Federal Court of Australia

Garnsey v Minter Ellison Services Pty Limited (Application for adjustments and accommodations) [2026] FCA 1193

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    On or by 28 August 2026, the parties are to provide consent or competing short minutes of order to give effect to these reasons, which is to include provision for a trial plan.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

SHARIFF J:

1.    INTRODUCTION

1    These reasons deal with an interlocutory application filed by the applicant (Ms Garnsey) seeking orders that the Court make adjustments and accommodations in the conduct of the final hearing of the proceedings, which is presently scheduled to commence on 21 September 2026. Ms Garnsey presses the application on the basis that she says she suffers from certain conditions which will prevent her from participating in the final hearing in the usual way, especially in respect of evidence to be given by her under cross-examination. Ms Garnsey says that the Court should make the orders that she seeks to ensure that she is afforded a fair hearing.

2    By way of background, Ms Garnsey has been employed by the respondent (Minter Ellison) since in or about June 2019 in an administrative role. She continues to be employed by Minter Ellison but has not worked since in or about February 2022. Ms Garnsey is 72 years of age, and says she has Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), a learning disorder in the form of Dyslexia, and chronic depressive disorders which have been assessed to amount to a 45% whole person impairment.

3    In the substantive proceedings, Ms Garnsey claims that Minter Ellison has engaged in unlawful discrimination contrary to the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DD Act) and that it has further and/or alternatively engaged in adverse action in contravention of s 340 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act). Minter Ellison denies these claims.

4    Ms Garnsey’s claims are presently listed for a final hearing before me. It is with the final hearing looming that Ms Garnsey has made her present application. Ms Garnsey’s application relies upon ss 23, 37M, 37N and 37P of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act), r 1.32 of the Federal Court of Australia Rules 2011 (Cth) (FC Rules) and ss 26, 29 and 47A of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) to seek certain adjustments as set out in a schedule to the interlocutory application to enable her to participate “effectively in the proceeding and to give her best evidence”. Broadly, those adjustments seek that:

(a)    Ms Garnsey be allowed substantially extended time to hear, consider and answer each question, with questions put slowly and one at a time, with a pause after each question;

(b)    questioning proceed in plain English, in short, single-issue questions, free of figurative language, legal jargon and compound or leading propositions, repeated as often as needed to ensure comprehension, and that Ms Garnsey be asked to restate each question in her own words to confirm understanding;

(c)    Ms Garnsey not be required to read any document aloud or silently, any necessary material instead being either read aloud to her, summarised orally or provided in Easy-Read or visually supported form, with dense text and complex written instructions to be avoided;

(d)    scheduled supervised breaks be taken (10 minutes after every 20-30 minutes of evidence) and that Ms Garnsey be permitted an immediate break on indicating distress or the onset of sensory overload;

(e)    Ms Garnsey give evidence by audio-visual link from a quiet, familiar, low-stimulus room;

(f)    the Court order an assessment of the applicant by a “Communication Intermediary”, that the Communication Intermediary be present to assist her communication at the hearing, and that a “ground rules” hearing be held;

(g)    a support person be permitted to sit with Ms Garnsey to assist with orientation and locating documents and, where she is unable to retrieve information because of her disability, to assist her to do so, subject to the control of the Court;

(h)    the topics and proposed questions for cross-examination be provided in advance to the Communication Intermediary and the Court for consideration at the ground rules hearing;

(i)    Ms Garnsey be provided with a daily schedule including the order of witnesses and expected timing, with sudden changes to be avoided wherever possible;

(j)    no adverse inference be drawn against Ms Garnsey from pauses, delay, emotional expression or the need for breaks; and

(k)    the hearing be conducted so as to avoid raised voices, displays of frustration and exaggerated gestures, all communication with Ms Garnsey being explicit and neutral, and consistent with what Ms Garnsey refers to as a “trauma informed approach”.

5    In support of these orders, Ms Garnsey relies upon an affidavit she affirmed on 19 June 2026. This affidavit annexes reports containing opinions expressed by medical and allied health professionals, as follows:

(a)    reports dated 11 December 2023, 25 November 2024 and 4 August 2025 of Dr Glen Smith, a consultant psychiatrist;

(b)    a report dated 24 April 2024 of Ms Kate Ward, a psychologist;

(c)    a report dated 5 September 2025 of Ms Georgia Dornin, a psychologist; and

(d)    a report dated 16 June 2026 of Professor Robyn Young, a clinical psychologist.

