Federal Court of Australia

Parmar v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 1433

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The appeal be dismissed.

2.    The first respondent’s name be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.

3.    The appellant is to pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1    This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (the PJ) dismissing the appellant’s application for judicial review of a decision of the former Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal). The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, to refuse the appellant’s application for a Medical Treatment (Visitor) (Class UB) (subclass 602) visa (medical visa). I will refer to the Tribunal’s decision as TD. The appellant seeks orders setting aside the primary judgment, quashing the decision of the Tribunal, and remitting this matter to the Tribunal for determination according to law. For the reasons that I will set out below, the appeal should be dismissed.

2    The appellant entered Australia on a student visa in 2009: PJ [5]. The visa application at issue in this proceeding was lodged on 7 May 2018: PJ [6]. A delegate of the Minister rejected the application on 28 May 2018: PJ [7]. The appellant then lodged his application for merits review with the Tribunal on 15 June 2018.

3    The issue before the Tribunal was whether the appellant satisfied cl 602.215 of schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth).

4    On 6 March 2020, the Tribunal wrote to the appellant enclosing an “invitation to provide information” with respect to how long the appellant intended to remain in Australia for the purpose of undergoing medical treatment: see Appeal Book (AB) at 56-57. That was done pursuant to s 359(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). This letter also said that:

If you cannot provide the information by 20 March 2020, you may ask us for an extension of time in which to provide the information. If you make such a request, it must be received by us before 20 March 2020 and you must state the reason why the extension of time is required.

(Emphasis in original.)

5    The appellant requested an extension of time to comply with the request for information: AB 58. The Tribunal then requested information relating to the reason to grant the extension: AB 59. In the proceedings below, there was a factual dispute as to whether that information was provided: PJ [14]-[17]. On 27 March 2020, the Tribunal gave the appellant a short extension of time until 10 April 2020 to respond to the request of 6 March 2020: AB 62. That letter stated that:

If we do not receive the information by 10 April 2020, we may make a decision on the review without taking any further action to obtain the information. You will also lose any entitlement you might otherwise have had under the Migration Act 1958 to appear before us to give evidence and present arguments.

6    The appellant did not provide that information as requested by 10 April 2020, and the Tribunal made its decision on 17 April 2020 without an oral hearing, affirming the delegate’s decision to refuse to grant the appellant a medical visa. That course was permitted by s 359C(1) of the Act (read with s 360(2)(c) and (3)).

7    In its decision, the Tribunal found that the appellant was not medically unfit to depart Australia at paragraphs [18]-[20]: see cl 602.215(2) of schedule 2 to the Regulations read with cl 602.212(6). Accordingly, he needed to satisfy cl 602.215(1), which provided (as of 17 April 2020):

(1)    The applicant genuinely intends to stay temporarily in Australia for the purpose for which the visa is granted, having regard to:

(a)    whether the applicant has complied substantially with the conditions to which the last substantive visa, or any subsequent bridging visa, held by the applicant was subject; and

(b)    whether the applicant intends to comply with the conditions to which the Subclass 602 visa would be subject; and

(c)    any other relevant matter.

8    The Tribunal was ultimately not satisfied that the appellant genuinely intended to stay temporarily in Australia for the purpose for which the visa would be granted: at [32], [33].

9    The Tribunal found that the appellant had not provided up-to-date and relevant information regarding his past or proposed medical treatment. Further, the Tribunal found that the time for which the appellant was required to remain in Australia, being “5 May 2018 to 5 December 2018”, to seek treatment for his bleeding haemorrhoids had elapsed, which undermined his claim that he intended to stay in Australia temporarily for the sole purpose of receiving medical treatment: TD [23]-[27]. Finally, the Tribunal noted at paragraphs [28], [29] that the appellant had a history of applying for various categories of visas and seeking review of those decisions, which was said to support an inference that the appellant was seeking to remain in Australia permanently, rather than having a bona fide intention to only remain temporarily for the purposes of medical treatment.

10    Drawing those strands together, the Tribunal said this at paragraph [32]:

… the applicant has not departed Australia, despite claiming an intention to stay temporarily for the purpose of medical treatment which was to have ended in December 2018. Further his actions in seeking permanent visas and vigorously pursuing merits and judicial review indicates that he seeks to remain permanently or indefinitely in Australia. He has not provided any medical or other evidence consistent with a genuine intention to stay in Australia temporarily. Overall the evidence indicates, and the Tribunal finds, that the applicant does not have a genuine intention to stay temporarily in Australia for the purpose of medical treatment.

