Federal Court of Australia

ISGroup Pty Ltd v Mellon [2026] FCA 1482

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    Pursuant to ss 1337H(2)(a) and 1337M(a) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), this proceeding is transferred to the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

2.    The applicants are to pay the respondents' costs of the interlocutory process filed on 11 August 2026 to be taxed if not agreed.

3.    The costs of this proceeding are otherwise reserved to the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

VANDONGEN J:

1    The applicants, ISGroup Pty Ltd and ISG Shared Services Pty Ltd, have commenced this proceeding against a former director and employee of ISGroup, Roy David Mellon, a current director and employee of ISGroup, Peter John Rullo, and an employee of ISG Shared Services, Alexander Rullo (collectively, the Respondents). In summary, it is alleged that in late April 2026, and without authority or permission, the Respondents gained access to premises occupied by ISGroup and took certain information and property belonging to both ISGroup and ISG Shared Services (together, the Applicants). In those circumstances the Applicants seek injunctive and declaratory relief, together with orders requiring the Respondents to deliver up upon oath the information and property that is alleged to have been taken.

2    Six other proceedings have been commenced in the Supreme Court of Western Australia (Supreme Court). Almost all of the parties to this proceeding are also a party to at least one of the Supreme Court proceedings. The Respondents now apply by interlocutory process for an order under s 1337H of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) that this proceeding be transferred to the Supreme Court.

3    For the following reasons I am of the view that the discretion conferred by s 1337H(2) of the Corporations Act should be exercised in favour of transferring this proceeding to the Supreme Court.

The circumstances in which the Respondents seek an order under s 1337H of the Corporations Act

4    The following summary is drawn from the concise statements that have been filed in this proceeding, as well as from the affidavit material on which the parties rely. In that respect the Respondents rely on an affidavit affirmed by Taylor Jade Saggers, as well as three further affidavits affirmed by Cameron James Maxton Dunlop. Both Ms Saggers and Mr Dunlop are employed by Bennett, a firm of solicitors that act on behalf of the Respondents. The Applicants rely on two affidavits affirmed by Caitlin Grace Hughes, a solicitor employed by Clayton Utz who act on behalf of the Applicants.

5    ISGroup is the parent company of ISG Shared Services. The parent company of ISGroup is a company called PG Rocket Holdings Pty Ltd. All of the A Class shares in PG Rocket are, in turn, held by a company called Phenna Group Australia Pty Ltd (Phenna). The B Class shares in PG Rocket are held by various entities, including those controlled by Mr Mellon and Mr P Rullo. Mr Mellon is a former director and employee of ISGroup, having been removed as a director and terminated as an employee on 24 April 2026. Mr Mellon is also a director of PG Rocket. Mr P Rullo is currently a director and employee of ISGroup, a director of ISG Shared Services and a director of PG Rocket. Mr A Rullo is currently an employee of ISG Shared Services.

6    In this proceeding it is alleged that, on 26 April 2026, the Respondents accessed premises occupied by ISGroup and, without authorisation or permission, took away with them documents and other items, including encrypted hard drives containing a backup of the email and OneDrive accounts of Mr Mellon and Mr P Rullo. It is also alleged that between at least 26 April 2026 and 28 April 2026, Mr A Rullo, acting at the request and knowledge of either or both Mr P Rullo and Mr Mellon, used his account to access corporate email accounts of other ISGroup employees. According to the Applicants, the information that was obtained in this way was confidential and commercially sensitive.

7    The Applicants contend that, by engaging in this conduct, the Respondents contravened ss 182 and 183 of the Corporations Act and also breached the fiduciary duties they owed to either or both of the Applicants. It is further alleged that one or more of the Respondents were involved in contraventions of ss 182 and 183, for the purposes of s 79 of the Corporations Act, and that they were knowing assistants in the breaches of fiduciary obligations. On that basis, the Applicants seek injunctive relief, delivery up of the documents and other items that were taken on 26 April 2026, and declarations of the Respondents' contraventions, breaches and involvement.

8    There are several other proceedings that are currently on foot in the Supreme Court.

9    The first of those proceedings is CIV 1553 of 2026, which is between Mr Mellon as plaintiff and ISGroup as defendant (Mellon Employment Proceeding). In that proceeding Mr Mellon claims damages on the ground that his employment with ISGroup was wrongfully terminated.

10    A statement of claim has been filed in the Mellon Employment Proceeding. Relevantly, in the statement of claim Mr Mellon alleges that ISGroup wrongfully summarily terminated his employment agreement with ISGroup. Mr Mellon pleads that he accepted ISGroup's repudiatory breach of his employment agreement and terminated that agreement. Particulars of his acceptance of the alleged repudiatory breach are given in the statement of claim, which include that, on or around 26 April 2026, Mr Mellon attended ISGroup's offices to collect personal items and return a laptop and an iPad.

11    A defence has been filed in the Mellon Employment Proceeding. By that defence ISGroup denies, amongst other matters, that Mr Mellon accepted any repudiatory breach by ISGroup of his employment agreement. The defence also pleads the reasons why ISGroup says it terminated Mr Mellon's employment. None of those reasons include that Mr Mellon attended at the premises of ISGroup on 26 April 2026 or that he acted without authority or permission.

12    Mr Mellon has filed a reply in the Mellon Employment Proceeding.

13    The second proceeding, which was commenced on the same day as the Mellon Employment Proceeding, is CIV 1554 of 2026 (Investment Agreement Proceeding). That proceeding was commenced by Land Surveys Pty Ltd, as trustee for the P Rullo Family Trust, and Laura Lee Mellon, as trustee for the Shawshack Investment Trust, as first and second plaintiffs, respectively. There are 11 defendants to those proceedings. Amongst those defendants are PG Rocket and Phenna, as well as Phenna's parent company, Phenna Group Holdings Limited (Phenna Holdings). The other defendants are an employee of Phenna who holds redeemable preference shares in PG Rocket as well as several holders of Class B shares in PG Rocket.

14    In the Investment Agreement Proceeding, the plaintiffs claim that the defendants breached an agreement known as the 'Investment Agreement'. Under the terms of the Investment Agreement, Phenna acquired 50.1% of the shares in PG Rocket, which was established as a special purpose vehicle to acquire all of the shares in ISGroup. The Supreme Court has made an order that the plaintiffs in the Investment Agreement Proceeding are to file a statement of claim by 16 October 2026.

