Federal Court of Australia

Storry, in the matter of an application by Storry [2026] FCA 1302

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The application for leave to institute proceedings to set aside the order in QUD 18 of 2025 made on 19 March 2025 is refused.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

LONGBOTTOM J:

1    The applicant (Ms Storry) is prohibited from instituting any proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia, without making an application for leave in accordance with s 37AR of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth): Storry v Parkyn (Vexatious Proceedings Order) [2024] FCAFC 100; (2024) 304 FCR 318.

2    On 19 March 2025, Ms Storry was refused leave under s 37AR of the Act to institute proceedings in relation to two matters (QUD 8 of 2025 and QUD 18 of 2025): Storry, in the matter of Storry [2025] FCA 231 (O’Sullivan J) (refusal order). Ms Storry sought leave in QUD 8 of 2025 to file a stay application pursuant to s 52(3) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) and to set side certain decisions associated with a sequestration order and the vexatious proceedings order made in Storry v Parkyn. Ms Storry sought leave in QUD 18 of 2025 to file a stay application pursuant to s 52(3) of the Bankruptcy Act and set aside on appeal the decision of Rangiah J in Storry v Clout [2024] FCA 1274. In Storry v Clout, Rangiah J summarily dismissed an originating application by Ms Storry to replace her trustee in bankruptcy and dismissed her interlocutory applications for an injunction and the preservation of property and for discovery.

3    Ms Storry now seeks leave under s 37AR of the Act to apply to set aside the refusal order in QUD 18 of 2025, so that she can bring an application to appeal the decision in Storry v Clout (proposed application). The proposed application is to be brought pursuant to r 39.05(c) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) and “in consideration of the jurisdiction reliant on” Praljak v Office of the Australian Information Commissioner [2025] FCAFC 126; (2025) 311 FCR 178. Rule 39.05(c) confers power on the Court to vary or set aside an order after it has been entered if it is interlocutory.

4    The Court must dismiss an application under s 37AR of the Act if it considers that the proceeding is a “vexatious proceeding”: Act, s 37AS(2). The Court may dismiss the application without an oral hearing, either with or without the consent of the applicant: Act, s 37AS(3).

5    A “vexatious proceeding” is defined by s 37AM of the Act in non-exhaustive terms. The meaning of the expression is well traversed in the authorities: see, eg, Ferdinands v Registrar Cridland [2021] FCA 592 at [27]-[31] (White J) and Prior v South West Aboriginal Land and Sea Council Aboriginal Corporation [2020] FCA 808 at [38] (McKerracher J). Of present relevance, a proceeding will be “vexatious” if it is “instituted or pursued without reasonable cause” or is “so obviously untenable or manifestly groundless as to be utterly hopeless”: Ferdinands at [28] and Prior at [38].

6    I consider the proposed application to be so obviously untenable or manifestly groundless as to be utterly hopeless such that it is a vexatious proceeding within the meaning of the Act. That is for three reasons.

7    First, the refusal order is not an “interlocutory order” such that the Court has power under r 39.05(c) of the Rules to set it aside. Rather, the refusal order is a final order because its legal effect was to finally determine the rights of Ms Storry in relation to her application for leave under s 37AR of the Act to institute proceedings in, relevantly, QUD 18 of 2025: Re an appeal by Luck [2003] HCA 70; (2003) 203 ALR 1 at [4] (McHugh ACJ, Gummow and Heydon JJ). The proposed application under r 39.05(c) is, therefore, obviously untenable because the rule is not engaged.

8    Second, Praljak provides no discernible basis for the proposed application. The issue in that case was the competence of an application for leave to appeal an order dismissing an application to extend the time within which to institute judicial review proceedings: at [12]. That required consideration of s 24(1AA)(a) and s 20(3)(b) of the Act, which provide that an appeal must not be brought from a judgment that is a determination of an application for an extension of time within which to institute proceedings in the Court. The Full Court (Mortimer CJ, Colvin and Thawley JJ) held that their combined operation was such that there was no statutory right of appeal and the proposed appeal was not competent: at [12], [61] and [64]. The proposed application in reliance on Praljak is, therefore, manifestly groundless because the decision neither concerns an application for leave under s 37AR of the Act, nor supports, by analogy, the contention that the Court otherwise has jurisdiction to set aside the refusal order.

9    Third, even if the Court did have power under r 39.05(c) of the Rules to set aside the refusal order, the proposed application is so obviously untenable as to be utterly hopeless. To set aside an interlocutory order of a substantive nature, it is ordinarily necessary to demonstrate some change in circumstances, new evidence that was not able to be given previously, or other circumstances that are exceptional or otherwise of such a nature that justice requires the interlocutory relief to be revisited: Waterproofing Technologies Pty Limited v Perri (No 3) [2025] FCA 934 at [20] (Moore J) and the authorities there cited. The proposed application does not satisfy any of those criteria. It is brought on the basis of an asserted miscarriage of justice by reason of errors of law made by Rangiah J in Storry v Clout and O’Sullivan J in in the matter of Storry. While framed as errors of law, the grounds of the proposed application do not propound any such errors. Rather, they reiterate arguments made before O’Sullivan J regarding Storry v Clout which his Honour found to be “completely without merit”: in the matter of Storry at [34]. It would be inimical to the policy considerations in favour of the finality of litigation to set aside the refusal order in relation to QUD 18 of 2025 on those grounds: cf, Act, s 22 and Perri (No 3) at [18], citing Brimaud v Honeysett Instant Print Pty Ltd (1988) 217 ALR 44 at 46 (McLelland J) and Pivotel Satellite Pty Ltd v Optus Mobile Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 121 at [26] (Jagot J).

10    It follows that the application for leave to institute the proposed proceeding must be refused: Act, s 37AS(2).

Associate:

Dated: 4 September 2026