FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Bilal v Ampol Limited (Recusal Application) [2026] FCA 1448

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    Justice Shariff be disqualified from further case managing, hearing or determining proceedings NSD497/2026 and NSD609/2026.

2.    Proceedings NSD497/2026 and NSD609/2026 be referred to the National Operations Registrar for reallocation to another judge of the Court as soon as practicable.

3.    The interlocutory application dated 10 June 2026 be otherwise dismissed.

4.    Proceedings NSD391/2025, NSD617/2025, NSD1187/2025, NSD185/2026, NSD444/2026 and NSD156/2026 be listed for case management at 9.45 am on Thursday, 15 October 2026.

5.    Any application for leave to appeal or appeal against these orders and this judgment be referred to the National Operations Registrar for allocation to another judge of the Court.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

SHARIFF J:

1.    INTRODUCTION

1    The applicant (Mr Bilal) has commenced multiple proceedings in this Court. Since in or about May 2025, eight of those proceedings have been allocated to my docket.

2    By an interlocutory application filed on 10 June 2026, Mr Bilal seeks an order that I be disqualified from any further involvement in the management, hearing and determination of all or some of these proceedings (Recusal Application).

3    The eight proceedings that have been allocated to me are the following ones:

(a)    Ali Bilal v Ampol Limited & Ors (NSD391/2025) (Ampol Whistleblower Proceedings);

(b)    Ali Bilal v EML NSW Limited & Ors (NSD617/2025) (EML Whistleblower Proceedings);

(c)    Ali Bilal v Ampol Australia Petroleum Pty Ltd (NSD1187/2025) (Ampol Misrepresentation Proceedings);

(d)    Ali Bilal v EML NSW Limited (NSD185/2026) (EML Misrepresentation Proceedings);

(e)    Ali Bilal v Ampol Australia Petroleum Pty Ltd & Ors (NSD444/2026) (Further Ampol Misrepresentation Proceedings);

(f)    Ali Bilal v Jodie Burns Registrar of the Federal Court of Australia (NSD497/2026) (First Registrar Review Proceedings);

(g)    Ali Bilal v Registrar of the Federal Court of Australia (NSD609/2026) (Second Registrar Review Proceedings); and

(h)    Ali Bilal v Ampol Australia Petroleum Pty Ltd (NSD156/2026) (Ampol Fair Work Information Statement Proceedings),

together, the Eight Proceedings.

4    In his written and oral submissions, Mr Bilal advanced several contentions in support of the Recusal Application. Mr Bilal contended that:

(a)    I am his designated Judge and have accumulated extensive history about him and his claims (Ground 1: Designated Judge and Accumulated Judicial History Contention);

(b)    I have participated in gatekeeping decisions affecting Mr Bilal’s ability to commence proceedings (Ground 2: Judge as Gatekeeper Contention);

(c)    I have become the arbiter of my own cause (Ground 3: Judge as Arbiter of His Own Cause Contention);

(d)    I have applied a selective lens that is unfavourable to Mr Bilal (Ground 4: Judge's Selective Lens Contention);

(e)    I have controlled Mr Bilal’s various cases in a way that gives rise to the optics of bias (Ground 5: Judge's Control of the Litigation Optics Contention);

(f)    I have descended into the arena in various hearings of Mr Bilal’s matters (Ground 6: Judge Descends into the Arena Contention);

(g)    I have exhibited a concern to ensure the various respondents’ comfort and satisfaction (Ground 7: Judge's Concern with Respondent Comfort and Satisfaction Contention);

(h)    I have predetermined the quantum or likely quantum of Mr Bilal’s claims (Ground 8: Judge's Predetermination of Mr Bilal's Loss and Harm Contention);

(i)    I have relied on extraneous information and there has been a contamination of my memory from case managing the various matters (Ground 9: Judge's Extraneous Information and Memory Contamination Contention);

(j)    I have predetermined Mr Bilal’s credibility (Ground 10: Judge's Predetermination of Mr Bilal's Credibility Contention);

(k)    I have disclosed an interest in preserving my earlier decisions (Ground 11: Judge's Interest in Preserving Earlier Decisions Contention); and

(l)    the cumulative effect of these matters is that there may be an apprehension that I may not bring an impartial mind to bear in the case management and hearing of Mr Bilal’s claims (Ground 12: Cumulative Effect Contention).

5    In support of these contentions, Mr Bilal relied on various things that I had said and done during various case management and other hearings that have been held in the Eight Proceedings, as well as the interlocutory rulings and decisions I have made in those Proceedings. I have addressed Mr Bilal’s contentions in these respects in Part 4 below.

6    There were submitting appearances in the First and Second Registrar Proceedings. In the balance of the Eight Proceedings, the relevant respondents neither consented to nor opposed the orders sought by Mr Bilal in the Recusal Application and submitted that the question of whether I should recuse myself was a matter for the Court. However, these respondents did file: (a) submissions outlining the applicable legal principles; and (b) supplementary submissions in which they provided responses to Mr Bilal’s reliance upon the things that have been said and done in each of the Eight Proceedings and, in doing so, sought to correct various submissions that Mr Bilal had made and otherwise provided further context to the selective focus that Mr Bilal had placed on what had occurred at various case management and interlocutory hearings in the Eight Proceedings.

7    For the reasons that follow, I am satisfied that I should disqualify myself from further case managing, hearing or determining the First and Second Registrar Review Proceedings but that the balance of the Recusal Application should be dismissed.

2.    BACKGROUND

8    Mr Bilal was employed by Ampol Australia Petroleum Pty Ltd between 10 July 2023 and 6 September 2023. His employment was terminated by Ampol Australia on 6 September 2023.

9    Following the termination of his employment, on 2 November 2023, Mr Bilal applied for workers compensation claiming that he had suffered psychological injury in the course of his employment. EML NSW Limited (EML) was, and is, responsible for managing Mr Bilal’s workers compensation claims under the regime that is applicable in New South Wales and is an agent of Insurance and Care NSW and the Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer. Ms Taylor and Mr Stewart were employed by EML and were case managers responsible for managing Mr Bilal’s workers compensation entitlements between, respectively, 30 October 2023 and 20 December 2023, and 20 December 2023 and 7 February 2024.

2.1    Ampol Whistleblower Proceedings: NSD391/2025 - Ali Bilal v Ampol Limited & Ors

10    Mr Bilal commenced proceedings claiming that Ampol Limited, Ampol Australia and Ampol Energy Pty Ltd each contravened the “whistleblower” protections contained in Pt 9.4AAA of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act). These proceedings were listed before me as follows:

(a)    on 13 May 2025, the proceedings were listed for a case management hearing where I made timetabling orders in relation to the respondents’ application for the summary dismissal of the proceedings or, alternatively, orders for the striking out of the originating application and statement of claim;

(b)    on 4 September 2025, the proceedings were listed before me for hearing of the respondents’ interlocutory application for summary dismissal and/or strike out;

(c)    on 25 September 2025, the proceedings were listed for judgment and also for a case management hearing where I handed down my judgment in Bilal v Ampol Limited [2025] FCA 1189. As there set out, I summarily dismissed part of Mr Bilal’s claims, struck out the statement of claim and made timetabling orders in relation to a proposed amended statement of claim;

(d)    on 20 November 2025, the proceedings were listed before me for case management where I made timetabling orders for the filing and service of an amended statement of claim, amended originating application, defence and reply;

(e)    on 10 February 2026, the proceedings were listed before me for case management where I made timetabling orders for the filing and service of evidence in chief on liability and for the parties to confer regarding discovery;

(f)    on 20 May 2026, the proceedings were listed before me for case management where I made orders setting aside my previous orders and made timetabling orders for the hearing of the present Recusal Application;

(g)    on 15 July 2026, the proceedings were listed before me for case management regarding the release of transcripts and directions relating to a further interlocutory application that was filed by Mr Bilal on 14 July 2026; and

(h)    on 22 and 23 July 2026, the proceedings were listed before me for interlocutory hearing of the Recusal Application.

2.2    EML Whistleblower Proceedings: NSD617/2025 - Ali Bilal v EML NSW Limited & Ors

11    Mr Bilal commenced these proceedings against EML and two of its employees, Ms Hayley Taylor and Mr Conor Stewart, alleging contraventions of the “whistleblower” protections contained in Pt 9.4AAA of the Corporations Act and contraventions of the prohibition in s 345 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) against knowingly or recklessly making false or misleading representations about workplace rights. These proceedings were listed before me as follows:

(a)    on 13 May 2025, the proceedings were listed before me for case management where I made orders standing the matter over to 27 May 2025;

(b)    on 27 May 2025, the proceedings were listed before me for case management where I made orders for the filing and service of a defence and reply, and a future listing date;

(c)    on 8 July 2025, the proceedings were listed before me for case management where I made orders in relation to interlocutory applications already filed or yet to be filed by the parties, which consisted of:

(i)    an application for a separate hearing and determination of any compensation, which was filed by Mr Bilal on 1 July 2025;

(ii)    an application seeking summary dismissal or strike out of the statement of claim, which was filed by the EML Respondents on 16 July 2025; and

(iii)    an application for discovery, which was filed by Mr Bilal on 22 July 2025.

(d)    on 5 September 2025, the proceedings were listed before me for interlocutory hearing of the above applications filed by the parties;

(e)    on 25 September 2025, the proceedings were listed before me for judgment and case management where I handed down my judgment in Bilal v EML NSW Limited [2025] FCA 1190. As explained in that judgment, I made orders striking out the statement of claim filed on 23 April 2025 in its entirety. I also made timetabling orders relating to a proposed amended statement of claim;

(f)    on 20 November 2025, the proceedings were listed before me for case management where I made timetabling orders for the filing and service of an amended statement of claim, amended originating application, defence and reply. I also made orders dismissing Mr Bilal’s interlocutory application filed 1 July 2025 seeking orders for a separate trial, dismissing Mr Bilal’s interlocutory application filed 22 July 2025 seeking orders for discovery and dismissing the proceedings as against the second and third respondents, being Ms Taylor and Mr Stewart;

(g)    on 10 February 2026, the proceedings were listed before me for case management where I made timetabling orders for the filing and service of evidence in chief on liability and for the parties to confer regarding discovery;

(h)    on 20 May 2026, the proceedings were listed before me for case management where I made orders setting aside my previous orders and made timetabling orders for the Recusal Application;

(i)    on 23 June 2026, the proceedings were listed before me for case management where I made orders for EML to file and serve evidence in response on the question of liability; and

(j)    on 22 and 23 July 2026, the proceedings were listed before me for hearing of the Recusal Application.

2.3    Ampol Misrepresentation Proceedings: NSD1187/2025 - Ali Bilal v Ampol Australia Petroleum Pty Ltd

12    These proceedings arise from Mr Bilal’s claim for weekly payments of workers compensation (WC Claim), which he began receiving in or about June 2024 and continued to receive until 11 November 2024 when they were suspended. The suspension of the weekly payments was communicated by EML in a letter dated 11 November 2024 (the Suspension Letter). Mr Bilal claims that through the Suspension Letter, Ampol Australia knowingly or recklessly made false or misleading representations about his “workplace rights” in contravention of s 345 of the FW Act. These proceedings were listed before me as follows:

(a)    on 26 August 2025, the proceedings were listed before me for case management where I made timetabling orders for the filing and service of a statement of claim, defence and any interlocutory application;

(b)    on 25 September 2025, the proceedings were listed before me for case management where I made timetabling orders for the filing of a reply and any affidavit evidence upon which Mr Bilal relies in chief;

(c)    on 15 October 2025, the proceedings were listed before me for directions where I made timetabling orders for the filing of any submissions in support of Mr Bilal’s two interlocutory applications filed 29 September 2025 and 12 October 2025, and the filing of any evidence and submissions in reply and any evidence in chief in respect of issues in the proceedings relating to liability;

(d)    on 19 November 2025, the proceedings were listed before me for interlocutory hearing of the two interlocutory applications that had been filed by Mr Bilal referred to above;

(e)    on 27 November 2025, the proceedings were listed before me for judgment where I delivered judgment dismissing Mr Bilal’s interlocutory applications referred to above: see Bilal v Ampol Australia Petroleum Pty Ltd (Interlocutory) [2025] FCA 1473. I made orders that the question of whether the respondent contravened s 345 of the FW Act be heard and determined prior to the hearing and determination of any other issues, including as to causation, loss, damage and remedy. I also made timetabling orders relating to the filing and service of evidence and discovery;

(f)    on 10 February 2026, the proceedings were listed before me for case management where I made timetabling orders for the filing of submissions and evidence in relation to an interlocutory application filed by Mr Bilal on 16 January 2026 and the filing of submissions in relation to the question of liability. I listed the interlocutory application for hearing, and also separately listed the matter for hearing on questions of liability at a time after the interlocutory application could be determined;

(g)    on 5 May 2026, the proceedings were listed before me for hearing of Mr Bilal’s interlocutory application filed on 16 January 2026;

(h)    on 13 May 2026, the proceedings were listed before me for judgment where I delivered an interlocutory judgment dismissing Mr Bilal’s interlocutory application dated 16 January 2026: see Bilal v Ampol Australia Petroleum Pty Ltd (Discovery) [2026] FCA 591;

(i)    on 20 May 2026, the proceedings were listed before me for case management where I made orders setting aside my previous orders and made timetabling orders for the Recusal Application;

(j)    on 15 July 2026, the proceedings were listed before me for case management; and

(k)    on 22 and 23 July 2026, the proceedings were listed before me for interlocutory hearing of Mr Bilal’s Recusal Application.

2.4    EML Misrepresentation Proceedings: NSD185/2026 - Ali Bilal v EML NSW Limited

13    Mr Bilal commenced these proceedings alleging that EML had contravened s 345 of the FW Act by, amongst other things, making false representations about the suspension of his weekly compensation payments. These proceedings were listed before me as follows:

(a)    on 21 April 2026, the proceedings were listed before me for case management and directions where I made timetabling orders for the filing and service of a defence and reply, and for the listing of Mr Bilal’s interlocutory application filed 14 April 2026 for directions;

(b)    on 14 May 2026, the proceedings were listed before me for directions where I made timetabling orders for the filing and service of evidence and submissions in relation to the determination of Mr Bilal’s interlocutory application filed on 14 April 2026 seeking judgment be entered in his favour on account of default by EML;

(c)    on 20 May 2026, the proceedings were listed before me for case management where I made orders setting aside my previous orders and made timetabling orders for the Recusal Application; and

(d)    on 22 and 23 July 2026, the proceedings were listed before me for interlocutory hearing of Mr Bilal’s Recusal Application.

2.5    Further Ampol Misrepresentation Proceedings: NSD444/2026 - Ali Bilal v Ampol Australia Petroleum Pty Ltd & Ors

14    Mr Bilal commenced these proceedings alleging that Ampol Australia, EML and the Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer had contravened s 345 of the FW Act by making false and misleading representations about his workplace rights in relation to the management of his WC Claim. These proceedings were listed before me as follows:

(a)    on 13 May 2026, the proceedings were listed before me for case management where I made orders relating to service of Mr Bilal’s interlocutory application filed 25 April 2026 and listed this application and Mr Bilal’s earlier interlocutory application filed 24 April 2026, for hearing;

(b)    on 20 May 2026, the proceedings were listed before me for case management where I made orders setting aside my previous orders and made timetabling orders for the Recusal Application; and

(c)    on 22 and 23 July 2026, the proceedings were listed before me for interlocutory hearing of Mr Bilal’s Recusal Application.

2.6    First Registrar Review Proceedings: NSD497/2026 - Ali Bilal v Jodie Burns Registrar of the Federal Court of Australia

15    Before turning to the First Registrar Review Proceedings, it is necessary to outline my understanding of the procedural history of Mr Bilal’s attempts to file various further proceedings.

16    On 4 March 2026, Mr Bilal lodged an originating application and statement of claim (Lodgment ID 1628070) (4 March 2026 Lodgment). On 5 March 2026, my Chambers received an email from the Registry stating that these documents had been lodged for filing and that they were very similar to documents that had been filed in the EML Misrepresentation Proceedings save that they had added another respondent and made additional allegations. The Registry asked me for my views as to whether the 4 March 2026 Lodgment should be accepted for filing and allocated to a judge, with a view to consolidating the proposed new proceedings and the EML Misrepresentation Proceedings, or whether the documents should be dealt with in some other way.

17    On 5 March 2026, my Chambers (at my direction) responded to the Registry and I subsequently disclosed the substance of that communication to the parties as set out below at [32].

18    As I understand the position, the Registry subsequently rejected the 4 March 2026 Lodgment. As I further understand the position, Mr Bilal does not challenge the rejection of his 4 March 2026 Lodgment in either the First or Second Registrar Review Proceedings. However, the rejection of the 4 March 2026 Lodgment provides important context to the subject matter of those two Proceedings.

19    On 16 March 2026, Mr Bilal sent the below email to the Registry:

I refer to the eLodgment submitted under ID 1628070 on 4 March 2026.

I previously wrote on 9 March 2026 and again on 12 March 2026 regarding the status of the lodgment. The registry indicated that the document had been referred to the National Duty Registrar and that an update had been requested. The matters raised in those enquiries have not received a substantive response.

The lodgment continues to remain in "Unprocessed" status.

The continuing delay in processing filings in the Applicant's matters causes ongoing harm and prejudice to the Applicant, particularly given the nature of the proceedings and the need for timely progression.

Please clarify:

•    why the lodgment has been referred to the National Duty Registrar,

•    the statutory or procedural basis under which that referral and any consideration of the lodgment are occurring, and

•    the anticipated timeframe for completion of that process and processing of the lodgment.

20    From the above email, it appears that Mr Bilal had previously corresponded with the Registry in relation to the 4 March 2026 Lodgment (on 9 and 12 March 2026) but these emails were not in evidence.

21    On 16 March 2026, an officer of the Registry, but not a Registrar, responded to Mr Bilal as follows:

Thank you for your email, we have received the below response and will reject lodgment 1628070 accordingly.

This lodgement has not been accepted by the Court on the basis that this application concerns similar matters to your existing claim against EML.

You should raise these issues as part of that existing claim.

22    Later, on 16 March 2026, Mr Bilal sent the following further email to the Registry:

I refer to the eLodgment submitted under ID 1628070 on 4 March 2026, which is marked “Rejected”.

To enable the Applicant to protect and enforce his legal rights, please confirm:

•    The name and position of the person who made the decision to reject the lodgment, and

•    The statutory or procedural authority relied upon to make that decision.

23    On 17 March 2026, an officer of the Registry, but not a Registrar, responded to Mr Bilal as follows:

Thank you for your email.

The decision to reject lodgment 1628070 was made by Justice Shariff.

24    On 27 March 2026, Mr Bilal again emailed the Registry in relation to his 4 March 2026 Lodgment, stating as follows:

I am writing in relation to elodgment ID 1628070 submitted on 4 March 2026.

On 9 March 2026, I was advised that the lodgment had been referred to the National Duty Registrar. On 12 March 2026, I was advised that an update had been requested from the Duty Registrar.

Confirm the name of that Registrar.

25    Later that day, an officer of the Registry, but not a Registrar, responded to Mr Bilal reiterating the information provided in the Registry’s earlier email from 17 March 2026:

Thank you for your email.

I confirm our email to you on 17 March states this decision to refuse the documents was made by Justice Shariff.

26    As noted above, Mr Bilal did not proceed to challenge the rejection of the 4 March 2026 Lodgment.

27    On 25 March 2026, Mr Bilal lodged a further originating process (Lodgment ID 1641264) (25 March 2026 Lodgment). Mr Bilal gave evidence that the 25 March 2026 Lodgment was in substantially the same terms as the 4 March 2026 Lodgment and that on 26 March 2026, the 25 March 2026 Lodgment was rejected. He stated that he received correspondence from the Registry attaching a letter communicating the decision to reject the 25 March 2026 Lodgment.

28    Mr Bilal commenced the First Registrar Review Proceedings seeking a review of Registrar Burns’ decision refusing the 25 March 2026 Lodgment for filing. It appears that Registrar Burns had made the decision to reject the 25 March 2026 Lodgment. I understand that by his 25 March 2026 Lodgment, Mr Bilal wished to bring new proceedings against EML and the Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer alleging that they had both contravened the FW Act.

29    As I explain further below, I am satisfied that I should disqualify myself from further involvement in the First Registrar Review Proceedings. My reasons for doing so will become apparent.

30    The First Registrar Review Proceedings were listed before me as follows:

(a)    on 14 May 2026, the proceedings were listed before me for case management where I made orders that Mr Bilal be provided with an electronic copy of particular transcripts and made orders for the filing of the Recusal Application together with evidence and submissions in support, to be determined on the papers;

(b)    on 20 May 2026, the proceedings were listed before me for case management where I made orders setting aside my previous orders and made timetabling orders for the Recusal Application, including the making of requests for transcripts; and

(c)    on 22 and 23 July 2026, the proceedings were listed before me for interlocutory hearing of Mr Bilal’s Recusal Application.

31    It is convenient at this juncture to note that part of Mr Bilal’s contentions in support of the Recusal Application is that I have involved myself as a “gatekeeper” in determining what claims he is permitted to bring in this Court. He contended that I was involved in preventing him from filing the 25 March 2026 proceedings he wished to bring against EML and the Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer.

32    Once Mr Bilal filed the Recusal Application, I realised that I may in fact have been involved, albeit not directly, in the decision made by Registrar Burns to refuse Mr Bilal’s filing of the new proceedings. I considered it appropriate to disclose my involvement and, to that end, on 24 June 2026, I caused my Chambers to send the following email to the parties:

Dear Parties,

Further to the case management hearing held in proceedings NSD617/2025 and NSD156/2026 where Justice Shariff raised certain matters relating to Mr Bilal's Recusal Application in those proceedings and several others, his Honour now sets out the email that his Honour said he would provide to the parties.

The relevant circumstances are as follows.

On a date unknown to his Honour, but sometime in late February or early March 2026, it appears that Mr Bilal sought to file new proceedings in this Court (eLodgment ID 1628070). His Honour was not told when those documents had sought to be filed. His Honour was informed as follows:

(a)    That there was an Originating Application and Statement of Claim (which were not provided to his Honour, but which were said to be very similar to documents in NSD185/2026, but that the applicant had added another party and some further allegations;

(b)    That as the first directions hearing had not yet taken place, would it be prudent for the new proposed proceedings to be accepted for filing or whether some other course could be taken.

His Honour understood that such a request from the Judicial Registrar was consistent with the r 1.37 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (FC Rules) which permits the Court to give a direction to a Registrar.

His Honour conveyed the view that it would be preferable for Mr Bilal to bring any further claims against EML as part of any existing case against EML such as in NSD185/2026 and to join any additional respondents as a new party. His Honour requested that Mr Bilal be advised that whilst the new claims (which his Honour had not sighted) would not be accepted for filing, he raise any new claims as part of one of his existing proceedings and, if he did not wish to do so, that his Honour could case manage any such new claims as a separate proceeding together with any other overlapping proceeding.

His Honour also considered whether a direction should be issued to Mr Bilal to this effect under 2.27E of the FC Rules. Thereafter, his Honour did not hear anything further about the matter.

On 17 April 2026, his Honour was allocated new proceedings (NSD497/2026 ALI BILAL v JODIE BURNS REGISTRAR OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA) for a review of a Registrar's decision refusing to accept documents for filing (eLodgment ID 1641264).

After being allocated this matter, his Honour corresponded with the parties and listed the matter for case management hearing on Thursday 14 May 2026. At that time, his Honour did not know whether this claim was in relation to the same matter referred to above. At that case management hearing, his Honour sought to better understand Mr Bilal's claims in an attempt to see whether they could be added to one or more of his other proceedings.

As his Honour adverted to at this morning's case management hearing, given that in proceedings NSD497/2026, Mr Bilal seeks a review of a Registrar's decision which may have been influenced by his Honour's communications with the Judicial Registrar, his Honour considers that at least on a preliminary basis, there may be grounds for a reasonable apprehension of bias to arise if his Honour was to determine on whether Mr Bilal's review of the Registrar's decision should be upheld or dismissed.

33    As will be apparent from the above, I was directly involved in the decision to reject the 4 March 2026 Lodgment (which Mr Bilal does not challenge). Although I was not directly involved in any decision to reject the 25 March 2026 Lodgment, as noted above, Mr Bilal gave evidence that the 25 March 2026 Lodgment was in substantially the same terms as the 4 March 2026 Lodgment. My reasons for disqualifying myself from the First Registrar Review Proceedings are set out in Part 4.2 below.

2.7    Second Registrar Review Proceedings: NSD609/2026 - Ali Bilal v Registrar of the Federal Court of Australia

34    On 1 April 2026, Mr Bilal lodged a further originating process (Lodgment ID 1645644) (1 April 2026 Lodgment) seeking to commence proceedings against EML NSW Limited and the Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer as respondents. Mr Bilal gave evidence that on 2 April 2026, he received an email from the Registry stating that the 1 April 2026 Lodgment had been rejected, and identifying that a Duty Registrar had made the decision to refuse the lodgment and further stating that the rejection was on the same basis as the rejection of the 25 March 2026 Lodgment.

35    On 2 April 2026, Mr Bilal sent the following email to the Registry:

I refer to the eLodgment portal in respect of eLodgment ID 1645644, which is marked as “Rejected” with the following message:

“Please refer to email from the Registry dated 2/4/2026. Kind regards, EC.”

I also refer to the email from the NSW Registry dated 2 April 2026, which states:

“The Duty Registrar refuses the current documents (originating application and statement of claim) on the same basis as raised in the Letter of Registrar J Burns dated 26 March 2026, as the documents are substantially similar to the documents that were refused on 26 March 2026.”

Please provide the following:

•    The full name of the officer who made the decision to refuse elodgment ID 1645644 (not merely the office).

•    The authority relied upon to refuse acceptance of the documents.

•    The reasons for refusal of elodgment ID 1645644, stated clearly and unambiguously in full, in the decisionmaker's own words, and not by reference to any earlier correspondence, document, or unspecified material.

Please ensure the response sets out the decision-maker, the authority relied upon, and the reasons for refusal in clear and complete terms.

In the current circumstances of the Applicant, any delay in the pursuit of his legal rights causes prejudice, including financial and non-financial harm.

36    Later that day, an officer of the Registry, but not a Registrar, sent the following response:

The Duty Registrar refused the documents filed under eLodgment ID 1645644 on the same basis as raised in the Letter of Registrar J Burns dated 26 March 2026, as the documents are substantially similar to the documents that were refused on 26 March 2026.

37    Mr Bilal commenced the Second Registrar Review Proceedings seeking declarations that the refusal to accept the 1 April 2026 Lodgment was invalid and unlawful.

38    The Second Registrar Review Proceedings were listed before me as follows:

(a)    on 20 May 2026, the proceedings were listed before me for case management where I made orders setting aside my previous orders and made timetabling orders for the Recusal Application; and

(b)    on 22 and 23 July 2026, the proceedings were listed before me for interlocutory hearing of Mr Bilal’s Recusal Application.