15    On 28 April 2026, Land Surveys Pty Ltd, as trustee for the P Rullo Family Trust, and Laura Lee Mellon, as trustee for the Shawshack Investment Trust, commenced a further proceeding against PG Rocket and Phenna, two directors of Phenna as well as minority shareholders in PG Rocket, seeking relief from what is alleged to have been oppressive conduct of the affairs of PG Rocket by Phenna and others since 1 April 2026 (COR 48 of 2026) (First Oppression Proceeding).

16    Two further oppression proceedings were commenced on 15 June 2026 (COR 79 of 2026) and 27 August 2026 (COR 135 of 2026) (Second Oppression Proceeding and Third Oppression Proceeding, respectively). It appears that the Second Oppression Proceeding was commenced to address what is alleged to have been oppressive conduct that has occurred since the First Oppression Proceeding was commenced, and the Third Oppression Proceeding was commenced to address further alleged oppressive conduct engaged in since the Second Oppression Proceeding was commenced. It is worth noting that in the Third Oppression Proceeding the plaintiffs seek, amongst other orders, an order that PG Rocket cause ISGroup and ISG Shared Services to discontinue the proceeding in this Court and to pay the Respondents' costs on an indemnity basis.

17    All three oppression proceedings have now been consolidated by the Supreme Court.

18    The Supreme Court has ordered that the Mellon Employment Proceeding, the Investment Agreement Proceeding and the three consolidated oppression proceedings are to be listed for a strategic conference on a date to be fixed. I understand that one of the purposes of that strategic conference is to determine to what extent those proceedings should be case managed together.

19    The hearing of a strike out application made by ISGroup in the Mellon Employment Proceeding has also been listed before the Supreme Court on 14 October 2026.

20    The final proceeding in the Supreme Court is COR 78 of 2026 (Document Access Proceeding), which was commenced at the same time as the Second Oppression Proceeding on 15 June 2026. In the Document Access Proceeding, Mr P Rullo and Mr Mellon apply under ss 198F, 290 and 1303 of the Corporations Act, at common law and in the inherent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, for access to certain books of ISGroup and PG Rocket. The hearing of the Document Access Proceeding is listed to take place on 19 October 2026.

21    Having summarised this proceeding and the other proceedings that are currently before the Supreme Court, it is necessary to say something about the relevant legal framework within which the Respondents' application for an order to be made under s 1337H(2)(a) of the Corporations Act falls to be determined.

Relevant legislative provisions

22    Section 1337A(2)(a) of the Corporations Act provides that Div 1 of Pt 9.6A of that Act operates to the exclusion of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (Cth).

23    Section 1337H of the Corporations Act, which appears in Div 1 of Pt 9.6A of that Act, relevantly provides as follows:

(1)    This section applies to a proceeding (the relevant proceeding) in a court (the transferor court) if:

(a)    the relevant proceeding is:

(i)    a proceeding with respect to a civil matter arising under the Corporations legislation; or

(ii)    a subsection 1337B(3) proceeding; and

(b)    the transferor court is:

(i)    the Federal court; or

(ii)    a State or Territory Supreme Court.

(2)    Subject to subsections (3), (4) and (5), if it appears to the transferor court that, having regard to the interests of justice, it is more appropriate for:

(a)    the relevant proceeding; or

(b)    an application in the relevant proceeding;

to be determined by another court that has jurisdiction in the matters for determination in the relevant proceeding or application, the transferor court may transfer the relevant proceeding or application to that other court.

…

(6)    Nothing in this section confers on a court jurisdiction that the court would not otherwise have.

(7)    The fact that some references in this section to the interests of justice include the desirability of related proceedings being heard in the same jurisdiction does not of itself mean that other references to the interests of justice, in this section or elsewhere in this Act, do not include that matter.

24    Section 1337H applies because these proceedings are with respect to a 'civil matter' arising under the Corporations Act: s 1337H(1)(a)(i) of the Corporations Act. In that regard, a 'civil matter' is a matter other than a criminal matter: s 9 of the Corporations Act. As the Applicants allege that the Respondents breached duties under ss 182 and 183 of the Corporations Act, or that they were involved in breaches of those duties, these proceedings are with respect to a civil matter arising under the Corporations Act as required by s 1337H(1)(a)(i). Further, as this Court is the transferor court, s 1337H(1)(b)(i) is satisfied in this case.

25    In deciding whether to transfer a proceeding under s 1337H, a court is required by s 1337L to have regard to:

(1)    the principal place of business of any body corporate concerned in the proceeding;

(2)    the place or places where the events that are the subject of the proceeding took place; and

(3)    the other courts that have jurisdiction to deal with the proceeding.

26    A transfer under s 1337H(2) may be made, relevantly, on the application of a party to the proceeding and at any stage: s 1337M(a). An appeal does not lie from a decision made in relation to a transfer of a proceeding under s 1337H: s 1337R(a).

Relevant legal principles

27    In Bogan v The Estate of Peter John Smedley (Deceased) [2025] HCA 7, the High Court was required to determine whether the making by the Supreme Court of Victoria of a group costs order in a class action commenced under Pt 4A of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic), in a matter arising under the Corporations Act or the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth), was a relevant consideration in the exercise by the Supreme Court of Victoria of its discretionary power to transfer the proceeding to the Supreme Court of New South Wales under s 1337H(2) of the Corporations Act. At [70] to [73] in Bogan, the plurality (Gageler CJ, Gordon, Gleeson, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ) made the following observations about the operation of s 1337H(2):

(1)    Section 1337H(2) confers a discretion to transfer to the Federal Court or a Supreme Court, as might appear to the transferor court to be 'more appropriate' to determine the proceeding or application in the proceeding, 'having regard' to the interests of justice and 'having regard' to the mandatory considerations in s 1337L.

(2)    The requirement of s 1337H(2) that the transferor court 'hav[e] regard' to the interests of justice in exercising the discretion to transfer the proceeding or application to another court requires the transferor court to consider the interests of justice and to treat the interests of justice as a fundamental element in exercising the discretion.

(3)    The requirement to 'hav[e] regard' to the interests of justice does not confine the considerations that are able to be taken into account by the transferor court to the interests of justice.

(4)    The discretion to transfer the proceeding or application conferred by s 1337H(2) would not properly be exercised contrary to the transferor court's evaluation of the interests of justice.