11    Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that the decision to refuse the grant of the medical visa ought to be affirmed.

12    The appellant then filed an application for judicial review in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) on 12 May 2020. A hearing was conducted remotely on 18 November 2024. On 9 December 2024, the primary judge dismissed the application for judicial review.

13    The further amended application for judicial review contained the following grounds:

1.    I never got justice, they treated my unfairly forget about natural justice, when I lodged my application at that time I submitted all documents with the application and next day the officer also called me and she said to me that I will sent you to panel doctor but she did not send me any request and few days later they sent me refusal without meaningful reason.

2.    AAT did not invited me for interview but they ask me for documents but the documents was already there. AAT have not seen my case properly they just ask me for documents but if they invited me I clarify all their doubts but they made preconceived notion against me which is their habit.

3.    The rules are same for all and there should be no partiality no discrimination or no favouring of any kind.

4.    However, I feel that I treated unfairly, but those who had applied this visa, for them they kept aside all the rules and grant them visa. I am asking to the Honourable. Court that if the rules are same for everyone then why they did injustice to me.

5.    The decision given to me by AAT and Delegates is arbitrary and full of bias. The reason for this is that they have given the visa to others by bypassing all the rules.

6.    The biggest irony is that, I never got justice and there is no hope.

14    The primary judge observed that these review grounds were “problematic” insofar as they largely related to attempts to re-litigate the merits of the impugned decision. After hearing oral submissions from the appellant, the primary judge distilled these grounds of review into two primary submissions, which were outlined in the excerpt below from paragraph [27] of the primary judgment.

I then invited the applicant to explain his criticism of the Tribunal's decision and decision-making process in his own words. As he did so, it became apparent he had two substantive complaints. First, he was upset that he had been denied a hearing. He said he would have been able to explain the difficulty in collecting supporting information if he had been given the opportunity to do so at a hearing. He was particularly troubled by what he took to be the unfairness of the Tribunal holding hearings for other visa applicants in the same position as him who were known to him. I take his complaint to be, in substance, that there was a breach of the rules of procedural fairness in that he was not afforded an opportunity to present his case before an unbiased decision-maker. Second, he was upset that he had not been given a longer extension of time to collect the information. He said he should have been given at least several months because of the disruption caused by COVID. He said, in effect, the Tribunal acted unreasonably in failing to give him an adequate extension of time.

(My emphasis.)

15    In summary, the appellant’s first complaint was that he had been denied a hearing, which revealed a claim for apprehended bias on the part of the Tribunal, and his second complaint was that the Tribunal acted unreasonably in not providing him with a longer extension of time.

16    In respect of the first aspect of the first complaint, the primary judge held that, as the Tribunal had provided a valid invitation to provide information pursuant to s 359 of the Act, which the appellant had not responded to within the required time (which included an extension), it was entitled to proceed and make its decision on the limited record before it: PJ [30]. The primary judge referred to the decision of the Full Court of this Court in Hasran v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 183 FCR 413, where Jacobson, Gilmour and Foster JJ held at paragraphs [26]-[29] that the effect of ss 359C and 360 of the Act was to disentitle an applicant from appearing before the Tribunal where they have failed to give information requested under s 359.

17    In respect of the second aspect of the first complaint, the primary judge held that the appellant’s claim of apprehended bias was unparticularised and unmeritorious: PJ [29].

18    In respect of the second complaint, the primary judge was not satisfied that the Tribunal acted unreasonably in relation to the request for an extension of time, observing at paragraph [35] of the primary judgment that:

The request for information about the applicant's challenges in getting information went unanswered. In the face of that silence from the applicant, the Tribunal's exercise of the discretion not to further extend the time for the applicant to comply with the invitation issued pursuant to s 359 of the Act was not unreasonable in the sense that expression is used in cases like Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332.

19    After rejecting both grounds of review (as understood at the hearing), the primary judge dismissed the application.

20    On 16 December 2024, the appellant filed a notice of appeal in this Court as well as a supporting affidavit.

The hearing before me

21    Mr Parmar’s notice of appeal set out six grounds of appeal, reproduced below. As will become clear, those grounds were superseded by later events.

