundamentally unreliable, logically flawed, and a fabrication on its face. The affidavit explicitly declares under oath that the underlying claim form was commenced and processed in 2020 – a physical and chronological impossibility, given that the underlying retainer contract between the Appellant and Respondent was not executed until July 2021.

Conclusion

A default judgment entered where a claim form has not been legally served is an absolute nullity ab initio. Under CPR 13.2(a), the court holds zero judicial discretion and must set the default judgment aside as a matter of absolute right. The lower court’s failure to do so constitutes a profound violation of natural justice.

(bold and italic emphasis in original)

28    On 16 July 2026, Judicial Registrar Young heard Ms St Clair’s application in the present proceeding. As noted above, the application was dismissed.

29    On 23 July 2026, Ms St Clair filed the present application for review.

30    On 16 September 2026, orders were made in the United Kingdom concerning Ms St Clair’s application for permission to appeal against the order of District Judge Sandiford: (1) requiring her to file a transcript of the judgment; and (2) indicating that the appeal file would be put before a Civil Circuit Judge upon receipt of that transcript to consider whether permission to appeal could be granted on the papers.

C.    Consideration

31    The essence of Ms St Clair’s application as presented in her written and oral submissions is that the Court should make orders so as to preserve the status quo while she pursues her recently filed application for permission to appeal the decision dismissing her appeal against the County Court judgment. The focus in submissions was upon the application of the principle in Ahern v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Qld) [1987] FCA 312; (1987) 76 ALR 137 at 148 (Davies, Lockhart and Neaves JJ) that in general a Court exercising jurisdiction in bankruptcy should not proceed to sequestrate the estate of a debtor where an appeal is pending against the judgment relied on as the foundation of the bankruptcy proceeding provided that the appeal is based on genuine and arguable grounds.

32    In effect, Ms St Clair asks the court to set aside the bankruptcy notice because, she contends, this is an appropriate case in which the Court should go behind the judgment in order to determine whether in truth and reality a debt is due from Ms St Clair to Irwin Mitchell: see, e.g. Corney v Brien [1951] HCA 31; (1951) 84 CLR 343; Wren v Mahoney [1972] HCA 5; (1972) 126 CLR 212; and Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2017] HCA 28; (2017) 261 CLR 132. The power to go behind a judgment in this manner is usually a question addressed upon the hearing of a creditor’s petition for a sequestration order based upon the failure of the judgment debtor to comply with the bankruptcy notice. However, the power to go behind a judgment may be exercised on an application, such as the present, to set aside a bankruptcy notice: Olivieri v Stafford [1989] FCA 486; (1989) 24 FCR 413 at 430 to 431 (Gummow J); Xu v Wan Ze Property Development (Aust) Pty Ltd (in liq) (ACN 131 642 147) [2014] FCA 461; (2014) 315 ALR 523 at 533 [55] (Robertson J).

33    The principles informing the exercise of the Court’s discretion to go behind a judgment were conveniently summarised by Wigney J in Katter v Melhem (No 2) [2014] FCA 1176; (2014) 319 ALR 646 at 658 [69] to 660 [79]. In so far as is relevant to the present application, his Honour’s summary was as follows:

[69] The existence of a judgment is prima facie evidence of a debt: Corney v Brien (1951) 84 CLR 343 at 355; [1951] ALR 525 (Corney v Brien) per Fullagar J. However, a judgment is never conclusive in bankruptcy and the court has a discretion to “go behind” the judgment to investigate whether there was a good debt to support it: Corney v Brien at CLR 347 per Dixon, Williams, Webb, Kitto JJ, at 353–4 per Fullagar J.

[70] The court will not, however, inquire into the consideration for a judgment as a matter of course: Wren v Mahoney (1972) 126 CLR 212 at 222–3; [1972] ALR 307 per Barwick CJ. While the circumstances in which the court will inquire into the validity of a judgment debt are not closed (Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Jeans [2005] FCA 978 (Commonwealth Bank v Jeans) at [15]) and there is no inflexible rule (Re Wong; Ex parte Kitson (1979) 27 ALR 405; Chancliff Holdings Pty Ltd v Bell [1999] FCA 1708 (Chancliff) at [90]), it is possible to identify a number of guiding principles.

