Federal Court of Australia

JVU25 v Operator, National Redress Scheme for Institutional Child Sexual Abuse [2026] FCA 1141

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The time within which the applicant may file an application for leave to appeal from the decision of the primary judge is extended to 16 February 2026.

2.    Leave to appeal is refused.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

O’SULLIVAN J:

1    On 2 December 2025, the primary judge ordered that the applicant’s solicitor, Mr Christopher Chidiac, pay personally the respondent’s costs of a case management hearing heard on 20 November 2025: JVU25 v Operator, National Redress Scheme for Institutional Child Sexual Abuse [2025] FCA 1696 (J).

2    Since the primary judge’s orders were interlocutory, leave to appeal is required: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A).

3    An application for leave must be made within 14 days after the date on which the judgment was pronounced, or, on or before a date fixed for that purpose by the Court from which leave to appeal is sought: Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 35.13.

4    On 28 January 2026, the applicant applied for leave to appeal from the primary judge’s orders made on 2 December 2025. That application was filed outside the FCR 35.13(a) timing requirement and there was no date fixed by the primary judge pursuant to FCR 35.13(b).

5    That being the case, the applicant filed an application for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal: FCR 35.14. At the time the application for leave to appeal was filed, reasons for the orders made by the primary judge on 2 December 2025 had not yet been published. The application for an extension of time was supported by an affidavit of Mr Chidiac sworn on 29 January 2026 annexing, among other things, a proposed notice of appeal.

6    The applicant elected to have the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal determined without an oral hearing.

7    It is for the following reasons that:

(1)    the time within which the applicant may file an application for leave to appeal from the decision of the primary judge is extended to 16 February 2026, being the date the application was accepted for filing; and

(2)    leave to appeal is refused.

Principles

8    The principles governing the granting of leave to appeal are well settled. The two primary considerations for determining the question of whether leave to appeal is granted are:

(1)    whether in all of the circumstances, the decision is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered; and

(2)    whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused, supposing the decision to be wrong: Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; 33 FCR 397 at 398-399 and the cases cited therein.

9    In AZO24 v Commonwealth of Australia [2025] FCAFC 77, the Full Court (Raper J: at [32], with whom Wigney J agreed: at [5] and Lee J: at [11]) observed that the Court’s discretion is to be exercised in a way that best promotes the overarching purpose in s 37M(3) of the FCA Act, citing Nationwide News Pty Limited v Rush [2018] FCAFC 70: at [2].

10    Raper J continued: at [33]:

33    However, when considering whether to grant leave to appeal from interlocutory orders, account is taken of the subject matter of those orders and whether they relate to points of procedure or determine substantive rights. In the latter case, leave will be more readily granted: Décor at 400; Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1572; 104 FCR 564 at [43] per French J, as he then was, (Beaumont and Finkelstein JJ agreeing). However, an applicant seeking leave to appeal must still show that the decision below is attended by sufficient doubt, and that substantial injustice would flow from the decision to refuse leave: Sandhurst Trustees Ltd v Clarke [2015] FCAFC 21; 321 ALR 1 at [17] citing Wills v Australian Broadcasting Company [2009] FCAFC 6; 173 FCR 284 at [31] per Rares J (with whom Emmett J agreed).

11    Given that the award of costs is discretionary, the applicant must satisfy the requirements of House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504-505 (Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ) as part of satisfying the requirement that the decision below is attended by sufficient doubt:

… The manner in which an appeal against an exercise of discretion should be determined is governed by established principles. It is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so. It may not appear how the primary judge has reached the result embodied in his order, but, if upon the facts it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance. In such a case, although the nature of the error may not be discoverable, the exercise of the discretion is reviewed on the ground that a substantial wrong has in fact occurred. …

12    On the question of whether leave to appeal should be granted, see also the recent judgment of Burley J in Dann v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) (Northern Territory) [2026] FCA 840 at [4]-[5].

Application for an extension of time

13    Mr Chidiac filed an affidavit sworn on 29 January 2026 in support of the application for leave to appeal. The delay in filing the application for leave to appeal was short and is explained by Mr Chidiac in that affidavit. I am satisfied that an extension of time within which to file the application for leave to appeal should be granted.