39    Although I did not have any direct involvement with the Second Registrar Review Proceedings, as noted above, the Registry indicated to Mr Bilal that the 1 April 2026 Lodgment was rejected on the same basis as the 25 March 2026 Lodgment, which Mr Bilal contended was in substantially the same terms as the 4 March 2026 Lodgment (the rejection of which I was involved in). As explained further below, I am satisfied that I should disqualify myself from further managing, hearing or determining the Second Registrar Review Proceedings for the reasons set out in Part 4.2 below.

2.8    Ampol Fair Work Information Statement Proceedings: NSD156/2026 - Ali Bilal v Ampol Australia Petroleum Pty Ltd

40    Mr Bilal commenced these proceedings alleging a contravention of s 44 of the FW Act claiming that Ampol Australia failed to provide him with a Fair Work Information Statement as required under the FW Act and that the contravention was systematic and serious.

41    These proceedings were initially allocated to Needham J and were reallocated to my docket on or about 20 May 2026.

42    The proceedings had been listed before Needham J on 4 March 2026 and 10 April 2026. On the latter occasion, her Honour made timetabling orders for the filing and service of evidence in chief by both parties and listing the matter for case management hearing. The proceedings were thereafter listed before me as follows:

(a)    on 20 May 2026, the proceedings were listed before me for case management where I made orders setting aside previous timetabling orders made by Needham J and made timetabling orders for the Recusal Application;

(b)    on 23 June 2026, the proceedings were listed before me for case management where I made orders varying earlier orders made by Needham J for the respondent to file and serve evidence; and

(c)    on 22 and 23 July 2026, the proceedings were listed before me for interlocutory hearing of Mr Bilal’s Recusal Application.

2.9    Observations about the Eight Proceedings allocated to my docket

43    As will be apparent from the above, all of the Eight Proceedings that Mr Bilal has commenced, or has sought to commence, relate in one way or another to: (a) his employment with Ampol Australia; (b) the circumstances leading up to and including the termination of his employment with Ampol Australia; and/or (c) the management of his WC Claim or representations made to him about that claim.

44    In the Eight Proceedings that have been allocated to my docket, six of them involve claims against one or more of Ampol Limited, Ampol Australia, Ampol Energy, EML or the Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer, and two of them involve challenges to decisions of Registrars of this Court. For ease, I have referred to Ampol Limited, Ampol Australia and Ampol Energy as Ampol either individually or collectively, other than where the context requires me to refer to them separately or individually. Similarly, I have referred to EML, Ms Taylor and Mr Stewart either individually or collectively as the EML Respondents, other than where the context requires them to be individually mentioned.

45    The proceedings challenging the decisions of Registrars relate to new proceedings that Mr Bilal wishes to commence against EML and the Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer as set out above. In relation to the respective proceedings that Mr Bilal has commenced against Ampol, EML and the Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer, other than the whistleblower proceedings, each of them alleges contraventions of the FW Act against these parties.

46    To date, in managing the Eight Proceedings and the various interlocutory applications that have been filed by the parties, I have held 20 hearings in a period of approximately 14 to 15 months. Some of these hearings involved the listing of more than one of the Eight Proceedings, but that was not the case in relation to every such hearing.

47    As will also be apparent from the above, Mr Bilal has filed 11 interlocutory applications across the Eight Proceedings (but has not done so in every one of the Proceedings). These interlocutory applications are as follows:

(a)    an interlocutory application filed 1 July 2025 in the EML Whistleblower Proceedings (NSD617/2025) in which he sought orders for a separate trial (Separate Trial Application);

(b)    an interlocutory application filed 22 July 2025 in the EML Whistleblower Proceedings (NSD617/2025) in which he sought orders for discovery (EML Discovery Application);

(c)    an interlocutory application filed 29 September 2025 in the Ampol Misrepresentation Proceedings (NSD1187/2025) in which he sought a production order (Production Application);

(d)    an interlocutory application filed 12 October 2025 in the Ampol Misrepresentation Proceedings (NSD1187/2025) in which he sought:

(i)    orders that summary judgment be entered against Ampol by way of a declaration that the respondent made false or misleading representations about Mr Bilal’s workplace rights (the Summary Judgment Application), but with a hearing as to damages and penalties to be deferred for up to 12 months (the Deferral Application);

(ii)    orders for the questions of liability and quantum to be determined separately (the Separation Application);

(iii)    an order that Ampol give non-standard discovery in 13 categories as pressed by him (the Ampol Discovery Application);

(iv)    orders vacating earlier orders requiring Mr Bilal to file and serve his evidence on liability (the Vacation Application); and

(v)    injunctive relief, preventing Ampol from relying on or giving effect to the false or misleading representations contained in the Suspension Letter (the Injunction Application);

(e)    an interlocutory application filed 16 January 2026 in the Ampol Misrepresentation Proceedings (NSD1187/2025) in which he sought:

(i)    declarations that Ampol failed to comply with orders for discovery made by the Court on 27 November 2025 (Discovery Orders), and specifically Orders 5, 6 and 7;

(ii)    an order Ampol give fresh discovery in compliance with the Discovery Orders, and that this discovery be verified by an affidavit prepared in accordance with the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (Rules);

(iii)    an order that Ampol be precluded from relying at trial on any document not discovered by it in accordance with the proposed new discovery order; and

(iv)    an order that Ampol be precluded from relying, for any purpose in this proceeding, on any contention pleaded in its Defence filed on 19 September 2025 that EML was its insurer “including (without limitation) any contention of subrogation or any contention that depends upon or is derived from that alleged status”;

(f)    an interlocutory application filed 14 April 2026 in the EML Misrepresentation Proceedings (NSD185/2026) in which he sought orders for judgment to be entered against EML (First Default Application);

(g)    an interlocutory application filed 24 April 2026 in the Further Ampol Misrepresentation Proceedings (NSD444/2026) in which he sought orders for judgment to be entered against Ampol (Second Default Application);

(h)    an interlocutory application filed 25 April 2026 in the Further Ampol Misrepresentation Proceedings (NSD444/2026) in which he sought orders for judgment to be entered against EML (Third Default Application);

(i)    an interlocutory application filed 25 April 2026 in the Further Ampol Misrepresentation Proceedings (NSD444/2026) in which he sought orders for judgment to be entered against the Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer (Fourth Default Application);

(j)    the Recusal Application; and

(k)    an interlocutory application filed 13 July 2026 in the Ampol Whistleblower Proceedings (NSD391/2025) in which he sought orders that Ampol comply with his request made under the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).

48    In addition, either Ampol or EML have filed the following interlocutory applications:

(a)    an interlocutory application filed 16 July 2025 in the EML Whistleblower Proceedings (NSD617/2025) in which EML sought summary dismissal of the whole of the proceedings or, in the alternative, an order that the statement of claim be struck out in whole or in part (EML Summary Dismissal Application); and

(b)    an interlocutory application filed 2 May 2025 in the Ampol Whistleblower Proceedings (NSD391/2025) in which Ampol sought summary dismissal of the proceedings or, in the alternative, an order that the statement of claim be struck out, and the transfer of proceedings (Ampol Summary Dismissal Application).

49    I have heard and determined each of the interlocutory applications specified in [47(c)-(e)] and [48(a) and (b)] above, and I have now determined the Recusal Application. The need to determine the other applications did not arise or has not arisen due to the way the various proceedings have evolved.

3.    APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES

50    Mr Bilal contended that my conduct in case managing the various proceedings and the things I have said and done during the various hearings listed before me, as well as other matters, gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias such that I should be disqualified from further involvement in the Eight Proceedings.

51    Mr Bilal made it clear that his contentions did not involve any allegation of actual bias.

52    Any application for recusal necessarily requires a judge to examine the so-called “duty to sit” as against the maintenance of public confidence in the administration of justice by the discharge of judicial functions consistent with the judicial oath and affirmation, and with the principles of natural justice: QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 15; 279 CLR 148 at [278]-[279] and [319]-[320] (Jagot J). Although the “duty to sit” has been described as a “misnomer” (QYFM at [129] (Edelman J)), the applicable principles recognise that a fundamental function of appointment to judicial office requires a judge to hear and determine the cases that are allocated to him or her, but to do so impartially and, importantly, without any apprehension that cases will be decided on anything other than their merits. Thus, the “duty to sit” is not absolute. In Re JRL; Ex parte CJL [1986] HCA 39; 161 CLR 342 at 352, Mason J stated that:

Although it is important that justice must be seen to be done, it is equally important that judicial officers discharge their duty to sit and do not, by acceding too readily to suggestions of appearance of bias, encourage parties to believe that by seeking the disqualification of a judge, they will have their case tried by someone thought to be more likely to decide the case in their favour.

53    In order to establish grounds for recusal on the basis of a reasonable apprehension of bias, Mr Bilal accepted that he had to establish the “double might” test that a “fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that [I] might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question[s] [that I am] required to decide” (emphasis added): Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; 205 CLR 337 at [6] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ).

54    There are at least two steps involved in the application of the test enunciated in Ebner: first, one must identify “what it is said might lead a [decision-maker] to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits”; and second, there “must be an articulation of the logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits”: Ebner at [8] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). Where this is made out, the decision-maker is disqualified: Ebner at [6].

55    It has since been held that there is a further criterion or third evaluative step which requires an assessment of the reasonableness of the apprehension of bias. In Charisteas v Charisteas [2021] HCA 29; 273 CLR 289 at [11], Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane, Gordon and Gleeson JJ stated that:

Where, as here, a question arises as to the independence or impartiality of a judge, the applicable principles are well established, and they were not in dispute. The apprehension of bias principle is that "a judge is disqualified if a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide". The principle gives effect to the requirement that justice should both be done and be seen to be done, reflecting a requirement fundamental to the common law system of adversarial trial - that it is conducted by an independent and impartial tribunal. Its application requires two steps: first, "it requires the identification of what it is said might lead a judge … to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits"; and, secondly, there must be articulated a "logical connection" between that matter and the feared departure from the judge deciding the case on its merits. Once those two steps are taken, the reasonableness of the asserted apprehension of bias can then ultimately be assessed.

56    In QYFM at [38], Kiefel CJ and Gageler J stated that the criterion arising from Ebner logically entails:

(1) identification of the factor which it is said might lead a judge to resolve the question other than on its legal and factual merits; (2) articulation of the logical connection between that factor and the apprehended deviation from deciding that question on its merits; and (3) assessment of the reasonableness of that apprehension from the perspective of a fair-minded lay observer.

57    These three-step criteria have since been applied in SunshineLoans Pty Ltd v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2026] HCA 8; 100 ALJR 489 at [1] (Gageler CJ and Gleeson J), [60] (Gordon J), [105] (Edelman J), [130] (Jagot J) and [173] (Beech-Jones J). It follows that the correct application of the test for apprehension of bias involves the following:

(a)    identification of the factor which it is said might lead a judge to resolve the question other than on its legal and factual merits;

(b)    articulation of the logical connection between that factor and the apprehended deviation from deciding that question on its merits; and

(c)    assessment of the reasonableness of that apprehension from the perspective of a fair-minded lay observer.

58    In the present case, Mr Bilal’s submissions did not address themselves to these steps, but the essence of his contentions was that my conduct in the Eight Proceedings in various ways might lead a fair-minded lay observer to reasonably apprehend that I might not bring an impartial mind to bear in the management, hearing and determination of all or some of the Eight Proceedings.

59    Central to Mr Bilal’s contentions was what the fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend. It is necessary to say something about the construct of the fair-minded lay observer, especially in the context of contemporary case management principles and particularly those which are specified to be the overarching purpose of the civil practice and procedure of this Court as stated in s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act).

60    It is to be accepted that the fair-minded lay observer is a “construct”: see QYFM at [45] (Kiefel CJ and Gageler J), [85] (Gordon J), [175] (Edelman J), [249]-[250] (Gleeson J) and [275] (Jagot J). The hypothetical fair-minded lay observer is an objective observer of the relevant proceedings and will be assumed to be properly informed as to their nature, the matters in issue and the conduct complained of: Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H [2001] HCA 28; 179 ALR 425 at [28]–[29] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ); NADH of 2001 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 328; 214 ALR 264 at [14]–[21] (Allsop J; Moore and Tamberlin JJ agreeing). Thus, the fair-minded lay observer is not assumed to be entirely ignorant of the law or its processes. As has been stated, the “fictional observer” is not to be “assumed to have a detailed knowledge of the law”, but “the reasonableness of any suggested apprehension of bias is to be considered in the context of ordinary judicial practice”: Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48; 201 CLR 488 at [13] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). That includes the observer being aware of the relevant legal, statutory and factual context: see, eg SunshineLoans at [40] (Gageler CJ and Gleeson J), [69] (Gordon J), [146] (Jagot J) and [178] (Beech-Jones J).

61    There is something further to be said about the reasonable apprehensions of the fair-minded lay observer in the context of contemporary judicial practice, case management and the hearing and determination of interlocutory proceedings. The role of “modern judges” in “active case management” was recognised in Johnson at [13], where the plurality, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ, stated:

Whilst the fictional observer, by reference to whom the test is formulated, is not to be assumed to have a detailed knowledge of the law, or of the character or ability of a particular judge, the reasonableness of any suggested apprehension of bias is to be considered in the context of ordinary judicial practice. The rules and conventions governing such practice are not frozen in time. They develop to take account of the exigencies of modern litigation. At the trial level, modern judges, responding to a need for more active case management, intervene in the conduct of cases to an extent that may surprise a person who came to court expecting a judge to remain, until the moment of pronouncement of judgment, as inscrutable as the Sphinx. In Vakauta v Kelly Brennan, Deane and Gaudron JJ, referring both to trial and appellate proceedings, spoke of “the dialogue between Bench and Bar which is so helpful in the identification of real issues and real problems in a particular case.” Judges, at trial or appellate level, who, in exchanges with counsel, express tentative views which reflect a certain tendency of mind, are not on that account alone to be taken to indicate prejudgment. Judges are not expected to wait until the end of a case before they start thinking about the issues, or to sit mute while evidence is advanced and arguments are presented. On the contrary, they will often form tentative opinions on matters in issue, and counsel are usually assisted by hearing those opinions, and being given an opportunity to deal with them.

(Emphasis added; footnotes omitted.)

62    A further fact of ordinary judicial practice, especially in this Court, which operates on a docket system, is that judges who are allocated matters on the determination of the Chief Justice, may and will be called upon to take an active role in case management, and often will be called upon to determine interlocutory applications that will inevitably be favourable or unfavourable to one party or set of parties. That is not to say the expedient of case management and efficiency prevails over the necessity for impartiality and the appearance of it, but to recognise that the fair-minded lay observer is not to be taken to be ignorant of the contemporary desire (if it was ever any different in the past) for the “just resolution of disputes” in accordance with law and as “quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible” as stated in s 37M(1) of the FCA Act. It may be thought that the fair-minded lay observer as a lay member of the community has not only an expectation but an interest in the efficient use of public time and resources.

63    None of this is novel; it is an ordinary incident of judicial practice informed by community expectations and necessary for engendering trust and confidence in the administration of justice. In British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Laurie [2011] HCA 2; 242 CLR 283, Heydon, Kiefel and Bell JJ referred to the active role a modern judge is likely to play in case management and stated at [140] that “[t]rial judges are frequently required to make rulings excluding irrelevant and prejudicial material from evidence [and] [r]outine rulings of this nature are unlikely to disqualify the judge from further hearing the proceeding”.

64    The same position and expectations apply in relation to the determination of interlocutory applications. In Doggett v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2019] FCAFC 19, the Full Court (Kerr, Davies and Thawley JJ) considered claims of apprehended bias based on rulings made by a judge in interlocutory proceedings and stated at [11]:

Claims of apprehended bias arise not infrequently, as they have in this appeal, in respect of interlocutory proceedings. The usual position in relation to interlocutory proceedings is that an apprehension of bias is not per se manifested by an unfavourable finding. That is because often there will be instances prior to a final decision where a judge will require steps to be taken or not taken which disappoint one side or another in a proceeding. It is inherent in the interlocutory process that such preliminary decisions are made. Unfavourable findings, in such circumstances, are not to be taken by a fair-minded person as an expression that the judge has other than an impartial and unprejudiced mind in relation to the substantive proceeding. …

65    As I will explain further below, these matters are ones which feature prominently in the determination of the Recusal Application.

66    There is a further matter of principle that is convenient to address at this point. It relates to the obligations of the Court to litigants in person. I have addressed these obligations previously in Bilal v EML NSW Limited [2025] FCA 1190 at [8]-[9] and Kitoko v University of Technology Sydney (No 3) [2025] FCA 915 at [16] and [62]. By way of short summary, the relevant principles are that it is not the function of the Court to give judicial advice to, or conduct the case on behalf of, a self-represented litigant: Bhagwanani v Martin [1999] SASC 406; 204 LSJS 449 (Bleby J); Clark v New South Wales (No 2) [2006] NSWSC 914 (Johnson J). However, the Court nevertheless has an obligation to ensure a fair trial and to take appropriate steps to ensure that a self-represented litigant has sufficient information about the practice and procedure of the Court, so far as is reasonably practicable for the purpose of ensuring a fair trial (or hearing): EBW21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 341 at [38] (Feutrill J) (and the authorities there cited). Ultimately, as Markovic, Derrington and Anastassiou JJ observed in Flightdeck Geelong Pty Ltd v All Options Pty Ltd [2020] FCAFC 138; 280 FCR 479 at [53]–[57], the Court must remain an “impartial adjudicator” and “the extent of the Court’s obligation to assist an unrepresented litigant is factually idiosyncratic and, significantly, depends upon ‘the litigant, the nature of the case, and the litigant’s intelligence and understanding of the case’”: citing Abram v Bank of New Zealand [1996] FCA 1650; ATPR 41–507 at 42,347. It is important to bear these principles in mind because (as will become apparent from the below), Mr Bilal has taken issue with various things I have said or done in seeking to explain the practices and procedures of this Court, and the operation of its rules and practice notes.

4.    CONSIDERATION

67    As mentioned at the outset, I am satisfied that I should recuse myself from further managing, hearing or determining the First and Second Registrar Review Proceedings, but that the Recusal Application should otherwise be dismissed.

68    I have structured this part of my reasons as follows:

(a)    in Part 4.1, I set out Mr Bilal’s “Big Picture” contentions as to what the fair-minded lay observer is taken to know;

(b)    in Part 4.2, I set out my reasons for recusing myself from the First and Second Registrar Review Proceedings;

(c)    in Part 4.3, I set out and address Mr Bilal’s submissions in relation to my conduct at and during the various hearings that I have held. It is convenient to address these matters as Mr Bilal’s various grounds for recusal relied upon my conduct during these hearings as informing or being critical to his contentions that a reasonable apprehension of bias had been established;

(d)    in Part 4.4, I address Mr Bilal’s submissions in relation to my published reasons to date. Again, Mr Bilal’s various grounds for recusal also relied upon these reasons; and

(e)    in Part 4.5, I address each of Mr Bilal’s various grounds for recusal, some of which were overlapping or at least interrelated.

4.1    Mr Bilal’s Big Picture Contentions and the Reasonable Fair-minded Lay Observer

69    Mr Bilal advanced, what he described as, “Big Picture” contentions as to my conduct and management of the Eight Proceedings and made submissions as to what the fair-minded lay person “would” observe about these matters.

70    As expanded upon in Part 4.5.1 below in relation to Ground 1, Mr Bilal submitted that the fair-minded lay observer may apprehend that his various proceedings are being allocated to me for some reason and, as a result, I have accumulated an extensive history about him which may increase the risk of cross-contamination of irrelevant information across the proceedings and the risk of my allegedly adverse views about Mr Bilal’s credibility and reliability being brought to bear in subsequent determinations that I may be called upon to make.

71    In advancing these contentions, it is convenient to note at this point that Mr Bilal’s submissions as to the knowledge to be attributed to the fair-minded lay observer and what that person is taken to observe about my conduct proceeded from a narrow standpoint. In various respects, I do not accept Mr Bilal’s contentions as to what the fair-minded lay observer is taken to know or not know.

72    Most critically, Mr Bilal’s submissions fail to address the objective fact that the fair-minded lay observer is taken to have some knowledge of the facts, matters and circumstances of the Eight Proceedings. In this respect, I am satisfied that the fair-minded lay observer is taken to know that Mr Bilal has commenced multiple proceedings against Ampol and EML, and that these proceedings in one way or another relate to the circumstances leading up to and including the termination of his employment and the management of his WC Claim (including the suspension of his weekly entitlements). Further, I consider that the fair-minded lay observer would also be taken to know that the different proceedings involve claims under the same or similar statutory provisions of either the Corporations Act or the FW Act.

73    I am satisfied that the fair-minded lay observer is also taken to know that the Eight Proceedings have been allocated to the same judge for case management and, ultimately, for hearing and determination. I am further satisfied that the fair-minded lay observer is taken to know that it is an ordinary incident of judicial practice in this Court that it operates on a docket system and that one of the purposes of such a system is to ensure efficient case management of proceedings by a single judge who is to ultimately hear and determine those proceedings in a manner consistent with s 37M of the FCA Act.

74    In my view, and for the reasons set out at [61]-[65] above, I am satisfied that as a member of the community, the fair-minded lay observer has an interest in the efficient administration of courts and the use of public time, money and resources in the determination of legal disputes. The construct of the fair-minded lay observer is intended to be reflective of the community’s views and expectations as to the impartial administration of justice, including the appearance of impartiality, such that there is an ultimate determination or determinations made on the legal and factual merits of each case without any appearance that this may not occur. An essential element of the administration of justice is that members of the community have an expectation that legal disputes will be heard and determined as quickly as possible, and that courts and judges will facilitate the just resolution of such disputes in this way.

75    Given that the operation of the docket system in this Court is an ordinary incident of judicial practice and how this Court in fact functions, I am satisfied that, in the absence of any concerns as to partiality or the appearance of partiality or the risk of matters being determined other than on their merits, the fair-minded lay observer is taken to know or have an expectation that different proceedings relating to the same parties involving allegations of contraventions of the same or similar statutory provisions will be managed, heard and determined by the same judge where possible to ensure not only efficiency, but also consistency in fact finding and the determination of common questions of law as between those parties.

76    These general matters as to the knowledge to be attributed to the fair-minded lay observer are expanded upon in the parts that follow.

4.2    First and Second Registrar Review Proceedings

77    The background to the First and Second Registrar Review Proceedings is outlined in Parts 2.6 and 2.7 above, and in particular, in my email to the parties dated 24 June 2026 (extracted above at [32]).

78    In brief, by the 4 March 2026 Lodgment, Mr Bilal sought to initiate new proceedings. I was informed of this by the Registry and asked for my views as to whether the documents should be accepted for filing or whether some other course should be taken. I was not asked to make a decision. Nor did I consider that I was making a decision. Instead, I considered that I was providing assistance to the Registry in whether the documents should be accepted for filing and I was being asked to do so because I already had several matters in my docket relating to Mr Bilal. I understood that what I was being asked for was practical advice and/or the giving of a direction under r 1.37 of the Rules.

79    As I have earlier set out, the advice that I gave was that Mr Bilal should be informed that if he wished to bring any new claims against the same or similar parties, he could and should raise any such claims as part of his existing proceedings and, if he did not wish to do so, I would case manage any such new claims as a separate proceeding together with any other potentially overlapping proceeding. As will be apparent, at no time did I convey that Mr Bilal should be precluded from bringing any new claim and, instead, I was seeking to find an efficient and practical way for him to be able to do so in a way that could best be managed by the Court.

80    These are the facts as I know them. It may be that the fair-minded lay observer may or may not be apprised of all these facts, but it is what occurred.

81    At some point after the Registry had been in touch with me, Mr Bilal’s documents were not accepted for filing.

82    Various correspondence between Mr Bilal and the Registry followed in which an officer of the Registry but not a Registrar, indicated to Mr Bilal that it was me that had made the decision to reject the 4 March 2026 Lodgment. However, it is not altogether clear that I had in fact made the decision, as opposed to providing advice or giving a direction relating to that decision, but it was qualified by what I said should also be communicated to Mr Bilal about the course he should take.

83    For present purposes, it does not much matter whether I am taken to have substantively made the relevant decision or was involved in it. I will proceed on the basis that the reasonable fair-minded lay observer is taken to know that I either made or was involved in the decision to reject the 4 March 2026 Lodgment. That Lodgment is not the subject of the First or Second Registrar Review Proceedings.

84    Nor is it clear to me that I was involved in any way in the 25 March 2026 or 1 April 2026 Lodgments which are the subject of Mr Bilal’s challenges in the First and Second Registrar Review Proceedings. I was not contacted by the Registry about any further lodgments. However, I think it is reasonable to infer that the relevant officers of the Registry and Registrars may have proceeded on the basis of the course I had earlier stated. Again, for present purposes, it does not matter much and I will proceed on the basis that the reasonable fair-minded lay observer is taken to know that I either made or was involved in the decision to reject the 25 March 2026 and 1 April 2026 Lodgments that are the subject of the First and Second Registrar Review Proceedings.

85    Having regard to the above, in circumstances where the First and Second Registrar Review Proceedings seek to challenge the decisions made not to accept the relevant documents for lodgment, and I was involved in or made the relevant decisions, I am satisfied that an apprehension of bias is well-founded and has been established. Mr Bilal’s application in this respect should be upheld.

86    Having said that, it should be noted that the reasonable fair-minded lay observer is taken to know that my decision or my involvement in that decision to reject the relevant lodgments was not made because I sought to prevent Mr Bilal from bringing the claims that he wishes to bring, or that there is any appearance of me seeking to do so. Rather, as is made clear from my email of 24 June 2026 referred to above and the other matters I have raised with Mr Bilal in open Court in relation to the First and Second Registrar Review Proceedings, my interest was in the most efficient way for Mr Bilal to bring his additional claims, and whether he could do so by way of an amendment to an existing proceeding, rather than instituting fresh proceedings.

87    In my view, the reasonable fair-minded lay observer would be taken to be apprised of why I had taken the view that I had, given I have stated these matters on the record. I have expressly conveyed my position to Mr Bilal in open Court during the case management hearing on 14 May 2026 in the First Registrar Review Proceedings and during the case management hearings listed on 20 May 2026 in all Eight Proceedings. As set out below, during these hearings I expressly raised with Mr Bilal that there may be a way for me to short circuit the respective Review Proceedings by granting him leave to amend one of his existing proceedings to bring his new claims.

88    In other words, I do not accept that the fair-minded lay observer may consider that my conduct amounted to prejudgment of any of Mr Bilal’s claims, but may consider that I have been involved in or made decisions to ensure the efficient use of the Court’s resources in the management of his multiple proceedings.

4.3    Conduct during the hearings

89    In seeking to establish that my conduct at and during the various hearings gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, Mr Bilal relied upon extracts of the transcripts of those hearings. These transcripts were made available to Mr Bilal by orders that I made on 20 May 2026. In addition, Mr Bilal sought that the Court also make available to him any audio and video recordings of these hearings. I declined Mr Bilal’s request in this regard and indicated that I would give reasons for this decision in my final judgment.

