Federal Court of Australia

Nawaz v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 1182

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The name of the first respondent is amended to ‘Minister for Immigration and Citizenship’.

2.    Pursuant to Item 10 in Sch 16 of the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 (Cth), the Administrative Review Tribunal is substituted for the Administrative Appeals Tribunal as the second respondent.

3.    The appeal is dismissed.

4.    The appellants must pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JACKSON J:

1    This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (Circuit Court) dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) not to grant a student visa.

2    The first appellant, Muhammad Nawaz, is a citizen of Pakistan who came to Australia on a student visa in 2007. He has since held subsequent student visas or associated bridging visas. The second, third and fourth appellants are Mr Nawaz’s wife and their minor children.

3    Mr Nawaz applied for a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) Vocational Education and Training Sector (Subclass 572) visa in March 2015. He was the primary visa applicant and Hafza Memoona Ilyas and Ahmad Nawaz were secondary visa applicants, as dependent members of the same family unit as Mr Nawaz. Zainab Nawaz, the fourth appellant, is also a dependent member of that same family unit, but was born after the visa application was made.

4    It appears from a statement submitted by Mr Nawaz that his son Ahmad is an Australian citizen, so it is unclear why he is named as an appellant to this proceeding. Subject to that, the outcome of the appeal for the second to fourth appellants depends on the outcome of the appeal for Mr Nawaz.

5    On 24 June 2015, a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the visas. The refusal was on the basis that the delegate was not satisfied that Mr Nawaz met the genuine temporary entrant criterion for the grant of a student visa, then found in cl 572.223(1)(a) of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). It followed that the secondary visas for the other appellants were also refused, as they did not satisfy the requirements in cl 572.322(b) for members of a family unit of a primary visa applicant.

6    The Migration Review Tribunal (which shortly after this time became a division of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) affirmed the delegate’s decision on review, however that decision was later quashed by the Circuit Court with the consent of the parties, on the basis that it was affected by jurisdictional error. The matter was remitted to the Tribunal, which affirmed the delegate’s decision again, orally, on 15 May 2018. Written reasons were published on 7 August 2018, following a request made by the appellants.

7    The appellants subsequently sought judicial review in the Circuit Court. Mr Nawaz was unrepresented at the hearing of that application, on 19 July 2024. On 25 July 2024, a judge of that Court dismissed the application. The appellants now appeal from that decision. The appeal was allocated to my docket on 28 May 2026.

8    The appellants advance thirteen grounds of appeal. The grounds assert errors on the part of the Tribunal that were not agitated before the primary judge and do not engage with the primary judge’s reasoning on the ground of review that was before her Honour. The appellants therefore require leave to advance their proposed grounds. For the following reasons, there is insufficient merit in the proposed grounds to grant that leave. The appeal will be dismissed, with costs.

Adjournment application

9    On 4 August 2026, less than a week before the hearing of this matter, the appellants made an application to adjourn the hearing for six months. That application was heard at the beginning of the hearing and dismissed, with reasons to be published at the same time as judgment in the matter as a whole.

10    The application said that the purpose of the adjournment was to allow the appellants to ‘await the outcome of their pending request for Ministerial Intervention and to prepare their case as self-represented litigants’. The application was supported by a statement written by Mr Nawaz outlining the changed circumstances of the family unit since the Tribunal decision, which formed the basis of the appellants’ request for Ministerial intervention. While the statement was not provided in the form of an affidavit, I took it into account. The application was also accompanied by a screenshot of the Department of Home Affairs website showing a confirmation message that an enquiry had been submitted successfully and an (apparently automated) email from the Department acknowledging receipt of a request to contact the Minister. Those supporting documents are all dated 3 August 2026.

11    Mr Nawaz acknowledged in his supporting statement that merely lodging the request for Ministerial intervention does not mean intervention will occur, and that the request does not ‘automatically stay, suspend or discontinue the present Federal Court proceeding’. Nevertheless, he said the outcome of the request ‘may materially affect whether it remains practically necessary to continue the appeal and may potentially avoid the parties and the Court incurring the time and expense associated with a substantive [hearing]’.