14    Accordingly, the issue for consideration is whether leave to appeal should be granted.

Application for leave to appeal

Primary judge’s reasons

15    The primary judge set out the relevant background: at J [13]-[50].

16    The primary judge clarified that the order made against Mr Chidiac personally was not made to punish Mr Chidiac for his conduct, but to ensure that the respondent is compensated for the legal costs wasted by the need for its legal representatives to prepare for, and then appear at, a case management hearing on 20 November 2025 and to ensure that the applicant, JVU25, is not liable himself to pay those costs.

17    In setting out the relevant background, the primary judge identified that an anterior issue in the proceeding was whether the common law negligence claim brought by the applicant was one over which the Court had jurisdiction. Allied with the question of jurisdiction was the nature and scope of the alleged duty of care. That issue was raised at the first case management hearing on 16 June 2025.

18    At that first case management hearing, Mr Chidiac was ordered to file written submissions on the question of jurisdiction, however he failed to do so until prompted by the primary judge’s chambers. The matter was relisted for a case management hearing on 31 July 2025.

19    Prior to that case management hearing, the parties had agreed by their submissions that the Court had jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the primary judge wished to clarify aspects of the submissions and the case management hearing on 31 July 2025 proceeded. I pause to note that notwithstanding the parties agreed the Court had jurisdiction, that was not determinative. The parties cannot agree to a Court having jurisdiction it does not have and the primary judge was, with respect, correct to proceed in the fashion he did.

20    At the case management hearing held on 31 July 2025, the Court raised questions of Mr Chidiac about the nature and scope of the duty of care alleged and the basis upon which the Court had jurisdiction under s 39B(1A)(c) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). The primary judge clarified in his reasons that this issue was important (as it clearly was) given the Full Court’s observations in Rana v Google Inc [2017] FCAFC 156; (2017) 254 FCR 1 at [18] as to when a “matter” will “arise under” a law of the Parliament for the purposes of that section.

21    During the case management hearing, Mr Chidiac accepted that the applicant had not pleaded the precise basis upon which the alleged duty of care arose.

22    In answer to an enquiry from the primary judge as to whether he had engaged counsel to assist him, Mr Chidiac confirmed that although he had spoken to counsel, he had not briefed counsel on the jurisdiction question which, he accepted, was a fundamental issue.

23    The case management hearing was adjourned on the basis that the parties would confer on the question of jurisdiction with that conferral to include any counsel retained by Mr Chidiac.

24    The case management hearing was adjourned to 28 August 2025. Contrary to the requirements of the primary judge’s chambers, no consent memorandum or proposed minutes of order were received by the primary judge’s chambers by 27 August 2025. That day, the primary judge’s Associate wrote to the parties enquiring whether any minutes of proposed orders would be provided. No reply was received, such that the primary judge’s Associate again wrote to the parties making the same enquiry.

25    Minutes of consent orders were then provided by Mr Chidiac (having earlier been sent proposed orders by the respondent) seeking an order that the case management hearing be adjourned to not before 25 September 2025. There was a suggestion that the applicant wished to discontinue proceedings. By consent, the case management hearing was adjourned.

26    On 22 September 2025, the primary judge’s Associate wrote to the parties seeking an update as to the progress of the matter. As a consequence of that correspondence, Mr Chidiac wrote to the primary judge’s chambers seeking, amongst other things, that he be given two months to find alternative counsel since his original counsel had advised that he would be unable to assist with the matter. The primary judge allowed two weeks to find alternative counsel.

The case management hearing on 13 October 2025

27    The next case management hearing was heard on 13 October 2026 at which time the primary judge observed that Mr Chidiac appeared to understand that the Court was, by then, entitled to expect that Mr Chidiac would have spoken to counsel about the issue of jurisdiction. It had been nearly two months since the prior case management hearing and some three weeks since Mr Chidiac advised the Court that the previous counsel briefed was unable to assist on the issue.

28    At the case management hearing on 13 October 2025, Mr Chidiac informed the primary judge that he had spoken to alternative counsel, but that counsel had not been retained. The Court reminded Mr Chidiac that although he had asked for two months to find alternative counsel, he had been given two weeks. Mr Chidiac confirmed that he had engaged counsel to reformulate the applicant’s pleadings so that the issue of jurisdiction could be dealt with. At that stage he also raised with the primary judge the prospect that the issue of jurisdiction could be considered at trial – a proposal which, unsurprisingly, the primary judge did not embrace.

