Federal Court of Australia

Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2026] FCA 1171

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The Notice of Appeal dated 15 May 2025 is dismissed.

2.    Subject to order 3, the Appellants pay the Respondents’ costs as agreed or assessed.

3.    If any party wishes to seek an order as to costs which differs from that set out in order 2:

(a)    that party is to file, within 7 days, written submissions of no more than 5 pages together with any evidence upon which it wishes to rely on the issue of costs;

(b)    the other party is to file any written submissions in response of no more than 5 pages, and any evidence on which it wishes to rely on the issue of costs, by 7 days after receipt of the material referred to in order 3(a).

4.    Subject to order 3, the issue of costs will be decided on the papers.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BENNETT J:

Introduction and summary

1    The Appellants appeal from the judgment and orders of Judge Fary made on 6 May 2025. By those orders, his Honour dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (as it then was) (Tribunal) affirming a decision of a delegate (Delegate) of the First Respondent (Minister) not to grant the First Appellant’s Regional Employer Nomination (Class RN) (Subclass 187) visa (Visa). The Second and Third Appellants were listed as dependents on the Visa.

2    While the First Appellant has ventilated a range of grievances with the process as he perceives it, he has not identified any relevant legal error. Accordingly, for the reasons that I have outlined in detail below, the appeal must be dismissed.

background facts

3    This outline of background facts is derived from the First Appellant’s affidavit, the documents before the Tribunal or the Court below, and, in some instances, from submissions filed by the Appellants without leave following the close of submissions. Given my conclusions as to the disposition of this appeal, I have had regard to those submissions in the interests of completeness. However, I note that in some respects that narrative is untested and represents only the Appellants’ perception. My recitation of those matters should not, without more, be taken as acceptance of those assertions.

4    The First Appellant and his family are citizens of India. One daughter, who was born in Australia, has been granted Australian citizenship. The First Appellant arrived in Australia in February 2010 as a student and undertook various diplomas in management and business.

5    The First Appellant was granted a 457 visa on 16 December 2013. This visa was connected with the position of Customer Service Manager. The First Appellant asserts that there was no difficulty with that visa. The First Appellant stated in his submission that the original sponsoring employer sold the business and the new employer then applied to nominate him for the same role. The First Appellant stated that the nomination was refused in August 2015. The First Appellant complains that the failure to permit the new 457 nomination was unfair on him.

6    The First Appellant then applied for the Visa, which was a Regional Employer Nomination (Class RN) (Subclass 187) visa. A company called Far Qld Pty Ltd nominated the First Appellant on 24 November 2016.

7    It appears that the First Appellant worked for Far Qld Pty Ltd for two years. On 30 November 2018, his employer withdrew its nomination for him. On 30 November 2018, a Delegate wrote to the First Appellant and invited comment on the information that had been received, being that the nomination had been withdrawn. There was no response from the Appellants.

8    On 4 January 2019, a Delegate refused the application for the Visa (the Delegate’s Decision). The Delegate said that she was not satisfied that cl 187.233 of Sch 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations) was satisfied. The Delegate found that because the nomination had been withdrawn, the criterion in cl 187.233(3) was not met.

9    The Appellants sought review of the Delegate’s decision in the Tribunal on about 23 January 2019. A hearing was set down for 28 February 2020. The First Appellant attended with the assistance of a Punjabi interpreter.

10    The decision of the Delegate was affirmed orally. A written statement of reasons was requested. On 16 March 2020, those reasons were provided. The Tribunal’s reasons provided, in substance, that:

In the present case the applicant is seeking the visa in the direct entry stream to work in the nominated position of office manager. Clause 187.233 requires that the position to which the application relates be the subject of an application for approval of a nomination in the direct entry stream located in regional Australia. The requirement cannot be satisfied by a later nomination in the position made by a different employer and according to current authority, a nomination in respect of the same position made by the same employer could also not be relied on to meet the Schedule 2 criteria.

…

The applicant has requested additional time in order to secure a new employer. As discussed with the applicant, the Tribunal cannot defer making a decision indefinitely and for that reason along with the fact that this application cannot be saved by a later nomination application, I consider that the Tribunal is bound to deal with the case expediently and efficiently based on the information before it as required by the guidelines of good practice.

11    The Appellants sought judicial review in the Federal Circuit and Family Court. That application was dismissed (Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 633 (PJ)).