6    The reports of Dr Smith, Ms Ward and Ms Dornin, respectively, express the opinion that Ms Garnsey suffers from chronic psychiatric injuries (Dr Smith), Dyslexia (Ms Ward) and ASD (Ms Dornin). Professor Young’s report addresses the adjustments and accommodations that are sought by Ms Garnsey.

7    Minter Ellison opposes many of the adjustments that are sought by Ms Garnsey. Whilst it acknowledges that the Court has broad discretionary powers, it disputes the power of the Court to order certain measures such as the appointment of a Communication Intermediary. It otherwise submits that the adjustments sought by Ms Garnsey are able to be managed by the Court in the exercise of a range of powers available to it and in the discharge of its usual function to ensure a fair hearing for all parties including by regulating the conduct of cross-examination by Senior Counsel for Minter Ellison who would (in any event) be bound by ethical and professional obligations. Minter Ellison contends that Professor Young’s report is of limited assistance as it is focussed on clinically ideal scenarios rather than the balanced requirements of a fair civil trial conducted by the Court.

8    There was some delay in the filing and service of materials for the purpose of the determination of the interlocutory application, and it is unnecessary to dwell on them. At a case management hearing held on 13 August 2026, the parties agreed that I should determine the interlocutory application on the papers.

9    For the reasons that follow, I have decided that some orders should be made but not all of those sought by Ms Garnsey. I will direct the parties to provide consent or competing short minutes of order within seven days to give effect to these reasons.

2.    CONSIDERATION

10    For the purpose of the determination of the present application, I will proceed on the basis that Ms Garnsey suffers from chronic depression, Dyslexia and ASD. Although these diagnoses were contained in reports annexed to Ms Garnsey’s affidavit, as this is an interlocutory application I am prepared to accept the various opinions so expressed. I accept that these are matters that will need to be proved for the purpose of the substantive proceedings based on evidence adduced at the final hearing.

11    Ms Garnsey’s request for adjustments and accommodations may broadly be categorised as those relating to:

(a)    the regulation of questioning in cross-examination and arrangements relating to documents that she is to be asked questions about, including that they be in an accessible form;

(b)    the provision of regular breaks;

(c)    the giving of evidence by Ms Garnsey by audio-visual link (AVL);

(d)    the giving of evidence by Ms Garnsey with the assistance of a Communication Intermediary and a support person;

(e)    predictability and structure of the daily schedule for the hearing; and

(f)    assessments as to the credibility and quality of evidence given by Ms Garnsey.

12    In large measure, these adjustments and accommodations are based on Professor Young’s report and evidence given by Ms Garnsey in her affidavit. These adjustments are said to reflect a trauma informed approach to be taken by the Court. I have given Professor Young’s evidence weight, but it needs to be weighed against other matters including matters of principle. It is necessary to say something about these matters of principle.

2.1    Matters of principle

13    Ordinarily, the concepts of reasonable adjustments and accommodations in the context of a person suffering from medical conditions arises by reason of the operation of the DD Act. One fundamental difficulty in applying these concepts to the conduct of judicial proceedings is that the DD Act does not apply to judicial officers, especially when performing judicial functions: Luck v University of Southern Queensland [2014] FCAFC 135 at [41] (Murphy, Pagone and Perry JJ). This was common ground between the parties and I have proceeded on that basis.

14    Whilst the DD Act likely applies to access to the Court’s premises and perhaps the other facilities and services provided in the administration of the Court’s non-judicial functions, it is unnecessary to consider these matters further. That is because each of the adjustments and accommodations sought by Ms Garnsey relate to the conduct of the final hearing and in the discharge of the Court’s judicial functions.

15    The accommodations and adjustments sought by Ms Garnsey were propounded on the basis that they were essential to ensure a fair hearing and to afford her natural justice. And, essential to those concepts is the application of the rules of procedural fairness. Thus, the question of the making of adjustments and accommodations are to be viewed through the lens of whether a failure to make them would deny procedural fairness: e.g., see Luck v Secretary, Department of Human Services (No 4) [2016] FCA 950 at [124] (Bromberg J). However, as has been regularly stated, the rules of procedural fairness are not fixed in stone, and they are concerned with “practical injustice”: e.g., see Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1 at 14 (Gleeson CJ).

