Federal Court of Australia

Lee v Haynes Mechanical Pty Ltd trading as Haynes Labour Hire [2026] FCA 1390

File number(s):

QUD 467 of 2026

Judgment of:

DOWLING J

Date of judgment:

18 September 2026

Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – interlocutory application to prevent transfer of proceeding to Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) – where it is in the interests of the administration of justice that the proceeding be transferred – interlocutory application dismissed

Legislation:

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 539, 566, 567

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) s 135

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 32 AB, 37M

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 27.01(3)

Cases cited:

Freeway Sports Centre Pty Ltd ATF Freeway Sports Centre Unit Trust v Freeway Fitness Pty Ltd ATF Freeway Fitness Unit Trust [2025] FCA 82

Re The Scorpion and The Frog Pty Ltd (in liq) [2026] FCA 98

Division:

Fair Work Division

Registry:

Queensland

National Practice Area:

Employment and Industrial Relations

Number of paragraphs:

18

Date of hearing:

18 September 2026

Counsel for the Applicant:

The Applicant appeared in person, via audio-visual link

Solicitor for the Respondent:

Ms R Pezzutti of IRIQ Law, via audio-visual link

ORDERS

QUD 467 of 2026

BETWEEN:

JONATHAN LOGAN LEE

Applicant

AND:

HAYNES MECHANICAL PTY LTD T/AS HAYNES LABOUR HIRE

Respondent

order made by:

DOWLING J

DATE OF ORDER:

18 September 2026

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

A.    Rule 27.01(3) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) states:

(3)    Before the Court makes an order under subsection 32AB(1) of the [Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)] transferring a proceeding from the Court to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2):

(a)    the Court must consult the Chief Justice of the Court in relation to the proposed transfer; and

(b)    the Chief Justice of the Court must consult the Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) in relation to the proposed transfer.

B.    Following this hearing, Dowling J will advise the Chief Justice of the Federal Court of Australia of the interlocutory application dated 2 September 2026, made by Jonathan Logan Lee, and of Dowling J's view that proceeding QUD467/2026, commenced in this Court by an originating process dated 20 July 2026, be transferred to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2), pursuant to s 32AB(1) of the Act. This will enable the Chief Justice to confer with the Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2), in relation to the proposed transfer.

C.    The Court will not make any order today effecting the transfer of the proceeding, so as to allow for the consultation process in r 27.01(3) of the Rules to take place.

D.    The Court will inform the parties of the outcome of the consultation process set out in r 27.01(3) of the Rules.

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The applicant’s interlocutory application dated 2 September 2026 be dismissed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Delivered ex tempore, revised from transcript)

DOWLING J

1    On 20 July 2026, the applicant, Mr Jonathan Lee, lodged an originating application in this Court alleging dismissal in contravention of the general protections provisions of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) by the respondent Haynes Mechanical Pty Ltd t/as Haynes Labour Hire.

2    In his application Mr Lee says that he commenced employment with the respondent on 16 March 2026 as a Storeperson at Austchrome in Paget, Queensland. He says his employment ended on 7 May 2026. He claims, “the Respondent took adverse action by dismissing [him] in contravention of the general protections”. The application contains no details of that claim. Mr Lee says in his application that his “economic loss is 24 days without work at [his] ordinary rate of pay”. No statement of claim or concise statement has been filed otherwise detailing the claims or loss. No affidavit was filed explaining the circumstances of the alleged dismissal or any loss.

3    The application was listed for a case management hearing before a Registrar of this Court on 28 August 2026. On that day, the Registrar determined that it was appropriate to transfer the proceeding to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) pursuant to s 32AB of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), and recorded this determination in a notation to the Registrar’s order. The only order made by the Registrar was to grant leave for the applicant to file an amended originating application regularising the name of the respondent as including its trading name. An amended application to that effect was lodged on 29 August 2026.

