Federal Court of Australia

KTW25, in the matter of application by KTW25 for leave to file [2026] FCA 1114

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The application for leave to file the documents received by the Court on 10 July 2026 being an application for leave to appeal, a notice of appeal and an affidavit of the applicant is dismissed without an oral hearing.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

COLVIN J:

1    The applicant, as a litigant in person, seeks to commence appeal proceedings in this Court. He lodged three documents for filing; an application for leave to appeal, a notice of appeal and an affidavit. The proposed appeal is in respect of the decision of Gerrard J in KTW25 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 1157. The documents were brought to the attention of Jackson J, who was the Filings Judge at the time of their lodgement. His Honour gave a direction that the documents not be accepted without the Court's leave.

2    In the High Court, where there is a similar procedure for leave to be required to file a document when so directed by a judge, leave to file a document will ordinarily be refused where there is an attempt to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court on a basis that is 'confused or manifestly untenable', noting that leave is only to be refused in the 'clearest of cases'. As to these matters see Re Young [2020] HCA 13 at [11]-[13] (Gageler J).

3    The applicant now brings an application for leave. Any such application for leave in respect of a notice of appeal must meet the requirements of r 2.27A of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). In particular, the application must explain concisely why leave should be granted for the proposed proceedings to be instituted. The reasons given by the applicant are:

The Grounds of appeal section of the forms submitted are cogent accuracy and have capacity to cause a wide impact on administrative decision-making.

The appeal is likely to impact the operations and activities of the previous administration with respect to exposing the unreasonableness of Justice Jackson to refuse to hear the defamation claim.

The request does not pertain to the commercial interest of the applicant, on the contrary the request is indefinitely-freedom-driven (in the interest of justice).

(Italics in original).

4    The first and third points reflect the terms of the proposed application for leave to appeal. The purpose of the proposed appeal is there described by the applicant in the following terms:

On the surface the pursuit of this appeal may appear unnecessary because the applicant is currently a holder of a visa and receiving SRSS funding, however the conduct of the Tribunal and the Department leading up to this is concerning with respect to its ability to logically justify its decisions. The purpose of this appeal is to also ensure that the system more broadly is kept in check with respect to it handling of the applicant’s SRSS renewal application, as this appeal relies on some of the perceived judicial errors from the Tribunal that are relevant to the Department's assessment of the applicant’s SRSS renewal application and also the ability for the Attorney General’s Department to have oversight of that SRSS review process.

5    The reference to 'SRSS funding' appears to be a reference to Status Resolution Support Services which provides limited support through Services Australia for vulnerable individuals while they await a decision on a visa application.

6    The decision of Gerrard J concerned the refusal of an application for judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Review Tribunal affirming a decision by the Minister to refuse to grant the applicant a bridging visa. It did not concern the provision of SRSS funding, nor did any issues as to SRSS funds bear on the outcome of the decision. The proposed appeal is directed towards statements in the reasons of Gerrard J which sought to explain that the Court could not consider the applicant's complaints about the lawfulness of decisions relating to his eligibility for SRSS. Given the nature of the review application before his Honour, it is obvious on the face of the materials the applicant seeks to file (which include, as they must for an application for leave to appeal, a copy of the reasons of Gerrard J) that there is no merit in any appeal that seeks to raise any complaint about SRSS funding. Put another way, the documents that the applicant seeks to file do not raise any recognisable basis for an appeal against the decision of Gerrard J.

7    It follows that it is clear that the basis for the proposed application for leave is manifestly untenable.

8    As to the second point advanced in support of the application for leave, it appears that the applicant also seeks to raise an issue as to whether Jackson J had a conflict of interest when he made the direction requiring leave. The basis for that alleged conflict is a direction issued by Jackson J in January 2026 that an application by the applicant for proposed defamation proceedings not be accepted for filing. A refusal of that kind does not give rise to a conflict of interest. A previous decision that is adverse to the interests of a litigant does not, in and of itself, give rise to an apprehension of bias: Re JRL; ex parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342 at 352 (Mason J). In any event, the question of leave has now been considered by me and for reasons I have given, the proposed application for leave to appeal is manifestly untenable.

9    There are other requirements that must be met on an application for leave pursuant to r 2.27A. However, given the conclusion I have reached that this is a clear case where the proposed appeal is manifestly untenable no purpose would be served in considering whether those requirements have been met.

10    The application for leave is to be determined without an oral hearing unless the Court otherwise orders: r 2.27A(2). In the circumstances I have described, the applicant has been afforded an opportunity to provide an affidavit explaining the reasons why leave should be granted. There is nothing about the nature of those reasons that would give rise to a need for an oral hearing or an opportunity for further submissions by the applicant.

11    For those reasons, the leave sought is refused without an oral hearing.

Associate:

Dated:    11 August 2026