[71] First, the court looks with suspicion on consent judgments and default judgments: Corney v Brien at 348 per Dixon, Williams, Webb and Kitto JJ citing Latham CJ in Petrie v Redmond (1942) 13 ABC 44 at 48–9. Where the judgment in question is a default judgment, it appears that the court will always “go behind” the judgment if there is what it regards as a bona fide allegation that no real debt lay behind the judgment: Corney v Brien at 357–8 per Fullagar J.

[72] Second, if the judgment in question followed a full investigation at a trial at which both parties appeared, the court will not reopen the matter unless a prima facie case of fraud or collusion or miscarriage of justice is made out: Corney v Brien at 356–7 per Fullagar J. In Re Flatau; Ex parte Scotch Whisky Distillers Ltd (1888) 22 QBD 83 at 86, Fry LJ said: “this power has never, so far as I am aware, been extended to cases in which a judgment has been obtained after issues have been tried out before a [c]ourt”. In Corney v Brien, Fullagar J said (Corney v Brien at 358) that he had not been able to find any such case since Fry LJ made this statement in 1888.

…

[78] The particular circumstances of any given case may no doubt throw up other considerations relevant to whether the court should exercise its discretion to go behind a judgment. Where the judgment debtor seeks to go behind the judgment on particular grounds, it is difficult to see why it would not be a relevant consideration that those grounds could have been, but were not, raised in opposition to the judgment, or in an application to set aside the judgment. Parties are ordinarily bound by the way they have chosen to conduct litigation. The fact that, for whatever reason, a party did not put particular arguments before the court that made (or refused to set aside) the judgment does not mean that there was no relevant hearing on the merits: Commonwealth Bank v Jeans at [18]–[21]; Olivieri v Stafford at 424 per Beaumont J.

[79] The question whether the judgment is to be reopened or “gone behind” at all will usually involve some preliminary investigation of the merits of the attack of the judgment: Corney v Brien at 358. That question can and often is dealt with as a preliminary question: see for example Commonwealth Bank v Jeans. Once the court decides that it will go behind the judgment “the whole [of the] matter is open”: Corney v Brien at 358. Where it is legitimate to go behind a judgment entered after trial, there would effectively be no alternative but to retry the whole case.

(bold and italic emphasis in original)

34    In Dunkerley v Comcare [2019] FCA 1002, Justice Griffiths explained at [68]:

I turn now to summarise the principles relating to the circumstances in which the Court may go behind a judgment debt. It is generally accepted that a Court will accept a judgment as being conclusive of the existence of a debt, however, the Court has a discretion in an appropriate case to go behind a judgment debt to examine whether there is in truth consideration for it. The relevant principles may be summarised as follows:

(a)    The Court has the power in an appropriate case to go behind a judgment in an application to set aside a bankruptcy notice, but that power “is not readily exercised if there has been a substantive hearing of the matter on its merits by the court in which the judgment was granted” (see Xu v Wan Ze Property Development (Aust) Pty Ltd (in liq) [2014] FCA 461; 315 ALR 523 at [55] (Xu) per Robertson J).

(b)    In determining whether to go behind a judgment on which a bankruptcy notice is based, the Court will take into account similar considerations to those which apply when determining whether or not to go behind a judgment on the hearing of a creditor’s petition (see Xu at [55], [118]-[120] and [131] per Robertson J).

(c)    Although the Court has the power in an appropriate case to go behind a judgment on which a bankruptcy notice is based, the Court does not have the power to set aside the judgment itself and it is also important to bear in mind that the Court is not hearing an appeal from the judgment on which a bankruptcy notice is based (Xu at [57]).

(d)    A judgment debt is usually expected to provide the most reliable statement of debt humanly attainable because the ordinary processes of the adversarial system provide a practical guarantee of reliability. That is why there usually is no occasion in a bankruptcy proceeding to investigate whether the judgment debt is a true reflection of the underlying debt (Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2017] HCA 28; 261 CLR 132 (Ramsay) at [68] per Kiefel CJ, Keane and Nettle JJ).