29    The primary judge reminded Mr Chidiac that the issue of jurisdiction was live and that the purpose of adjourning on the last occasion was to ensure that the pleadings were put into shape and in a form where jurisdiction could be dealt with at an early stage. His Honour expressed concern that nothing had been done, that he had expected Mr Chidiac and counsel for the respondent to have spoken about the issue of jurisdiction, and that Mr Chidiac would have retained counsel to prepare a statement of claim which would deal with the issue of jurisdiction, as well as the other issues concerning the duty of care.

30    The primary judge reminded Mr Chidiac that the purpose of adjourning the matter previously to 25 September 2025 was for Mr Chidiac to engage counsel to look at the pleadings and to see whether or not the issue of jurisdiction could be resolved instead of continually being postponed. The primary judge explained to Mr Chidiac, yet again, that the issue was with the applicant’s pleadings and that it needed to be made clear as to the basis upon which the applicant alleges there was a duty of care owed to the applicant.

31    Mr Chidiac’s response, in broad terms, was that he was mindful of incurring costs at an early stage by engaging counsel and was looking at alternative ways of dealing with the question of jurisdiction so as not to hold up the proceedings. That is another way of saying that Mr Chidiac wanted the question of jurisdiction dealt with at a later stage in the proceedings, whereas the primary judge made it perfectly clear that it needed to be addressed at a pleading stage.

32    Nonetheless, Mr Chidiac indicated that he understood the primary judge’s requirements and would focus on retaining counsel to assist in amending the pleadings. The primary judge reiterated to Mr Chidiac:

… that it is in the best interests of your client, and I emphasise ‘the best interests of your client’, for you to engage experienced counsel to look at the pleadings and to speak with [counsel for the respondent] and/or those who instruct her, with a view to ironing out any issues that they have with those pleadings, with a view at least to establishing the factual basis for jurisdiction …

(Square brackets provided)

33    The primary judge told Mr Chidiac that he had been given very clear indications about what needed to be done for the question of jurisdiction to be dealt with properly.

34    Mr Chidiac indicated that he would probably need three weeks to retain counsel and participate in a meaningful conferral with counsel for the respondent. The case management hearing was adjourned to a date to be fixed so that Mr Chidiac could obtain counsel’s available dates.

35    Subsequently, there were numerous attempts by the primary judge’s Associate to find a date suitable to counsel. Some two weeks after the case management hearing on 13 October 2025, and after a lack of response by Mr Chidiac, the matter was listed for a case management hearing on 13 November 2025.

36    On 12 November 2025, the solicitors for the respondent wrote to the primary judge’s chambers and advised that both counsel for the respondent and counsel retained by Mr Chidiac would be available to appear at a case management hearing on 20 November 2025. The matter was listed accordingly and the case management hearing listed on 13 November 2025 was vacated.

The case management hearing on 20 November 2025

37    On 20 November 2025, the applicant’s counsel did not appear at the case management hearing. Mr Chidiac applied for a short adjournment and explained that the non-appearance of the applicant’s counsel was an oversight on his part.

38    Given the absence of the applicant’s counsel, the primary judge asked Mr Chidiac that if he was to adjourn the case management hearing as requested, whether there was any reason why he should not pay the costs of that day’s case management hearing personally. Mr Chidiac explained that the costs of the hearing should not be awarded against him personally because he sought an adjournment on the basis that there was an opportunity for an early settlement discussion. Mr Chidiac confirmed that he had made no attempt to contact the respondent’s counsel as he did not consider that it was his place as a solicitor where counsel is involved.

39    In response, (by then) Senior Counsel for the respondent observed that she held instructions to seek costs to be payable by Mr Chidiac personally and that his client not be required to pay for Mr Chidiac’s misunderstanding of what Senior Counsel described as, “… the remarkable waste of taxpayers’ money that has been involved in the Scheme litigating this matter”.