4    The transfer of the proceeding was supported by the respondent. Before any transfer order was made, on 3 September 2026, Mr Lee lodged an interlocutory application dated 2 September 2026 seeking orders including:

1.    An order that the proceeding not be transferred to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia, and that the matter remain in the Federal Court of Australia.

2.    An order restraining the Respondent from taking any step to transfer, [redeploy], alter or terminate the Applicant’s employment, or otherwise change the Applicant’s employment status, until the final determination of this proceeding.

5    That interlocutory application was referred to me in my capacity as general duty judge on 15 September 2026. On 16 September my Chambers advised the parties that I would hear the parties on the appropriateness of a transfer at 10.15 am on 18 September 2026.

6    For the reasons explained below I consider that it is in the interests of the administration of justice that the proceeding be transferred to the Federal Circuit and Family Court.

The relevant provision and principles

7    Section 32AB of the Act provides that the Federal Court may transfer a proceeding to the Federal Circuit and Family Court. Section 32AB(2) provides that this Court may transfer a proceeding on the application of a party to the proceeding or on its own initiative. Section 32AB(6) provides that in deciding whether to transfer a proceeding the Federal Court must have regard to:

(a)    any rules of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) setting out factors that are to be taken into account by the Court in deciding whether to transfer a proceeding;

(b)    whether proceedings in respect of an associated matter are pending in the Federal Circuit and Family Court;

(c)    whether the resources of the Federal Circuit and Family Court are sufficient to hear and determine the proceeding; and

(d)    the interests of the administration of justice.

8    For the purposes of (a), the only relevant rule is r 27.01(3). That rule provides that the Federal Court must consult the Chief Justice of the Federal Court, who in turn must consult the Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court in relation to the proposed transfer, before making an order under s 32AB.

9    Concerning the interests of the administration of justice, in Freeway Sports Centre Pty Ltd ATF Freeway Sports Centre Unit Trust v Freeway Fitness Pty Ltd ATF Freeway Fitness Unit Trust [2025] FCA 82, Button J said at [42] “the question of what is in the interests of justice depends on the circumstances in each particular case, and other cases in which transfers have been made, or refused, are of limited relevance and do not provide assistance in determining the present application”.

10    In Re The Scorpion and The Frog Pty Ltd (in liq) [2026] FCA 98, Anderson J said at [46] that it was appropriate to consider the overarching purpose of civil practice and procedure provided by s 37M of the Act in the assessment of the interests of the administration of justice. In summary that purpose includes the just determination of proceedings, the efficient use of judicial and administrative resources, the efficient disposal of the Court’s caseload, the disposal of proceedings in a timely manner and the resolution of disputes at a cost proportionate to the importance and complexity of the matters in dispute.

consideration

11    Dealing first with the three matters at s 32AB(6)(a)-(c). First, as explained, the only relevant rule provides that the Federal Court must consult the Chief Justice of the Federal Court, who in turn must consult the Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court in relation to the proposed transfer, before making an order under s 32AB. Second, the applicant said in the certificate of urgency provided to the Court that there are no proceedings pending in the Federal Circuit and Family Court associated with the present proceeding, and that position did not alter at the hearing before me. Third, I am satisfied that the resources of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia are “sufficient to hear and determine the proceeding”.

12    As to what is in the interests of the administration of justice, the respondent says that: there are no complex legal or factual issues raised; the Federal Circuit and Family Court routinely deals with proceedings of this sort; there is no prejudice to Mr Lee arising from a transfer because the proceeding is at an early stage; and the Federal Circuit and Family Court is better equipped to deal with the proceeding because of its simplified forms and processes, and that also means it is likely to be quicker and cheaper.

