Federal Court of Australia

Ranavue v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 1274

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    A writ of certiorari be issued quashing the decision of the second respondent made on 24 December 2025.

2.    A writ of mandamus be issued remitting the applicant’s application for review to the second respondent for determination according to law.

3.    The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs as agreed or taxed, with the parties to apply to the Court on 7 days’ notice should they seek to vary this order.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

SHARIFF J:

1    The applicant is a citizen of Fiji who had his visa mandatorily cancelled under s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act) on 8 January 2024 by reason of his criminal record (Cancellation Decision). A delegate of the respondent (Minister) declined to revoke this decision on 3 October 2025 (Non-Revocation Decision). The Administrative Review Tribunal (Tribunal) then affirmed the Non-Revocation Decision: Ranavue and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (Migration) [2025] ARTA 2769 (Tribunal Decision or TD).

2    The applicant now seeks judicial review of the Tribunal’s Decision. The brief background is that the applicant is currently 40 years of age. He arrived in Australia with his parents in 1989 at the age of four. He returned to Fiji on his own between 1993 and 1998, during which time he was subjected to sexual abuse by a male cousin. He subsequently returned to Australia and has not departed since. The applicant has four Australian children with Ms AA, and two Australian stepchildren with Ms BC (his current wife). On or about 17 December 2020, the applicant was convicted of the offence of “stalk/intimidate intend fear physical etc harm (domestic), destroy or damage property, assault occasioning actual bodily harm (DV)”, and “common assault”. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 18 months. On appeal, the sentence was varied to 12 months’ imprisonment for assault occasioning actual bodily harm (DV); and eight months’ imprisonment to be served by way of Intensive Correction Order for “stalk/intimidate intend fear physical etc harm (domestic), destroy or damage property”, and “common assault”.

3    By an Amended Originating Application, the applicant contends that the Tribunal erred by:

(a)    failing to comply with paragraph 9 of Ministerial Direction 110 made under s 499(1) of the Migration Act (Direction 110) by finding at TD [173] that the “other consideration” of “[l]egal consequences of the decision” was “not enlivened” in the applicant’s case (Ground 1);

(b)    failing to comply with paragraph 8.3(1) of Direction 110 by not considering the impact of the decision on the applicant’s immediate family members in Australia (Ground 2);

(c)    failing to comply with paragraph 8.4(3) of Direction 110 by failing to give individual consideration to the best interests of each relevant minor child to the extent that their interests differed (Ground 3); and

(d)    failing to comply with paragraph 9.2(1) of Direction 110 by failing to take into account the applicant’s mental health (Ground 4).

4    For the following reasons, Grounds 2 and 3 should be upheld and each of the other Grounds should be dismissed.

1.    GROUND 1

5    By Ground 1, the applicant contends that the Tribunal failed to consider the legal consequences of the decision because it erroneously concluded at TD [173] that this consideration was “not enlivened”. In response, the Minister contends that the applicant’s contentions involve an overly pedantic reading of the Tribunal’s reasons, which pays insufficient regard to the Tribunal’s reasons at TD [167]-[172] which provide context as to how TD [173] is to be read and understood. I agree with the Minister’s contentions.

6    It is unnecessary to set out the contents of paragraph 9 of Direction 110, which the Tribunal set out in full at TD [167]. There was no dispute between the parties that paragraph 9 of Direction 110 required the Tribunal to consider the legal consequences of its decision: referring to NBMZ v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 38; 220 FCR 1 at [8]-[10] (Allsop CJ and Katzmann J). Nor was there any dispute between the parties that in this respect, the Tribunal must have regard to the statutory framework in which the power to revoke a mandatory cancellation decision exists, including the direct and immediate “statutorily prescribed” consequences of an exercise of the power: Taulahi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 177; 246 FCR 146 at [84] (Kenny, Flick and Griffiths JJ). For the purpose of the argument, the Minister accepted that the relevant legal consequences extended beyond consideration of non-refoulement obligations and required the Tribunal to consider matters such as the duration for which the applicant may be detained and his prospects of removal.

7    The Tribunal considered the legal consequences of its decision at TD [168]-[173], as follows:

168.    Section 5 of the Act defines non-refoulement obligations as including Australia’s obligations as a party to certain Conventions, Protocols and Covenants, and ‘any obligations accorded by customary international law…of a similar kind to those mentioned’ in those treaties. As held in Ibrahim v Minister for Home Affairs (2019) 270 FCR 12 at [103] non-refoulement obligations are ‘not confined to the protection obligations to which s 36(2) refers’. Legal consequences of a Tribunal decision can also be quite broad and encompass duration of detention and prospects of removal.

169.    The Tribunal is required to give active intellectual consideration to the Applicant’s clearly articulated representations about risk of harm, regardless of characterisation. This is in the context of ‘another reason’ for revocation under s 501CA(4) of the Act, where claims are not required to meet predetermined benchmarks and can be less categorical than the more comprehensive assessment process conducted under s 36A of the Act. Active intellectual consideration of claims requires the Tribunal to:

…bring their mind to bear upon the facts stated in them and the arguments or opinions put forward, and appreciate who is making them. From that point, the decision-maker might sift them, attributing whatever weight or persuasive quality is thought appropriate.

170.    The Tribunal is satisfied that the country of reference in this application is Fiji.

171.    The Applicant is not covered by a protection finding and his circumstances fall under cl 9.1.2 of the Direction. Neither he nor his lawyer advanced non-refoulement claims in documentary submissions or during the hearing. The Applicant’s evidence instead focussed on impediments to removal, which is more relevantly considered under cl 9.2 of the Direction.