(e)    Ms Dunkerley must establish special circumstances for the Court to go behind the underlying judgment debt (Petrie v Redmond [1943] St R Qd 71 at 75-76 per Latham CJ, with whom Rich and McTiernan JJ agreed and see also Ramsay at [69] per Kiefel CJ, Keane and Nettle JJ). As a matter of practical experience, special circumstances of this nature are usually only when there has been a consent judgment, default judgment or some other circumstance which means the judgment debtor was unable to present his or her case on its merits in the litigation leading to the judgment debt (Ramsay at [70] per Kiefel CJ, Keane and Nettle JJ).

(f)    The Court is reluctant to go behind a judgment once it has been the subject of adjudication by a Court, even if there were problems relating to such matters as the debtor’s representation or some other unusual feature. It is accepted, however, that the Court can inquire into the validity of a judgment where there is evidence that it has, for example, been obtained by fraud, collusion or a miscarriage of justice, but the debtor carries the onus of establishing that the fraud was “directly material to the judgment” (see Kirk v Ashdown [1999] FCA 522) and Emerson v Wreckair Pty Ltd (1992) 33 FCR 581 (Emerson) at 588). There may be other substantial reasons for going behind a judgment debt, however, in the absence of some evidence of fraud, collusion or miscarriage of justice, a court sitting in bankruptcy will rarely have substantial reasons to investigate whether the judgment debt was truly owed (Ramsay at [111] per Edelman J).

(g)    It is insufficient to set aside a bankruptcy notice merely because the debtor establishes that a judgment is irregular because, for example, the pleadings or proof that were offered were inadequate to support the judgment or the judgment is for the wrong amount (see, for example, Re Skaff; Ex parte Farrow Mortgage Services Pty Ltd (1993) 41 FCR 331 per Drummond J and Re Bedford; Ex parte H E Sleigh (Queensland) Pty Ltd (1967) 9 FLR 497 per Gibbs J).

(h)    Absent some good reason for doing so, a Court exercising bankruptcy jurisdiction should avoid embarking on a course which amounts to a re-trial of the issues that have been determined by another Court after a contested hearing. This is, particularly so where that other Court’s determination has been the subject of an appeal because the appeal is the appropriate form in which to review the correctness of the judgment (Emerson at 588).

(i)    A court exercising jurisdiction in a bankruptcy proceeding should not re-litigate on the same evidence, a dispute which has already been fully litigated in adversarial proceedings (Doggett v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2019] FCAFC 19 (Doggett) at [49] per Kerr, Davies and Thawley).

(bold and italic emphasis in original)

35    In the present case the relevant judgment is the Supreme Court judgment. It is that judgment which is the subject of the bankruptcy notice. See also the analysis of Judge Manousaridis in Kuhadas v Gomez [2014] FCCA 1130; (2014) 285 FLR 464 at 470 to 471 ([28] to [32]), which was undisturbed on appeal in Gomez v Kuhadas (No 2) [2015] FCA 561 (Gleeson J); and cited in part recently in Doyle v Cooper as Liquidator of NQ Minerals PLC (in liq), in the matter of Doyle (No 2) [2026] FCA 117 at [45] (Collier J).

36    I am not persuaded that this is an appropriate case for the Court to go behind the Supreme Court judgment. That is so for the following reasons.

37    First, Ms St Clair has twice attempted to set aside the Supreme Court judgment and has failed on each attempt. Justice Adams was unpersuaded, after considering the evidence before her Honour, that the registration of that judgment ought be set aside ([18] above). Justice Faulkner was also unpersuaded. No appeal has been filed against the orders made by Justice Adams or Justice Faulkner. The outcomes of these prior determinations as to whether the Supreme Court judgment should be set aside suggest strongly that there are no reasonably arguable grounds for going behind that judgment.

