Federal Court of Australia

White Oak Commercial Finance Europe (Non-Levered) Ltd v Insurance Australia Ltd (Further Security for Costs) [2026] FCA 1496

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The applicant provide further security for the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the proceeding in the sum of $2,500,000.

2.    The applicant provide further security for the second, sixth and seventh respondents’ costs of and incidental to the proceeding in the sum of $5,500,000.

3.    The security for costs required by orders 1 and 2 be provided on or before 7 days after the date of these orders by way of electronic payment into the interest bearing account nominated by the District Registrar pursuant to order 6 of the orders made on 6 October 2026, with the amount in order 1 to be held in favour of the first respondent and the amount in order 2 to be held in favour of the second, sixth and seventh respondents.

4.    If the applicant fails to comply with any of orders 1 to 3 above, the proceeding be stayed pursuant to rule 19.01(1)(c) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) until further order.

5.    The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to the amended interlocutory applications dated 23 September 2026 and 29 September 2026.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THAWLEY J:

1    These reasons concern applications for security for costs made by BCC/TM and IAL against White Oak, in the amounts of $10.9 million and $5.07 million respectively. Those parties are defined fully in the notation to the orders in White Oak Commercial Finance Europe (Non-Levered) Ltd v Insurance Australia Ltd (IA Costs) [2026] FCA 919. There was no dispute that an order for security for costs in favour of both BCC/TM and IAL was appropriate. The only issues concerned the amount of security and the form of security.

2    BCC/TM’s and IAL’s applications were heard on 6 October 2026, the day before commencement of the trial expected to run until the end of the year. At the conclusion of submissions, I considered that at least $2.5 million of security for each of BCC/TM and IAL was appropriate and orders were made for payment of those amounts into an appropriate account within 7 days. These reasons explain why I consider the total security which should be provided is $8 million for BCC/TM and $5 million for IAL.

QUANTUM

BCC/TM’s estimate of costs

3    BCC/TM’s estimate of costs was addressed in three affidavits of Ms Hartwell. Ms Hartwell’s final estimate comprised past costs (from 1 August 2026 to 22 September 2026) of $2,908,718 and future costs (from 23 September 2026) of $8,063,850, producing a total of $10,972,568.

4    BCC/TM included in its estimate costs incurred from 1 August 2026, being shortly before it notified White Oak (by letter dated 5 August 2026) that it would be seeking further security for costs. Past costs consisted of:

    $4,664,177 billed up to 25 August 2026: Hartwell 2 at [29(a)];

    approximately $2.2 million in Kennedys’ unbilled work in progress (WIP) from 25 August 2026 to 22 September 2026: Hartwell 2 at [29(b)]; and

    estimated counsel WIP of $1,983,000 for the latter part of August and September 2026: Hartwell 2 at [30] to [31].

5    Because most of those costs were incurred before the settlement of the Credit Suisse proceedings, Ms Hartwell attributed 40% of them to White Oak: Hartwell 2 at [44].

6    Ms Hartwell allowed a reduction on the basis of past costs being recoverable only on a party and party basis. She applied a 30% reduction to solicitors’ fees and a 5% reduction to counsel fees and disbursements: Hartwell 2 at [23], [44] to [45].

7    The resulting past costs totalled $2,908,718, derived by taking the amount of $3,538,871 (40% of total past costs) and applying the 30% and 5% recoverability reductions in respect of solicitor and counsel fees: Hartwell 2 at [29] to [31], [44] to [45]; MFI-1. As events transpired, past costs were exceeded: Hartwell 3 at [10].

8    As to future costs, Ms Hartwell estimated BCC/TM’s costs from 23 September 2026 to the conclusion of the trial at $8,063,850. The amount of $8,063,850 comprised:

    Kennedys London: $1,800,211;

    Kennedys Australia: $2,044,342;

    counsel: $3,914,750; and

    disbursements (printing and eTrial fees): $304,547.

