Federal Court of Australia

Reeve v Fair Work Commission (No 2) [2026] FCA 1295

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The applicant pay the fourth and fifth respondents’ costs of the applicant’s application for the recusal of Justice Meagher as agreed or taxed.

2.    The Court determines that it will not issue a referral certificate under r 4.12 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MEAGHER J

introduction

1    This is an application by the fourth and fifth respondents for the costs of the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025) brought by the applicant in this matter, Mr Reeve. At the end of the hearing of the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025), the fourth and fifth respondents’ solicitor indicated that he had instructions to be heard on the costs of the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025). On 27 March 2026, I ordered that the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025) be dismissed and made orders that the parties file and serve written submissions on costs, with the question of costs to be determined on the papers thereafter: Reeve v Fair Work Commission [2026] FCA 368 (Recusal Judgment (QUD648/2025)). The definitions used in this judgment mirror those used in the Recusal Judgment (QUD648/2025).

2    The fourth and fifth respondents seek their costs of the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025) and rely on their written submissions filed on 1 April 2026. The applicant opposes this position and relies on an affidavit affirmed on 2 April 2026, which he clarified he wanted to be treated as his submissions in relation to costs.

3    On 27 April 2026, I directed the Court Registry to invite the parties to file further submissions addressing the application of s 570 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) to this proceeding. The Court Registry’s email included the following:

I refer to the above matter and to her Honour’s orders of 27 March 2026, in which the applicant and the fourth and fifth respondents were ordered to file and serve written submissions with respect to the costs of the applicant’s recusal application. I note that the applicant and the fourth and fifth respondents did not specifically address s 570 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) in their submissions.

The applicant and the fourth and fifth respondents are invited to make submissions in relation to the application of s 570 of the FW Act to this proceeding of not more than 2 pages in length. … Her Honour will determine the issue of costs on the papers thereafter.

(Original emphasis.)

4    On 28 April 2026, rather than filing submissions, the applicant filed a document identified as an affidavit, which was in the nature of submissions. Therefore, I treated this document as the applicant’s further submissions on costs. On 5 May 2026, the fourth and fifth respondents filed their further submissions on costs.

5    On 12 May 2026, the applicant filed an application for extension of time and leave to appeal (Leave Application (QUD648/2025)) in respect of the Recusal Judgment (QUD648/2025). By email from the Court Registry dated 13 May 2026, the parties were advised that no further steps would be taken in this proceeding pending the outcome of the Leave Application (QUD648/2025). The applicant had also, on 10 May 2026, filed an application for leave to appeal from the judgment dismissing the Recusal Application (QUD551/2025) (Leave Application (QUD551/2025)).

6    The Leave Application (QUD648/2025) and the Leave Application (QUD551/2025) were heard before Lee J on 23 July 2026. His Honour made orders dismissing the Leave Applications: Reeve v Fair Work Commission (Leave to Appeal from Refusal of Disqualification) [2026] FCA 1041. No appeal lies to the High Court in respect of the decision of Lee J, by operation of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act): see s 33(4B)(a), together with s 25(2), of that act. However I note, in any case, that the applicant did not seek to make any application for special leave to appeal to the High Court (which, if made, would be incompetent: see QYFM v Minister for Immigration [2024] HCASL 94 at [2]), and the time for doing so has expired pursuant to r 41.02.01 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth). Therefore, I will now proceed to determine the issue of the costs of the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025).

principles

Section 570 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) constrains the award of costs

7    Section 43 of the FCA Act grants the Court a wide discretion to award costs in a proceeding. However, s 43 of the FCA Act is subject to s 570 of the FW Act, which provides as follows:

570  Costs only if proceedings instituted vexatiously etc.

(1)     A party to proceedings (including an appeal) in a court (including a court of a State or Territory) in relation to a matter arising under this Act may be ordered by the court to pay costs incurred by another party to the proceedings only in accordance with subsection (2) or section 569 or 569A.

