Federal Court of Australia

Kassem, in the matter of Fortworx Pty Ltd (in liquidation) [2026] FCA 1352

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The application by Alexander Kladas for an adjournment of the Summons for Examination issued on 1 April 2026 be refused.

2.    Pursuant to r 11.10(2)(a) of the Federal Court (Corporations) Rules 2000 (Cth), a warrant issue in the form annexed to these Orders for the arrest of Alexander Kladas of 21 Banks Street, Monterey NSW 2217 and for him to be brought before the Court to be examined pursuant to the Summons for Examination issued on 1 April 2026 (Summons).

3.    Upon his arrest, Mr Kladas be brought before the Court as soon as practicable and, if the Court is not then sitting, at the next sitting of the Court, and be detained in custody in the meantime if necessary.

4.    Immediately upon the arrest of Mr Kladas, the person who carries out the arrest give notice of the arrest to a Registrar of the New South Wales District Registry of the Court, and the Registrar notify the plaintiff’s solicitors of the arrest.

5.    The examination of Mr Kladas pursuant to the Summons be adjourned to a date to be fixed, and be relisted as soon as practicable after Mr Kladas is brought before the Court.

6.    The warrant is to remain in force until it is executed or until it is discharged or set aside by further order of the Court.

7.    By 10:00 am AEST on 9 September 2026, the plaintiff is to deliver a copy of these Orders and of the warrant on Mr Kladas:

(a)    to 21 Banks Street, Monterey NSW 2217; and

(b)    by email to ahussein@abhlegal.com.au.

8.    There be liberty to apply on 24 hours’ notice, including to Mr Kladas to apply to discharge or set aside the warrant.

9.    Mr Kladas is to pay the plaintiff’s costs of and incidental to the attendances on 7 and 8 September 2026 and of this application, as agreed or taxed, and that such costs be payable forthwith.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

ANNEXURE

Federal Court of Australia

District Registry: New South Wales Registry

Division: General No: NSD2129/2025

OZEM KASSEM IN HIS CAPACITY AS LIQUIDATOR OF FORTWORX PTY LTD

(IN LIQUIDATION) ACN 666 098 728 and others named in the schedule

Plaintiff

ARREST WARRANT

TO WHOM THIS WARRANT IS ADDRESSED

TO:     All members and special members of the Australian Federal Police; and

TO:     All officers of the police force of the State or Territory in which ALEXANDER KLADAS is found; and

TO:     The Sheriff of that State or Territory and all of that Sheriff’s officers.

WHEREAS:

1.    Fortworx Pty Ltd (in liquidation) ACN 666 098 728 (the Company) is being wound up in insolvency.

2.     On 1 April 2026, the Court issued a Summons for Examination to Alexander Kladas pursuant to s 596A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), requiring him to attend before the Federal Court of Australia at the Law Courts Building, Queens Square, Sydney NSW 2000 at 10.15 am on 7 September 2026, and from day to day until excused by the Court, to be examined on oath or affirmation about the examinable affairs of the Company (the Summons).

3.     Alexander Kladas failed to attend before the Court as required by the Summons on 7 September 2026 and, the examination having been adjourned to 8 September 2026 and notice of the adjourned date having been given to him, on 8 September 2026.

4.     Alexander Kladas has, without reasonable cause, failed to attend at the time and place appointed by the Summons.

THIS WARRANT THEREFORE REQUIRES AND AUTHORISES YOU TO:

5.     Take and arrest ALEXANDER KLADAS and to bring him before the Federal Court of Australia at the Law Courts Building, Queens Square, Sydney NSW 2000 and to keep him there pending the making of a further order by the Court.

6.     In the meantime, to detain him in custody.

NOTICE OF ARREST

7.     Immediately upon the arrest of Alexander Kladas, the person who carries out the arrest must give notice of the arrest to a Registrar of the New South Wales District Registry of the Federal Court of Australia at Level 17, Law Courts Building, Queens Square, Sydney NSW 2000, or by email to nswreg@fedcourt.gov.au.