172.    Cancellation of the Applicant’s visa in January 2024 resulted in him becoming an unlawful non-citizen under s 14 of the Act. The immediate legal consequence of revocation is return of his permanent visa and release from detention. Non-revocation results in continuing detention under s 189 of the Act and liability for removal as soon as reasonably practicable under s 198. There is no evidence that removal to Fiji is not reasonably practicable. Continuing detention is permissible pending removal or while other valid applications are considered or appeal rights exercised under Part 7 of the ART Act. It is accepted that a non-revocation decision, subject to any appeal, would likely preclude the Applicant’s return to Australia in future, which is consistent with the intention of the Act.

173.    This consideration is not enlivened and weighs neutrally.

(Footnotes omitted.)

8    As is evident from the above passages, the Tribunal correctly identified that Fiji was the relevant country of reference, and that the applicant was not covered by a protection finding and had not advanced any non-refoulement claims: TD [171]. At TD [172], the Tribunal correctly found that the effect of the Cancellation Decision was that the applicant was now an unlawful non-citizen, and that the immediate consequence of not revoking the Cancellation Decision would be that the applicant would continue in detention and was liable to be removed to Fiji as soon as was reasonably practicable. The Tribunal also indicated that there was no evidence to establish that removal to Fiji was not reasonably practicable: TD [172]. It stated that continuing detention within that context was permissible: TD [172]. The Tribunal also correctly recognised that any decision made by it not to revoke the Cancellation Decision would likely preclude the applicant from returning to Australia in the future: TD [172].

9    From these passages alone, it is plain that the Tribunal considered the legal consequences of not revoking the Cancellation Decision. It concluded that these consequences would be that: (a) the applicant would continue to be detained; (b) the applicant was liable to be removed to Fiji as soon as was reasonably practicable; and (c) it was likely that he would be precluded from returning to Australia in the future. Not only had the Tribunal considered each of these matters, the conclusions reached by the Tribunal were plainly correct. The applicant did not contend otherwise.

10    The applicant’s contentions focused on the finding at TD [173] where the Tribunal stated that “…this consideration is not enlivened…”. The applicant submitted that, even though the Tribunal had considered the legal consequences of its decision, its finding that the consideration was “not enlivened” was erroneous. The applicant submitted that the words “not enlivened” had their ordinary meaning and meant that the Tribunal regarded this consideration as not arising at all. It was submitted that, therefore, the Tribunal did not consider the legal consequences of its decision.

11    Whilst I accept that words “not enlivened” may be read as having the meaning for which the applicant contends, read fairly and as a whole without an eye attuned to error, I do not consider that this is what the Tribunal meant by using those words: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259 at 272. Rather, I consider the Tribunal to have been conveying that, having considered the legal consequences of its decision, those considerations were not ones which the Tribunal considered were ones which arose in favour of or against the applicant such that they were to be given neutral weight. This reflects the substance of what the Tribunal had actually done in discharging its obligations on the review. The Tribunal clearly had regard to the legal consequences of its decision (as addressed above). It was then seeking to evaluate whether those considerations fell in favour of the applicant or against him. In my view, it was in substance reasoning that the considerations were not enlivened in favour of the applicant, such that they were neutral.

12    Ground 1 has not been established.

2.    GROUND 2

13    The applicant contends that the Tribunal failed to comply with paragraph 8.3(1) of Direction 110 by failing to consider the impact of the decision on the applicant’s parents.

14    Paragraph 8.3 of Direction 110 provides:

(1)     Decision-makers must consider any impact of the decision on the non-citizen’s immediate family members in Australia, where those family members are Australian citizens, Australian permanent residents, or people who have a right to remain in Australia indefinitely.

(2)     Where consideration is being given to whether to cancel a non-citizen’s visa or whether to revoke the mandatory cancellation of their visa, the decision-maker must also consider the strength, nature and duration of any other ties that the non-citizen has to the Australian community. In doing so, decision-makers must have regard to:

a)     how long the non-citizen has resided in Australia, including whether the non-citizen arrived as a young child, noting that:

i.     less weight should be given where the non-citizen began offending soon after arriving in Australia; and

ii.     more weight should be given to time the non-citizen has spent contributing positively to the Australian community

b)     the strength, duration and nature of any family or social links with Australian citizens, Australian permanent residents and/or people who have an indefinite right to remain in Australia.

15    The applicant contended that the text and structure of paragraph 8.3 was such that they deal with related but different considerations. In this respect, the applicant relied upon Moore J’s reasoning in Brown v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 323 at [49]-[57], which, in turn, considered the decision of Derrington J in Siale v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2025] FCA 608 at [52].

16    I agree with Moore J’s reasoning in Brown at [49]-[57]. It is useful to set out his Honour’s reasons (to which I have nothing to add):

[49]     Some observations may be made about paragraph 8.3 of Direction 110. First, the chapeau to paragraph 5.2 of Direction 110 directs a decision-maker to the Primary Considerations and Other Considerations “to the extent relevant in the particular case…that must be considered” in making a decision under ss 501 and 501CA of the Migration Act. Therefore, if a Primary Consideration is relevant in the particular case, it must be considered.

[50]     Secondly, the threshold for the applicability of paragraph 8.3(1) is different from the threshold for paragraph 8.3(2). Paragraph 8.3(1) applies where consideration is being given to refuse, cancel or revoke the mandatory cancellation of a non-citizen’s visa, whereas paragraph 8.3(2) does not apply where consideration is being made to refuse a visa.

[51]     Thirdly, paragraphs 8.3(1) and 8.3(2) concern different types of relationships.

[52]     Fourthly, paragraphs 8.3(1) and 8.3(2) are directed to different enquiries. Paragraph 8.3(1) is concerned with the impact of a visa decision on the non-citizen’s immediate family members in Australia. Paragraph 8.3(2) is concerned with the strength, nature and duration of any other ties the non-citizen has to the Australian community.

[53]     The structure of Primary Consideration 3 is relatively straightforward. Under paragraph 8.3(1), the decision maker must consider any impact of the decision on the relatively narrow class of persons consisting of the non-citizen’s immediate family members (if they are Australian citizens, permanent residents, or otherwise have a right to remain in Australia indefinitely).

