Federal Court of Australia

Ardalan v Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2026] FCA 1063

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The proceeding be dismissed.

2.    The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the proceeding.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

RANGIAH J:

1    The applicant applies under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) for certiorari and mandamus in respect of a decision by the respondent’s delegate under s 19AL of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) to refuse the applicant’s release from prison on parole.

2    On 14 March 2023, the applicant was sentenced by the District Court of Queensland to five years’ imprisonment for the offence of obtaining a financial advantage by deception contrary to s 134.2(1) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). The offence involved the applicant making false claims under the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme totalling about $1.9 million. The Court fixed a non-parole period of 18 months ending on 13 September 2024.

3    Since the expiry of the non-parole period, the respondent has made a series of decisions refusing to release the applicant on parole; and the applicant has made a corresponding series of applications for judicial review. The history of the decisions and proceedings was explained in Ardalan v Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia [2026] FCA 615.

4    The most recent decision to refuse to release the applicant on parole was made on 16 December 2025. The applicant seeks judicial review of that decision.

The grounds of review

5    The grounds set out in the applicant’s Originating Application for Judicial Review are lengthy, but at the hearing, the applicant’s senior counsel indicated that only the following grounds are pressed:

1.    The decision-maker’s findings that she considered that the Applicant was such a risk that the Applicant would engage in acts of family violence in the community and that the Applicant’s release on parole might pose an unacceptable risk to community safety such that refusing the Applicant release on parole meant that the risk the Applicant posed to the community could be more effectively mitigated in the short term was invalid for failure to take into account considerations relevant to the third decision:

Particulars:

…

d.    The decision-maker failed to take into account the conditions that could be lawfully imposed upon the Applicant as part of making the parole order:

i.    A specification pursuant to s 19AL(3)(b) that the Applicant be released subject to supervision;

ii.    The condition imposed by s 19AN(a) that the Applicant must, during the parole period, be of good behaviour and not violate any law;

iii.    The condition that arises pursuant to the specification that the Applicant be released subject to supervision and pursuant to s 19AN(b) that the Applicant must be subject to the supervision of a parole officer or other person specified in the order and obey all reasonable directions of that officer or other person;

iv.    A condition imposed pursuant to s 19AN(c) that the Applicant, as a condition of his parole, continue to comply with the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Order made by the Magistrates Court at Pine Rivers on 10 August 2022;

v.    A condition imposed pursuant to s 19AN(c) that the Applicant reside in accommodation approved by his supervising parole officer;

vi.    A condition imposed pursuant to s 19AN(c) that the Applicant not attend at the residence of his wife and children without the written consent of the Applicant’s wife;

vii.    A condition imposed pursuant to s 19AN(c) that the Applicant undertake courses approved by his supervising parole officer (or listed in the condition) including courses directed at anger management and, otherwise, any risk of the Applicant’s committing domestic and family violence; and

viii.    Other conditions directed to addressing the perceived risk that the Applicant would engage in acts of family violence in the community and that the Applicant’s release on parole might pose an unacceptable risk to community safety.

e.    The decision-maker failed to take into account the existence of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Order and the lawful restraints upon the Applicant’s conduct that it imposes including the susceptibility to punishment of the Applicant for breaches of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Order and the availability of the resources of the Queensland Police Service to intervene and to investigate and prosecute any breaches of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Order were such breaches to occur.

f.    The decision-maker failed to take into account the content of submissions made by the Applicant in support of his application for parole by failing to give proper, realistic and genuine consideration to the following:

…

vi.    In the six months between when the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Order was made and when he was incarcerated, the Applicant:

1.    continued to live with his wife without incident or issues;

2.    was not charged with, nor convicted of any breaches of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Order;

vii.    The risk of family and domestic violence was to be mitigated by the circumstance that the Applicant and his wife and children would not be living with one another, as well as the conditions placed by the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Order.

viii.    The risk of any breach of the Family and Domestic Violence Protection Order was to be mitigated by the Applicant’s engaging in counselling, seeking support from family and community members were he to be stressed and by engaging in problem solving skills (including mindfulness and mediation) acquired by the Applicant;

…

…

h.    The decision-maker:

i.    failed to take into account that the Applicant had not breached the Protection Order since it was made on 10 August 2022.

ii.    erred by conflating the Applicant’s breach of a prior Police Protection Notice made on 9 August 2022 (to which he was sentenced to a fine of $300 with no conviction recorded on 15 November 2022) with an unwillingness to comply with the Protection Order made on 10 August 2022.

