Federal Court of Australia

Mbuzi v Aye (Joint Case Management) [2026] FCA 1224

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    Previous orders as to the conduct of the application are vacated.

2.    Pursuant to s 25(2)(e) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), the application for leave to appeal is to be heard and determined by a Full Court.

3.    The application for leave to appeal is to be heard and determined at the same time as the applications for leave to appeal in each of QUD235/2026 and QUD81/2026.

4.    The application is referred to a registrar for the making of further directions as to the conduct of the Full Court hearing.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    Previous orders as to the conduct of the application are vacated.

2.    Pursuant to s 25(2)(e) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), the application for leave to appeal is to be heard and determined by a Full Court.

3.    The application for leave to appeal is to be heard and determined at the same time as the applications for leave to appeal in each of QUD325/2025 and QUD235/2026.

4.    The application is referred to a registrar for the making of further directions as to the conduct of the Full Court hearing.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    Pursuant to s 25(2)(e) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), the application for leave to appeal is to be heard and determined by a Full Court.

2.    The application for leave to appeal is to be heard and determined at the same time as the applications for leave to appeal in each of QUD325/2025 and QUD81/2026.

3.    The application for leave to appeal shall stand as an appeal.

4.    The grounds stated in the application shall stand as the grounds of appeal.

5.    The application is referred to a registrar for the making of further directions as to the conduct of the Full Court hearing including the making of submissions as to whether it is appropriate for the Full Court to hear and determine whether a vexatious proceeding order should be made that applies to other proceedings brought by the applicant in this Court against the fourth respondent or its former or current officers or employees.

6.    Upon the appeal being assigned to a Full Court, the Full Court be requested to consider whether it is appropriate for it to hear and determine whether a vexatious proceeding order should be made that applies to other proceedings brought by the applicant in this Court against the fourth respondent or its former or current officers or employees and, if so, the appropriate terms of any such order.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

COLVIN J:

1    Mr Josiyas Mbuzi is a former employee of World Vision Australia. He is the applicant in many proceedings in this Court arising out of his employment by World Vision Australia. Mr Mbuzi is conducting those proceedings on his own behalf. Two of those proceedings are QUD523/2023 and QUD24/2024 commenced in the original jurisdiction of the Court. A further three of those proceedings are applications for leave to appeal, namely QUD325/2025, QUD81/2026 and QUD235/2026. The application for leave to appeal in QUD235/2026 seeks to challenge a vexatious proceedings order made in a further proceeding brought by Mr Mbuzi, namely QUD542/2024. The vexatious proceeding order was confined to the institution of further proceedings by Mr Mbuzi against World Vision Australia or any of its current or former employees or officers without leave of the Court. The order did not apply to the further conduct of the other five proceedings to which I have referred.

2    At the end of July 2026, the five proceedings (QUD523/2023, QUD24/2024, QUD325/2025, QUD81/2026 and QUD235/2026) were allocated to me for joint case management. A joint case management hearing was held on 11 August 2026. At the hearing, I informed the parties that consideration was being given to convening a single Full Court hearing to deal with the three applications for leave to appeal. In addition, consideration was being given to whether the Court should invite submissions at that hearing as to whether the Court, on its own initiative, should make a vexatious proceedings order in respect of Mr Mbuzi's further conduct of the five proceedings. The latter possibility had been raised in an email to the parties on 27 July 2026 as a matter that would be considered at the joint case management hearing.

3    I note that applications for leave to appeal must be heard and determined by a single judge unless a judge directs that the application be heard and determined by a Full Court: s 25(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).

Mr Mbuzi's oral application for recusal

4    Mr Mbuzi's initial position was that I was required to recuse myself for bias. I heard submissions in support of his recusal request. For reasons I gave at the time, I declined to recuse myself from conducting the joint case management hearing. On the basis that Mr Mbuzi reserved his right to seek leave to appeal my decision to refuse to recuse myself, I heard further submissions from the parties.

The contentions of the parties as to the appropriate case management orders

5    Ultimately, the position of all parties was to the effect that they agreed that the applications for leave should be heard at a single Full Court hearing. However, Mr Mbuzi opposed the making of any orders that would mean that the single Full Court hearing would also consider whether any further vexatious proceeding order should be made against him in respect of any of the five applications. Mr Mbuzi emphasized that the vexatious proceedings order the subject of his application for leave to appeal in QUD235/2026 was an order that had been made in QUD542/2024 and it did not apply to proceedings that were already on foot at the time the order was made.