DURATION

8.     This warrant remains in force until it is executed or until it is discharged or set aside by order of the Court.

Date: 8 September 2026

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

DERRINGTON J

Introduction

1    Two applications were made to the Court on an urgent basis and heard in the Commercial and Corporations duty list.

2    The first application is brought by Mr Alexander Kladas, who seeks an adjournment of a summons for examination served upon him by Mr Ozem Kassem, the liquidator of Fortworx Pty Ltd (Fortworx). Mr Kassem is conducting a public examination into the affairs of Fortworx, of which Mr Kladas was the sole director. The summons issued to Mr Kladas required him to appear for examination at 10:15 am on 7 September 2026, however he did not appear on that day. Nor did he attend the adjourned hearing on the following day. Mr Kladas now seeks an adjournment of the public examination on the basis that he is medically unfit to attend.

3    Conversely, Mr Kassem seeks an order that, consequent upon Mr Kladas’s non-compliance with the summons, a warrant be issued for his arrest.

4    For the reasons which follow, the adjournment sought by Mr Kladas should not be granted, and a warrant for his arrest should be issued. The medical certificates upon which he relies are insufficiently detailed and do not establish an inability to appear in Court. Moreover, in the circumstances of his repeated non-compliance with the summons for examination, a warrant for his arrest is justified.

Background

5    The circumstances leading to the public examination are not especially material to the present applications.

6    Nevertheless, it is relevant to mention that Fortworx is being wound up in insolvency, and Mr Kassem is seeking to examine Mr Kladas, as its sole director, in relation to the circumstances of the insolvency and other matters.

7    To that end, a summons for examination was issued to Mr Kladas out of this Court on 1 April 2026, requiring his attendance at 10:15 am on 7 September 2026, and from day to day thereafter, until excused. The summons included the usual notice to the effect that Mr Kladas might be arrested and imprisoned if he did not comply with its requirements.

8    There is no issue as to the service of the summons on Mr Kladas. On the available material, it is evident that he was served by hand on or about 8 April 2026.

9    In any event, it is clear that his solicitors have been in communication with Mr Kassem’s solicitors in relation to the summons and as to the issues on which Mr Kladas is sought to be examined. In that correspondence, Mr Kladas’s solicitors indicated that they were acutely aware that the examination was listed at 10:15 am on 7 September 2026. Indeed, in a letter of 24 August 2026, they stated that their client was “aware of the listing and will attend as required”. The letter also acknowledged that any meeting between Mr Kladas and Mr Kassem, as had been proposed, would “not replace or displace the formal examinations”.

10    On 7 September 2026, Mr Kladas did not appear in Court. However, his Counsel appeared and made an oral application for an adjournment of the summons. The foundation for the adjournment was, allegedly, that Mr Kladas believed that he was not required to attend by reason of his having had discussions with Mr Kassem. That is difficult to reconcile with the assertions of his solicitors in the letter of 24 August 2026.

11    The Registrar with carriage of the examination refused the application but stood the matter down for a short period. The parties had some discussions and it was agreed that the hearing would be adjourned until 10:15 am the following day, 8 September 2026. That agreement was reached on the basis that Mr Kladas agreed to attend the following day. Consequently, the Registrar made orders giving effect to the agreed adjournment.

12    Thereafter, at around 2:30 pm on 7 September 2026, the solicitor for the liquidator, Mr Rollins, attended at Mr Kladas’s residential address and personally delivered to him an envelope containing certain documents. They included a letter dated 7 September 2026, the orders made by consent, and a copy of the summons for examination. It was not disputed that such a delivery occurred. Relevantly, the enclosed letter reiterated Mr Kladas’s obligation to attend the hearing on the following day and restated the consequences which would flow from his non-attendance.

13    As it transpired, Mr Kladas did not attend Court on 8 September 2026. Rather, his Counsel appeared and made a further application for an adjournment.

14    The liquidator opposed the application for an adjournment being heard by the Registrar and applied, under s 35A(7) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), for the Registrar to make arrangements for the application to be heard by the Court.

15    The matter was then referred to the duty judge.

The adjournment application

16    The first matter for determination is Mr Kladas’s application for an adjournment of his examination summons. As mentioned, the foundation of his application is that he is medically unfit to give evidence. In support of that contention, he relies upon the affidavit of his solicitor, Mr Hussein, which purports to set out the circumstances of his medical condition.

17    Relevantly, Mr Hussein’s affidavit states that:

(1)    At around 1:30 pm on 7 September 2026, Mr Hussein telephoned Mr Kladas and informed him of the orders made by consent, and that he was required to attend Court at 10:15 am the following day.

(2)    Mr Kladas sounded stressed and anxious about attending Court.

(3)    At around 3:00 pm on 7 September 2026, Mr Kladas telephoned Mr Hussein and said that he had been unwell and was going to consult a doctor.

