Federal Court of Australia

Reynolds v Stewart [2026] FCA 1291

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The originating application, in which the applicant applied for judicial review of the decision of Registrar Stewart made on 16 December 2025 to refuse to accept documents for filing is dismissed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The originating application, in which the applicant applied for judicial review of the decision of Registrar Young made on 14 November 2025 to refuse to accept documents for filing is dismissed.

[Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.]

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

VANDONGEN J:

1 These reasons concern two separate but related applications for judicial review of decisions made by registrars of this Court, under r 2.26 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (Rules), to refuse to accept documents sought to be filed by the applicant, Kellan John Reynolds.

2 In WAD 75 of 2026, Mr Reynolds challenges a decision made by Registrar Young to refuse to accept for filing an originating application together with various associated documents on the basis that they were, on their face, an abuse of process, frivolous and vexatious, and 'inevitably destined to fail if [they] were to be accepted for filing'.  In WAD 20 of 2026, Mr Reynolds challenges a subsequent decision made by Registrar Stewart to refuse to accept for filing an urgent application before the start of proceedings, purportedly made under r 17.02(1) of the Rules, together with a supporting affidavit by which Mr Reynolds sought a review of Registrar Young's decision under s 35A(5) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act).

3 For the following reasons both of those proceedings must be dismissed.

Relevant background

4 It appears that Mr Reynolds has been charged with a criminal offence before the Magistrates Court of Western Australia (criminal proceedings).

5 On 13 November 2025, Mr Reynolds presented several documents for filing in the Federal Court's Victorian Registry.  Those documents were an originating application, two affidavits, a concise statement, a genuine steps statement, an interlocutory application, an affidavit of service and a letter to 'The Registrar'.  By those documents, Mr Reynolds sought that this Court make various orders in relation to the criminal proceedings, including grants of declaratory and injunctive relief.

6 On 14 November 2025, Registrar Young wrote to Mr Reynolds and, amongst other things, informed him that after carefully considering those documents, he determined they should not be accepted for filing because they were, on their face, an abuse of process, frivolous and vexatious, and that any resulting proceedings were inevitably destined to fail if the documents were to be accepted for filing.

7 Then, on 18 November 2025, Mr Reynolds submitted to the Victorian Registry what purported to be an urgent application before the start of a proceeding, apparently under r 17.02(1) of the Rules, together with an affidavit in support of that application.  In this application, Mr Reynolds sought an order that he be granted '[l]eave' to bring an interlocutory application to review Registrar Young's decision under r 3.11 of the Rules and under s 35A(5) of the FCA Act.  Other orders were also sought, including an order that there be an '[u]rgent short-directions listing before a Judge' as well as further orders by which Mr Reynolds sought, in effect, injunctive relief to restrain the progress of the criminal proceedings.

8 On 16 December 2025, Registrar Stewart wrote to Mr Reynolds and advised that the documents that were sought to be filed on 18 November 2025 had been referred to him for review and determination as to whether those documents should be accepted for filing.  In his letter to Mr Reynolds, Registrar Stewart said the following:

For the following reasons, I am satisfied that the documents are an abuse of process and are otherwise frivolous or vexatious.  First, the decision of the Registrar to refuse the documents for filing is an administrative decision and not an exercise of delegated judicial power:  see AZO24 v Registrar, Registry of New South Wales, Federal Court of Australia (No 2) [2024] FCA 1004 at [66]-[68].  Accordingly, the application for 'leave' to review the decision pursuant to s 35A of the [FCA Act] is doomed to fail.  Second, the orders sought in respect of the conduct of the proceeding in the Magistrates Court of Western Australia were the subject of the earlier decision of the Registrar to refuse the earlier documents for filing.  Such relief is purportedly brought pursuant to s 39B(1A)(b) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) on the basis that it involves a matter arising under the constitution.  No explanation is readily discernible from the Documents as to what the constitutional matter might be, and I am accordingly satisfied that claim is fanciful and made without proper basis.  Further, the seeking of such relief utilising the procedures under Part 7 of the [Rules] is inappropriate, particularly as the Documents are framed as being made on ex parte basis.

9 Unhappy with Registrar Stewart's decision, Mr Reynolds then filed an originating application for judicial review of that decision.  In that application, WAD 20 of 2026, Mr Reynolds sought orders that Registrar Stewart's decision be declared invalid and set aside, as well as several other orders to the effect that the documents he originally sought to file on 18 November 2025 be accepted for filing.

