Federal Court of Australia

Saini v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 1116

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The applicant’s interlocutory application dated 4 August 2026 be dismissed.

2.    The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the interlocutory application, such costs to be taxed if not otherwise agreed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Delivered ex tempore, revised from transcript)

DOWLING J:

1    The applicant, Mr Rahul Saini, has been in immigration detention at the Meriton Suites in Brisbane since 5 November 2025. He was told during the evening of 3 August 2026 that he would be transferred to the Melbourne Immigration Detention Centre (MIDC) on 5 August 2026 at 8:00 am. He says that was the first notification he received of the decision to transfer him.

2    On 4 August 2026 at around 4:00 pm, Mr Saini filed an interlocutory application seeking an order to restrain the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship from transferring him to the MIDC. The interlocutory application was listed for hearing before the Court at 7:00 pm on the same day. The hearing concluded at 9:00 pm and this judgment was delivered at 11:30 pm.

3    Mr Saini says the transfer should not take place because it would: deny him potential contact with his children; compromise his preparation and appearance in his proceedings in the Administrative Review Tribunal (ART) and in his criminal proceedings; and deny him the ability to participate in rehabilitation programs.

4    The Minister says that he has a broad power to transfer between detention centres and that he is transferring Mr Saini to the MIDC because the Brisbane Immigration Detention Centre (BIDC) is unable to accommodate Mr Saini’s security requirements. He says that there is no basis to make the interlocutory orders enjoining him.

5    For the reasons explained below the interlocutory application is dismissed.

Background

6    The Minister explains that Mr Saini is detained at the Meriton Suites in Brisbane because the BIDC is a low security classification detention centre which cannot house detainees with a higher security classification such as Mr Saini.

7    The Minister says that security facilities were put in place to ensure that Mr Saini can be held at the Meriton Suites in accordance with his security classification, but that those are not viable long-term arrangements and that Mr Saini needs to be transferred to a facility that can accommodate his security needs. The Minister says that such a transfer has not been practicable or possible until now.

8    The Minister says there are no current plans for Mr Saini’s removal from Australia, and that the transfer to Melbourne is not in any way connected with a plan to remove him from Australia.

9    On 20 July 2021, orders were made by a Registrar of the Family Court of Australia which provide most relevantly: that Mr Saini has equal shared parental responsibility for his two children and that Mr Saini will pick up or arrange to pick up the children from the mother’s residential address between 4.00 pm to 8.00 pm Saturday and will drop off the children between 4.00 pm to 8.00 pm on Sunday.

10    On 5 November 2025 Mr Saini commenced his immigration detention in the Meriton Suites.

11    On 23 February 2026 Judge Vasta of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia delivered judgment in Mr Saini’s application for review of a decision of the ART and an interlocutory application filed in the same proceeding: Saini v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 787. Today, 4 August 2026, Mr Saini filed what purports to be a notice of appeal from that decision of Judge Vasta, or at least, an application to seek leave to appeal that decision out of time.

12    Mr Saini is the applicant in two proceedings before the ART. One of those proceedings is listed for a two-day video hearing commencing on 24 August 2026. On 30 June 2026, the ART made timetabling directions requiring the parties to file material by certain dates.

13    Mr Saini is the defendant in criminal proceedings, including for breach of a domestic violence order, before the Ipswich Magistrates Court. At least one of the criminal proceedings is listed for a directions hearing on 22 October 2026.

14    Mr Saini says that he currently attends rehabilitation classes with Alcoholics Anonymous.

Principles and legislation

Detention and the Migration Act

15    I understand Mr Saini is detained pursuant to s 189 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

16    In Graham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Others [2018] FCA 1012; 265 FCR 634, Tracey J said at [123]:

A person who is properly detained under the Act pursuant to s 189(1) [such as the applicant in that case, as an unlawful non-citizen], has no right or interest to be detained in any particular place. He or she can lawfully be moved to any place of immigration detention without attracting procedural fairness obligations.

17    The word “detain” is defined in s 5(1) of the Migration Act as (a) “take into immigration detention”; or (b) “keep, or cause to be kept, in immigration detention”; and “includes taking such action and using such force as are reasonably necessary to do so”. The words “immigration detention” are defined in s 5(1) of the Migration Act.

