Federal Court of Australia

Haywood v Comcare [2026] FCA 1483

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The Respondent’s objection to competency be upheld.

2.    The appeal be dismissed as incompetent.

3.    The Applicant pay the costs of the Respondent, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

HESPE J:

1    The applicant seeks to appeal the refusal of an application for an extension of time by a judge of this Court: Haywood v Comcare [2026] FCA 773 (Younan J). The primary judge dismissed the applicant’s application for an extension of time to appeal a decision of the then Administrative Appeals Tribunal dated 31 August 2016. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of the respondent made on 5 September 2014 to deny the applicant’s claim for compensation under s 14 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth).

2    On 24 July 2026, the applicant filed a notice of appeal.

3    On 7 August 2026, the respondent filed a notice of objection to competency, alleging that by reason of s 24(1AA)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act), the appeal is incompetent on the basis that the Court does not have appellate jurisdiction to determine an appeal from a judgment of a single judge of the Court in relation to a request for an extension of time.

CONSIDERATION

4    In refusing the application to extend time, the primary judge was exercising the Court’s original jurisdiction under s 20(1) of the FCA Act.

5    An appeal is a “creature of statute”: Dwyer v Calco Timbers Pty Ltd [2008] HCA 13; (2008) 234 CLR 124 at [2]. The statutory right of appeal from judgments of this Court constituted by a single judge exercising the original jurisdiction of the Court is conferred in s 24(1)(a) of the FCA Act:

(1)    Subject to this section and to any other Act, whether passed before or after the commencement of this Act (including an Act by virtue of which any judgments referred to in this section are made final and conclusive or not subject to appeal), the Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine:

(a)    appeals from judgments of the Court constituted by a single Judge exercising the original jurisdiction of the Court;

…

6    There are limits to the statutory right of appeal. This includes s 24(1AA)(a) which is in the following terms:

(1AA)    An appeal must not be brought from a judgment referred to in paragraph (1)(a), (d) or (e) if the judgment is:

(a)    a determination of an application of the kind mentioned in subsection 20(3);

7    By reason of s 20(3)(b), “a determination of an application of the kind mentioned in s 20(3)” includes an application “for an extension of time within which to institute proceedings in the Court”.

8    The Full Court in Praljak v Office of the Australian Information Commissioner [2025] FCAFC 126; (2025) 311 FCR 178 (Mortimer CJ, Colvin and Thawley JJ) confirmed that the effect of s 24(1AA)(a) is to preclude appeals from “a determination of an application of the kind mentioned” in s 20(3) irrespective of whether the orders made by a single judge were in a matter in which the original jurisdiction of the Court was to be exercised by a Full Court.

9    The applicant submits that the FCA Act is qualified by the Magna Carta. That submission is without merit and is rejected. The Magna Carta does not override or qualify an Act of the Commonwealth Parliament: Chia Gee v Martin [1905] HCA 70; (1905) 3 CLR 649 at 653.

10    It follows that the combined effect of s 24(1AA)(a) and s 20(3)(b) is that the applicant has no right of appeal and no right to seek leave to appeal a judgment refusing an extension of time, and that the proposed appeal is not competent.

DISPOSITION

11    For the above reasons, the proposed appeal is not competent. The respondent’s objection to competency is allowed and the appeal is to be dismissed with costs.

Associate:

Dated:    7 October 2026