…

(2)     The party may be ordered to pay the costs only if:

(a)     the court is satisfied that the party instituted the proceedings vexatiously or without reasonable cause; or

(b)     the court is satisfied that the party’s unreasonable act or omission caused the other party to incur the costs; or

(c)     the court is satisfied of both of the following:

(i)     the party unreasonably refused to participate in a matter before the FWC;

(ii)     the matter arose from the same facts as the proceedings.

8    The substantive proceeding is an application for an extension of time under r 31.02 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (Rules) for the applicant to file the originating application for judicial review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act) in respect of decisions of the first respondent, the Fair Work Commission. While the applicant’s originating application for judicial review is under the ADJR Act, the rights he seeks to enforce are rights contained in the FW Act. Therefore, the proceeding is a proceeding “in relation to a matter arising under” the FW Act: see Twomey v Que 5 Pty Ltd (No 2) [2023] FCA 1481 at [1] – [6] (Jackson J), read with Twomey v Que 5 Pty Ltd [2023] FCA 1155 at [2] (Jackson J); Martires v Endura Paint Pty Ltd (No 3) [2021] FCA 314 at [4] (Jackson J); Baker v Patrick Projects Pty Ltd (No 2) [2014] FCAFC 166; 145 ALD 548 at [1] – [3] (Dowsett, Tracey and Katzmann JJ). To the extent that any of the above-cited cases relate to applications for judicial review under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), I consider that the cases are sufficiently analogous to the present, such that s 570 of the FW Act also applies to the issue of costs in relation to an application for judicial review sought to be made under the ADJR Act of a decision of the Fair Work Commission. However, nothing in this judgment should be taken to prejudge the appropriateness of bringing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Fair Work Commission under the ADJR Act.

9    Section 570(1) of the FW Act “operates as an express limitation on the Court’s broad discretion to award costs” under s 43 of the FCA Act, but this limitation does not apply if one or more of the criteria in s 570(2) of the FW Act are satisfied: United Firefighters’ Union of Australia v Fire Rescue Victoria [2025] FCAFC 7 at [20] (Katzmann, Snaden and Shariff JJ). The limitation in s 570 operates “to provide access to justice by ensuring that the fear of an adverse costs order does not discourage litigants from pursuing good claims”: Mutch v ISG Management Pty Ltd (No 2) [2020] FCA 954 at [7] (Bromberg J), citing Trustee for the MTGI Trust v Johnston (No 2) [2016] FCAFC 190 at [8] (Siopis, Collier and Katzmann JJ). However, s 570 of the FW Act does not preclude costs being awarded against a claimant for at least such part of a proceeding as has been unreasonably pursued: Tomvald v Toll Transport Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 1208 at [315] (Flick J).

10    Where one or more of the preconditions of s 570(2) is satisfied, the Court should not award costs except in a “clear case”: Saxena v PPF Asset Management Ltd [2011] FCA 395 at [6] (Lee J).

Submissions

11    The fourth and fifth respondents’ broad submissions are as follows:

(1)    The applicant brought the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025) unreasonably. The fourth and fifth respondents point to the fact that the applicant made complaints without evidentiary foundation or logical basis and pursued “nonsensical arguments” which misunderstood the Court’s role in adversarial proceedings.

(2)    Relying on QS Holdings Sarl v Paul’s Retail Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 1038 at [33], the fourth and fifth respondents, as the successful litigants in the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025), were entitled to costs under the ordinary rule that “costs … follow the event”.

(3)    Relying on James v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (No 2) [2015] FCA 599 at [16] – [17], as respondents who have successfully resisted an interlocutory application, the costs of the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025) should be awarded to the fourth and fifth respondents, rather than being costs in the cause.

(4)    The fourth and fifth respondents’ position is consistent with r 40.04(a) of the Rules.

12    The fourth and fifth respondents’ position in their further written submissions does not explicitly address whether s 570 of the FW Act applies. However, they address s 570(2)(a) and (b) of the FW Act.