18    In Graham, Tracey J continued at [129]:

The Minister has a broad power to determine the place and mode of detention. The definition of “detain” in [s]5(1) of the Act, which refers to taking such action and using such force “as [is] reasonably necessary”, does not employ words of limitation: VLAH v Minister for Immigration [2002] FCA 1554 at [9] (Ryan J); SBEG v Commonwealth (2012) 208 FCR 235 at 247; [2012] FCAFC 189 at [49] (Keane CJ, Lander and Siopis JJ). While decisions as to the place of detention are not immune from judicial review, the broad nature of the power and breadth of considerations that may be taken into account mean that it will be difficult to establish legal unreasonableness.

19    I return to these principles in assessing any claim for final relief made by Mr Saini.

Principles regarding interlocutory relief

20    The relevant principles in relation to the grant of interlocutory relief are well established, and may be summarised as requiring the establishment of a serious question to be tried and the consideration of whether the balance of convenience favours the grant of such relief: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill [2006] HCA 46; 227 CLR 57 at [65]-[72] per Gummow and Hayne JJ (with whom Gleeson CJ and Crennan J agreed at [19]).

21    In Erueti v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 961, Needham J, considered two applications to enjoin the Minister from transferring the applicants between detention centres. Her Honour said at [4]:

Neither of the applicants have sought any final relief, and accordingly the principle expressed by the Full Court in Samsung Electronics Company Ltd v Apple Inc (2011) 217 FCR 238; [2011] FCAFC 156 at [44]-[74] that the legal or equitable rights to be determined at trial must be identified. As noted by Gleeson CJ in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199; [2001] FCA 63 at [15]:

If the respondent cannot show a sufficient colour of right of the kind sought to be vindicated by final relief, the foundation of the claim for interlocutory relief disappears.

Consideration

Serious question to be tried

22    Mr Saini did not identify any final relief sought by him or explain the basis for any final relief. I have endeavoured to assess Mr Saini’s submissions as generously as possible and by reference to claims for final relief that he may establish.

23    The Minister accepts that the relevant decision was the decision to transfer Mr Saini to the MIDC. He accepts, for the purposes of the interlocutory application, that this Court has jurisdiction to review that decision. He otherwise says there is nothing unlawful or invalid about the decision.

24    The Minister directs attention to Graham, including where at [122] Tracey J said:

Once he was taken into detention Mr Graham had no right, under the Act or otherwise, to be held in any particular place of immigration detention. His management required decisions to be made as to the most appropriate available facility in which he was to be held. In my opinion he had no right to be heard in relation to a determination that he be held or remain in a particular facility.

25    As explained above, Tracey J went on to observe (at [123]) that a person who is properly detained under the Migration Act pursuant to s 189(1) has no right or interest to be detained in any particular place and that they can lawfully be moved to any place of immigration detention without attracting procedural fairness obligations. As also explained, Tracey J also concluded (at [129]) that while decisions as to the place of detention are not immune from judicial review, “the broad nature of the power and the breadth of considerations that may be taken into account mean that it will be difficult to establish legal unreasonableness”.

26    Those observations were cited with approval in Chamoun v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2019] FCA 1520 (Robertson J) and in Erueti. The decisions in Graham and Chamoun were also cited with approval in Kepu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2026] FCA 123 (Collier J).

27    In Chamoun Robertson J said (at [155]) that the applicant’s “residual liberty”, “being the separation or removal from him of the ability to have face-to-face contact with his children and his family did not have the consequence that he was entitled to an opportunity to be heard before the transfer decision was made or before it was put into effect”. 

28    I am satisfied, in the circumstances of this case and consistent with those authorities, there can be no serious question of a breach of procedural fairness.

29    As to whether the circumstances might establish unreasonableness, in Erueti Needham J, relying on Graham, said at [15] that “…it is difficult to see, given the broad and sweeping powers of the [Minister] in relation to determining the place and mode of detention pursuant to the Migration Act, how these applicants can establish legal unreasonableness in relation to the respective decisions”.

30    I share that difficulty in this case. Construing Mr Saini’s submissions as generously as possible, the legal unreasonableness is said to arise from the impact on his potential contact with his children, the impact on his ability to prepare for and appear at his court and tribunal hearings, and the impact on his ability to attend rehabilitation classes. I am not satisfied that those matters, separately or together, establish a serious question of legal unreasonableness in the present circumstances and consistent with the above authorities. I address each of those matters in more detail in the context of the balance of convenience. The findings that I reach on those matters below apply equally to the consideration of a serious question to be tried.