[54]     Paragraph 8.3(2) requires additional consideration (“must also consider”) in the cases to which it applies (ie when considering whether to cancel or revoke the mandatory cancellation of a relevant visa). That consideration is additional to any consideration under paragraph 8.3(1). It is also potentially much broader. It requires consideration of the strength, nature and duration of “any other ties” to the Australian community. Merely by way of example:

(a)    the non-citizen might have ties with family members who are not “immediate family”, or potentially with immediate family who are not Australian citizens, permanent residents or persons who have a right to remain in Australia indefinitely;

(b)    the non-citizen might have ties with friends in the Australian community; or

(c)    the non-citizen might have ties with the broader community: eg the non-citizen might be coaching a sporting team, or a member of an association, or doing volunteer work, or working in a business as part of a team.

[55]     The observations in Siale at [52], set out earlier, highlight the distinction between paragraphs 8.3(1) and 8.3(2). There is one aspect of the quoted passage from Siale which requires comment, being the observation of Derrington J that paragraph 8.3(2) is concerned with the impact on the non-citizen of the loss of any other ties. Whilst the relevant consideration may well include considering the impact on the non-citizen, I do not consider that paragraph 8.3(2) can be read as limiting the required consideration to that subject. Indeed, unlike paragraph 8.3(1), paragraph 8.3(2) is not expressed in terms of “impact” at all. It may in any event be necessary to consider the effect on others: eg the impact on the local cricket team of the loss of their coach, the impact on an Australian of the loss of a good friend and provider of support, or the impact on a business of the loss of a valued employee.

[56]     Whilst paragraphs 8.3(1) and 8.3(2) deal with different considerations, it does not follow that a decision-maker is required rigidly to consider those paragraphs separately in its Reasons, so long as the Reasons indicate that the decision maker considered and understood the relevant matters in paragraphs 8.3(1) and 8.3(2).

17    In the present case, the applicant contended that the Tribunal did not consider the impact of his removal on specific members of his immediate family, namely, his mother and father. The applicant’s parents were identified as members of his immediate family in his statement of facts, issues and contentions (SFIC). The applicant had submitted in the SFIC that his mother and father would suffer “substantial emotional, practical and financial hardship” if his visa cancellation was not revoked. This submission was raised in the context that the applicant had lived in Australia since 1989, albeit with an intervening period of residence in Fiji as a child. The applicant’s claims about parents and siblings were identified by the Tribunal at TD [129], where it set out the applicant’s summary of his claims as follows:

My father…has been my guiding force throughout my life. He has always provided me with emotional support, guidance and stability. My relationship with him is close and essential. He has shaped the person I am today. Being forced to leave Australia would not just separate me from my father it would cause him immense grief and heartache. Losing his son would be devastating and the thought of permanently being apart from him is unbearable.

I lost contact with my mother for many years … Recently she moved to Australia to reconnect and rebuild the relationship we had lost over time. This reconnection has been incredibly important to both of us. Deportation would destroy the progress we’ve made in reconnecting and cause significant emotional pain for both of us.

My siblings…are all in Australia and we share a strong lifelong bond. Being removed from Australia would sever these relationships and leave my family without my support, love and presence. The emotional impact on my father and siblings would be profound as they rely on me as much as I rely on them.

My family has been my anchor through all the challenges I’ve faced including my past mistakes, incarceration and my rehabilitation journey. Being taken away from them would not just affect me it would ripple through every member of my family leaving a hole in all of our lives that cannot be replaced.

18    The Tribunal also had before it evidence from both the applicant’s father and mother. It also received oral evidence from the applicant’s mother. The applicant’s mother is a New Zealand citizen but migrated permanently to Australia in 2023. Her evidence included the impact that the applicant’s removal would have on her. For example, she spoke of “as a mother, a feeling of guilt, anxiety and helplessness that will surely disrupt our family unit that we are trying to rebuild and is evident in my making the move from New Zealand two years ago to try and rebuild broken relationships in my family…[t]he devastating effect of his removal is stressful enough at my age, and I do not want to see myself and our older members go through long term mental and health issues overtime as well”). She also described the applicant’s visa issues as resulting in her hopes being “shattered”. Whilst the applicant’s mother was living in a rural area, the Tribunal recorded her evidence was that she would “willingly move interstate to be closer to him if he could remain in Australia” (TD [71]), and that the applicant’s circumstances were “taking an adverse toll on her health” (TD [72]). The applicant’s father has resided in Australia since at least 1999. He gave evidence that if the applicant was forced to leave Australia “this will break up the family, causing hardship and emotional distress to all members”.

19    The Tribunal addressed paragraph 8.3 of Direction 110 at TD [128]-[142]. After setting out the summary of the applicant’s claims at TD [129] (as extracted above), the Tribunal observed as follows at TD [130]:

The evidence about the strength of the Applicant’s familial links in Australia differs somewhat to his claims above. A Sentencing Assessment Report dated 2024 states his ‘support network is limited to his partner and some close friends’. There are references in custodial records to the Applicant’s having relatively limited past contact with his parents, including because his mother lived in New Zealand for 20 years, and because his father kicked him out of the family home at the about the age of 15 or 16 and then lived interstate. The Tribunal has considered a brief letter dated 18 January 2024 from the Applicant’s father, which does not appear to reflect knowledge of the Applicant’s relationship circumstances since 2023. The Applicant’s mother currently lives in southern Victoria whereas the Applicant resides in Sydney. She has only physically seen him once since 1998, during an Easter 2025 visit to Villawood Immigration Detention Centre. Any future intention for her to live geographically closer to the Applicant is aspirational.