12    In oral submissions, Mr Nawaz put emphasis on his position as an unrepresented litigant and the difficulties he has faced in preparing to present the appeal. He submitted that the appeal raises difficult questions of jurisdictional error. While he did not require the assistance of an interpreter, he pointed out that English is not his first language. He also referred to parental responsibilities and employment responsibilities he has, which he said have made it difficult to prepare for the appeal. He also referred in oral submissions to his Ministerial intervention request as a reason to adjourn the hearing.

13    The Minister opposed the adjournment on the basis that Ministerial intervention is a separate process and unrelated to this appeal. As a non-compellable power, there is no certainty that it will be exercised in the appellants’ favour. Counsel for the Minister also submitted that Mr Nawaz filed the appeal as long ago as 7 August 2024, and has had sufficient time to seek legal advice.

14    The power to grant an adjournment is discretionary. It must be exercised judicially, with regard to all the relevant individual circumstances: EPH17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 824 at [18] (Kenny J). It must be exercised in the way that best promotes the overarching purpose in s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) to facilitate the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible.

15    As the Minister submitted and Mr Nawaz properly acknowledged, the request for Ministerial intervention is unrelated to the current appeal. Indeed, it is inconsistent with it, as the delegate and the Tribunal refused the visa application because they were not satisfied that Mr Nawaz wished to stay in Australia temporarily, and the request for intervention relies principally on the interests of Mr Nawaz’s two children in their parents being able to stay in Australia.

16    It is also significant that the request for intervention seeks to invoke a personal power of the Minister, which he has no obligation even to consider exercising, let alone any obligation to exercise: see MZAPC v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 877 at [9] (Colvin J). Whether the request will be considered by the Minister, the timeline for any consideration, and whether it will ultimately be granted are all unknown. It cannot be said that there is any probability that the request will be considered or granted. So the suggestion that waiting for six months will save the Court and the parties any time and cost is speculative.

17    Another matter relevant to the exercise of the discretion is that when Mr Nawaz lodged the request for intervention on 3 August 2026, he had been on notice of the listing of this matter for over two months. Yet the request was lodged and the adjournment application made only a week before the hearing. Time and expense in preparation for this matter had undoubtedly already been spent and incurred. There was no suggestion that the circumstances apparently forming the basis of the intervention request had only arisen recently; they included the birth of Mr Nawaz’s youngest child in 2021, and the suggestion that Mr Nawaz’s oldest child had gained Australian citizenship at an unspecified date. The unexplained lateness of the application to adjourn is a discretionary reason against allowing it.

18    The asserted need to further prepare as a litigant in person was not a persuasive reason to adjourn. As has been said, the appeal was filed in 2024, and the appellants had over two months’ notice of the date of the hearing, which was ample time to prepare. I recognise the difficulties that face them as litigants in person, but there is no right to legal representation in these circumstances, and there was no reason to think that additional time would have made any difference.

19    In summary, Mr Nawaz had not established any real likelihood that his request for intervention will succeed and so save the Court or the parties the time and expense of determining the proceeding. His application was made late in the proceeding, with no good explanation for the delay. He has had sufficient time to prepare and there was no reason to conclude that allowing further time would have affected the outcome. The overarching purpose confirms that in the absence of good reason, further delay should be avoided. In all those circumstances, it was in the interests of justice to proceed and hear the appeal on 10 August 2026.

The Tribunal decision

20    The Tribunal identified the ‘main issue’ before it as whether Mr Nawaz met the genuine temporary entrant criterion at the time of the delegate’s refusal decision. As has been said, that criterion was found in in cl 572.223(1) of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations. As it stood at the time of the visa application in March 2015, it was necessary that the Minister be satisfied:

… that the applicant is a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student because:

(a)     the Minister is satisfied that the applicant intends genuinely to stay in Australia temporarily, having regard to:

(i)     the applicant’s circumstances; and

(ii)     the applicant’s immigration history; and

(iii)     if the applicant is a minor—the intentions of a parent, legal guardian or spouse of the applicant; and

(iv)     any other relevant matter…

21    The Tribunal was also bound by Ministerial Direction No 53 in assessing the criterion, which required it to have regard to specific factors, including: an applicant’s circumstances in their home country; their potential circumstances in Australia; the value of a study course to an applicant’s future; an applicant’s immigration history; and previous travel.