(5)    Where the interests of justice are evaluated as neutral or equivocal, the discretion is open to be exercised by reference to more pragmatic considerations bearing on the appropriateness of transfer, which can include convenience of the parties or the court.

28    As to the meaning of the phrase, 'interests of justice', Edelman J said at [101] that it is 'an extremely broad expression, encompassing not merely matters relevant to the fair resolution of a dispute between parties but also systemic considerations of administration of justice'. However, the interests of justice are not the same as the interests of one party and there may be interests wider than those of the parties to be considered. Nevertheless, the interests of the parties (which may be common or in conflict) will arise for consideration, and the interests of justice are 'not disembodied, or divorced from practical reality': BHP Billiton Limited v Schultz [2004] HCA 61; (2004) 221 CLR 400 at [15] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Heydon JJ).

29    It should also be noted, as McKerracher J said in Yara Pilbara Fertilisers Pty Ltd [formerly known as Burrup Fertilisers Pty Ltd] v Oswal (No 8) [2015] FCA 49 at [25]:

[t]he Court should not approach the transfer question with any presumption as to where the interests of justice lie: BHP per Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Heydon JJ (at [25]). It is not a circumstance in which an applicant has an onus of persuasion analogous to an onus of proof: BHP per Gummow J (at [71]). The disposition of an application for transfer of a proceeding does not require weight to be given to the plaintiff's choice of forum, which is essentially a neutral factor: BHP per Kirby J (at [168]) and per Gummow J (at 77).

30    The courts have recognised several considerations that may be relevant in deciding whether to exercise the discretion in s 1337H(2). Those considerations were gathered together in Yara Pilbara Fertilisers at [26] and include:

(1)    the stage of the proceedings in the respective courts;

(2)    the commonality or diversity of the parties;

(3)    the nature of the proceedings;

(4)    the commonality or diversity of issues;

(5)    the risk of conflicting findings of fact or conflicting orders;

(6)    a cost benefit analysis;

(7)    the potential unnecessary drain on judicial and other public and private resources; and

(8)    whether there is any particular judicial expertise residing in one court or the other.

31    It must be emphasised that this list of considerations is not exhaustive and must not be understood as amounting to a list of mandatory relevant considerations. Whether any of those, or indeed any other considerations, are relevant to the statutory task presented by s 1337H(2), and the weight to be afforded to such considerations, will depend on the extent to which they bear on the question of whether, having regard to the interests of justice, it is more appropriate for a relevant proceeding or application to be determined by another court. Each case will depend on its own unique circumstances, including specific considerations on which the parties rely in support of their contentions in favour of, or in opposition to, an exercise of the discretionary power conferred by s 1337H(2).

32    Having summarised the relevant legal framework within which the Respondents' application for an order under s 1337H(2)(a) falls to be determined it is convenient to first deal with the mandatory considerations in s 1337L.

Mandatory considerations in s 1337L of the Corporations Act

33    It is not in dispute that the Applicants' principal place of business is in Western Australia, or that Western Australia is the place where the events that are the subject of this proceeding took place: subss (a) and (b) of s 1337L. It is also not in dispute that there are several other courts that have jurisdiction to deal with this proceeding including, by operation of s 1337B, the Supreme Court: s 1337L(c) of the Corporations Act.

34    The proceeding having been commenced in the Perth registry and docketed to a judge based in Perth, it is to be expected that this Court would hear and determine the proceeding in Western Australia. Accordingly, the mandatory considerations in s 1337L are, in my view, essentially neutral: see the similar conclusion reached by McKerracher J in Bell Group N.V. v Bell Group Finance Pty Ltd, in the matter of Western Interstate Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 1440 at [43].

35    It follows that the critical question to be determined is whether it appears to the Court that, having regard to the interests of justice, it is more appropriate for this proceeding to be determined by the Supreme Court.

Is it more appropriate for this proceeding to be determined by the Supreme Court, having regard to the interests of justice?

The parties' submissions

36    The Respondents submit that the 'whole of the argument' that it is 'more appropriate' for this proceeding to be determined by the Supreme Court, having regard to the interests of justice, is concerned with the relationship between this proceeding and the six proceedings that are currently before the Supreme Court, to which reference has been made earlier in these reasons.

37    The starting point for the Respondents' contention that it is more appropriate for this proceeding to be determined by the Supreme Court is that this proceeding is the only one of a total of seven related proceedings that has been commenced outside the Supreme Court. In support of the contention that the proceedings are all related, the Respondents submit that the two sides of this proceeding are, in substance, the same two sides of all of the proceedings in the Supreme Court. In that regard, the Respondents point out that, under the Investment Agreement, Phenna is entitled to appoint directors of PG Rocket and any other 'Group Company', and that it has done so in relation to the Applicants. One of those directors of the Applicants, Brett Anthony Coleman is the Divisional Managing Director for Asia of Phenna Holdings, which is the holding company of Phenna, and a director of Phenna. Another director of the Applicants is Ketheesan Mahesan, who is also a director of Phenna. Each of Mr Coleman and Mr Mahesan are defendants in their own right in the First Oppression Proceeding, Second Oppression Proceeding and Third Oppression Proceeding. Mr Coleman is also a defendant in the Investment Agreement Proceeding.

38    The Respondents also submit that the issues of fact and law in this proceeding are already in issue in the Supreme Court. The Respondents note that at para 7 of the Applicants' concise statement in reply it is said that:

The true matter in issue in these proceedings is narrow and is whether the respondents were authorised or otherwise permitted by law to:

(a)    access the ISGroup premises and take the material described in [para 7 of the Concise Statement]; and/or

(b)    use ISGroup's IT systems to access corporate email accounts of other ISGroup employees as described in [para 8 of the Concise Statement].

39    It is submitted that this means that this proceeding turns on one question, namely, whether Mr Mellon and Mr P Rullo 'were entitled to the information' that was taken as a result of the events of 26 April 2026, under specific clauses in the constitutions of PG Rocket and ISGroup, the Investment Agreement and ss 198F(2) and 290 of the Corporations Act.

40    Sections 198F(2) and 290 of the Corporations Act are in the following terms:

198F Right of access to company books

…

Right during 7 years after ceasing to be director

(2)    A person who has ceased to be a director of a company may inspect the books of the company (including its financial records) at all reasonable times for the purposes of a legal proceeding:

(a)    to which the person is a party; or

(b)    that the person proposes in good faith to bring; or

(c)    that the person has reason to believe will be brought against them.