10 Then, in March 2026, Mr Reynolds filed a further originating application for judicial review.  In that application, WAD 75 of 2026, Mr Reynolds sought orders that Registrar Young's decision of 14 November 2025 also be set aside, together with further orders that the documents he sought to file on 13 November 2025 be accepted for filing.

11 When Mr Reynolds appeared at the hearing of his applications, he expressed some surprise that they had been listed for final hearing.  It is not clear why he was surprised as it had previously been made clear to him that this is what was to occur.

12 However, although Mr Reynolds was offered the opportunity for his applications to be adjourned to a further hearing date, he informed the Court that he was content to rely on his written submissions, as supplemented by oral submissions made at the hearing, and that he did not wish for the hearings to be adjourned.

13 Having summarised the relevant background to Mr Reynolds' applications, I will now explain why I am of the view that both of those applications must be dismissed.

Applicable principles

14 The principles to be applied in the context of an application for judicial review of a registrar's decision to refuse to accept documents for filing under r 2.26 of the Rules were recently summarised by Banks-Smith J in Ogbonna v Young [2026] FCA 610 at [21] to [27]:

Under r 2.26 a Registrar may refuse to accept a document if the Registrar is satisfied that the document is an abuse of the process of the Court or is frivolous or vexatious.

In assessing whether a document answers these criteria, the Registrar may have regard to the face of the document.  The Registrar may also refer to any documents already filed or submitted for filing with the document.

In Bizuneh v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 42; (2003) 128 FCR 353, the Full Court described the former analogous rule (O 46 r 7A), observing that (at [15]):

'The purpose of r 7A is to assist the Registrar to maintain efficient operation of a registry and, thereby, the Court.  Even without a rule in the terms of r 7A it may be thought that it would be implied that a Registrar would have the power, or be under a duty, to protect court procedures from abuse by refusing to accept a document for lodgment or filing which, on its face, would be an abuse of court process or frivolous or vexatious.'

In Ferdinands v Registrar Cridland [2021] FCA 592 at [29]-[30], White J addressed in detail the composite phrase 'an abuse of process of the Court or is frivolous or vexatious', concluding:

'[29]    In Prior v South West Aboriginal Land and Sea Council Aboriginal Corporation [2020] FCA 808, McKerracher J discussed the meaning of the terms "vexatious" and "frivolous" appearing in r 26.01(1) of the [Rules].  His Honour said:

"[35]    The expressions 'scandalous', 'vexatious' and 'frivolous' can be used either separately, or in conjunction, or interchangeably, with the expression 'abuse of process of the court' …

[36]    A matter is 'frivolous and vexatious' where the 'cause of action is one which on the face of it is clearly one which no reasonable person could properly treat as bona fide, and contend that he had a grievance which he was entitled to bring before the court' …

[37]    In relation to the term 'frivolous':

(a)    a matter that is 'frivolous' may be described as one that is 'without substance or groundless or fanciful' …;

(b)    a proceeding will be 'frivolous' where, despite whatever attempts are made to discern a cause of action in the case, it is still not arguable …; and

(c)    'frivolous' may also describe a situation where a party is trifling with the Court or wasting the Court's time …

[38]    In relation to the term 'vexatious':

(a)    a 'vexatious' proceeding is one without foundation, which cannot succeed, or is brought for an ulterior and collateral purpose.  'Vexatious' might also describe proceedings that are seriously and unfairly burdensome, prejudicial or damaging …;

(b)    proceedings may also be described as 'vexatious' where they impose on a respondent party an unnecessary injustice in the form of a burden other than, and additional to, the burden necessarily imposed on a party to litigation instituted on reasonable grounds for the purpose of obtaining relief within the scope of the available remedy …;

(c)    a proceeding is to be regarded as 'vexatious' where:

(i)    it is instituted with the intention of annoying or embarrassing the person against whom the proceeding is brought; or

(ii)    it is brought for collateral purposes, and not for the purpose of having the court adjudicate on the issues to which it gives rise; or

(iii)    irrespective of the motive of the litigant, the proceeding is so obviously untenable or manifestly groundless as to be utterly hopeless …; and

(d)    'vexatiousness' is a quality of the proceeding rather than a litigant's intention, so that the question is not whether the proceedings have been instituted vexatiously but whether the legal proceedings are in fact vexatious …"

(Citations omitted)

[30]    As is apparent, a proceeding will be frivolous and vexatious if, amongst other things, it is based on a cause of action which no reasonable person could properly treat as bona fide or if it is without substance, groundless, or fanciful …'

The Full Court in Ferdinands v Registrar Cridland [2022] FCAFC 80 at [8] referred to White J's review in Ferdinands of the meaning of the components with approval.  There have been many other cases where the Court has similarly approved such descriptions of the terms.

