Federal Court of Australia

GUE18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 1213

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The name of the First Respondent is amended to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.

2.    The appeal is dismissed.

3.    The Appellant is to pay the First Respondent’s costs, fixed in the amount of $5,000.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

HILL J:

introduction

1    This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Div 2) (FCFCOA): GUE18 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 421 (J). The primary judge dismissed an application for review of a decision of the former Administrative Appeals Tribunal, which affirmed a decision not to grant the Appellant a protection visa.

2    The Appellant’s notice of appeal largely repeats the arguments put to the primary judge. It is said that the primary judge erred in law by failing to find that:

    the Tribunal’s assessment of the Appellant’s credibility, based on inconsistencies in the date of conversion and land donation was legally unreasonable, because (it is said) those inconsistencies were minor or immaterial and he had plausible explanations for them (Ground 1);

    the Tribunal relied on an irrelevant consideration in treating Majlis Wahdat-ul-Muslimeen (MWM) as a political organisation. It is said the Tribunal failed to consider whether the Appellant’s understanding of MWM was religious in nature, and improperly used its characterisation of MWM to discredit the Appellant without proper evidentiary foundation (Ground 2);

    the Tribunal constructively failed to exercise its jurisdiction by not properly considering corroborative evidence, including a First Information Report (FIR) and evidence of the High Court advocate from Pakistan. It is said that the Tribunal’s rejection of these documents was based on generalised country information and failed to properly evaluate their probative value (Ground 3).

Those arguments should be rejected, essentially for the reasons given by the primary judge.

3    The Appellant represented himself at the hearing, and made different arguments, relating particularly to difficulties with the interpreter at the interview before the delegate. Those arguments should also be rejected. The appeal must therefore be dismissed with costs.

background

4    Arrival in Australia (Jul 2014): The Appellant is a citizen of Pakistan (J [2]). He arrived in Australia in July 2014 on a tourist visa that was valid for 3 months.

5    Application for protection visa (Oct 2014): On 22 October 2014, the Appellant applied for a protection visa. He claimed to fear harm because of his alleged conversion from the Sunni sect to the Shia sect of Islam, and because he donated a plot of land to MWM, a Shia organisation (J [2]).

6    Delegate refuses application (Sep 2015): On 2 September 2015, a delegate of the Minister refused the application for a protection visa. The delegate was not satisfied as to the credibility of the Appellant or the veracity of his claims.

7    Application to AAT (Sep 2015): On 30 September 2015, the Appellant applied to the Tribunal for merits review of the delegate’s decision.

8    AAT confirms refusal decision (Dec 2018): On 4 December 2018, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision (J [1]).

9    The Appellant’s key claim was that on return he would be killed by the Sunni extremist group “Sipah-e-Saba (Lashkar-e-Jhangvi)” (SSP), who threatened him because he “converted” from Sunni to Shia Islam and refused to sell them his deceased Shia father’s plot of land, but donated it for use as a Shia school (AAT [32]). The Tribunal did not find the Appellant to be a credible and truthful witness. The Tribunal had regard particularly to various inconsistencies in the Appellant’s evidence throughout the process, and the unpersuasive nature of some key aspects of his claims (AAT [34]).

10    “Conversion”: The Tribunal found that the Appellant’s evidence about his “conversion” from Sunni to Shia Islam over the course of his protection visa process to be contrived and inconsistent, including with country information. Country information emphasised that Sunni and Shia are sects of the same religion (Islam), and that no conversion is required (AAT [37], [38]).

11    Inconsistencies in timing of events: The Tribunal found that the Appellant’s evidence regarding the two events central to his claims – his alleged “conversion” and the handover of his father’s plot of land for a Shia school – was significantly undermined by inconsistencies in his evidence regarding the timing of these events (AAT [40]).

(a)    Throughout the protection visa process, the Appellant identified the date on which he was accepted into the Shia sect as 12 May 2014, and this was also given in the statements of the three witnesses (who provided evidence about his conversion). He also told the Tribunal and the Department that he decided to become a Shia on the day he handed over his land for the Shia school. However, the date the Appellant gave for this handover was 10 June 2014 – a month later than his claimed “conversion”. These June dates also appear on the land transfer document which the Appellant provided in support of his claims.