90    The present position in this Court is that the transcripts of hearings are prepared by external service providers from audio recordings of those hearings which are created by the Court. The Court’s use of platforms such as Webex or Microsoft Teams may also result in audio or audio-visual link (AVL) recordings of hearings. There is nothing in the FCA Act or the Rules that expressly addresses the right that a party or any other person has to access the recordings of the Court’s hearings. Nor is there any practice note of the Court that addresses the issue. It must follow then that whether such recordings are to be made available to the parties or to third parties is a matter for the exercise of the Court’s discretion having regard to its functions and the overarching purpose of the civil practice and procedure of this Court. This is the point that O’Bryan J made in Sayed v National Disability Insurance Agency [2022] FCA 1494. There, like here, a litigant in person sought access to the AVL recordings of hearings that had been conducted before O’Bryan J for the purpose of advancing a recusal application. His Honour declined the request that had been made by the litigant on the basis that where a recusal application is made to a judge in respect of that judge’s conduct, ordinarily a transcript is sufficient because that judge will be aware of the conduct of the prior hearings. His Honour stated at [34]-[38]:

34.    Returning to the application that was made by email to my chambers, there are two main circumstances in which the Court may require an audio recording to be provided to a litigant.

35.    The first is where there is a legitimate dispute as to the accuracy of the written transcript. In the present case, the applicant has not demonstrated any basis for a belief that the transcript of the case management hearing is inaccurate. I have reviewed the transcript and I have been unable to observe any inaccuracy in the record.

36.    Second, a court may have regard to an audio recording of a hearing (whether of a tribunal or an inferior or first instance court) where a question is raised of actual or apprehended bias (of the decision-maker or the judge respectively) and:

(a)     the court considering the question of actual or apprehended bias is not the decision-maker or judge that presided at the hearing the subject of the allegations of bias (ie, in a judicial review or appellate context rather than a recusal application); and

(b)     the allegation of bias refers to matters that can only be gleaned from the audio recording (cf. the transcript) because they relate to the manner in which the hearing was conducted including matters such as the tone or volume of the judge or the frequency of interruptions.

37.    There are many cases in that second category. Examples include Chen and Dennis as cited by the applicant as well as the first instance decisions in Kaur v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 145; Zaki v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1822; and SWDB v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1636.

38.    In contrast, in a recusal application made to a judge on the ground of actual or apprehended bias arising from the conduct of an earlier hearing by that judge, it will usually be unnecessary for the party making the application to rely upon an audio recording of the prior hearing. A transcript of the hearing will usually be sufficient because the judge hearing the application will be aware of the manner in which the prior hearing was conducted.

91    O’Bryan J proceeded to state at [42]:

In reaching the decision on these applications, I have also had regard to s 37M of the FCA Act which requires the Court to interpret and apply the civil practice and procedure provisions, and any power conferred or duty imposed by them, in the way that best promotes the overarching purpose, which is to facilitate the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible. I consider that the applicant’s application for an audio recording of the case management hearing, when a transcript is available, is only productive of cost and inefficiency. It is not a step that is necessary for the just resolution of the applicant’s recusal application. It is also important for the Court to adopt a principled approach to applications such as the present to discourage unmeritorious applications for audio recordings.

92    I agree with O’Bryan J’s reasons.

93    In the present case, as the judge who was the presiding judge at each of the hearings that Mr Bilal complains about, I considered that it was unnecessary for me to be taken to the audio or AVL recordings of those prior hearings. In coming to that conclusion, I had regard to s 37M(1) of the FCA Act and concluded that it was unnecessary to provide access or have regard to AVL recordings for the just resolution of the Recusal Application.

94    I now turn to address the specific instances in respect of which Mr Bilal submitted that my conduct might give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. It should be noted that in many instances, Mr Bilal referred to large extracts of the various transcripts. I have attempted to summarise what occurred and included shorter transcript extracts as relevant. As will be apparent from what follows, many of Mr Bilal’s submissions failed to have regard to the full context of what was being said and done.

4.3.1    Case management hearing on 13 May 2025 in the Ampol Whistleblower Proceedings (NSD391/2025) and EML Whistleblower Proceedings (NSD617/2025)

95    Mr Bilal relied on the transcript of the first case management hearing in the Ampol and EML Whistleblower Proceedings, respectively, which were held on 13 May 2025. Ampol appeared in the Ampol Whistleblower Proceedings, but the EML Respondents did not appear in the EML Whistleblower Proceedings. There was some confusion as to whether the EML Respondents had been properly served. In light of this, Mr Bilal ultimately agreed to the EML Whistleblower Proceedings being stood over until 27 May 2026. The balance of the case management hearing related to the Ampol Whistleblower Proceedings.

96    Mr Bilal made a number of contentions, which I deal with in turn.

97    First, Mr Bilal contended that at the hearing, instead of addressing what he says should have been the “ordinary” progression of the matter by the ordering of a timetable to provide for amendments to the pleadings, joinder of additional respondents and the filing of defences, I took the course of making orders relating to the Ampol Summary Dismissal Application. Mr Bilal contended that during that hearing, I referred to the alleged overlap between the proceedings and also other proceedings, and raised questions of abuse of process, transfer, consolidation and the efficient use of the Court’s resources.

98    I accept that these matters were broadly discussed during the course of the hearing on 13 May 2025, whether they were raised by the parties in the course of discussing their respective positions or by me. The context though is important. Ampol had indicated it would be filing a summary dismissal application, it had not filed a defence, the respondents in the EML Whistleblower Proceedings had not appeared (apparently on the basis that they had not all been served), and Mr Bilal was seeking to press on with his case, whereas Ampol was seeking to agitate its application. That context emerges in what follows as I work through each of Mr Bilal’s other contentions.

99    Second, Mr Bilal contended that when he asked under what rule a respondent is not required to file a defence, I did not identify any statutory or procedural authority. Mr Bilal said that instead of addressing his position, I responded to the effect that Ampol had filed an application which I intended to determine first and stated that it was unnecessary to refer to the Rules. Mr Bilal emphasised the following exchange:

HIS HONOUR: They’re not obliged to – if they put a different application before the court, then I have to deal with that application.

MR BILAL: Apologies, per what rule, your Honour?

HIS HONOUR: Forget rules. I’m just telling you that that – they’ve filed an application, as I understand it, and they want that application heard, so why shouldn’t I deal with that application?

MR BILAL: I respectfully contest that.

HIS HONOUR: All right. Well, I will hear you about that. Yes. Thank you, Mr Bilal. Yes, Mr Watts, what’s your position? Your side – that is, the respondents – you can take a seat, Mr Bilal.

(Emphasis added.)

100    Mr Bilal submitted that the comments made by me and the approach I took reflected a more general pattern or course of conduct whereby I have insisted that he strictly comply with the Rules, but have not required such compliance of Ampol. For example, Mr Bilal contended that I emphasised the need for compliance with the Rules when requiring that Mr Bilal serve Ms Taylor and Mr Stewart personally, but disregarded the Rules when Ampol sought to have the Ampol Summary Dismissal Application heard before filing a defence. I do not accept these submissions. As I have explained to Mr Bilal, the Rules sometimes require strict compliance and on other occasions do not, and it is within the discretion of the Court to dispense with compliance with the Rules, including to ensure efficient case management.

101    In any case, as the transcript makes clear, I questioned Counsel for Ampol as to the substance of the Ampol Summary Dismissal Application. I did not merely accede to the course Ampol advanced. As to whether a defence should be filed, it should also be observed that Counsel for Ampol indicated that as Mr Bilal had sought to amend his statement of claim, Ampol should not be required to put on its defence(s) until that document was received. Mr Bilal later confirmed he intended to amend his claim to bring further claims against the existing respondents, as well as to join further respondents.

102    In light of these various matters, I was satisfied that Ampol should not be required to file a defence at that time and that it was appropriate for Mr Bilal to be given the opportunity to amend his statement of claim. I also considered it appropriate that I should hear the Ampol Summary Dismissal Application before requiring Ampol to file a defence. During the course of a later exchange with Counsel for Ampol, my reasoning for taking that course is patent:

HIS HONOUR: …On the one hand, I’ve got Mr Bilal saying you should put on your defence. He’s also saying he wants to further amend. And you’re saying you shouldn’t have to do anything because you want the case tossed out. So I need to deal with that before I can deal with any case management that goes from that. If you’re right on your application, it doesn’t arise.

MR WATTS: Indeed.

103    I also explained this reasoning to Mr Bilal several times, including during the below exchange:

HIS HONOUR: Well, as I keep saying to you, they have – prior to the filing of the time required to file their defence, they’ve filed an application to dismiss your proceedings. In those circumstances, I’m not going to require them to file a defence. They’re not in default because they’ve exercised a legal right to have the proceedings dismissed, Mr Bilal.

MR BILAL: I contest that, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: All right. Well - - -

104    In my view, the approach taken reflects the orthodox approach of case management and is consistent with the overarching purpose contained in s 37M(1) of the FCA Act. I will return below to whether any reasonable apprehension of bias has been established.

105    Third, Mr Bilal submitted that I proposed a case management structure under which he would amend his pleadings, separately apply to join additional respondents, and have those applications programmed together with the Ampol Summary Dismissal Application, repeatedly stating that Ampol had exercised a legal right to seek dismissal before filing a defence. I accept that this occurred. I have explained the context above.

106    Fourth, Mr Bilal contended that when he maintained that Ampol remained in default because it had not filed defences, I repeatedly rejected that contention, stating that Ampol had exercised a legal right, were not in default, and would not be required to file a defence because the Ampol Summary Dismissal Application would need to be determined first. As noted above, I accept this occurred and, for the reasons stated above, I consider this approach to be consistent with the orthodox approach to case management and with the overarching purpose contained in s 37M of the FCA Act.

107    Fifth, Mr Bilal claimed that I stated that any expedited hearing of the proceedings depended upon shortening the proposed timetable in light of existing hearings already allocated to me in my docket, and that I indicated that proceedings already listed in my docket would take priority. I am satisfied that this broadly occurred.

108    Sixth, Mr Bilal contended that in discussing his medical conditions and their impact on hearing times, I stated that more persuasive evidence would be required before altering the proposed hearing arrangements, encouraged Mr Bilal to obtain legal advice because the claims were complicated, and explained that hearing times affected other litigants, other matters within my docket, court commitments and court officers. Mr Bilal referred to the emphasised text in the below exchange:

Now I would list this matter to commence at 10.15. You have some difficulties appearing in the afternoons. Is that what you’re – sorry. You have difficulties appearing in the morning. I will need a lot more convincing than a medical certificate, I have to tell you, Mr Bilal.

MR BILAL: What do I need to provide?

HIS HONOUR: Well, just give me a moment to read this. But just on the – have you seen this, Mr Watts?

MR WATTS: I haven’t, your Honour. No.

HIS HONOUR: I think you need to show Mr Watts.

MR BILAL: Because I wanted to file an affidavit, I couldn’t get a .....

HIS HONOUR: Yes. But I will tell you some – you need to show this to Mr Watts. But two things, the - - -

MR BILAL: Is it 10.15 your Honour said?

HIS HONOUR: Yes.

MR BILAL: And this is 11. So very different, 11 and 10.15.

HIS HONOUR: But, Mr Bilal, that medical certificate doesn’t say that you are unfit. It says that it is harder for you to concentrate at earlier times and that you would benefit from a later start time and that you would benefit from an assistant. I can’t offer you an assistant. That’s a matter for you. If you’ve got someone to help you take notes and to help you, that’s a matter for you. I would suggest that you go and get legal advice. The kinds of claims you’re bringing are complicated. But at the moment, you will need to put on a better evidentiary basis to say that you are unfit to attend a hearing commencing at 10.15. And I’m not just saying this because it affects me. It affects other litigants in this court. I have other matters. I have other commitments. The court has other commitments.

MR BILAL: We can move on. That’s fine.

HIS HONOUR: Sorry?

MR BILAL: I’m happy with that.

HIS HONOUR: And I’ve got court officers who don’t work beyond certain hours. There’s a whole range of matters that affects that. So I will list it at 10.15. I’m not going to preclude you from making an application to be – on proper evidence, if you want to persuade me that the matter should commence at midday. But, yes. So Mr Watts and Mr Bilal, are you clear that at the moment, the orders are, as I pronounce them, to be reduced to writing and sent to my chambers to be made with a hearing on 9 September? But if the two of you go outside and agree to a shorter time frame, I will accommodate you in that week of June.

(Emphasis added.)

109    As is clear from the above exchange, I was not precluding Mr Bilal from making an application for later start times, but was seeking better evidence to make the necessary arrangements which would impact on others.

110    I am not satisfied that any of the above matters, or that all of them or some of them cumulatively, establish any reasonable apprehension of bias. Mr Bilal has not demonstrated how any of the relevant conduct satisfies the three-step criteria outlined at [57] above. I am not satisfied that the fair-minded lay observer might consider my conduct might give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. Rather, I consider that the fair-minded lay observer would consider the course I took as being consistent with the dictates of case management and ordinary judicial practice. I am therefore not satisfied that my conduct at this case management hearing gives rise to any apprehension of bias. In particular, I am not satisfied that Mr Bilal has established a logical connection between the conduct and the apprehended deviation from deciding any relevant questions on their legal and factual merits.

4.3.2    Case management hearing on 27 May 2025 in the EML Whistleblower Proceedings (NSD617/2025)

111    The EML Whistleblower Proceedings were listed for case management on 27 May 2025. As noted above, the proceedings were listed on this occasion because there was no appearance by the EML Respondents at the first case management hearing on 13 May 2025 and at that time, I ordered that the EML Whistleblower Proceedings be stood over to 27 May 2025 for further case management. Mr Bilal had submitted at the earlier hearing that he had served the originating application and statement of claim on the EML Respondents using registered mail. He said that, in the interests of time, he had also emailed the EML Respondents a copy of the notice of listing issued by the Registry to the EML Respondents’ last known email address (which was not their address for service). Mr Bilal said that therefore the EML Respondents were on notice of the listing. With this context in mind, Mr Bilal made a number of submissions about my conduct at the hearing on 27 May 2025.

112    First, Mr Bilal submitted that during the hearing, I explained to the EML Respondents’ representative that I had previously listed the EML Whistleblower Proceedings, together with Mr Bilal’s other proceeding, being the Ampol Whistleblower Proceedings because “it appeared to me, just on the papers, that there was an overlap”. Mr Bilal submitted that I further explained that the related proceeding had already been programmed for the exchange of submissions and the hearing of the Ampol Summary Dismissal Application before turning to the EML Whistleblower Proceedings, stating that the matters had initially been listed together to determine whether there was any efficiency in them travelling together. I am satisfied that this broadly occurred. The context here was that I was explaining to the EML Respondents’ representative that I had earlier listed both the Ampol and EML Whistleblower Proceedings together as I had considered there to be an overlap between them such that it was efficient for them to be case managed together, and I was thereafter explaining what had occurred at the earlier case management hearing on 13 May 2025.

113    Second, Mr Bilal contended that during the case management hearing on 27 May 2025, I stated that I was already familiar with issues arising in his related proceedings, including the issue of accessorial liability and that if the EML Respondents later wished to seek summary dismissal after filing their defences, that application could be raised at a subsequent case management hearing. I am not entirely certain of the point that Mr Bilal was making in relation to my conduct. However, it is correct that I said that I was aware of the issues arising in both the Ampol and EML Whistleblower Proceedings as I had read the pleadings in both of them. That included the claims that Mr Bilal had made that two employees of EML were accessories to the contraventions alleged against EML. I was also endeavouring to work through appropriate case management orders in the event that the EML Respondents also wished to bring a summary dismissal or strike out application.

114    I am not satisfied that any of the matters raised by Mr Bilal in relation to my conduct at the case management hearing on 27 May 2025 give rise to any apprehension of bias. I am not satisfied that Mr Bilal has demonstrated how any of the relevant conduct satisfies the three-step criteria outlined at [57] above. Again, I consider that the fair-minded lay observer would consider the course I took as being consistent with the dictates of case management and ordinary judicial practice. I am therefore not satisfied that my conduct at this case management hearing gives rise to any apprehension of bias.

4.3.3    Case management hearing on 8 July 2025 in the EML Whistleblower Proceedings (NSD617/2025)

115    The EML Whistleblower Proceedings were listed for a case management hearing on 8 July 2025. Prior to this date, on 1 July 2025, Mr Bilal had filed the Separate Trial Application seeking to have his claims regarding the question of liability in respect of the alleged contraventions of s 345 of the FW Act heard and determined separately from the balance of the Proceedings.

116    Mr Bilal made several contentions regarding my conduct during the case management hearing on 8 July 2025.

117    First, Mr Bilal contended that during the hearing, I stated that I could not prevent the EML Respondents from filing a summary dismissal application, and if such an application was filed, I would have to hear and determine it. Mr Bilal further contended that I identified three interlocutory applications in the Proceedings to date, being the EML Summary Dismissal Application, together with the Separate Trial Application and a discovery application that Mr Bilal had foreshadowed that he would file, and that I had raised whether these applications should be heard together. I am satisfied that this occurred. I am further satisfied that my conduct was consistent with the orthodox approach to case management. I do not regard any of these matters as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

118    Second, Mr Bilal submitted that before hearing the Separate Trial Application, I referred to a general disinclination to order separate trials because the same witnesses may be involved across issues. He further submitted that later in the hearing, I stated that, from what I had read, my preliminary view was that there would be no case management efficiency in granting the Separate Trial Application. Mr Bilal is correct that I raised concerns about his Separate Trial Application as follows (in the context of having limited time to hear a separate question as to liability quickly):

HIS HONOUR: I haven’t – I think you might have heard what the parties said in the matter before this one, that generally the court is disinclined to order separate trials because I don’t know anything at the moment about the nature of the respondent’s case concerning what witnesses that they will call, and so on. Generally, if there are going to be the same witnesses across matters, the court doesn’t order separate trials.

MR BILAL: But that’s for me to provide evidence for that, because this - - -

HIS HONOUR: All right. Well - - -

119    I did not state that there would be “no case management efficiency” in granting Mr Bilal’s Separate Trial Application, but I expressed what may be best described as an impressionistic and preliminary view as to why courts are disinclined to order that separate questions be determined and the types of matters that would need to be addressed. What I did say was this:

HIS HONOUR: - - - I must say, from what little I’ve read into this, I’m not sure there’s much case management efficiency to be achieved by a separate trial on the 345 contravention.

120    Mr Bilal relied upon my conduct as indicative of an overarching pattern on my part to respond negatively to steps he had taken or proposed to take, or to express adverse views about his arguments. I do not accept that this is what occurred at this case management hearing. To the extent that Mr Bilal is suggesting that I prejudged his application, I do not accept that either. I do not regard any of these matters as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

121    Third, Mr Bilal contended that I expressed views in relation to the EML Whistleblower Proceedings by reference to other proceedings involving him. Mr Bilal said that, in discussing the EML Respondents’ (then) proposed timetable, I noted that the Ampol Summary Dismissal Application in the Ampol Whistleblower Proceedings was already listed on 4 September 2025 and discussed hearing the various interlocutory applications in the EML Whistleblower Proceedings on the following day because of the perceived overlap between the proceedings. I accept that this is what occurred. Counsel for the EML Respondents indicated that listing the matter for hearing on the day after the hearing of the Ampol Summary Dismissal Application would be desirable because Counsel understood the Ampol application concerned broadly similar issues as those arising from the EML Summary Dismissal Application. In fact, Counsel for the EML Respondents suggested that the two applications be heard together. I rejected that proposal on the basis that I considered that it was not reasonable for Mr Bilal to defend two applications concurrently. Instead, I listed the EML Summary Dismissal Application on 5 September 2025 in the interests of ensuring some degree of efficiency. I do not regard any of these matters as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

122    Fourth, Mr Bilal submitted that at the case management hearing, I repeatedly expressed concern about being called upon to determine multiple interlocutory applications, the time required to prepare judgments, and the resulting delay to a final hearing. He further contended that I referred to proceedings of this kind taking on “a life of their own”, described my “anxiety” about determining multiple interlocutory applications, and expressed a preference to avoid interlocutory disputes by progressing the EML Whistleblower Proceedings directly to a final hearing. I accept that in broad terms I expressed concerns to this effect. However, a review of the transcript discloses that my observations were largely directed towards the EML Respondents, who intended to put on an application for summary dismissal and strikeout which was subsequently filed on 16 July 2025, being the EML Summary Dismissal Application. The point I was seeking to raise, and labour, was whether instead of dealing with all of these interlocutory applications, it would be more efficient to simply list the matter for final hearing so that all parties could have their respective claims heard and determined in an efficient way. When this point was raised, Counsel for the respondents stated:

MR GANDAR: I can take some instructions, your Honour. I certainly understand the wisdom of your Honour’s proposal. I expect my client will have some anxiety about the cost of running a matter to full hearing when it says it can, and should be, disposed of on a short, interlocutory basis. Especially where discovery is foreshadowed.

123    I then expressed my various concerns with the approach proposed by Counsel for the EML Respondents as follows:

HIS HONOUR: The court’s anxiety is this. I’m going to be hearing three applications and writing a judgment on all three. From the sounds of what you’re saying, there’s a technical point about estoppel, or abuse of process, for which I will have to write a judgment. So on your proposal, I’m going to hear something in – sometime in September to try and align it with the other matter. It will then take me however long – a couple of months to write a judgment on that. You may lose, you may win, then I bring you back in. It sounds like your whistle-blower – your complaints about the whistle-blower contravention are more pleading points, not dismissal points.

MR GANDAR: Yes.

HIS HONOUR: So your client’s still going to have to confront that case…isn’t it?

MR GANDAR: Yes. Yes, I take your Honour’s point.

HIS HONOUR: So all the proceedings get parked for two months – which is Mr Bilal’s point – whilst I write a judgment on your application and his separate trial application. And then, we come back, and by then I’m looking at dates – not in February – for trial – whatever is left in the matter, I’m looking at dates in mid next year, or later. That’s my concern. But if you really – if your client really wants to press some knockout blow, I will try and fit it in.

But I’m foreshadowing to you that I expect what’s going to be advanced is a true knockout blow type of argument, not some pleading point. If there’s a pleading point, I expect pleading points to just be dealt with. The fact that an applicant hasn’t pleaded that they had a bona fide intention for making a disclosure is – I can see the point on the scheme of the statutory in the Corporations Act, and the text of the provision. But of the essential elements of a whistle-blower contravention, it’s one, but it’s not the most critical.

124    As will be apparent from the above exchange, I was seeking cooperation from the parties for a pragmatic confrontation of the real issues in dispute in the Proceedings so that all parties could have their respective cases heard as quickly as I could fit them in. I do not regard any of these matters as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

125    Fifth, Mr Bilal contended that in the course of addressing his concern about delay, I stated that I initially had “some sympathy” for Mr Bilal’s position but then stated that given he had elected to bring claims against different parties “with all these different permutations”, I no longer had that sympathy. He further contended that I also rejected his observation that he was being punished by delay and described it as “a very unfair observation”. The actual exchange was as follows:

HIS HONOUR: So I would have done that. But, now – look, what – I will hear from Mr. Bilal, but at the moment, in the other matter – I’ve listed that for hearing on 4 September. I don’t think it – I think I accept what Mr Bilal says, that he shouldn’t have to be burdened with running two applications or – and defending them on – at the same time. But I do have 5 September free, which is the next day. And I would be prepared to notionally give that to the parties. But beyond that, I have very little time. And I – and at the moment, I’m happy to list that – whatever applications there are – on that day. But I would encourage your side to think about what application they press at that time. And alternatively, whether we can’t just get on with the show, and - - -

MR GANDAR: Yes.

HIS HONOUR: - - - get to a final trial in February. I will hear from Mr Bilal. But - - -

MR GANDAR: Yes.

HIS HONOUR: Yes. Mr Bilal, I have some sympathy to your position, which is that I don’t want the matter to be bogged down with interlocutory applications. But they raise a very good point, which is that if there’s no case that you could bring, anyway, why should they have to be put to the cost of defending a case that they didn’t have to bring? Sorry, that they didn’t have to defend. And that’s – I have to take that into account. But you’ve elected to bring all these various claims against all these different parties, with all these different permutations, so it’s – the extent I have any sympathy to your position, I lose it, because – at that juncture – because you’ve elected to bring all these various claims, which means that they’re entitled to seek to strike them out - - -

MR BILAL: May it please - - -

HIS HONOUR: - - - or dismiss them.

MR BILAL: - - - I played my part, your Honour, in avoiding multiplicity of the proceeding by discontinuing that before serving it on them. Now, I see that I am being punished by a delay in all my matter. Even though that’s a contravention, subsection - - -

HIS HONOUR: You’re not being punished, Mr Bilal. That’s a very unfair observation to make. This court deals with very important matters, including yours, in many matters that have preceded yours being listed.

MR BILAL: Yes, your Honour - - -

HIS HONOUR: You’re not being punished.

126    As will be apparent from the above, I was in fact seeking to find an efficient way through the various applications. I expressed sympathy towards Mr Bilal having to be met with multiple applications, but was also making the important point that he too had decided to bring multiple proceedings and was pressing his own interlocutory applications. I do not regard any of these matters as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

127    Sixth, Mr Bilal contended that during a discussion of the EML Respondents’ proposed estoppel and abuse of process arguments, I repeatedly questioned Mr Bilal about whether he had obtained legal advice and considered the High Court's decision in Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Limited [2015] HCA 28; 256 CLR 507. At the time, Mr Bilal submitted that my experience should permit me to assess the apparent strength of the EML Respondents’ position, at which point, he claims that I twice directed him not to disrespect me and stated that I did not appreciate him impugning my experience.

128    Mr Bilal’s contentions are acontextual. As Mr Bilal was representing himself and advancing complex legal arguments, I repeatedly asked Mr Bilal if he had taken legal advice. Mr Bilal did not answer the question directly the first time, and so I pressed him. Mr Bilal then asked me how strong his case was. I responded, “Well, I don’t know. I’m going to have to hear the argument about it”. Mr Bilal then responded, “Yes, but your Honour should have enough experience to see how strong is this case”, at which point I asked him to please not disrespect me or the Court. I later indicated to Mr Bilal that he was “not directly answering my questions” and was “impugning the court’s experience on these matters”, which “doesn’t assist me”. The way I understood Mr Bilal’s contention at the time was that in substance he was saying that as an experienced (former) legal practitioner and now judge, I should have already been in a position to have worked out the strength of his case. The point I was making in response was that it was disrespectful to the Court to infer that which he was raising, including the suppressed premises contained in such a submission. I do not regard any of these matters as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

129    Seventh, Mr Bilal submitted that I expressed a preliminary view about the nature of his case, and the scale and character of the EML Whistleblower Proceedings after asking how long Mr Bilal had been employed by Ampol Australia and how many witnesses he proposed to call. He contended that the fact that I raised these matters tended to confirm my preliminary view that there would be no efficiency in granting the Separate Trial Application and described the EML Whistleblower Proceedings as a “fairly straightforward” case akin to an adverse action proceeding.