16    Section 37M of the FCA Act provides that the “overarching purpose” of the civil practice and procedure of this Court is to “facilitate the just resolution of disputes” according to law and as “quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible”. Section 37M(2)(a) reinforces that an overarching purpose includes the objective of the “just determination of all proceedings before the Court”. To this end, s 37N(1) requires the parties to a civil proceeding to conduct the proceeding in a way that is consistent with the overarching purpose. And, s 37P provides that the Court may give directions about the practice and procedure to be followed in relation to the proceeding or part of it. That includes, directions that require things to be done, setting time limits, limiting the number of witnesses to be called or the number of documents to be tendered, and waiving or varying any provision of the FC Rules in their application to the proceeding (s 37P(3)). The latter is also reinforced by r 1.32 of the FC Rules which empowers the Court to dispense with any requirement imposed by those Rules.

17    Although nothing express in the FCA Act or the FC Rules speaks of the Court being obliged to ensure “fair hearing”, that is the very quintessence of the judicial function in a civil trial that involves the exercise of the judicial power as invested by Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution. The duty of the Court to ensure a fair hearing is not one-sided; it is a duty to ensure a fair hearing for all parties: e.g., see Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292 at 298-300 and 309-311 (Mason CJ and McHugh J), 326-328 and 331 (Deane J), 353 (Toohey J), 363 and 371-372 (Gaudron J).

18    Whilst the metes and bounds of a “fair hearing” may be difficult to state with absolute precision, there are certain fundamental elements of trials that are time-honoured in the common law. In Al Rawi v Security Service [2012] 1 AC 531; [2011] UKCE 34, Lord Dyson JSC stated at [10]-[13]:

There are certain features of a common law trial which are fundamental to our system of justice (both criminal and civil). First, subject to certain established and limited exceptions, trials should be conducted and judgments given in public. The importance of the open justice principle has been emphasised many times: see, for example, R v Sussex Justices, Ex p McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256, 259, per Lord Hewart CJ, Attorney General v Leveller Magazine Ltd [1979] AC 440, 449h–450b, per Lord Diplock, and recently R (Mohamed) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No 2) (Guardian News and Media Ltd intervening) [2011] QB 218, paras 38–39, per Lord Judge CJ.

…

Secondly, trials are conducted on the basis of the principle of natural justice. There are a number of strands to this. A party has a right to know the case against him and the evidence on which it is based. He is entitled to have the opportunity to respond to any such evidence and to any submissions made by the other side. The other side may not advance contentions or adduce evidence of which he is kept in ignorance. The Privy Council said in the civil case of Kanda v Government of Malaya [1962] AC 322, 337:

“If the right to be heard is to be a real right which is worth anything, it must carry with it a right in the accused man to know the case which is made against him. He must know what evidence has been given and what statements have been made affecting him: and then he must be given a fair opportunity to correct or contradict them.”

Another aspect of the principle of natural justice is that the parties should be given an opportunity to call their own witnesses and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses.

19    In support of the last proposition, Lord Dyson JSC quoted the statement made by Gleeson CJ and Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ in Lee v R (1998) 195 CLR 594 at 602 at [32] (albeit in relation to evidence in the nature of hearsay) that:

And the concern of the common law is not limited to the quality of evidence, it is a concern about the manner of trial. One very important reason why the common law set its face against hearsay evidence was because otherwise the party against whom the evidence was led could not cross-examine the maker of the statement. Confrontation and the opportunity for cross-examination is of central significance to the common law adversarial system of trial.

20    None of this is to suggest that the Court’s procedures cannot be tailored to accommodate particular exigencies depending on the case at hand, with the purpose being to avoid practical injustice. As stated by Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ in HT v The Queen [2019] HCA 40; (2019) 269 CLR 403 at [18]:

Whilst stated as principles or rules deriving from the more general principle of procedural fairness, these rules do not have immutably fixed content. The content of procedural fairness may vary according to the circumstances of particular cases. Procedural fairness is not an abstract concept; rather, it is essentially practical. The concern of the law is the avoidance of practical injustice. It is that consideration which guides a court in deciding whether its procedures should be adapted to meet difficulties which may arise.