22    The Tribunal decision began with a review of Mr Nawaz’s study history in Australia. It noted that he first arrived in Australia with the intention to pursue a Master of Information Technology degree, but due to unsatisfactory progress in a mandatory pre-requisite English course he instead completed a number of Vocational Education and Training (VET) courses. Those included a Diploma in Hospitality Management; a Diploma of Business Management; a Diploma of Information Technology Networking; a Diploma of Marketing; and an Advanced Diploma of Marketing. The Tribunal noted that at the time of the hearing in 2018, Mr Nawaz was enrolled in a further course, an Advanced Diploma of Hospitality Management, as confirmed by a certificate of confirmation of enrolment (COE) Mr Nawaz had provided. The Tribunal accepted Mr Nawaz’s explanation for studying at the VET level, rather than the university level, and his explanation for changing his course of study to focus on the hospitality industry.

23    The Tribunal considered evidence Mr Nawaz gave about a future career plan to open a restaurant in either Pakistan or Dubai. It noted that the plan was not particularly detailed, but it accepted that it was genuinely held. It found that the skills learned in some of the above-mentioned courses would help with the plan. However, it also considered that Mr Nawaz had already undertaken sufficient study to achieve the plan, and that he would have been able to return to Pakistan in 2017, following completion of his Advanced Diploma in Marketing.

24    The Tribunal found that the Advanced Diploma of Hospitality Management, being the stated purpose of the visa application, would only add ‘limited incremental additional value’ to Mr Nawaz’s career plan, given his existing qualifications. It reasoned from the timing of his enrolment and the nature of the course that he was using the Advanced Diploma as a means of supporting the grant of a further student visa and prolonging his stay in Australia.

25    The Tribunal considered Mr Nawaz’s circumstances in Pakistan and in Australia, including part-time work he had undertaken in Australia in the hospitality sector, his occupation as a taxi driver at the time of the hearing, and his young family. It found that there were ‘family incentives’ for Mr Nawaz to return to Pakistan. It also noted there was no adverse information to suggest that he would be unable to return to Pakistan, based on potential military service, economic or political circumstances, civil unrest or other situations.

26    The Tribunal found Mr Nawaz’s evidence to be straightforward and reasonable but noted the then eleven years during which he had been in Australia on various study related visas. Its conclusion on the review was as follows:

32.    Findings: having consideration of all the factors in direction 53 overall, the applicant had every personal and business reason to cease his residence [in] Australia by the end of 2017. Regarding his conduct in enrolling in an Advance Diploma of Hospitality Management, the tribunal finds this superfluous to the applicant’s stated future plan, and makes the suggestion that he will not yield to incentives that he has to leave Australia, and his desire to start a business.

33.    The above factors accumulatively indicate that the applicant is not a genuine student; rather, the applicant appears to be using the student visa program as a means of prolonging residence in Australia and does not genuinely intend to stay in Australia temporarily. Overall given the study history and the potential circumstances in Australia and the immigration history and value of the future course to the applicant’s future, the tribunal finds the applicant is utilising the student visa program to circumvent permanent migration programs, and the tribunal is not satisfied the applicant is a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student, and that he intends to stay in Australia temporarily. On the basis of the above information and having considered the applicant’s circumstances, immigration history and other matters as considered relevant, the tribunal is not satisfied the applicant genuinely intends to stay in Australia temporarily. Accordingly, the applicant does not meet clause 572.223(1)(a).

27    The Tribunal therefore affirmed the delegate’s decision.

The Circuit Court decision

28    At the Circuit Court hearing, Mr Nawaz relied on the following ground of review:

I believe that the decision has not been made by the respectable Member taking all facts and surrounding circumstances in my case. They would have been an error by the member or the matter has been over looked. I believe, I am satisfying all the conditions (500.212)(a) of The Genuine Temporary Entrant. Even though there was a ground for refusal. The Member did not properly look at the fact and made an error in judgement. During my stay in Australia, I was fully complying with terms and conditions of my student visas, I was completely focusing on my studies and have a plan for my career. I highly request to [Honourable] Court to accept my application on ground of fair justice, as my whole career and future depends on the [decision]. If this application will not be accepted, I will not be able to achieve my career objectives, and it will be hard for me to continue a career with incomplete skillset and continuingly bearing a heavy cost.