40    Upon the respondent’s Senior Counsel contacting the applicant’s counsel, the matter was adjourned to 25 November 2025 for a case management hearing. The primary judge ordered that by 4:00pm on 24 November 2025, Mr Chidiac was to file and serve an outline of written submissions and any affidavit evidence upon which he wished to rely in relation to the question of whether an order should be made that he pay personally the respondent’s costs of the adjourned case management hearing on 20 November 2025.

41    Towards the conclusion of the case management hearing on 20 November 2025, the applicant’s counsel joined the hearing by Microsoft Teams and informed the Court that he was not advised of the hearing and that he was embarrassed.

42    Mr Chidiac failed to comply with the primary judge’s order that he file his submissions and any affidavit material by 4:00pm on 24 November 2025. Instead, Mr Chidiac filed an affidavit later that night at 9:36pm at which time he did not provide an explanation of his failure to comply with the Court’s order.

43    In his affidavit sworn 24 November 2025, Mr Chidiac deposed that due to an “administrative oversight” on his part, the date and time of the case management hearing on 20 November 2025 was not scheduled in counsel’s diary.

The case management hearing on 25 November 2025

44    On 25 November 2025, a further case management hearing occurred at which time counsel for the applicant appeared in person. At the hearing, Mr Chidiac made submissions as to why he should not pay the costs of the case management hearing on 20 November 2025. The primary judge noted that Mr Chidiac was obviously under pressure and struggled to articulate himself. The primary judge took that into account when weighing Mr Chidiac’s submissions.

45    Mr Chidiac explained the “administrative oversight” was a result of him misreading an email, and that it was not until 19 November 2025 that he realised the applicant’s counsel was not available to appear at the case management hearing. However, initially Mr Chidiac did not inform the primary judge on 20 November 2025 that the purpose of seeking an adjournment was due to him failing to ensure the applicant’s counsel was available. Rather, he sought an adjournment so that early settlement discussions could be undertaken.

The primary judge’s findings

46    Ultimately, the primary judge identified the reasons why he ordered that Mr Chidiac personally pay the costs of the case management hearing held on 20 November 2025, which may be summarised in the following terms:

(1)    From the first case management hearing on 16 June 2025, the Court identified an important jurisdictional issue that needed to be resolved, as well as related issues with the applicant’s statement of claim. The primary judge formed the view that Mr Chidiac had either been unwilling or unable to appreciate that it was his responsibility to address those issues so that the proceedings were conducted in accordance with the overarching purpose: FCA Act s 37M; J [80];

(2)    By 13 October 2025, little had been achieved in the two and half months that had passed from the last case management hearing. Nonetheless, at the case management hearing held that day, Mr Chidiac indicated that he understood that the Court held the firm view that he should brief counsel to rectify deficiencies in the statement of claim as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible, such that he should have been under no misapprehension about the significance of what had been said on behalf the respondent: J [82];

(3)    At the end of the hearing on 13 October 2025, Mr Chidiac clearly understood the Court was adjourning the proceedings to allow time for him to ascertain counsel’s availability to appear at the next case management hearing, for counsel to review the statement of claim and for the applicant’s counsel to confer with the respondent’s Senior Counsel.

It was a clear expectation on the part of the Court that the applicant’s counsel would appear at the next case management hearing so that future conduct of the matter could be efficiently progressed. Those matters were reinforced to Mr Chidiac in the communications that were subsequently exchanged between the Court and the parties: J [83];

(4)    The 20 November 2025 case management hearing had been held listed on the specific basis that the presence of the applicant’s counsel would be beneficial both to the respondent and the applicant. However, Mr Chidiac failed to brief counsel to appear and there is no direct evidence about whether during the period since 13 October 2025, Mr Chidiac had briefed counsel to review the statement of claim or that he had himself undertaken that task, nor whether there had been any relevant conferral with the respondent.

The primary judge noted that when counsel for the applicant eventually appeared on 25 November 2025, counsel requested an adjournment to give him time to consider whether the applicant had a cause of action and if so, whether it was a matter over which this Court has jurisdiction: J [84]-[85];

(5)    On 20 November 2025, Mr Chidiac did not immediately inform the Court that he had failed to brief counsel properly, although ultimately told the Court that counsel for the applicant did not appear because of an oversight on his part: J [86];

(6)    At the case management hearing on 25 November 2025, Mr Chidiac confirmed that he realised his oversight the night before the 20 November 2025 case management hearing: J [87]. The primary judge considered that Mr Chidiac failed to act in accordance with the overarching purpose in s 37M of the FCA Act by failing to ensure the applicant’s counsel was briefed to appear at the case management hearing on 20 November 2025 and to ensure that someone appeared on behalf of the applicant who was in a position to assist the Court to deal with the matter, consistent with the overarching purpose.