1.    If the delegates is considering to refused a visa under section 602.215 of the Act. The delegates is required by s57 of the Act to notify the visa holder that there appear to be grounds for refused the visa, giving particulars of those grounds and of the information because of which the grounds appear to exist, s56 of the Act requires that the visa holder is to be notified and ask for more information regarding their application.

2.    It is pertinent to mention here that the applicant submitted all documents were centrally relevant to the matters that the Delegate was considering in their decision. Failure to consider or engage with this evidence was, accordingly, capable of giving rise to error considered in SZRKT 1. It is worth mentioning here that none of this evidence was noted or engaged with in the Delegates' reasons for decision.

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013] FCA 317; (2013) 212 FCR 99 at (SZRKT) at (111]-[112]

3.    The delegate appears to have been aware of the Evidence of medical intended treatment in the application, whereas the Delegate did not refer to it at all in their reasoning. Had Delegates engaged the panellist, the result would have been different.

4.    If this is not discrimination, then what is it? No one calls me for an interview, without even investigating my case by AAT.

5.    I also believe that Delegates have misused the authority given to him and have grossly violated the rules.

6.    The Learned Hon. Judge had sympathy for me, but calls it his helplessness of powerlessness; it is reflected in his decision. I repeatedly said in court that AAT breach his duty but they say that AAT is right.

22    The hearing in this appeal was held on 14 September 2026. At that hearing, Mr Parmar appeared for himself, while Mr F Ryan of the Australian Government Solicitor appeared for the Minister. To assist the appellant, I suggested that Mr Ryan address the Court first, so that Mr Parmar could better understand the matters in issue before me. Both parties agreed to that suggestion.

23    After Mr Ryan had concluded his oral submissions, the appellant attempted to hand up an amended notice of appeal and submissions in support of those amended grounds. Mr Parmar had not filed an application to amend his grounds of appeal (or provided any notice he intended to do so). Furthermore, his submissions were filed in default of the timetabling orders for this matter. The orders of Registrar McCormick dated 31 January 2025 required the appellant to file submissions no later than ten business days before the hearing, which was 31 August 2026.

24    In those circumstances, I temporarily adjourned the hearing at 2:41 pm to provide the Minister with an opportunity to consider the additional material and to consider whether it wished to seek a longer adjournment. At 3:11 pm when Court resumed, Mr Ryan informed me that his instructions were that the Minister did not oppose the Court receiving the amended application and submissions. On that basis, I gave the appellant leave to file those documents in Court. I offered the Minister the opportunity to provide further written submissions in response if he wished, which the Minister declined. I should note that Mr Ryan very ably dealt with Mr Parmar’s significantly revised notice of appeal with very little notice, for which the Court is grateful.

Amended grounds of appeal

25    The amended grounds of appeal (omitting the particulars) were as follows:

1.    Failure to consider material medical evidence: The learned primary judge erred in law in failing to find that the decision of the Tribunal was affected by jurisdictional error because the Tribunal failed to consider and properly engage with material evidence before it concerning the Appellant's proposed medical treatment and the purpose of his application for a Subclass 602 visa.

2.    Material reliance upon an erroneous factual premise concerning migration history: The learned primary judge erred in law in failing to find that the Tribunal's decision was affected by jurisdictional error because the Tribunal materially relied upon an erroneous and internally impossible chronology concerning the Appellant's previous migration history in determining whether the Appellant genuinely intended to stay temporarily in Australia.

3.    Failure to consider material matters relevant to the statutory task: The learned primary judge erred in law in failing to find that the Tribunal's decision was affected by jurisdictional error because the Tribunal failed to consider material matters relevant to the statutory question required to be determined under cl 602.215.

4.    Materiality of the jurisdictional errors: Further or alternatively, the learned primary judge erred in failing to find that the errors identified in Grounds 1-3 were material jurisdictional errors.

5.    Error by the primary judge in relation to the migration history: The learned primary judge erred in law at [36] of the judgment in accepting the Tribunal's treatment of the Appellant's migration and review history without determining whether the Tribunal's adverse inference was materially affected by the erroneous chronology identified in Ground 2.

26    It will be apparent that none of the grounds of appeal resemble the grounds advanced below before the primary judge. But the Minister did not object to the appellant arguing those grounds and I would accordingly grant the appellant leave to rely upon those grounds. The appellant confirmed that those grounds superseded the grounds in his original notice of appeal.