13    First, the fourth and fifth respondents’ position is that the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025) was brought without reasonable cause, for the reasons summarised above at [11](1). Further, the respondents refer to the following cases: Reeve v PKF (Gold Coast) HR Services Pty Ltd [2024] FWC 2776 at [16] – [24], Reeve v PKF (Gold Coast) HR Services Pty Ltd [2024] FWCFB 434 at [19], Reeve v PKF (Gold Coast) HR Services Pty Ltd [2023] FWC 1565 at [6] and Reeve v PKF (Gold Coast) HR Services Pty Ltd [2023] FWCFB 153 at [49]. The fourth and fifth respondents point to the fact of the applicant at least raising allegations of bias against the relevant decision-makers, if not making formal applications for recusal in those matters. The fourth and fifth respondents further point to Reeve v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2026] QIRC 113, in which the applicant brought an application for the recusal of the decision-maker in that matter on 13 March 2026: at [9].

14    The fourth and fifth respondents’ submission is that the applicant is or ought be aware of the “requirements that must be established for determining an application for recusal”. In this regard, the fourth and fifth respondents note that he was “previously forewarned” that a reasonable lay observer would not draw the connections sought to be established in this case, “particularly in circumstances where it was the first time that the decision-maker had encountered such parties to legal proceedings”. On this basis, the fourth and fifth respondents contend that the applicant “continues to bring applications for recusal vexatiously and without reasonable cause”.

15    Second, the fourth and fifth respondents submit that the applicant’s actions throughout the hearing of the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025) have unreasonably caused the fourth and fifth respondents to incur unnecessary costs. In this regard, they submit that the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025) was unnecessary. Additionally, they relevantly submit, relying on Messenger v Commonwealth of Australia (Represented by the Department of Finance) (No 2) [2023] FCA 20 at [67], that his conduct in the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025), including correspondence contravening the Correspondence Orders (QUD648/2025) which has “often been scandalous, and at times lengthy”, has increased the costs incurred by the fourth and fifth respondents. I take their submissions to be to the effect that the voluminous and prolix nature of the applicant’s material has caused the fourth and fifth respondents to incur greater costs than they otherwise would have, had the applicant’s material clearly presented the basis for his application.

16    The applicant’s broad submissions are as follows:

(1)    The fourth and fifth respondents’ characterisation that the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025) was “wholly unsuccessful” and “pursued … ‘unreasonably’” is incorrect. Rather, the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025) raised “legitimate issues”, was brought about by the “conduct of other parties” and was supported by the evidence and the applicant’s genuine concern and experience.

(2)    The matter raised concerns regarding the applicant’s procedural advantage and non-disclosure of evidence similar to those raised in the Recusal Judgment (QUD648/2025).

(3)    The fourth and fifth respondents caused the costs to be incurred by way of “[i]nconsistent and disputed material”, “[l]ack of clarity and disclosure” and “[c]ontested representations”.

(4)    The Recusal Judgment (QUD648/2025) acknowledged the matter’s procedural complexity, supporting the applicant’s concerns about whether his evidence had been filed, considered and whether relevant material was being made available to him.

(5)    For a costs order to be awarded, an application must be found to be “frivolous”, “vexatious” or “brought for an improper purpose”. A mere dismissal does not justify a costs order.

(6)    A costs order should not be awarded in a recusal case, where issues of “[j]udicial impartiality”, “[p]rocedural fairness” and “[i]ntegrity of the process”, which are “fundamental issues”, are raised.

(7)    The Court should exercise its discretion in the interests of justice and avoid “[p]enalis[ing] legitimate concerns”, “[d]iscourag[ing] raising fairness issues” and “[u]ndermin[ing] confidence in the process”.

17    The applicant relies on his previously filed written submissions on costs, as well as his further submissions. In his further submissions, the applicant submits that no order for costs should be made. The applicant refers to the “[p]rotective [s]tandard” under s 570 of the FW Act, and submits that neither of s 570(2)(a) nor (b) is satisfied.

18    First, in reference to s 570(2)(a) of the FW Act, the applicant submits that the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025) was not vexatious or without reasonable cause. In the applicant’s submission, it was supported “by affidavit evidence and arose from genuine concerns”. The applicant submits that the Court’s reasons in the Recusal Judgment accord with his concerns that, in his words, he “repeatedly raised difficulties understanding procedural requirements and sought clarification in good faith”, and that it had recorded his explanation of “significant personal and financial strain caused by the proceedings, his inability to secure representation, and repeated difficulties filing material”. The applicant submits that the above matters are inconsistent with vexatious conduct, instead demonstrating a “self-represented litigant attempting to comply in difficult circumstances”.