(4)    At around 7:15 pm on 7 September 2026, Mr Kladas telephoned Mr Hussein and said that he had consulted with a doctor and had been instructed to attend hospital urgently. He also said that he had been given a medical certificate by the doctor, Dr Hyungwoo Kim, which was annexed to the affidavit.

(5)    Mr Kladas later informed Mr Hussein that, at around 7:30 pm on 7 September 2026, he consulted a second doctor, Dr Judhyajit Choudhuri, who provided him with another medical certificate, which was also annexed to the affidavit.

(6)    Mr Kladas informed Mr Hussein that he was suffering “continuous atrial fibrillation episodes and hyperventilation”, which was a pre-existing condition that required him to consult a heart specialist.

(7)    At 7:20 am on 8 September 2026, Mr Kladas informed Mr Hussein that he had arranged to see his heart specialist, Dr Queenie Lo, and that the appointment was for the earliest available time. He said that he would be attending Hurstville Heart Centre immediately and was likely to remain there for an extended period, undergoing testing and monitoring.

(8)    At 8:00 am on 8 September 2026, Mr Kladas advised Mr Hussein that he would not be able to appear in Court, as he was with his specialist and his release time was unknown.

18    At the time of the hearing of this application, it appeared or was at least suggested that Mr Kladas remained at Hurstville Heart Centre. Consistently with Mr Hussein’s affidavit, it was suggested that he was likely to remain there for an extended period to undergo testing and monitoring. However, no precise estimate of that period was offered.

Relevant principles

19    The Court’s discretion to grant an adjournment is a matter of practice and procedure, and is to be exercised in the particular circumstances of each case.

20    Of course, courts are, and always have been, conscious of the challenges witnesses may face when giving evidence. Those challenges are exacerbated if the person to give evidence is suffering poor health at the time. In that respect, where a person is medically unfit to attend court or give evidence, it is generally inappropriate to force them to do so for two reasons: firstly, it could exacerbate a health condition; and second, the witness’s evidence might be of a lower quality than what they might otherwise give if they were in good health.

21    Whilst those matters are uncontroversial, it is also notorious that courts are frequently confronted with applications for adjournments of proceedings on the grounds of medical unfitness or incapacity, and it is regrettable that on many occasions the applicant for an adjournment has exaggerated or falsified the state of their alleged unfitness for the purposes of attempting to avoid giving evidence.

22    It is a regular occurrence that applications of this type are accompanied by certificates issued by medical practitioners, which support or purport to support the claimed state of medical unfitness. Consequently, there are now several cases in which courts have considered the circumstances in which an adjournment is appropriate based on such a certification.

23    Relevantly, from those cases, it is well established that courts will only act upon proper and sufficiently detailed medical evidence. As McColl JA observed in Bobolas v Waverley Council (2016) 92 NSWLR 406 at 448 – 449 [221] – [222], a medical certificate which will support the exercise of discretion to adjourn must have certain characteristics:

221    A medical certificate relied upon to demonstrate a litigant is unable to attend court must address the “critical question whether, and if so why, the medical condition would prevent the [litigant] from travelling to the Court and participating effectively in a court hearing.”

222     The appellants’ medical certificates did not address the “critical question”. Further, the volume of motions and affidavits the appellants have filed in the course of these proceedings belies the proposition that they are unable to attend court. Indeed, they demonstrate great attention to detail, not only as to matters of fact, but also as to matters of legal principle and practice.

(Footnotes omitted).

24    Similarly, in UTSG Pty Ltd v Sydney Metro (No 5) [2019] NSWLEC 107, Pepper J observed:

42    While each case turns on its facts, the medical evidence should, at a minimum, answer the central question of why — and not just whether — the medical condition will prevent a litigant from participating in a court hearing either in person or by some other means (for example, by telephone). It is this nexus that is critical.

43     To be sufficient, the medical evidence should identify in broad terms the medical condition that the person is suffering from, the symptoms of that condition insofar as they are relevant to a litigant’s participation in a court hearing, the severity of the condition, and its expected duration. The doctor providing the certificate must be clearly identified and the certificate must be signed and dated.