27    As to the First Ground, the Tribunal considered the evidence relating to the appellant’s medical treatment, which it considered relevant to the matters it needed to consider under cl 602.215(1) of schedule 2 to the Regulations.

28    That evidence comprised the appellant’s answers to questions in his visa application and a Form 1507 (Evidence of Intended Medical Treatment) dated 4 May 2018, which appears to have been provided with the visa application: PJ [6].

29    That material was specifically considered by the Tribunal at [23]-[27] of its decision, where the Tribunal said this:

The applicant has not provided up to date and relevant information regarding his past, current or proposed medical treatment. The Tribunal considers this undermines his claim that he intends to stay temporarily in Australia for the purpose of medical treatment or related purposes.

In the application for the medical treatment visa, Question 17 of the application form asks what period of time the applicant would be under medical care in Australia. The applicant stated from “5 May 2018 to 5 December 2018” in answer to this question. He has not provided any explanation of why he needs to stay in Australia past the dates he nominated in his application form.

The applicant provided a Form 1507 (Evidence of Intended Medical Treatment) dated 4 May 2018 and completed by Dr Mark Joseph stated the applicant had bleeding haemorrhoids and had been referred to a surgeon for follow up and haemorridectomy. No other medical information was provided with the application or any updated information in connection with the review.

The Form 1507 provided by the applicant was completed in May 2018. Almost two years has passed since that document was provided and the applicant has not given any updates on treatment. In his application the applicant indicated that his medical care would be completed by December 2018 and the Tribunal notes that the date on which care was to have ended was 15 months ago.

The applicant has not provided any other evidence which is consistent with an intention to stay temporarily in Australia for the purpose of undergoing medical treatment. In his request for an extension of time to respond to the Tribunal’s invitation to provide further information, he stated that he was finding it difficult to access information due to the COVID-19 pandemic situation. However, he failed to provide the name of his medical practitioner or even to give an explanation of the reasons for his application for review or why he needed further time for treatment or related purposes.

30    The appellant’s primary complaint appeared to be that the Tribunal had not expressly referred to a particular statement that appeared within the application for the medical treatment visa.

31    In particular, under the heading “Part J - Additional information” the following statement appeared:

I AM ALREADY BOOKED FOR CONSULTATION. AND MY GP TREATING ME AS WELL. 25 june 2018 is with Dr. mark at strathfield

32    In a column that appeared to the left on that page, that statement was identified as additional information in connection with question number 16, where the appellant had indicated that he was applying as “A person who will attend a medical consultation” (the appellant had ticked the box next to that statement).

33    Question 17 then asked the appellant “For what period will you be under medical care while in Australia?” (the applicant gave a date range of 5 May 2018 to 5 December 2018). As will be seen from the extract above, the Tribunal expressly referred to that information in paragraph [24] of its reasons.

34    The very next question on that page, Question 18, asked the appellant to “Briefly describe the medical treatment in Australia you have arranged and estimated cost”, in response to which the appellant said this:

MY TREATMENT IS ONGOING RIGHT NOW AND I HAVE BOOKED FOR SECOND DOCTAR FOR CONSULTATION ON 25 JUNE WITH SURGEON THEN AFTER DOCTAR WILL GIVE ME DATE FOR NEXT MEDICAL PROCEDUR.

35    That was seemingly a reference to the same consultation referred to in annexure J. It is inherently unlikely that the Tribunal overlooked the appellant’s response to that question, having expressly referred to his answer to the question that appeared immediately above on the same page (question 17).

36    In any event, nothing said by the Tribunal suggests that it overlooked or failed to consider that material. The essential point made by the Tribunal was that the appellant had indicated that his medical care would be completed by December 2018, meaning that, as at the date of the hearing before the Tribunal, the date on which his care was to have ended was 15 months earlier. The appellant had provided no explanation of why he needed to stay in Australia past the dates he nominated in his application form. The issue for the Tribunal was that there was a dearth of information before it regarding any such ongoing need. It was the absence of that material which the Tribunal considered that undermined the appellant’s claim that he intended to stay in Australia temporarily for the sole purpose of receiving medical treatment.

37    The appellant took particular issue with what was said by the Tribunal in the last sentence of paragraph [25] of its reasons (“No other medical information was provided with the application or any updated information in connection with the review”). In that paragraph, the Tribunal was dealing with what was contained in Form 1507, which was lodged with the visa application. It was that document which provided the only substantive detail identifying the appellant’s medical condition and future treatment plan, being information that was provided by a medical practitioner (who signed the form). I would not take from that single sentence that the Tribunal overlooked the (essentially administrative) detail that the consultation with the surgeon had in fact been booked as at the date of the visa application.