A decision by a Registrar to refuse to accept a document for filing under r 2.26 is an administrative decision.  The Full Court in Nyoni v Murphy [2018] FCAFC 75; (2018) 261 FCR 164 at [38] described the Registrar's function as follows (at [38]):

'… a Registrar acting under r 2.26 does not have power to adjudicate under the substantive law whether an application that a party seeks to bring is an abuse of process (or is frivolous or vexatious).  The Registrar has no judicial power to determine substantively whether a claim must be dismissed because it is an abuse of process (or is frivolous or vexatious).  Rather, r 2.26 is the means by which an administrative requirement is expressed that all documents filed in the Registry must not in their form and content (irrespective of any substantive assessment of their merit) be an abuse of the process of the Court or frivolous or vexatious …'

Because a refusal decision is administrative in character it is subject to review pursuant to s 5(1) of the ADJR Act:  Nyoni at [32]-[37].

15 Although Mr Reynolds' application for judicial review of Registrar Young's decision was filed later in time, it is convenient to deal with that application first.

Application for judicial review of Registrar Young's decision:  WAD 75 of 2026

16 In his originating application for judicial review Mr Reynolds seeks an order setting aside Registrar Young's decision of 14 November 2025.  Although his originating application for judicial review of Registrar Young's decision was filed under r 31.01 of the Rules, which is concerned with applications for orders of review under s 11(1) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act), Mr Reynolds did not specify the provisions of that Act upon which he wished to rely.

17 Nevertheless, the grounds upon which Mr Reynolds relies in support of his application for judicial review are, in essence, that:

(1) the Registrar misapplied r 2.26 of the Rules;

(2) he failed to consider mandatory considerations;

(3) his decision was affected by legal unreasonableness; and

(4) his power was exercised in bad faith.

To the extent that Mr Reynolds relies on the ADJR Act, I have taken his application to rely on s 5(1)(e), when read with paras (b), (d) and (g) of s 5(2), and on s 5(1)(f).  I will also assume that Mr Reynolds intended to rely on s 39B(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth).

18 I do not accept that Registrar Young misapplied r 2.26 of the Rules.  In his written reasons for decision, the Registrar accurately summarised the effect of r 2.26.  The Registrar also correctly summarised the consideration given to that rule in Ferdinands v Registrar Cridland [2021] FCA 592 and in Prior v South West Aboriginal Land and Sea Council Aboriginal Corporation [2020] FCA 808, cases that were referred to by Banks-Smith J in Ogbonna in the passage which I have reproduced at [14] of these reasons.  It was in that context that the Registrar said that, after carefully considering the documents Mr Reynolds sought to file, he determined that they should not be accepted for filing because the documents:

on the [sic] face are an abuse of process, frivolous and vexatious and inevitably destined to fail if it [sic] were to be accepted for filing.

19 Mr Reynolds submits that the Registrar's use of the words 'inevitably destined to fail' demonstrate that he impermissibly exercised judgment about the underlying merits of the claims.  However, consistently with the approach taken in Ogbonna at [39], those words must be read in their context.  In that regard the words used by the Registrar appear after reference was made to what was said in Ferdinands at [30], namely, that a matter that is frivolous and vexatious will be one that is 'based on a cause of action which no reasonable person could properly treat as bona fide or if it is without substance, groundless, or fanciful' (italics in original, emphasis added in bold).  Further the Registrar correctly noted, by reference to what was said in Re Young [2020] HCA 13 at [13] (Young), that the concept of an abuse of process captures attempts to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court on bases that are confused or untenable.  Accordingly, there is no basis on which to conclude that the Registrar misapplied r 2.26 of the Rules.

20 Mr Reynolds also contended that Registrar Young failed to consider mandatory considerations.  However, Mr Reynolds does not identify what considerations Registrar Young failed to take into account or why those considerations were required to be taken into account when exercising the power conferred by r 2.26.