12    The hearing took place on 1 May 2025. The PJ records (at [26]) that:

The Court is satisfied that the Hearing provided a meaningful opportunity for the Applicant to engage with the Court.

13    The Appellants filed no written submissions, and the substance of their submissions appear to have been contained within the application itself. The PJ records those grounds as follows:

1    I Jagjit Singh am the main applicant of this application and Varinderjit Kaur, Jugraj Singh are the dependent applicants. (Ground 1).

2.    I came to Australia as the holder of student visa. I completed my studies and getting sponsored from nominated employer. (Ground 2).

3    The Tribunal erred in misconstruing and interpreting clause cl.187.233. (Ground 3).

Particulars

a.    The Tribunal erred by not assessing and considering the ability of second applicant to meet the primary criteria for the subclass 187 visa.

b.    Tribunal erred in not considering whether the secondary applicant has made any claims against the primary criteria for the grant of subclass 187 visa pursuant to sch.2 of the regulation.

c.    The tribunal failed to independently assessed whether the secondary applicants satisfies cl.187.233 individually.

That the decision of the tribunal is affected by the jurisdictional error.

The tribunal failed to accord to the applicants procedural fairness and natural justice in support of my application.

4.    The nomination application was lodged and due to unknown reasons the employer of nomination application took his step back from the lodged application. This was a huge shock to me. (Ground 4).

5.    I tried several times to contact my employer and also dropped several email from my end but he didn’t respond me back. Even he didn’t try to contact me or did not pick up my calls. (Ground 5).

6.    Member didn’t pay any heed towards my separate visa application. He gave his direction on the basis of my nomination application, which was totally unbiased decision for me and no further investigation was done on this matter. (Ground 6).

7.     Member erred in dismissing the applicant’s application without providing extra time without any basis in law and fact. (Ground 7).

8.    The appellant’s application clearly raises an arguable case and the decision of the tribunal is short and void and must be overlooked again. (Ground 8).

9.     Substantial justice was not provided and that’s the reason I want to apply in Federal Circuit Court of Australia. (Ground 9).

14    The PJ found that grounds 1, 2, 4 and 5 did not allege error. His Honour therefore focused on grounds 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9.

15    His Honour briefly sketched the statutory framework relevant to the Visa, noting (PJ at [52]) that:

The dispositive issue in relation to the Tribunal’s Decision was whether the Tribunal was satisfied in relation to the employer nomination application criterion in cl 187.233 in circumstances where the employer had withdrawn its nomination application

16    His Honour then considered each of the grounds which arguably identified a form of error in the following way. I have adopted the numbering used by his Honour.

Ground 3

17    Ground 3 was concerned with an alleged misinterpretation of cl 187.233. It was accompanied by the following particulars:

a.    The Tribunal erred by not assessing and considering the ability of second applicant to meet the primary criteria for the subclass 187 visa.

b.    Tribunal erred in not considering whether the secondary applicant has made any claims against the primary criteria for the grant of subclass 187 visa pursuant to sch.2 of the regulation.

c.    The tribunal failed to independently assessed whether the secondary applicants satisfies cl.187.233 individually.

That the decision of the tribunal is affected by the jurisdictional error.

The tribunal failed to accord to the applicants procedural fairness and natural justice in support of my application.

18    His Honour noted that the Tribunal was not required to assess and consider the ability of the other Applicants to meet the primary criterion for a subclass 187 visa, in circumstances where none of those people were identified in the nomination application connected with the Visa application (PJ at [56]). His Honour considered the clause was otherwise correctly construed and applied by the Tribunal.

19    The Applicants contended that the Tribunal failed to consider the circumstances in which the employer’s nomination application was withdrawn. His Honour said he could discern no such requirement in the provisions of cl 187 and did not consider that the Tribunal erred by failing to consider the circumstances of the withdrawal: what was relevant was the fact of the withdrawal (PJ at [57]). Similarly, his Honour found that even though the Applicants were not informed of the withdrawal for some time, this did not overcome the fact of the withdrawal (PJ at [57]).

20    Ground 3 also contained allegations of a lack of procedural fairness. His Honour reviewed the position carefully and said (PJ at [62]) that he was not satisfied that there had been a denial of procedural fairness because:

(1)    The Applicants were invited to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments in accordance with s 360(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act).