(b)    Moreover, in his statement submitted to the Department after his interview, the Appellant stated that his “conversion to the Shia sect” had taken place before he declined the SSP’s offer of money and donated the plot of land to the Shia mosque.

12    The Tribunal found that these inconsistencies “call[ed] into question the sequence of events that the [Appellant] claims resulted in threats from Sunni extremists and raise[d] serious doubts about the veracity of his evidence, as well as the supporting documents he provided” (AAT [40]).

13    Concerns about evidence regarding the MWM: The Tribunal was also concerned about the Appellant’s evidence regarding the MWM, the Shia organisation he initially identified as the recipient of his father’s plot of land for the Shia school (AAT [41]).

    The Appellant submitted two statements from the Secretary-General of the organisation’s Bhalwal district. The second statement described MWM as a “religious” organisation, not involved in any political activity or affiliated with any political party. At hearing, the Tribunal made four unsuccessful attempts to telephone the Secretary-General, whom the Appellant nominated as a witness in Pakistan (AAT [41]).

    At the hearing, the Appellant described MWM as a “community organisation”, taking care of Shia people in the area and “not a powerful organisation”. He reiterated that it was not a political party, part of a national political party or linked with any political party. However, after the hearing, the Tribunal found that, contrary to the Appellant’s evidence and Secretary-General’s statement, the web address identified on the letterhead of all the Secretary-General’s statements linked through to the site of the MWM Pakistan, a Shia political organisation. Further, sources such as Wikipedia and Pakistani media also identified the MWM as a major Shia political party with a presence all over the country, including in Punjab (AAT [42]).

    In light of these contradictions, the Tribunal invited the Appellant after the hearing to make submissions on whether he really had donated land to the MWM (AAT [43]). The Appellant’s response attached a statement from the Secretary-General of MWM on the same letterhead with the same link to the website of MWM Pakistan. The Secretary-General reiterated his earlier statement that MWM was “a religious organisation and is not engaged in any political activity nor is affiliated with any political party”, and stated that MWM “did not have any capability for engaging in political activities” and that “not a single person related to our party has contested the recent elections in Pakistan held in July 2018, neither for The National Assembly nor for the Provincial Assemblies. … In a nutshell, [MWM] Pakistan is a Shia religious organisation established solely for promoting and safeguarding the interests of Shia Community and do[es]n’t have any political connections or ambitions, whatsoever” (AAT [44]).

    The Tribunal found that the Appellant’s response (and the Secretary-General’s statement) did not explain why, if MWM was not a political organisation, the web address provided on the Secretary-General’s letterhead linked through to the website of the political organisation of the same name. The statement that no one related to the MWM contested the 2018 elections was inconsistent with Pakistan media reports. Those inconsistencies raised doubts as to whether the Appellant had been truthful in his evidence regarding his involvement with the MWM, and the genuineness of the documents purported to have been provided by the Secretary-General of the MWM’s Bhalwal branch (AAT [45]).

14    Land transfer document: The Tribunal had regard to a hand-written land transfer document and a letter from the Revenue Office provided by the Appellant which indicated that it was not possible to issue a computerised property ownership document (FARD). However, in light of DFAT’s advice that document fraud is endemic in Pakistan, as well as its concerns about the credibility of other material submitted by the Appellant and his credibility generally, the Tribunal did not attach any weight to these documents (AAT [47]).

15    FIR and statement from High Court advocate: The supporting documents provided by the Appellant included a First Information Report (FIR) dated 6 June 2014 regarding threats at his home on 5 June 2014, and a letter from a High Court advocate in Pakistan attesting that documents including the FIR were genuine (AAT [7], [14]). The Tribunal did not give weight to these documents.

    The Tribunal had regard to the FIRs. However, in light of DFAT advice regarding the prevalence of document fraud in Pakistan, the relative ease with which hand-written fraudulent FIRs might be produced and that DFAT does not consider the existence of an FIR to constitute evidence that the events described in the FIR actually occurred, the Tribunal did not attach weight to the FIRs submitted. Further, there were discrepancies between the versions of the FIR submitted to the Department and the Tribunal. Of most concern was that the original Punjabi document presented to the Tribunal bears a stamp of the “Police Station Bhalwal” which is absent from the same document on the Department file (AAT [54]).