Given that counsel did appear at the case management hearing on 25 November 2025, but needed time to consider whether the applicant had a cause of action, it would seem that, notwithstanding the Court had been raising issues of jurisdiction and the basis for a cause of action for over six months, Mr Chidiac had given little or no attention to those issues: J [88]; and

(7)    As a consequence, notwithstanding the issues that had been raised with Mr Chidiac for over six months, the Court was not provided with the assistance it required on 20 November 2025, such that the hearing was “an abject waste of time”: J [90].

47    It was for those reasons that the primary judge considered that Mr Chidiac failed to take into account the duty imposed on the applicant by s 37N(1) of the FCA Act and that Mr Chidiac failed to comply with the duty imposed on him by s 37N(2). Further, Mr Chidiac further failed to assist the applicant in complying with his duty under s 37N(1) to conduct the proceedings in a way that was consistent with the objectives of the overarching purpose, including the efficient use of judicial resources and the disposal of the proceedings in a timely manner: J [91].

48    Still further, the primary judge considered that on 17 November 2025, Mr Chidiac had realised that the case management hearing listed for 20 November 2025 should be adjourned to facilitate settlement discussions, but failed to comply with his duties under s 37N(2) by leaving it until the last minute before attempting to contact his opponent to discuss the prospect of adjourning proceedings by consent. By that time, it was too late for that to occur. In the circumstances, there was no utility in the 20 November 2025 case management hearing proceeding: J [96].

49    As to the power to make a costs order against a party’s lawyer, the primary judge noted that that power should be exercised with considerable caution and only in clear cases. His Honour considered that the circumstances of the case justified the exercise of the Court’s discretion under s 43(3)(f) of the FCA Act because, notwithstanding that the Court had required Mr Chidiac’s assistance over a considerable period of time (in the order of five months), nonetheless Mr Chidiac failed to ensure that the assistance was made available, thereby rendering the hearing on 20 November 2025 a wasted effort: J [99].

50    Under those circumstances, the primary judge considered Mr Chidiac’s conduct as unreasonable which had the consequence of the respondent incurring legal costs associated with the preparation for and attendance at a hearing that was rendered pointless. The primary judge considered that neither the respondent nor the applicant personally should be required to bear those costs.

51    Against that background, the primary judge exercised his discretion under s 43(3)(f) of the FCA Act to order that Mr Chidiac pay personally the respondent’s legal costs of the case management hearing heard on 20 November 2025.

Mr Chidiac’s submissions and consideration

52    In an affidavit sworn 29 January 2026, Mr Chidiac includes, as part of his proposed notice of appeal, a section dealing with the background, a chronology of events, the issue of retaining counsel to appear at the case management hearing on 20 November 2025, the issue of jurisdiction, the late delivery of reasons, an asserted failure to consider FCR 28.01, an asserted lack of leniency against a sole practitioner and a request for an alternative decision to be made in this matter.

53    I deal with each of these sections of Mr Chidiac’s submissions in turn below.

Background

54    There is nothing of note in the background section save that the proposed notice of appeal was prepared without the benefit of the primary judge’s reasons. Nothing further has been provided by Mr Chidiac.

Chronology of events

55    The applicant sets out a chronology which is more limited than, but not inconsistent with, the background set out in the primary judge’s reasons.

Retaining counsel to appear at a case management hearing

56    Amongst other things, the applicant contends that at the case management hearing on 20 November 2025, the primary judge refused to hear Mr Chidiac’s submissions on the basis that counsel for the applicant was not present to make those submissions and notwithstanding that Mr Chidiac appeared. Mr Chidiac contends that the primary judge refused to hear his submissions “on the matter”.

57    I do not accept that submission. The “matter” is the question of the jurisdiction of the Court and the amendments of the statement of claim to address identified deficiencies in relation to the content of the duty of care.