9    The estimate involved multiplying the relevant hourly rates of the various solicitors and counsel by the estimated number and length of working days for each person. The estimate assumed:

(a)    two weeks of further preparation from 23 September 2026 and a hearing lasting approximately ten weeks: Hartwell 2 at [42(a)];

(b)    approximately 40 hearing days, together with work on non-sitting days: Hartwell 2 at [33] to [34];

(c)    seven-hour days for solicitors and ten-hour days for counsel: Hartwell 2 at [32] to [33];

(d)    full or substantial utilisation of three senior counsel and part of the junior counsel team, with work distributed across that team: Hartwell 2 at [32] to [33]; and

(e)    that White Oak, as the sole remaining applicant, would be responsible for all costs incurred from the settlement of the Credit Suisse proceedings, rather than only an apportioned share: Hartwell 2 at [38] to [43].

10    Ms Hartwell did not apply a recoverability discount to reflect party and party costs for future costs. She considered that the majority of the future costs would be incurred during the trial period. In her experience, trial costs did not require the standard discount ordinarily applied to preparation costs: Hartwell 2 at [42(b)].

11    Ms Hartwell regarded her estimate as conservative because the assumed working days might understate the hours actually worked and work would be necessary on non-sitting days. Also, some disbursements had not been included, including witness travel: Hartwell 2 at [33], [37].

12    In oral submissions, BCC/TM relied on an aide memoire which summarised its estimates and included a discount for future costs by applying the same 30% and 5% reductions which had been applied to the past costs of the solicitors and counsel: MFI-1. If one applied the 30% and 5% discounts to both past and future costs, the resulting total was $9,623,465.

Summary of White Oak’s principal submissions on BCC/TM’s estimate

13    White Oak submitted that BCC/TM’s claim should be reduced in three stages: removal or reduction of particular costs; application of a “recoverability discount” to reflect recovery on a party and party basis; and a further “broad-brush” discount which White Oak submitted was ordinarily applied to the estimate made on a party and party basis.

Reduction or removal of costs

14    Costs between 1 and 25 August 2026: White Oak submitted that security should not be allowed for costs incurred between 1 and 25 August 2026, because those costs had already been billed when BCC/TM made its first application (dated 28 August 2026) and BCC/TM did not then seek security for them. White Oak says that no explanation has been given for the later change of position (in BCC/TM’s amended application dated 23 September 2026) and that the subsequent Credit Suisse settlement did not increase costs already incurred in August: WOS at [24].

15    WIP between 27 August and 22 September 2026: White Oak submitted that the WIP figures are approximate, are not satisfactorily broken down between solicitors and counsel, and do not identify the component attributable to Kennedys London.

16    White Oak submitted that any allowance for this period should be capped at $500,000: WOS at [25].

17    Past costs: White Oak submitted that the relative complexity of the Credit Suisse proceedings in comparison to the White Oak proceeding suggested that it was not appropriate to attribute as much as 40% of past costs to White Oak’s claims while Credit Suisse remained a party: WOS at [38].

18    Kennedys London: White Oak submitted that the estimated $1.8 million for Kennedys London fees should be removed. It submitted that English solicitors’ fees would not be recoverable as costs in proceedings in this Court, at least at anything other than a law clerk rate of between $140 and $290 – see: Jadwan Pty Ltd v Rae & Partners (A Firm) (No 7) [2022] FCA 1174; T51.31. In this regard, White Oak observed that: none of its claims were governed by English law; no adequate reason had been given for the London team’s involvement; and Kennedys London’s converted rates were materially higher than those of Kennedys Australia: WOS at [26].

19    Size of team: White Oak contended that BCC/TM’s solicitor team was disproportionately large given the remaining issues in the proceeding since the settlement of the Credit Suisse proceedings. BCC/TM’s solicitor team involves approximately 23 fee earners working an estimated 985 full days for a trial expected to occupy 35 hearing days: WOS at [26].

20    Senior counsel: White Oak accepted that three senior counsel may have been appropriate when the respondents faced claims exceeding $7 billion, made in 11 proceedings being heard together, but submitted that it was no longer reasonable or proportionate to maintain three senior counsel for the only remaining claim, being White Oak’s claim.

21    White Oak submitted that it was appropriate to remove, from the estimate of costs appropriate for security, the cost of the “middle” senior counsel, while leaving two senior counsel fully engaged: WOS at [27] to [28].

Recoverability discount

22    White Oak submitted that it was not appropriate to allow for 100% of estimated future costs. It criticised Ms Hartwell’s assertion that trial costs need not attract the standard recoverability discount to reflect party and party costs, particularly given the number and rates of solicitors and counsel, and referred in this regard to competing evidence given by Ms John: WOS at [19], [29]; John 1 at [42].