This right continues for 7 years after the person ceased to be a director of the company.

…

290 Director access

Personal access

(1)    A director of a company, registered scheme, registrable superannuation entity or disclosing entity has a right of access to any financial or sustainability records at all reasonable times.

Note:    Section 1232B extends this section to the directors of the corporate director of a retail or wholesale CCIV.

Court order for inspection on director's behalf

(2)    On application by a director, the Court may authorise a person to inspect the financial or sustainability records on the director's behalf.

(3)    A person authorised to inspect records may make copies of the records unless the Court orders otherwise.

(4)    The Court may make any other orders it consider appropriate, including either or both of the following:

(a)    an order limiting the use that a person who inspects the records may make of information obtained during the inspection;

(b)    an order limiting the right of a person who inspects the records to make copies in accordance with subsection (3).

41    According to the Respondents, the question of entitlement to the information is already in issue in the three oppression proceedings, where the withholding of information is one of the grounds of oppression relied upon. It is also submitted that the same question is in issue in the Mellon Employment Proceedings.

42    The Respondents further submit that, having regard to what is said in the Applicants' concise statement in reply about the construction of ss 198F and 290, the proper construction of those provisions will have to be determined in both this proceeding as well as in the Supreme Court and, in particular, in the Document Access Proceeding and the three oppression proceedings. The Respondents say that, in circumstances in which the proper construction of those provisions is unsettled, it would be more appropriate for one court to determine that issue to avoid the prospect of further uncertainty were this Court to reach a different construction to one reached by the Supreme Court. Relatedly, it is also argued that, in applying the Applicants' construction of s 198F, this Court would be required to characterise proceedings pending in the Supreme Court, in particular, the three oppression proceedings and the Mellon Employment Proceeding.

43    It is further submitted that the issue of whether the Respondents were entitled to the information taken in connection with the events on 26 April 2026 will be informed by resolving questions about whether:

(1)    Mr Mellon's employment and directorship had been validly terminated;

(2)    some oppressive conduct was engaged in against parties related to Mr Mellon and Mr P Rullo;

(3)    a dispute relating to such conduct was in Mr Mellon's contemplation on 26 April 2026; and

(4)    whether, for the purposes of s 198F(2), the documents were obtained for the purposes of a legal proceeding.

44    The Respondents contend that the Applicants' own case demonstrates that whether s 198F(2) is available to the Respondents to authorise the events of 26 April 2026 depends on the proper characterisation of the three oppression proceedings. In that regard, para 9(a) of the Applicants' concise statement in reply says, in part, that the 'legal proceeding' to which s 198F applies is a legal proceeding brought or defended by, relevantly, a former director in their capacity as a former director and not a legal proceeding brought by that former director as a shareholder, including any oppression proceeding.

45    Attached to the Respondents' written submissions is a schedule that purports to demonstrate the extent to which there is commonality in the issues that arise in this proceeding when compared to issues that arise in the various Supreme Court proceedings. In the body of the Respondents' written submissions, four of those issues are highlighted.

46    Firstly, it is said that the circumstances in which the Respondents attended at ISGroup's premises on 26 April 2026 is in issue in both this proceeding and in the Mellon Employment Proceeding. In that regard, it is pleaded in the statement of claim in the Mellon Employment Proceeding that, by his conduct, Mr Mellon accepted ISGroup's repudiatory breach of his contract of employment. Part of the conduct relied upon is Mr Mellon's attendance at the premises of ISGroup on 26 April 2026 'to collect personal items and return the laptop and iPad issued to him'. That conduct is denied by ISGroup in its defence in the Mellon Employment Proceeding.

47    Secondly, it is contended that the lawfulness of the termination of Mr Mellon's contract of employment is a matter that is in issue in this proceeding. It is submitted that the termination of Mr Mellon's contract of employment is the event from which the conduct alleged in this proceeding is said to have followed. Further, in his concise response in the proceeding in this Court, Mr Mellon pleads that his conduct of 26 April 2026 was authorised by, amongst other things, s 198F(2) of the Corporations Act. That provision confers a right on a former director of a company to inspect the books of the company provided that it is, relevantly, for a purpose of a legal proceeding the person proposes in good faith to bring. It is submitted that the question for determination in the Mellon Employment Proceeding, which was commenced on 27 April 2026, is whether the termination of Mr Mellon's employment contract was for cause, and that this question cannot be separated from questions about whether those proceedings were proposed in good faith. It is also submitted that the lawfulness of the termination of Mr Mellon's contract of employment is in issue in the three oppression proceedings and the Investment Agreement Proceeding.

48    Thirdly, it is said that the confidential information that the Applicants seek to permanently restrain the Respondents from using includes information 'regarding mergers and acquisitions strategies, budgets, financial modelling, financial forecasts and strategic planning'. The Respondents submit that they are the very subjects with which the defence and reply in the Mellon Employment Proceeding are concerned.

49    Fourthly, it is submitted by the Respondents that the entitlement to information is in issue in the three oppression proceedings because one of the grounds on which it is alleged that there was oppressive conduct is an 'information blackout' involving the withholding of information sought about the affairs of PG Rocket and ISGroup. According to the Respondents, the 'measure' of their entitlement to such information is the same as the 'measure' of the entitlement to information relied upon in this proceeding, namely, the Investment Agreement, the constitutions of PG Rocket and ISGroup, as well as ss 198F and 290 of the Corporations Act.

50    It is also submitted that it is more appropriate that this proceeding be determined by the Supreme Court because there is a risk of conflicting findings and conflicting orders being made. Insofar as the potential for there to be conflicting orders is concerned, the Respondents point to the fact that, in the Third Oppression Proceeding, an order is sought that PG Rocket cause the Applicants to discontinue this proceeding and pay the Respondents' costs on an indemnity basis. That order is sought on the basis that PG Rocket has control over the Applicants through its nominated directors. It is said that if the proceeding is transferred to the Supreme Court, then the prospect that another court may decide that the commencement and continuation of this proceeding amount to oppressive conduct will be avoided.