(2)    The Applicants appeared before the Tribunal with the assistance of a Punjabi interpreter and gave evidence and presented arguments.

(3)    The Applicants were notified of the withdrawal by the employer of the nomination application.

21    His Honour therefore concluded that ground 3 was not established.

Ground 6

22    Ground 6 was:

Member didn’t pay any heed towards my separate visa application. He gave his direction on the basis of my nomination application, which was totally unbiased decision for me and no further investigation was done on this matter. (Ground 6).

23    The Primary Judge said that he was not satisfied that the matters alleged in ground 6 demonstrated error by failing to “pay any heed towards my separate visa application” (PJ at [65]). The Primary Judge observed that it was unclear what was intended to be referred to by the First Applicant’s “separate visa application” (PJ at [65]). The Primary Judge speculated that this was perhaps a reference to the First Applicant’s request for more time to secure a new employer but noted that in the absence of an approved or pending nomination application, the Tribunal was not, and could not be, satisfied that the criteria in cl 187.233 had been met (PJ at [65]).

24    Thus, no jurisdictional error was identified.

Ground 7

25    Ground 7 was:

Member erred in dismissing the applicant’s application without providing extra time without any basis in law and fact. (Ground 7).

26    In relation to this issue, the Tribunal noted that the Applicants had sought “additional time in order to secure a new employer” but refused that request because it could not defer the decision indefinitely, and because “this application cannot be saved by a later nomination application” (PJ at [68]).

27    Section 363(1)(b) of the Act (at the time of the hearing before the Tribunal) provided that for the purpose of the review of a decision, the Tribunal may “adjourn the review from time to time”. The Primary Judge noted that, given that the power to adjourn was a discretionary one, there was an obligation on the Tribunal to exercise that power reasonably, citing Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332 at [63] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell J) (PJ at [69]).

28    The Primary Judge was not satisfied that the Tribunal erred by failing to give the Applicants “extra time”, presumably to procure another employer nomination. In particular, the decision not to adjourn was not one “which lacks an evident and intelligible justification” and hence was not unreasonable having regard to a number of matters, not least of which was that the withdrawal of the nomination by the employer meant that the Applicants could not satisfy the employer nomination application criterion in cl 187.233, noting the nomination and application for a visa is a “one off” process (PJ at [71]).

Ground 8

29    Ground 8 was:

The appellant’s application clearly raises an arguable case and the decision of the tribunal is short and void and must be overlooked again. (Ground 8).

30    The Primary Judge noted that ground 8 did not clearly identify an allegation of jurisdictional error. His Honour observed that because it was a final hearing, the question for the Court was not whether an arguable case had been raised, but whether there was a jurisdictional error (PJ at [74]). His Honour found that the Tribunal’s Decision appropriately dealt with the issues of the case, including the dispositive issue of whether there was a valid and subsisting employer nomination application.

Ground 9

31    Ground 9 was simply:

Substantial justice was not provided and that’s the reason I want to apply in Federal Circuit Court of Australia. (Ground 9).

32    His Honour observed that the assertion that “substantial justice was not provided”, without any particulars, did not assist in identifying any jurisdictional error (PJ at [77]). The Primary Judge proceeded on the basis that a claim in such terms lacked merit.

Materiality / Futility

33    Having considered the claims carefully, the Primary Judge went on to consider the Minister’s contention that the grant of any relief would be futile given the lack of employer nomination. His Honour concluded that any remittal would be futile because the nomination did not exist at the relevant time (PJ at [79]).

The Appeal to this Court

34    The Appellants were self-represented in this Court and initially filed no submissions. The Notice of Appeal in this Court identified the following grounds of appeal:

1.    The decision of Honourable Court is affected by a jurisdictional error.

2.    The Honourable Judge Fary did not adopt a fair process in making a decision and incorrectly interpreted the law.

3.    The Honourable Judge Fary made an error in interpreting the Migration Regulation and Migration PAM (Procedures Advice Manual).

4.    The Honourable Judge Fary failed to consider that each case has its own facts and merits and ought to be consider on a specific case-to-case basis.

35    At the conclusion of the hearing, the First Respondent undertook to provide supplementary submissions on a discrete legal point. As a matter of fairness, the Appellants were given the opportunity to respond to those submissions. The submissions that were filed went well outside the grant of leave necessary to respond to the Minister’s (appropriately confined) submissions. As explained above, I consider it appropriate to have regard to the additional submissions in the interests of completeness.