23    White Oak proposed notional recovery rates of 60% for solicitor fees and 90% for counsel fees: WOS at [42(2)].

Broad-brush discount

24    White Oak made a number of submissions relevant to a “broad-brush” assessment and application of a discount to estimate party and party costs.

25    Trial-length: White Oak submitted that BCC/TM’s estimate did not sufficiently take into account that the trial is likely to be shorter than presently estimated. In White Oak’s submission, it is unlikely that every witness will be called. It submitted that a trial plan generally reflects the greatest estimate advanced for each aspect of the trial and that some allowance should be made for the realistic prospect that the hearing will be shorter. It proposed removing two weeks to take this matter into account. This would reduce the presently scheduled hearing days by more than 25%: WOS at [32] to [34].

26    Existing security: White Oak noted that BCC/TM already held security from White Oak which covered the period until the end of trial. That security was fixed at a time when White Oak was allocated only 10% of the costs of a larger trial involving other applicants: the GBAG parties (7 proceedings) and the Credit Suisse parties (3 proceedings). White Oak submitted that this should be recognised by applying a further 10% discount to total estimated costs: WOS at [35].

27    Common interests and duplication: White Oak submitted that BCC/TM and IAL are, for most practical purposes, in the same interest. It submitted that, with few exceptions, their central arguments are closely aligned, and they should divide cross-examination and oral argument rather than duplicate them. White Oak submitted that this bore upon the reasonableness of maintaining six senior counsel between the two respondent groups: WOS at [36].

28    Proportionality and reduced complexity: White Oak submitted that the structure and size of BCC/TM’s defence team (and that of IAL) were implemented when the claims against them exceeded $7 billion. It noted that the teams had not been materially reduced following settlement of the GBAG and Credit Suisse proceedings. It submitted that they are no longer proportionate to White Oak’s remaining claims: WOS at [37].

29    White Oak submitted that its claim is not just smaller, but also more straightforward. It concerns only 29 receivables, one finance program and one policy, whereas the Credit Suisse proceedings involved more than 400 notes, approximately 4,700 receivables, 17 programs and three policies.

30    Nature of the remaining issues: White Oak submitted that the disputes of primary fact are relatively confined, the case is largely documentary, and the issues are principally legal or concern the characterisation of primary facts. It also submitted that the extensive written openings have already addressed most of the critical issues, reducing the likely cost of preparing closing submissions: WOS at [39].

31    White Oak’s quantification: White Oak submitted that, after removing Kennedys London and one senior counsel, applying recoverability rates of 60% and 90% for solicitors and counsel, and allowing only $500,000 for the relevant past-cost period, a further global discount of 30% to 50% should be applied to take account of the various matters the subject of its submissions. Applying these reductions, the resulting range for further security for BCC/TM was between $2,469,940 and $3,257,916: WOS at [42].

IAL’s estimate of costs

32    IAL’s estimate of costs was addressed in two affidavits of Ms Prinsloo. Her final estimate was based on costs from 27 August 2026 (the day the application for security for costs was first filed) until the end of the trial. It is in part for this reason that IAL’s estimate is lower than BCC/TM’s estimate. Ms Prinsloo’s estimate comprised an apportioned component for the period before the Credit Suisse proceedings settled and an unapportioned component thereafter.

33    Ms Prinsloo estimated IAL’s costs by reference to the actual level of expenditure during an earlier period of intensive trial preparation. She then extrapolated from those costs to estimate the costs of the remaining trial preparation period: Prinsloo 1 at [37].

34    Ms Prinsloo applied that methodology for the period from 27 August to 24 September 2026, attributing to White Oak, after apportionment, a total of $1,068,489.29, comprising:

    $559,311.56 in Allens’ professional fees incurred or estimated to be incurred from 27 August to 24 September 2026: Prinsloo 2 at [15]; and

    $509,177.73 in counsel’s fees for the same period: Prinsloo 2 at [16].

35    Ms Prinsloo treated IAL’s costs from 25 September 2026 to the end of trial as wholly referable to the White Oak proceeding, in light of the settlement of the Credit Suisse proceedings. She estimated IAL’s combined solicitor and counsel fees for that period at $5,697,016.27: Prinsloo 2 at [26]; see also Prinsloo 1 at [33] to [40].