51    In relation to the risk of conflicting findings of fact, it is submitted that the risk is not merely in relation to 'findings made along the way to different causes of action', but in relation to the question of entitlement to the information that was obtained as a result of what is alleged to have occurred at the premises of ISGroup on 26 April 2026. In that respect, the Respondents again note that the question of entitlement falls to be resolved by reference to the Investment Agreement, the constitutions of PG Rocket and ISGroup, and to ss 198F and 290 of the Corporations Act.

52    In a related submission, the Respondents also contend that there is a risk that, if this proceeding is not transferred to the Supreme Court, an order may be made in the Document Access Proceeding that compels production of the same documents the Applicants seek, in this proceeding, to restrain the Respondents from using.

53    The Respondents submit further that the Supreme Court is already managing the various proceedings in that Court as a group. It is said that a judge of that Court is case managing five of the six proceedings and, in any event, the Supreme Court would be in the best position to consider whether to make orders across the whole of the litigation, including orders to effect consolidation, to proceed by concurrent hearings and to make directions with respect to the evidence so as to avoid duplication.

54    Finally, the Respondents submit that this proceeding is at a relatively early stage, even though the parties have exchanged concise statements and the Applicants have filed a concise statement in reply. The Respondents say that their solicitors in this proceeding are the same solicitors who act for the plaintiffs in all of the Supreme Court proceedings. Further, the Applicants' solicitors also act for ISGroup in the Mellon Employment Proceeding and for PG Rocket in all the proceedings to which it is a party. The Respondents point out that there is likely to be significant similarity in the documentary and testimonial evidence in this proceeding and the Supreme Court proceedings. In those circumstances, it is said that a transfer would alleviate any unnecessary drain on judicial and other resources.

55    The Applicants submit that this proceeding raises confined issues about what occurred over a few days in April 2026, which are different from the myriad of issues raised in the various proceedings currently before the Supreme Court. In that regard, the Applicants contend that the relevant matter in issue in these proceedings is whether the Respondents were authorised or otherwise permitted by law to access the premises of ISGroup on 26 April 2026 and to take the material referred to in the concise statement and/or to use ISGroup's information technology systems to gain access to the email accounts of other ISGroup employees. The Applicants also say that those issues ultimately feed into questions about whether the Respondents thereby contravened ss 182 and 183 of the Corporations Act, whether they breached their contractual and fiduciary obligations, and whether they were involved in any contraventions of the Corporations Act, or knowingly assisted in breaches of other obligations. The Applicants argue that none of these issues arise for determination in any of the other proceedings that are currently on foot in the Supreme Court, and that there is no real risk of inconsistent findings of fact should this proceeding continue in this Court.

56    The Applicants also submit that the state of preparation and progress of the proceedings in the Supreme Court is mixed and, in any event, that it cannot be said that those proceedings are more advanced than this proceeding. On that basis, it is submitted that, other than the Document Access Proceeding, it cannot be concluded that any of the Supreme Court proceedings are capable of being determined in the time that it is likely for this Court to finally determine this proceeding. The Applicants further submit that there is some urgency in having this proceeding finalised as there is a risk that the information that was obtained as a result of the activities of 26 April 2026 may be further misused.

57    In relation to the Respondents' contention that there is a significant degree of commonality between the parties to this proceeding when compared to the parties to the Supreme Court proceedings, the Applicants point out that there are more parties involved in the Supreme Court proceedings. In that regard, the Applicants say that each of Phenna, Mr Coleman, Mr Mahesan and the other minority shareholders in PG Rocket are separately represented, and that the oppression proceedings and the Investment Agreement Proceeding involve 'five sides', three of which have no interest in the proceeding in this Court.

58    The Applicants also submit that there is no sufficient commonality of issues, or sufficient risk of making conflicting findings or orders, to justify a conclusion that it would be more appropriate for the Supreme Court to determine this proceeding. The Applicants contend that the issues raised in this proceeding are confined and distinct from those raised in the Supreme Court proceedings. It is said that the issues raised in this proceeding are concerned with what, if any, rights the Respondents had to enter upon the premises of ISGroup and to take property or gain access to information by electronic means. On the other hand, it is said that there are many issues raised in the other proceedings, including issues about whether Mr Mellon and Mr P Rullo are entitled to orders allowing them to now inspect documents of ISGroup and PG Rocket, whether Mr Mellon's contract of employment was lawfully terminated, and whether the rights of certain minority shareholders were infringed such as to give rise to a cause of action for oppression.

59    It is contended by the Applicants, relying on observations that were made by Banks-Smith J in JKC Australia LNG Pty Ltd v AkzoNobel NV (No 5) [2023] FCA 1248, that the mere factual or other overlap between this proceeding and the Supreme Court proceedings does not, of itself, require transfer to the Supreme Court particularly as transfer will mean that the parties to this proceeding will become 'entwined' in larger, more complex and slower-moving proceedings. According to the Applicants, there is no good reason why the narrow case presented by this proceeding should be transferred to become one part of a larger and more complex set of disputes in the Supreme Court. Relatedly, the Applicants submit that to transfer this proceeding to the Supreme Court will introduce a new issue into the Supreme Court and will, in all likelihood, result in the determination of the Applicants' asserted entitlement to relief being delayed while procedural steps are taken in the other proceedings. It is submitted that causing the determination of the discrete issues in this proceeding to be delayed by transferring it to join with other more complex and slow-moving litigation is not in the interests of justice. It is submitted that if this proceeding were to be transferred to the Supreme Court, then it is 'almost inevitable' that it will not be dealt with as quickly and efficiently as it is likely to be dealt with in this Court.

60    Insofar as the Respondents rely on the fact that an order is sought in the Third Oppression Proceeding that PG Rocket cause the Applicants to discontinue this proceeding, the Applicants point out that no application has been made to stay this proceeding pending the determination of the application for that order.

61    Finally, it should be noted that the Applicants submit that the Respondents' contention that the proceedings in the Supreme Court are being case managed together is an 'exaggeration'. It is said that the question of whether the proceedings are to be case managed is the subject of a proposal by Mr Mellon and Mr P Rullo, which is opposed by the defendants in those proceedings, and which is an issue that will be determined at a yet to be held strategic conference.