20    It appears that at TD [130] the Tribunal was scrutinising the claims that had been made by the applicant and the evidence given by his mother and father against other documentary evidence which cast doubt on the existence and/or the strength of the ties between the applicant and his parents. However, as I return to below, the Tribunal did not make any express finding to the effect that the applicant’s mother and father were not members of his immediate family or that they would not be affected by his removal. There was no express acceptance or rejection of the evidence of the applicant, his mother or father. At best, there was a characterisation of some of the evidence as demonstrating “limited past contact”, an absence of knowledge by his father of the applicant’s current relationships, and an “aspirational” desire on the part of his mother to move closer to her son.

21    The Tribunal then turned to consider the applicant’s relationship with and ties to Ms BC and their respective children, and his ties to the community: TD [131]-[139]. The Tribunal concluded as follows at TD [140]-[142]:

140.    The Applicant’s connection to the Australian community is very strong. He has lived here for most of his life and has strong ties to his biological children, Ms BC, members of her family, his stepchildren, through employment, and a network of supportive friends.

141.     The Tribunal accepts a non-revocation decision would have negative emotional, practical and financial effects on Ms BC and her children. It is also likely to affect Ms AA and the Applicant’s biological children through his ability to pay child support. The Tribunal accepts Ms BC does not currently intend accompanying the Applicant to Fiji, including because of opportunities she and her children have in Australia. Although not expressly stated, the Tribunal has inferred from Ms BC’s Aboriginality claim that this may bear on her decision. In the event of non-revocation, Ms BC would be confronted by an undoubtedly difficult but ultimately personal decision. If she decided to remain in Australia, her ability to maintain contact with the Applicant would likely be limited to telephone communication and infrequent visits. If she accompanied him to Fiji on a permanent or intermittent basis, this could adversely impact the life she aspires to for herself and her children in Australia. Her eldest child turns 18 in early 2026, however, and can make his own choices. The Applicant’s prosocial friends who have submitted supportive references would also likely be disappointed by a non-revocation decision. That said, the effect on them is unlikely to rise higher than disappointment or sadness.

142.     The Applicant’s long residence in Australia and breadth of ties are such that this primary consideration weighs substantially in favour of revocation.

22    The applicant submitted that the Tribunal failed to consider the impact that non-revocation of the cancellation of the applicant’s visa would have on his parents. The applicant submitted that the focus of the reasons at TD [141] was the impact on Ms BC (the applicant’s wife) and her children, Ms AA (the applicant’s former partner) and the applicant’s biological children, and the applicant’s “prosocial friends”.

23    It was submitted that as nothing was said about the applicant’s parents, it should be inferred that the Tribunal failed to consider the impact upon them contrary to the requirement to do so.

24    The Minister acknowledged that the Tribunal “…made findings regarding the negative impact of a non-revocation decision on various members of the applicant’s family and friends but, as the applicant observes, did not specifically refer to any negative impact on his parents”. The Minister submitted that the degree of consideration required of the Tribunal in respect of a particular matter depends upon the centrality of the issue and the prominence it assumes in the representations: citing Singh v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 3; 267 FCR 200 at [37] (Reeves, O’Callaghan and Thawley JJ). The Minister submitted that the Tribunal’s reasons did not disclose error in light of the established principle that a “decision-maker is not obliged to make actual findings of fact as an adjudication of all material claims” made by an applicant: citing Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 17; 275 CLR 582 (M1/2021) at [24] (Kiefel CJ, Keane, Gordon and Steward JJ). The Minister submitted that at TD [130], the Tribunal in essence made findings that cast doubt on the strength of the applicant’s relationship with his parents based on other documentary records such that “…the Tribunal's level of engagement with this matter [was] appropriate” and that “…the omission of the parents from the findings at…[TD [141]]…does not demonstrate a failure to consider the matter. Rather, it reflects the Tribunal’s earlier findings at [129]-[130]…regarding the strength of those relationships”.

25    I do not accept the Minister’s contentions. As set out above, paragraph 8.3(1) required the Tribunal to consider “any impact of the decision” on the applicant’s “immediate family members” in Australia. The Tribunal did not comply with this requirement.

26    It was common ground that the words “immediate family members” are not defined. In one sense, the word “immediate” may be seen as pointing to the closeness of the relevant familial bond (irrespective of whether it is biological, legal (by marriage) or social (by living arrangements or by reason of ongoing interaction)) so as to distinguish those who are members of an immediate biological, legal or social family to those who are more distant in terms of the closeness of that bond. In another sense, the word “immediate” may also be seen as pointing to the proximity of the relevant familial relationship so as to distinguish those who are part of a household to those who are not. In context, I consider that the word “immediate” is not to be narrowly construed, and each of these meanings (and possibly others) may be applicable depending on the circumstances of the case at hand and the particular claims that are made. The intention of paragraph 8.3(1) to be objectively divined from its text and structure is to require a decision-maker to consider the impact of the decision on those persons who are a part of an immediate biological, legal or social family, where the immediacy may arise because of the proximity of living arrangements, or because of the existence of a relevant emotional or social bond, or the innumerable other ways in which an immediate family is to be viewed in the contemporary Australian community.

27    Within this context, ordinarily, a person’s immediate family members will likely include their parents but that may not always be the case. The relationship may not have the relevant degree of immediacy about it either because of estrangement between parent and child or for some other reason indicative of an absence of an immediate emotional or social bond due to irregularity of contact or distance, or some other reason. I do not regard paragraph 8.3(1) as requiring a decision-maker to have regard to the impact on every member of a person’s family, but only those which the evidence establishes are persons who are members of an immediate family. As I have indicated, much may depend on the claims and contentions advanced by an applicant, as well as the evidence.