19    Second, the applicant submits that no unreasonable act or omission caused the fourth and fifth respondents to incur their costs. In the applicant’s submission, the fourth and fifth respondents chose to actively oppose the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025) and pursue costs, and that such costs were “part of ordinary contested litigation” and not caused by his misconduct. The applicant submits that there was “no failure to attend without explanation, no abuse of process, and no deliberate non-compliance”.

20    Third, the applicant submits that there has been genuine uncertainty as to whether documents were accepted, how they were to be characterised and whether they were before the Court, supporting his concern about procedural uncertainty and the need for interlocutory applications and responses. In this context, and in the context of the Court’s recognition that litigants in person may “imperfectly express legitimate concerns”, he submits that “genuine applications” are not “unreasonable conduct”.

consideration

The fourth and fifth respondents are entitled to their costs of the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025)

21    I consider that the bringing of the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025) by the applicant was an “unreasonable act” which caused the fourth and fifth respondents to incur costs within the meaning of s 570(2)(b) and that the Court should exercise its discretion to award costs to the fourth and fifth respondents.

22    The word “unreasonable” is not capable of precise definition and is “inherently sensitive to context”: Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (the costs of the Cup of Tea Case) [2019] FCAFC 36 at [18] (Flick, Reeves and O’Callaghan JJ). In Patrick Stevedores Holdings Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union (No 5) [2021] FCA 1645, Lee J at [6] summarised the relevant principles that apply to s 570(2)(b) of the FW Act, albeit in a case concerning failures to accept offers of compromise. There, his Honour held that “unreasonable” does not equate to “exceptional”: at [6]. Further, relying on Tomvald at [315], Lee J considered that the Court should “scrutinise the manner in which proceedings … are conducted to ensure that” (1) costs are not unreasonably incurred and (2) that the public interest in the orderly and cost-effective administration of justice is not too readily put to one side: at [6]. Finally, his Honour noted that a lack of compliance with ss 37M and 37N of the FCA Act will inform the assessment of whether one of the preconditions for the exercise of the costs discretion mandated by s 570 of the FW Act exists: at [6]. His Honour affirmed the following statement of Mortimer J in Ryan v Primesafe [2015] FCA 8; 323 ALR 107 at [66]:

Section 570, and the conditions it imposes on the Court’s general costs discretion under s 43 of the [FCA Act], is not a licence to parties to ignore the requirements of s 37M of the [FCA Act], nor the Court’s power to order costs against parties who fail to comply with their obligations under s 37N. The content of ss 37M and 37N, and parties’ obligations to assist the Court in achieving the objectives set out in s 37M, must be reconciled with access to justice provisions such as s 570(1). That reconciliation occurs through a focus on the reasonableness of parties’ conduct, the appropriateness of the Court processes undertaken by them, the timeliness of their compliance with Court orders or steps in the proceeding, and the existence of a substantive legal and factual basis for the claims made and arguments put.

(Emphasis added.)

23    I accept the fourth and fifth respondents’ submissions that the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025) was without evidentiary foundation or logical basis and that the applicant was “wholly unsuccessful”. I reject the applicant’s submission that the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025) was brought reasonably and further consider that the applicant has provided no evidence that the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025) was brought about or caused by other parties, including the fourth and fifth respondents. Additionally, the mere facts of (1) asserted procedural complexity, (2) concerns about whether evidence had been filed and considered and (3) concerns about whether relevant material was being provided, were not reasonable grounds for bringing the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025). As noted in [21] – [27], [35] – [37], [88] – [89], [93], [97] and [101] of the Recusal Judgment, these asserted bases for the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025) were largely the product of the applicant’s misunderstandings of the filing requirements or the Court’s role in this proceeding, and had no connection to me.

24    As already found in the Recusal Judgment (QUD648/2025), the applicant:

(1)    Made bare assertions comprising serious allegations of alleged conflicts of interest, corruption and collusion between my Chambers and the respondents with no evidentiary foundation: Recusal Judgment (QUD648/2025) at [84], [99] – [100].