6    The applicant’s case focusses on the delegate’s findings that there was an unacceptable risk that the applicant would engage in domestic violence and pose an unacceptable risk to community safety if he were released on parole.

7    The substance of the applicant’s case as argued at the hearing is that the delegate failed to have regard to two substantial and clearly articulated arguments raised by the applicant’s solicitors. The first was that the risk of the applicant engaging in domestic violence could be ameliorated by the imposition of conditions upon a parole order (Grounds (1)(d) and (1)(f)). The second was that the existence of a Domestic Violence Protection Order (and a Temporary Protection Order) against the applicant itself ameliorated that risk (Grounds (1)(e) and (1)(h)).

The facts

8    The decision of 16 December 2025 to refuse the applicant’s release on parole was substantially based on the perceived risk that the applicant might engage in domestic violence if released on parole. On 9 August 2022, the applicant had been fined for contravening a Police Protection Notice. On 10 August 2022, a Domestic Violence Protection Order was made listing the applicant’s former partner, his two children and another person as protected persons and requiring that the applicant be of good behaviour and not commit domestic violence against them. On 15 May 2025, a Temporary Protection Order was made imposing additional conditions prohibiting the applicant from approaching within 100 metres of the protected persons or their residence and from contacting them. It may be noted that the Domestic Violence Protection Order was made by consent without admissions and the Temporary Protection Order seems to have been made ex parte.

9    The Commonwealth Parole Office wrote to the applicant on 20 October 2025 giving him an opportunity to respond to information that may weigh against his release on parole. The letter indicated, relevantly, that the decision-maker may consider there to be a risk that the applicant would engage in acts of domestic or family violence, which would be a breach of the applicant’s parole conditions and a risk to the safety of others. The letter indicated the decision-maker may consider that the applicant may be unable or unlikely to comply with the conditions of a parole order, such that his supervision on parole may not be wholly protective in mitigating the risk.

10    The applicant responded by handwritten letters and notes in which he said, inter alia, that he had never breached any domestic violence order that had been set by a court. He asserted that the current Temporary Protection Order involved a, “manufactured & a manipulated & calculated LIE”, and indicated that he was contesting the domestic violence proceeding and had no desire to be in contact with his former partner again.

11    In an undated letter to the Commonwealth Parole Office, solicitors acting for the applicant wrote to the Commonwealth Parole Board making submissions which included the following:

25.    The decision maker can reinforce these positive aspects by including in the parole release order conditions requiring Mr Ardalan to obtain such counselling and therapeutic treatment as his parole officer mandates.

…

36.    It is further the case that, because Mr Ardalan’s former partner has aired these allegations, there is no risk or possibility of Mr Ardalan and his former partner residing in the same residence or even nearby. This actually significantly reduces the risk that might, otherwise, have arisen. The decision maker is in a position to ensure that this occurs by imposing a condition that Mr Ardalan resides in a place approved by his parole officer. The decision maker can also impose a specific condition that Mr Ardalan not engage in any form of domestic and family violence in relation to his former partner [name deleted] or children. In this way, the decision maker can ensure that Mr Ardalan has a strong incentive not to so offend and to ensure that effective action can be taken if Mr Ardalan does infringe the condition.

…

38.    … If Mr Ardalan is released on parole, two courts20 will closely monitor Mr Ardalan’s actions and make any findings necessary concerning the allegations against him.

[20 The second Court is the Magistrates Court which will hear the contested domestic and family violence application.]

…

41.    However, where the risk perceived is very different to the crime for which the sentence was imposed, there are limits to what action should be taken to deal with that risk. It is in accord with the purposes of parole to impose conditions which require actions to be taken to mitigate the risk such as attending courses or living at one location rather than another. However, it defeats the purposes of parole and exceeds the power bestowed for a decision maker to refuse blankly to consider granting parole. The effective imposition of many months of increased imprisonment because of allegations of past conduct (or perceived risk of future conduct) with which police and the courts are capable of dealing and which conduct may not incur significant or any punishment goes well beyond the purposes for which the discretion to grant or refuse parole is bestowed upon the Attorney-General. Such decision making, especially, where the imposition of conditions can act to mitigate the risk without requiring further time in prison is likely to exceed the discretionary power bestowed by the Act.

42.    While this matter may justify the imposition of conditions to ensure appropriate risk reducing conduct by Mr Ardalan, it does not justify a refusal of parole.

(Underlining added.)