29    In his oral submissions to the Circuit Court, Mr Nawaz said that he had provided all his relevant diplomas and degrees to the Tribunal and had explained his study and career aspirations. Further, he said he was ‘very excited’ at the time of the hearing, because he believed that the Tribunal member agreed with him and that his application would be successful.

30    At [34], the primary judge interpreted Mr Nawaz’s ground of review as raising the following issues:

(a)    whether the Tribunal failed to take into account all facts and circumstances, with the particular facts and circumstances referred to in the applicants’ ground being that the first applicant:

(i)    fully complied with the terms and conditions of his student visas;

(ii)     completely focused on his studies; and

(iii)     had a plan for his career;

(b)    whether the Tribunal ‘properly’ considered the facts or whether the Tribunal made an ‘error in judgement’.

31    Regarding whether the Tribunal considered Mr Nawaz’s compliance with past visa conditions, the primary judge considered that this was addressed by paragraph 29 of the Tribunal’s reasons, which said:

The tribunal has considered the applicant’s immigration history and has considered that the applicant has not studied at a university level in Australia but has studied at a college VET provider level and has not envisaged a higher education level, but nonetheless the Tribunal understands the reasons for not doing so.

32    The primary judge observed that this paragraph should be interpreted in light of the reasons as a whole, including the Tribunal’s earlier acknowledgment that Mr Nawaz had initially come to Australia to study at university level, and the regard it had to Ministerial Direction No 53. Her Honour reasoned:

[40]    As I read [29] of the Tribunal’s reasons, considered in the context of the matters referred to in the two preceding paragraphs of this judgment, it appears to me that the Tribunal implicitly found that the first applicant did not comply with his previous visa conditions, because he did not study at the level required for the purpose of the visa he was granted, but that the applicant had a reasonable excuse for this. It was therefore not a factor that weighed against the applicants in any way. If this interpretation of [29] of the Tribunal’s reasons is correct, it follows that the Tribunal did consider whether the applicant had fully complied with the terms and conditions of his past student visas.

[41]    If, however, my interpretation of [29] of the Tribunal’s reasons is not correct, I would still not find that the failure to expressly refer to the first applicant’s compliance or non-compliance with the conditions of his past visas amounts to jurisdictional error. There is no evidence before the Court to show that the applicants expressly made any submissions to the Tribunal about whether the first applicant had complied or not complied with past visa conditions and I am unable to locate any direct evidence in the materials before the Court in relation to whether or not the first applicant had complied with his past visa conditions. The Tribunal is not required to refer in its reasons to each and every matter in Ministerial Direction No 53. …

33    Regarding whether the Tribunal considered that Mr Nawaz was completely focused on his studies, the primary judge found that the appellants’ assertion was misconceived; the Tribunal had considered Mr Nawaz’s study history and his explanations of the value of the Advanced Diploma, and made no adverse findings based on any assessment of his commitment to his studies or his failure to pursue a degree at a master’s level.

34    The primary judge also found that the Tribunal had regard to and accepted evidence about Mr Nawaz’s future career plan.

35    Regarding whether the Tribunal ‘properly’ considered the facts or made an error in judgment, her Honour reasoned at [44]:

To the extent that the applicants assert that the Tribunal did not properly look at the facts and made an error in judgement, this appears to be an invitation to engage in impermissible merits review and an expression of disagreement with the Tribunal decision. The applicants’ disagreement with the Tribunal decision cannot, of itself, give rise to jurisdictional error. Nor does the first applicant’s belief that he would be successful before the Tribunal, of itself, demonstrate that the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error in affirming the delegate’s decision. The Court does not have any power to decide for itself whether the applicants meet the criteria for the grant of student visas and cannot review the factual merits of the Tribunal decision.

36    Finally, the primary judge considered Mr Nawaz’s oral submissions as to his belief in his success before the Tribunal. The Minister submitted that this could be interpreted as an assertion of a denial of procedural fairness. Her Honour said at [45] that this appeared to be based on the concept of ‘legitimate expectations’, and noted that the High Court has since moved away from that concept. The genuine belief of Mr Nawaz therefore did not give rise to any denial of procedural fairness. Her Honour further noted there was no suggestion that the Tribunal failed to comply with its procedural fairness obligations under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

37    The primary judge found there was no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal decision and therefore dismissed the application for judicial review.