(2)    Fundamentally misunderstood the Court’s practices, procedures and attempts to assist him in filing his material: see Recusal Judgment (QUD648/2025) at [86] – [89], [92] – [93], [96] – [97].

25    The applicant has not since the Recusal Judgment (QUD648/2025) shown how, in his submission, the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025) was based on “documentary evidence available to” him. Further, though the applicant submits that the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025) was based on a “genuine and reasonable concern that [he] would not receive a fair and impartial hearing”, the relevant question is an objective one: see Zirk-Sadowski v University of New South Wales (No 4) [2024] FCA 813 at [12] (Anderson J). Even if this submission may reflect the applicant’s sincere belief, the purpose of s 570 of the Act “is not to provide protection for a party who is incapable of perceiving the manifest hopelessness of the party’s claims”: Kennedy v Secretary, Department of Industry (No 4) [2017] FCAFC 7 at [11] (Flick, Jagot and Bromwich JJ). For completeness, I note that the two abovementioned cases were decided primarily in the context of s 570(2)(a) of the FW Act (i.e., whether the relevant proceeding was instituted vexatiously or without reasonable cause). However, I consider that the statements of principle as to the relevant standard of reasonableness are equally applicable to s 570(2)(b) of the FW Act. On no objective assessment of the facts preceding the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025) outlined at [1] – [49] of the Recusal Judgment (QUD648/2025), could it be said that the bringing of the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025) was not an unreasonable act.

26    The fact of unreasonableness is highlighted by the fact that the applicant has previously made allegations of bias, which the relevant decision-maker has rejected, and in doing so, has set out the legal tests and their application when it is sought to establish that a decision-maker should recuse themselves: see Reeve v PKF (Gold Coast) HR Services Pty Ltd [2023] FWCFB 153 at [25] – [32], Reeve v PKF (Gold Coast) HR Services Pty Ltd [2024] FWC 2776 at [11] – [24] and Reeve v PKF (Gold Coast) HR Services Pty Ltd [2024] FWCFB 434 at [19].

27    In these circumstances, the fact of the applicant’s asserted genuine concern in relation to whether his material was properly before the Court, and his difficulty understanding the Court’s processes, do not deprive the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025) of its character as an “unreasonable act” because, by virtue of the authorities referred to immediately above, I take it that he is generally aware of the requirements for establishing that a decision-maker should recuse themselves. Thus, he would have been aware that his asserted concerns did not satisfy the tests for actual or apprehended bias. However, I accept for completeness that the recusal application in Reeve v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2026] QIRC 113 was made after the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025), and so the judgment in that matter insofar as it explains to the applicant the test for actual or apprehended bias is not relevant to assessing whether the applicant bringing the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025) constituted an unreasonable act.

28    In the context of the lack of evidence in support of the grounds of the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025), I consider that the applicant’s action in making the application was an unreasonable act. While I accept the general proposition that s 570 of the FW Act operates in such a way that applicants are not deterred from bringing applications by the prospect of adverse costs orders, the authorities referred to above indicate that the protection afforded by s 570 of the FW Act must be reconciled with the broader administration of justice in the manner set out in ss 37M and 37N of the FCA Act. As already found, there was no substantive legal or factual basis for the claims articulated in the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025), a factor which weighs strongly towards the applicant’s conduct in bringing that application constituting an unreasonable act.

29    I accept that the fourth and fifth respondents have incurred costs in responding to, and appearing at the hearing of, the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025). I do not accept the applicant’s submissions that the fourth and fifth respondents “chose to actively oppose the recusal application and pursue costs”, such that costs are “part of ordinary contested litigation”, rather than costs “caused by the misconduct of the Applicant”. I note that the applicant has been on notice that the fourth and fifth respondents might resist the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025) since as early as 17 February 2026, when orders were made timetabling the filing and serving of materials in that application.

30    Thus, the discretion to award costs under s 570(2)(b) of the FW Act is enlivened. I consider this to be a “clear case” of unreasonableness where the discretion to award costs should be exercised.