44     Absent this bare minimum the opposing party cannot, as a matter of fairness, test the cogency of the medical evidence and the Court does not have sufficient information before it to meaningfully exercise its discretion to grant the vacation sought. To the extent that the provision of an appropriately detailed medical certificate to the Court (and to the opposing party) results in a loss of privacy, this is the price that must be paid by a litigant in order for the Court to grant the indulgence of a vacation of hearing dates, a course that a Court does not undertake lightly having regard to the inevitable increased cost to the parties of the delay and the inefficient allocation of Court resources that results.

45    In Bobolas, the appellants appealed against a series of decisions and orders made against them by this Court. One of the appealed decisions is relevant to the present application, namely, a decision by Pain J in Bobolas v Waverley Council (No 3) [2015] NSWLEC 100 to refuse to set aside orders made against the appellants by Sheahan J. The appellants sought to rely on affidavit evidence that they had “defences to council claims, but [they] were too sick to attend the hearing to voice them in any way.” Attached to the affidavit was a number of what purported to be medical certificates relating to each of the three appellants. Only three of the certificates were considered by the Court of Appeal to be relevant to the hearing before Sheahan J (at [210]). The first “certifie[d]” that the author of the certificate (whose name was redacted) had examined the first appellant and that, in the author’s opinion “she was/is suffering from A MEDICAL CONDITION [and] she was/will be unfit for work up to and including 1.5.15.” The remaining two certificates related to the second and third appellants and contained similar language, however, they specified the conditions suffered by the second and third appellants as “CONTUSED L FOOT/ANKLE” and “CELLULITIS FEET”, respectively. Pain J rejected all of the medical certificates as having no probative value.

46     On appeal, McColl JA held that Pain J’s rejection of the certificates was “unexceptionable”. In doing so, she opined that (at [221]):

221    A medical certificate relied upon to demonstrate a litigant is unable to attend court must address the “critical question whether, and if so why, the medical condition would prevent the [litigant] from travelling to the Court and participating effectively in a court hearing.”

47     McColl JA went on to conclude that the appellants’ medical certificates failed to address the “critical question” (at [222]).

48     In Pachkovski, in dismissing an application to adjourn a hearing based on the illness of the three applicants, Hodgson JA stated that (at [4]):

4    Those medical certificates are not in a satisfactory form. They are not supported by any appropriately verified evidence from the doctor. They do not identify the symptoms or the degree of the alleged problem, so as to justify the assertion that the person would be unfit to attend court. They provide a wholly inadequate basis on which the court could be satisfied that there is a compelling reason why this matter, which has for some time been fixed for this date, should not proceed.

49     In this Court, medical evidence tendered in support of an application to vacate hearing dates in Ross (No 13) has been rejected because (at [2]):

2    …The medical certificate does not specify the condition said to render Mr Ross to be unfit to attend the remainder of today's hearing in these proceedings, nor does it specify the nature of the medication and its effects. In addition, no explanation is given in the certificate as to the nexus between the unspecified medical condition Mr Ross is suffering from and his asserted inability to continue representing himself in these proceedings.

50     The difficulties that arise when medical evidence is given in vague and broad terms were summarised in Magjarraj (at [22]):

22    All too frequently judges see cryptic written statements from medical practitioners referring to some undisclosed and undiagnosed “medical condition”, culminating in the assertion that a person is unfit to attend court or unfit for a court hearing. To the extent that such statements are put forward as evidence about the state of the person’s health and the extent to which impaired health may incapacitate a person from participating in court proceedings, the statements fail the most fundamental test for the reception of expert evidence. Bald unexplained and unfathomable statements of that kind must be simply rejected out of hand as evidence of anything.

51     Finally, the Court of Appeal in Woodhouse considered an adjournment application arising from a factual matrix not dissimilar to the present case. There, an application was made by the applicant (a litigant in person) by way of an email to the Registrar attaching letters from the applicant’s treating doctor and a clinical psychologist. In holding not to grant the adjournment the Court determined that (at [23]):

23    The Court was not satisfied that the medical and other material provided by Mr Woodhouse to the Registrar justified an adjournment for reason of any medical condition from which he may suffer. The note from his treating doctor indicates that it would be “ideal” if the hearing of the case were delayed so as to avoid “stressors”. The psychologist’s letter suggests without further elaboration that any attendance by Mr Woodhouse in court would be “ineffective”. Neither, in the Court’s opinion, showed that Mr Woodhouse’s condition in any practical sense would prevent him from attending before the Court to support his current application or that his doing so would exacerbate that condition or otherwise put his health at risk.

Are the medical certificates sufficient?