21 To the extent that it was contended that Registrar Young's decision was 'legally unreasonable', it was merely submitted that the decision lacked 'an evident and intelligible justification when the initiating material expressly identified the statutory and constitutional bases for the proposed proceeding, yet the refusal treated the proceeding as inevitably doomed at the threshold stage'.  The test of unreasonableness is necessarily stringent:   Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; (2018) 264 CLR 541 at [11] (Kiefel CJ); see also at [52] (Gageler J) and [135] (Edelman J).  In my view, the reasons given by Registrar Young plainly demonstrate that his decision not to accept the documents for filing was reached by adopting reasoning that was 'intelligible and reasonable and directed towards and related intelligibly to the purposes of the power' in r 2.26:  Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [25] (French CJ) (Li).  In that regard, Registrar Young referred to and adopted the settled principles as explained in Prior, Young, and Ferdinands, and did so in a way that could not be sensibly described as lacking any evident and intelligible justification.  Furthermore, to the extent Mr Reynolds contended that the outcome of Registrar Young's decision was legally unreasonable, there is no basis for concluding that it was so devoid of plausible justification that no reasonable person could have taken that course:  Li at [91] (Gageler J); see also at [76] and [85] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ).

22 The final ground on which Mr Reynolds relied in support of his application for judicial review of the decision of Registrar Young is that the decision was made in bad faith.  In that regard, Mr Reynolds relies on three particulars of the alleged bad faith.

23 Firstly, Mr Reynolds contends that the Registrar's letter of 14 November 2025 used 'substantially the same standardised reasons' as two other decisions made by registrars of this Court.  According to Mr Reynolds, this demonstrates a 'template response rather than evaluation of the specific material lodged' with the Court.  The two other decisions of registrars of this Court on which Mr Reynolds relies are the decision of Registrar Stewart, which is the subject of WAD 20 of 2026, and a decision of Registrar Burns on 7 November 2024.

24 Mr Reynolds' contention is without merit.  The three decisions relied on by Mr Reynolds fall well short of demonstrating that Registrar Young did not exercise his own judgment in deciding to refuse to accept the documents for filing.  While the decisions display some similarities, the reasons are by no means identical, and they certainly do not evidence an unthinking and formulaic use of a 'template response'.  In any event, there is no basis for a conclusion that Registrar Young acted in bad faith when he decided that the documents should not be accepted for filing.  As the Full Court said in SCAS v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 397 at [19], citing NAAV v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 228; (2002) 123 FCR 298 at [107] to [108] (Beaumont J):

[a]n allegation of bad faith is a very serious one.  Bad faith in this context implies a lack of an honest or genuine attempt to undertake the task and involves a personal attack on the honesty of the decision maker.

25 There is absolutely no evidence that Registrar Young made his decision other than based on an honest and genuine attempt to exercise the power in r 2.26 of the Rules.

26 Secondly, Mr Reynolds appeared to contend that Registrar Young asserted in his decision that no constitutional matter was 'readily discernible'.  Mr Reynolds claims that, on the contrary, his application 'expressly [identified] constitutional and jurisdictional issues and the asserted statutory basis for federal jurisdiction' and that this supports an 'inference of deliberate or reckless disregard of the material' on the part of Registrar Young.  This contention is also without merit.  Contrary to Mr Reynolds' contention, Registrar Young did not assert that no constitutional issue was readily discernible.

27 Thirdly, Mr Reynolds relies on the fact that Registrar Young refused to allow the documents to be filed without first offering him the opportunity to make amendments, to clarify any matters, or to have the proceedings listed for directions so that the issue could be determined by the Court.  On this basis, Mr Reynolds contends that an inference should be drawn that the Registrar's refusal to allow the documents to be filed was 'not a bona fide exercise of the r 2.26 power'.

28 Mr Reynolds' claim is baseless.  Satisfaction that a document that is sought to be filed in the Court is 'an abuse of process of the Court or is frivolous or vexatious … on the face of the document', for the purposes of r 2.26(a), enlivens a discretion to refuse to accept that document for filing.  However, there is nothing in the words used in r 2.26 to suggest that, before exercising that discretion, a registrar is obliged to offer up an opportunity to amend or clarify the document.  In those circumstances, the fact that the Registrar did not offer Mr Reynolds such an opportunity before exercising that discretion cannot, of itself, support the very serious allegation of bad faith.

29 Mr Reynolds also sought an order 'pursuant to' s 35A(7)(b) of the FCA Act and r 3.05 of the Rules that Registrar Young:

arrange for the Court to determine the application which gave rise to the refusal and do all acts and things necessary to list that application before a Judge for determination, including acceptance of the originating application and affidavit for filing or otherwise dealing with it according to law, or alternatively remit the matter to the Respondent for reconsideration according to law.