58    It is not to the point that Mr Chidiac appeared. The action had been listed specifically for the convenience of counsel for both parties. Further, a consideration of the transcript that day, reproduced at J [51]-[53], reveals that Mr Chidiac sought an adjournment for the purposes of seeing whether the respondent would be in the position to engage in settlement discussions. There was no attempt by Mr Chidiac to engage with the apparent deficiencies in the statement of claim that the primary judge had been seeking to address for some five months, being the question of the content of the duty of care alleged to be owed and in particular, the question of jurisdiction, neither of which had been addressed.

59    It is not correct to say that the primary judge refused to hear Mr Chidiac’s submissions “on the matter”.

60    Next, Mr Chidiac submits that the applicant should have a right of choice as to who appears for the applicant as the applicant’s legal representative. So much so may be accepted, but Mr Chidiac had not engaged with the two issues that clearly vexed the primary judge.

61    It was because of those two issues that the primary judge accommodated the parties availability to ensure counsel for the applicant was retained and could attend to address those very issues. His Honour had made that perfectly clear on a number of occasions.

62    Next, Mr Chidiac submits that it was not reasonable for the primary judge to require a party to retain counsel and, in doing so, did not honour the right of audience for a solicitor nor the right of an applicant to choose their representative.

63    I do not accept that submission. It is not to the point that Mr Chidiac attended and had a right of audience, nor is it to the point that an applicant has a right to choose their representative. That submission ignores the requirements of ss 37M and 37N of the FCA Act.

64    Further, there was no requirement to retain counsel. The position was that Mr Chidiac was not addressing the points that the primary judge had been pressing since the first case management hearing. That is why the primary judge informed Mr Chidiac that it was in his client’s best interests that counsel be retained.

65    Mr Chidiac contends that because of a requirement to retain counsel, there was a breach of procedural fairness.

66    I do not accept that submission. As I have noted, there was no requirement to retain counsel. There was, however, a requirement to address the issues raised repeatedly by the primary judge. Mr Chidiac had ample opportunity to address those issues and yet failed to do so. Not only did he fail to do so, but he also failed to ensure that counsel who had been retained to address those issues attended at the case management hearing on 20 November 2025 listed specifically for that purpose, a listing that had been made to accommodate counsel’s then availability.

67    Next, Mr Chidiac contends that to punish a solicitor or applicant by way of a costs decision where counsel is not able to appear, in circumstances where a legal practitioner is able to appear in counsel’s place, is a breach of procedural fairness.

68    Two points may be raised in answer to that submission. The first is that the primary judge specifically disavowed any intention to punish Mr Chidiac. Rather, it was to compensate the respondent for what were wasted costs. Second, counsel was unable to appear because Mr Chidiac had not arranged for him to appear due to an admitted oversight on his part.

69    It is for those reasons that I do not accept the submission that there was a breach of procedural fairness.

70    Next, Mr Chidiac submits that the primary judge undermined the important principles of the right of audience and the choice of legal representation in order to prioritise having counsel appear on behalf of the applicant.

71    It is for the reasons set out above that I do not accept that submission.

72    Finally, Mr Chidiac clarifies that the applicant was not opposed to the primary judge recommending that counsel be retained but rather took issue with the requirement that counsel appear at each case management hearing. That submission needs to be seen in context which is set out above.

73    The consequence is that over a period of some five months, the two questions with which the primary judge was concerned had not been addressed. Having received no assistance from Mr Chidiac, the primary judge informed Mr Chidiac that it was in his client’s best interests to retain counsel to address the issues. Notwithstanding the accommodation given to Mr Chidiac, a case management hearing listed specifically for the purpose of addressing the issues and taking into account the availability of counsel had to be adjourned because of Mr Chidiac’s admitted oversight.

74    The result was, as the primary judge put it, wasted effort.

75    That wasted effort came at a cost which may fairly be placed at Mr Chidiac’s feet.

The exercise of the discretion

76    No error in the exercise of the primary judge’s discretion has been demonstrated, such that the decision is not attended with sufficient doubt to warrant being considered.

77    That being the case, Mr Chidiac fails on the first limb of the two stage test identified in Décor. Since the two limbs are cumulative, it follows that the application for leave to appeal must be dismissed and there will be orders accordingly.

Associate:

Dated:    13 August 2026