25    In this case, the medical certificates relied upon by Mr Kladas are attended with some difficulty. As the foregoing authorities make clear, medical certificates are required to set out the condition affecting the person, the symptoms of that condition insofar as they are relevant to the person’s participation in a hearing, the severity of the condition, and the expected period of recovery. The certificates relied upon here fall short of that.

26    The first certificate is from Dr Kim. It was issued on 7 September 2026, apparently after Mr Kladas had been personally served with the consent orders and other documents by Mr Rollins (see supra [12]). The certificate states as follows:

Based on my assessment via telehealth consultation today, I believe Alexander Kladas has atrial fibrillation and hyperventilation and will be unfit to attend work from Monday, 7th September 2026 to Friday, 11th September 2026 inclusive.

27    The lack of clarity of this certificate is immediately apparent. Though it identifies the occurrence of a telehealth consultation and the diagnosis of Mr Kladas as having atrial fibrillation and hyperventilation, it does not discuss the basis for that diagnosis, or the extent of his symptoms. It also does not attempt to identify the connection between the diagnosis and his inability to attend Court for examination. Indeed, the certificate does not mention Mr Kladas’s fitness to attend Court at all; rather, it merely states that he is “unfit to attend work”. In those circumstances, the assertions in Dr Kim’s certificate are insufficient to warrant the granting of an adjournment.

28    To similar effect are the contents of Dr Choudhuri’s certificate, which was also issued on 7 September 2026 and, again, after Mr Kladas was provided with copies of the relevant documents by Mr Rollins. It states:

Based on the information available to me, in my opinion Alexander Kladas is medically unfit and should be allowed absence from 07/09/2026 to 11/09/2026 (inclusive). Unable to perform duties untill [sic] clearance given by heart specialist due to continuous Atrial fibrillation episodes.

29    This certificate is even more vague. It is also somewhat unusual, in that it purports to certify that Mr Kladas is medically unfit for the period 7 September 2026 to 11 September 2026, yet subsequently suggests that he is unable to perform duties until he is given clearance to do so by a heart specialist. That aside, like Dr Kim’s certificate, it also fails to set out the nature and extent of Mr Kladas’s symptoms and, crucially, the reasons why they prevent him from appearing in Court to give evidence. As such, it is insufficient for failing to address and identify any relevant information on which the Court may act.

30    Mr Kladas, by his Counsel, also sought to rely upon the information contained in Mr Hussein’s affidavit relating to the nature and extent of his condition. Though the matters discussed in that affidavit provide some explanation for his non-attendance, they are nonetheless insufficient in the circumstances.

31    In particular, whilst it can be accepted that Mr Kladas informed his solicitor of his pre-existing condition, and that he needed to, and did, consult a heart specialist, it is not apparent from the material that he was urgently required to do so. The evidence did not go so far as to establish that he could not have attended the Hurstville Heart Centre at some time other than when he was due to give evidence, or that it was imperative that he attend on the day that he was required to give evidence, rather than after that. Even allowing for the fact that the affidavit was prepared hastily in the urgent circumstances of this application, the evidence nonetheless does not establish the necessity for Mr Kladas to have attended the heart clinic on 8 September 2026, rather than attend Court in compliance with the summons.

Conclusion

32    In the circumstances, Mr Kladas has failed to establish sufficient justification for any adjournment of his examination summons. There is no need to opine any further as to the veracity of Mr Kladas’s claimed explanations for his non-attendance, though, as Counsel for the liquidator suggested, there is some cause for suspicion. In particular, his explanation for his non-attendance on 7 September 2026 – that he believed he was not required – is curious, to say the least.

33    The application for an adjournment is refused.

The arrest warrant application

34    The second matter for determination is whether a warrant ought to be issued for Mr Kladas’s arrest. This application was heard on an ex parte basis, as Counsel for Mr Kladas appeared only in respect of the adjournment application. It was, however, appropriate to hear the two applications together, given they traversed similar issues.

35    At the outset, it is appropriate to observe that issuing an arrest warrant is a very serious matter. The Court should be cautious in doing so, particularly in circumstances where there is some evidence of the subject experiencing ill health. On the other hand, orders of the Court, including those requiring attendance pursuant to a summons for examination, are not to be disregarded.

36    The power of the Court to issue an arrest warrant is contained in r 11.10(2)(a) of the Federal Court (Corporations) Rules 2000 (Cth), which provides that if, without reasonable cause, a person fails to comply with a summons for examination, the Court may “issue a warrant for the arrest of the person summoned or ordered to attend for examination”.