30 However, s 35A(7)(b) confers power on a registrar hearing an application for the exercise of a power referred to in s 35A(1) to 'make appropriate arrangements for the application to be heard by the Court'.  Rule 3.05 provides that a party may make an oral application to a registrar under s 35A(7)(b).  Accordingly, neither of those provisions are of any assistance to Mr Reynolds.

31 Finally, Mr Reynolds relied on r 1.37 of the Rules, which confers a discretionary power on the Court to direct a registrar to do, or not to do, an act or thing.  In that context, while Mr Reynolds' application also referred to r 3.05, it may be inferred that he really meant to rely on r 3.04.  That is because r 3.04 provides that a person may apply to the Court without notice for an order that a registrar do any act or thing that the registrar is required or entitled to do but has refused to do.  Essentially, in addition to asserting that Registrar Young fell into jurisdictional error in refusing to accept documents for filing, Mr Reynolds seeks the Court's independent intervention to direct that Registrar Young accept those documents for filing.

32 In Luck v Principal Registrar and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Court of Australia (Permanent Stay) [2024] FCA 1256, Wheelahan J said at [33] to [34], about the approach to rr 1.37 and 3.04 in relation to a 'review' of a registrar's decision under r 2.26, that:

As Colvin J observed in AMB19 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 439 at [61], the registry of any court acts under the administrative direction of its judges.  In this Court, that finds reflection in r 1.37, which provides that the Court may direct a Registrar to do, or not to do, an act or thing.  It also finds reflection in r 3.04, under which a person may apply to the Court without notice for an order that a Registrar do any act or thing that the Registrar is required or entitled to do but has refused to do.  In Cristovao v Registrar Scott [2013] FCAFC 92, the Full Court (North, Siopis and McKerracher JJ) noted at [17] that r 3.04 was the most obvious avenue for review of a decision of a Registrar not to accept a document for filing, and at [38] described the process under r 3.04 as involving a full review.  The power under r 3.04 was exercised by Stewart J in DOB18 v Ng [2019] FCA 1575 to direct a Registrar to accept a document for filing.  The powers under rr 1.37 and 3.04 were exercised by Horan J in Sayed v Salvation Army Housing [2023] FCA 1298 to direct a Registrar to accept a document for filing on the ground that it was in the interests of the administration of justice to do so.  Horan J found it unnecessary in that case to determine whether the Registrar's decision not to accept the documents involved any error:  see at [53].  See also Re Pickering [2009] FCA 809 at [16] (Barker J) in relation to the corresponding provision of the former rules; MS PD v Registrar of the Federal Court of Australia [2021] FCA 1197 at [8] (Logan J); and Somasundaram v Luxton [2020] FCA 1076 at [16] (Murphy J).

Returning to judicial review, in light of the control that judges may exercise over the filing of documents in the Court, I consider that it would be an unusual case where a discretionary remedy was given upon judicial review of a Registrar's decision not to accept documents for filing where the judge seized of the matter upon judicial review formed a firm view that the documents were on their face an abuse of process of the Court, or frivolous, or vexatious such that the Registrar was correct in not accepting them for filing.  In many cases, judicial efficiency might result in a focus on the character of the documents themselves as a dispositive issue going to the grant of relief:  see, in this respect, Nyoni v Murphy at [49].

33 In deciding whether to give a direction to Registrar Young to accept the documents for filing I am, in effect, required to consider whether the power provided for in r 2.26 should be exercised.  That power is administrative in character and exists to protect the Court's jurisdiction from abuse.  It does not exist to allow for a form of evaluation that is properly reserved for consideration and determination in the exercise of judicial power:  Independent Commission Against Corruption v Waterhouse (Removal of Filed Document) [2026] FCAFC 110 at [29] (Waterhouse).  The exercise of the power in r 2.26 is confined and only to be exercised in clear cases:  Waterhouse at [29].

34 I have reviewed for myself the documents that were the subject of Registrar Young's decision of 14 November 2025.  Based on that review, I am of the view that all of those documents are, on their face, an abuse of process of the Court, or that they are frivolous or vexatious.  For that reason, I would not grant any discretionary remedy on Mr Reynolds' application for judicial review even if I were satisfied that Registrar Young had fallen into jurisdictional error.  Further, and in any event, I would also not give a direction under r 1.37 that a registrar accept for filing the documents Registrar Young determined should not be accepted for filing.