36    The appeal to this Court was supported by an affidavit of the First Appellant which recounted the background to the matter and asserted, without elaboration, that the First Appellant believed that the decision of the Primary Judge did not accord procedural fairness, that he believed that he had a strong case, and that he required legal assistance to prepare his case. In the submissions subsequently filed by the Appellants, the Appellants said that:

…the Department's handling of his visa and nomination process has been marked by significant procedural delay, inconsistent decision-making, and a failure to give proper weight to the compelling humanitarian circumstances affecting his family. These matters need’s the Court's careful consideration.

37    I turn now to consider the grounds identified in the notice of appeal.

The Grounds of Appeal

38    I have considered each ground raised by the Appellants. In doing so, I am conscious of the Court’s obligations to unrepresented litigants (SZRUR v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 146; 216 FCR 445 at [37] (Robertson J, with Allsop CJ and Mortimer J agreeing); NWQR v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 30 at [27] (the Court)). The principles were conveniently summarised by Moshinsky J in Wahed v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 247 at [26] as follows (citations omitted):

Courts have an overriding duty to ensure that a trial is fair to all parties. In the context of an unrepresented litigant, that duty requires the Court to take appropriate steps to ensure that the unrepresented litigant has sufficient information about the practice and procedure of the Court, so far as is reasonably practicable for the purpose of ensuring a fair trial. The application of that principle will vary depending upon the circumstances of the case … However, there is no statutory right to legal representation. Nor is there any absolute right to legal representation at common law … In civil proceedings, procedural fairness does not require that a party be provided with legal representation, no matter how serious the consequences of the proceedings might be …

39    The obligation to ensure a trial is fair does not require the judge to give legal or tactical advice to a self-represented litigant that would compromise the judge’s impartiality and be unfair to the opposing party (Chetcuti v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 112; 270 FCR 335 at [106] (Murphy and Rangiah JJ)).

Appeal ground 1

40    Appeal ground 1 is no more than the bare assertion of jurisdictional error. It is so broad as to be meaningless and is not established.

Appeal ground 2

41    The second ground asserts a lack of procedural fairness. A review of the procedural background to the matter makes clear that procedural orders were made on 5 May 2021 and 17 March 2025 to file any amended application, written submissions and additional evidence. The Appellants did not do so. The Appellants had the benefit of a Punjabi interpreter and made oral submissions at the hearing.

42    His Honour was aware of his obligations to self-represented litigants and his reasons disclose close and careful analysis of any arguable matters (even outside those disclosed in the application). There is no basis to suppose that there was a lack of procedural fairness, and nothing was advanced in support of this ground orally.

43    Ground 2 is not established.

Ground 3

44    The PAM was not relevant to the Tribunal’s decision and did not arise for consideration on judicial review. Nothing was advanced orally that assisted in understanding this ground.

45    To the extent ground three otherwise asserts an error of construction, the ground likewise cannot succeed. His Honour accurately recorded the requirements of cl 187.233 of Sch 2 to the Regulations (PJ at [51]). His Honour was correct to find that the Tribunal properly interpreted and applied that provision, and that there was no requirement in the provision for the Tribunal to consider the circumstances in which a nomination had been withdrawn – rather, the only matter that was relevant was the fact of withdrawal and the absence of a subsisting and valid nominating employer application (PJ at [56]).

46    In any event, the primary criteria for the grant of a subclass 187 visa in the Direct Entry Stream include cl 187.233 of Sch 2 to the Regulations. At all relevant times, cl 187.233 was as follows:

(1)    The position to which the application relates is the position:

(a)    nominated in an application for approval that:

(i)    identifies the applicant in relation to the position; and

(ii)    is made in relation to a visa in a Direct Entry stream; and

(iii)    seeks to meet the requirements of subregulation 5.19(12); and

(b)    in relation to which the declaration mentioned in paragraph 1114C(3)(d) of Schedule 1 was made in the application for the grant of the visa.

(2)    The person who will employ the applicant is the person who made the nomination.

(3)    The Minister has approved the nomination.

(4)     The nomination has not subsequently been withdrawn.