31    The applicant is not correct in saying that recusal applications form a special class of case in respect of which costs should not be awarded. Examples exist of recusal cases where costs orders are made against the unsuccessful applicant: see, e.g., Masi-Haini v Minister for Home Affairs [2023] FCAFC 126; 298 FCR 277 (Markovic, Meagher and Kennett JJ); Dunstan v Orr [2022] FCA 1006 (Wigney J); De Varda v Scott in his capacity as the trustee of the bankrupt estate of de Varda (Recusal application) [2022] FCA 170 (Rares J).

32    In relation to the applicant’s submission that a mere dismissal does not justify a costs order, to the extent that it relates to s 570 of the FW Act, this is accepted; however, an award of costs does not depend on the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025) being found to be “frivolous”, “vexatious” or “brought for an improper purpose”. Section 570(2)(b) grants a discretion to award costs where one party’s “unreasonable act … caused the other party to incur the costs”. As already explained, I consider that the discretion is enlivened and should be exercised here.

33    As to the applicant’s submission that the Court should consider the interests of justice and not award costs, I consider that in exercising its discretion, the Court must also have regard to the interests of the fourth and fifth respondents who, by virtue of the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025), were put to the expense of defending an interlocutory application which ultimately failed. Whilst s 570 of the FW Act exists to protect the interests of litigants who bring proceedings “in relation to a matter arising under” the FW Act, that section reserves a discretion to award costs in the circumstances set out in s 570(2). That discretion should be exercised to compensate the fourth and fifth respondents for the expense of defending an interlocutory application which had no evidentiary basis, proceeded on a fundamental misunderstanding of the Court’s role and was wholly unsuccessful.

Appropriate costs order

34    As the fourth and fifth respondents submit, as they have successfully resisted an interlocutory application by the applicant, they are entitled to an award of costs: James at [16] – [17] (Katzmann J); Lanzer v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (No 2) [2021] FCA 1321 at [15] (Nicholas J); Athavle v New South Wales [2021] FCA 1075; 290 FCR 406 at [116] (Griffiths J). Accordingly, the appropriate order is that the applicant pay the fourth and fifth respondents’ costs as agreed or taxed.

35    The usual position in relation to interlocutory applications is that the party in whose favour a costs order is made must not tax the costs until the proceeding is finished: r 40.13 of the Rules. One of the policy reasons for this rule is that the unsuccessful party to an interlocutory application may ultimately succeed in the substantive proceeding. Further, it avoids multiple taxations in a proceeding: see Axent Holdings Pty Ltd v Compusign Australia Pty Ltd (No 3) [2018] FCA 6 at [15] (Kenny J). The fourth and fifth respondents did not seek an order that costs be taxed immediately, though the fourth respondent reserved his position to seek taxation if he is successful in the Removal of Respondent Application.

one other matter: The Applicant’s application for legal representation

36    On 2 April 2026, the applicant filed an interlocutory application (Legal Representation Request) and a supporting affidavit (Legal Representation Affidavit) dated 2 April 2026, seeking that the Court:

1.     Facilitate referral to appropriate pro bono legal services (including LawRight or equivalent);

2.     Grant any adjournment necessary to secure representation;

3.     Make any further orders the Court considers appropriate to ensure:

•    Procedural fairness

•    Proper presentation of the Applicant’s case

37    Div 4.2 of the Rules provides for the Court to make referrals for legal assistance. The Court’s power to do so is contained in r 4.12 of the Rules, the exercise of which is a matter for the Court’s discretion: Robinson v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2013] FCAFC 64 at [147] (Siopis, Besanko and McKerracher JJ). The removal from r 4.12 (as compared to the predecessor rule, O 81 r 4(1) of the Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) (Old Rules)) of the qualification that a referral be “in the interests of the administration of justice to do so” demonstrates the breadth of the Court’s discretionary power: see Fuller v Toms [2012] FCA 27; 247 FCR 440 at [92] – [93] (Barker J).

