Federal Court of Australia

Groom v State of South Australia [2026] FCA 1384

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The originating application is summarily dismissed pursuant to s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 26.01(1)(d) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

2.    The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the originating application.

3.    The time by which the applicant may commence an application for leave to appeal from the orders in paragraphs 1 and 2 be extended so as to commence to run on the date following the publication of formal written reasons for judgment.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

CHARLESWORTH J:

1    By his originating application, the applicant, Mr Stephen Groom, challenges the validity of an interim domestic violence restraining order made against him on 19 October 2011 (Interim Order). The State of South Australia is the sole respondent.

2    The State seeks an order that the originating application be summarily dismissed pursuant to s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and/or r 26.01(1)(d) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) on the basis that Mr Groom’s claims constituted an abuse of the Court’s processes and otherwise enjoyed no reasonable prospect of success.

3    Following a hearing on 7 September 2026, I granted the State’s application, ordered that the proceeding be summarily dismissed and gave oral reasons on the same day. The parties were informed that written reasons to the same effect as the oral reasons (with some elaboration) would be published. These are the written reasons.

RECORD OF ORAL REASONS

4    I have concluded that this proceeding should be dismissed on the basis that it constitutes an abuse of the processes of the Court. The continuation of the proceeding would be contrary to the finality principle as summarised in some authorities to which I will refer shortly and so constitutes an abuse of process. I do not consider it necessary in the circumstances to ask whether or not the proceeding would otherwise have had a reasonable prospect of success.

5    Mr Groom’s originating application and statement of claim are summarised in my reasons for judgment in Groom v National Registrar Federal Court of Australia [2026] FCA 720 at [7]-[15]. It is convenient to extract the whole of that summary here:

7    The proposed originating application names the State of South Australia as the respondent. As the Registrar identified, it is in Form 66 (being the form prescribed under r 31.01(1) of the Rules for the commencement for an application for review of a decision under s 11(1) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act)) and is structured in five parts.

8    Part 1 is an introduction. It is to the effect that Mr Groom:

(1)    sought “judicial review and damages” in relation to an intervention order “purportedly issued on 19 October 2011 by the Adelaide Magistrates Court” (emphasis in original) in a specified action;

(2)    contended that the intervention order was void ab initio because there was no originating complaint, such that no “matter” existed and the Magistrates Court therefore lacked jurisdiction;

(3)    alleged that he was unlawfully detained and subjected to “ongoing enforcement for a total of 5,144 days [ongoing]” (emphasis in original);

(4)    alleged that he has suffered severe personal, financial and reputational harm; and

(5)    relied upon Chapter III of the Constitution, the principles stated in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, NZYQ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 280 CLR 137 and “[c]ommon law principles of jurisdiction and procedural fairness”.

9    Part 2 of the proposed originating application contains a chronology of events commencing with the issue of the intervention order on 19 October 2011 “without complainant”, and including the enforcement of the intervention order in 2012-2013 resulting in Mr Groom’s detention. The chronology refers to proceedings in the Supreme Court of South Australia, the nature of which is unclear. There is a reference in the chronology to a “vexatious litigant trial” and various references to missing evidence, wrongdoing on the part of the police and an allegation that the “CSO” (understood to be the Crown Solicitor’s Office) conceded that there was no original complaint supporting the intervention order.

10    Part 3 of the proposed originating application is titled “Grounds for Relief”. It contains five grounds. The first is an allegation that the Magistrates Court lacked jurisdiction to issue the intervention order because no complaint had been sworn or filed, there was no “matter” as required by Chapter III of the Constitution and the judicial power of the Magistrates Court had not been invoked. As a consequence, the intervention order is said to be void ab initio. The second and third grounds are to the effect that Mr Groom’s detention was an act of unlawful detention by the Executive branch of the government in violation of the principles discussed in Kable and NZYQ. The fourth ground alleges procedural unfairness and misfeasance. It includes allegations that police, prosecutors and the Crown Solicitor’s Office knew that no original complaint existed, ignored subpoenas and that “[e]vidence went missing from the court file for years”. The conduct is said to constitute an abuse of process, misfeasance in public office, procedural unfairness and a breach of natural justice. The fifth ground alleges that there has been continuous enforcement of the intervention order including detention on remand on two occasions totalling five weeks, overnight detention in cells, home detention and “[r]estrictions and legal proceedings based on a void order”. By that ground Mr Groom alleges that he has suffered “personal, financial and reputational harm” and that he seeks “damages of not less than $25,000,000”.