38    In any event, it is literally true that the only “medical information” provided “with” the application was that contained in the Form 1507: that was the only medical information that accompanied (ie was provided “with”) the application form. The evidence before me indicates that the only other documents provided “with” the application were: a copy of a Receipt – pre-pay visa application dated 7 May 2018; a copy of a driver’s licence; a copy of a passport; and a bank statement. None of that was “medical information”. Read fairly and in context, the Tribunal was not, in the last sentence of [25] of its reasons, stating that there was no “medical information” in the application itself (although, as I have said, all of the substantive detail concerning the appellant’s medical condition and future treatment plan was contained within the Form 1507).

39    The relevance of those matters for the Tribunal’s decision concerned the point which I have noted above: considerable time had passed; the date on which the appellant’s treatment was to be completed was well in the past; and the Tribunal had nothing else before it that was consistent with an intention to stay temporarily in Australia for the purpose of undergoing medical treatment. As I have noted above, the Tribunal had by that time issued a request to the appellant for information under s 359 of the Act, and provided a further extension of time, neither of which elicited a response by the requested date. The Tribunal accordingly made a decision on the materials that were before it in the way provided for by the Act.

40    None of that suggests that the Tribunal failed to bring its mind to bear upon the material before it: see generally the principles summarised in RDYQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 645 at [31]. Even if it did, in the context of the path of decision-making I have described above, there was no realistic possibility that the decision that was made in fact could have been different if any such error had not occurred: LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 280 CLR 321 at [7] (Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Gleeson, Steward and Jagot JJ). Assume, for the sake of argument, that the Tribunal failed to have regard to the fact that the appellant made a medical appointment during the period of time he originally stated his treatment would be undertaken and completed. There was no realistic possibility that any such error could have altered the Tribunal’s conclusions on that issue, which turned on the fact that that period was well in the past and there was no “explanation of why [Mr Parmar] needs to stay in Australia past the dates he nominated in his application form”: at [24] and see also [26], [27] and [32]. The possibility that the absence of any error (if there was one) could have led to a different outcome is aptly described as improbable or fanciful: LPDT at [14].

41    Any failure as alleged in ground 1 could not amount to jurisdictional error in those circumstances.

42    The appellant’s second ground in his amended notice of appeal alleged that paragraph [28] of the Tribunal’s reasons demonstrated that the Tribunal proceeded on an erroneous factual basis. In that paragraph, the Tribunal stated:

In the primary decision the delegate gave an outline of the applicant’s migration history as follows.

….

•    On 11 September 2015 the applicant lodged an application for a Medical Treatment (subclass 602) Visa which was refused on 15 September 2014. He sought merits and judicial review and his application for judicial review was dismissed by the Full Federal Court on 13 April 2018.

(My emphasis.)

43    The error in the passage above is no more than an obvious typographical error, where “11 September 2015” is used instead of “11 September 2014” (which would align with the procedural history of that application that was recited by Dowsett J in proceedings involving the same appellant in Parmar v Minister of Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 502 at [1]). It was not suggested by the appellant that the relevant visa application was not in fact made on 11 September 2014, or that it was not in fact refused on 15 September 2014. It was not suggested that the appellant’s subsequent applications for merits and judicial review were dealt with other than in the way recorded in that paragraph.

44    The typographical error is not replicated elsewhere in the reasons and does not appear to have played any part in the Tribunal’s reasoning. The point of recounting the appellant’s “migration history” was to ground the following aspects of the Tribunal’s reasoning (which immediately followed that summary) at [29]:

The Tribunal finds that applicant’s actions in applying for several visas and seeking judicial review through the court system to the point of applying to the High Court in two matters and the Full Federal Court in one matter, indicates he has a very strong motivation to remain in Australia permanently. His actions are not consistent with a claimed intention to stay temporarily in Australia for the purpose of medical treatment or related purposes.

(see also [32] of the Tribunal’s reasons extracted above: “Further his actions in seeking permanent visas and vigorously pursuing merits and judicial review indicates that he seeks to remain permanently or indefinitely in Australia”.)