    In view of DFAT advice that there are credible reports of Pakistani officials accepting bribes to verify fraudulent FIRs, the Tribunal did not attach weight to the written statement from the High Court advocate in Pakistan who claims to have verified the FIR and land transfer documents. The Tribunal noted that, during his witness evidence, although asked several times, the advocate was unable to explain how he went about getting police verification of these documents beyond saying that he “got confirmation from the police”, “got police verification” and “went personally to the police and obtained confirmation” (AAT [55]).

16    Application to FCFCOA (Dec 2018, Jun 2020, Feb 2025): On 28 December 2018, the Appellant applied to the FCFCOA for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision. The Appellant lodged an amended application on 23 June 2020, and a further amended application on 11 February 2025. The further amended application contained a single ground of review, which contended that the Tribunal failed to exercise its jurisdiction to properly assess the credibility of the Appellant's claims, or exercised it in a manner that was unreasonable. That ground had two particulars (see J [26], [34]):

a)     The [Appellant] was brought up in the Sunni sect of Islam by his mother, although his father and many other members of his family belonged to the Shia sect. He claimed that his father had asked him to donate a parcel of land to a Shia religious organisation after he died. The [Appellant] claimed that he did so, and also joined the Shia sect. The Tribunal found this claim was false on the basis of what it said were inconsistencies in the [Appellant]’s evidence. The Tribunal's findings were based on factually incorrect understanding of the evidence, or on an irrelevant finding about the nature of the organisation.

b)     The Tribunal made findings about credibility that unreasonably failed to consider corroborative evidence.

17    Primary judge dismisses application (Apr 2025): On 16 April 2025, the primary judge dismissed the application for judicial review.

18    Inconsistencies (particular (a)): The primary judge stated that the Tribunal identified three inconsistencies in the Appellant’s claim to have donated a plot of land for a Shia school (J [27]):

(a)    The Appellant said he “decided to become a Shia on the day he handed over his land for the Shia School”, but the date of the land transfer (10 June 2014) was a month later than his “claimed conversion” (12 May 2014).

(b)    The Appellant had said in his statement of 2 June 2015 that his “conversion” had taken place before he donated the land to the Shia group: see [11](b) above.

(c)    The Appellant said that the organisation to which he donated the land (MWM) was a political party, not a religious organisation.

19    The Appellant submitted that these first two inconsistencies were based on a factually incorrect reading of the evidence by the Tribunal (J [28]). However, the primary judge found that there was evidence before the Tribunal to support each of the various dates and other matters referred to by the Tribunal that gave rise to the inconsistencies (see J [31]).

20    On the third inconsistency, the Appellant submitted that the Tribunal did not explain why the nature of MWM had any relevance to the Appellant’s claim. However, the primary judge found that the Tribunal explained that the nature of MWM raised doubts about the genuineness of the Appellant’s claims, given the central importance to his claim that he had donated land to a religious Shia organisation (ie MWM), for a Shia school (J [32]).

21    Corroborative evidence (particular (b)): The Appellant complained that the Tribunal had failed to consider corroborative evidence; in particular, the FIR and the evidence of the High Court advocate who alleged to have verified the FIR. The primary judge rejected that argument, and found that it was clear from the Tribunal’s reasons that it had considered the evidence, and had given an evident and intelligible justification for not accepting it (J [35]-[36]).

22    Notice of appeal (Apr 2025): On 24 April 2025, the Appellant filed a notice of appeal against the decision of the primary judge. The notice contains the following three grounds of appeal, summarised in [2] above. The grounds of appeal broadly correspond to the two particulars of the ground of review before the primary judge, although (as explained below) appeal grounds 1 and 2 have a somewhat different emphasis from the arguments made below.