35 It is obvious that Mr Reynolds is an adherent of what has become known as 'pseudolaw'.  Mr Reynolds appears to be a proponent of a particular theory espoused by pseudolaw exponents that is known as the 'strawman duality':  see, for example, Kelly v Fiander [2023] WASC 187 at [11] to [13].  In Meads v Meads [2012] ABQB 571, the Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta, Canada, undertook a comprehensive review of the characteristic features of pseudolaw.  Consistent with some of those features, and by way of example only, Mr Reynolds adopted the practice of signing various documents using a red thumbprint, and by referring to himself as holding the 'executors office for the Kellan Reynolds, estate' or as being 'known in common usage as Kellan John, and in law as Kellan John Reynolds, of the family Reynolds, domiciled [in] Western Australia'.  In one of the affidavits that he sought to file Mr Reynolds expressly said that he appeared in a 'dual capacity':

The Applicant appears in dual capacity - (1) as a natural person, and (2) as trustee and executor of the legal estate styled Kellan John Reynolds.  These capacities, though related, are distinct:  one arises by natural creation; the other is recognised at law.  Together they form the basis of standing before this Honourable Court to uphold truth, fairness and the integrity of the Commonwealth Constitution.

36 When a person relies on pseudolaw ideas to commence legal proceedings, it is often exceedingly difficult to identify any coherent claims.  The attempt by Mr Reynolds to commence proceedings in this Court is no exception.  To give a true sense of the documents that Mr Reynolds sought to file, it is useful to reproduce the following part of the originating application in the exact way in which it appears:

Nature of the Case - Public - Interest Constitutional Test Case

(a).  Jurisdictional error and breach of statutory duty under Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 78B; impairment of Chapter III institutional integrity (Kable/Kirk); and non-discrimination under Constitution s 92, arising from the Midland Magistrates Court proceeding despite federal notice and pending Supreme Court matters.

Evidentiary foundation. (b).  Affidavit of Truth (Form 59), affirmed [18] October 2025, Exhibits KJR-l→KJR-19 (+ Part X schedule).  WA statutory footing: Criminal Procedure Regulations 2005 (WA) r 5(1) & Sch 1 (mandatory statutory forms; naming consistency); CP Regs Sch 2 cl 3 (service certificate); Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) s 23 (if PN used); CP Acts s 174. Federal hooks: Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B(1A)(b); s 78B(l)-(4); Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth) s 14. Particular (name/status used to proceed): as per Aff ¶25 addendum and Aff ¶¶25A, 44, 49-50 inserts (status, service, constructive knowledge).

Affidavit relied on & statutory footing. Affidavit of Truth (Form 59), affirmed [18] October 2025, Exhibits KJR-l→KJR-19 (+ Part X schedule).  WA statutory footing: CP Regs 2005 (WA) r 5(1) & Sch 1 (mandatory statutory forms / party-naming consistency); CP Regs Sch 2 cl 3 (service certificate); CP Act 2004 (WA) s 23 (if a prosecution notice is used); CP Act s 174 (signature presumption).  Federal hooks: Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B(lA)(b); s 78B(l)-(4); ET Act 1999 (Cth) s 14 (constructive receipt).

1. This application concerns jurisdictional error, abuse of process, and breach of constitutional duty by the Midland Magistrates Court of Western Australia in proceeding against the Applicant while substantially the same constitutional questions were pending before the Supreme Court of Western Australia, and after formal notice under Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 78B had been given.

Affidavit ¶¶ 11-18; Ex KJR-l→KJR-4.

2. The Applicant relies on the accompanying Affidavit of Truth, including Exhibit KJR-14 (Statutory Declaration lodged with the Australian Federal Police on 19 August 2025), corroborating systemic disregard of federal obligations and the Applicant's proven fear of continuing harm.

Affidavit ¶¶ 40, 50-53; Ex KJR-14.

3. Status not presumed. The State's characterisation of legal status is not admitted. Status cannot be presumed/assumed/consented; it must be established in accordance with mandatory statutory form requirements (CP Regs r 5(1), Sch 1) where process relies on a name designation.  Proceeding brought on a dual-status basis (natural person; trustee/executor).  XREF: Aff ¶5 addendum.