21    Their Honours further stated at [44] that:

It is well known that the courts have modified and adapted the content of the general rules of open justice and procedural fairness in particular kinds of cases. Orders for non-publication are an example of the former. The non-disclosure of evidence in wardship cases is an example of the latter. More relevant for present purposes is litigation concerning trade secrets where disclosure is sometimes limited, for example with “confidentiality rings” being placed around disclosure and the persons who are permitted to see the confidential material. In Roussel Uclaf v Imperial Chemical Industries Plc, Aldous J observed that each case has to be decided on its own facts and on the broad principle that the court has the task of deciding how justice can be achieved taking into account the rights and needs of the parties.

22    As will be apparent from these principles, the duty imposed on the Court to ensure a fair hearing will depend on the case at hand. Necessarily the discharge of that duty will need to take into account any medical conditions affecting a party or a witness based on probative medical evidence. The discharge of the duty must also take into account that a fair hearing needs to be afforded to all parties, not just one side. That is particularly important where, as here, the claims involve allegations of conduct that is said to have been unlawful due to it being contrary to Commonwealth laws.

23    The irreducible minimum standard of affording a fair hearing to all parties also needs to take into account that the concern of the law is with practical justice. A great deal of pragmatism may be required where the duty to afford a fair hearing to all parties is to be discharged in circumstances where one party or witness suffers from medical conditions. Often that may necessitate the Court being adequately informed of the applicable medical conditions (on the basis of probative medical evidence) and to adapt and tailor the procedures of applicable hearings, and to do so either in advance of the hearing or during the course of the hearing where assessments may be better made as to whether a fair trial is being afforded to all parties. In some cases, it may be necessary to make orders both in advance of the relevant hearing and during that hearing. In seeking to discharge those duties, considerable judgment will be required to be exercised. But a fair hearing must be afforded to all parties.

24    I have borne these principles firmly in mind in assessing the adjustments and accommodations sought by Ms Garnsey to which I now turn.

2.2     The regulation of cross-examination and access to documents

25    As set out at [4] above, Ms Garnsey sought orders in relation to the regulation of cross-examination. Those orders related to the nature and form of questions, the manner in which Ms Garnsey be permitted to respond to them and making available documents in an accessible form. These orders were said to be informed not only by Ms Garnsey’s medical conditions but also by reference to a trauma informed approach to ensuring a fair hearing. I accept that these orders have been based on the assessment made by Professor Young, but I am not satisfied that any such orders need to be made.

26    The final hearing will be presided by me. Having read Professor Young’s report (which should also be tendered at the final hearing subject to any objections), I have now been informed of the difficulties that Ms Garnsey says she may encounter in giving evidence. As the trial judge, I will have these matters in the forefront of my mind in regulating:

(a)    the time for which Ms Garnsey is cross-examined;

(b)    the period of time she is given to hear, consider and answer questions;

(c)    any questions I consider to be unfair, or confusing because they are not sufficiently in plain English or otherwise unclear due to use of jargon or their length;

(d)    any questions that I consider to be inappropriate due to their tone, nature or delivery;

(e)    the questions put to Ms Garnsey so as to permit her to ask them to be clarified or for her to restate the question in her own words so as to ensure she has understood them; and

(f)    cross-examination on documents so as to ensure that Ms Garnsey has had sufficient time to read the relevant parts of them or for them to be read to her, or such other measure I consider appropriate in the context of the relevant document and any difficulty Ms Garnsey expresses in relation to them (including whether they are capable of being provided in some other accessible form).

27    In taking the abovementioned course, I am conscious that Ms Garnsey will be represented by Pro-Bono Counsel, who was in fact appointed following my determination on 1 April 2025 to refer Ms Garnsey for pro bono legal assistance under r 4.12 of the FC Rules. I have every confidence that Counsel for Ms Garnsey will take appropriate objections during the course of the final hearing and will raise with me any matters of concern relating to her assessment of Ms Garnsey’s welfare. I am also conscious that Minter Ellison will be represented by Senior and Junior Counsel, who are both experienced in the matters that are the subject of the substantive proceedings. Both Senior and Junior Counsel have clearly read the various medical reports relied upon by Ms Garnsey, and have indicated in their written submissions that they will adhere to their ethical and professional obligations (which, of course, goes without saying). I expect Senior and Junior Counsel to make forensic judgments in advancing their client’s case, bearing in mind the medical evidence so to assist the Court in discharging its duty to ensure there is a fair hearing for all parties.

