Federal Court of Australia

Reynolds, in the matter of an application by Reynolds [2026] FCA 1447

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The application filed on 21 September 2026, seeking leave to file the proposed notice of appeal from the orders made in WAD75/2026, is dismissed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The application filed on 21 September 2026, seeking leave to file the proposed notice of appeal from the orders made in WAD20/2026, is dismissed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JACKSON J:

1    These reasons concern two applications for the leave of the Court to accept for filing documents supporting proposed appeals from the same primary judgment of this Court, Reynolds v Stewart [2026] FCA 1291. There are two proposed appeals because two proceedings brought by the applicant, Kellan Reynolds, were dismissed in that judgment, namely WAD 75 of 2026 and WAD 20 of 2026. Each of those proceedings was an application for judicial review of a decision by a registrar of the Court not to accept documents for filing, under r 2.26 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

2    The primary judgment sets out the procedural history. Mr Reynolds initially sought to apply for orders concerning proceedings in the Magistrates Court of Western Australia. A registrar refused to accept that application for filing. Mr Reynolds made an application for judicial review of that refusal (proceeding WAD 75 of 2026). But before seeking judicial review in WAD 75 of 2026, Mr Reynolds sought to file an application for review of the Registrar’s refusal decision under s 35A(5) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). A second registrar refused to accept that application for filing. Mr Reynold’s application for judicial review of the refusal by the second registrar was the subject of proceeding WAD 20 of 2026.

3    In each case, leave to proceed with the proposed appeal is necessary because each notice of appeal was initially referred to the duty filings judge, who made a direction under r 2.27(f) of the Rules that it not be accepted for filing without the leave of the Court. Mr Reynolds now applies for that leave under r 2.27A of the Rules.

Application for leave – WAD 357 of 2026

4    The proposed notice of appeal from the orders made in WAD 75 of 2026 is prolix, containing 12 grounds of appeal, each with detailed particulars.

5    I have reviewed each of the grounds and am satisfied that none of them has a reasonable prospect of success. Several grounds are essentially complaints that the primary judge did not seek to cure deficiencies in the proposed originating application, but it was no appropriate part of his Honour’s role to seek to discern some cogent point underneath the incoherent surface of the application. Others claim that the primary judge somehow misapplied r 2.26, but in doing so they distort his Honour’s true reasoning, in which there was no misapplication of the applicable law. One asserts a reasonable apprehension of bias, but discloses no reason to think that his Honour might reasonably have been influenced by anything extraneous to the merits of the matter before him. And the remaining grounds are sentences which, while grammatically correct, on examination disclose no intelligible proposition pointing to error on the part of the primary judge.

6    An application for leave to institute proceedings where the Court has given a direction under r 2.27(f) will be determined without an oral hearing unless the Court orders otherwise: r 2.27A(2). There is no need for an oral hearing here. Mr Reynolds has been given the opportunity to explain in his affidavit why leave should be granted: r 2.27A(1)(c)(i) and see KTW25, in the matter of application by KTW25 for leave to file [2026] FCA 1114 at [10] (Colvin J).

7    After considering Mr Reynolds’ explanations and the proposed notice of appeal, I am not satisfied that leave should be granted. None of the proposed grounds of appeal has a reasonable prospect of succeeding. That is clearly so, making it appropriate that leave be refused: see Re Young [2020] HCA 13 at [11]-[13] (Gageler J). The application in WAD 357 of 2026 will be dismissed.

Application for leave – WAD 358 of 2026

8    The proposed notice of appeal from orders made in WAD 20 of 2026 is again prolix, containing seven grounds of appeal, with detailed particulars.

9    I have reviewed each of the grounds and am satisfied that none of them has a reasonable prospect of success. One ground claims the primary judge failed to independently determine WAD 20 of 2026, but it is apparent from the content and structure of his Honour’s reasons that this assertion is without merit. Several grounds are, again, essentially complaints that the primary judge failed to cure deficiencies in the proposed originating application; again, it was no appropriate part of his Honour’s role to do so. Others allege the primary judge misapplied the applicable law, but in doing so misrepresent his Honour’s true reasoning, in which there was no such misapplication.

10    Moreover, nowhere does the proposed notice of appeal really grapple with the obvious difficulty for Mr Reynolds’ attempt to seek review of the first registrar’s decision under s 35A(5) of the Federal Court Act, namely that the Registrar had exercised an administrative power, not the delegated judicial power that is the subject of that power of review. Mr Reynolds seems to be saying that this was not determinative. But it is not apparent why he says that. The second registrar refused to accept the application on that basis, so it follows, as the primary judge said, that any application for review of that refusal was doomed to fail. Contrary to the position Mr Reynolds seeks to put, that did indeed dispose of the whole application.

11    The primary judge expressly found that the other orders sought by Mr Reynolds in the application were ancillary to that application. Although one proposed ground of appeal complains that his Honour erred in doing so, on examination it discloses no intelligible reason to think that the finding was incorrect.

12    I am therefore satisfied that the proposed appeal from the orders made in WAD 20 of 2026 has no reasonable prospect of success. Once again, the position is clear, and there is no need for an oral hearing. The application for leave in WAD 358 of 2026 will also be dismissed.

Associate:

Dated:    1 October 2026