11    The relief sought is detailed in Part 4 of the proposed originating application. It includes a declaration that the intervention order was void ab initio, “[o]rders of certiorari and prohibition, as required”, damages under the common law “and constitutional principles”.

12    Part 5 of the proposed originating application is titled “Summary of Legal Authority”. It includes references to Ch III of the Constitution, Kable, NZYQ and various common law principles.

13    The proposed statement of claim repeats the allegations made in the proposed originating application. More specifically, it contains the following pleas:

3.    The Applicant contends that the conduct of State officers constitutes serious abuses of process, breaches of statutory duty, malicious prosecution, and misfeasance in public office.

…

7.     Multiple applications across different courts, including the Supreme Court of SA and High Court, failed to resolve the invalidity despite contested evidence.

…

11.     The Applicant requests orders in the nature of certiorari and prohibition to set aside all orders, warrants, detentions, home detentions, convictions, or enforcement actions arising from the invalid order.

…

14.     On 5 May 2025, the CSO failed to contest a Supreme Court application regarding the missing complaint. (CIV 25-3840)

14    Under the heading “Legal Grounds” there is a reference to “[m]alicious prosecution”, “[a]buse of process”, “[m]isfeasance in public office”, “[b]reach of statutory duty” and “[b]reach of international human rights”.

15    Also among the Documents is Mr Groom’s affidavit of 20 November 2025. In that affidavit, Mr Groom refers to his application “for judicial review and constitutional relief, including orders of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, declarations, and damages, arising from” the intervention order. He refers to the intervention order being replaced with a restraining order under the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA). Among other things, he alleges that the intervention order affected his rights in family law proceedings. Mr Groom also refers to proceedings commenced by the Attorney-General for the State of South Australia to have him declared a vexatious litigant. The outcome of that proceeding is not stated. He alleges that in the course of that proceeding it was established that there had been no originating complaint in the proceedings in the Magistrates Court. Mr Groom further states that he commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court “seeking to have the jurisdiction of the purported intervention order determined” and to have the order revoked. He states that the application was not contested but does not state the outcome of that proceeding.

6    The Interim Order was made under s 9(2) of the now repealed Domestic Violence Act 1994 (SA). It was confirmed on 10 December 2013 under transitional provisions to the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA) and so became an Intervention Order. At the heart of Mr Groom’s claims is an assertion that there does not exist an original copy of a complaint on the file of the Magistrates Court of South Australia and that, as a consequence, the jurisdiction to make an order was not validly invoked.

7    Mr Groom also made submissions about the quality of the evidence that might have been relied upon in support of the Interim Order.

8    Mr Groom is a person who has been involved in litigation against the State in connection with the validity of the Interim Order since it was confirmed on 10 December 2013. The history of that litigation is set out in the reasons for judgment of Blue J of the Supreme Court of South Australia in Attorney-General v Groom [2023] SASC 18 at [3]-[67]. His Honour heard and determined an application by which the State (by the Attorney-General) sought to have Mr Groom declared a vexatious litigant in that Court.

9    In the same proceeding, Mr Groom filed an interlocutory application and supporting evidence. By that application, he sought to have the validity of the Interim Order determined in the same proceeding in which the Attorney-General sought to have him declared vexatious.

10    That is what occurred, the interlocutory application proceeding by way of a cross-claim to the Attorney-General’s application. Justice Blue determined the cross-claim against Mr Groom. His Honour’s reasons for doing so include those that appear at [132]-[147] of the judgment. His Honour went on to declare Mr Groom vexatious.