6    Mr Mbuzi also made submissions to the effect that there was an order in place by which the proceedings in QUD24/2024 were stayed pending the outcome of the application for leave to appeal in QUD325/2025. He submitted that in those circumstances it was not appropriate for any orders to be made that required steps to be taken in QUD24/2024. He also submitted that orders could not be made that would require a Full Court to consider whether orders should be made in the original jurisdiction of the Court and the Full Court hearing should be confined to the three applications for leave to appeal. Alternatively, he submitted that if there was jurisdiction to make the orders then it was inappropriate for such orders to be made because any such orders would deprive him of his right to appeal. Mr Mbuzi also submitted that there was significance in the fact that the vexatious proceeding order had been made in his absence. He also made submissions to the effect that he had been successful in opposing the making of such orders in other proceedings.

7    The position of the respondent parties was that they supported the making of directions that would mean that the single Full Court hearing would consider whether there should be any further vexatious proceeding order made against Mr Mbuzi. Further, they submitted that the question whether any such order should be made should be determined before the applications for leave to appeal. They made submissions to the effect that Mr Mbuzi would still be able to seek to bring an appeal in the High Court. Of course, an appeal to the High Court would require special leave.

8    I indicated that, in the circumstances, given the common position of the parties and in the interests of efficiency, orders should be made for the three applications for leave to be heard and determined at a single Full Court hearing. However, I would consider the position as to the precise terms of the orders and whether there should be orders as to whether the Full Court would also consider whether there should be any further vexatious proceedings order and, if so, the terms of any such order.

The provisions of the Federal Court of Australia Act concerning vexatious proceedings orders

9    Where a person has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings, the Court may make an order staying or dismissing all or part of any proceedings in the Court already instituted by the person: s 37AO(2)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act. It can prohibit the person from instituting proceedings, or proceedings of a particular type: s 37AO(2)(b). It can also make any other order that the Court considers appropriate: s 37AO(2)(c). For example, it could make an order that would require a party to obtain leave before proceeding with the conduct of proceedings already on foot at the time of the order. Further, the Court may make any such orders on its own initiative: s 37AO(3). It may only make such orders after hearing the person or giving them an opportunity to be heard: s 37AO(4).

10    If an order is made prohibiting the person from instituting proceedings or proceedings of a particular type then the applicant may apply for leave to institute a proceeding that is subject to the order: s 37AR.

11    Vexatious proceedings orders have been made by Full Courts following a process which allowed for the party concerned to file submissions and materials as to why such an order should not be made: see, for example, Ferdinands v Registrar Burns (Vexatious Proceedings Order) [2024] FCAFC 157 (Cheeseman, Goodman and McEvoy JJ), Luck v Secretary, Services Australia (Vexatious Proceedings Order) [2025] FCAFC 103 (Rofe, Hespe and Kennett JJ) and Laverack (formerly AZO24) v Commonwealth of Australia (Vexatious Proceedings Order) [2025] FCAFC 162 (Wigney, Lee and Raper JJ). In each of those instances, at the conclusion of the appeal, orders were made by the Court on its own initiative for the filing of submissions and materials. That course was taken even though there would be no right to appeal against those orders if made and the only course would be to seek special leave to appeal to the High Court. In each of the three cases referred to, the Full Court was persuaded that it was appropriate for vexatious proceeding orders to be made.

12    As those cases indicate, the power conferred upon the Court by s 37AO(3) to make vexatious proceedings orders on its own initiative may be exercised by a Full Court, and directions may be made as to the procedure to be followed by the Full Court. Although the procedure that was followed in the three cases to which I have referred was established after the hearing of the appeal, I see no reason why, in an appropriate case, such directions could not be made in advance of a Full Court hearing. However, as is explained below, such a course could only be followed if there was a direction by the Chief Justice or if a Full Court, once assigned, made such orders.

Further matters to be considered

13    It is necessary to have regard to two additional aspects. First, a vexatious proceeding order by a judge of this Court that is of the kind the subject of the application for leave to appeal in QUD235/2026 is a final order: s 37AO(5) of the Federal Court of Australia Act. Therefore, leave to appeal is not required and the appellate jurisdiction is to be exercised by a Full Court, being a court that consists of 3 or more judges: see s 14(1) and s 25 of the Federal Court of Australia Act.

14    Second, the original jurisdiction of the Court is to be exercised by a single judge except that the Chief Justice has a power to direct that the jurisdiction of the Court in a specific matter is to be exercised by a Full Court where the matter 'is of sufficient importance' for that to occur. However, once a Full Court has been assigned then it can consider whether the Full Court, on its own initiative, will make a vexatious proceedings order that applies to the matters before the Full Court or to other proceedings in the Court. That is because the power conferred by the Federal Court of Australia Act to consider on its own initiative to make a vexatious proceedings order may be exercised by a Full Court, as it was in each of the cases I have mentioned.

15    In those circumstances, I consider it appropriate to treat the application in QUD235/2026 for leave to appeal a vexatious proceeding order as an appeal that must be heard and determined by a Full Court. I propose to make orders to give effect to that view so that the application can proceed as an appeal. As a single judge, I have power to give directions about the practice and procedure to be followed in the appeal: see s 25(2B)(bd) and s 37P of the Federal Court of Australia Act. In the present case, the appeal concerns the vexatious proceedings order made in QUD542/2024.