36    The total estimated costs, before any discount to reflect recovery on a party and party basis, were therefore $6,765,505.56.

37    Ms Prinsloo considered that IAL could reasonably expect to recover between 60% and 70% of billed solicitor fees and 100% of counsel fees, having regard to the complexity of the proceeding: Prinsloo 2 at [31]; see also Prinsloo 1 at [52] to [54]. After applying these discounts, IAL sought $5.07 million in further security.

Summary of White Oak’s principal submissions on IAL’s estimate

38    White Oak submitted that IAL’s estimate was more reasonable than BCC/TM’s, but that it still required material reductions: WOS at [49].

39    Trial-preparation costs: White Oak challenged the claimed trial-preparation costs of approximately $1.351 million on two bases. First, the costs to 24 September 2026 depended upon attributing to White Oak 40% of IAL’s costs as against all of the relevant applicants. White Oak submitted that an allocation of 40% was disproportionate to the comparative value and complexity of its claim: WOS at [50], referring also to [37] to [38]. Secondly, White Oak submitted that the extrapolation from solicitor and counsel costs during periods when the parties were preparing for earlier trial commencement dates (before the Credit Suisse settlement) was an unreliable basis for projecting the cost of preparing White Oak’s case alone: WOS at [50].

40    White Oak submitted that most trial preparation costs should already have been incurred before the Credit Suisse settlement and that IAL should receive no more than $500,000 for trial preparation: WOS at [51].

41    Counsel’s fees: Although Ms Prinsloo applied a recoverability discount to solicitor fees, she assumed 100% recovery of counsel’s fees. White Oak submitted that this was unrealistic, particularly given the rates charged. It proposed a 90% recovery rate for trial counsel’s fees: WOS at [52], [57(2)].

42    In reply submissions, IAL clarified that its lead senior counsel would not be appearing at the hearing, meaning that only two senior counsel would appear.

43    Proportionality of IAL’s resourcing: White Oak submitted that IAL had continued with the same numbers in its solicitor and counsel team which had been assembled for the Greensill litigation when it was larger in amounts claimed and complexity. It emphasised that Ms Prinsloo’s calculations extrapolated from costs incurred before the Credit Suisse settlement and were based on an earlier estimate relating to a trial of both White Oak’s proceeding and the Credit Suisse proceedings. White Oak submitted that those historical expenditure levels should not simply be carried forward into the remaining White Oak proceeding: WOS at [53].

44    Common interests and duplication: White Oak repeated the substance of its submissions directed at BCC/TM concerning the common interest between BCC/TM and IAL: WOS at [54], referring to [36].

45    Trial-length: White Oak repeated the substance of its submissions directed at BCC/TM concerning the length of trial: WOS at [55], referring to [33] to [34].

46    Lack of explanation: White Oak submitted that the components underlying Ms Prinsloo’s estimate were not sufficiently exposed to permit their individual reasonableness to be assessed. According to White Oak, that should be taken into account by making a larger approximate or global discount: WOS at [46], [49], [56].

47    Absence of a further broad-brush discount: White Oak noted that IAL sought the entirety of its estimated recoverable (party and party) costs, without any further global discount. It contrasted this with IAL’s earlier application, in which the security sought was approximately 75% of estimated recoverable costs: WOS at [48], [56].

48    White Oak’s quantification: White Oak proposed: replacing IAL’s claimed $1,351,282.08 for trial preparation with $500,000; allowing 90% rather than 100% recovery of trial counsel’s fees; and applying a further global discount of 30% to 50% to trial costs. This produces a range of $2.27 million to $2.978 million in further security for IAL: WOS at [56] to [57].

Conclusions on quantum

49    Taking into account BCC/TM’s estimate of costs, and the various criticisms made of that estimate by White Oak, an appropriate amount of security with respect to BCC/TM is $8 million.

50    I have determined the amount of security in a “broad brush” and somewhat impressionistic way, without attempting to determine the actual amount likely to be recoverable on assessment – see: Bryan E Fencott & Assocs Pty Ltd v Eretta Pty Ltd [1987] FCA 102; (1987) 16 FCR 497 at 515 (French J); Allstate Life Insurance Co v ANZ Banking Group Ltd [1995] FCA 1778; (1995) 134 ALR 187 at 199–201 (Lindgren J).