Determination

62    As I have already noted, the plurality in Bogan made it clear that, when considering whether to transfer a proceeding under s 1337H(2) of the Corporations Act, the transferor court is required to have regard to the interests of justice, and to treat those interests as a fundamental element in exercising the discretion conferred by that provision. Where the transferor court evaluates the interests of justice as supporting a conclusion that it is more appropriate that a proceeding be determined by another court that has the requisite jurisdiction, the discretion conferred by s 1337H(2) would not be properly exercised contrary to that evaluation. It is only when the interests of justice are evaluated as neutral or equivocal that the discretion may be exercised by reference to 'more pragmatic considerations'.

63    Neither the Respondents nor the Applicants suggest that any the various factors on which they relied in support of their respective positions stood outside factors relevant to where the interests of justice lie.

64    As will appear from my summary of the parties' respective submissions, a major focus of the Respondents' contention that this proceeding should be transferred to the Supreme Court is on what they say is the existence of a commonality of interests and issues between the proceedings currently before both courts.

65    It has been said that it is inappropriate for two courts to be deciding the same issues between the same parties if that can be avoided, although that statement can be qualified if in one court two judges are to hear the same issues: Winpar Holdings Ltd v National Consolidated Ltd [2001] FCA 1663 at [16]. Relevantly, and without intending to exhaustively explain why the existence of a commonality of interests and issues may be relevant in this context, it may be contrary to the interests of justice for two courts to decide the same issues of fact or law, particularly where those issues have the potential to affect the same interests, as that may be productive of inefficiencies in the administration of justice, including by the unnecessary incurring of costs. It may also result in inconsistent findings of fact and/or law, and the making of conflicting orders. However, the mere overlap of issues will not, of itself, require transfer: Winpar at [16]. Further, the relevant risk of inconsistent findings with which the courts are concerned is the risk that such inconsistency may bring the administration of justice into disrepute, including by undermining confidence in the rule of law: JKC Australia LNG at [36] and [47] to [49].

66    In the context of this application to transfer under s 1337H(2) it is not possible to undertake a comprehensive analysis of the various documents by which this proceeding, or the proceedings in the Supreme Court, have been commenced, or of any pleadings or similar documents that have been filed across both courts with a view to determining the precise nature of any current or prospective overlap between the proceedings. A determination about whether to transfer proceedings is, after all, a 'nuts and bolts' management decision: see BHP at [13] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Heydon JJ), citing Bankinvest AG v Seabrook (1988) 14 NSWLR 711 at 713 to 714 (Street CJ). It would also be inappropriate for me to make any observations about the merits of any of the respective cases sought to be run by the parties.

67    The Applicants' position is that the 'true matter' in dispute in this proceeding is as I have identified it at [38] of these reasons. The Respondents have indicated that, for the purposes of their application to transfer this proceeding to the Supreme Court, they are prepared to proceed on the basis that this is the 'true matter' in dispute. However, the Respondents submit that having regard to the 'true matter' in dispute, this proceeding ultimately turns on one question, namely, whether Mr Mellon and Mr P Rullo were entitled to the information that is alleged to have been obtained by them as a result of the events of 26 April 2026, under the constitutions of PG Rocket and ISGroup, the Investment Agreement, and also under ss 198F and 290 of the Corporations Act. On that premise the Respondents contend that the question of whether Mr Mellon and Mr P Rullo were entitled to that information is already in issue in the Supreme Court proceedings. The Respondents argue that there is therefore a commonality of issues that are in dispute in both this proceeding and in the Supreme Court such that, in the interests of justice, it is more appropriate that this proceeding be decided by the Supreme Court.

68    It may be accepted that there are questions relating to the entitlement of each of Mr Mellon and Mr P Rullo to certain information that are in issue in the Supreme Court. The Document Access Proceeding is the clearest case in which that entitlement is in issue. In that proceeding both Mr Mellon and Mr P Rullo seek orders that certain of the Applicants' records be made available for inspection and copying. It also appears that, in the three oppression proceedings, the first and second plaintiffs, who are parties related to Mr Mellon and Mr P Rullo, seek relief against alleged oppressive conduct of the affairs of PG Rocket including on the basis that information has been withheld. It may be expected that questions about an entitlement to such information will arise in each of those proceedings.

69    However, on a close examination of the way in which the 'true matter' in dispute in this proceeding has been articulated it appears to me that there is in fact very limited commonality with the questions regarding Mr Mellon and Mr P Rullo's entitlement to information that are currently before the Supreme Court. In that regard, it must be appreciated that the 'true matter' focuses on specific conduct in which the Respondents are alleged to have engaged on and shortly after 26 April 2026, and, critically, whether that conduct was 'authorised or otherwise permitted by law'. The relevant conduct is:

(1)    gaining access to the premises of ISGroup on 26 April 2026;

(2)    taking certain material from those premises; and

(3)    using ISGroup's information technology systems to access corporate email accounts of certain named ISGroup employees.

Other conduct includes being involved in or assisting such conduct, to the extent that such conduct may constitute a contravention of relevant provisions of the Corporations Act, or assistance in the breach of fiduciary obligations. Accordingly, to the extent that this proceeding raises questions about entitlement to information, it is concerned only with the existence of an entitlement (or authorisation, or permission) to obtain information by the specific conduct in which the Respondents are alleged to have engaged. Whether the Respondents were entitled, authorised or permitted to obtain the information that is alleged to have been obtained by engaging in that conduct is not a matter that is in issue or falls to be determined in any of the other proceedings in the Supreme Court.

70    Based on the Respondents' concise statement in reply, while there may be some dispute about what took place during their attendance at the premises of ISGroup, the fact that the Respondents attended at those premises on 26 April 2026 is not in dispute. It also does not appear to be in dispute that Mr A Rullo accessed the corporate email accounts of ISGroup employees. However, whether the Respondents engaged in the specific conduct which the Applicants alleged they engaged in on 26 April 2026, or whether they were authorised or otherwise permitted to engage in that conduct, is also not in issue in any of the other proceedings before the Supreme Court.

71    It is true that Mr Mellon relies on his attendance at the ISGroup premises on 26 April 2026 as a particular to a pleading made in his statement of claim filed in the Mellon Employment Proceeding that he accepted a repudiatory breach of his employment contract with ISGroup, and that this pleading is denied by ISGroup in its defence. Nevertheless, it appears that it is the character of Mr Mellon's conduct on 26 April 2026 that is in issue in those proceedings, and not whether the conduct as alleged in this proceeding occurred or whether it was authorised or permitted.