The way in which the appeal will be determined

38    As mentioned at the outset of these reasons, the appellants now raise thirteen grounds of appeal. Those grounds will appear further below. As has been said, none of the errors asserted on the part of the Tribunal was advanced before the primary judge, and the grounds do not engage with her Honour’s actual reasoning. So leave is required to advance any of them as new grounds in this Court.

39    The appellants did not file any written submissions in this appeal. Mr Nawaz appeared at the hearing of the appeal alone. I explained to him that the Minister had submitted that the appeal grounds go beyond the matters he put to the primary judge, but nevertheless I invited him to explain or expand on any of them in his oral submissions. He declined to do so.

40    So, leave is required to advance the grounds of appeal, no explanation has been advanced as to why they were not put to the Circuit Court, and no submissions have been made to support them. In those circumstances, it would not be appropriate to address them in any detail. Even if submissions in support had been advanced, it would be sufficient for the Court to assess the merits of the proposed new grounds on a ‘reasonably impressionistic basis’: AWV18 v Minister for Home Affairs (No 3) [2020] FCA 365 at [55] (Derrington J). I will therefore set out each ground below, followed by my own briefly expressed view about it.

There is no apparent error in the primary judge’s decision

41    Before that, however, it is appropriate to comment on the reasons of the primary judge: see AWV18 at [55]. As has been said, none of the proposed grounds of appeal address those reasons or seeks to assert that her Honour erred in the way in which she determined the ground of review before her. So I will briefly consider her Honour’s reasons, in overview.

42    My respectful view is that there is no error apparent in those reasons. Her Honour’s summary of the issues raised by the ground of review did full justice to that ground.

43    Concerning Mr Nawaz’s immigration history, while the visa criterion in cl 572.223(1) and Direction 53 required the Tribunal to have regard to it, the Tribunal said that it had considered his immigration history and the Tribunal’s reasons as a whole provide no reason to doubt that. While the Tribunal did not expressly refer to every matter listed in Direction 53, it was not required to do so, particularly in circumstances where, as her Honour found, no submissions or evidence had been directed to the Tribunal on the subject: see Kumar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCAFC 16; (2020) 274 FCR 646 at [108] (Derrington and Thawley JJ).

44    Concerning whether Mr Nawaz was ‘completely focused on his studies’, the primary judge was correct to dismiss this complaint. The Tribunal’s reasons show that it considered Mr Nawaz’s history as a student in Australia in detail and it made no finding that he had not fulfilled the requirements of the various courses he had successfully completed.

45    The Tribunal also accepted that Mr Nawaz ‘had a plan’ for his career, namely to open a restaurant in Pakistan or Dubai. Its adverse conclusion was based on reasoning that the proposed new course of study was not necessary to implement that plan.

46    The primary judge was similarly correct to dismiss Mr Nawaz’s generally expressed complaints that the Tribunal had not ‘properly’ considered the facts or had made an ‘error in judgement’. The reasoning of the Tribunal displays a real engagement with its statutory task and does not display any error of reasoning. To criticise its reasons beyond those aspects would be to engage in merits review.

47    Finally, to the extent that Mr Nawaz was complaining of a denial of procedural fairness, it is difficult to see how that arises. Even assuming that the Tribunal member gave him the impression during the hearing that the outcome of the review would be favourable, Mr Nawaz did not identify how that disabled him from presenting any evidence or submissions.

The proposed grounds of appeal

48    I will now set out each proposed ground of appeal followed by my views on it, after considering it in the context and manner set out above. (All punctuation and emphasis are in the original.)

1.     ignoring materials the decision-maker was required to look at; e.g COE

49    The Tribunal accepted that Mr Nawaz had enrolled in an Advanced Diploma of Hospitality Management, and so took the COE into account. No other materials it was required to consider have been identified or are apparent.

2.     making a decision for which there was no evidence, or that was not reasonably open on the materials.

50    The Tribunal reasoned on the basis of Mr Nawaz’s expressed plan, the courses he had completed and the course in which he was enrolled, to come to the intelligible conclusion that the proposed future course was not necessary to the plan, and so to the inference that Mr Nawaz had enrolled in it to prolong his stay in Australia. This reasoning was open to the Tribunal on the basis of the materials before it.