28    In the present case, there was a clearly articulated claim made by the applicant that his mother and father were members of his immediate family who would be impacted by the decision. Both the applicant’s mother and father gave evidence about the impact that the applicant’s removal would have on them and on their family. At TD [129]-[130], the Tribunal had regard to the applicant’s claims and then scrutinised them against other evidence. As noted above, the Tribunal stated that the evidence indicated the applicant having “relatively limited past contact with his parents” and pointed to evidence indicating a previously strained relationship with his father (who appeared to have little knowledge of the applicant’s relationship circumstances since 2023) and his mother who the applicant had only physically seen once since 1998. In one sense, it may be that what the Tribunal was endeavouring to do at TD [130] was to reject the applicant’s claim, and his mother’s and father’s evidence, that his mother and father were members of his “immediate” family due to the absence of any meaningful relationship or bond with them. However, the Tribunal did not say this. It made no express finding that the applicant’s mother and father were not members of his immediate family. Nor did it make any express finding about the strength and duration of the ties, other than to point to evidence that potentially cast doubt on them.

29    I accept (as the Minister contended) that, if the Tribunal rejected the applicant’s claims and the relevant evidence that his mother and father were immediate family members, it was unnecessary for the Tribunal to then consider the impact of the applicant’s removal on them. However, as I have already said, the Tribunal made no finding to this effect. The Minister’s submissions invited me to infer that the Tribunal was, in fact, rejecting the claim that the applicant’s mother and father were members of his immediate family. I do not accept this contention. It requires reading more into TD [130] than appears on its face.

30    I also accept that it was not necessary for the Tribunal to adjudicate on every item of evidence by making factual findings in relation to them. Much depends on the evidence as bearing upon the central claims made. As observed by the Court in Singh at [37(2)(b)], the failure to mention “a particular piece of evidence should be analysed by reference to the whole of the material before the Tribunal and its prominence assessed by reference to all of the issues and the way in which the matter was conducted in the Tribunal”. The requisite degree of consideration is affected by the centrality to the issues of the matter with which it is said the decision-maker did not engage, and the prominence the matter assumed: Jabari v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 98; 298 FCR 431 at [55(4)] (Katzmann, Jackson and McEvoy JJ), citing Singh at [37(1)].

31    In the present case, the applicant made a clearly articulated claim that his mother and father would be impacted by his removal, and there was evidence called to that effect. In these circumstances, the Tribunal was required by paragraph 8.3(1) of Direction 110 to consider the relevant impact. As the Minister conceded, it did not do so. It follows that I am satisfied that Ground 2 is established in that the Tribunal failed to consider paragraph 8.3(1).

32    As to materiality of the error, the Minister submitted that in relation to Ground 2, it was “trite to state that a failure to consider a claim or evidence would lead to jurisdictional error in the sense that the error was material”. However, the Minister submitted that the error alleged in Ground 2 did not amount to a failure “to consider claims or evidence; rather, they argue with either the breadth of the consideration, or where in its reasons the consideration was made…”. The Minister accepted that if the Court found that the Tribunal had failed to consider a claim or evidence, it would likely follow the error was material.

33    I am satisfied here that the Tribunal failed to consider the claim that the applicant’s mother and father would be impacted by his removal from Australia. Whilst the Tribunal considered some of the relevant evidence, it did not consider the claim or discharge its obligation under paragraph 8.3(1) of Direction 110.

34    Ground 2 is therefore made out.

3.    GROUND 3

35    The applicant contends that the Tribunal failed to comply with paragraph 8.4(3) of Direction 110 which requires decision makers to consider the “best interests of minor children in Australia affected by the decision” and provides that “[i]f there are two or more relevant children, the best interests of each child should be given individual consideration to the extent that their interests may differ”.

36    The applicant has four biological children and two stepchildren, along with nieces and nephews: TD [144]. The evidence before the Tribunal was that one of the applicant’s biological children (the second youngest, referred to as “Child I”) has special needs, including autism, an anxiety disorder and significant learning difficulties, which require ongoing care, funds and support. The evidence before the Tribunal included the following:

(a)    in his statement dated 28 May 2025, the applicant explained that Child I “has special needs and requires ongoing care and support. He has an anxiety disorder and significant learning difficulties”. The applicant went on to describe Child I’s treatment, the financial barriers to that treatment, his role in providing specific financial and emotional support to Child I, and the impact that his removal would have on Child I;

(b)    in his statement received by the Tribunal on 17 November 2025, the applicant gave further evidence to similar effect. For example, he stated that Child I “has anxiety, autism and learning difficulties and the consistency of having both parents present is vital for his stability and progress… He requires ongoing speech therapy, psychiatric support and paediatric care… Since I have been detained, he has struggled significantly. He now attends school for only two hours per day because his mother cannot manage his needs alone”;

(c)    in her 5 November 2025 statement, the applicant’s wife, Ms BC, gave evidence to similar effect about Child I (her stepson); and

(d)    the applicant gave similar evidence to a psychologist, Mr Billel Rababi.

37    The above evidence had been relied on by the applicant as a consideration specific to Child I, which meant that Child I’s interests differed from his two other biological siblings.

38    The Tribunal considered the best interests of minor children at TD [143]-[156]. The Tribunal identified the obligation arising from paragraph 8.4(3) of Direction 110 at TD [143], and stated as follows:

145.    In terms of the Applicant’s relationship with his biological children with Ms AA, the Tribunal has considered his recent claims174 and the oral evidence of his eldest child, who turns 18 in early 2026. The other children are between 8 and 14. It is not possible on current evidence to reliably distinguish the younger children’s interests except by age. Given that there is more time before they become adults, during which the Applicant could play a positive role, the interests of the three younger children are given more weight.

39    The Minister accepted that there was evidence before the Tribunal that Child I had special needs. The Minister further accepted that this evidence was not specifically addressed by the Tribunal in its reasons, and that the Tribunal did not distinguish the interests of the applicant's children on this basis. However, the Minister drew attention to the fact that at TD [148] the Tribunal commented on the lack of direct evidence from the three younger children or the children's mother (Ms AA). The Minister submitted that it was relevant that there was no independent evidence in support of the claim that the applicant's children had special needs. Taking these matters into account, the Minister submitted that the Tribunal appreciated that cl 8.4(3) of Direction 110 required it to give individual consideration to the best interests of each minor child to the extent that their interests may differ, but found it was not possible on the evidence to reliably do so. The Minister submitted that the Tribunal had not thereby misconstrued its obligations under cl 8.4(3).