28    For these reasons, I am not satisfied that the orders sought by Ms Garnsey are necessary to be made. They are matters that I am confident will be able to be addressed during the course of the final hearing and with the cooperation of all the relevant legal representatives.

2.3    Regular Breaks

29    Ms Garnsey seeks that she be provided with regular scheduled breaks of 10 minutes in duration after every 20-30 minutes of her giving evidence. It is unnecessary to make an order to give effect to this request, as I will permit it. As set out below, I will direct the parties to prepare a trial plan which provides an estimate as to the duration of Ms Garnsey’s evidence and which is to allow for scheduled breaks for the duration and frequency as requested by her.

2.4    Evidence by AVL

30    Ms Garnsey seeks that an order be made that she give evidence by way of AVL from a quiet, low-stimulus room.

31    Minter Ellison accepts that this is not an uncommon accommodation, but says that the Court should be guided by the principles stated in Southernwood v Brambles Limited (No 2) [2022] FCA 973 at [27]–[44] (Murphy J) bearing in mind that Ms Garnsey’s evidence will be “centrally important” to the case and her credibility as a witness is in issue, and that the use of video link may frustrate or delay the management of documents in cross-examination: see Brambles at [43]. Minter Ellison, however, contends that the power of the Court does not extend to making an order as to the location from which Ms Garnsey is to give evidence or as to it being a low-stimulus room. Minter Ellison also queries how such evidence will be given in circumstances where Ms Garnsey says she needs assistance in locating documents. Minter Ellison submits that any orders made by the Court should include strict safeguards including the presence of an independent observer or a camera angle to ensure that no support person or third party “coaches” Ms Garnsey off-camera.

32    Sections 47A(1) and (4) of the FCA Act permit the Court to order that evidence be given by audio-visual link, subject to the operation of s 47A(2) and 47A(3). I have addressed the principles and considerations that are to inform the Court’s exercise of power and discretion under these provisions in ACN 117 641 004 Pty Ltd (in liq) v S&P Global, Inc (No 5) [2025] FCA 687. It is unnecessary for me to repeat those principles here.

33    Based on the evidence of Professor Young, I am satisfied that an order should be made for Ms Garnsey to give her evidence by AVL subject to the parties addressing the matters set out below.

34    I will not presently make an order as to the location from which Ms Garnsey is to give evidence, or that it is to be low-stimulus. I will leave it to Ms Garnsey and her Counsel to identify such a location with the assistance of those treating her so that she can give evidence from that location. These matters can be addressed in the short minutes of order that the parties are to provide. It is imperative that the parties ensure that:

(a)    there are computer facilities and a stable internet connection at the relevant location from which Ms Garnsey is to give evidence so as to enable her participation via the Court’s presently preferred platform, Webex;

(b)    Ms Garnsey have access to the relevant Court Book which contains documents upon which she may be cross-examined; and

(c)    Ms Garnsey or her representatives clearly communicate to the Court and Minter Ellison who else will be present at that location whilst Ms Garnsey is giving evidence including the independent support person as addressed further below.

35    Subject to the matters raised below, I will direct the parties to confer and provide short minutes of order to give effect to the above.

2.5    Communication Intermediary and Support Person

36    Ms Garnsey seeks orders that she be assessed by a Communication Intermediary, for that person to be present to assist her communication at the hearing, that a “ground rules” hearing be held in advance of the final hearing to address the precise role of such a person, and that the Communication Intermediary be given advance notice as to the topics for cross-examination.

37    In addition, Ms Garnsey seeks an order that a support person be permitted to sit with her to assist her in orienting to and locating documents, as well as assisting with emotional regulation and grounding.

38    Both these requested adjustments are based on the recommendations made by Professor Young.

39    Ms Garnsey submits that an order for a Communication Intermediary is not an unprecedented request. It was submitted that such intermediaries and “ground rules” hearings are now established, by statute or court-administered program, across every Australian State and Territory, and the Australian Government has itself commissioned a scoping study toward a Commonwealth witness intermediary scheme: eg see Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), ss 294L-294N; Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), s 21AZL; Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 106F; Evidence Act 1929 (SA), s 14A; Evidence (Children and Special Witnesses) Act 2001 (Tas), s 7F; Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991 (ACT), s 4AJ; and, in Victoria, the court-administered Intermediary Program. Ms Garnsey accepts that these schemes have their origins in criminal proceedings but says that this is no answer as the schemes recognise that an impaired witness gives more accurate evidence, and the hearing is fairer, when the impairment is accommodated.