45    The precise date upon which the appellant’s application for the Medical Treatment (subclass 602) Visa was made was beside the point. The point was that he had sought that visa (amongst others) and then pursued merits and judicial review. As Mr Ryan put to me:

… what matters is that those visa applications were made prior to the current visa application. Whether it was 2014 or 2015 that the application was lodged and then refused is not specifically relevant to the question

46    A typographical error alone does not necessarily involve a form of jurisdictional error on the part of an administrative tribunal: see e.g., CRI026 v Republic of Nauru (2018) 355 ALR 216 at [56], [57] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Nettle JJ). However that putative error is characterised, there was no realistic possibility that the decision that was made in fact could have been different if it had not occurred: see again LPDT (2024) 280 CLR 321 at [7] and [14] (Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Gleeson, Steward and Jagot JJ). The typographical error could not amount to jurisdictional error in those circumstances.

47    It became apparent during oral argument that the appellant’s third ground of appeal was essentially parasitic on grounds 1 and 2. That is also evident from the particulars which stated:

24. The Tribunal correctly identified at [21] that the statutory question was whether the Appellant genuinely intended to stay temporarily in Australia for the purpose for which the visa was granted.

25. The medical purpose of the proposed stay was therefore directly relevant to T 26. The Tribunal's assessment of that question was materially informed by its conclusion that there was insufficient medical information.

27. That conclusion was affected by the error identified in Ground 1.

28. The Tribunal's assessment was also materially informed by the Appellant's migration history and the inference drawn from that history.

29. That assessment was affected by the error identified in Ground 2.

30. The Tribunal therefore did not lawfully undertake the evaluative task required by cl 602.215 because material aspects of the factual foundation upon which its conclusion rested were not properly considered or were materially misconceived.

(My emphasis.)

48    Having rejected grounds 1 and 2, it necessarily follows that ground 3 also fails. I understood the appellant to accept that that was so.

49    The appellant’s fourth ground of appeal was that the primary judge erred in finding that errors identified in appeal grounds 1-3 were not material. The primary judge did not, in fact, make a finding on materiality (although it appears he may have explained that concept to the appellant – see at [26]). Indeed, the primary judge did not consider grounds 1-3 at all – as I have said, those were entirely new grounds, argued for the first time before me. For the reasons I have already given, those grounds involved no relevant error, or at least none that was material. It follows that this ground also fails.

50    The appellant’s fifth ground of appeal raised a similar issue to ground 2 (the Tribunal’s typographical error regarding the appellant’s migration history) but in relation to the following passage at PJ [36]:

There is one further matter that I should address. It was not raised by the applicant but I discussed it with Ms Hilder, the minister's representative. I have already noted the Tribunal considered the applicant's history of making applications for visas and prosecuting appeals as an ‘other relevant matter’ under cl 602.215(1)(c) of the Regulations. One must carefully scrutinise any suggestion that an applicant will be disadvantaged in a subsequent decision-making process because they have previously availed themselves of their rights under Australia's comprehensive system of administrative law and review. A visa applicant should not be penalised for pursuing their rights. Having raised this concern, I am satisfied the Tribunal's analysis in this case did not stray into that dangerous territory. The Tribunal highlighted the fact the applicant had applied for several different visa types in the past; the fact he had pursued those applications to their limit in the review process was incidental to the observation about the applicant applying for different visa types with one end in mind: to secure any visa that would permit the applicant to stay in Australia. I accept that pattern of behaviour is a relevant consideration and provides a reasonable foundation for the conclusion the Tribunal reached.

51    That was said by the appellant to involve “accepting the Tribunal's treatment of the Appellant's migration and review history without determining whether the Tribunal's adverse inference was materially affected by the erroneous chronology identified in Ground 2”. There is no substance in that ground. The primary judge was (carefully, and in the appellant’s favour) exploring the question of whether the Tribunal’s consideration of the appellant’s history of making applications for visas and prosecuting appeals involved an extraneous consideration or some similar failure to abide by a condition on power. None of that involves any error of the kind alleged in ground 5.

52    For completeness, and noting that the appellant is legally unrepresented, I have considered whether the decision of the primary judge (and that of the Tribunal) contains any self-evident error: see COS16 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 112 at [20] (McKerracher J). I am satisfied that neither decision contains any obvious legal error.

Conclusion

53    I will dismiss the appeal.

54    Mr Ryan sought an order that the appellant pay the Minister’s costs. I will make that order.

Associate:

Dated:    6 October 2026