16    The above matters have consequences for the appropriate case management orders to be made.

The case management of QUD235/2026 (appeal against vexatious proceedings order made in QUD542/2024)

17    Consideration of the reasons for the making of the vexatious proceedings order in QUD542/2024 shows that, before the primary judge, there was a considerable amount of material as to the extent of litigation that had been brought by Mr Mbuzi in this Court, in the Federal Circuit and Family Court and in the Supreme Court of Queensland and in other tribunals: Mbuzi v Aye (Vexatious Proceedings Order) [2026] FCA 237. On the appeal against the vexatious proceeding order, the Full Court will be required to consider those materials. A cursory examination of those materials indicates that Mr Mbuzi has brought a very considerable number of proceedings in this and other Courts. Indeed, at the joint case management hearing, Mr Mbuzi made a number of submissions which referred to his extensive experience as a litigant in this and other courts.

18    Having considered those materials, there is merit in the position advanced by the respondents to the effect that it would be appropriate for the Court on its own initiative to consider whether a vexatious proceeding order that applies to the other proceedings that Mr Mbuzi has commenced in this Court should be made. Further, in circumstances where the appeal in QUD235/2026 is to be heard and determined by a Full Court there would be efficiency in having that matter considered by the Full Court hearing Mr Mbuzi's appeal against the existing vexatious proceedings order. As the materials are required to be addressed by the parties in the conduct of the appeal it will be most efficient if any further question as to whether a vexatious proceeding order should be made that applies to other proceedings is heard and determined at the same time.

19    However, I am of the view that the authority that I have to make case management directions for the purposes of Mr Mbuzi's appeal against the vexatious proceedings order is confined to the conduct of that appeal. It does not extend to the making of an order that would refer to that Full Court consideration as to whether the Full Court on its own initiative should make a vexatious proceedings order that applied to one or more of the five applications. An order of that kind could only be made by a single judge following a direction by the Chief Justice that such a matter be referred to a Full Court or by a Full Court once allocated.

20    I note that it is the position of the respondents that their interlocutory application in QUD542/2024 as heard and determined by the primary judge included an application for vexatious proceedings orders staying or dismissing various proceedings brought by Mr Mbuzi, including QUD523/2023 and QUD24/2024. However, as to that aspect of the interlocutory application by the respondents, Rangiah J said at [100]:

It should be noted that I have not considered whether the applicant's other proceedings against World Vision and its employees already on foot in the Court before other judges are vexatious. The orders I make are not intended to affect those proceedings.

21    Therefore, if the position of the respondents is correct, then part of its interlocutory application was not determined. If so, it would be open to the respondents to renew that aspect of its application before the primary judge. However, there would be considerable inefficiency in that course in circumstances where the Full Court will be required to consider the materials that had been relied upon before the primary judge for the purposes of determining the appeal by Mr Mbuzi. It is also possible that the respondents to the appeal could seek to bring some form of cross appeal.

22    These are further reasons why, in the circumstances of the present case, it may be appropriate for orders to be made to enable the Full Court to determine all issues as to whether there should be vexatious proceedings orders and, if so, in what terms, in a single hearing. However, as I have explained, I am not able to make orders of that kind.

23    As I have explained, I have also concluded, as the parties accepted, that there will be efficiencies if the Full Court that is convened to hear the appeal in QUD235/2026 should, at the same time, hear and determine the applications for leave to appeal in QUD325/2025 and QUD81/2026.

24    However, I am not persuaded that it is necessary for any case management orders to be made in QUD523/2023 or QUD24/2024.

25    In all the circumstances, in the interests of efficiency in the use of the resources of the Court and to avoid the multiplicity of applications, there should be orders for QUD235/2026, QUD325/2025 and QUD81/2026 to be heard together. I will make orders to that effect and refer the question of further directions to a registrar. I will also make directions that will allow the Full Court when assigned to consider whether it is appropriate for the Full Court to hear and determine whether a vexatious proceeding order should be made that applies to other proceedings brought by Mr Mbuzi in this Court against World Vision Australia or its former or current officers or employees and, if so, the appropriate terms of any such order.

26    Mr Mbuzi made submissions to the effect that other judges had made orders as to the conduct of two of the applications for leave to appeal. Those are orders that may be vacated or varied to allow for the making of further case management orders that deal with those applications in the interests of efficiency.

27    Finally, I note that on 7 May 2025, Mr Mbuzi signed an acknowledgement of the terms of the Court's Litigant in Person Practice Note (GPN-LIP). His communications by email to my associate have not conformed to those requirements. All future communications in relation to the conduct of these proceedings are expected to conform with the requirements of that Practice Note, particularly paras 4.7 to 4.12. Failure to conform to those requirements may result in a stay of proceedings.

Associate:

Dated:    26 August 2026