13    In oral submissions Mr Lee relied on five reasons why the proceeding should not be transferred from this Court. First, that the Federal Court had “primary jurisdiction” under the Fair Work Act. However, it is clear that the Federal Cicruit and Family Court also has jurisdiction to entertain Mr Lee’s substantive claim: see ss 539, 566 and 567 of the Fair Work Act and s 135 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth). Second, that the proceeding involved a significant question of statutory construction of s 361 of the Fair Work Act. Mr Lee was unable to explain the nature of that question. There is nothing before me to suggest that there is such a significant question arising from this claim. Third, he said the matter involved complex legal questions including “post employer casual attribution”. Again, there is nothing before me to suggest that there is any complex legal question arising from Mr Lee’s employment and termination. Fourth, Mr Lee said a transfer would cause “months of procedural delay” because the procedural clock would be reset. However, Mr Lee accepted that the “clock” in this Court is at the very beginning in that no substantive steps in the litigation have occurred since the filing of the originating application, the matter has not been through any docketing process to a particular judge, and any resetting would not be meaningful. Fifth, he said that this Court is already seized of the matter. Again, it is relevant to note that the matter is at the earliest stages and no timetabling steps have been ordered to prepare the matter for any substantive hearing (save only the change in the respondent’s name). None of those submissions provides a basis to establish that the interests of the administration of justice favour the matter remaining in this Court.

14    In the affidavit filed in support of the interlocutory application Mr Lee submitted that the proceeding involves “allegations of adverse action, procedural unfairness, and factual disputes requiring cross-examination of multiple witnesses” and “labour-hire arrangements, host-employer conduct, and the interaction between labour-hire obligations and Fair Work Act protections”. As explained, none of that is particularised or elucidated and the applicant did not elaborate on it at the hearing before me. There is nothing before the Court to suggest those things establish that the interests of the administration of justice favour the matter remaining in this Court.

15    To the contrary, I am satisfied that it is in the interests of the administration of justice that the proceeding be transferred. I am satisfied on the material before me that there are no complex legal or factual issues such that it would be necessary for the matter to remain in this Court. The Federal Circuit and Family Court has jurisdiction and undoubted expertise in claims of this sort alleging dismissal under the Fair Work Act. Such claims are regularly and efficiently determined by that Court. I am also satisfied that on the material before me any economic loss claimed would be modest. As Mr Lee claims, it is limited to 24 days without work at his ordinary rate of pay. There is nothing before me to establish that there would be a basis for the “general or aggravated damages” raised by Mr Lee. None of that is to suggest that the claims are not important to the parties, and particularly to Mr Lee.

16    I am satisfied that, given the early stages of the proceeding, the transfer would not cause any meaningful delay that would prejudice Mr Lee. To the contrary, it is possible, but not certain, that the Federal Circuit and Family Court’s processes (designed with regard to that Court’s high-volume jurisdiction with large numbers of unrepresented parties) and forms might be of assistance to Mr Lee. It is also possible, but not certain, in the circumstances of this claim, that those processes and forms might be quicker and cheaper for the parties.

17    I have also considered s 37M of the Act, where that purpose is relevant to the interests of the administration of justice. In all of the above circumstances I consider that a transfer would be consistent with the just determination of the proceedings, the efficient use of judicial and administrative resources, and particularly with the disposal of proceedings in a timely manner and the resolution of disputes at a cost proportionate to the importance and complexity of the matters in dispute.

18    In all of those circumstances I consider that it is in the interests of the administration of justice that the proceeding be transferred. That resolves order one sought in the interlocutory application. It is not necessary or appropriate for me to address order two, namely, the order sought restraining the respondent from taking any step to transfer, [redeploy], alter or terminate the Applicant’s employment. I note that the respondent submits that, given the applicant’s employment ended on 7 May 2026, an order of that kind is not possible or practicable as it assumes that the applicant’s employment remains in force. In any event, subject to consultation between the Chief Justice of this Court and the Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court, the proceeding will be transferred and the appropriateness of any such orders should be determined by the Federal Circuit and Family Court. The interlocutory application will be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding eighteen (18) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Dowling.

Associate:

Dated:    18 September 2026