130    Again, Mr Bilal’s submissions are acontextual. I explained to Mr Bilal that given the EML Respondents opposed the Separate Trial Application, I would need to list it for hearing. I referred to the three interlocutory applications that I had already identified and informed him that I would have to list all of them for hearing. I explained to Mr Bilal that I had very limited time. Mr Bilal proposed that the Separate Trial Application be heard on the papers. I indicated that I did not consider it was the kind of matter that could be dealt with on the papers in light of the EML Respondents’ foreshadowed summary dismissal application and that I would be assisted by arguments from the parties. I subsequently asked Mr Bilal how he wanted me to proceed. He confirmed that he wanted me to hear the EML Respondents’ foreshadowed summary dismissal application first, then depending upon how I decided that, to hear his Separate Trial Application. In order to get a sense of the arguments in support of the Separate Trial Application, I asked Mr Bilal how many witnesses he intended to call. He informed me that he would call more than 10 witnesses in his case. I then said:

HIS HONOUR: All right. Well, you can put all those matters to me in support of your application. But I have to say, Mr Bilal, the types of issues that you’re raising with me only tend to confirm my preliminary thoughts. And they’re no more than preliminary – looking at the filed documents – that there’s going to be no efficiency from a separate trial on any particular issue. But anyway, you can try and persuade me otherwise. Yes, thank you, Mr Bilal.

(Emphasis added.)

131    My reference to the case being “fairly straightforward” was one which arose in the context of the concerns I had already expressed to Counsel for the EML Respondents to the effect that I was “troubled by where all this [was] going … for what should be a fairly straightforward – akin to an adverse action type case.”

132    The point I was making to both sides was that they were embarking upon a course to overcomplicate the essential issues in the matter. In my view, that was an obvious observation to make. I also made it clear that I was expressing no more than preliminary views. It is precisely the type of observation it might be thought that the fair-minded lay observer would expect judges to make when seeking to case manage multiple interlocutory applications.

133    Again, while Mr Bilal has identified the conduct which he contended might lead me to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits, he has not identified any logical connection between that conduct and the apprehended deviation from deciding the relevant questions on their legal and factual merits. Accordingly, I am not satisfied that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that I might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the questions that I am required to decide.

4.3.4    Case management hearing on 26 August 2025 in the Ampol Misrepresentation Proceedings (NSD1187/2025)

134    The Ampol Misrepresentation Proceedings were listed for a case management hearing on 26 August 2025. Mr Bilal contended that various events occurred during that hearing which support his claims as to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

135    First, Mr Bilal contended that during this hearing, I questioned whether this proceeding should continue to be managed separately from his various other proceedings involving Ampol and EML. Mr Bilal further contended that after referring to the Ampol Whistleblower Proceedings and his various proceedings against EML, I raised whether all of the proceedings should “travel together” and at least be case managed together, subject to the outcome of the Ampol and EML Summary Dismissal Applications and the Separate Trial Application (that by that time had already been listed for hearing).

136    What Mr Bilal has said is correct. I did raise with him whether all the various proceedings should be case managed together. I do not regard this as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. My conduct was consistent with the orthodox approach to case management whereby proceedings with overlapping parties and facts should ordinarily be managed together, at least for the purposes of case management.

137    Second, Mr Bilal submitted that in discussing his originating application and supporting affidavit filed on 14 July 2025, I questioned how he proposed to establish that EML’s alleged conduct was undertaken as Ampol’s agent. He contended that I observed that allegations of “knowing or reckless” misleading conduct were serious allegations requiring clear pleadings and stated that a statement of claim should be filed so that the basis upon which EML’s conduct was said to be attributable to Ampol could be identified with precision. He further contended that I illustrated the point by reference to a hypothetical insurer-insured relationship before directing that a statement of claim be filed.

138    The context for the actual observations I made at the case management hearing needs to be explained. As of 26 August 2025, Mr Bilal had filed affidavits (on 14 July 2025 and 14 August 2025) with his originating application. I asked Mr Bilal to identify the precise representation that he contended that Ampol had made. I further explained that a case asserting that a person made a knowingly false representation was effectively pleading an allegation of fraud, which is a serious allegation. I indicated to him that the Rules require such allegations to be clearly pleaded. I explained that I would be assisted by the filing of a statement of claim to assist me in ascertaining with precision the relevant representation and why he said that it was a knowingly or recklessly false representation. I also raised with Mr Bilal that his case required him to prove that EML acted as an agent for Ampol, and sought clarification about that point in the absence of a pleading. I gave Mr Bilal the example of an insurer hypothetical to illustrate the point. I considered that Mr Bilal would need to properly plead the basis for such an agency relationship and other aspects of his claim. Mr Bilal objected to filing a statement of claim but was unable to direct me to a paragraph of his supporting affidavits which set out the basis of the agency relationship he alleged between EML and Ampol, or addressing the other matters that I had raised. I do not regard any of my conduct in this regard as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

139    Third, Mr Bilal submitted that when he referred to his expectation of more expeditious case management, I questioned why he had commenced separate proceedings against Ampol, rather than including his claim regarding s 345 of the FW Act in the Ampol Whistleblower Proceedings. Mr Bilal said that I observed that he had chosen to commence separate proceedings rather than advancing all claims in the one proceeding, and stated that he should not complain about the way I was managing the proceeding given the way he had elected to bring his claims. Mr Bilal further submitted that I also referred to my own trial commitments and the accommodations that had already been afforded to him. Again, these points need to be viewed in context. Mr Bilal had indicated that he thought that his case could be dealt with quickly as it was a simple misrepresentation case. In response, I was pointing out that Mr Bilal had commenced multiple proceedings, which required case management, and he could have taken a different course. I also pointed out to him that I had to case manage his matters in light of the interests of other litigants in my docket. I do not regard my conduct as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

140    I am satisfied that my conduct was entirely consistent with law and with orthodox approaches to case management. Accordingly, I do not consider that Mr Bilal has satisfied the three-step criteria outlined at [57] above.

4.3.5    Interlocutory hearing on 4 September 2025 in the Ampol Whistleblower Proceedings (NSD391/2025)

141    On 4 September 2025, the Ampol Summary Dismissal Application was listed for interlocutory hearing. Mr Bilal made several submissions in relation to that hearing as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

142    First, Mr Bilal contended that I undertook an extensive examination of his pleadings, repeatedly explaining how the claims should be pleaded, identifying the material facts that I considered necessary, directing how disclosures, detriments and claims for relief should be structured, explaining how claims should be pleaded against each respondent, and repeatedly expressing the view that I could not understand the pleading in its current form. He submitted that I stated that the pleading “betray[ed] every principle, every fundamental principle of pleading”, was “rolled up”, “conclusory”, and indicated how Mr Bilal should reformulate the pleading before the proceeding could continue.

143    I accept that I attempted to explain to Mr Bilal why I considered his pleadings were deficient, including because they failed to identify essential elements of the cause of action. I further observed that the pleading failed to plead relevant material facts at all or failed to plead material facts in the body of the statement of claim (rather than in particulars), and that many assertions were conclusory, or were vague, and involved rolled-up allegations against different respondents. I did so in the context of a summary dismissal and strike out application where I had proposed to strike out the pleadings entirely and give Mr Bilal the opportunity to replead. I considered it important that I explain to Mr Bilal, as a self-represented litigant, why I considered his pleadings to be deficient before repleading. I am satisfied that such conduct was appropriate in the circumstances and consistent with the authorities referred to at [66] above. I do not regard this as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

144    Second, Mr Bilal contended that I proposed alternative courses for the future conduct of the proceedings, including striking out the pleading, granting a further opportunity to replead, suggesting how the amended pleading should be prepared, identifying the matters of which Mr Bilal should “be mindful”, proposing discovery procedures, discussing future timetabling, and raising with Ampol whether it should abandon the Ampol Summary Dismissal Application and instead proceed directly to a final hearing. He observed that following an adjournment, Ampol accepted that course and no longer pressed the Ampol Summary Dismissal Application at that stage.

145    After hearing the parties’ arguments, I explained to Mr Bilal that I proposed to strike out his pleadings in their entirety and give him approximately two months to replead. Mr Bilal reiterated that he opposed the striking out of his pleadings and that he would need significantly more time to replead if I took that course. I then asked Ampol whether it submitted that I should take this course, or whether I should order that it file a defence, and move the matter to an early trial, at which time it could seek summary dismissal. After a short adjournment, Ampol contended that the preferred approach was for the Ampol Summary Dismissal Application to be stood down and for the Proceedings to be set down for final hearing.

146    While I had initially indicated that in the interests of facilitating a quick, efficient and just resolution of all disputes, the preferable course was to list the matter for final hearing and make timetabling orders, upon further exchanges with Mr Bilal in relation to other interlocutory matters, it became apparent that further interlocutory disputes were likely to emerge which would require me to revisit the pleadings. It became apparent to me that any efficiency in an early listing of the matter for final hearing would not achieve the purpose of efficiency. As a result, I reserved my judgment to consider these various factors and ultimately determined to strike out Mr Bilal’s statement of claim in its entirety and allow him six weeks to serve a proposed amended statement of claim. I am satisfied that my conduct during this hearing was consistent with the orthodox approach to case management and with the objects contained in s 37M of the FCA Act. I do not regard this as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias in accordance with the three-step criteria outlined above.

147    Third, Mr Bilal submitted that throughout the hearing, I repeatedly questioned him about the extent to which ChatGPT had been used in preparing court documents, including his statement of claim filed on 20 March 2025, his written submissions and his proposed discovery categories. He contended that this questioning extended beyond the scope of the Ampol Whistleblower Proceedings, including me examining his proposed discovery categories in the EML Whistleblower Proceedings. He further submitted that I repeatedly revisited the subject by asking how particular drafting choices had been made, questioned whether ChatGPT had been used for more than grammatical assistance, discouraged reliance upon ChatGPT, observed that preparing pleadings was difficult even for experienced legal practitioners, and repeatedly urged him to obtain legal representation before the proceeding progressed further.

148    It is correct that I asked Mr Bilal if he had used ChatGPT in the preparation of his pleadings and his submissions, and he contended that he had only used it to correct his grammar. I did so because I was making an attempt to understand the structure and content of the pleadings and his submissions, and whether Mr Bilal was their true author. Subsequently, during a discussion about the EML Discovery Application (which was to be heard the following day on 5 September 2025), I asked whether Mr Bilal had used ChatGPT to create the categories of discovery in that Application. He again asserted that he had only used it to fix grammar. The following exchange then occurred:

HIS HONOUR: Are you sure about that?

MR BILAL: I don’t appreciate the court repeating the same question. I answered that question.

HIS HONOUR: Well, how did you come up with a definition of the word “hold” in paragraph 1.10?

MR BILAL: From my own knowledge.

HIS HONOUR: How did you know that you had to have a definition of “hold” in the document?

MR BILAL: I do not have to answer these questions. I’m not here for interrogatories.

HIS HONOUR: Excuse me. You’re a litigant before the court. You’ve submitted a document to the court. You’re asking me to consider it.

MR BILAL: I’m not here for that interlocutory application today.

HIS HONOUR: Well, I’ve asked you a question, what kind of discovery categories you would seek, and you’ve said, “Similar to these ones.” Mr Bilal, I think you’re under a misapprehension of what is a duty of a litigant to a court.

149    As is apparent from the last passage, the reason I had considered the proposed discovery categories in the EML Whistleblower Proceedings is because Mr Bilal submitted that he would be seeking the same categories in the Ampol Whistleblower Proceedings. I was concerned then that Mr Bilal was not the true author of the categories and I was seeking to explore which categories were truly necessary, as opposed to those that may have been generated by an AI tool or application. I was seeking to test whether the AI tool or application had only been used to correct grammar. In my view, the questions I posed were perfectly legitimate to raise with a litigant. I also encouraged Mr Bilal to seek legal advice twice during this hearing, and also encouraged him not to rely on ChatGPT. I do not regard any of this conduct as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

150    In particular, I am not satisfied that Mr Bilal has established any logical connection between my conduct and the feared deviation from the course of deciding his case on its merits. I am therefore not satisfied that, on the basis of the conduct identified above, the fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that I might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the questions that I am required to decide.

4.3.6    Interlocutory hearing on 5 September 2025 in the EML Whistleblower Proceedings (NSD617/2025)

151    On 5 September 2025, the EML Summary Dismissal Application, the EML Discovery Application and the Separate Trial Application were listed for interlocutory hearing. Again, Mr Bilal relied upon my conduct during this hearing as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

152    First, Mr Bilal submitted that, yet again, during this hearing, I went beyond identifying alleged deficiencies in his pleading and repeatedly explained how the case should be pleaded and structured. He contended that I discussed how the allegations should be organised, how the factual matters should be separated, how the legal causes of action should be expressed, and how the claims against the individual respondents should be reformulated. He further contended that the discussion extended well beyond identifying defects and involved detailed guidance as to how he should present his case.

153    I reject Mr Bilal’s contentions. The sections of the relevant transcript to which Mr Bilal refers involve exchanges between Counsel for the EML Respondents and me during which Counsel was working through the pleadings chronologically, identifying deficiencies and responding to my questions regarding the structure of the pleadings or the location of particular allegations.

154    Second, Mr Bilal submitted that I repeatedly reformulated his submissions and explained how arguments should be advanced, including identifying what allegations should be retained, what matters should be omitted, and how particular issues should instead be expressed. According to Mr Bilal, I repeatedly explained litigation strategy and pleading technique, rather than confining myself to determining the interlocutory applications before me.

155    Again, the sections of the relevant transcript to which Mr Bilal referred involved discussions between Counsel for the EML Respondents and me. It is not apparent to me how it is said that I reformulated Mr Bilal’s submissions or explained how arguments should be advanced. At one stage, I did say to Counsel for the EML Respondents, “your true summary dismissal point on the misrepresentation claim is one as to whether – having a look at the universe of documents upon which [Mr Bilal] relies as being the basis of the representation, they don’t say what that – what he says. It’s really that”. In summary, Counsel for the EML Respondents continued to work through Mr Bilal’s pleadings before taking me to several documents in support of the EML Summary Dismissal Application. I consider that my exchanges with Counsel for the EML Respondents were orthodox in the context of a summary dismissal or strike out application.

156    I do not regard any of this conduct as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. In particular, I am not satisfied that Mr Bilal has satisfied the second limb of the three-step criteria outlined at [57] above and, therefore, I do not consider that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that I might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the questions that I am required to decide.

4.3.7    Case management hearing on 25 September 2025 in the Ampol Misrepresentation Proceedings (NSD1187/2025)

157    The Ampol Misrepresentation Proceedings were listed for a case management hearing on 25 September 2025 following the filing of the statement of claim on 5 September 2025 and the defence on 19 September 2025. Again, Mr Bilal relied upon my conduct during this hearing as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

158    First, Mr Bilal contended that during that hearing, I repeatedly explained to him how the proceeding should be conducted, including its ordinary sequence following the close of pleadings, the filing of evidence, the principles governing discovery, the purpose of discovery, the applicable practice notes, the requirements for interlocutory applications, and the manner in which future applications would be dealt with. He contended that I also explained what he would need to establish to obtain discovery and how the proceedings would progress to trial.

159    After initially proposing that Mr Bilal file his reply to the defence and then his evidence, Mr Bilal contended that the filing of evidence was premature in circumstances where he may want to make interlocutory applications. I indicated to him that I would order that he file any reply to the defence within two weeks’ time, and that he file any evidence a further four weeks later. I briefly explained the principles concerning discovery to Mr Bilal, including that discovery is typically not ordered prior to the filing of evidence, and directed him to the applicable practice notes. I indicated to Mr Bilal that he could file an interlocutory application (including for discovery or summary judgment) at any time, and that I would deal with it and consider whether the timetable required any amendments at that stage. I consider the approach taken to be consistent with the usual procedural approach to progressing a matter and that the fair-minded lay observer would regard what occurred as little more than a judge explaining aspects of practice and procedure to a litigant in person consistent with the authorities referred to at [66] above. I do not regard any of this conduct as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

160    Second, Mr Bilal also submitted that I reviewed Ampol’s defence during the hearing, explained why I did not agree with his contentions that these pleadings were evasive, explained pleading principles applicable to misleading and deceptive conduct claims, stated that Mr Bilal “does not understand the fundamental rules of pleading”, advised Mr Bilal to obtain legal advice, and explained how Mr Bilal would need to prove particular aspects of the case, including attribution and agency.

161    The context is that Mr Bilal contended that Ampol’s defence was evasive. I explained to him that the parts of the defence to which he directed me were standard and that Ampol was putting him to proof on the matters alleged in his statement of claim. Mr Bilal contended that one way in which the defence was evasive was that it did not engage with the particulars of what the relevant representation was. In response, I stated to Mr Bilal that this demonstrated that he did not understand the “fundamental rules of pleading” and explained that particulars are not to be traversed in a defence. I again suggested that Mr Bilal seek legal advice. To the extent that I explained the pleading principles applicable to misleading and deceptive conduct, I did so because Mr Bilal asked me why the proceeding continued with a statement of claim, rather than the affidavit he initially filed. I explained to him, as I had on previous occasions, that the types of allegations he was making typically required pleadings, not merely an affidavit. I do not regard any of this conduct as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias and again consider such conduct to be consistent with the authorities referred to at [66] above.

162    I am not satisfied that my conduct as outlined above would create in the fair-minded lay observer a reasonable apprehension that I might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the questions that I am required to decide including on the basis that Mr Bilal has failed to demonstrate the link between that conduct and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits.

4.3.8    Case management hearing on 15 October 2025 in the Ampol Misrepresentation Proceedings (NSD1187/2025)

163    On 15 October 2025, the Ampol Misrepresentation Proceedings were listed for a case management hearing. Mr Bilal contended that during that hearing, I repeatedly explained how his interlocutory applications should be prepared and argued, including the sequence for filing evidence and submissions, the requirements for a summary judgment application, the basis upon which discovery should be sought, the purpose of written submissions, and the procedural steps he should take to advance the applications. Mr Bilal alleged that I repeatedly explained why I considered his proposed approach to be “very unorthodox”, how the applications should instead proceed, and how the proceeding should be managed.

164    The context is as follows. On 29 September 2025, Mr Bilal had filed the Production Application. On 12 October 2025, Mr Bilal then filed an interlocutory application which included the Summary Judgment Application and the Ampol Discovery Application.

165    During the hearing on 15 October 2025, Mr Bilal submitted that Ampol should be required to put on its evidence before he filed submissions in his Summary Judgment Application so that he could see this evidence before articulating why the defence should be dismissed. I explained to Mr Bilal that this approach was “very unorthodox” in circumstances where it was his Summary Judgment Application. I ultimately ordered that he file submissions in support of the Production Application and the interlocutory application dated 12 October 2025 (which included the Summary Judgment Application), following which Ampol would file any evidence and submissions before Mr Bilal be given a further opportunity to file submissions and evidence in reply. I ordered that Mr Bilal’s various applications be heard on 19 November 2025 and that, following this time, on 3 December 2025, Mr Bilal file any evidence in chief in respect of issues relating to liability.

166    As I indicated to Mr Bilal at the time, I considered that by giving him an extended period of time to file his submissions and by vacating the initial date by which he was to file his evidence in chief until after the hearing of his interlocutory applications, I was being lenient and understanding.

167    I do not regard any of the conduct about which Mr Bilal complains as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

168    Second, Mr Bilal further submitted that I repeatedly explained what Mr Bilal would need to establish in order to succeed in his Summary Judgment Application, including the evidence he would need to call to prove the claims, the manner in which the agency issue would need to be addressed, the operation of discovery, the relationship between liability and remedy, the procedural conduct of civil penalty proceedings, and the future conduct of the litigation. He claimed that throughout the hearing, I sought to explain how he should prepare and present his case rather than confining myself to determining the interlocutory applications before me.

169    I am not satisfied that this is what occurred. In the sections of the transcript to which Mr Bilal referred, I explained to Counsel for Ampol that I considered it to be sensible to separate questions of liability from questions of damage. I advised Mr Bilal that I understood he wished to seek discovery before putting on his evidence but noted that he did not want me to hear the Ampol Discovery Application that day. I indicated that if, on 19 November 2025, when I heard Mr Bilal’s various interlocutory applications, he persuaded me that he should get discovery before filing his evidence, I would consider that fact in granting him a further extension of time to file his evidence. I further indicated to him that he should wait and see what evidence is filed by Ampol before seeking discovery and explained to him that I typically encourage parties to communicate about the discovery they seek.

170    I do not regard any of this conduct as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. I am not satisfied that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that I might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the questions that I am required to decide on the basis of the conduct outlined above. Again, Mr Bilal has not established the logical connection between the conduct identified above and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits.

4.3.9    Interlocutory hearing on 19 November 2025 in the Ampol Misrepresentation Proceedings (NSD1187/2025)

171    The Ampol Misrepresentation Proceedings were listed for interlocutory hearing on 19 November 2025, to hear the Production Application, along with Mr Bilal’s interlocutory application filed on 12 October 2025, which comprised the Summary Judgment Application, Deferral Application, Separation Application, Ampol Discovery Application, Vacation Application and Injunction Application. Mr Bilal again submitted that my conduct during this hearing gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

172    First, Mr Bilal contended that I acted inconsistently during the course of this hearing. Mr Bilal said that I was viewing the Ampol Misrepresentation Proceedings as being serious because of their impact on Ampol, without taking into account his interests. By way of example, Mr Bilal relied upon the following statements I made during the hearing:

…Have you sought legal advice about any of these things?

MR BILAL: About what exactly?

HIS HONOUR: About the reinstatement of your weekly compensation payments?

MR BILAL: No. What legal advice should I seek about that?

HIS HONOUR: About all of these matters. Have you sought any legal advice about all of these claims?

MR BILAL: No.

HIS HONOUR: Why not? Have you tried to obtain some pro bono assistance?

MR BILAL: I trust my knowledge in this. It appears to me very clear on the face of it, contravention.

HIS HONOUR: But could I suggest, Mr Bilal, that you do go and see a lawyer, even if it’s on a pro bono basis? Because it seems to me, that the points that you’re raising and the case that you’re raising is far more complicated than you think it is. And there’s only limits that I can go to, to try and help you understand that. But it’s – I’m not sure I could just simply hold this case up for an inordinate amount of time. All right, but I’ve heard what you’ve said about that. Now, the next point you raise is the timing of your evidence. You want it – the orders I’ve made to be vacated. Why would I do that? You make submissions in writing that the orthodox approach, or the normal approach, is that a party should get their discovery, before they’re required to put on evidence. That’s not right, Mr Bilal, as a matter of law. Can you point me to any case that establishes that?

173    I do not regard any of my comments as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

174    Mr Bilal further contended that I struck out his statement of claim on the basis that his pleading was inadequate in light of the serious allegations he was making. He further contended that, in relation to the Summary Judgment Application, my approach was to see it as serious from the lens of Ampol, whereas in relation to any matter favourable to Ampol, I regarded the matter as not serious and as very simple. I am not satisfied that the examples provided by Mr Bilal reflect such a course of conduct on my part. I did make the following observations, to which Mr Bilal may be referring:

Your case is that a letter was sent to you. It made a representation. It was a representation made by Ampol, and it was knowingly or recklessly misleading or false. So your evidence on that should be pretty straightforward. It’s going to be an affidavit from you setting out what had happened. You will need to prove why, in due course, the representation was knowingly or recklessly indifferent to the truth.

175    My observations about the relative simplicity or complexity of the Ampol Misrepresentation Proceedings as a whole, or some component of them, were relative and context dependent. I do not consider there to be any inconsistency between, on the one hand, my observation that Mr Bilal’s case was “far more complicated” than he realises and that accordingly he should seek legal advice, and, on the other hand, that his evidence “should be pretty straightforward”. I do not consider that the fair-minded lay observer might see this as me treating Mr Bilal adversely and Ampol beneficially. I do not regard any of this conduct as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

176    Second, Mr Bilal contended that during the hearing, I repeatedly explained how the Production Application and his interlocutory application dated 12 October 2025 should be argued and why I considered the issues raised to be matters for trial, rather than summary determination. He contended that I explained the operation of summary judgment, the distinction between pleaded facts and ultimate liability, the role of discovery, the sequence for filing evidence, the purpose of reply evidence, the manner in which documentary evidence should be tendered, the operation of civil procedure, and repeatedly explained how he should prepare and present the case. He further contended that I also explained what evidence would be required to establish agency, attribution, misleading representations, and the mental element of the pleaded statutory contraventions.

177    I reject that I explained to Mr Bilal how he should argue his case. However, during the course of Mr Bilal’s submissions in support of summary judgment, I questioned why the matters he was raising could not be dealt with at trial and explained the distinction between pleaded facts and deemed admission of liability (so as to warrant summary judgment). I also explained other aspects of civil procedure to him, including that it is not correct that the orthodox approach is to require discovery before evidence. I do not regard any of this conduct as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. I again consider that the fair-minded lay observer would regard what occurred as little more than a judge explaining aspects of practice and procedure in this Court to a litigant in person consistent with the authorities referred to at [66] above.

178    Third, Mr Bilal submitted that I further proposed and settled a detailed procedural framework for the future conduct of the Ampol Misrepresentation Proceedings, including the sequencing of liability and remedy, the filing of primary evidence, reply evidence, documentary bundles, discovery, additional categories of discovery relating to the appointment of EML, the future timetable for the Proceedings, and the progression of the matter to trial. Mr Bilal further submitted that throughout the hearing, I repeatedly explained to him how the litigation should be conducted and managed the matter beyond determining the interlocutory applications then before me.

179    In the section of this transcript to which Mr Bilal pointed, I was raising issues with Counsel for Ampol about submissions and timetabling for the filing of evidence by both parties. I then indicated to Mr Bilal that I would try to deliver my judgment on the interlocutory matters quickly, but that if I dismissed the Summary Judgment Application, I was minded to: (a) extend the time for him to file his evidence until late December 2025; (b) order that Ampol file its evidence in the second week of February 2026; and (c) order that Mr Bilal file his evidence in reply sometime in March 2026, including any documents arising from any discovery orders.

180    I also explained to Mr Bilal that he had been provided the document he sought as part of his Production Application, and that to the extent that he sought something different, it may be provided in discovery. Mr Bilal then relevantly enquired when Ampol would give discovery. I asked Mr Bilal whether, if I made the orders he sought, he could file his affidavit evidence by 20 December 2025. He asked why he should not first wait for discovery to be given and I explained again that I did not consider that he needed discovery to put on his primary evidence. I explained that he should put on his evidence, after which time Ampol would do the same, and then Mr Bilal would be given the chance to put on evidence in reply and could include any discovered documents at that stage. Both parties indicated that they could file their evidence earlier than proposed, and Counsel for Ampol indicated that Ampol could give discovery by 19 December 2025. On this basis, I considered that it was appropriate to allow Mr Bilal until 6 March 2026 to file his evidence in reply and to serve a bundle of tender documents in order to afford him sufficient opportunity to review the discovered documents. I then reserved my judgment. I do not regard any of this conduct as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

181    Fourth, Mr Bilal contended that in determining his Injunction Application, I repeatedly questioned him on disputed factual matters concerning separate proceedings in the Personal Injury Commission, including whether the proceedings had resolved by conciliation, the terms of the alleged settlement, whether Mr Bilal had agreed to provide consent to the release of medical records and to attend an independent medical examination, whether those obligations had been fulfilled, and whether weekly compensation payments would otherwise have been reinstated. Mr Bilal further contended that I explained that those matters were relevant to my assessment of the balance of convenience and that I repeatedly sought direct answers from him notwithstanding his position that he relied upon the affidavit evidence filed in support of his Injunction Application. During oral submissions, in relation to this issue, Mr Bilal contended that I cross-examined him from the bench, thereby “eliciting evidence for the other party” in circumstances where he expressed his discomfort in light of the fact that he was the moving party on the Injunction Application. He pointed to the following exchange:

HIS HONOUR: Now, do you agree, Mr Bilal, that you – the dispute in the personal injury proceedings was resolved at a conciliation on 11 February 2025?