23    Appeal hearing (Aug 2026): The appeal was heard on 19 August 2026. The Appellant made submissions with the assistance of an interpreter. These submissions did not refer to the arguments in his notice of appeal, but raised completely different matters: see [28]-[38] below.

consideration

Two general comments

24    As the Appellant does not have a lawyer acting for him in this appeal, I begin with two general comments.

25    Court asks only whether the Tribunal decision was lawful: First, as explained to the Appellant at the hearing, the Court in judicial review proceedings does not determine whether the Tribunal’s decision was correct on the factual merits. Instead, the only issue is whether the Tribunal’s decision was lawfully made. The specific issue before the primary judge was whether the Tribunal’s decision contained a serious legal error, called a “jurisdictional error”. On appeal, this Court asks whether the primary judge was correct to find that the Tribunal’s decision did not contain any jurisdictional error: see DKX17 v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2019] FCAFC 10; (2019) 268 FCR 64 at [63] (Rangiah J, with Reeves and Bromwich JJ agreeing); CKL21 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] FCAFC 70; (2022) 293 FCR 634 at [3] (the Court).

26    Duty to make sure Court’s processes are fair: Second, a judge has a duty to ensure that a hearing is fair to all parties (that is, both appellants and respondents). If a party does not have a lawyer, the judge may tell them about the practices and procedures of the Court, as relevant, to try to ensure a fair hearing. However, the judge does not give legal or tactical advice to a party who does not have a lawyer, because the judge must be impartial. See generally NWQR v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 30 at [27] (the Court), and Kumar v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCAFC 79 at [21] (the Court).

27    Importantly, this duty is to ensure that the Court’s processes are fair: the Court must apply the law as it is, and cannot simply make orders to achieve a result that the Court thinks is “fair”. But I will consider whether any argument of substance arises squarely from the materials: see DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 784 at [9]-[10] (Colvin J); BYP16 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 531 at [35], [38] (Wheelahan J). The Appellant was legally represented below, and he appears to have had assistance in preparing the grounds of appeal at least. I will therefore consider those arguments (in addition to the arguments raised at the hearing), even though the Appellant did not refer to them at the hearing of the appeal.

Arguments made at the hearing

28    As noted, the Appellant represented himself at the hearing of the appeal, and made submissions with the assistance of an interpreter. The key points raised by him at the hearing were as follows:

(1)    The Appellant said that the interpreter in the Appellant’s interview before the delegate was from a different religious background, and could not explain the Appellant’s evidence properly. The Appellant said that his conversion to Shia Islam did not involve any ceremony, and the delegate and the Tribunal were wrong to think that the Appellant had said there was a ceremony. The Appellant says that he did not hire the interpreter, and that the interpreter apologised to him after the interview. The Appellant asked for his matter to be re-heard with a different interpreter, who had the same religious background as him.

(2)    The Appellant said that he was not given an opportunity to present his claims before the Tribunal or before the primary judge in the following ways.

(a)    He said that the Tribunal focused on the land that the Appellant gave to the MWM, and did not let the Appellant say anything about the people he was afraid of.

(b)    He said that, at the hearing before the primary judge (when the Appellant had a lawyer), the Appellant raised his hand because he wanted to explain his situation, but he was not allowed to.

(3)    The Appellant said that his documents (such as the FIR) were genuine, and he could verify them for the Court. He sought to hand up a document to verify his claims. He also said that other applicants for student visas provided false documents.

(4)    The Appellant also said that an objection was made against his claims that, if the Appellant feared for the safety of his family, why did he not bring his family with him. The Appellant said that his real problem was that he left his children at home, but the delegate asked him about different things.

29    These arguments are completely different from the arguments put to the primary judge. The Appellant therefore requires leave (permission) to raise them for the first time on appeal: VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158; (2004) 238 FCR 588 at [46]‑[47] (the Court); DBWG v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCAFC 3; (2024) 301 FCR 344 at [23] (the Court). However, given the Appellant does not have legal representation, I propose to deal with these new arguments on their merits. The Minister (as model litigant) did not raise any objection to this approach, and the merits of the arguments are an important factor in deciding whether to grant leave in any event: DBWG at [24].

30    Interpretation issues: The key point made by the Appellant at the hearing was that his interpreter for the interview with the delegate did not interpret the Appellant’s evidence properly. This argument should be rejected, for two reasons.