38    Rule 4.13 of the Rules makes clear that “[a] party is not entitled to apply to the Court for a referral under rule 4.12”, though a party raising the question of a referral may be “a means of initiating the Court’s consideration of the exercise of its discretion”: Fuller at [94]; DQV20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship & Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 430 at [68] (Dowling J). In this regard, it is worth noting that the Legal Representation Request is referred to as such because the Court’s consideration of it should not be taken as expressing a view that an interlocutory application seeking a referral for legal representation under r 4.12 of the Rules can be made to the Court.

39    The mere fact that a party is unrepresented is not a sufficient reason for issuing a certificate. Legal services which members of the legal profession are prepared to offer for free are a resource to be cherished, not abused: ADF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1099 at [29]. Thus, referrals are generally to be reserved for matters perceived to have appropriate merit: DQV20 at [72]. Further, even where a referral is made, there may be no legal practitioner willing and available to act for no fee, a prospect which is more likely the more referrals are made. This is a factor to be considered when deciding whether to make a referral: see AMV19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 99 at [9] (Colvin J).

40    In Taylor v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 319, in reference to O 80 r 4 of the Old Rules, French J at [10] observed that the absence of legal representation, even where the outcome of the case would be sufficiently significant to afford the applicant every opportunity to present their case, did not mean that “the litigation must come to a halt”. Rather, “[i]t may be that, if in the end, no pro bono practitioner is found who is willing to act then the appellant would have to represent himself”.

41    These proceedings are not yet at a point where there has been argument as to the merits of the applicant’s substantive applications or the fourth respondent’s Removal of Respondent Application. Therefore, it is not appropriate for the Court to form a view of the merits of the proceedings in considering whether to make a referral for legal representation: AMV19 at [8]. In AMV19, Colvin J referred to a number of considerations that the Court might take into account when deciding whether to exercise its discretion under r 4.12 of the Rules, at a point in the proceeding that precedes any argument on the merits. At [8], his Honour stated as follows:

I would prefer to say that in considering whether to issue a referral certificate in such instances, the Court considers the nature of the issues raised in the case, the resources available to the party, the nature of the consequences for the party, the ability of the party to be able to participate in the proceedings without legal assistance and any other matters that bear upon forming a view as to whether there is a substantial risk of injustice if the case was to proceed without legal representation, but the party has no real means of obtaining representation.

42    In light of these and other factors relevant to this matter, the Court should refuse the Legal Representation Request for the following reasons.

43    First, the applicant has no right to bring an application for a referral under r 4.12 of the Rules: r 4.13 of the Rules.

44    Second, the material contained in the Legal Representation Affidavit suggests that either (1) facilitating a referral to appropriate pro bono services or (2) granting an adjournment to permit the applicant to secure representation would not be useful. The Legal Representation Affidavit annexes, inter alia:

(1)    An email from LawRight dated 19 February 2026, in which it informs the applicant that they are “unable to assist at this stage” on the basis LawRight “do[es] not offer an employment law service”, albeit that the email relates to a request for assistance with “employment law matters” in the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission. LawRight’s email also notes that it is “unable to refer [the applicant’s] matter”, and “will not open a file or take any further steps in this matter”.

(2)    A letter from a Senior Grants Officer of Legal Aid Queensland dated 13 March 2026 advising the applicant of the outcome of a request for internal review of Legal Aid Queensland’s decision to refuse his application for legal aid on 30 April 2025. Legal Aid Queensland confirmed that it was unable to assist the applicant because:

(a)    The applicant’s unfair dismissal claim, which related to Reeve v PKF (Gold Coast) HR Services Pty Ltd [2024] FWC 2776 and Reeve v PKF (Gold Coast) HR Services Pty Ltd [2024] FWCFB 434, was out of time.

(b)    The other “matter types” which the applicant raised, namely “Workcover”, “Legal Professional Negligence”, “Whistleblower”, “Defamation”, “Complain[t]s about [Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand]” and “Complaints to ASIC regarding a Ponzi Scheme” were not within the areas of Legal Aid Queensland’s civil justice service areas of legal practice.

(c)    The applicant’s application did not meet the means test because he did not provide sufficient information.