12    On 9 December 2025, an officer of the Commonwealth Parole Office made a submission to the delegate recommending that she refuse to grant parole to the applicant and sign the attached notice and reasons (the CPO Submission).

13    The CPO Submission discussed the allegations of domestic violence that had been made against the applicant, noting that he had been fined for contravening a Police Protection Notice, that a Domestic Violence Protection Order had been made and that a Temporary Protection Order had subsequently been made. The CPO Submission noted that Queensland Corrective Services (QCS) recommended the applicant be released on parole as it considered that he had identified professional supports to mitigate his risk of domestic violence perpetration, demonstrated appropriate insight into his offending behaviour and had identified ample coping strategies to minimise his risk of recidivism. He had developed an appropriate release plan, maintained acceptable custodial behaviour and progressed through the custodial environment to a satisfactory level. However, QCS had also assessed it to be highly likely that the applicant exerted control over his former partner through emotional abuse, isolation and wanting contact with their children and had displayed resentment and fixation towards her. The CPO Submission recorded that the applicant denied the allegations and was contesting the Temporary Protection Order.

14    The CPO Submission noted that the applicant had been advised the decision-maker may consider that he may be unable or unlikely to comply with the conditions of a parole order, and his supervision by QCS on parole may not be wholly protective, and then summarised the applicant’s response to that concern. The CPO Submission also referred to the submissions made by the applicant’s solicitors, including that the risk had been significantly reduced because the marital relationship had been terminated and the decision-maker could impose parole conditions to further mitigate any risk.

15    The CPO Submission stated that, “[w]hile parole conditions can be imposed to enforce his compliance with intervention and supervision, the risk of him reoffending is largely dependent on his willingness and ability to comply with those conditions”. The CPO Submission also stated that, “the CPO has concerns about Mr Ardalan’s willingness and ability to remain of good behaviour and comply with the parole order and the TPO in the community”.

16    On 16 December 2025, the delegate marked and signed the CPO Submission to indicate that she approved the recommendation to refuse to grant the applicant parole. The delegate signed the draft reasons provided by the Commonwealth Parole Office.

17    The reasons adopted by the delegate were as follows:

1.    I have had regard to your risk of engaging in acts of domestic or family violence in the community.

I have had regard to the fact you are named as the respondent in an active Temporary Protection Order which names your ex-partner, your children and an associate of your ex-partner as protected persons.

I have had regard to the fact that in May 2025 Queensland Police Service (QPS) applied to vary the existing Protection Order to include additional conditions and extend the order. QPS indicated that it believed this was necessary in order to safeguard Ms Shannon and your children.

Queensland Corrective Services (QCS) reported that you display a risk of domestic violence perpetration, and you present with limited insight into your risk of domestic violence perpetration. QCS reported that you displayed callous disregard for the Temporary Protection Order and described the order as a ‘laughing matter’ and a ruse by your ex-partner to cause a reaction.

I have had regard to a Victim Submission that raises concerns that you have engaged in domestic violence towards your ex-partner across a number of years. The submission further raises concerns that you have engaged in domestic violence towards your children.

Taking this information into account, I consider you pose an unacceptable risk of engaging in acts of domestic violence in the community and your release on parole at this time poses an unacceptable risk to community safety.

2.     I have had regard to your behaviour in custody and criminal history.

I have had regard to a QCS intelligence report which indicates that, based on reviewed calls from the Prisoner Telephone System, it was highly likely that you exerted control over [name deleted] through emotional abuse and isolation while you were in custody.

I have had regard to the Victim Submission which raises concern that, even after your charge and being in prison, you continued to breach boundaries set in place to protect your ex-partner and your children.

I have had regard to advice from QPS that you are the respondent in a Contravention of Domestic Violence Order report made to QPS on 11 September 2025. I have further had regard to the fact you were fined for contravening a condition of a Police Protection Notice on 9 August 2022.

Taking this information into account, I hold concerns with your ability to be of good behaviour, not violate any law, and comply with the conditions of a parole order and domestic violence protection orders in the community. As such, I consider you may pose an unacceptable risk to the safety of the community.

3.    I have had regard to the short and long-term risks to the community. Having taken the above matters into consideration, I consider that refusing your release at this time means the risk you pose to the community can be more effectively mitigated in the short term. Further, I consider the longer-term risks to the community are better mitigated by refusing release at this time so you can continue your rehabilitative progress through counselling and demonstrate a period of good behaviour in custody without concerns raised about you engaging in acts of domestic or family violence.