31    First, the decision under review was made by the Tribunal, not the delegate. The Tribunal’s decision replaced that of the delegate. The transcript of the Tribunal hearing shows that the Tribunal was aware that the Appellant had a problem about the interpreter in his interview with the delegate. That transcript records the Appellant stating (through the interpreter) that he did not have any difficulty understanding the interpreter in the Tribunal. As discussed below, the key inconsistencies relied on by the Tribunal arose from the Appellant’s written claims, not what he said to the delegate at the interview (such as whether there was a conversion ceremony: see [34] below). In these circumstances, it is hard to see how any interpretation issues before the delegate could have affected the Tribunal’s decision.

32    Second, the Court does not have any evidence of the type that could show that there was a translation error: the Appellant asserted at the appeal hearing that the interpreter did not interpret his evidence properly, but the Appellant also said that he could not tell if the interpreter was interpreting his evidence properly, because he (the Appellant) does not speak English. To show that there had been a translation error, there would need to be evidence from a properly qualified person comparing the evidence given by the Appellant in Urdu with the English interpretation of that evidence given by the interpreter at the interview or hearing. I note that not every error in interpretation leads to the decision being invalid; the question is whether any mistranslations are of such a nature or extent that the relevant statutory requirements were not met (relevantly, the opportunity to present evidence and arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review under the previous s 425(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)): see DVO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] HCA 12; (2021) 273 CLR 177 at [8] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Gordon and Steward JJ).

33    The Appellant also wished to play to the court a recording of the hearing (it was not clear whether this was a recording of the interview with the delegate, or the Tribunal hearing). For the reasons just given, playing the recording, by itself, would not establish any translation errors: the Court would require evidence from a properly qualified person to demonstrate that the translation from Urdu to English was incorrect.

34    The Appellant also said in this context that he had never said there was a conversion ceremony when he converted from Sunni to Shia Islam, and that the delegate and the Tribunal over-complicated things. However, the Tribunal’s reasons in AAT [37] rely on written statements made by the Appellant himself: a statutory declaration (dated 2 June 2015) which referred to a “conversion ritual”, and a statutory declaration dated 21 June 2018 which referred to a “conversion process” in the presence of two persons (noting that there are some discrepancies between names of the persons provided by the Appellant in this June 2018 declaration and the names of the three people who previously provided statements in April 2018 who said they were present at or supervised the Appellant’s conversion). That is, the Tribunal’s reference to a conversion ceremony was based on the Appellant’s own written evidence. There was no error in this respect by the Tribunal, and certainly no error arising out of the translation of the Appellant’s oral evidence before the delegate (or the Tribunal, for that matter).

35    Reasonable opportunity to present arguments? The Appellant also said at the hearing that he was not given a reasonable opportunity to present his case, in two respects.

36    The Appellant’s first complaint is that the Tribunal focused on the sale of land by the Appellant to MWM, and did not let him talk about the people he was afraid of. The transcript of the Tribunal hearing is in evidence. It appears from the transcript that at one point the Tribunal asked the Appellant what happened to the plot of land that he said he donated to MWM, and when the Appellant started talking about going to the police station to report the threats he had received, the Tribunal asked the Appellant to answer the question of what happened to the block of land. The donation of the block of land was central to the Appellant’s claims. The Tribunal was entitled to ask the initial question, and entitled to press the Appellant to answer that question. Towards the end of the hearing, after the Tribunal had put certain matters to the Appellant, the Tribunal asked the Appellant if there was anything else he would like to say. The Appellant had an opportunity then to talk about the people he was afraid of. The Appellant provided further written material after the Tribunal hearing. The Tribunal did not deprive the Appellant of a reasonable opportunity to give evidence and present arguments.

37    The Appellant also says that he wished to clarify certain matters at the hearing before the primary judge, but he was not allowed to. However, the Appellant was legally represented at this hearing by both counsel and a solicitor. His submissions were therefore to be made through his lawyers, who would seek instructions on factual matters from the Appellant as required. The Appellant did not have any right to communicate directly with the primary judge. And the hearing before the primary judge was to determine whether the Tribunal’s decision was lawfully made, which greatly reduced the need for factual issues to be clarified.

38    Other arguments: The other matters raised by the Appellant (summarised in [28](3) and (4) above) go only to the factual correctness of the Tribunal’s decision, and do not suggest any legal error by the Tribunal. The genuineness of the FIR is considered in appeal ground 3 below.