MR BILAL: I don’t concede this fact, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: You accept that?

MR BILAL: I do not concede anything in that affidavit, as mentioned in my affidavit.

HIS HONOUR: But I’m asking you a question. Do you accept that?

MR BILAL: I really don’t know what is the part of that affidavit that I relied on. And as – and I cared about - - -

HIS HONOUR: I’m asking you - - -

MR BILAL: Yes.

HIS HONOUR: You’re seeking an injunction from this court - -

MR BILAL: Right. Right.

HIS HONOUR: - - - to restrain the suspension letter.

MR BILAL: Right.

HIS HONOUR: In determining whether to grant an injunction, I have to assess a balance of convenience. So I’m asking you a direct question, to which I would like a direct response, please. Did you attend a conciliation on 11 February 2025?

MR BILAL: I can’t remember.

HIS HONOUR: All right. If you can’t remember the date, did you resolve the PIC proceedings at a conciliation?

MR BILAL: What PIC proceeding?

HIS HONOUR: Number – well, how many proceedings have you had before the PIC?

MR BILAL: A lot. Yes. Three, four, I guess.

HIS HONOUR: All right.

MR BILAL: Should I continue, or you want to say - - -

HIS HONOUR: Just give me a moment, please. All right. Did you – do you recall whether it was part of one of the settlements, that you – sorry, do you recall whether one of the proceedings you had before the PIC resulted in a settlement? Whereby, it was agreed that your workers compensation payments would be reinstated, on the condition that the insurer could obtain medical records from treating medical providers, and you agreeing to attend an independent medical examination.

MR BILAL: There must be something, but I do not call that was evolving the matter. That’s technically have they discontinue a match.

HIS HONOUR: And then, do you accept that, you have then, since that time not given the medical authorities that were required and haven’t attended a medical examination with Dr Malik?

MR BILAL: There are more to it.

HIS HONOUR: Yes, but do you accept, at least, those things?

MR BILAL: No, I do not accept them.

HIS HONOUR: But were you asked to attend a medical examination with Dr Malik? Do you accept that?

MR BILAL: Your Honour is putting me in a situation of giving evidence you.

HIS HONOUR: I am asking you. You’re a litigant before the court.

MR BILAL: Right.

HIS HONOUR: You’re seeking an injunction.

MR BILAL: Yes.

HIS HONOUR: And I’m asking you questions directly relevant to that to assist me in understanding.

MR BILAL: And, your Honour, rely please on my evidence tendered in support of this interlocutory. I’m satisfied and I have more points to raise here.

(Emphasis added.)

182    As I explained to Mr Bilal at the time, I am satisfied that the questions I posed to Mr Bilal were relevant to determining the balance of convenience and did not indicate that I had prejudged the merits of his case. I do not regard any of this conduct as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. Again, Mr Bilal has failed to demonstrate the link between the conduct identified and the risk of deviation from deciding the case on its merits.

4.3.10    Case management hearing on 20 November 2025 in the EML Whistleblower Proceedings (NSD617/2025)

183    Mr Bilal contended that during a case management hearing in the EML Whistleblower Proceedings on 20 November 2025, I made procedural orders by consent to regularise the pleadings and timetable the proceeding. He contended that I again encouraged him to obtain legal advice, proposed that he consider a referral for pro bono legal assistance under the FCA Act, explained the process by which I could arrange such a referral through the Registry, and encouraged him to discuss the proceedings with a solicitor or barrister.

184    I accept that this generally occurred. However, I do not regard any of this conduct as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

4.3.11    Case management hearing on 20 November 2025 in the Ampol Whistleblower Proceedings (NSD391/2025)

185    The Ampol Whistleblower Proceedings were listed for a case management hearing on 20 November 2025. Mr Bilal again contended that my conduct during this hearing gave rise to an apprehension of bias.

186    First, Mr Bilal contended that I repeatedly questioned his refusal to consent to Ampol’s proposed liberty to apply order and expressed dissatisfaction that the issue had required argument. He further contended that I stated, “you’ve had to come all the way in, and Ms Baxter has had to come all the way in to argue about one order”, treating the attendance of both parties as demonstrating unnecessary expenditure of time and money. He claimed that those remarks were made notwithstanding that he had already appeared before me immediately beforehand in the EML Whistleblower Proceedings which had been listed immediately before the Ampol Whistleblower Proceedings.

187    Relatedly, Mr Bilal contended that I repeatedly questioned him regarding the reasons for refusing to consent to Ampol’s proposed liberty to apply order, challenged his understanding of the operation of liberty to apply, and repeatedly sought to persuade him that the proposed order was unnecessary because the parties retained liberty to apply irrespective of whether the order was made. He submitted that I became emotional and that the fair-minded lay observer may perceive that I was frustrated with Mr Bilal for failing to consent to Ampol’s proposed liberty to apply order.

188    Second, Mr Bilal contended that I again encouraged him to obtain legal advice, stating that a lawyer would have explained the operation of liberty to apply and expressing the view that legal advice would assist him in understanding the Court’s procedures and avoid unnecessary expenditure of time and costs in the conduct of the Ampol Whistleblower Proceedings.

189    By way of background, Ampol’s representatives had prepared proposed orders. On the morning of the case management hearing, Mr Bilal indicated that he agreed to the orders except in relation the order reserving liberty to apply. During the hearing, I asked Mr Bilal if he understood what liberty to apply was and why he did not consent to it in order to understand his position. I explained to Mr Bilal that even if the proposed order regarding liberty to apply was removed, the parties would still have liberty to apply at any time. I accept that I was concerned about the efficient use of the Court’s time. In context, the observations I made to which Mr Bilal refers above were as follows:

HIS HONOUR: - - - have you, I think I asked you this yesterday, taken steps to obtain legal advice about these matters?

MR BILAL: Sir, this liberty to apply has anything to do with legal advice?

HIS HONOUR: Yes. Because a lawyer might have explained to you what liberty to apply means.

MR BILAL: And is my understanding of it is flawed?

HIS HONOUR: Yes. It seems to be wrong because every party in proceedings before this court has liberty to apply to the court at any time.

MR BILAL: Without making a proper application?

HIS HONOUR: With making a proper application - - -

MR BILAL: Exactly.

HIS HONOUR: No. Please don’t point your finger to me.

MR BILAL: No. I said exactly.

HIS HONOUR: Mr Bilal, I have to say I’m really encouraging you to obtain legal advice in all of these matters. They can apply either by a formal application or they can write to my chambers with your consent to ask for the matter to be relisted, and if you don’t consent to that, they can indicate that you haven’t consented to it being relisted. So the fact that you’ve had to come all the way in, and Ms Baxter has had to come all the way in to argue about one order, just demonstrates to me that the amount of time and money that is being wasted in these matters, we could have dealt with this easily, Mr Bilal.

MR BILAL: I consented to the orders.

HIS HONOUR: Except for liberty to apply.

MR BILAL: Whatever. They should send that to the court saying, “This is what consented” …

190    Contrary to Mr Bilal’s submissions, the case management hearing in the EML Whistleblower Proceedings occurred after the case management hearing in the Ampol Whistleblower Proceedings, such that Mr Bilal’s statement that he had already appeared before me is not correct. While he was required to appear again in the case management hearing in the EML Whistleblower Proceedings, Ampol was not.

191    I also accept that I encouraged Mr Bilal to seek legal advice. I consider that such conduct was appropriate in the context of a litigant in person who appeared to be operating under misapprehensions as to the operation of civil procedure in this Court. I consider my conduct in the hearing more broadly to be consistent with orthodox approaches to case management, my role in overseeing the efficient case management of proceedings in my docket and the objects of s 37M of the FCA Act more broadly.

192    I do not regard any of this conduct as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

4.3.12    Case management hearing on 10 February 2026 in the Ampol Whistleblower Proceedings (NSD391/2025), EML Whistleblower Proceedings (NSD617/2025) and Ampol Misrepresentation Proceedings (NSD1187/2025)

193    The Ampol Whistleblower Proceedings, EML Whistleblower Proceedings and Ampol Misrepresentation Proceedings were each listed for case management on 10 February 2026. Mr Bilal relied upon my conduct during those hearings as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

194    First, Mr Bilal contended that I repeatedly explained the procedural requirements governing discovery applications, including the distinction between standard and non-standard discovery, the purpose and operation of category-based discovery, the use of Redfern schedules, the continuing obligation of discovery, the sequencing of evidence and discovery, the requirements of the relevant practice note, the expectation that parties confer before seeking discovery orders, and the procedural basis upon which interlocutory applications concerning discovery should be determined. Mr Bilal further contended that I repeatedly explained the procedural requirements applicable to interlocutory applications, cross-examination on affidavits, evidence, written submissions, liability hearings, case management and the future conduct of the proceedings.

195    Second, Mr Bilal submitted that I further explained the management of the proceedings, including the scheduling of interlocutory applications, evidence, submissions, liability hearings, discovery case management, the sequencing of liability before any assessment of relief, the availability of hearing dates, the effect of other proceedings upon my availability, and repeatedly explained why particular procedural orders were being made. He further submitted that I made orders requiring the parties to confer regarding discovery, granted liberty to apply on 48 hours’ notice, and explained the operation and purpose of those procedural directions.

196    It is correct that I explained several matters of procedure to Mr Bilal, including the obligation on parties to confer regarding categories of discovery, the operation of Redfern schedules, continuing discovery obligations, the sequencing of evidence and discovery and the application of the relevant practice notes. These explanations were given in the context of Mr Bilal making submissions as to why I should make various orders. For example, Mr Bilal sought leave to cross-examine the deponent of an affidavit verifying discovery. I explained to him that he could make that application at the hearing of his interlocutory application filed on 16 January 2026 in the Ampol Misrepresentation Proceedings on 5 May 2026, but that he would need to consider the rules that govern when a deponent of an affidavit that verifies discovery can be cross-examined and persuade me that such an order should be made. Again, I consider that the fair-minded lay observer would regard my conduct as a judge explaining aspects of practice and procedure to a litigant in person consistent with the authorities referred to at [66] above.

197    I do not regard any of this conduct as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

198    Third, Mr Bilal contended that when he orally sought leave to cross-examine the deponent of an affidavit verifying discovery, explaining that the deponent might not attend the interlocutory hearing unless the application was made beforehand, I declined to determine the application at that time, referring to the procedural requirements governing cross-examination on discovery affidavits, the need for Ampol to have an opportunity to respond, and procedural fairness. Mr Bilal submitted that I directed him to make any such application at the interlocutory hearing.

199    I accept that this is generally what occurred. I informed Mr Bilal that I was not (then) at a case management hearing currently in a position to hear his applications. I explained that he should write to Ampol’s solicitor in relation to the matters he raised, and, if there was a dispute, he could bring the application before me at the interlocutory hearing on 5 May 2026. I consider this to be an entirely appropriate course given that Mr Bilal was making applications orally without prior notice at a case management hearing. I do not regard any of this conduct as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

200    Fourth, Mr Bilal submitted that I also again encouraged him to obtain legal advice, stating that I could not educate him on every aspect of practice and procedure, and that he would need to obtain legal advice regarding the conduct of the proceedings. He contended that this was an example of me taking different positions, being on the one hand, that Mr Bilal was someone who required legal advice and on the other hand, viewing him as a “strategist in litigation”.

201    My suggestion that Mr Bilal seek legal advice occurred in the context of Mr Bilal’s submissions about matters of practice and procedure in civil litigation. For example, one such suggestion arose in the following context where Mr Bilal requested a notation to orders that I proposed to make:

HIS HONOUR: What’s the notation?

MR BILAL: The notation is that the applicant is granted leave to tender further evidence-in-chief apart from what he tenders here, but then if the respondent want to respond to them, they can. Because reply is - - -

HIS HONOUR: Well, I will deal with that on 16 June. But if there’s documents produced on discovery that you want to tender, you can do that in the hearing at the trial. But you can – that’s the way discovery works, Mr Bilal.

MR BILAL: Yes.

HIS HONOUR: I can’t educate you on every aspect of practice and procedure. You will need to get legal advice at some point, but that’s the way discovery works.

MR BILAL: I won’t benefit from legal advice.

HIS HONOUR: I’m sorry?

MR BILAL: I won’t benefit from legal advice.

HIS HONOUR: You won’t benefit from legal advice?

MR BILAL: Yes.

HIS HONOUR: All right. Well, that’s a matter for you. But I won’t make such notation, it goes without saying. …

202    To the extent that I have made observations about Mr Bilal’s “strategy” in one or more of the various hearings that have been held before me, it has been in the context of Mr Bilal having embarked upon an approach or a strategy to commence multiple separate proceedings against the same respondents, instead of having all his causes of action against one respondent brought in one proceeding.

203    I do not regard any of this conduct as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

204    Fifth, Mr Bilal pointed to several exchanges by which he said I was “descending into the arena” and that I made observations about his conduct in bringing multiple applications when the matter before me at that time was only the “second motion” he had pressed in the Court. Mr Bilal pointed to the following exchange which occurred in the context of discussions about when the Ampol Misrepresentation Proceedings would be listed for final hearing:

MR BILAL: And I am highly prejudiced by this. And it takes us more than a year to just hear the liability, and I’ve been waiting for judgment of that, potential appeal, then damage. This is – I would say in that case, why don’t your Honour, if you really can’t make a time, let the hearing be by another judge? Case management, you are doing it - - -

HIS HONOUR: That’s not the way this court operates, Mr Bilal. You’re not the only litigant before this court, and you’ve brought this case, but you’ve also brought a number of applications in this case that have prolonged it, which I’ve discouraged you from wanting to do, but you – sorry, let me finish, please. You’ve insisted upon making a number of applications, including for discovery, in a matter that you say is not very complicated. Well, if it’s not very complicated, then I should have been able to determine it before. But the fact is I raised this with you – whether it was in these proceedings or the other proceedings or the ones against EML, I’ve raised it with you several times. I would like to get these proceedings moving towards a final hearing. I had offered you the prospect of setting them down for final hearing, but at each turn you resisted that. And I’ve warned you that what will happen in the meantime is that other matters come into my docket. I have to hear other matters. I’ve got other responsibilities to other litigants, not just you. So that’s when I’m listing the hearing. If you want to make an application to vacate the hearing dates and have the matter listed somewhere else, you can go and get some legal advice about that, but I will list the matter for final hearing then.

(Emphasis added.)

205    Mr Bilal then referred to the following exchange which had occurred earlier in the context of discussions about the listing of his interlocutory application in the Ampol Misrepresentation Proceedings:

HIS HONOUR: Well, I’m going to have to suspend the orders. I’m going to have to say they’re extension for you to file your reply.

MR BILAL: But is it not a bit unusual to hear a motion in, I don’t know, three months?

HIS HONOUR: I will tell you what’s unusual, Mr Bilal, is for a party to keep, as you keep doing, running interlocutory applications before this court in circumstances where I have other matters already listed. I’m on duty for the second part of February and then I have appeal sittings throughout March, which means I’m not available. I have other hearings in April. I am saying the first available date I can do was 30 April and 1 May, but their counsel is not available on those days, which I would give some consideration to, but it’s not determinative. I can hear the matter on 5 May. Are you available on 5 May?

(Emphasis added.)

206    Mr Bilal’s contentions about the observations I made are not factually correct. By 10 February 2026 (which is when these exchanges occurred), Mr Bilal had filed five interlocutory applications in his various proceedings before me. Two of those applications sought a range of orders, including for summary judgment, deferral of a hearing as to damages and penalties, separation of questions of liability and quantum, discovery and injunctions. My observations to Mr Bilal reflect a correct characterisation of events. Mr Bilal was complaining about delays hearing and determining his interlocutory application, but as I pointed out to him, he had also filed a number of interlocutory applications and had resisted my attempts to progress the various proceedings to final hearing. I do not regard any of this conduct as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

207    Sixth, Mr Bilal generally referred to the following further exchanges. The first arose in the course of a discussion about the Court’s expectation in the Central Practice Note: National Court Framework and Case Management (CPN-1) that there be conferral between the parties about discovery:

MR BILAL: The parties have to confer, not just I write to them a few things and they say – I waste my time in drafting an email for them.

HIS HONOUR: But they might think you’re equally wasting their time because you never seem to listen to them and they don’t listen to you.

MR BILAL: Exactly. Yes. That’s why - - -

HIS HONOUR: So you’re both acting like children.

MR BILAL: Yes. And - - -

HIS HONOUR: Right. So why am I going to depart from the practice note of this court?

(Emphasis added.)

208    It is clear from the above exchange that my observations were made in relation to both parties not in fact genuinely conferring about discovery to find common ground in a way consistent with the applicable practice note. The comment about the parties behaving like children was not directed to Mr Bilal alone, but to all the parties. I do not regard any of this conduct as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

209    Mr Bilal next referred to an exchange where I asked him whether he had written to EML indicating that he only wanted three categories of discovery, as follows:

MR BILAL: No.

HIS HONOUR: All right.

MR BILAL: Because I’m not stupid, I’m not idiot. I don’t do that. I respect my dignity. I am still asking them for info, and they don’t provide it. This is just asking me keep playing ping-pong with them, keep asking them. I’m not going to damage my dignity.

HIS HONOUR: All right. Mr Bilal, the expectation of this court is in proceedings involving allegations of contravention of the Corporations Act, parties will confer about discovery before the court is required to determine such issues.

MR BILAL: Not in this matter.

HIS HONOUR: Mr Bilal, that is the expectation of the court in all matters. Now, there might be some exceptional circumstances in some matters where, for one reason or another, conferral is not necessary. But I think you should, in the first instance in this matter, confer with them. If there’s only three categories, for example, that you ask for them, you should ask them for those. They might agree. I don’t know.

MR BILAL: If you know this matter – just taking the pleading at face value, do you expect them to give me something?

HIS HONOUR: Mr Bilal - - -

MR BILAL: You just want me to create paper trail? I create paper trail for you.

HIS HONOUR: Mr Bilal, you have brought proceedings in this court making serious allegations.

MR BILAL: And that’s why I’m not entitled to discovery?

HIS HONOUR: You’re entitled to discovery by an order of this court. You don’t have any entitlement without an order of this court. You need to persuade this court that you should have such orders, and as I keep telling you, the expectation of this court is before it will make such orders, it expects conferral. So you don’t have - - -

MR BILAL: Just because I - - -

HIS HONOUR: You don’t, in Australian courts, simply say, “I’ve brought a proceeding. Now you have to cough up documents because I’m asking you to.” That’s not the way the legal system works in Australia.

(Emphasis added.)

210    I consider the explanations I gave to Mr Bilal in the above exchange to be entirely appropriate and, as I had previously indicated to Mr Bilal, consistent with the Central Practice Note: National Court Framework and Case Management (CPN-1) which requires, in the first instance, conferral between parties in relation to discovery.

211    Again, I do not regard any of this conduct as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. I am not satisfied that my conduct as outlined above could give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the fair-minded lay observer on the basis that Mr Bilal has not demonstrated the link between the conduct identified and the risk of deviation from deciding the case on its merits.

4.3.13    Case management hearing on 21 April 2026 in the EML Misrepresentation Proceedings (NSD185/2026)

212    The EML Misrepresentation Proceedings were listed for a case management hearing on 21 April 2026. Shortly before this case management hearing, on 14 April 2026, Mr Bilal filed the First Default Application. Mr Bilal relied upon my conduct at the case management hearing as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

213    First, Mr Bilal contended that I repeatedly questioned him about the commencement of multiple proceedings against the same respondents, raised the possibility that doing so could amount to an abuse of process, queried why claims had not been brought within existing proceedings by amendment, and explored the relationship between the various proceedings before determining the procedural course for the matter.

214    Second, Mr Bilal submitted that I repeatedly questioned him regarding the content and structure of his existing proceedings, including whether particular statutory claims could have been advanced within earlier proceedings rather than by commencing separate proceedings, and linked those matters to the management of the sole proceeding that was before me on 21 April 2026.

215    Third, Mr Bilal contended that I explained that, before determining the First Default Application, it would be necessary to consider whether EML had a triable defence and an explanation for not filing a defence, indicated that the multiplicity of proceedings appeared to form part of that explanation, and decided to permit EML further time to file a defence before listing the First Default Application for hearing.

216    I generally accept that I raised the matters that Mr Bilal has pointed to, but again they have been taken out of context. During the case management hearing on 21 April 2026, Counsel for EML brought to my attention that further proceedings had been commenced by Mr Bilal against EML (being the Further Ampol Misrepresentation Proceedings also brought against Ampol and the Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer). Counsel for EML informed me that although EML had not been served with any originating application or pleadings, the Court’s electronic filings portal disclosed that yet more proceedings had been commenced by Mr Bilal against EML and that they involved a general protections claim under the FW Act. Part of the explanation for the delay in filing a defence appeared to be that EML was waiting to be served with the relevant originating documents in the other proceedings in order to ascertain whether there was any overlap in relation to the matters to be traversed. Nevertheless, Counsel for EML indicated that a defence could be filed by the end of that week in the EML Misrepresentation Proceedings.

217    Mr Bilal observed that he was appearing at that time to deal with the EML Misrepresentation Proceedings, which he claimed were listed for “notice of motion, for default, for not filing defence”, that is, the First Default Application. Mr Bilal opposed EML being allowed additional time to file its defence and contended that the bringing of other proceedings was irrelevant to its delay. In substance, Mr Bilal’s position appeared to be that the points raised by EML about waiting to be served originating documents in other proceedings was irrelevant to the matter that was before me on that day and to the EML Misrepresentation Proceedings altogether.

218    I explained to Mr Bilal that, whilst the EML Misrepresentation Proceedings had been listed before me on that day, the First Default Application had not been listed for hearing and I would need to separately list that application for hearing if that is what he sought. It was in this context that I asked Mr Bilal a series of questions about the various proceedings he had commenced and whether the claims he was making in the new proceedings (being the Further Ampol Misrepresentation Proceedings) were related and could have been brought in other proceedings that were already on foot. Mr Bilal claimed that this is what he did in 2025, that is, he “brought whistleblower [proceedings] and [he] add[ed] all the [section] 345 [contraventions] to that proceeding against EML”, but that I struck them out for reasons which he did not understand. This contention is not factually correct. What occurred was that in Bilal v EML NSW Limited [2025] FCA 1190, I made orders striking out Mr Bilal’s statement of claim filed on 23 April 2025 in its entirety in the EML Whistleblower Proceedings. His original statement of claim did include a claim alleging a contravention by EML of s 345 of the FW Act. I ordered Mr Bilal to file an amended statement of claim. That amended statement of claim, which was filed on 21 November 2025, did not press any case in relation to contraventions of s 345 of the FW Act. It was repleaded solely as a whistleblower claim. Mr Bilal then separately filed the EML Misrepresentation Proceedings which had some overlap with the misrepresentation claim previously contained in the EML Whistleblower Proceedings.

219    In any event, Mr Bilal submitted that instead of following what he believed to be the usual course of asking EML whether it had filed a defence and bringing EML to account for that failure by ordering default judgment, I instead asked him about his various proceedings against EML. He pointed to the following exchange, during which he said he showed his discomfort and that I employed a “very strong tone”:

HIS HONOUR: Well, one of the reasons they’ve raised this morning is that it seems that you’ve commenced other proceedings against EML. Is that right?

MR BILAL: That is right, but that’s irrelevant.

HIS HONOUR: I’m sorry?

MR BILAL: That is right, but that is irrelevant to filing defence in this matter.

HIS HONOUR: No, it’s not entirely irrelevant. How many proceedings have you now commenced against EML?

MR BILAL: I do not know.

HIS HONOUR: How can you not know?

MR BILAL: I need to think about it. Why it is relevant?

HIS HONOUR: Because it can be an abuse of the court’s processes to continually commence proceedings against the same respondent. The – your claim – you already have existing proceedings that are in my docket against EML. I think they’re whistleblower contraventions. Is that right?

MR BILAL: Yes.

HIS HONOUR: So why couldn’t – and I think at about the same time that you commenced those whistleblowing contravention proceedings against EML, you also commenced them against Ampol, correct?

MR BILAL: I don’t know where I will be going, but yes.

HIS HONOUR: Yes. And in the proceedings against Ampol, you’ve got a claim for a contravention of section 345, correct?

MR BILAL: That could be the case.

HIS HONOUR: When you say that could be the case, it is the case, isn’t it?

MR BILAL: I’m not sure what is happening currently. I’m being interrogated?

HIS HONOUR: I’m asking you questions. That’s my role as a judge to manage my docket.

MR BILAL: Yes. Relevant to direction hearing today for this motion?

HIS HONOUR: Yes, it is relevant. Now, when you commenced the proceedings against EML claiming contraventions of the whistleblowing provisions of the Corporations Act, you could have commenced proceedings under section 345 as well in that one set of proceedings, couldn’t you?

MR BILAL: That goes into the merits of what you said about abuse and these things. I’m not here today to make submissions.

HIS HONOUR: All right. So I will take it from that that you don’t want to answer my question.

MR BILAL: I find it irrelevant.

HIS HONOUR: All right. You then commenced these proceedings in February, I think you told me, and then when did you commence the next set of proceedings against EML?

MR BILAL: Don’t remember.

HIS HONOUR: Was it after February?

MR BILAL: Don’t remember.

HIS HONOUR: And what is the nature of those proceedings – the new proceedings you’ve commenced against EML?

MR BILAL: General protections.

HIS HONOUR: And what’s the claim in them? What does it relate to? The termination of your employment with Ampol, or something else?

MR BILAL: It’s not that.

HIS HONOUR: So why couldn’t those proceedings have been commenced by way of – or those claims been brought – by way of amendment to your existing proceedings against EML? Why have you commenced three separate proceedings?

MR BILAL: Now I am definitely not making submission about directions hearing of this default motion. I’m not ready here to make any submission about any such allegation.

HIS HONOUR: One of the issues that you will have to address me on, in order to succeed on your application for default judgment, is whether they have a triable defence to your proceedings, and what their reason is for not having filed a defence to date. And one of the things that their counsel has raised is because of the multiplicity of proceedings. So even if I were to order default judgment, Mr Bilal, because they haven’t filed a defence, that’s liable to be set aside. If they have a triable defence - - -

MR BILAL: They need to - - -

HIS HONOUR: - - - they tell me they have a triable defence.