3.     The FCC and the AAT had erred in its application of the relevant law which caused it to identify a wrong issue, to ask itself the wrong question or to reach a mistaken conclusion and the Tribunal's exercise or purported exercise of power was thereby affected.

51    No mistake of law, wrong issue, wrong question or mistaken conclusion made or considered by the Tribunal or the Circuit Court has been identified, and none is apparent from the reasoning as summarised and considered above.

4.    That the making of the decision was an improper exercise of the power conferred by the enactment in pursuance of which it was purported to be made.

52    It is not possible to understand what this ground is referring to.

5.     The FCC and the AAT did not provide enough weight to the situation I had tried to explain while they had put more weightage on disposing of the case before them rather quickly than EXERCISE any fact finding and gathering evidence from us, the visa holders.

53    There is no apparent basis on the facts for these assertions. The reasons of the Tribunal and of the Circuit Court show that they each addressed the appellants’ case with due deliberation and care. The weight to be put on any aspect of that case was a matter for the Tribunal. There is no apparent basis in the evidence for the suggestion that either process was rushed.

6.     The Tribunal fundamentally misunderstood the requirements of 573.223 in Schedule 2 of the Regulations and thereby fell into jurisdictional error.

54    No misunderstanding of cl 572.223 is identified or is apparent.

7.     The FCC and the AAT were merely focused on the application for review, which was not received by the Tribunal and decided that the application for review was not made in accordance with the relevant legislation and the Tribunal had no jurisdiction in this matter.

55    This proposed ground is difficult to understand. The Tribunal plainly had jurisdiction to determine the appellants’ application for review before it, and it was right to focus on that application exclusively. The jurisdiction of the Circuit Court to engage in judicial review was then founded exclusively on the Tribunal’s review.

56    If the ground complains that the Circuit Court and the Tribunal determined that the visa application did not comply with the requirements of the regulations, for the reasons given above that determination was open to the Tribunal and was correctly not disturbed by the Circuit Court.

8.     The FCC and the AAT had the benefit of viewing all submissions uploaded and lodged together with the application for review but decided to dispose of the application for review without fully considering it under natural justice and on the its merits.

57    Mr Nawaz has identified no submission he made that was not considered by the Tribunal or the Circuit Court, and none is apparent on the materials before me. As has been said, both the Tribunal and the Circuit Court gave the matter careful consideration. No denial of procedural fairness (natural justice) is identified or apparent.

9.     The FCC and the AAT with a predetermined mind and a preconceived outcome of having the application for review disposed without weighing and considering the factual circumstances presented. This has caused great unjust to me under Natural Justice and as such is a jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal member.

58    These assertions of apparent or actual bias have no factual basis.

10.     The decision to give a decision without considering the application on merits was irrational, arbitrary and vitiated by jurisdictional error.

59    This appears to be a generic assertion of a failure to consider the application on its merits. It is not clear whether it is the Tribunal that is said to have erred in that way, or the Circuit Court, or both. Whichever it is, what has been said above shows that this ground has no merit.

11.     The FCC and the AAT exceeded its jurisdiction or constructively failed to exercise its jurisdiction for its failure to take into consideration my oral and other documental evidences in relation to my nominated position;

60    This ground just puts complaints that have already been addressed in a different way. It takes the appeal no further.

12.     The FCC and the AAT exceeds its jurisdiction or constructively failed to exercise its jurisdiction and denied procedural fairness by not giving any weight on my oral explanations and the documents provided for consideration in this regard. If the FCC and the AAT had verified the matter individually and given me further opportunities to explain that could have led to a different decision by the FCC and the AAT.

61    This proposed ground fails to identify any specific opportunity to explain that Mr Nawaz has been denied. Beyond that, it too is repetitive of the previous grounds, and need not be separately addressed.

13.     The FCC and the AAT with apprehended bias in the overall information and considered my case on average without giving any weight to my claims and didn't look at the matter individually.

62    This is also repetitive of previous proposed grounds and need not be separately addressed.

Conclusion

63    There is no merit in any of the proposed grounds of appeal, and there is no reason to think that the primary judge erred. The appeal will be dismissed, with costs.

Associate:

Dated:    20 August 2026