4. Particular (name/status used to proceed). Processing on a specific legal designation required strict compliance with mandatory statutory identification and form requirements (CP Regs r 5(1), Sch 1; CP Act s 23 where applicable; CP Regs Sch 2 cl 3). Inconsistent styling of my name and selective acceptance of a defective prosecution form while compliant defence filings were refused is unlawful non-compliance with binding legislation, supporting procedural unfairness, misidentification risk, and jurisdictional error. (XREF: Aff¶25 fix & addendum; Ex KJR-5; KJR-4)

5. The refusal to perform the statutory duty under s 78B-and the continuation of proceedings despite notice of a live constitutional matter pending in the Supreme Court-constitutes an abrogation of judicial independence and an impairment of institutional integrity contrary to Chapter III of the Constitution.

Affidavit ¶¶22, 31-32, 51; Ex KJR-15-KJR-16.

6. The Applicant seeks declarations and orders to preserve constitutional structure, ensure compliance with federal law, and prevent ongoing oppression through the State process, including relief under s 39B(JA)(b) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) as set out in the 'Relief sought' section of this Form 15.

Grounds relied upon

A. Jurisdictional error - breach of s 78B duty

Proceeding after federal notice and while substantially the same constitutional question was pending in the Supreme Court.

Affidavit ¶¶ 11-18, 39-46; Ex KJR-1→KJR-4, KJR-15-KJR-16

B. Denial of procedural fairness / equality of arms

Selective refusal of compliant defence filings while accepting a defective police Form 6.  Affidavit ¶¶ 17-18, 33, 36; Ex KJR-4-KJR-5. Prosecution/registry proceeded on 'KELLAN JOHN REYNOLDS' or Kellan John REYNOLDS while rejecting compliant defence filings and applying inconsistent naming within the same file, contrary to CP Regs 2005 (WA) r 5(1) & Sch 1 (mandatory statutory form requirements).  This unlawful non-compliance affected identification, service, and validity of steps, reinforcing procedural inequality and the juristic-person objection (Crown Suits Act 1947 (WA) s 5(1)-(2)). [XREF: Aff ¶25 (fix + addendum); Ex KJR-4/-5/-6]

C. Chapter III institutional integrity (Kable/Kirk)

Conduct impairing the court's capacity to exercise federal jurisdiction.  Affidavit ,¶¶ 22, 31-32,50-53

D. s 92 non-discrimination (in the alternative)

Discriminatory/protectionist burden on judicial intercourse and the s 78B process.

Affidavit ¶ 27; Ex KJR-10

E. s 109 inconsistency

State rule/practice frustrating the operation of s 78B invalid to the extent of inconsistency.  Affidavit ¶ 32, 55(d)

F. Juristic-person defect (supportive)

'WA Police' not a juristic party; proceedings should be in the name 'The State of Western Australia'.  Affidavit ¶¶ 24, 34; Ex KJR-6-KJR-8

37 The other documents Mr Reynolds sought to file are very much like this part of the originating application in both their contents and appearance.  With all due respect to Mr Reynolds, what they reveal is the incoherent nature of the various claims he sought to make.  That incoherency has led me to be firmly of the view that, on their face, the documents are an abuse of process or are otherwise frivolous or vexatious because they seek to invoke this Court's jurisdiction on a basis that is 'confused or manifestly untenable':  Young at [13].  Accordingly, I would not exercise the powers in rr 1.37 or 3.04 to direct that a registrar accept for filing the documents that, on 14 November 2025, Registrar Young refused to accept for filing.

Mr Reynolds' application for judicial review of Registrar Stewart's decision:  WAD20 of 2026

38 By an originating application filed on 20 January 2026, Mr Reynolds seeks judicial review of a decision made by Registrar Stewart, on 16 December 2025, to refuse to accept for filing an urgent application before the start of proceedings, together with a supporting affidavit affirmed by Mr Reynolds, which were submitted to this Court for filing on 18 November 2025.  The orders sought in that urgent application included an order that Mr Reynolds be granted leave to bring an interlocutory application to review Registrar Young's decision of 14 November 2025, to which I have already referred, under r 3.11 of the Rules and s 35A(5) of the FCA Act.  Further ancillary orders were sought to, effectively, bring the criminal proceedings to a standstill.

39 The originating application expressly provides that it is made pursuant to ss 5(1), 6(1) and 7(1) of the ADJR Act and s 39B(1) and paras (a) and (b) of s 39B(1A) of the Judiciary Act, on the grounds that:

(1) Registrar Stewart misconstrued r 2.26 of the Rules;

(2) his decision was legally unreasonable or involved an improper exercise of power;

(3) he failed to take into account mandatory relevant considerations; and

(4) there was a denial of procedural fairness.