51    I have taken into account each of the matters raised by White Oak, but make specific mention of some of them below. Some of the matters raised by White Oak are addressed in the context of addressing IAL’s application.

52    In my view, it is appropriate to take into account costs from when BCC/TM raised the issue of further security and I note that this is one reason why the security sought by IAL is significantly less than that sought by BCC/TM.

53    I have taken into account that notification that security for costs would be sought was given on 5 August 2026. BCC/TM is not precluded from seeking security for those costs on the basis that, before amending its application, it had not claimed an amount in respect of those costs.

54    I have taken into account White Oak’s contentions concerning the fees of Kennedys London about whether, and to what extent, those fees would be recoverable as costs in the proceedings or as disbursements – see: Jadwan. I express no concluded view about whether those fees are recoverable, or on what basis, but consider the argument about those fees sufficient to warrant a notional discount in fixing an appropriate amount for security in a “broad brush” way. The future fees in respect of Kennedys London were quantified as $1,800,211 before any discount for recoverability.

55    The amount of $2,908,718 for past fees includes an allowance for past solicitors’ fees and I have assumed that some of those fees relate to Kennedys London, although the evidence was not clear about this.

56    White Oak submitted that, when the teams representing IAL and BCC/TM were combined, those respondents’ essentially overlapping interests were being addressed by six senior counsel, 11 junior counsel, 23 fee earners from Kennedys and 31 fee earners from Allens.

57    As to this submission, first, it is unavoidable that there are two teams because IAL’s and BCC/TM’s interests materially diverge even though they have a common interest in defending the claims brought by White Oak. Secondly, the size of the teams is not particularly unusual given the factual issues in dispute and the fact that, to the extent all the relevant lawyers are working at the same time, they will be attending to different tasks, some in court and some out of court.

58    An allied submission was made that BCC/TM and IAL had spent more than $62 million in the 12 months to July 2026, which exceeded the principal amount of loss White Oak claims in its no-transaction case, excluding interest.

59    As to this submission, first, that was an intensive period during the proceedings, at a time when there were 11 sets of proceedings with claims totalling over $7 billion. Secondly, the amount does not exceed, or come near, the amount White Oak actually seeks. Thirdly, those past fees do not suggest that the respondents’ estimates of future fees are unreasonable.

60    I do not consider that three senior counsel for BCC/TM is unwarranted. Context is important in this regard. The counsel team was assembled at a time when the proceedings as a whole were more complex, involving some 25,000 pages of pleadings. It is evident from management of the case that there has been a degree of specialisation within the existing BCC/TM counsel team. Removing one senior counsel shortly before trial would require other counsel to increase work in order to reperform the work of the removed counsel. Not only would this come with a cost, but it assumes that there would be sufficient time for that to occur.

61    I have taken into account that party and party costs are likely to be recovered in respect of future work, subject to any special costs orders, and considered White Oak’s criticisms in this regard, but I have not aimed for a figure less than the amount which might be recovered on assessment or even for the low end of the range which might be recovered. In a case such as the present, I consider the approach adopted by Parker J in Les & Zelda Investments Pty Ltd v Whitehaven Coal Ltd [2020] NSWSC 1091 at [86] and Shariff J in ACN 117 641 004 Pty Ltd (in liq) v S&P Global, Inc (No 3) [2024] FCA 1238 at [15(c)] and [66] to be appropriate.

62    Taking into account IAL’s estimate of costs, and the various criticisms made of that estimate by White Oak, an appropriate amount of security with respect to IAL is $5 million.

63    As with BCC/TM’s application, I have determined the amount of security in a “broad brush” and somewhat impressionistic way. I have taken into account each of the matters raised by White Oak. Some of those matters have been addressed above in addressing the criticisms of BCC/TM’s estimate. I make specific mention of others below.

64    I accept as reasonable Ms Prinsloo’s allocation to White Oak of 40% of costs before 24 September 2026, having regard to her consideration of: the common issues between the parties (then including Credit Suisse); the number and significance of issues which primarily relate to White Oak (namely, issues relating to the claim for indemnity, including Mr Brereton’s authority); and the number of witnesses proposed to be called by each party: Prinsloo 1 at [50]. I note a similar allocation question arises in relation to BCC/TM’s application – see [17] above.