40    I do not accept the Minister’s submissions. There was clearly evidence before the Tribunal that Child I had special needs. Those needs made Child I’s interests different to those of the other children. It is plain that the applicant had advanced a claim that Child I had special needs and that these should be taken into account in the Tribunal’s consideration as to the appropriate decision to be made in the review. The Tribunal failed to refer to Child I’s special needs such that it is to be readily inferred that the relevant evidence in this respect was ignored. The Tribunal’s statement at TD [145] that it was not possible to “reliably distinguish the younger children’s interests except by age” does not explain why the evidence from the applicant and Ms BC as to Child I’s special needs was unreliable, which reinforces in my view that the Tribunal overlooked this evidence. By overlooking that evidence, the Tribunal had not merely failed to pay attention to an item of evidence but had failed to consider an important aspect of the applicant’s claims in the review and thereby failed to comply with paragraph 8.4(3) of Direction 110.

41    The Minister properly accepted that if this error was established, it was material. I am satisfied that Ground 3 is established.

4.    GROUND 4

42    The applicant contends that the Tribunal failed to comply with paragraph 9.2(1)(a) of Direction 110 which required the Tribunal to “consider the extent of any impediments that the non-citizen may face if removed from Australia to their home country…taking into account (a) the non-citizen’s age and health”.

43    The Tribunal addressed this consideration at TD [174]-[183]. Within these paragraphs, the Tribunal gave detailed consideration at TD [175]-[178] to the evidence before it concerning the applicant’s serious eye condition (called keratoconus) for which he was receiving ongoing treatment, including multiple surgeries, at the Sydney Eye Hospital. At TD [179]-[183], the Tribunal considered the language or cultural barriers the applicant would face if returned to Fiji, and the supports available to him there. Whilst the applicant acknowledged that the Tribunal considered these matters, he submitted that the Tribunal failed to consider relevant evidence and information concerning the applicant’s mental health and the impediments that would arise for the applicant from these health issues if he was returned to Fiji. Specifically, the applicant contended that the Tribunal failed to refer to or consider the following evidence that was relevant to the applicant’s mental health when considering paragraph 9.2(1)(a) of Direction 110:

(a)    a letter from a psychologist, Ms Diamond, that was dated 20 December 2023, which noted that she had provisionally diagnosed the applicant with “major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety, complex post-traumatic stress disorder and alcohol use disorder” and which recommended that the applicant continue with trauma informed psychological therapy, which would likely be required in the long term due to the pervasive nature of his developmental trauma;

(b)    a report from a psychologist, Mr Rababi, dated 13 November 2025. Mr Rababi was also cross-examined at the hearing before the Tribunal: TD [74]. Mr Rababi gave evidence that:

(i)    the applicant suffers from “complex and long standing” “developmental trauma, major depressive disorder (MDD), generalised anxiety disorder (GAD), and alcohol misuse disorder”;

(ii)    the applicant’s symptoms are consistent with “diagnostic criteria for major depressive disorder, generalised anxiety disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as outlined in the DSM-5-TR3”; and

(iii)    the applicant’s removal to Fiji would “sever his access to ongoing psychological support” and have “a profoundly detrimental impact on his mental and physical health, significantly jeopardising his recovery and rehabilitation” (HB 495); and

(c)    evidence that the applicant was prescribed an antidepressant in 2021 that is used for treating post-traumatic stress disorder.

44    The Minister submitted that the Tribunal had, in fact, considered and addressed this evidence in its reasons, including that given by Ms Diamond and Mr Rababi: TD [103]-[104], [107] and [118]. The Minister contended that the Tribunal gave this evidence little weight, such that there was no evidence to support the assertion that the applicant would not have access to appropriate services in Fiji: TD [104] and [118]. The Minister further observed that the specific claim the applicant had made in the SFIC was that his “childhood trauma, including sexual abuse by a cousin, resulted in estrangement and rejection by extended family members”. The Minister submitted that the Tribunal addressed this claimed childhood mistreatment and accepted the possibility that the applicant may have an unplanned encounter with the responsible cousin if returned to Fiji but the Tribunal noted that the applicant would not be required to live in the same area as that cousin: TD [180]. The Minister further submitted that the only claim that the applicant made about absence of access to services in Fiji related to those concerning treatment of his eye condition.

45    I am not satisfied Ground 4 has been established. The Tribunal had regard to the evidence of both Ms Diamond and Mr Rababi, and, as the Minister submitted, decided to give that evidence little weight.

46    In respect of Ms Diamond’s evidence, the Tribunal stated at TD [103] and [107]:

103.    The Applicant submits he has broken ‘the cycles that once controlled [him]’ by seeing a counsellor at the ‘Wellnest Clinic’, a ‘drug and alcohol counsellor at Woy Woy Hospital’, and by attending Alcoholics Anonymous (‘AA’). He said counselling has helped him engage in ‘healing’ and to learn strategies to ‘maintain accountability in all areas of [his] life’. He refers to sobriety since being imprisoned in late 2023 and re-engaging with his faith as ‘a central part of [his] rehabilitation’. He intends continuing with AA ‘if needed’ to support ‘long term sobriety’. The Tribunal notes that apart from a single referral relating to ‘Woy Woy General Practice’, there is no corroboration for the Applicant’s claims about Woy Woy Hospital or AA. In terms of the Wellnest Clinic, a letter from psychologist Ms Emma Diamond dated 20 December 2023127 was considered by the Court in April 2024. Ms Diamond refers to the Applicant only attending two sessions with her in late 2023. She also stated:

Following his initial assessment, including semi-structured interview and psychometric measures, it appears that Mr. Ranavue meets clinical threshold for provisional diagnoses of major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety, complex post-traumatic stress disorder, and alcohol use disorder. He reports a long history of chronic and significant abuse and neglect from an early age. It is recommended that Mr. Ranavue continue with traumainformed psychological therapy. It is likely that this therapy will be required in the long term due to the pervasive nature of his developmental trauma.