(4A)     Either:

(a)    there is no adverse information known to Immigration about the person who made the nomination or a person associated with that person; or

(b)    it is reasonable to disregard any adverse information known to Immigration about the person who made the nomination or a person associated with that person.

(5)     The position is still available to the applicant.

(6)     The application for the visa is made no more than 6 months after the Minister approved the nomination.

47    The effect of cls 187.233(1) and (3) is that the visa application needs to be for a particular position of employment which is specified in the application and is the subject of a declaration made in the visa application in accordance with cl 1114C(3) of Sch 1 to the Regulations, that position needs to be named in a nomination, and that nomination needs to be approved. This issue was considered by Mortimer J (as her Honour then was) in Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 105; 253 FCR 267 (Singh). Her Honour explained that determining whether a person meets cl 187.233 requires consideration of whether there is a specific nomination for “a particular job with a particular employer that exists at a particular point in time, and in a particular set of factual circumstances” (Singh at [88]). The relevant point in time is the point at which the nomination was submitted for approval by the Minister. It is that specific act of nomination to which the declaration in the visa application is directed. It was characterised as a “once off” process connecting the visa application to a specific employer nomination (Singh at [90] (Mortimer J)). The same construction is supported by cl 187.212 which provides that the person to whom the visa application relates will provide to the applicant the employment referred to in the application for approval. The criterion, in addition to the declaration in cl 1114C(3), ties the visa application to a specific employer nomination.

48    The analysis in Singh applied even where a nomination was refused or withdrawn. In Begum v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 227, the Court applied Singh in circumstances where the nomination was withdrawn. In doing so, Cheesman J said (at [28]-[29]):

By ground 3 the appellants contend that in the circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Tribunal failed to allow the appellants to provide another nomination to seek to meet the visa criteria.

This ground does not establish error because an applicant for a subclass 187 visa can only rely on the original nomination application in which they were nominated and which was declared at the time of the subclass 187 visa application: Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 105; 253 FCR 267 at [81]-[91] (Mortimer J, Jagot and Bromberg JJ agreeing at [1], [2] respectively). An applicant for a subclass 187 visa cannot rely on either a new nomination application lodged by the original nominator after the subclass 187 visa was lodged or a nomination application lodged by a new (alternative) nominator. No error has been demonstrated in the conclusion of the primary judge that the judicial review application lacked utility because the Tribunal would be bound to affirm the decision even if the matter were to be remitted.

49    His Honour’s reasons do not reveal any misunderstanding of the terms of cl 187.233 or any other provision of the Regulations.

50    Ground 3 therefore does not succeed.

Ground 4

51    Ground 4 is an assertion that the Primary Judge failed to consider the case on its merits. There is no substance to this ground. The Primary Judge carefully and thoroughly undertook his task of review and afforded the Appellants every opportunity to advance their case. Nothing said by the Appellants orally gave any further substance to this ground. It therefore does not succeed.

Other matters

52    None of the grounds demonstrate error. Having regard to the Appellants’ self-represented status, I have nonetheless set out the arguments advanced in their supplementary submissions.

The First Appellant’s 457 visa

53    The First Appellant complains that his 457 visa status was revoked by the Department after a change in employer. He complains that this was an inconsistent position to have taken because the Department had earlier approved his 457 visa and there had been, in his view, no relevant change to the role that he was carrying out. He said that this involved “inconsistency” and was “an error” because he then lost two years during which he could not secure another sponsor or lodge a new application.

54    This complaint does not arise in relation to the decision under review. It concerns a different decision made at a much earlier stage. It is simply not before this Court. The present appeal does not collaterally challenge predecessor steps so far out of time, without a notice of appeal, and without any of the relevant materials being before the Court. It is therefore not a matter which arises for consideration in the context of this appeal.

Unreasonable time pressure and the subsequent RSMS application

55    The First Appellant next complains that he was given only 90 days after the refusal of his 457 visa to find a new sponsoring employer – a timeframe which he asserts was unreasonably short given the criteria that had to be met.

56    Like his complaint in relation to the 457 visa, this issue is not properly before the Court. In any event, on his own version of events, it is apparent that the First Appellant did find a sponsoring employer in Queensland who nominated him under the Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme (RSMS). It was that application that was lodged on 24 November 2016.