Balance of convenience

31    As explained, I would refuse the interlocutory relief on the basis that there is no serious question to be tried. However, for completeness, I consider the balance of convenience matters.

32    I understood Mr Saini to rely on the three matters referred to above as demonstrating the balance of convenience in his favour. First, the impact on his contact with his children. Second, the impact on his ability to prepare for and appear at his court and tribunal hearings. Third, the impact on his ability to attend rehabilitation classes. I address each in turn.

Impact on contact with his children

33    Mr Saini says that he should remain in Brisbane because he has greater prospect of seeing his children. He says that if transferred to Melbourne he will not have any prospects of seeing his children. Mr Saini accepts that he has not seen his children since 13 November 2025, but that he has made “dozens” of requests to see his children. Mr Saini drew the Court’s attention to the parenting orders which are in place and referred to above.

34    There is no evidence before the Court as to Mr Saini’s ability to see his children in Brisbane. I consider that while there is no material before the Court as to that ability, there remains at least a possibility that he could see his children in Brisbane. However, the evidence is that that has not happened since 13 November 2025.

Impact on Court and Tribunal proceedings

35    As discussed above, Mr Saini said he has a proceeding before the ART with timetabling steps and a hearing dated in August, and criminal matters in the Ipswich Magistrates Court. The Minister says there is little practical difference for Mr Saini’s ability to participate in his court and ART proceedings if Mr Saini is detained at the Meriton Suites in Brisbane as compared to immigration detention in the MIDC.

36    In relation to the criminal proceedings, Mr Saini says he is required to attend an in-person directions hearing on 22 October 2026. Immediately following the hearing, Mr Saini sent an email to my Chambers containing correspondence from Rostron Carlyle Lawyers, who I understand to be acting for Mr Saini in the criminal proceedings in the Ipswich Magistrates Court. That email states “Please note, your appearance is required on 22 October 2026, and you will be produced in person.” Mr Saini says that because he is required to attend the directions hearing in person, if he was transferred to Melbourne, he would have to be transported to Ipswich from Melbourne and back each time there is a hearing which would involve the use of public resources.

37    There is no evidence before me as to whether the Ipswich Magistrates Court may permit Mr Saini to appear remotely at the directions hearing. The Minister says there is no evidence that an in-person appearance is required. I am not satisfied the correspondence from Mr Saini’s lawyers establishes that requirement. The Minister says there is no reason Mr Saini could not prepare for the proceeding from Melbourne. I am not satisfied that preparations could not be undertaken in Melbourne.

38    As for the Tribunal proceedings, Mr Saini said the hearing is by video. It is not clear from the material before the Court why Mr Saini could not attend and prepare for the hearing, or meet the other timetabling deadlines, from Melbourne.

Impact on rehabilitation

39    As for Mr Saini’s ability to participate in the rehabilitation programs, Mr Saini says that he would have difficulties in the MIDC facility attending the rehabilitation programs because of anticipated internet issues and difficulties participating in the programs in shared accommodation and amongst other detainees.

40    The Minister says that there is no significant practical difference between attending the rehabilitation programs remotely in Brisbane compared to attending the programs remotely in Melbourne. The Minister says there is no reason Mr Saini would not have access to those facilities in Melbourne. I am not satisfied that Mr Saini would not be able to participate in such programs in Melbourne.

Cost to the Minister of re-arranging transfer

41    The Minister submitted that there would be costs associated with cancelling and re-arranging transfer to Melbourne if the transfer does not proceed tomorrow morning. There is no evidence before me as to how much cost would be involved or wasted in re-arranging the transfer.

Conclusion on balance of convenience matters

42    As discussed above, I would refuse the interlocutory relief for lack of a serious question to be tried. However, if it were necessary to decide, and noting the limited material before the Court, I would also find that the balance of convenience does not lie sufficiently in favour of Mr Saini so as to justify the grant of interlocutory relief.

Disposition

43    For those reasons, I dismiss the applicant’s interlocutory application dated 4 August 2026.

44    The orders I make are as follows:

(1)    The applicant’s interlocutory application dated 4 August 2026 be dismissed.

(2)    The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the interlocutory application, such costs to be taxed if not otherwise agreed.

Associate:

Dated:    12 August 2026