72    I accept that there may be some commonality in the legal issues that arise in this proceeding and in at least some of the Supreme Court proceedings. In that regard, I note that in this proceeding the Applicants and the Respondents have joined issue on the question of whether the conduct in which Mr Mellon and Mr P Rullo are alleged to have engaged on 26 April 2026 was authorised by the constitutions of both PG Rocket and ISGroup, read with the Investment Agreement, and/or by ss 198F and 290 of the Corporations Act. The concise statements filed in this proceeding raise specific issues of construction concerning ss 198F and 290 about which different, but not binding views, appear to have been expressed in the authorities. The Respondents also rely on ss 198F and 290 in the context of the Document Access Proceeding. Accordingly, the proper construction of those provisions is likely to be a matter about which both this Court and the Supreme Court would be required to separately determine, were this proceeding to remain in this Court.

73    It is also relevant to observe that, earlier this year, the plaintiffs in the Second Oppression Proceeding unsuccessfully sought interim injunctive relief in the Supreme Court: Land Surveys Pty Ltd as Trustee for the P Rullo Family Trust v PG Rocket Holdings Pty Ltd [2026] WASC 304. The Respondents submit that, in refusing to grant the relief sought, Gething J 'measured the relief sought' against the Investment Agreement and the constitutions of both PG Rocket and ISGroup. On that basis, I am prepared to accept that the construction of those instruments may also be in issue in both proceedings to some extent.

74    However, and as I have already observed, the mere overlap of issues does not, of itself, suggest that the interests of justice tend in favour of transfer under s 1337H(2). In any event, I am not satisfied that there is a risk of inconsistent determinations that could potentially bring the justice system into disrepute: JKC Australia LNG at [36]. In that regard it must be understood that, even if this proceeding were to be transferred to the Supreme Court, there is no reason to assume that the issues of construction that may arise will be determined by the same judge. Accordingly, the risk that inconsistent constructions may be reached in relation to ss 198F and 290 of the Corporations Act, and of the various instruments to which I have referred, will exist regardless of whether this proceeding is transferred.

75    The Respondents' position is that there is also some commonality of issues with the Mellon Employment Proceeding. In that respect it is clear that, in this proceeding, the Applicants' case that Mr Mellon did not have the requisite authority or permission to engage in the specific conduct in which he is alleged to have engaged is based to some extent on an allegation that his contract of employment with ISGroup had been terminated and that he was removed as a director of that company before he gained access to the ISGroup premises on 26 April 2026. In the Mellon Employment Proceeding, Mr Mellon claims that his employment agreement with ISGroup was wrongfully terminated. It is also submitted that the termination of Mr Mellon's employment formed part of the oppressive conduct that is the subject of the First Oppression Proceeding and part of a pattern of breaches for the purposes of the Investment Agreement Proceeding. However, it does not appear to me that this gives rise to a commonality of issues between this proceeding and the Mellon Employment Proceeding or any of the three oppression proceedings. In this proceeding, the Applicants seek to rely on the termination of Mr Mellon's employment, and the fact that he was removed as a director, as part of their case that he did not have the requisite authority or permission to engage in the relevant conduct on 26 April 2026. The Respondents admit in their concise statement in reply that, on 24 April 2026, Mr Mellon's employment with ISGroup was terminated and he was removed as one of its directors. In that context, questions about whether Mr Mellon was lawfully terminated, and whether that termination formed part of any oppressive conduct, appear to have no logical bearing on the issues of authorisation and permission to be determined in this proceeding.

76    As I have already alluded to earlier in these reasons, the Respondents' submissions, and the schedule that is attached to their written submissions, suggests that there are other issues that arise in this proceeding that also arise in, or overlap with issues that are likely to arise in, the Supreme Court proceedings. I have considered all of those issues. However, while there may be some other areas of commonality or where issues overlap, when considered in totality they are not in my view ultimately of such a nature that the interests of justice tend in favour of a conclusion that it would be more appropriate for the Supreme Court to determine this proceeding.

77    The Respondents' further contentions that there is a risk of conflicting orders being made, and a further risk of a 'collision' between this proceeding and the Third Oppression Proceeding because the Respondents seek an order that PG Rocket cause the Applicants to discontinue this proceeding, need to be considered.

78    Insofar as it is suggested that there is a risk of conflicting orders, the Respondents concentrate on the Document Access Proceeding. In that regard, the Respondents' central contention is that the interests of justice support a transfer because there is a risk that the Respondents may, in this proceeding, be restrained from using or disclosing information that is alleged to have been obtained as a consequence of the events of 26 April 2026 and yet be granted access to the same information in the Document Access Proceeding.

79    I do not accept that there is a risk of conflicting orders. The injunctive orders sought in this proceeding are concerned with restraining the Respondents from using or disclosing the particular information that is alleged was obtained by them as a consequence of the events of 26 April 2026, and without authorisation or permission. By contrast, in the Document Access Proceeding the Respondents seek an order under s 1303 of the Corporations Act to compel PG Rocket (which is not a party to this proceeding) and ISGroup to allow an immediate inspection of identified records and to make orders for the copying of those records on the basis that PG Rocket and ISGroup have, in contravention of the Corporations Act, refused to permit such inspection or to supply copies of those records. In any event, any risk of conflict would not be avoided by transferring this proceeding to the Supreme Court. That is because the Supreme Court would still be required to determine whether to make the injunctive orders sought in this proceeding as well as the orders sought in the Document Access Proceeding.

80    In relation to the contention that there is a risk of 'collision' between this proceeding and the Third Oppression Proceeding, it is said that the commencement and continuation of this proceeding is a matter that is itself in issue in the Supreme Court. As I understand it, the Respondents' contention is that the interests of justice favour this proceeding being determined by the Supreme Court because it would avoid the prospect of the Supreme Court being required to 'judge the conduct of this proceeding'.

81    To be clear, I did not understand the Respondents to be suggesting that the Supreme Court will be required to make findings about this Court's conduct. Instead, the Supreme Court will be asked by related parties of the Respondents to make findings that the institution of this proceeding amounted to conduct of the affairs of PG Rocket, including the affairs of the Applicants, that was oppressive. However, it is not apparent to me why this state of affairs carries with it a risk of 'collision' such that the interests of justice favour transfer. It may be accepted that if this Court were to hear and determine this proceeding before the Supreme Court hears and determines the Third Oppression Proceeding, then the order sought in the Supreme Court that PG Rocket cause the Applicants to discontinue this proceeding will be rendered otiose. However, that does not appear to me to be a reason why, having regard to the interests of justice, it would be more appropriate for the Supreme Court to determine the proceedings. The same potential outcome would arise in the Supreme Court were this proceeding to be transferred.