39    For completeness, I will also address the arguments raised by the Appellant’s notice of appeal next: although the Appellant did not refer to these arguments at the hearing, he did not abandon them either.

Appeal ground 1: Inconsistencies in dates of conversion and land donation

40    Appeal ground 1 contends, in effect, that the Tribunal’s assessment of the Appellant’s credibility based on inconsistencies in the date of conversion and land donation was legally unreasonable. It is said the inconsistencies relied on by the Tribunal were minor or immaterial and had plausible explanations in the evidence, such that no reasonable decision-maker could have placed decisive weight on them.

41    This argument is similar to the argument made to the primary judge about the first two inconsistencies identified by the Tribunal: see [18]-[19] above. However, whereas the argument below was that there was not any inconsistency in the Appellant’s account (once the evidence was properly understood), the argument on appeal accepts that there were inconsistencies, but contends that it was legally unreasonable of the Tribunal to rely on these inconsistencies as a reason to disbelieve the Appellant’s account.

42    Legal unreasonableness and inconsistencies: It can be accepted that, if a decision-maker does not believe a person’s account of events (makes an adverse credit finding) because of inconsistencies in that account, the proper discharge of the fact-finding task usually requires that the decision-maker explain why he or she has found that those differences justify rejecting the person’s account: ASB17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 38; (2019) 268 FCR 271 at [43] (the Court); AVQ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 133; (2018) 266 FCR 83 at [28] (the Court).

43    However, that principle operates within the usual limits of legal unreasonableness. And legal unreasonableness is a stringent standard of review, to ensure that the Courts do not impermissibly intrude on the factual merits of an administrative decision. Accordingly, an adverse credit finding is not legally unreasonable, simply because it may seem harsh, or to fasten onto matters which the person sought to explain in a way which was not implausible: see AIC16 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2019] FCA 531 at [23] (Mortimer J).

44    Adverse finding was not legally unreasonable: The Tribunal’s use of inconsistencies in AAT [40] can be considered in the light of the principles set out above.

    First, the timing differences the Tribunal identified in AAT [40] were true inconsistencies, and not just differences in emphasis or the inclusion of a matter that was not included elsewhere: cf ASB17 at [42].

    Second, the Tribunal explained why it attached weight to these inconsistencies. These events went to the Appellant’s central claim, and the inconsistencies in dates “call[ed] into question the sequence of events” that (on the Appellant’s account) led to Sunni extremists making threats against him. That is, on the Appellant’s account there was a causal connection between these events: he said he donated the plot of land, because he converted to Shia Islam. Thus, the order in which these events occurred was significant, and something that the Appellant could reasonably be expected to remember.

    Third, the nature of the events being recalled is also relevant: some caution needs to be exercised before finding that variations in a person’s account of a violent and traumatic event are probative of falsity or a lack of credibility: see AVQ15 at [24]; ASB17 at [45]. But the events here (the Appellant “converting” to Shia, donating a plot of land) are not of that nature.

45    In these circumstances, it was open to the Tribunal to conclude in AAT [40] that the inconsistencies in dates in the Appellant’s account called into question the truthfulness of his account. The Tribunal’s reasoning was not legally unreasonable.

Appeal ground 2: Nature of MWM as a political organisation

46    Appeal ground 2 contends, in effect, that the Tribunal relied on an irrelevant consideration in treating the nature of MWM as a political organisation. It is said that the Tribunal failed to consider whether the Appellant’s understanding of MWM was religious in nature, and improperly used its characterisation to discredit the Appellant without proper evidentiary foundation.

47    This argument is an elaboration of the argument put to the primary judge, which was that the Tribunal had not explained why the nature of MWM as a political organisation was relevant (see J [32]). Appeal ground 2 challenges the Tribunal’s fact-finding process, and contends (in effect) that there was an explanation for why the Appellant thought MWM was a religious organisation, and that any misunderstanding of the nature of MWM was not a sufficient reason to disbelieve the Appellant.