11    The long history of litigation preceding and following the judgment of Blue J is set out in the respondent’s written submissions. It includes a description of the proceedings culminating in the judgments referenced in footnote 8 to the submissions. The various judgments are annexed to the affidavit of Airlie Rose Waterman, affirmed and filed on 22 July 2026 in this proceeding. As the history is known by Mr Groom and not disputed by him, it is sufficient to list those citations here:

(1)    Groom v Police [2013] SASC 49 (26 March 2013) (Sulan J);

(2)    Groom v Police (No 2) (2013) 115 SASR 446 (26 March 2013) (Sulan J);

(3)    Groom v Police (No 3) [2013] SASC 93 (25 June 2013) (Sulan J);

(4)    Groom v Police [2014] SASC 41 (21 March 2014) (Kelly J);

(5)    Groom v Police [2014] SASCFC 125 (19 November 2014) (Vanstone, Peek and Parker JJ);

(6)    Groom v Police [2015] SASC 101 (14 July 2015) (Nicholson J);

(7)    Groom v State of South Australia (unreported, Supreme Court of South Australia, 21 June 2016) (Dart J);

(8)    Groom v State of South Australia (unreported, Supreme Court of South Australia, 24 June 2016) (Dart J);

(9)    Police v Groom (unreported, Magistrates Court of South Australia, 30 November 2016) (Magistrate Grasso);

(10)    Groom v Police [2017] SASC 21 (23 February 2017) (Vanstone J);

(11)    Groom v State of SA [2017] SASCFC 35 (1 May 2017) (Kourakis CJ, Nicholson and Hinton JJ);

(12)    Groom v Police; Groom v State of SA [2017] SASCFC 161 (7 December 2017) (Kourakis CJ, Nicholson and Hinton JJ);

(13)    Groom v Police [2018] HCASL 90 (19 April 2018) (Bell and Gageler JJ);

(14)    Police v Groom (unreported, Magistrates Court of South Australia, 26 May 2020) (Magistrate Sheppard);

(15)    Groom v Police [2020] SASC 167 (11 September 2020) (Lovell J);

(16)    Groom v Police [2021] SASCA 1 (22 January 2021) (Kelly P, Doyle and Livesey JJA);

(17)    Groom v Police [2021] HCASL 102 (17 June 2021) (Keane and Edelman JJ);

(18)    Attorney-General v Groom [2023] SASC 18 (10 February 2023) (Blue J);

(19)    Groom v Attorney-General [2023] SASCA 83 (1 August 2023) (Lovell and Bleby JJA);

(20)    Groom v Attorney General [2024] HCASL 84 (11 April 2024) (Gleeson and Beech-Jones JJ);

(21)    Groom v Police [2025] HCADisp 17 (6 March 2025) (Gordon and Beech-Jones JJ); and

(22)    Stephen Barry Groom v Department of Public Prosecution (unreported, Supreme Court of South Australia, 5 May 2025) (Gray J).

12    As I have mentioned, Mr Groom did not take issue with the correctness of the legal history as outlined by the State. He did, however, take issue with the correctness of the findings of fact and law made in the various judgments against him over the years. He especially took issue with the judgment of Blue J and the findings that his Honour made in relation to the existence of a complaint on the court record, the consequence of that complaint being only a photocopy, and the consequences that would follow even if there was no original complaint on the court file.

13    The essence of the findings of Blue J was that, notwithstanding the arguments of Mr Groom, the Interim Order was valid and subsequent proceedings commenced against Mr Groom, arising out of that order, were not invalidated by virtue of his arguments concerning the absence of an original complaint. In this Court, Mr Groom complained that his Honour had ignored correspondence sent to his Honour’s Chambers before the judgment was entered.

14    Mr Groom appealed the judgment of Blue J to the Court of Appeal. That application was dismissed: Groom v Attorney-General [2023] SASCA 83 (Lovell JA and Bleby JA). Special leave to appeal to the High Court was refused: Groom v Attorney General [2024] HCASL 84 (Gleeson and Beech-Jones JJ). Subsequent to that series of litigation, in 2025 Mr Groom made an application for leave to commence another proceeding challenging the Intervention Order in the Supreme Court of South Australia. That application was also dismissed: Stephen Barry Groom v Department of Public Prosecution (unreported, Supreme Court of South Australia, 5 May 2025) (Gray J).