40    Minter Ellison opposes such an order including on the basis that the Court has no power to make such an order, and that there is no evidence as to what such a Communication Intermediary would do.

41    Professor Young’s evidence on the topic of a Communication Intermediary is as follows:

It is my opinion that a CI would support comprehension, ensure that questions are understood, and assist Ms Garnsey in expressing accurate responses. The CI’s role is to prevent miscommunication caused by autism, dyslexia and processing delays. A CI does not provide content, suggest answers or coach. They may, however, alert the Court to Ms Garnsey having difficulties with communication or regulation. All communication between the CI and Ms Garnsey should be recorded and transparent. This enhances her ability to reliably engage in the Court process by ensuring she is emotionally regulated and understands questions posed.

42    Based on the limited nature of this evidence, as I understand it, the role of a Communication Intermediary would be to: (a) assess Ms Garnsey in advance of the final hearing; (b) attend at a “ground rules” hearing so that arrangements can be made by the Court to define the role of that person; (c) be present during the hearing either at the same location as Ms Garnsey or in the court room; (d) enable Ms Garnsey to communicate with that person whilst giving evidence to raise queries as to comprehending questions or understanding documents; and (e) for that person to independently notify the Court when they consider that Ms Garnsey is having such difficulties.

43    On the state of the present evidence, I am not satisfied that the orders sought by Ms Garnsey should be made. I have concerns about the use of a Communication Intermediary if it would involve Ms Garnsey being able to talk to that person whilst giving her evidence. It is critical that Ms Garnsey’s evidence be given by her without any risk of it being filtered by another person, even if the purpose is to aid in comprehension or understanding various matters. Whilst I accept that these matters could be explored at a “ground rules” hearing conducted in advance of the final hearing, I do not consider it is appropriate to adopt that course in light of what I consider to be the more appropriate course of ensuring an independent support person is present to assist Ms Garnsey.

44    On the basis of Professor Young’s evidence, I am satisfied that an independent support person should be made available to Ms Garnsey and such a person may well be a person who is relevantly qualified so as to alert the Court or Ms Garnsey’s Counsel to any difficulties that person assesses Ms Garnsey to be encountering in giving evidence. One difficulty with this arrangement is that Ms Garnsey is to give evidence via AVL such that the independent support person will need to be present where Ms Garnsey is located. In order to facilitate such a process, I will direct Ms Garnsey to notify Minter Ellison as to the identity of an independent support person (together with a CV or other document outlining the qualifications and skills of that person) who will be present with Ms Garnsey at the location from which Ms Garnsey is to give evidence, and for the parties to agree to a protocol by which that person can raise with the Court or Ms Garnsey’s Counsel any assessment made by that person as to any difficulties Ms Garnsey is encountering in giving evidence. I have in mind that the independent support person will also be able to assist Ms Garnsey in orienting to or locating relevant documents and, on application by Ms Garnsey or those representing her, this person may be permitted to read documents to Ms Garnsey. In relation to this latter matter, I do not consider it necessary to make any order to this effect at this stage but will deal with these matters during the final hearing. Any such person will need to agree to be bound by an order or direction of the Court not to coach Ms Garnsey in giving evidence and will need to be situated in the relevant room in a way where I can observe them through the AVL facilities.

2.6    Predictability and structure

45    Ms Garnsey seeks an order that she be provided with advance notice of a daily schedule of the final hearing and that sudden changes be avoided. I will direct the parties to confer and provide Ms Garnsey and me with a trial plan.

2.7    Assessments as to credibility and quality of evidence

46    Ms Garnsey seeks an order that no adverse inference be drawn against her from pauses, delay, emotional expression or the need for breaks.

47    I see no basis to make such an order. As already indicated, I have read the various medical reports. I will be conscious of the matters raised in those reports when assessing Ms Garnsey’s evidence, if any submissions are to be made about whether it should be accepted or rejected. It is appropriate that both parties make submissions about these matters after her evidence has been given, but I have made clear I am alert to the matters that have been raised on behalf of Ms Garnsey and I will hear the parties in due course as to how those matters bear upon an assessment of whether her evidence should be accepted or rejected (if any such submissions are made).

3.    DISPOSITION

48    I will direct the parties to provide me with consent or competing short minutes of order to give effect to my reasons.

Associate:

Dated:    24 August 2026