38    Secondly, this is underscored by the dismissal in the County Court of Ms St Clair’s appeal against the default judgment on 11 August 2025 and the dismissal of her further application to set aside the County Court judgment on 8 July 2026. With respect to the 8 July 2026 dismissal, the advocate’s record of the events of that hearing indicates that arguments that Ms St Clair wishes to raise on a further appeal were raised in substance by Ms St Clair on that appeal. In any event, Ms St Clair has had ample opportunity to raise any and all grounds upon which she wishes to rely (both in the United Kingdom and in Australia) and to the extent that she has previously failed to raise arguments that are now sought to be put, she is bound by the way that she has chosen to conduct the litigation: see Katter at 660 [78].

39    Thirdly, although the Supreme Court judgment is based upon the County Court judgment and the latter judgment is a default judgment, this is not a case in which either judgment should for that reason be treated with suspicion (cf. Corney at 348; Katter at [71]), in view of the unsuccessful challenges discussed in the previous two paragraphs.

40    Fourthly, the latest attempt to seek permission to appeal the County Court judgment does not detract from the matters set out in the previous three paragraphs. As Wilcox J explained in Samootin v Wagner [2006] FCA 945 at [15], the mere existence of unresolved litigation is itself insufficient, and the question remains whether the challenge to the judgment the subject of the bankruptcy notice is based on genuine and reasonable grounds. For the reasons explained above, the unsuccessful challenges to date suggest strongly that there are no reasonably arguable grounds for going behind the Supreme Court judgment.

41    Fifthly, there is no stay in place with respect to the Supreme Court judgment (or indeed the County Court judgment).

42    Sixthly, there is no suggestion of fraud, malice or collusion with respect to the Supreme Court judgment (or the County Court judgment).

43    Finally, I am not persuaded that the bankruptcy notice ought be set aside for reasons unrelated to going behind the judgment. Ms St Clair identified no such reasons.

44    Further, to the extent that the relief sought by Ms St Clair so as to preserve the status quo would have the effect of extending the time for compliance with the bankruptcy notice, such relief would be contrary to the interests of the general body of Ms St Clair’s creditors. It is in their interests that the date of the commission by her of any act of bankruptcy be as early as possible: see Byron v Southern Star Group Pty Ltd [1997] FCA 151; (1997) 73 FCR 264 at 270 (Lehane J); Sharpe v WH Bailey & Sons Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 921; (2014) 317 ALR 738 at 744 ([28] to [29]) (Gleeson J). Relatedly, as Justice Lehane explained in Byron at 270 (see also Sharpe at 744 [28]), the commission of an act of bankruptcy by dint of a failure to comply with the bankruptcy notice, albeit a serious matter, is not of the same order of gravity as the change of status brought about by the making of a sequestration order.

45    It follows that the bankruptcy notice should not be set aside.

46    For completeness, I note that Ms St Clair also submitted that in the absence of orders maintaining the status quo she would be prejudiced because she has causes of action in the United Kingdom that would vest in a trustee in bankruptcy upon the making of a sequestration order and the trustee may choose to compromise or abandon those causes of action. However, Ms St Clair’s contentions as to her causes of action are more appropriately dealt with on an application for a sequestration order and do not provide a basis to set aside the bankruptcy notice.

47    Relatedly, after judgment was reserved, Ms St Clair filed an affidavit which was said to be relevant to those causes of action and, after Irwin Mitchell objected to the receipt of that affidavit, I convened a short further hearing for the purpose of considering whether that affidavit should be received into evidence. Ms St Clair did not appear. Ms Knight, who appeared for Irwin Mitchell, relied upon written submissions which had been sent to Ms St Clair.

48    In light of the views expressed at [46] above that Ms St Clair’s contentions concerning her causes of action are more appropriately dealt with at the hearing of any application for a sequestration order and do not provide a basis to set aside the bankruptcy notice, it is not necessary to resolve this issue.

D.    Conclusion

49    For the foregoing reasons, the application for review should be dismissed, and the orders made by Judicial Registrar Young should be affirmed. There is no reason why costs should not follow the event. I will make orders accordingly.

Associate:

Dated:    15 October 2026