48    Reviewing credit findings – general principles: A finding by the Tribunal whether or not to believe a person’s account of events (a credit finding) can be reviewed by the courts but, again, the courts take care not to intrude on the factual merits of an administrative decision. A credit finding may be invalid if it lacks any logical, rational or probative basis; however, the courts will exercise a “high degree of caution” before deciding that a credit finding is illogical or irrational, or legally unreasonable: see DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 2; (2018) 258 FCR 175 at [30] points (2) and (5) (the Court); see also Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 3; (2022) 289 FCR 21 at [33], [35] (the Court).

49    Adverse credit findings relating to MWM were open: Here, the donation of a plot of land to MWM was central to the Appellant’s claim. The stated reason for this donation was because MWM was a religious organisation. Accordingly, the Appellant’s understanding of the nature of MWM was an important part of the Appellant’s claims. The Appellant’s description of MWM (that it was not involved in any political activity, was a community organisation, and not a powerful organisation) was completely at odds with reliable country information in the form of Pakistan media reports. Evidence provided by the Appellant (letters from a person purporting to be the Secretary-General of MWM for Bhalwal district) also described MWM in a manner that was contrary to those media reports. In these circumstances, it was well open to the Tribunal to conclude that the inconsistency between this evidence from the Appellant and the documents he provided, on the one hand, and reliable country information about the nature and activities of MWM, on the other, cast doubt on the genuineness of his claims (see AAT [43], [45]). In addition, the letterhead on those letters contained a web address for the website of a political party with the same name, which meant there were internal inconsistencies in the letters from the Secretary-General provided by the Appellant.

Appeal ground 3: Treatment of corroborative evidence

50    Appeal ground 3 contends, in effect, that the Tribunal constructively failed to exercise its jurisdiction by not properly considering corroborative evidence, including the FIR and the evidence of the High Court advocate in Pakistan. It is said that the Tribunal’s rejection of these documents was based on generalised country information and failed to properly evaluate the documents’ probative value. These arguments should be rejected, essentially for the reasons given in J [35]-[36].

51    Again, the Court only decides whether the Tribunal’s decision is lawful, not whether it is factually correct on the merits. Therefore, although a credit finding may give rise to jurisdictional error if it lacks any logical, rational or probative basis (and is relevant to the outcome), the Court would exercise a high degree of caution before deciding that a credit finding lacks any probative basis: see [47] above.

52    Findings had a probative basis: Here, the Tribunal relied on DFAT advice that a FIR does not constitute evidence that the events described in the FIR actually occurred (AAT [54], fn 12). That DFAT advice would provide a probative basis, in itself, to disbelieve the FIR, but the Tribunal also referred to discrepancies in the two versions of the FIR provided to the Department and to the Tribunal (AAT [54]). Similarly, the Tribunal relied on DFAT advice that there were credible reports of Pakistani officials accepting bribes to verify fraudulent FIRs, in deciding not to attach weight to the written statement from the High Court advocate (AAT [55]). The Tribunal also relied on the fact that the person’s oral evidence could not explain how he obtained verification of police documents (AAT [55]). The Tribunal noted (in fn 13) that the call to the High Court advocate disconnected and, when the Tribunal attempted to call the advocate again, there was no answer. The Tribunal noted elsewhere that it had reservations about how much weight it could give to oral evidence from unknown witnesses at the end of a telephone line in a foreign country, although it took their evidence at face value (AAT [18]). In these circumstances, there was an ample probative basis for the Tribunal findings that are challenged in appeal ground 3.

conclusion

53    For these reasons, the appeal must be dismissed.

54    Costs: The usual position is that the unsuccessful party pay the legal costs of the successful party. A person’s financial capacity to pay costs is not relevant to whether costs should be awarded: Northern Territory v Sangare [2019] HCA 25; (2019) 265 CLR 164 at [25], [35] (the Court).

55    The Minister seeks costs in a fixed sum of $5,000. In the case of proceedings to challenge migration decisions, the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) set out an amount that may be claimed if an appeal is discontinued before hearing (currently $5,648), and a higher amount that may be claimed if an appeal is dismissed after hearing (currently $8,907): see Rules r 40.43, Sch 3 items 15.1 and 15.2. I am satisfied that the amount sought by the Minister is reasonable and proportionate, having regard to the nature and complexity of this appeal: see Bitek Pty Ltd v IConnect Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 506; (2012) 290 ALR 288 at [18] (Kenny J).

Associate:

Dated:    25 August 2026