37    It is well established that authority to issue a warrant under this rule depends on proof of three matters:

(1)    The person has been summoned or ordered by the Court to attend for examination;

(2)    They have failed to attend at the time or place appointed or failed to attend from day to day until the conclusion of the examination; and

(3)    Their failure to attend was without reasonable cause.

(See McKenna (liquidator), in the matter of Raised Pty Ltd (in liq) [2025] FCA 699 [10]; Shute (Liquidator), in the matter of Modliv Pty Ltd (in liq) [2025] FCA 224 [18]; Goyal, in the matter of Biotech Energy Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers appointed) [2023] FCA 653 [34]).

38    In this case, the sole contentious issue is whether Mr Kladas’s failure to attend Court was without reasonable cause. For substantially the same reasons as those given in relation to the adjournment application, the medical certificates relied upon do not establish a reasonable cause for Mr Kladas’s failure to attend. That is particularly so in circumstances where the reason given for his non-attendance on 7 September 2026 was that he believed he was not required to do so. As such, the Court’s discretion to issue a warrant is enlivened.

39    It is now accepted that, upon the Court’s discretion being enlivened, certain matters will attend the question of whether the discretion should be exercised in the circumstances of the case. They were identified by Brereton J in Ian Lawrence Struthers (in his capacity as liquidator) of P.A.C.I. Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 864 at [45] as follows:

45    That is not the end of the matter, because although the conditions for issue of a warrant might be satisfied, the decision to issue a warrant remains a discretionary one. As to the exercise of this discretion, relevant considerations include (1) the prima facie entitlement of a person who has procured the issue of a subpoena or examinations summons which has not been set aside to have it complied with and, if not, enforced; (2) the importance of securing compliance with orders of the Court intended to enable relevant evidence or information to be obtained in the interests of justice; (3) the reasonableness of steps already taken to obtain the co-operative attendance of the examinee or witness and the possibility of securing attendance by less extreme means; and (4) whether the burden imposed by the subpoena or summons is prima facie oppressive.

40    As to the first consideration, the liquidator has sought and obtained an examination summons for Mr Kladas, who was the sole director of the company whose affairs are being investigated. Persons in that position are ordinarily central to the ascertainment of the circumstances surrounding a company’s insolvency. Further, no application was made to set aside the summons, nor is there any prima facie basis upon which it might be set aside.

41    As to the second consideration, Mr Kladas is plainly an important witness for the purposes of the examination. As the sole director of the company in liquidation, he is likely to possess information concerning its affairs that is unavailable from any other source. Indeed, it is difficult to think of a person more important for the purposes of the examination. Accordingly, securing his attendance is of particular importance to the effective conduct of the examination and to the administration of the winding up.

42    As to the third consideration, there is no doubt that attempts have been made to secure Mr Kladas’s cooperation to attend to give evidence. Those efforts include the orders made by consent adjourning the 7 September 2026 examination to the following day.

43    Finally, as to the fourth consideration, the evidence of Mr Kladas’s health is of some concern as it suggests that compliance with the summons might be burdensome in his present circumstances. However, whilst that might be so, for the reasons given in relation to the adjournment application, there is insufficient evidence on which it might be concluded with sufficient confidence that he is medically unfit to attend Court. On the available material, the extent of his purported ill health does not outweigh the other considerations in favour of an arrest warrant being issued.

44    In those circumstances, it is appropriate to grant the liquidator’s application and issue a warrant for the arrest of Mr Kladas. Orders will be made in the form provided in draft by the liquidator.

Costs

45    The liquidator also seeks an order that Mr Kladas pay his costs. That is appropriate, in circumstances where the catalyst for the issuing of the arrest warrant was Mr Kladas’s non-attendance without reasonable justification. As such, the appropriate order is that Mr Kladas pay the liquidator’s costs of and incidental to the attendances on 7 and 8 September 2026, and of this application, as agreed or taxed, and that such costs be payable forthwith.

Note

46    These are the amended and revised reasons for judgment given on 8 September 2026. Whilst the reasons given above refine and develop those that were delivered ex tempore, the substance of what was said that day has not been changed nor has any other material change been made.

Postscript

47    It is noted that the warrant for Mr Kladas’s arrest was subsequently discharged by this Court on the basis that he appeared and gave evidence at the public examination on 9 September 2026.

Associate:    

Dated:    14 September 2026