82    Based on what I have considered to this point, I am not persuaded that the interests of justice favour a conclusion that it is more appropriate for the Supreme Court to determine this proceeding. However, I will now turn to deal with the contentions made on behalf of the Applicants, before explaining why I am nevertheless of the view this proceeding should be transferred.

83    The essence of the Applicants' contention that this proceeding should not be transferred is that this proceeding raises confined issues about what occurred over a few days in April 2026, and that if it were to be transferred to the Supreme Court then it is inevitable that it will be caught up with several larger and significantly more complex proceedings and that it will not be dealt with as quickly or as efficiently as it would be dealt with in this Court. A further, and related contention, is that, as the Supreme Court does not have the power to proceed by way of concise statements, there is a risk that were the proceedings to be transferred the parties will unnecessarily be put to the cost of preparing pleadings.

84    I do not accept that if this proceeding were to be transferred to the Supreme Court it would take longer for it to be finally determined. The argument that it would take longer to determine this proceeding if it were to be transferred to the Supreme Court appears to assume that the timing of its determination would be fixed by the time it will take to determine the other proceedings that are before that Court. However, if, as the Applicants submit, this proceeding does raise discrete issues of fact and law that can be dealt with in short order, and if there is some urgency in having those issues finally determined to ensure protection of the Applicants' business from potential harm, there is no reason to think that the Supreme Court would not be in as good a position as this Court to allocate the resources that may be necessary for its efficient disposal.

85    Two things may be said about the risk that the parties will be required to put on pleadings were this proceeding to be transferred to the Supreme Court. Firstly, I note that the Supreme Court has in the past adopted alternatives to formal pleadings, including by using what are known as statements of facts, issues and contentions: see, for example, Gray v Indianic Diving Services Pty Ltd [2023] WASC 166. Accordingly, there does not appear to be any reason to assume that the Supreme Court would not proceed to hear and determine this proceeding based on the concise statements filed by the parties in this Court. Secondly, the contention that additional costs and delay will be occasioned if pleadings were required by the Supreme Court proceeds on the premise that this Court will not ultimately agree with the submissions that have already been made by the Respondents that pleadings are required in order to secure the fair resolution of this proceeding.

86    Accordingly, I am also not persuaded by the contentions made by the Applicants that the interests of justice tend against a conclusion that it is more appropriate that this proceeding be determined by the Supreme Court.

87    However, and as I have already noted, this proceeding is the only one of a total of seven proceedings that are currently before courts sitting in this State. While the parties to each of those proceedings are not completely identical, it is nevertheless clear that, broadly speaking, the same common interests are represented on both sides in all of the proceedings, and that those common interests appear to be the predominant moving or active parties in those proceedings. On the one hand there are the interests of what might be called the Phenna group, which include the Applicants, PG Rocket and the individuals who in one way or another exercise control over those entities. On the other hand, there are the Respondents' interests, which include the interests of related parties such as Land Surveys Pty Ltd, which is a trustee for the P Rullo Family Trust, and Ms Mellon, who is the trustee of The Shawshack Investment Trust. By identifying those interests in this way it should not be assumed that I have ignored the fact that other interests are also represented in the proceedings, particularly in each of the oppression proceedings.

88    Whatever view might be taken of the true nature of the issues in dispute in this proceeding, and about the extent to which there is any commonality or overlap with the issues that are at play in the proceedings that are currently in the Supreme Court, it is patently clear that those issues form part of a larger dispute between those common interests. That this is so is at least demonstrated by what is said in the concise statement filed by the Applicants in this proceeding. In that regard, the Applicants contend that they have drawn an inference that the Respondents' conduct on or about 26 April 2026, which is the conduct at the heart of this proceeding, was motivated, at least in part, by Mr Mellon and Mr P Rullo's desire to 'obtain an inappropriate advantage in prosecuting [the] Supreme Court proceedings'. According to what is alleged in the Applicants' concise statement, those Supreme Court proceedings are the Mellon Employment Proceeding, the Investment Agreement Proceeding, the Document Access Proceeding, the First Oppression Proceeding and the Second Oppression Proceeding.

89    There are also other obvious intersections between the dispute that is sought to be determined in this proceeding, the Mellon Employment Proceeding and, at least, the Third Oppression Proceeding. The existence of those intersections reinforces the interrelatedness of the various individual disputes.

90    In those circumstances there is an obvious advantage to the overall administration of justice in having all of the disputes that are sought to be resolved by the seven separate proceedings managed within, and ultimately determined by, the one court. Significantly, there can be no doubt that one court will be better able to make an overall assessment of where the interests of justice lie from time to time and will therefore be better placed to determine how the just resolution of the various branches of the broader dispute might best be facilitated according to law and as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible, taking into account the interests of all parties.

91    I accept that there is no evidence that, if transferred, this proceeding will be allocated to the same case managing judge. Understandably, the Supreme Court has previously been reluctant to confirm in advance how a proceeding might be case managed were it to be transferred: Sino Iron Pty Ltd v Mineralogy Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 675 at [81] to [82]. However, there is evidence that the question of how the proceedings that are currently before the Supreme Court should be case managed, other than the Document Access Proceeding that is to be heard later in October 2026, will be considered at a strategic conference that is yet to be listed before the Honourable Justice Hill. Accordingly, there is a pending opportunity for one court to make strategic case management decisions concerning all of the disputes. Further, it demonstrates that none of the proceedings have reached an advanced stage of preparation that might otherwise render nugatory the advantages of the dispute being managed within one court, unlike the circumstances that were relevant in JKC Australia LNG.

92    Ultimately, I am of the view that the discretion to transfer these proceedings should be exercised in the circumstances of this case. Whether the reasons that I have given for reaching that view are properly to be regarded as bearing on an evaluation of the interests of justice or because they fit more in the category of the sort of pragmatic considerations referred to at [73] in Bogan (Gageler CJ, Gordon, Gleeson, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ), I conclude that, having regard to the interests of justice, it is more appropriate that this proceeding be determined by the Supreme Court.

Associate:

Dated:    8 October 2026