15    As has been explained to Mr Groom, it is not the role of this Court to determine whether or not the various decisions adverse to him over the years were correctly decided.

16    The circumstances in which a proceeding may constitute an abuse of process by relitigation are helpfully summarised in the judgment of Besanko J in McDonald v State of South Australia [2011] FCA 297 at [41]-[46]. There his Honour said:

Abuse of process by relitigation

41    The doctrines set out above have a number of technical requirements. The Court’s jurisdiction to protect a party from an abuse of process constituted by an attempt to relitigate a case already disposed of is not limited to cases where those technical requirements can be made out: Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378 at 393 per Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ (‘Walton’); Rana v University of South Australia [2008] FCA 1903 at [43]. The operation of the doctrines of res judicata, issue estoppel and Anshun estoppel is subsumed into the Federal Court’s implied incidental power to prevent abuse of its processes: Spalla at [59]. Justice French said in Spalla (at [66]) that:

the doctrines of res judicata, issue estoppel, and Anshun do not exhaust the circumstances in which a proceeding may be regarded as amounting to an abuse of process by way of attempted relitigation of a dispute already judicially determined.

In Walton Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ said (at 393) that:

… proceedings before a court should be stayed as an abuse of process if, notwithstanding that the circumstances do not give rise to an estoppel, their continuance would be unjustifiably vexatious and oppressive for the reason that it is sought to litigate anew a case which has already been disposed of by earlier proceedings.

42    The power to strike out a claim is to be exercised sparingly and ‘upon an examination of the relevant circumstances of the particular case before the Court: Spalla at [70].

43    In State Bank of New South Wales Ltd v Stenhouse Ltd (1997) Aust Torts Reports 81-423 (at 64,089) (‘Stenhouse’), Giles CJ set out a list of relevant matters in determining whether it would be an abuse of process if a party were allowed to litigate an issue already raised in previous proceedings:

(a)    the importance of the issue in and to the earlier proceedings, including whether it is an evidentiary or an ultimate issue;

(b)    the opportunity available and taken to fully litigate the issue;

(c)    the terms and finality of the finding as to the issue;

(d)    the identity between the relevant issues in the two proceedings;

(e)    any plea of fresh evidence, including the nature and significance of the evidence and the reason why it was not part of the earlier proceedings; all part of –

(f)    the extent of the oppression and unfairness to the other party if the issue is relitigated and the impact of the relitigation upon the principle of finality of judicial determination and public confidence in the administration of justice; and

(g)    an overall balancing of justice to the alleged abuser against the matters supportive of abuse of process.

In Spalla, French J described this list as a non-exhaustive one (at [70]).

44    The parties need not necessarily be the same for the proceedings to be permanently stayed as an abuse of process.

45    In a case bearing some similarities to the present, R v Lessur-Millar (1990) 47 A Crim R 111, Lockhart J said (at 117-118):

For this Court to allow the present matter to proceed and to consider granting the relief sought by the applicant would be to lend its aid to a further investigation of the very matters which have been fully considered by judges at first instance and on appeal in New South Wales and, though a special leave application and not the hearing of a substantive appeal, by the High Court.

No fresh evidence of any probative kind has been placed before the Court additional to what was before the New South Wales courts.

It is vexatious and an abuse of process for a party, having sued unsuccessfully before the courts of New South Wales, to seek to agitate the very same issues and facts in this Court. The proceedings, remedies and parties are not precisely identical; but they are in all essential respects the same

46    There are a number of cases dealing with the category of abuse of process by relitigation. For present purposes it is sufficient for me to refer to SZJAB v Minister for Immigration (2008) 168 FCR 410 at 423 per French J and Rippon, in addition to the cases to which I have already referred.