MR BILAL: If the court - - -

HIS HONOUR: What you seem to be doing is wanting to commence multiple proceedings against the same defendant – against the same respondent, sorry. Is that right?

MR BILAL: I’m not understanding what is happening.

HIS HONOUR: You have commenced multiple proceedings against the same respondent.

MR BILAL: If that means there are current proceedings, more than one, against EML New South Wales Limited, that’s right.

HIS HONOUR: Yes. All right. So in terms of your opposition to the orders that are proposed by EML, your point is that it will make your application for default judgment go away or not necessary. Is that right?

MR BILAL: It will be more to spend, basically.

HIS HONOUR: All right. Well, I’m minded to give them until the end of this week to file their defence.

MR BILAL: Well, that means your Honour are dismissing the motion .....

HIS HONOUR: I’m not dismissing your motion. I will hear it. It’s a matter for you whether you still wish to press it.

(Emphasis added.)

220    As is apparent from the above exchanges, Mr Bilal is correct that I asked him many questions about matters that were, in my view, relevant to the case management of the EML Misrepresentation Proceedings. I also accept that my questions were delivered in a forthright tone. It will be apparent that this was the case because Mr Bilal was not directly answering the questions I was asking of him relating to relatively straightforward matters as to the various proceedings he had commenced. Whilst Mr Bilal may have perceived these matters to be irrelevant to his position or the course he wished to take, they were, in my mind, clearly relevant to the efficient case management of matters not only in my docket but confronting the administration of the Court’s resources as a whole.

221    The matters raised with Mr Bilal and my general conduct of the case management hearing was entirely consistent with the discharge of the judicial function in this Court. No reasonable apprehension of bias is established. I am not satisfied that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that I might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the questions that I am required to decide on the basis of the conduct outlined above. Again, Mr Bilal has not established the logical connection between the conduct identified above and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits.

4.3.14    Interlocutory hearing on 5 May 2026 in the Ampol Misrepresentation Proceedings (NSD1187/2025)

222    Mr Bilal’s interlocutory application filed on 16 January 2026 in the Ampol Misrepresentation Proceedings was listed for interlocutory hearing on 5 May 2026. Mr Bilal claims that my conduct during this hearing gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

223    First, Mr Bilal referred to my facial expressions and contended that I had calm and peaceful interactions with Ampol’s representatives by contrast to my interactions with him. Mr Bilal further contended that I became active and “descend[ed] into the arena” when advantageous to Ampol but not otherwise.

224    Second, Mr Bilal contended that I repeatedly questioned and tested his submissions concerning discovery, including the interpretation of the Court's discovery orders, the Rules, the practice notes, the relevance of authorities relied upon, the operation of standard and non-standard discovery, and the practical operation of the discovery process. He further contended that I repeatedly explained my own understanding of the scope and intended operation of the discovery orders and the applicable procedural requirements.

225    Relatedly, Mr Bilal submitted that I repeatedly explained the operation of the Rules concerning discovery affidavits, officers of corporations, the Court's power to excuse procedural non-compliance, and the objective of progressing proceedings efficiently under s 37M of the FCA Act.

226    Third, Mr Bilal contended that I stated that he had repeatedly brought interlocutory applications, stated that those applications imposed a burden on the Court and on other litigants, expressed the view that many of the issues should instead have been resolved directly between the parties, stated that Mr Bilal was choosing to conduct the litigation in that manner, and referred to having previously made those observations to him on numerous occasions. Mr Bilal pointed to the emphasised parts of the following exchange:

HIS HONOUR: - - - the way – please don’t interrupt me. All right? I’ve told you time and time again, you keep bringing interlocutory applications before me. That requires me to take up time to hear your arguments, to read your documents, and then now go away and write a judgment. This could have all been progressed if you had bothered writing to them and dealt with each other like adults. You’re meant to assist the court in resolving disputes.

MR BILAL: You notice that I wrote to them?

HIS HONOUR: You wrote to them - - I’ve told you time and time again, you keep bringing interlocutory applications before me. That requires me to take up time to hear your arguments, to read your documents, and then now go away and write a judgment.

MR BILAL: For example, why they - - -

HIS HONOUR: Mr Bilal, you wrote to them, they wrote back to you, and then there was radio silence from you. You filed an application on 15 January.

MR BILAL: When I asked them for EML file. I told them - - -

HIS HONOUR: Mr Bilal, I’m not going to engage in a debate with you. I’ve told both parties numerous times in this matter, I’m not going to keep repeating myself. You keep bringing interlocutory applications before this court. It places a burden on me to have to listen to it, and it places a burden on other litigants who I don’t get to hear their cases, because you keep bringing interlocutory applications. Now, if you want more time to file your reply evidence, I’m not going to deal with it now, you can speak to Mr Watts. That means you must verbally communicate with him, Mr Bilal, and you can both send me an email with consent orders. Yes, is there anything further?

(Emphasis added.)

227    Fourth, Mr Bilal contended that at the commencement of his submissions, he informed me that statements made by Counsel for Ampol immediately before the hearing had disrupted his concentration. He contended that when he sought to explain the matter, I stated that I was "not interested in getting into all of this", characterised the matter as part of Ampol’s submissions, and directed Mr Bilal to proceed with the substantive reply submissions without further inquiry into the complaint.

228    Fifth, Mr Bilal submitted that I repeatedly emphasised the overarching purpose in s 37M of the FCA Act as a basis for progressing the proceeding efficiently, described aspects of his reliance upon the Rules and procedural requirements as a “technicality”, indicated that procedural non-compliance could be excused, and repeatedly directed attention away from the alleged non-compliance towards the efficient disposition of the proceeding. During the course of oral submissions, Mr Bilal contended that I applied s 37M of the FCA Act like it is an “authority”, “[t]o just do things” and to “override court orders without actually utilising [my] discretion to vary them”, and that I am less strict when it comes to whether Ampol has complied with its obligations.

229    Sixth, Mr Bilal contended that I repeatedly portrayed the FW Act jurisdiction as warranting a reduced emphasis on procedural compliance because it was “meant to be” a cost-effective resolution in a “no cost jurisdiction”. He further submitted that I repeatedly relied upon that characterisation to discourage him from pursuing alleged non-compliance with Court orders and the Rules, and instead emphasised efficiency and expediency in the conduct of the Ampol Misrepresentation Proceedings.

230    There are aspects of the matters raised by Mr Bilal which contain an accurate recitation of the events that occurred at the hearing before me on 5 May 2026 and others that do not. More generally, Mr Bilal’s contentions are (again) acontextual.

231    In relation to Mr Bilal’s complaints about what would have been observed as to my method, style, tone and facial expressions, there was little by way of detail or content that was provided. I have sufficient self-awareness to acknowledge that it might have been observed by a reasonable fair-minded lay observer that my method, style, tone and facial expressions may be different in some respects to other judicial officers and the same as some others. That is no more than to acknowledge that a reasonable fair-minded lay observer is taken to know that judges have different styles reflecting their inherent individuality though all such officers are expected to conform to judicial methods and standards of conduct. I do not consider the reasonable fair-minded lay observer has in his or her mind any particular exemplar of a model judge. Nor do I consider that the fair-minded lay observer expects judges to fit the apparent archetype of having an inscrutable Sphinx-like persona or character. In my view, the fair-minded lay observer expects that judges are themselves drawn from the community and may have distinct methods and styles to each other and that at times their tone and facial expressions (undoubtedly borne of genetics, genealogy or conditioning) may occasionally rise and fall with real-time reactions to arguments that are put during any hearing. What is expected by the fair-minded lay observer is conformance to judicial methods and standards of conduct. Without more, I am not satisfied that methods, styles, tones and facial expressions alone establish any reasonable apprehension of bias.

232    Whilst I am prepared to accept for present purposes that a reasonable fair-minded lay observer may have observed that my method, style, tone and facial expressions may have changed during the course of the various hearings, what I do not accept is Mr Bilal’s contention that the fair-minded lay observer may infer or conclude that: (a) this may give rise to an appearance that I may determine matters other than on their legal or factual merits; or (b) I acted in one way in response to his submissions and in another way towards those advanced by Ampol, or that I may have done so without regard to the merits of the arguments that were put by the parties. For example, it is not factually correct that I did not test the positions advanced by Ampol. I specifically asked Counsel for Ampol to: (a) account for the fact that the original list of discovered documents did not specify the number of documents being produced per category; (b) account for the extensiveness of the searches that were conducted; (c) explain the basis upon which it was said that the deponent of the verified list of discovery was an “officer”; and (d) various other matters relating to the discovery process.

233    To the extent that I tested Mr Bilal’s contentions with any difference in approach, the transcript discloses that this was occasioned by what I considered to be misconceptions on Mr Bilal’s part as to obligations relating to discovery in this Court and the application of the Court’s various practice notes. It is also correct that at times I explained to Mr Bilal my understanding of the scope and intended operation of the discovery orders that I had made, and this was done with the object of clarifying the position for Mr Bilal and in respect of which he was given the opportunity to put his case. I do not consider that any of these matters gives rise to an appearance in the mind of the fair-minded lay observer that I may not decide any legal and factual questions other than on their merits.

234    It is broadly correct that in raising various issues with both Mr Bilal and Counsel for Ampol, I was mindful of the overarching objective of progressing proceedings efficiently under s 37M of the FCA Act. It is also correct that I stated that Mr Bilal had repeatedly brought interlocutory applications which imposed a burden on the Court and on other litigants. It is also broadly correct that I expressed the view that many of the disputed issues could have been resolved directly between the parties. As noted above, it is factually correct that Mr Bilal had brought several interlocutory applications. It is also factually correct that certain of the issues in dispute between the parties could have been (in my view) readily resolved by genuine conferral. For example, it became apparent during the course of the hearing that Mr Bilal was raising contentions that had not been notified to Ampol’s representatives. Given that Counsel for Ampol acknowledged that the obligation of discovery is a continuing one, some of the disputed issues could have been resolved had the parties engaged in genuine conferral, not positional posturing in written correspondence.

235    In my view, none of the abovementioned matters gives rise to an apprehension of bias. I do not consider that the reasonable fair-minded lay observer may consider that any of these matters of method, tone or style may give rise to an apprehension that I may not decide matters on their merits. In fact, it is my view that such an observer is more likely to have viewed the conduct as being consistent with a judicial officer seeking to hold the parties to account to the overarching dictates of case management in this Court.

236    Mr Bilal’s complaint that he had been disrupted by Counsel for Ampol before the commencement of his submissions and that I did not look further into this matter does not accord with what was put to me. The actual exchange that occurred was as follows:

HIS HONOUR: Yes, Mr Bilal, it’s your opportunity now to reply to what Mr Watts has said.

MR BILAL: If I remember, your Honour. Once a party is non-compliant, like they were non-compliant, the other party can move the court on default. There is no such thing as the other party has any obligation to write to them or anything like that. That was done in a good faith by a self-represented person ..... person, unwell around December, writing to them. They engage with him in a – what I would describe it as a ping-pong correspondence, constantly telling him next week, tomorrow, they’re seeking an instruction. This is a law firm, industrial law firm, top-tier law firm. They even have some tutorials on their website and have discovery should be done, teaching their clients EDRM, eDiscovery reference model from the edrm.org. They expect me to teach them how discovery should be done. I think this is enough to answer most of the things. Written submission: I clearly told you - - -

HIS HONOUR: You can move past that.

MR BILAL: Yes.

HIS HONOUR: Just - - -

MR BILAL: Yes.

HIS HONOUR: What’s your next point?

MR BILAL: They actually broke my concentration just before the hearing by telling me you didn’t make written submission and you seek counsel from the court and this is right here.

HIS HONOUR: Well - - -

MR BILAL: Yes.

HIS HONOUR: - - - I think Mr Watts’ point is that you’ve raised complaints this morning that have not been raised with them before.

MR BILAL: What did I not raise with him?

HIS HONOUR: Well, I don’t – that’s just his submission. I’m not interested in getting into all of this.

MR BILAL: Right.

HIS HONOUR: I just want to hear your substantive responses to the points - - -

MR BILAL: Yes.

HIS HONOUR: - - - he has raised.

MR BILAL: Privacy: there’s no privacy privilege. That is a matter if someone is concerned with all those points - - -

HIS HONOUR: No, but his point isn’t that they’re claiming privacy privilege. His point is that one of the documents that answered your category was a document that contained irrelevant material.

MR BILAL: Yes.

HIS HONOUR: So why you need to know the names and injuries suffered by all other employees, that has got nothing to do with these proceedings.

MR BILAL: You seem to be very acceptable of what they said. That’s - - -

HIS HONOUR: No.

MR BILAL: Yes.

HIS HONOUR: I’m not.

MR BILAL: Yes.

HIS HONOUR: I’m asking you to respond to their submission. Why do you say that that’s relevant?

MR BILAL: You accepted the premise.

HIS HONOUR: I did not accept the premise, Mr Bilal. I am asking you to respond to the contention.

MR BILAL: Yes. You said there is a file, right?

HIS HONOUR: I’m assuming. That’s what I’ve been told.

MR BILAL: That’s the problem.

HIS HONOUR: I see.

MR BILAL: Yes.

HIS HONOUR: You don’t accept that?

MR BILAL: Yes. There is a PDF of an Excel file. You know Excel? Spreadsheet. Flattened. I can’t read even my column because it’s huge. They printed it. I can’t see my letters. You can’t read it even if you zoom in. It’s a piece of crap. Useless piece of crap. You don’t even see yours because they reduce a huge Excel that is horizontal – the font pixel is reduced to what? To nothing. You can’t read it. That is not useful, I think. This is first. Second, how would I see the versions of this Excel relevant for myself? They changed it hundred times. This is a spreadsheet. You can simply edit that. How about that? They produced just the last version? This is first. Second, in this discovery, yes, they – that’s a good thing there is. Actually, you have them. There’s no privilege – privacy privilege, but there is relevancy. That’s why they tried to say privacy. This is a non-standard discovery. It says you are not in a position to apply relevancy to this discovery. You produce every record. All right. The proper course would be for them to ask me, and I am under Harman undertaking. There is nothing you, they can’t say this party can’t be trusted or anything. If I did anything, I am under Harman. All right? This is first. Second, this is one example they provided. I gave you an example of an email, not a spreadsheet, email. This is an email saying Ali Bilal, case. Writing about me. All of a sudden a paragraph is, there are about at least three things, one of them isn’t redacted. And they say this is privacy of someone else. All of a sudden my email with title about me. That’s not something one can claim. If that was irrelevant, let it be irrelevant, whatever it is. We want to see everything in that document.

Because this can be their smoking gun. How can they just redact it and say, no, this is privacy? That easy? So, that doesn’t apply to what they say. I move to officer. It says, among the officers, they informed one. It’s not saying the officer should make it and the person which is informed. Obviously, read together, there is an officer which is informed. Mr Ben, I refer to his documents, to his things - - -

237    As will be apparent from the above exchanges: (a) I was told that Counsel for Ampol had approached Mr Bilal before the commencement of the hearing and told him that he was raising new complaints that had not been previously raised with Ampol; (b) Mr Bilal told me that this had disrupted his concentration; (c) I did say I did not want to get into what was said and was interested in Mr Bilal’s response to the substantive point; and (d) Mr Bilal was given an opportunity to respond to the points raised by Counsel for Ampol in a manner that did not suggest to me that he was not able to avail himself of that opportunity.

238    It is also correct that I pointed out to Mr Bilal that his contentions about the application of the Technology and the Court Practice Note (GPN-TECH) were not apposite to claims brought under the FW Act that are intended to be more cost-effective. The actual exchange was as follows:

HIS HONOUR: What’s the expression you’re using, a “legal hold”?

MR BILAL: Yes, legal hold.

HIS HONOUR: What’s a legal hold?

MR BILAL: To prevent destruction and modification of records. The moment discovery starts, you are asking me to do the homework here for you, and I’m sure you’re aware of that, but I make submissions on that. So, as part of the discovery methodology, they should first, after they identify the custodians, then make sure they preserve the data, put a legal hold.

HIS HONOUR: Mr Bilal, I think you’re operating on a misunderstanding here. The GPN-TECH requirements for electronic discovery are what is contemplated in complex, large, commercial-scale litigation. It is entirely inconsistent with a matter of this type. If that’s what you had in mind when I made those orders, I wouldn’t have made them in that way. I would have been more clear that I didn’t intend, that is, me as the court, did not intend to apply the criteria of SDMP and the other requirements of GPN-TECH in relation to what is complex electronic discovery in large-scale litigation.

Your case that you brought before this court in these proceedings is about a contravention of section 345 of the Fair Work Act for knowing or reckless misrepresentation in the suspension letter. It’s entirely disproportionate what you’re talking about. A legal hold, these are things that might operate in the context of very large-scale litigation. This is meant to be a cost-effective resolution of a claim made under the Fair Work Act.

239    In so doing, I was explaining aspects of practice and procedure in this Court to a litigant in person consistent with the authorities referred to at [66] above.

240    I am not satisfied that any of the abovementioned matters establish a reasonable apprehension of bias based on the three-step criteria set out at [57] above. In particular, as with other matters raised by Mr Bilal, I am not satisfied that there is any logical connection between my conduct and the apprehended deviation from deciding the relevant questions on their legal and factual merits.

4.3.15    Case management hearing on 13 May 2026 in Further Ampol Misrepresentation Proceedings (NSD444/2026)

241    Mr Bilal contended that during a further case management hearing in the Further Ampol Misrepresentation Proceedings which took place on 13 May 2026, I stated that it was for the Court, rather than Mr Bilal, to determine whether compliance with the Rules should be required in the circumstances, explained that the Rules permitted me to displace procedural requirements where appropriate, and strongly encouraged Mr Bilal not to pursue the Third and Fourth Default Applications against the second and third respondents, being EML and the Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer (who had not yet filed appearances), and the Second Default Application against the first respondent, being Ampol, after Ampol had filed evidence explaining its delay in filing its defence.

242    Mr Bilal’s contentions are factually inaccurate. I did not discourage him from bringing the Third and Fourth Default Applications in which he sought orders for judgment to be entered against the second and third respondents, being EML and the Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer, who failed to appear at this case management hearing. However, I did discourage Mr Bilal from pursuing the Second Default Application, which sought orders for judgment to be entered against Ampol on the basis that it was approximately two weeks late in filing its defence. I was informed by Ampol’s solicitor that he had written to Mr Bilal prior to the filing deadline to seek a short extension and that the reason for the delay was some further information had been sought from Mr Bilal regarding the substance of his claims, and that Ampol had since filed its defence. In view of the fact that Ampol had since filed a defence (some two weeks late), I did discourage Mr Bilal from pressing an application for default judgment and expressed the view that this would be a “waste of time and money”. In that context, I explained to Mr Bilal that it was for the Court to determine whether it was appropriate that compliance with the Rules be dispensed with. Despite my endeavours to dissuade Mr Bilal from pressing his Second Default Application, I nevertheless listed all interlocutory applications for hearing and encouraged Mr Bilal to consider not pressing the Second Default Application in the meantime.

243    Mr Bilal further contended that I referred to the pressures on my diary, stated that if the interlocutory applications could not be heard on the allocated date, they would likely have to wait months before being heard, and encouraged Mr Bilal to resolve part of the interlocutory dispute by consent once further evidence had been filed. I accept that this is broadly what occurred. It reflected the actual position as to my diary for impending hearings at the time.

244    I am not satisfied that any of these matters give rise to any reasonable apprehension of bias. I consider my conduct to be entirely consistent with orthodox approaches to case management. My statements reflected the practical reality that I had limited time available to hear the matter and were consistent with my role in encouraging efficient use of the Court’s time consistent with the objects of s 37M of the FCA Act.

245    I do not accept Mr Bilal’s contentions that the conduct raised here could give rise to any apprehension of bias. In particular, I am not satisfied that there is any logical connection between my conduct and the apprehended deviation from deciding the relevant questions on their legal and factual merits.

4.3.16    Case management hearing on 14 May 2026 in the EML Misrepresentation Proceedings (NSD185/2026)

246    The EML Misrepresentation Proceedings were listed for case management hearing on 14 May 2026. Mr Bilal described the events of this hearing as “close to the climax of … the history” in support of his contentions that my conduct has given rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

247    First, Mr Bilal contended that I repeatedly questioned him as to:

(a)    why he continued to pursue the First Default Application after EML had filed a defence and referred to the efficient administration of justice under ss 37M and 37N of the FCA Act;

(b)    how determining the First Default Application would assist the administration of justice; and

(c)    what prejudice Mr Bilal had suffered by reason of the delay in filing the defence.

248    Mr Bilal also pointed to the fact that I raised the possibility of an adverse costs order under s 570 of the FW Act if the continued pursuit of the First Default Application constituted an unreasonable act.

249    Second, Mr Bilal submitted that I, of my own motion, directed that the parties’ written submissions address the question of costs irrespective of whether either party had sought costs, notwithstanding Mr Bilal’s objection that no party had sought such relief. Mr Bilal further submitted that I stated that I wished to determine all questions of costs at the same time as the First Default Application, rather than reserve them for later determination, and directed that the application, including the appropriate costs orders, would be determined on the papers unless a party sought an oral hearing. He contended that in response to his objection that the respondent had not raised the issue of costs, I stated, “I am doing it” and in doing so, “descend[ed] into the arena” and became “combative”.

250    It is broadly correct that I questioned Mr Bilal as to the necessity of dealing with the default applications in circumstances where EML had filed a defence. I considered that to be entirely consistent with my duties and obligations as a judicial officer. It is also correct that I said I would determine the application on the papers and made an order that the parties also address the question of costs in their respective submissions. The actual exchange was as follows:

HIS HONOUR: But what I will add in order 1 is the applicant file and serve any affidavit evidence, any written outline of submissions, including as to the appropriate order as to costs that should be made in either eventuality, that is, whether the application is upheld or dismissed, so he will address me on costs.

MR BILAL: I don’t understand this one.

HIS HONOUR: Well, I’ve spelt it out. Your submissions will include what order of costs should be made if I determine the application in your favour or in a way that’s adverse to you, that is, if I dismiss the application. In either eventuality, you can address your submissions on the question of costs as well. Mr Gandar - - -

MR BILAL: I object to that.

HIS HONOUR: It’s a direction I’m making. It’s the ordinary court - - -

MR BILAL: Do you want to hear my objection?

HIS HONOUR: Sure. What’s your objection, Mr Bilal?

MR BILAL: The respondent did not seek this order.

HIS HONOUR: I am doing it.

MR BILAL: So the court - - -

HIS HONOUR: I am the court.

MR BILAL: The court is - - -

HIS HONOUR: I want to hear you on the question of costs if I uphold your application, and I want to hear the respondents on a question of costs if I dismiss your application, so that I don’t have to have a further hearing about that later, and I don’t wish to reserve the costs. I want all the arguments in, on the question of costs in the written submissions, because I will determine the matter on the papers.

MR BILAL: But what party sought costs in this motion?

HIS HONOUR: No one has. So I want you to address me on it. Do you want your costs if you succeed in your application?

MR BILAL: Whatever I sought in my motion, is in my motion. On the record.

HIS HONOUR: All right. Well, Mr Gandar - - -

MR BILAL: I don’t understand - - -

HIS HONOUR: All right. Thank you, Mr Bilal, I’ve heard you. Mr Gandar, do you wish to be heard on the question of costs, in the event that the application is unsuccessful?

MR GANDAR: Yes, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: All right.

MR GANDAR: We wrote to the applicant yesterday to say that we would be seeking our costs if this proceeds.

HIS HONOUR: All right. Well, I am directing – Mr Bilal, I’ve heard your submission. I’m directing that the submissions also address the question of costs. If you don’t wish to address them, you don’t have to address them. And order 2 can be adjusted so that the respondents can address the question of costs, as can order 3(b), so that Mr Bilal can address any question of costs and reply. I will also make order 4, and I will determine the default application, but add the words, including the appropriate cost orders that should follow from the determination of the default applications on the papers unless the party seeks to be heard orally. They’re the orders I’m going to make.

251    As is apparent from the above, in circumstances where I was to determine the matter on the papers, I wanted the parties to address all questions including costs. I did not want to determine the application only for one or other party to seek their costs of the application, which would require separate determination. It is correct that I made such an order without either party having adverted to it, but such an order is within the ordinary bounds of judicial practice where a judicial officer is to determine an interlocutory application on the papers.

252    I do not accept Mr Bilal’s contentions that the conduct raised here could give rise to any apprehension of bias. I am not satisfied that there is any logical connection between my conduct and the apprehended deviation from deciding the relevant questions on their legal and factual merits.

4.3.17    Case management hearing on 14 May 2026 in the First Registrar Review Proceedings (NSD497/2026)

253    By 14 May 2026, a further set of proceedings involving Mr Bilal had been allocated to my docket, being the First Registrar Review Proceedings. At the time these proceedings were allocated to me, I understood that Mr Bilal was challenging a decision made by a Registrar of the Court to refuse the filing of documents he wished to have filed (being the 25 March 2026 Lodgment), but at that time I had not joined the dots to appreciate any connection between the relevant documents Mr Bilal wished to lodge and the proceedings he had wished to initiate by the 4 March 2026 Lodgment which I had earlier suggested could be brought by way of an amendment to claims made in his existing proceedings.

254    The First Registrar Review Proceedings were listed for a first case management hearing on 14 May 2026 at 10.15 am. The EML Misrepresentation Proceedings were listed at 9.45 am on the same day. On the morning of these case management hearings, it appeared to me that there were now a number of proceedings involving Mr Bilal that had been allocated to my docket, and I was keen to understand why there were so many proceedings that had been commenced and to seek assistance from the parties in those proceedings to make them more efficient to minimise the burdens of case management, especially the burdens of case management of matters in my docket.

255    Mr Bilal characterised the events of the case management hearing as amounting to the “climax” of the “history”.

256    First, Mr Bilal contended that at the conclusion of the case management hearing in the EML Misrepresentation Proceedings, I asked Counsel for EML to remain in Court during the first case management hearing of the First Registrar Review Proceedings. This is correct. I did make that request, as I wished to raise questions of Mr Bilal as to the accumulated burden on my docket of the many proceedings he had commenced and whether there was a more efficient way forward to manage these matters.

257    Second, Mr Bilal contended that he had prepared short minutes of order for the case management of the First Registrar Review Proceedings, but when he went to hand them up, I indicated that I wished to raise other matters with him in the first instance and asked him to address me about his short minutes of orders when I told him he could do so. Mr Bilal stated that I then used “technical” language and led questions about him having commenced “multiple” proceedings. He submitted that I repeatedly: (a) questioned him regarding the number of proceedings he had commenced against Ampol, EML and related parties; (b) directed him to identify those proceedings and the relevant causes of action; and (c) stated that I was raising those matters as part of case management of what I understood to be Mr Bilal’s seventh proceeding before me. Mr Bilal submitted that I referred to the Court's right to protect its own processes and procedures through case management. Mr Bilal further contended that I then proposed listing all of his proceedings for a consolidated case management hearing to consider whether claims made against the same respondents should be consolidated, whether future claims should instead be advanced by amendment to existing proceedings rather than by commencing fresh proceedings, and indicated that I might avoid determining the First Registrar Review Proceedings by granting leave for the underlying claims to proceed by way of an amendment to one of the existing proceedings instead of being advanced in new proceedings. He contended that I stated that, if he did not adopt that course, I intended to hear submissions as to whether one or more proceedings should be dismissed as an abuse of the Court's processes.