65    I consider IAL’s estimate of party and party costs from 27 August 2026 to be reasonable in light of the likely length and complexity of the proceedings. IAL’s estimate is possibly on the conservative side given it used a 60% recovery rate for solicitors’ fees, it omitted witness-related disbursements and its actual costs have exceeded earlier estimates.

66    It is true that the hearing is likely to be shorter and less complex than when 11 sets of proceedings were to be heard together, but that does not mean that the proceedings are now short and simple. The pleadings still total over 2,000 pages.

67    White Oak maintains claims which are legally and factually complex, in some respects more so than the claims which had been advanced by GBAG and Credit Suisse, at least in the last formulation of their claims before settlement. The settlement removed Credit Suisse’s specific reliance and loss issues, but it did not materially alter the policy indemnity claims which White Oak continued to press after both GBAG and Credit Suisse had abandoned their indemnity claims. White Oak’s recently filed reply raises additional factual and legal issues. White Oak’s non-disclosure and misrepresentation cases require consideration of risks extending beyond the 29 receivables specific to White Oak’s case.

68    White Oak relied on the National Guide to Counsel Fees, reflecting the position of counsel in July 2013, in submitting that the rates of some senior counsel were high. The rates in the Guide are obviously outdated: GGPG Pty Ltd v Golden Eagle Property Group Pty Ltd (No 3) [2026] FCA 297 at [16] to [20]. The fees charged by all counsel are within the range commonly encountered in litigation of this kind and are reasonable.

69    I have not applied a further discount after discounting for recoverability being on a party and party basis, as urged by White Oak. I do not consider such an approach warranted in litigation of this kind. As with the security sought by BCC/TM, I have adopted the approach taken by Parker J in Les & Zelda at [86], applied by Shariff J in S&P Global at [15(c)] and [66].

70    The total security required from White Oak (in respect of IAL and BCC/TM) is not disproportionate to the size of the litigation, noting that the trial is expected to continue for the balance of the year and that the claim is for US$120 million, plus roughly six years of pre-judgment interest. In making that observation, I have taken into account the existing security, including the fact that the existing security caters to a degree for the costs of trial. That security was agreed at a time when GBAG and Credit Suisse also provided security for their considerably larger claims.

FORM OF SECURITY

71    White Oak proposed an undertaking to maintain an appropriate cash fund in the United Kingdom. It contended that this would be adequate because an Australian costs judgment could be readily enforced in the United Kingdom.

72    White Oak did not suggest that an order for security in the form sought by IAL and BCC/TM would stultify the proceeding. One or more entities behind White Oak stand to gain from the litigation and, I infer, are funding the litigation. There is no reason they should not be economically exposed should White Oak fail in its claims and good reason why they should be so exposed.

73    BCC/TM and IAL submitted that White Oak’s proposal did not constitute effective security because it created no segregated fund and depended upon continuing compliance by an impecunious foreign special-purpose vehicle in run-off. Compliance with an undertaking in Australia by a foreign company in run-off should not be assumed. They observed that security on the basis of overseas assets was generally only ordered in relation to substantial businesses or where there were sufficient fixed assets which were not readily dissipated – see: APFC No 1 Corporation v Insurance Australia Limited [2024] NSWSC 534; DIF III Global Investment Fund LP v BBLP LLC [2016] VSC 401; Derma Pen LLC v Biosoft (Australia) Pty Ltd (Security for Costs) [2022] FCA 885; Maxim’s Caterers Limited v Magnona Pty Ltd (No 1) [2010] FCA 450; Berry v Inovia Security Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 357; CME Blasting & Mining Equipment Ltd v Rock Tool Refurbishment Solutions Pty Ltd [2021] FCA 160. They sought payment into Court or an acceptable bank guarantee.

74    White Oak submitted that, if its proposed undertaking was not regarded as sufficient, the security should be paid into Court, rather than being provided by bank guarantee.

75    Security should be paid into Court for the reasons advanced by BCC/TM and IAL.

CONCLUSION

76    For these reasons, further security for costs will be ordered and White Oak should pay the costs of BCC/TM’s and IAL’s amended interlocutory applications.

Associate:

Dated:    9 October 2026

SCHEDULE OF PARTIES