17    See also McDonald v Colbran [2019] FCA 1937.

18    I have had regard to the subject matter of this proceeding, as disclosed on the face of Mr Groom’s originating application and statement of claim. I have especially had regard to the various causes of action that he seeks to maintain in the proceeding. I have earlier concluded that the proceeding goes beyond an application for judicial review, such that even if such an application were wrong-footed in this Court, that would not be a basis for striking out the whole of the proceeding or for finding that the application has no reasonable prospects of success.

19    Importantly, the material facts relied upon by Mr Groom (as set out in [4]-[17] of his statement of claim) include allegations that the Interim Order (upon which the Intervention Order was later based) was void ab initio, and that no original complaint or sworn evidence-in-chief was ever filed or served.

20    By his statement of claim, Mr Groom seeks an award of damages in the amount of $25 million for unlawful detention, home detention and systemic rights violations. The respondent relied upon that figure as being arbitrary, and an indicator that the proceeding is vexatious or frivolous. I do not accept that submission and do not base any part of my reasoning on that aspect of the submissions of the State. On that topic I have taken into account that Mr Groom is a self-represented litigant. I have interpreted his submissions both orally and in writing (including as they appear in his affidavits) as generously as is appropriate, having regard to his status as a non-lawyer. I proceed on the basis that his causes of action include malicious prosecution, abuse of process, misfeasance in public office, breach of statutory duty and breach of international human rights laws. I do not consider that the damages alleged in the amount of $25 million is so disproportionate to the nature of the claims that are sought to be made that I should base an application for summary judgment on that feature of the statement of claim. In his submissions Mr Groom expressed a sense of frustration and despair in connection with the Interim Order. He submitted that there has been an ongoing injustice that must be remedied by this Court. His oral and written submissions repeated the flaws that he alleged existed in the Magistrates Court file.

21    Mr Groom filed interlocutory applications in this Court seeking to invoke the Court’s powers to require the State to produce an original copy of the complaint that would become the jurisdictional foundation for the Interim Order. There is material before me to show that, in the proceeding before Blue J, the court file then before the parties was provided to them and they each had an opportunity to inspect it and to make submissions in connection with its content. Whatever was on the court file at that time was a matter of inspection by Mr Groom.

22    Since that time, there has been an appeal to the Court of Appeal from Blue J’s decision. Anything present or missing from the court file as inspected during the proceeding before Blue J would have been or ought to have been raised before the Court of Appeal. In addition, that issue is one that would have been raised on the application for leave to commence the proceeding determined by Gray J in 2025 and indeed it appears that it was.

23    Mr Groom submitted that he does not intend to give up in relation to his pursuit for justice, because, he says, “there is always another door to open”. The legal principles (specifically the principle of finality) are such that there is not always another door to open.

24    It is an abuse of this Court’s processes to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction in order to revisit an issue that has been decided. The principle applies irrespective of whether the issue has been decided correctly. Accordingly, it cannot assist Mr Groom to persuade me that there might be some error in the judgments of the Magistrates Court, Supreme Court, Court of Appeal or the High Court, putting aside the question of what this Court could do in the exercise of its jurisdiction in relation to the same subject matter.

25    In Groom v National Registrar, I identified that Mr Groom sought to make an application raising an issue or a matter arising under the Constitution. I articulated what I understood at that time the issue to be. I am conscious that when an issue arises under the Constitution or involving its interpretation, notices under s 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) should issue. However, I do not consider that the constitutional issue as articulated on the originating application and statement of claim is identified with sufficient clarity in order for me to delay the disposition of this application for summary judgment.

26    In any event, even if there was some constitutional basis upon which it could be said that the Interim Order was invalid by reason of an issue arising under the Constitution, that is itself a matter that ought to have been raised in any one of the many proceedings referred to above.

27    This proceeding is an abuse of process as it is an attempt to re-litigate issues that have previously been litigated and decided against Mr Groom. There will be an order summarily dismissing the originating application. The time by which Mr Groom may commence an application for leave to appeal from that order will be extended so as to commence to run from the day on which formal written reasons for the order are published.

Associate:

Dated:    18 September 2026