258    Mr Bilal contended that by taking the course that I did, I created an apprehension that I had “descend[ed] into the arena”. Mr Bilal submitted that the fair-minded lay observer might apprehend that the accumulation of proceedings had caused me frustration and created “mental fatigue” such that it might be apprehended that I could not bring an impartial mind to bear on the determination of his various cases.

259    Mr Bilal’s account of what transpired at the case management hearing is broadly correct, but I am not satisfied that it gives rise to any apprehension of bias. During the hearing, the following exchanges occurred:

HIS HONOUR: Mr Bilal, you tried to file a document with the registry that Registrar Burns, from what you tell me, didn’t accept for filing. What was the document that you sought to file?

MR BILAL: Originating a process.

HIS HONOUR: Against who?

MR BILAL: I don’t remember.

HIS HONOUR: I’m directing you to inform me. What is the document?

MR BILAL: I need to look at the eLodgment. I need to look at the - - -

HIS HONOUR: You don’t know what the originating process is?

MR BILAL: I may make an error. I don’t want to do that

HIS HONOUR: Well, do your best. Who are you suing in this one?

MR BILAL: Nominal insurer worker compensation, I guess, is one.

HIS HONOUR: Yes. Who else?

MR BILAL: EML New South Wales Limited.

HIS HONOUR: And who else?

MR BILAL: Can’t remember that one.

HIS HONOUR: Is Ampol a party?

MR BILAL: Maybe. I really can’t remember.

HIS HONOUR: Well, can I say to you, Mr Bilal, if that document is accepted for filing, if I accept your arguments and set aside the decision of the registrar, can you tell me how many proceedings you’ve now got before the court to which either EML or Ampol are a party?

MR BILAL: Can’t remember.

HIS HONOUR: Well - - -

MR BILAL: Can I say something?

HIS HONOUR: No. You can address me, when I tell you, you can address me, because I want to raise some issues with you, Mr Bilal. From what I can tell, you’ve got multiple proceedings before the court, which I’m case managing, that involve either EML or Ampol as a party. Is that right? Multiple proceedings.

MR BILAL: What is multiple? More than one? More than one.

HIS HONOUR: As against Ampol, you have a proceeding that alleges contraventions of the whistleblowing provisions. Is that right?

MR BILAL: Looks like that is right, yes.

260    As will be apparent from the above exchange, Mr Bilal was not in a position to inform me as to the identity of the party or parties against whom he wished to commence new proceedings, being those which had been rejected for filing by a Registrar of this Court. It is further apparent that Mr Bilal was unable to inform me of the nature of those proceedings or the number of proceedings he had commenced against each of Ampol or EML. I accept that I did not wish to hear at that point from Mr Bilal about the matters he wished to raise given that I was seeking to elicit from him information relevant to the case management of the First Registrar Review Proceedings and other proceedings in my docket. Mr Bilal said that he was not appearing that morning to address my questions on any other matters and thereafter became upset and asked for an adjournment to gather his thoughts. I granted him that time and I accept that he appeared to me to be upset by being asked questions about his various proceedings. Shortly after the case management hearing resumed, I said:

HIS HONOUR: Yes. Now, Mr Bilal, the orders you want me to make in proceedings NSD49 of 2026, I will make these orders, but what I would also like to do, Mr Bilal, is one day next week or the following week, I propose to list, and I will communicate through my associates to you.

I propose to list all the proceedings you have before this court for case management, and what I would like to hear from you about, at that time, and each of the parties to those proceedings, where they’ve been served, is whether there should be a consolidation of all the proceedings, excluding the one that I’ve already listed for hearing that’s the one against Ampol, and whether all your claims against Ampol should be consolidated into one proceeding, except for the one I mentioned, all your claims against EML should be consolidated into one proceeding, and all your claims against the nominal insurer should be consolidated into one proceeding.

The reason I raise that is because if these proceedings that you brought against the registrar relate to some further claim that you wish to bring against Ampol and EML, rather than deal with your application for review under ADJR Act, I might be able to short-circuit that and simply say you be granted leave to file those proceedings, but on the condition that they not be instituted as fresh proceedings but be instituted as an amendment to one or more of the other proceedings you’ve already got before the court.

If you don’t wish to do that, then what I would like to hear from you about, and from each of the respondents about, is whether what one or more of your proceedings should be dismissed as an abuse of the court’s processes. I don’t need to hear from you about that now. I’m just raising this with you to tell you that I will write to you separately and be seeking to list all the proceedings you’ve got before the court for directions either next week, the following week or the week after at a date convenient to you.

But in the meantime, I will make the orders that you seek me to make in these proceedings, and I will adjust order 1 to include the transcript of both proceedings that were before me today, so you’re given a transcript of all of those. Yes. Do you wish to say anything?

261    As is apparent from the above, at least one of the reasons I was seeking Mr Bilal’s assistance was to ensure that any new claim he wished to bring in the Court could in fact be brought, but be brought by way of amending one of the existing proceedings so that fresh proceedings were not required. It is evident that my concern here was about efficient case management and use of the Court’s resources. I was also giving Mr Bilal notice that I would need to take stock of all the proceedings and determine whether the multiple proceedings were in fact necessary.

262    I do not accept that any of these matters gives rise to any reasonable apprehension of bias based on the three-step criteria set out above at [57].

4.3.18    Case management hearing on 20 May 2026 in all Eight Proceedings

263    Following on from the case management hearing on 14 May 2026 in the First Registrar Review Proceedings, on 15 May 2026, I caused my Associates to send the following email to the parties:

Dear Parties,

We refer to the following proceedings.

1.    NSD391/2025 - ALI BILAL v AMPOL LIMITED & ORS

2.    NSD617/2025 - ALI BILAL v EML NSW LIMITED & ORS

3.    NSD1187/2025 - ALI BILAL v AMPOL AUSTRALIA PETROLEUM PTY LTD

4.    NSD185/2026 - ALI BILAL v EML NSW LIMITED

5.    NSD444/2026 - ALI BILAL v AMPOL AUSTRALIA PETROLEUM PTY LTD & ORS

6.    NSD497/2026 - ALI BILAL v JODIE BURNS REGISTRAR OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

7.    NSD609/2026 - ALI BILAL v REGISTRAR OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

8.    NSD156/2026 - ALI BILAL v AMPOL AUSTRALIA PETROLEUM PTY LTD

His Honour is now case managing all these proceedings presently before the Court and wishes to list all of them for case management at 9.45am on Wednesday 20 May 2026. His Honour will set aside at least 1 hour for the case management hearing. The purpose of this listing is to ascertain whether:

(a)    any one or more of the proceedings should be consolidated or should they be case managed together;

(b)    any one or more of the proceedings should be dismissed as constituting an abuse of process in circumstances where the proceeding has been commenced or has been sought to be commenced under the same statute and/or against the same parties and/or relating to the same or similar factual matters;

(c)    any other case management orders should be made;

(d)    any one or more of these proceedings should be case managed before a Registrar of the Court rather than a docket judge; or

(e)    any one or more of the respondents who have entered an appearance wish to be heard on or making any applications relating to the above matters.

His Honour appreciates that proceedings NSD1187/2025 is already listed for hearing on 22 – 23 July 2026 and that proceeding may fall into a separate category, but his Honour wishes to hear from all interested and affected parties.

The Court is taking this step in accordance with the exercise of its powers under ss 37M and 37N of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) to ensure the efficient and just resolution of the proceedings and in the exercise of its powers to guard against an abuse of the Court’s processes.

For the benefit of all parties, we have attached the Litigants in Person Practice Note.

264    The Eight Proceedings were then all listed for a case management hearing on 20 May 2026.

265    Mr Bilal contended that my conduct during this case management hearing gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

266    Mr Bilal submitted that during the case management hearing I made several statements regarding the bringing of the Eight Proceedings, including by:

(a)    stating that the Eight Proceedings involved substantially similar parties, facts and statutory claims, that I was concerned that the proceedings were not being conducted in the most efficient manner and that separate proceedings required separate determinations and interlocutory decisions which placed a burden on the Court's resources;

(b)    seeking submissions from Mr Bilal as to why the proceedings should not be consolidated into a smaller number of proceedings;

(c)    indicating that if Mr Bilal wished to advance further claims against Ampol or EML, those claims should instead be brought by amendment to existing proceedings, rather than by commencing fresh proceedings and that this would avoid additional proceedings and was the course the Court was attempting to raise with him; and

(d)    stating that the administration of multiple proceedings involving similar parties engaged not only the interests of the parties but also the Court's own interest in the administration of justice and its impact on other litigants, and foreshadowed hearing submissions as to whether one or more of Mr Bilal’s proceedings should be dismissed as an abuse of the Court's processes if they were not consolidated or otherwise managed differently.

267    It is broadly correct that I raised each of these matters with Mr Bilal.

268    Mr Bilal more generally contended that I “descend[ed] into the arena” by asking questions and discussing matters “on [my] motion”, without any application having been made by any party. It is correct that I had listed all Eight Proceedings for case management on my own motion. To the extent that I was descending into asking Mr Bilal questions about the various proceedings, that was the very purpose of the holding of the case management hearing.

269    Mr Bilal next stated that he raised the fact that he would be making the Recusal Application in respect of all of the Eight Proceedings. He asked that all existing case management hearings and listings be vacated, including the listing of the final hearing in the Ampol Misrepresentation Proceedings. This too is correct and I acceded to Mr Bilal’s request to vacate the existing orders in view of his indication that he would be making the Recusal Application, as I considered that to be reasonable and appropriate. Rather than vacate the existing listing on 22 and 23 July 2026, I ordered that the Recusal Application be heard on those dates.

270    Mr Bilal next submitted that I treated him inconsistently by regarding him as both legally capable and legally incapable. He said I scrutinised his pleadings as if he was a person who did not know the law, but at the same time considered him to be involved in strategic litigation. I do not accept these contentions. What is correct is that I had raised with Mr Bilal that he appeared to be pursuing a strategy of commencing disparate but related litigation against the same or similar parties and did not appear to appreciate that the Court had to manage its affairs and resources in an efficient manner consistent with the proper administration of justice.

271    Mr Bilal further submitted that during the hearing, I admitted one of his grounds for disqualification in an exchange with Counsel for Ampol, as follows:

HIS HONOUR: Of the Fair Work Act. Your client, putting to one side any application for recusal that Mr Bilal now brings, or wishes to now bring, asks me to determine that matter in July, or at least hear it and then determine it. From what I can see, Mr Bilal also has sought to file with the court, fresh proceedings against, at least, I don’t know, I don’t know the details of this, but further proceedings against Ampol and EML, alleging a contravention of section 345 of the Fair Work Act, that have been refused for filing or something. I don’t know all the details of this, because I don’t know what happens in the registry.

But he has asked for a review of the registrar’s decision to refuse filing on that. If I allow that proceeding to be filed, that means I will be called upon to hear and determine another proceeding, one different to 1187, where there’s an allegation of a contravention of section 345 of the Fair Work Act against Ampol. And if I make a determination in 1187 one way or another, that might give rise to a recusal of myself on a different basis, because I will have heard and determined already, one contravention case against Ampol under section 345.

And it’s partly the very reason I raised with Mr Bilal last week, a practical issue, which is, rather than bringing fresh proceedings, why doesn’t he just amend one of the extant ones? Now he might have good reason for that. I don’t know, I haven’t heard him on that, and he doesn’t wish to be heard on that at the moment. But do you understand the predicament your side would be putting me in, if I were to proceed and hear and determine the case in July?

272    As will be apparent from the above exchange, the point I was raising (by reference to the Ampol Misrepresentation Proceedings as an example) was that given that I had Eight Proceedings in my docket with overlapping issues of fact or law, at some point my determination of one of them on a final basis may give rise to concerns about a reasonable apprehension of bias in respect of my management and determination of the other proceedings. I do not regard the point I was raising as a concession, but the identification of an obvious conundrum that needed to be addressed by effective case management of the Eight Proceedings.

273    I am not satisfied that any of the matters raised during this case management hearing gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias based on the three-step criteria set out at [57] above.

4.4    My published reasons to date

274    During his oral submissions, Mr Bilal submitted that a reasonable apprehension of bias in various respects would arise from some of the observations I have made in my published reasons to date in matters involving him.

275    To date, I have published the following reasons relating to Mr Bilal:

(a)    Bilal v EML NSW Limited [2025] FCA 1190;

(b)    Bilal v Ampol Limited [2025] FCA 1189;

(c)    Bilal v Ampol Australia Petroleum Pty Ltd (Interlocutory) [2025] FCA 1473; and

(d)    Bilal v Ampol Australia Petroleum Pty Ltd (Discovery) [2026] FCA 591.

276    During the course of oral submissions, other than in a few minor respects, Mr Bilal did not identify what aspects of these published reasons supported his contentions. Mr Bilal submitted that there were aspects of the above judgments where I referred to the fact that he had yet again brought further interlocutory proceedings. To the extent that my earlier decisions make those and related observations, they are factually accurate. Being as objective as I can, in my view, my published reasons disclose that I have determined each application before me on their legal and factual merits. In this regard, it is to be observed that I have not acceded to the respondents’ applications in whole or in part and have made accommodations in favour of Mr Bilal. For example, in Bilal v Ampol Limited [2025] FCA 1189, I was ultimately not satisfied that Mr Bilal’s originating application and statement of claim in the Ampol Whistleblower Proceedings should be summarily dismissed, and instead made orders striking out his statement of claim and requiring him to file a proposed amended statement of claim. Similarly, in Bilal v Ampol Australia Petroleum Pty Ltd (Interlocutory) [2025] FCA 1473, despite finding that EML did not fail to comply with a notice to produce served by Mr Bilal and dated 20 September 2025, I nevertheless made orders for the discovery of further documents recording or evidencing EML’s appointment as insurer.

277    It should also be observed that, other than in relation to Bilal v Ampol Australia Petroleum Pty Ltd (Discovery) [2026] FCA 591, none of my published reasons have been the subject of any application for leave to appeal or appeal. As I understand it, there was an application for leave to appeal my decision in Bilal v Ampol Australia Petroleum Pty Ltd (Discovery) [2026] FCA 591, but this application was dismissed: see Bilal v Ampol Australia Petroleum Pty Ltd [2026] FCA 1382 (Charlesworth J).

278    In his supplementary written submissions filed after the conclusion of the hearing, Mr Bilal referred to various parts of the above judgments which he contended support the grounds for recusal outlined in Part 4.5 below. He did not, however, articulate which of his grounds for recusal each of the examples he relied upon related to or explain how they give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the fair-minded lay observer by reference to the three-step criteria outlined at [57] above. The extracts relied upon by Mr Bilal fall into several broad categories.

279    First, Mr Bilal pointed to references in the published judgments to proceedings brought by him which were either brought in this Court but not allocated to me, or brought in other courts. I am not satisfied that the mere reference to Mr Bilal’s other proceedings gives rise to any reasonable apprehension of bias.

280    Second, Mr Bilal relied upon observations made by me regarding the nature of the relevant proceedings, including, for example, that they raise “a narrow point for determination” or involve a “confined case” (see Bilal v Ampol Australia Petroleum Pty Ltd (Discovery) [2026] FCA 591 at [3], [33]). As with similar observations made orally during the course of the various hearings to date, such observations were made during the course of considering the appropriateness of various discovery orders sought by Mr Bilal, and whether such discovery orders were proportionate to the issues in dispute in the proceedings. Accordingly, I am not satisfied that such observations give rise to any reasonable apprehension of bias.

281    Third, Mr Bilal referred to references to reasons I have published in other proceedings to which Mr Bilal is a party, including principles, facts and background matters contained therein, and observations regarding the similarity between the factual substratum of these various proceedings. I considered those references to be in the interests of avoiding unnecessary repetition, and they were consistent with usual judicial practice. I am not satisfied that such references to earlier published reasons give rise to any apprehension of bias on the part of the fair-minded lay observer.

282    Fourth, Mr Bilal relied upon references to other proceedings brought by him and my observations regarding the number of proceedings or interlocutory applications brought, including the burdensome nature of such applications on the resources of the Court and the parties. As noted above in relation to similar submissions made orally by Mr Bilal, I am satisfied that such observations were factually accurate. They further demonstrate that I have endeavoured to case manage the Eight Proceedings towards final hearing which I consider appropriate and consistent with the overarching purpose contained in s 37M of the FCA Act.

283    Fifth, Mr Bilal referred to various observations in relation to him, including his failure to attend to the defects in his statement of claim in the EML Whistleblower Proceedings (see Bilal v EML NSW Limited [2025] FCA 1190 at [18]), his making of “quantum leaps in logic which have not been satisfactorily pleaded” (see Bilal v EML NSW Limited [2025] FCA 1190 at [23]) and various other deficiencies in his submissions and pleadings. Such observations were confined to the particular matters in issue in the relevant proceedings in relation to which they were made. They reflected my assessment of the merits of the claims before me and related to a version of pleadings that I determined be struck out in their entirety. As far as I can tell, Mr Bilal has revised his pleadings and it is the present or any further amended pleaded case that I will need to determine at any final hearing. In those circumstances, I am not satisfied that such observations give rise to any apprehension of bias on the part of the fair-minded lay observer.

284    Sixth, Mr Bilal relied upon various other observations and findings, which included, for example:

(a)    that particular questions were not suitable for summary determination (see Bilal v Ampol Australia Petroleum Pty Ltd (Interlocutory) [2025] FCA 1473 at [35]-[36]);

(b)    rejections of Mr Bilal's submissions, for example, that pleadings contained in a defence were made in "bad faith" (see Bilal v Ampol Australia Petroleum Pty Ltd (Interlocutory) [2025] FCA 1473 at [37]);

(c)    my refusal to grant an injunction sought by Mr Bilal (see Bilal v Ampol Australia Petroleum Pty Ltd (Interlocutory) [2025] FCA 1473 at [61]-[68]);

(d)    my observations that relevant evidence had not been challenged (including Mr Bilal's own evidence) (see Bilal v Ampol Australia Petroleum Pty Ltd (Discovery) [2026] FCA 591 at [6], [46]-[49]);

(e)    my finding that the Technology and the Court Practice Note (GPN-TECH) did not apply (see Bilal v Ampol Australia Petroleum Pty Ltd (Discovery) [2026] FCA 591 at [34]-[39]);

(f)    my finding that I was not satisfied that searches conducted by Ampol were inadequate or not in compliance with its discovery obligations (see Bilal v Ampol Australia Petroleum Pty Ltd (Discovery) [2026] FCA 591 at [43]-[52]); and

(g)    my decision to dismiss Mr Bilal's interlocutory application (see Bilal v Ampol Australia Petroleum Pty Ltd (Discovery) [2026] FCA 591 at [65]).

285    It should again be observed that the determination of interlocutory applications in one or more of the proceedings does not in and of itself give rise to an apprehension of bias: see Doggett at [11] (extracted at [64] above). Unfavourable findings, such as those relied upon by Mr Bilal as outlined above, are not taken by the fair-minded lay observer to be an expression that the judge has other than an impartial mind in relation to the substantive proceeding.

286    Seventh, Mr Bilal relied upon general observations directed to both parties, for example, regarding the desirability of avoiding multiple interlocutory disputes and efficiently progressing proceedings to trial, or my expectation that the parties resolve issues as to redacted documents as between themselves (see Bilal v Ampol Australia Petroleum Pty Ltd (Discovery) [2026] FCA 591 at [60]). In circumstances where such observations were directed to both parties and accorded with ordinary judicial practice in encouraging parties to litigate the real issues in dispute between them, I am not satisfied that they give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the fair-minded lay observer.

287    In the circumstances, I am not satisfied that Mr Bilal has established any matter arising from my published reasons whereby a fair-minded lay observer might consider that I have determined any of the interlocutory applications to date, or that I might determine any of Mr Bilal’s remaining claims, other than on their legal and factual merits.

4.5    The Grounds for Recusal

288    It is necessary to address each of the Grounds for recusal that Mr Bilal advanced. As already mentioned, these Grounds relied upon my conduct during the various hearings (as set out in Part 4.3) but not exclusively so. That is because in his written submissions, Mr Bilal submitted that the “Big Picture” did not arise from any “single event, statement, decision or proceeding in isolation” and relied upon the “cumulative effect of the matters” he had raised. Mr Bilal submitted that some of those matters arose from the various hearings I have addressed in Part 4.3 above, others arose from the “External Proceedings” (being those in other courts or before other judges of this Court), and yet others arose from the administration and allocation of proceedings to my docket such that the “significance of those matters emerges from the overall pattern they reveal when viewed together”.

289    I will deal with each contention in turn.

4.5.1    Ground 1: Designated Judge and Accumulated Judicial History Contention

290    Mr Bilal submitted that the fair-minded lay observer may apprehend that his various proceedings are being allocated in a way that makes me appear as a “designated judge” and that through the repeated allocation of his proceedings to my docket, I have “accumulated an unusually extensive history of interactions” with him. Mr Bilal submitted that the fair-minded lay observer may apprehend that Mr Bilal is no longer appearing before me to litigate discrete legal controversies, but is appearing before a judge with an accumulated history of him such that it “may consciously or unconsciously create impressions, assumptions and expectations concerning [Mr Bilal] which would not ordinarily exist where a litigant appears before a judicial officer for the first time”.

291    In support of these contentions, Mr Bilal submitted that the fair-minded lay observer would appreciate that each of the Eight Proceedings “concern different events, different factual circumstances and different causes of action” which are separated by the years in which those different events occurred. He submitted that the fair-minded lay observer would know that his various proceedings concern different subject matter (including whistleblower claims, employment-related matters, judicial review proceedings and proceedings concerning the administration of the Court) and that these are distinct proceedings and not the manifestation of a single dispute.

292    As I have identified in Part 4.1 above, I accept that the fair-minded lay observer is taken to have some knowledge: (a) of the facts, matters and circumstances of the Eight Proceedings; (b) that they have been allocated to my docket; (c) that I am to case manage those proceedings and ultimately hear and determine them; (d) that each of the proceedings (other than the First and Second Registrar Review Proceedings) relate in one way or another to the circumstances leading up to and including the termination of Mr Bilal’s employment and the management of his WC Claim (including the suspension of his weekly entitlements); and (e) that the different proceedings involve claims under the same or similar statutory provisions of either the Corporations Act or the FW Act.

293    Mr Bilal’s submissions appeared to suggest that there was something improper in the allocation of his various proceedings to me as the “designated judge”. In my view, the fair-minded lay observer would expect different proceedings relating to the same parties and involving allegations of contraventions of the same statutory provisions to be managed, heard and determined by the same judge to ensure consistency. The fair-minded lay observer is also taken to know that it is an ordinary incident of judicial practice and procedure that individual judges do not seek out allocation of matters to their respective lists or dockets, but that these are matters determined in the administration of the Court as guided by the Chief Justice: see, generally, Rajski v Wood (1989) 18 NSWLR 512 at 526 (Hope AJA). In Fingleton v The Queen [2005] HCA 34; 227 CLR 166, Gleeson CJ relevantly stated at [52]:

Within any court, the assignment of a judicial officer to a particular case, or a particular kind of business, or a particular locality, is a matter intimately related to the independent and impartial administration of justice. This was the basis of the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Rajski v Wood, where it was held that the nomination or allocation of a judge to hear a particular case was not justiciable. As was pointed out in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Wang, where it is the function of a head of jurisdiction to assign members of a court to hear particular cases, the capacity to exercise that function, free from interference by, and scrutiny of, the other branches of government is an essential aspect of judicial independence.

294    Mr Bilal’s submissions as to the knowledge and expectations to be imputed to the fair-minded lay observer appeared to assume that such a person has little interest in the efficient case management, hearing and determination of proceedings before the Court. To the extent that this was an assumption inherent in Mr Bilal’s submissions, I reject it. As I observed in Part 4.1 above, the construct of the fair-minded lay observer is intended to reflect community expectations, which undoubtedly include the just resolution of legal disputes as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible.

295    The real question raised by Mr Bilal’s submissions is whether the three-step criteria for reasonable apprehension of bias has been satisfied.

296    As to the first step, I am satisfied that Mr Bilal has identified the factors that might lead me to resolve a question other than on its legal and factual merits. Those factors are that as the docket judge of several proceedings to which Mr Bilal is a party, I may accumulate knowledge about Mr Bilal and his arguments or evidence in one matter which may impact my assessment of Mr Bilal, his arguments or evidence in another matter.

297    As to the second step, I do not accept that there is any logical connection between a single judge case managing multiple proceedings and seeking to do so in an efficient way for hearing and determination of those proceedings, and any apprehended deviation from the determination of those proceedings on their legal and factual merits. I will explain why this is so.

298    The identification of the factors in the first step do no more than indicate the matters that might lead a judge to decide matters other than on their merits. It is to be accepted that where a judge is to hear proceedings consecutively involving the same parties, with similar evidence and arguments, there is a risk that the judge may not decide the subsequent matter entirely on its merits even despite the assumed ability of the judge to exclude from his or her mind that which is irrelevant. That is a manifestation of ordinary human experience and frailty. It is the point that was made by the Full Court in GetSwift Ltd v Webb [2021] FCAFC 26; 283 FCR 328 (Middleton, McKerracher and Jagot JJ) at [38]-[45]. As their Honours there stated at [39] and [44]-[45]:

39.    Importantly, and we think determinatively in this appeal, it is to be recalled that even where a decision-maker has not consciously considered the extraneous information, a reasonable apprehension of bias can arise because of its “subconscious” influence: CNY17 at [27]–[28] (Kiefel CJ and Gageler); [51], [92], [97] (Nettle and Gordon JJ); [111] (Edelman J). Where there is a risk of subconscious bias “that risk cannot be cured by putting the information aside”: CNY17 at [97] (Nettle and Gordon JJ). Because “reason cannot control the subconscious influence of feelings of which it is unaware [where] there is ground for believing that such unconscious feelings may operate in the ultimate judgment, or may not unfairly lead others to believe they are operating, judges recuse themselves”: Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia v Pollak (1952) 343 US 451 (Pollak) at 466–7…

…

44.    Whilst then a judge is understood by the hypothetical observer to be able to discard the irrelevant, the immaterial and the prejudicial, and decide cases solely on the material that is in evidence, there still remains the possibility of apprehension of bias in respect of judicial officers seized of extraneous information. Otherwise, there would be no place for the recognition of human frailty and human nature which are accepted aspects of the approach of the fair-minded lay observer in considering apprehension of bias.

45.    It follows that there is a need to recognise “human frailty” such that, even where a decision-maker has expressly disavowed consideration of certain material, it may be that the particular nature and relevance of that material can still give rise to the risk of a subconscious influence.