40 I have already reproduced the critical part of Registrar Stewart's reasons for his decision at [8] of these reasons.  In my view, Registrar Stewart's conclusion that, on their face, the documents comprising Mr Reynolds' application for 'leave' to review Registrar Young's decision of 14 November 2025 were an abuse of process, was not infected by jurisdictional error as alleged or at all.

41 To the extent Mr Reynolds sought to file an application to review Registrar Young's decision under r 3.11 of the Rules and s 35A(5) of the FCA Act, that application was foredoomed to fail.  As Registrar Stewart correctly explained in his letter to Mr Reynolds dated 16 December 2025, Registrar Young's decision was administrative in character and was not made in the exercise of delegated judicial power.

42 Rule 3.11 provides as follows:

3.11 Application for review of a Registrar's exercise of power

(1)    A party may apply to the Court under section 35A(5) of the Act for review of the exercise of a power of the Court by a Registrar.

(2)    The application must be made within 21 days after the day on which the power was exercised.

43 Section 35A(5) provides that:

[a] party to proceedings in which a Registrar has exercised any of the powers of the Court under subsection (1) may, within the time prescribed by the Rules of Court, or within any further time allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court, apply to the Court to review that exercise of power.

44 It may be seen that s 35A(5) operates where a registrar has exercised a power in s 35A(1) of the FCA Act.

45 Section 35A(1) itself provides that:

[s]ubject to subsection (2), the following powers of the Court may, if the Court or a Judge so directs, be exercised by a Registrar:

(a)    the power to dispense with the service of any process of the Court;

(b)    the power to make orders in relation to substituted service;

(c)    the power to make orders in relation to discovery, inspection and production of documents in the possession, power or custody of a party to proceedings in the Court or of any other person;

(d)    the power to make orders in relation to interrogatories;

(e)    the power, in proceedings in the Court, to make an order adjourning the hearing of the proceedings;

(ea)    the power to make orders under section 32AE (about transferring certain criminal proceedings to other courts);

(f)    the power to make an order as to costs;

(g)    the power to make an order exempting a party to proceedings in the Court from compliance with a provision of the Rules of Court;

(h)    a power of the Court prescribed by Rules of Court.

46 Registrar Young did not exercise any of the powers referred to in paras (a) to (g) of s 35A(1) when he made his decision on 14 November 2025.  Furthermore, the power that Registrar Young did exercise under r 2.26 of the Rules is not a power of the Court that is prescribed by the Rules, for the purposes of s 35A(1)(h).  It follows that it would never have been open to the Court to exercise the power in s 35A(5).  In those circumstances Mr Reynolds' application to review Registrar Young's decision was doomed to fail.  Accordingly, it is unnecessary to consider any of Mr Reynolds' specific contentions that Registrar Stewart fell into jurisdictional error.  That the application that Mr Reynolds sought to file was doomed to fail necessarily means that it was an abuse of process or otherwise frivolous or vexatious, with the result that an exercise of the power in r 2.26 by a registrar to refuse to accept the application for filing was inevitable.

47 The balance of the orders that Mr Reynolds sought in the application that Registrar Stewart refused to accept for filing were merely ancillary to his application for a review of Registrar Young's exercise of power under r 2.26.  In that regard, it is clear that Mr Reynolds sought a 'stand-still' of the criminal proceedings pending the review of Registrar Young's decision of 14 December 2025 that he sought.  It necessarily follows from the conclusion that I have reached at [46], that the balance of Mr Reynolds' application was also, inevitably, an abuse of the process of the Court, or that it was otherwise frivolous or vexatious.

Conclusion

48 The originating application in WAD 75 of 2026, in which Mr Reynolds applied for judicial review of the decision of Registrar Young made on 14 November 2025 to refuse to accept documents for filing must be dismissed.  To the extent that Mr Reynolds sought that a direction be given to a registrar pursuant to rr 1.37 and 3.04 of the Rules to accept those documents for filing, I would decline to make such a direction.

49 The originating application in WAD 20 of 2026, in which Mr Reynolds applied for judicial review of the decision of Registrar Stewart made on 16 December 2025 to refuse to accept documents for filing must be dismissed.

Associate:

Dated:    2 September 2026