(3)    A letter from Legal Aid Queensland dated 27 March 2026 confirming that, on the applicant’s request of 13 March 2026, an External Review Officer would review Legal Aid Queensland’s internal review decision of 13 March 2026.

45    The annexed correspondence suggests that the “appropriate pro bono services” from which the applicant seeks legal assistance are unable to grant him the assistance that he seeks.

46    Third, though the applicant makes much of his status as a litigant in person in support of the Legal Representation Request, this in and of itself does not mean that the applicant should be referred to pro bono representation. Further, it does not mean that this matter should “come to a halt” pending the applicant seeking representation: Taylor at [10]. The existence of r 4.12 is arguably premised on a party to a proceeding being a litigant in person; therefore, little to no weight can be given to this aspect of the applicant’s Legal Representation Request.

47    Fourth, the mere fact of the matter allegedly involving matters of complexity requiring “specialised legal knowledge, including appellate principles and administrative law” does not entitle the applicant to a referral under r 4.12 of the Rules. It may be accepted that this assertion goes to both the nature of the issues raised and the ability of the applicant to participate in the proceeding: AMV19 at [8]. However, it must be borne in mind that the applicant himself has brought this application, presumably with knowledge of the attendant complexity he asserted. In these circumstances, I am not persuaded that there is a substantial risk of injustice if a referral for legal representation is not made.

48    Fifth, to the extent that the applicant relies on evidence of “significant psychological stress associated with ongoing litigation” and “stress-induced paranoid features in relation to legal and workplace matters”, as challenging as these issues may be, they were known to the applicant at the time that he commenced this proceeding. The applicant’s evidence in this regard is:

(1)    The Jha Report of 17 February 2025 referred to at [8] of the Recusal Judgment (QUD648/2025).

(2)    A letter dated 3 February 2023 from Dr David Barison (Barison Letter), a psychiatrist who treated the applicant between 2021 and 2023, which refers to the applicant’s Major Depressive Disorder and Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD).

(3)    A letter from Dr James Whiting dated 16 January 2023, a clinical psychologist at Brisbane Wellbeing Psychologists, referring to the applicant’s ADHD and the consequent difficulty with engaging in legal proceedings, as well as noting his emotional distress regarding alleged difficulties in his former workplace.

49    It may be accepted that the applicant might, as a result of the matters referred to in the above documents, face greater difficulty in presenting his case, and that this is a relevant factor when considering whether to make a referral for legal assistance: AMV19 at [8]. However, it is noteworthy that each of the materials referred to above is dated well before the applicant commenced this proceeding. Thus, it can be inferred that the applicant was, prior to commencing the proceeding, aware of the struggles he might face over the course of it. In my view, this fact suggests that there is not a substantial risk of injustice if a referral for legal representation is not made.

50    Sixth, to the extent that the applicant relies generally on the interests of justice to support his Legal Representation Request, it must be borne in mind that weighing the interests of justice requires consideration of other litigants in person who might merit the grant of a pro bono certificate under r 4.12 of the Rules. Further, the interests of justice are served by the respondents to this proceeding in having the allegations which the applicant makes, which are of a very serious nature, conclusively determined. Such an outcome will be delayed if the orders the applicant seeks are made. In this regard, in circumstances where the timetable set down by the Court in this matter at the case management hearing held on 3 December 2025 provided ample time for the applicant to secure legal representation, the applicant has not demonstrated how the interests of justice now favour the course of this matter potentially being further extended to provide him with the further opportunity to seek legal representation. Finally, the mere absence of legal representation on the applicant’s part does not mean that the Court cannot, as the applicant implies, “ensure that proceedings are conducted fairly” whilst he is a litigant in person.

51    Seventh, in relation to the other considerations set out by Colvin J at [8] of AMV19, the applicant has not, in his Legal Representation Affidavit, provided evidence as to the resources available to him or the nature of the consequences if a referral for legal representation is not made, save for bare assertions that he does not have the financial means to afford legal representation, and that this proceeding will cause further significant stress and disadvantage without legal representation.

52    Accordingly, the Court should not issue a referral under r 4.12 of the Rules.

Associate:

Dated:    2 September 2026

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