(Emphasis added.)

…

107.     Little weight is placed on the Applicant’s brief interaction with Ms Emma Diamond in late 2023. The two sessions he attended are of a preliminary nature and there is no persuasive evidence he has meaningfully advanced her treatment recommendations.

47    In relation to Mr Rababi’s evidence, the Tribunal stated as follows at [104] and [118]:

104.    The Applicant claims in his most recent statement to be a ‘low risk member of the community’ and wants to show through his future conduct that he is ‘not a risk’ at all.129 In terms of independent recidivism risk assessments:

(a)     Mr Billel Rababi’s oral evidence was set out earlier. In terms of recidivism risk, Mr Rababi stated in his report:

Risk of Recidivism

Mr. Ranavue’s risk of recidivism is closely aligned with his continued engagement in treatment, maintenance of sobriety, and the presence of stable social and occupational supports. His offending history demonstrates a clear nexus between alcohol misuse and criminal behaviour, with each offence occurring during periods of intoxication. Since achieving sobriety, he has demonstrated strong insight into the role of alcohol in his offending and has expressed a sustained commitment to abstinence. He recognises the importance of addressing his underlying mental health conditions and trauma as protective factors against relapse.

He has repeatedly expressed accountability for his past actions, refraining from excuses and openly acknowledging the connection between his mental health, lifestyle, and offending behaviour. His participation in rehabilitation programs— including anger management, emotional regulation, domestic violence awareness, and stress management—has further enhanced his self-awareness and capacity for behavioural change. If Mr. Ranavue continues to maintain employment, access therapeutic support, preserve his social connections, and remain abstinent from alcohol, the evidence suggests his risk of reoffending is significantly reduced. His insight, remorse, and demonstrated willingness to engage in ongoing treatment collectively indicate a reduced risk of recidivism, provided these protective factors remain in place.

Recommendations / Treatment Plan

If Mr. Ranavue is granted permission to remain in Australia, it is recommended that he resume treatment with his previous psychologist at the Wellness Clinic in Woy Woy, where he has an established therapeutic rapport. The treatment plan should incorporate structured alcohol counselling alongside CBT to address maladaptive thought patterns linked to depression, anxiety, and substance use. CBT-T or EMDR should be used to process unresolved trauma, on relapse prevention, maintaining sobriety, and enhancing coping strategies, will best support Mr Ranavue’s sustained recovery and rehabilitation.

A psychiatric referral is also advised for assessment and potential medication to manage mood and anxiety symptoms. A coordinated, trauma-informed approach addressing both mental health and substance misuse, while focusing and DBT to strengthen emotional regulation, distress tolerance, and interpersonal effectiveness.

…

118.    It remains of concern to the Tribunal that despite considerable past supports the Applicant has been unable to overcome his alcohol addiction since 2010, regulate his emotions, or meaningfully change the course of his life. His past responses to community-based supervision have been sporadic and there is a dearth of evidence about targeted treatment for persistent alcoholism. A formal warning from immigration authorities in 2011, non-custodial dispositions and periods of imprisonment have not curbed this repeated pattern of behaviour. He is yet to meaningfully undertake the interventions recommended by practitioners, with whom past engagement has been limited. Mr Rababi’s assessment about the Applicant’s potential to reduce his risk is highly conditional, is not based on all available documentary materials, relies entirely on clinical judgement during a relatively brief consultation, is unassisted by actuarial testing relevant to risk, and lacks a complete understanding of key circumstances that are relevant to the Applicant’s risk or relapse and recidivism. Mr Rababi’s moderation of the high AUDIT result is largely based on the Applicant’s self-reported claims about protective factors relating to sobriety that Mr Rababi has not personally assessed.

48    The Tribunal’s assessment of Mr Rababi’s evidence is to be viewed in the context of its earlier outline of his evidence at TD [74], as follows:

Mr Rabadi gave oral evidence by video on 22 December 2025. He adopted Exhibit A9 as true and correct. Key aspects of his oral testimony are summarised as follows:

(a)     Mr Rababi interviewed the Applicant via audiovisual link for two hours on 13 November 2025, and then for 20 minutes the following day to ‘validate information’. He said while it is preferrable to conduct interviews in person, an audiovisual interview is accurate and does not affect a report’s validity.

(b)     Mr Rababi confirmed the only documents he considered in preparing his report were the Applicant’s criminal history, sentencing remarks between 2010 and 2024, a State Parole Authority letter dated 31 October 2023, and the Applicant’s Statutory Declaration dated 28 May 2025. Otherwise, his report is based on the Applicant’s self-reported claims. He could not recall if the Applicant had breached conditional liberty conditions such as bail, AVO, or ICO.

(c)     In terms of the DASS-21, BAI, BDI-II, PCL-5, and AUDIT methodologies he used, Mr Rababi said these are ‘screeners just to get an overall view on symptoms’. Their completion does not require specialised training, but interpretation of results does. Mr Rababi said he put questions to the Applicant verbally and then recorded responses on the relevant forms.

(d)     Much of Ms Carnell’s cross-examination focussed on Mr Rababi’s assessment of the Applicant’s risk of relapsing into alcohol abuse and committing further crimes. Mr Rababi diagnosed the Applicant with ‘Alcohol Use Disorder Severe, in sustained remission (F10.21)’. He said this is because remission in a controlled custodial environment is not the same as abstinence in the community. Mr Rababi said the Applicant’s score on the Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (‘AUDIT’) indicates a ‘high risk’ and dependency on alcohol. Mr Rababi moderated this raw score in response to information gained during their meeting.