57    There is therefore no prejudice or issue of relevance arising from this issue. It is not clear if it is itself a matter that the First Appellant attempts to rely upon as a matter establishing error or is better understood as part of the overall timeline. If it is an attempt to identify error, no error is established.

Unreasonable departmental delay and nomination withdrawal

58    The First Appellant asserts that the Department took approximately two years to progress the nomination assessment for the Visa. During that period, the First Appellant was unable to commence work with his nominated employer, which he says caused financial hardship and significant uncertainty.

59    The First Appellant says in his written submissions that he was not informed at any point that his nomination was at risk. He received no opportunity to respond to any concerns or to seek an alternative employer before the nomination was withdrawn. When he ultimately received notification that the employer had withdrawn the nomination and that the Visa application had been refused, it was too late to take any meaningful remedial action. The First Appellant says:

Had the Department processed the nomination within a reasonable timeframe, the employer's circumstances may not have changed, and the Appellant would in all likelihood have been granted permanent residency. The inordinate delay by the Department was a direct and material contributing factor to the outcome the Appellant now faces.

60    This issue was not raised on the Notice of Appeal and was articulated in this way for the first time by supplementary written submissions. In any event, issues relating to the processing of the First Appellant’s Visa application simply do not bear on the question of whether the Primary Judge was correct to find that there was no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision. This Court does not engage in merits review of the decisions before it, much less in review of the merits of predecessor administrative steps. There is no issue connected with this Court’s jurisdiction raised by the issue.

61    In any event, as explained in relation to ground 3, the Tribunal in the present case was correct to apprehend that the Visa application could not be saved by a later nomination. There is no dispute that there was no specific nomination for the particular job, with any employer, at the time that the nomination was submitted for approval by the Minister. The Primary Judge was likewise correct to accept that approach to the statutory framework, and to adopt that analysis as part of the factual matrix within which the adjournment request was considered (PJ at [71]).

Hardship and humanitarian considerations

62    In the Appellants’ oral submissions, and then in subsequent written submissions, the Appellants asked the Court to give weight to the following circumstances:

1.    Australian-born minor child

The First Appellant asserts that his daughter was born in Australia in 2014 and obtained Australian citizenship on her tenth birthday. He says she is well settled socially, academically and emotionally. He states that she has no meaningful connection to India and that as a minor, she cannot remain in Australia without her parents. He argues that removing her would cause serious disruption to her development, education and emotional wellbeing.

2.    Son schooled entirely in Australia

The First Appellant states that his son completed his entire schooling in Australia from preparatory to year 12. Australia is the only home he has known. He is currently enrolled in a Certificate III in commercial cookery and is building a career in hospitality. He is fluent only in English and has no meaningful social or familial connections in India. The First Appellant says that his son’s removal to India would not only sever his educational and career trajectory but would expose him to significant social and psychological hardship in an environment that is entirely foreign to him.

3.    The First Appellant and his wife

The First Appellant and his wife are both over fifty years of age. They have both lived and worked in Australia for 16 years, paying taxes and building their lives here. Their professional networks, social ties and personal identity are firmly rooted in Australia. The First Appellant argues that the networks they once had in India have diminished significantly over the years. The First Appellant notes that since he is now over 45 years old, certain visa pathways that were open to him at that time are now closed. He asserts that this stems directly from the delay that he lays at the feet of the Department. The First Appellant asserts that being required to relocate to India represents an extraordinary and disproportionate hardship.

63    The First Appellant submits that, in light of these matters, together with what he considers to be the delay in processing his RSMS nomination, the “legally inconsistent” approach to his 457 visa in 2013, and other hardships, the Court should grant the relief sought.

64    There is no legal basis for the submissions advanced before this Court. Those submissions disclose no relevant error in the decision of the Primary Judge, who was considering whether there was any relevant error in the approach of the Tribunal. His Honour was not concerned in a free-roving merits review of the Appellants’ visa issues over many years. Nor is this Court concerned with such a review. While I do not doubt the Appellants’ depth of feeling, they disclose no relevant error. Moreover, for the reasons explained above, even if, contrary to my findings, there were an error, the lack of any current nomination would render any remittal inutile for the reasons explained in connection with ground 3 above.

Conclusion

65    For the foregoing reasons, the present appeal is dismissed. I will make provision for the parties to make any necessary submissions as to costs.

Associate:     

Dated:    20 August 2026