299    Whether a reasonable apprehension of bias arises will depend on the circumstances. For example, no logical connection may arise where it is an ordinary incident of judicial practice that in civil penalty contravention cases, a judge who determines questions of liability (which are adverse to a defendant) will subsequently hear and determine questions of penalty and relief. As reflected in the various judgments in SunshineLoans, without more, that of itself may not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, even where the judge has made adverse credibility findings in the liability judgment.

300    The risk of an apprehension arising from a single judge case managing multiple proceedings involving the same parties is precisely why the reasonable fair-minded lay observer expects courts and judges to efficiently manage cases involving the same or similar litigants and the same or similar factual and legal matters to ensure that matters are consolidated, heard concurrently and otherwise managed so that public time and resources are not wasted in the just determination of disputes. In the present case, the spectre of the risk has arisen because Mr Bilal has elected to commence multiple proceedings against the same parties. At an earlier point in time, where there were few proceedings, the objective record discloses that I had been endeavouring to move them along to a final hearing and discouraging interlocutory skirmishes. However, the case management of the multiplicity of proceedings and the prospect of yet more proceedings being commenced had reached a point where, in order to guard against the very risk that Mr Bilal has identified, I have taken steps to invite the parties to assist me in finding an efficient way forward.

301    In my view, nothing that has occurred to date establishes the second limb of the three-step criteria outlined at [57] above. Rather, I am satisfied that the fair-minded lay observer is more likely to view the events that have passed to date as reflecting a desire on the part of the single judge to case manage the various proceedings in an efficient way so that they can be efficiently heard and determined. As that second step has not been established, the third evaluative criteria of reasonableness of the apprehension does not arise.

302    I am not satisfied as to Ground 1.

4.5.2    Ground 2: Judge as Gatekeeper Contention

303    By Ground 2, Mr Bilal contended that the fair-minded lay observer may apprehend that I have personally participated in “gatekeeping” decisions affecting his ability to commence proceedings in the Court such that the observer may apprehend that I will not determine his proceedings on their legal and factual merits. In support of this contention, Mr Bilal said that I was involved in communications with the Registry and made decisions to refuse his filing of new proceedings. In particular, Mr Bilal said that, when he enquired as to who had made the decision to refuse the filing of new proceedings, he was informed by an email from the Registry that this decision was made by me.

304    Mr Bilal said that this was an unusual position whereby I have participated as a “gatekeeper” in preventing him from commencing new proceedings whilst at the same time participating in the management, hearing and determination of other proceedings.

305    The facts are as I have set them out above in Parts 2.6 and 2.7. For present purposes, I will accept that I made the decision or gave the direction that the Registry not accept the filing of the 25 March 2026 and 1 April 2026 Lodgments. However, as is also plain from the facts, what was communicated to the Registry was that if Mr Bilal was seeking to commence new proceedings against the same or similar parties, he could do so by way of amendment to the claims made in one of his existing proceedings. Once these full facts are properly considered, I am not satisfied that a reasonable apprehension of bias has been established.

306    As to the first step of the three-step criteria outlined at [57] above, I am satisfied that Mr Bilal has identified the factors that might lead me to resolve a question other than on its legal and factual merits. Those factors are that I made a decision that Mr Bilal not be permitted to file new proceedings which may impact my assessment of Mr Bilal, his arguments and evidence in another matter.

307    As to the second step, I do not accept that there is any relevant logical connection. The fact that I had made a decision that Mr Bilal should not commence new proceedings but should bring his new claims by way of amendment indicates that I was not making a decision to prevent Mr Bilal from bringing new claims, but the method by which he did so. That says nothing about the merits of his arguments or that there would be any apprehension I would deal with his claims other than on their merits.

308    Even if there was such a logical connection, I am not satisfied that the apprehension would be reasonable such that the third step outlined at [57] above has not been established.

309    Accordingly, Ground 2 has not been established.

4.5.3    Ground 3: Judge as Arbiter of His Own Cause Contention

310    By Ground 3, Mr Bilal contended that in circumstances where I made or was involved in the decision that he not be permitted to file various new proceedings, there is a reasonable apprehension of bias that arises in me hearing and determining the First and Second Registrar Review Proceedings. For the reasons I have addressed in Part 4.2 above, I agree with Mr Bilal.

311    Mr Bilal further contended that the fair-minded lay observer would further apprehend that by reason of my involvement, there are implications for the other six proceedings when considered cumulatively. This contention adds nothing to Ground 2 above and Ground 12 (which I deal with below).

312    I am satisfied that Ground 3 has been established in part for the reasons already stated.

4.5.4    Ground 4: Judge's Selective Lens Contention

313    By Ground 4, Mr Bilal contended that the fair-minded lay observer may apprehend that I have approached and treated Mr Bilal differently to the various respondents during hearings and in my published reasons. He submitted that when it suits the respondents’ arguments, I operate with a detailed command of the law, procedure and facts, and I am able to navigate statutory provisions and common law principles without assistance and recall facts from multiple proceedings, including the “External Proceedings”. Mr Bilal said that, on the other hand, when dealing with him and his arguments, I provide extensive explanations as to legal and procedural matters, test his submissions with interest (relative to being less interested in the respondents’ contentions), and have required precision from Mr Bilal in respect of his arguments and in holding him to strict compliance with applicable rules and practice notes. Mr Bilal submitted that the difference is not merely one of judicial style or emphasis but forms part of a broader pattern.

314    I am not satisfied that Ground 4 has been established. As to the first step of the three-step criteria outlined at [57] above, I am not satisfied that Mr Bilal has identified any factor or factors which may lead me to resolve the issues arising in the various proceedings other than on their legal and factual merits. The detailed examination in Part 4.3 discloses that my conduct at and during the various hearings has been consistent with ordinary judicial practice in dealing with the merits of the parties’ respective positions at case management and interlocutory hearings. Mr Bilal’s contentions to the contrary are largely acontextual or not factually correct. I am not satisfied that the fair-minded lay observer may apprehend any factor or factors arising from that conduct in relation to the determination of the issues arising in the proceedings other than on their legal and factual merits. For completeness, I would not have in any event been satisfied as to the relevant logical connection between the factors that Mr Bilal raises and an apprehended deviation from the determination of the issues on their factual merits, or the reasonableness of such an apprehension.

315    Ground 4 has not been established.

4.5.5    Ground 5: Judge's Control of the Litigation Optics Contention

316    By Ground 5, Mr Bilal contended that the fair-minded lay observer may apprehend that I have been conscious of the identity, status, influence or institutional significance of the respondents and the broader institutional, reputational and public-interest consequences which may follow from findings made in the litigation. Mr Bilal said that these matters can be discerned from the accumulation of matters that he relies upon, including my participation as a “gatekeeper”, my conduct during the various hearings and my published reasons to date. Mr Bilal submitted that the fair-minded lay observer may apprehend that I may bring external considerations to bear in the determination of the legal and factual merits of the issues in the various proceedings.

317    I am not satisfied that Ground 5 has been established. Again, as to the first step of the three-step criteria outlined at [57] above, I am not satisfied that Mr Bilal has established that I have brought any of the external factors that he asserts to bear upon my management of the Eight Proceedings, during the various hearings, or in my published reasons to date. As noted above, the detailed examination in Part 4.3 discloses that my conduct at and during the various hearings has been consistent with ordinary judicial practice in dealing with the merits of the parties’ respective positions. Further, an objective examination of my published reasons to date indicates that I have determined the various contested interlocutory applications on their merits. In those circumstances, I am not satisfied that Mr Bilal has established the factors that he says may give rise to an apprehension on the part of a fair-minded lay observer that I may resolve any matters of fact or law other than on their merits.

318    Ground 5 is not established.

4.5.6    Ground 6: Judge Descends into the Arena Contention

319    By Ground 6, Mr Bilal contended that the fair-minded lay observer may see that I have become actively involved in arguments during the various case management and interlocutory hearings, and that I have raised legal, procedural and factual points favourable to the respondents and adverse to him. Mr Bilal said that this is also reflected in my published reasons to date. Mr Bilal submitted that I have paid specific attention to Mr Bilal both personally and in respect of his arguments, and have become emotionally involved in the broader litigation through my words, demeanour, body language and facial expressions. Mr Bilal said that this conduct is not specific to any one hearing but is a pattern across all of them such that I have moved beyond the role of a detached adjudicator and become an active participant in the contest between the parties.

320    I am not satisfied that Ground 6 has been established. For the reasons set out in detail in Part 4.3, I am satisfied that my conduct at and during the various hearings has been attentive to the legal and factual merits of the respective positions advanced by the parties and in accord with ordinary judicial practice. Nor do I consider that my published reasons give rise to any apprehension to that effect. I am not satisfied that any of the three steps set out at [57] above have been established.

4.5.7    Ground 7: Judge's Concern with Respondent Comfort and Satisfaction Contention

321     By Ground 7, Mr Bilal submitted that the fair-minded lay observer may apprehend that I have given significant weight to the convenience, comfort and preferences of the respondent parties and their legal representatives in the management of the Eight Proceedings. He said that the fair-minded lay person may observe that matters such as hearing dates, procedural timetables, extensions of time and indulgences have been granted to the various respondents to suit the practical convenience of the respondents and their representatives, including by taking into account matters such as public holidays, Christmas and Easter breaks, professional commitments, annual leave of relevant witnesses or representatives, and so on. Mr Bilal said that the fair-minded lay person may, on the other hand, observe that I have not accommodated his comfort or satisfaction by taking into account matters such as the apparent fact that he is unwell, is under financial pressure and faces a real risk of ongoing prejudice arising from delay. Mr Bilal said that it would be observed that “medical practitioners have formally raised concerns regarding [Mr Bilal’s] mental and physical health”. Mr Bilal submitted that, where a choice exists between advancing the efficient determination of his claims and preserving the comfort of the respondent parties and their legal representatives, the latter consideration tends to prevail and that this has been a pattern by which I have managed the Eight Proceedings.

322    Mr Bilal has provided limited medical evidence in support of his medical conditions or as to the accommodations he has sought. As discussed above (see [108]), during the case management hearing on 13 May 2025 in the Ampol Whistleblower Proceedings, Mr Bilal provided a medical certificate in support of a request for later hearing times. However, Mr Bilal accepted during the hearing of the Recusal Application that it did not say that he was only fit to be able to appear in the afternoons. Accordingly, I indicated to him that better evidence would be required and did not preclude him from bringing an application based on better medical evidence.

323    As indicated above, in many cases, the medical certificates provided by Mr Bilal (and which he asked to remain confidential or that he did not tender) did not always support the accommodations he sought. Despite this, whether in reliance on this medical evidence or otherwise, the various accommodations I have made for Mr Bilal include the following:

(a)    allowing Mr Bilal breaks during hearings when requested, including during the interlocutory hearing on 4 September 2025 in the Ampol Whistleblower Proceedings, during the case management hearing on 14 May 2026 in the First Registrar Review Proceedings and during the interlocutory hearing of the Recusal Application on 22 and 23 July 2026;

(b)    adjusting Court sitting hours, including by agreeing to only sit from 10.15 am to 2.15 pm for the final hearing of the Ampol Misrepresentation Proceedings which was originally listed on 22 and 23 July 2026. These dates were ultimately used to hear the Recusal Application, but the same sitting times applied. On the first day of the hearing on 22 July 2026, Mr Bilal indicated that he was too tired to continue and accordingly, the matter was adjourned early at 1.03 pm;

(c)    allowing case management hearings to occur later in the morning or in the afternoon, depending on Mr Bilal’s preference. For example, during the 26 August 2025 case management hearing in the Ampol Misrepresentation Proceedings, I indicated that there would be a further case management hearing on 24 September 2025 at 12.45 pm on the basis that Mr Bilal stated that he was “not very well in the morning”. Similarly, during the 20 November 2025 case management hearing in the EML Whistleblower Proceedings, I indicated that I would try to accommodate Mr Bilal’s preference for an afternoon listing for the next case management hearing, despite being on duty, and subsequently listed the matter for case management at 2.15 pm on 3 February 2026. That case management hearing was ultimately vacated and relisted at Mr Bilal’s request so that Mr Bilal could attend a hearing in separate proceedings in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia; and

(d)    allowing Mr Bilal to stand, sit or move around during various hearings, depending on what was most comfortable for him, including during the interlocutory hearing on 5 September 2025 in the EML Whistleblower Proceedings and the interlocutory hearing on 5 May 2026 in the Ampol Misrepresentation Proceedings.

324    While I have not made every accommodation requested by Mr Bilal, as the above demonstrates, I have made a number of accommodations on several occasions, often in the absence of probative medical evidence. It is correct that I have also accommodated reasonable requests from the respondent parties. As is demonstrated by Part 4.3 above, consistent with s 37M(1) of the FCA Act, I have also been committed to ensuring that Mr Bilal’s various proceedings are progressed to final hearing as quickly as possible.

325    On this basis, I am not satisfied that any of the three steps set out at [57] above have been established. Accordingly, Ground 7 fails.

4.5.8    Ground 8: Judge's Predetermination of Mr Bilal’s Loss and Harm Contention

326    By Ground 8, Mr Bilal contended that the fair-minded lay observer may consider that I have prejudged the extent of the loss, harm and consequences that Mr Bilal claims in the proceedings in which he alleges contraventions of the Corporations Act and the FW Act. He further said that it would be observed that my demeanour and conduct indicate that I may not approach the issues as to his claims relating to loss and harm with the open-mindedness expected of a decision-maker who is yet to determine such issues. Rather, Mr Bilal said that I have already formed views about these matters. In support of these contentions, Mr Bilal relied on parts of the transcript of the interlocutory hearing heard before me on 4 September 2025 where I asked him questions about what his case was really about. The relevant exchange that occurred was as follows:

HIS HONOUR: What is this case actually about, Mr Bilal? What is it that you are seeking at the end of the day? Damages?

MR BILAL: Which one, this […]?

HIS HONOUR: No, no.

MR BILAL: Entire?

HIS HONOUR: What is the order that you are seeking from the court at the end of the day?

MR BILAL: It’s mentioned, your Honour. I can’t remember. It’s in it.

HIS HONOUR: So damages?

MR BILAL: Damages. Yes, yes.

HIS HONOUR: Following a period of six weeks of employment?

MR BILAL: I don’t know. Eight weeks, I think.

HIS HONOUR: Eight weeks. All right. And what do you say the damages are?

MR BILAL: Damages are mentioned in the detrimental conducts, undermined ability.

HIS HONOUR: Yes, but what’s your sense of what the quantum of the claim is?

MR BILAL: Could your Honour rephrase it?

HIS HONOUR: Are we talking $10,000? Are we talking $50,000? Are we talking $100,000? What are we talking about?

MR BILAL: No. We’re talking Supreme Court ..... range of things.

HIS HONOUR: What’s that?

MR BILAL: North, $700,000.

HIS HONOUR: $700,000 is what you’re - - -

MR BILAL: No. I didn’t say. I said north of that.

HIS HONOUR: North of $700,000.

MR BILAL: I said in the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court civil remedy, yes. This is personal injury, impairment. Just two years’ unemployment is four, five hundred thousand dollars. I’m not sure how your Honour is making this. It’s two years of employment just right now. Personal injury is on top, so if I can’t, we come back to all.

HIS HONOUR: So can you identify other categories of discovery you would seek? So one is personal information. What else?

MR BILAL: Discovery, your Honour?

HIS HONOUR: Yes.

MR BILAL: Talking discovery?

HIS HONOUR: Yes.

MR BILAL: Your Honour had reviewed EML ones, interlocutory? That would be very similar, that.

HIS HONOUR: EML what?

MR BILAL: EML. I have an interlocutory for discovery tomorrow.

HIS HONOUR: Yes.

327    Mr Bilal further contended that I have expressed views which minimise the significance of matters relied upon by him. For example, Mr Bilal said that my focus on the duration of his employment with Ampol Australia appears to have influenced my assessment of the significance of his claims for loss and harm, and his entitlement to relief. Mr Bilal also contended that I have dismissed, minimised or given limited significance to medical opinions that he has obtained and his requests for accommodations, notwithstanding the absence of any contrary evidence and the fact that persons such as him are routinely accommodated by courts without the existence of formal medical evidence. This conduct, he said, reinforces the apprehension that I may not bring an impartial mind to the determination of the matters of loss and harm claimed by him, including his broader claims of economic loss, loss of employment-related opportunities, loss of statutory entitlements, reputational harm, and the other forms of relief sought by him. Mr Bilal further contended that my pre-existing views in relation to these matters may affect my assessment of other matters pertaining to him such as credibility, causation, prejudice, and urgency.

328    I am not satisfied that Ground 8 has been established. In relation to Mr Bilal’s contentions that I have prejudged his claims for relief, and the loss and harm he claims to have suffered, the only evidence upon which Mr Bilal relies is the passage extracted above, though there may have been other similar exchanges (to which my attention was not drawn). As will be apparent from that exchange and its context, I was seeking to ascertain whether Mr Bilal’s claims against Ampol could be progressed quickly to a final hearing instead of dealing with a range of interlocutory disputes (including as to strike out of pleadings). Mr Bilal’s position was that he would need discovery so that he could have all the facts before the matter could be listed and, in that context, I was seeking to ascertain what Mr Bilal was actually seeking from and through the proceedings. Mr Bilal said he was seeking damages and I was seeking to ascertain the reference point for the claim by reference to the period of his employment with Ampol Australia. As will be apparent from the exchange, I did not make any assessment as to the strength of Mr Bilal’s claims for damage but was seeking to ascertain what was in issue so as to discharge my duty to ensure that the costs being incurred by the parties were proportionate to what was at stake. The factual premise for Mr Bilal’s contentions that I have prejudged his claims for loss or damage, or that the things I have said may give rise to the appearance of prejudgment in this regard, has not been established.

329    Nor has Mr Bilal established the factual premise of his contention that I have not made accommodations for him. In this regard, I repeat what I have said above at [323]. I do not accept that anything I have said or done has dismissed, minimised or not placed significance on “medical opinions” that he has put before the Court. I am not satisfied that any of my words or conduct may give rise to an appearance that I have dismissed, minimised or not placed significance on “medical opinions” relating to Mr Bilal.

330    As a result, I am not satisfied that any of the three steps identified at [57] above have been established. Mr Bilal has not identified any factor which might lead me to resolve a question other than on its legal and factual merits, or the logical connection between that factor and the apprehended deviation from deciding the relevant factual and legal questions on their merits. Ground 8 fails.

4.5.9    Ground 9: Judge's Extraneous Information and Memory Contamination Contention

331    By Ground 9, Mr Bilal contended that there is an apprehension that I may possess or rely upon information, impressions or assumptions derived from sources other than any single proceeding being determined because I will draw these from the other proceedings docketed to me. He said that this apprehension arises from my conduct to date. Mr Bilal submitted that I have already made decisions regarding whether documents lodged by him for filing should be accepted by the Registry and may have been exposed to originating processes, affidavits, submissions, allegations and other material lodged by him which never become part of any proceeding before the Court. This material, he contended, may inform my understanding of him, his disputes and the broader litigation history. He contended that I have expressed views concerning his wellbeing, financial circumstances, need for relief, alleged loss, harm, credibility and broader litigation conduct which demonstrate that I am relying upon knowledge of matters derived from outside the record of the relevant proceeding.

332    Mr Bilal contended that the fair-minded lay observer may apprehend bias irrespective of whether the information on which I have relied is accurate, on the basis that it has not been tested, placed before the Court or subjected to the ordinary processes of litigation. He said that the very fact that multiple of his proceedings have been docketed to me means that I may “consciously or unconsciously carry information, impressions or assumptions” which are at risk of influencing subsequent proceedings.

333    Other than in one respect, Ground 9 adds little to Ground 1 in relation to the issue of cross-contamination, and to the extent of that overlap, Ground 9 fails for the same reasons.

334    The only respect in which Ground 9 adds anything to Ground 1 is Mr Bilal’s contention that I have been exposed to documents he has sought to lodge in respect of proceedings that have not been commenced as the documents were not accepted for filing. Even assuming for the present moment that I have sighted and reviewed all such documents, it is an ordinary incident of judicial practice that judges will review materials that are later ruled inadmissible and are thereafter disregarded. I am not satisfied that any of the particular conduct on my part may give rise to an apprehension of bias. I am not satisfied that any of the three steps identified at [57] above have been established. Mr Bilal has not identified any factor which might lead me to resolve a question other than on its legal and factual merits, or the logical connection between that factor and the apprehended deviation from deciding the relevant factual and legal questions on their merits.

335    Accordingly, Ground 9 fails.

4.5.10    Ground 10: Judge's Predetermination of Mr Bilal’s Credibility Contention

336    By Ground 10, Mr Bilal contended that the fair-minded lay observer may apprehend that I have prejudged his credibility and reliability, as evidenced by me approaching matters raised by him with a scepticism that is inconsistent with a genuinely open mind. Mr Bilal said that I have not taken this approach with the various respondents. Mr Bilal contended that my conduct in this regard is demonstrated by the fact that I have treated matters raised by him relating to urgency, financial hardship, public interest, prejudice and the accommodations he has sought as doubtful, notwithstanding that they remain to be determined. He further contended that I have also given such matters limited significance, even when they have been supported by evidence that has not been contradicted by the respondents. Mr Bilal submitted that my assessment as to his credibility extends beyond any one issue and may influence my assessment of various matters that have not yet been determined.

337    I am not satisfied that Ground 10 has been established. The detailed review in Part 4.3 of the various hearings discloses that I have not prejudged Mr Bilal’s credibility or reliability, or given the appearance of doing so. I have tested the various positions he has put before the Court, and I have taken the same course with the respondents. Further, I do not accept Mr Bilal’s contentions that I have not sought to address his requests for accommodations. In this regard, I again repeat what I have said above at [323].

338    To the extent that I have determined interlocutory applications in one or more of the proceedings, that is not in and of itself a reason that gives rise to an apprehension of bias: see Doggett at [11] (extracted at [64] above). None of the earlier decisions have involved any determination that is adverse to Mr Bilal’s credibility and reliability as a witness.

339    I am not satisfied that any of the three steps identified at [57] above have been established. Mr Bilal has not identified any factor which might lead me to resolve a question other than on its legal and factual merits, or the logical connection between that factor and the apprehended deviation from deciding the relevant factual and legal questions on their merits. Accordingly, Ground 10 fails.

4.5.11    Ground 11: Judge's Interest in Preserving Earlier Decisions Contention

340    By Ground 11, Mr Bilal submitted that I have made various procedural decisions, interlocutory decisions, case management decisions and given judgments affecting him. He said that in doing so, I have publicly expressed views concerning Mr Bilal and his various claims. He contended that later proceedings may cause such views to come into question, including because those later proceedings may require consideration of matters closely connected with earlier decisions or allegations that such decisions were wrong, unlawful, procedurally unfair or affected by error. In those circumstances, Mr Bilal submitted that the fair-minded lay observer may apprehend that I may be influenced by those earlier views and seek to prioritise consistency with earlier positions over the merits of the particular matter before the Court. Mr Bilal submitted that this risk arises because I have been involved in managing and determining applications in multiple proceedings initiated by him over an extended period of time such that there is a further risk that I may become progressively invested in maintaining consistency with positions that I have previously taken. He submitted that there is a risk that I may not bring a wholly fresh or impartial mind to issues arising in his various proceedings.

341    Ground 11 repeats many of the earlier contentions which have not been established. As already noted, to the extent that I have determined interlocutory applications in one or more of the proceedings, that is not in and of itself a reason that gives rise to an apprehension of bias: see Doggett at [11] (extracted at [64] above). I am not satisfied that either the fact that I have made earlier determinations or that I am case managing multiple proceedings gives rise to an apprehension of bias.

342    I am not satisfied that any of the three steps identified at [57] above have been established. Mr Bilal has not identified any factor which might lead me to resolve a question other than on its legal and factual merits, or the logical connection between that factor and the apprehended deviation from deciding the relevant factual and legal questions on their merits. Accordingly, Ground 11 fails.

4.5.12    Ground 12: Cumulative Effect Contention

343    Mr Bilal contended that the above grounds must be considered collectively, rather than in isolation, as they reinforce one another.

344    I have considered whether the cumulative effect all of the grounds and the totality of Mr Bilal’s submissions in support of them are matters which, seen in that way, give rise to an apprehension of bias. I am not satisfied that they do. For all of the reasons stated above, I am not satisfied that any of the abovementioned grounds have been established. Nor am I satisfied that their cumulative effect gives rise to an apprehension of bias.

5.    CONCLUSION

345    For the foregoing reasons, I will disqualify myself from the First and Second Registrar Review Proceedings. The First and Second Registrar Review Proceedings will be referred to the National Operations Registrar for reallocation. I will not disqualify myself from the balance of the Eight Proceedings and Mr Bilal’s Recusal Application is otherwise dismissed. In respect of these other Proceedings, I am not satisfied that any of the matters raised by Mr Bilal establish a reasonable apprehension of bias. As earlier noted, whether it is properly described as a “duty to sit” or not, I am satisfied that having been allocated these matters for case management, hearing and determination, this is what I should do in order to discharge my functions as a judicial officer having not been satisfied that there is any reason not to do so.

346    The day before publishing this judgment and whilst it was being edited, my Chambers received the following email from Mr Bilal:

I write in relation to NSD391/2025, NSD617/2025, NSD1187/2025, NSD156/2026, NSD185/2026, NSD444/2026, NSD497/2026 and NSD609/2026, as the Applicant in each proceeding and in the Disqualification Application filed on 10 June 2026 concerning them.

The hearing concluded on 23 July 2026. The supplementary submissions process, directed by the Court rather than requested by the Applicant or the Respondents, concluded on 21 August 2026 under the orders made on 23 July 2026.

The Applicant requests that judgment be delivered. All eight proceedings remain unable to progress pending determination of the application, and the continuing delay is prejudicial to the Applicant.

In relation to NSD497/2026 and NSD609/2026, Shariff J has expressed preliminary views on occasions. If disqualification is to be granted in either proceeding, the Applicant invites the Court to make and enter the relevant orders so that the proceeding can progress, with reasons to follow. The Respondent in each proceeding has filed a submitting notice and is an officer of the Court. In those circumstances, no appeal against an order granting disqualification is anticipated.

For each of the remaining six proceedings, the Applicant similarly requests that, if disqualification is granted, the relevant orders be made and entered so that case management can resume, with reasons to follow. The Participating Parties, as defined in order 9 of the orders made on 20 May 2026, have stated on the record that they do not oppose the relief. On the basis of that recorded position, no appeal against orders granting disqualification is anticipated, nor is prejudice to any party from reasons being delivered later.

If disqualification is refused in any proceeding, the Applicant respectfully requests that leave to appeal be granted when the relevant orders are made, given their interlocutory nature. If an appeal is to be pursued, this would make the process more efficient by avoiding the additional time and resources required for a separate leave application in each affected proceeding, and would allow the position to be resolved sooner so that the proceedings can progress.

347    In circumstances where Mr Bilal has indicated that he intends to seek leave to appeal or appeal from my decision to dismiss the balance of his Recusal Application (that is, each of the Eight Proceedings other than the First and Second Registrar Review Proceedings), I consider it appropriate in all the circumstances that any such application for leave be determined by a different judge.

Associate:

Dated:    1 October 2026