Federal Court of Australia

Reynolds v State of Western Australia [2026] FCA 1297

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The proceedings are dismissed pursuant to s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).

2.    The applicant is to pay the first and second respondents' costs to be taxed if not agreed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

VANDONGEN J:

1    By an originating application the applicant, Kellan John Reynolds, seeks injunctive relief against the first respondent, the State of Western Australia, and the second respondent, the Commissioner of Police for Western Australia (together, the respondents), restraining them from taking any further steps in criminal proceedings in the Magistrates Court of Western Australia (criminal proceedings). Mr Reynolds also seeks interlocutory injunctive relief.

2    For completeness, Mr Reynolds originally sought the relief outlined above against the Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia (DPP) as the third respondent. On 20 April 2026, at the first case management hearing, the respondents sought an order that the DPP be removed as a party to the proceedings. At the conclusion of that case management hearing, and after hearing submissions from the parties, I concluded it was appropriate to make an order pursuant to r 9.08 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (Rules) removing the DPP as a party to these proceedings.

3    The respondents seek summary judgment against Mr Reynolds pursuant to s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act) and r 26.01 of the Rules on the grounds that:

(1)    Mr Reynolds has no reasonable prospect of prosecuting the proceeding or part of the proceeding;

(2)    the proceeding is frivolous or vexatious;

(3)    no reasonable cause of action is disclosed; and/or

(4)    the proceeding is an abuse of the process of the Court.

4    For the following reasons the respondents' application for summary judgment must be allowed and judgment must be given for the respondents against Mr Reynolds.

Background

5    In the criminal proceedings, Mr Reynolds is charged in the Magistrates Court of Western Australia with the offence of '[n]o authority to drive (disqualified from holding or obtaining)', contrary to subss (1)(a) and (3)(b) of s 49 of the Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA). It is alleged that he drove a motor vehicle on a road while not authorised under Pt 2 of the Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Act 2008 (WA), and at the time of driving was disqualified from holding or obtaining an Australian driver's licence of a kind required, other than as a result of the operation of the penalty enforcement laws as described in s 49(9) of the Road Traffic Act. It is alleged that Mr Reynolds was disqualified from driving on 8 July 2024 due to him having driven whilst his driver's licence was suspended, and that his driver's licence was subject to 21 active fine suspensions, meaning that there was no current end date to that disqualification.

6    In his originating application, Mr Reynolds claims injunctive relief pursuant to s 23 of the FCA Act and 'in aid of the Court's jurisdiction under ss 39B(1) and/or 39B(1A)(a) - (b) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)'. In essence, Mr Reynolds seeks an injunction restraining the respondents from taking any further steps in the criminal proceedings until further order. According to the terms of the originating application, the grounds on which Mr Reynolds seeks relief are stated in 'the statement of claim, accompanying affidavit or other document prescribed by the Rules'. However, Mr Reynolds has not filed a statement of claim. Instead, Mr Reynolds relies on two affidavits.

7    The first affidavit on which Mr Reynolds relies was affirmed by him on 12 March 2026. In that affidavit he says that the criminal proceedings concern the 'same underlying controversy as constitutional and jurisdictional issues raised in related proceedings', namely, proceedings in this Court concerning the refusal by registrars to accept certain documents for filing, as well as other proceedings in the Supreme Court of Western Australia and the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The proceedings in this Court to which Mr Reynolds referred are WAD 20 of 2026 and WAD 75 of 2026. In those matters, applications for judicial review of decisions made by registrars of this Court to refuse to accept certain documents for filing were dismissed: Reynolds v Stewart [2026] FCA 1291.

8    Mr Reynolds also says that he has issued notices under s 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) 'in relation to the controversy (including in State proceedings), and Attorney-General responses have been received'. He says that if the criminal charge that he faces proceeds to trial while related federal proceedings remain unresolved there is a real risk of:

(1)    prejudice, including the risk of conviction while he contends that 'constitutional and jurisdictional issues remain unresolved';

(2)    'duplicative and inconsistent determinations across courts'; and

(3)    'practical prejudice and hardship caused by repeated long-distance travel and the uncertainty of relisted trial dates'.

Mr Reynolds says that he is not asking this Court to determine his guilt or innocence but only to preserve the status quo while 'related federal proceedings are determined'.

9    The second affidavit on which Mr Reynolds relies was affirmed by him on 11 May 2026. In that affidavit, Mr Reynolds sought to explain why he was seeking injunctive relief and respond to an affidavit filed by the respondents in support of their application for summary judgment. Mr Reynolds also confirmed that the federal proceedings to which he referred in his first affidavit were WAD 20 of 2026 and WAD 75 of 2026.