(e)     Mr Rababi said the Applicant turned to alcohol in the past in social and workplace settings, as a response to stressors, and because of ‘difficulties coping’. This included disturbing thoughts from childhood trauma. Mr Rababi said he could not say if the Applicant will remain sober, which was contingent on adherence to the factors listed at paragraphs 51-52 of his report and the efficacy of protective factors the Applicant invoked. Mr Rababi said he had not assessed these and relied on the Applicant’s claims. He said the Applicant is yet to complete required therapies and ‘definitely needs’ these, including consultation with a psychiatrist for medication support. If he completed treatment and adhered to the conditions mentioned in Mr Rababi’s report, he ‘would be in a good position to maintain abstinence’.

(f)     Mr Rababi is aware the Applicant completed some courses, including ‘around anger management’. In terms of counselling, Mr Rababi could not recall what the Applicant had done but has the impression counselling was continuing prior to his arrest. Mr Rababi also believed the Applicant had developed a positive therapeutic relationship with a practitioner at Woy Woy Hospital and ‘was scheduled for continuing treatment’. When put by Ms Carnell that interaction with this practitioner was at an early stage and quite limited, Mr Rababi said: ‘If he hasn’t completed any sustained treatment, it would increase the risk’.

(g)     Mr Rababi said factors such as financial stability, supportive relationships, and steady employment can help reduce risk of relapse. He was unaware the Applicant had experienced problem gambling in the past, or that Ms BC has her own problems with alcohol, or that the Applicant used illicit drugs such as cocaine recreationally. Mr Rababi said it was ‘critical’ the Applicant develop skills through counselling and therapy to prevent future relapse, which is yet to be achieved.

(h)     Mr Rababi did not provide a descriptor for the Applicant’s recidivism risk in his report despite this being requested in the letter of instruction. Mr Rababi said he believes this is currently ‘moderate’, which is based on his clinical judgement alone. Mr Rababi did not use actuarial risk assessment methodologies to assess the Applicant’s risk because he has not done any training in these. ‘Due to limitations’, he was also unable to administer ‘screeners for malingering and personality’ that would have taken four-and-a-half hours. When asked what the predictive validity of his opinion about risk is, Mr Rababi said he has no answer for that, it is a matter for the Tribunal, and his report focusses on ‘measures to reduce’ the Applicant’s risk.

(i)     Mr Rababi was asked about his assessment at paragraph 50 of the report that the Applicant’s removal would ‘sever his access to ongoing psychological support, continuity of care, and essential medical treatment for his degenerative eye condition, which is not adequately available in Fiji’. Mr Rababi agreed he has no expert knowledge about the health system in Fiji and said this assessment was based on the Applicant’s self-reported claims and from Mr Rababi’s discussions with other Fijian clients.

49    As will be apparent from the above, the applicant relied upon the evidence of Ms Diamond and Mr Rababi as demonstrating why he was at lower risk of recidivism or offending again. This evidence was not relied upon specifically to contend that the applicant would confront impediments if removed from Australia, though Mr Rababi gave evidence to the effect that the applicant’s removal would sever his access to ongoing support, continuity of care and essential medical treatment for his eye condition. Nevertheless, the Tribunal decided to give little weight to this evidence for reasons which included that the applicant had not taken up recommended treatment plans in the past and because of the limited nature of the consultations he had with Ms Diamond and Mr Rababi. The Tribunal also observed that Mr Rababi had no direct expert knowledge of the Fijian health system.

50    I accept the Minister’s contention that the applicant’s submissions in support of Ground 4 conflated two distinct but related matters. On the one hand, there was evidence that the applicant had or experienced mental health issues and might benefit from further treatment. On the other hand, there was an absence of probative evidence that the applicant’s removal to Fiji would expose him to an impediment of the kind contemplated by paragraph 9.2(1)(a) of Direction 110. Neither the apparent diagnoses nor the recommendations made by Ms Diamond addressed the availability or adequacy of mental health care in Fiji. Mr Rababi’s evidence had addressed a concern about the applicant’s access to medical services being severed, but the Tribunal gave those opinions little weight given that Mr Rababi had no direct expertise in relation to the Fijian health system (and had also assumed that the applicant was seeking continuous care in relation to his mental health issues). The Tribunal more generally gave Mr Rababi’s evidence little weight as his opinions were highly conditional, based on incomplete information and substantially dependent on the applicant’s self-reporting.

51    It followed that there was no evidence of probative weight that established the applicant would face impediments on account of his mental health issues if removed to Fiji and, to the extent that such issues might arise from the applicant potentially coming into contact with his cousin, the Tribunal had clearly considered that matter.

52    Paragraph 9.2(1)(a) of Direction 110 did not require the Tribunal to make further findings about treatment in Fiji or the impediments to being returned to Fiji on account of mental health where no properly developed claim, supported by probative country-specific evidence, had been advanced. I am satisfied from my reading of the Tribunal's reasons as a whole that the Tribunal considered the applicant's mental health issues at a “level of engagement” that reflected the “length, clarity and degree of relevance of the representations” made by the applicant: M1/2021 at [25] per Kiefel CJ, Keane, Gordon and Steward JJ.

53    Ground 4 is not established.

5.    DISPOSITION

54    For the foregoing reasons, I am satisfied that Grounds 2 and 3 have been established. It follows that there should be a writ of certiorari quashing the Tribunal Decision and a writ of mandamus remitting the applicant’s application for review to the Tribunal for determination according to law.

55    The applicant sought costs against the Minister. I was informed that the applicant’s Counsel appeared pro bono on the basis of a conditional costs agreement. I am satisfied that the Minister should pay the applicant’s costs as agreed or taxed, but will give the parties a period of seven days to apply to the Court should they seek to vary that order in any way.

Associate:

Dated:    1 September 2026