10    In support of their application for summary judgment, the respondents rely on an affidavit of Tiffany Danuta Wells affirmed on 6 May 2026.

Consideration of the respondents' application for summary judgment

11    The principles that must be applied in the context of an application for summary judgment are well settled.

12    Section 31A(2) of the FCA Act provides that:

[t]he Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if:

(a)    the first party is defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and

(b)    the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding.

13    Rule 26.01(1) of the Rules relevantly provides that a party may apply to the Court for an order that judgment be given against another party because:

(1)    the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or part of the proceeding;

(2)    the proceeding is frivolous or vexatious;

(3)    no reasonable cause of action is disclosed; or

(4)    the proceeding is an abuse of the process of the Court.

14    Further, the relevant principles were summarised by Hill J in KTW25 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FCA 1391 at [27] to [30], which I gratefully adopt:

The principles governing s 31A were summarised as follows in Sayed v Salvation Army Housing [2023] FCA 526 at [45] (O'Callaghan J) (which was adopted in Scordo v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2024] FCA 359 at [45] (Button J)):

•    The essential requirement for an order under s 31A or r 26.01 is that the Court be satisfied that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the claim. This is a lower standard than the previous 'hopeless' or 'bound to fail' standard.

•    Summary judgment is available when well-established propositions of law deny the prospect of success.

•    On the other hand, summary dismissal is a serious step taken only with great care and if the Court is confident that there is no reasonable prospect of success.

The exercise of power under s 31A(2) should be used with caution, particularly where complex questions of fact or law are involved: Upaid Systems Ltd v Telstra Corporation Limited [2016] FCAFC 158 at [48] (the Court). At the same time, if the version of the facts asserted by the party resisting the motion is either so improbable, or fanciful, or trifling, or implausible, or tenuous then summary judgment must be granted: Fair Work Ombudsman v Austrend International Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 171; (2018) 273 IR 439 at [20] (Gilmour J); B&K Holdings (Qld) Pty Ltd v Garmin Australasia Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 64; (2019) 134 ACSR 404 at [17] (Derrington J); Australian Communications and Media Authority v V Marketing Pty Ltd (in liq) [2020] FCA 1326 at [49] (Collier J); PlayUp Limited v Mintas [2022] FCA 892 at [65] (Markovic J).

Scordo establishes the following propositions about the other tests for summary dismissal in r 26.01(1)(b) and (c) of the Rules:

•    A proceeding is 'frivolous' if the cause of action lacks substance or is groundless or fanciful, or where a party is trifling with the court or wasting its time. A proceeding is 'vexatious' if it is without foundation, cannot succeed or is brought for an ulterior and collateral purpose: Scordo at [48], and the cases cited.

•    A proceeding will disclose 'no reasonable cause of action' if it is so obviously untenable that it cannot succeed: Scordo at [49]; or if the originating application simply makes 'bare demands' without articulating the legal bases for the claims: Sayed at [46](a).

In Scordo, Button J made two general points worth emphasising. First, the Court's power to give judgment under s 31A does not involve 'mere pleading points' but is concerned with substance: Scordo at [42]. Second, the Court's resources are finite, and s 31A confers power on the Court to avoid the waste of those resources. While granting summary judgment is a serious matter as it brings to an end a litigant's ability to pursue claims to trial, the Court should not shy away from exercising its powers in an appropriate case: Scordo at [53].

15    I would allow the respondents' application for summary judgment for the following three reasons.

16    Firstly, and most significantly, no cause of action is disclosed in either Mr Reynolds' originating application or in either of his affidavits filed in these proceedings. Instead, Mr Reynolds' application for injunctive relief is freestanding and untethered to any underlying claim, let alone a claim in respect of which this Court may have jurisdiction. Mr Reynolds' application and affidavits simply make 'bare demands' without articulating any legal basis for a claim for injunctive relief. Further, no legal basis for that relief emerges from the materials before the Court. Accordingly, while summary dismissal is a serious step taken only with great care, the application plainly has no reasonable prospect of success and is frivolous.

17    Secondly, and in any event, the respondents are not parties to the criminal proceedings in respect of which Mr Reynolds seeks injunctive relief. According to the copy of the prosecution notice that is annexed to Ms Wells' affidavit, the person who issued that notice is a police officer, who has not been joined as a party to these proceedings.

18    Thirdly, as I have now dismissed WAD 20 of 2026 and WAD 75 of 2026, and they are therefore no longer pending, the purported basis for Mr Reynolds' application for injunctive relief in this Court falls away: see Reynolds v Stewart.

Conclusion

19    For these reasons, judgment must be given for the respondents pursuant to s 31A(2) of the FCA Act, and Mr Reynolds must pay the respondents' costs.

Associate:

Dated:    2 September 2026