In making my decision, I have considered the factors which support your release on parole at this time, including (but not limited to) you have reasonable post-release plans in relation to accommodation, employment and finances and professional supports in the community and you have maintained employment in custody.

Under paragraph 19AL(2)(b) of the Crimes Act, I am required to reconsider you for release on parole within 12 months of this notice being signed.

(Underlining added.)

The submissions

18    The applicant submits that the delegate failed to consider his solicitors’ argument that a parole order could be made subject to conditions that would ameliorate the risk that the applicant would engage in domestic violence. The applicant also submits that the delegate failed to consider his solicitors’ argument that the existence of the Temporary Protection Order against the applicant would itself ameliorate that risk. It may be noted that although the applicant’s Originating Application relies on the existence of the Domestic Violence Protection Order, his oral arguments focussed on the existence of the Temporary Protection Order. I have proceeded on the basis that the applicant relies on both Orders.

19    The applicant submits that these arguments were substantial and clearly articulated and the delegate was accordingly required to take them into account. The applicant submits that it is apparent from the delegate’s reasons that she failed to engage in an active intellectual process in respect of those arguments. The applicant submits that the delegate’s use of general language such as, “I have taken into account submissions made by you and on your behalf”, fails to demonstrate that the submissions were in fact considered.

20    The respondent submits that there was no clearly articulated submission that the delegate could ameliorate the risk by imposing specific conditions, nor that the Domestic Violence Protection Order and the Temporary Protection Order themselves ameliorated the risk. The respondent submits that there was no obligation to take into account any argument that was not clearly articulated. The respondent also submits that, in any event, it is evident that the delegate did take those matters into account through the content of the CPO Submission provided to the delegate and the reasons themselves.

21    The applicant submits that there is no evidence that the delegate took into account the CPO Submission. The applicant submits that, in any event, the CPO Submission does not demonstrate any active intellectual engagement with the submission concerning the ameliorating effect of parole conditions and the Temporary Protection Order.

The statutory scheme

22    Under s 19AB(1) of the Crimes Act, a Court must generally fix a single non-parole period in respect of a “federal sentence” if a person is convicted of a federal offence, the Court imposes a sentence of imprisonment exceeding three years and the person is not already serving a federal sentence. A “federal sentence” is, under s 16, a sentence imposed for a “federal offence”, which is an offence against a law of the Commonwealth.

23    The purposes of parole are described in s 19AKA of the Crimes Act as follows:

19AKA    Purposes of parole

The purposes of parole are the following:

(a)    the protection of the community;

(b)    the rehabilitation of the offender;

(c)    the reintegration of the offender into the community.

24    Section 19AL(1) requires that the Attorney-General, “must, before the end of a non-parole period fixed for one or more federal sentences imposed on a person, either make, or refuse to make, an order directing that the person be released from prison on parole (a parole order)”.

25    Section 19AL(2) provides:

(2)     If the Attorney-General refuses to make a parole order for a person under subsection (1) or (1A), paragraph (b) of this subsection, or subsection (2A), (6) or (7), the Attorney-General must:

(a)     give the person a written notice, within 14 days after the refusal, that:

(i)     informs the person of the refusal; and

(ii)     includes a statement of reasons for the refusal; and

(iii)     sets out the effect of paragraph (b) of this subsection; and

(b)     reconsider the making of a parole order for the person and either make, or refuse to make, such an order, within 12 months after the refusal.

…

26    Section 19ALA sets out a list of matters to which the Attorney-General “may have regard” in making a decision under s 19AL, as follows:

(1)    In making a decision under section 19AL in relation to a person, the Attorney-General may have regard to any of the following matters that are known to the Attorney-General and relevant to the decision:

(a)    the risk to the community of releasing the person on parole;

(b)    the person’s conduct while serving his or her sentence;

(c)    whether the person has satisfactorily completed programs ordered by a court or recommended by the relevant State or Territory corrective services or parole agency;

(d)    the likely effect on the victim, or victim’s family, of releasing the person on parole;

(e)    the nature and circumstances of the offence to which the person’s sentence relates;

(f)    any comments made by the sentencing court;

(g)    the person’s criminal history;

(h)    any report or information in relation to the granting of parole that has been provided by the relevant State or Territory corrective services or parole agency;

(i)    the behaviour of the person when subject to any previous parole order or licence;

(j)    the likelihood that the person will comply with the conditions of the parole order;

(k)    whether releasing the person on parole is likely to assist the person to adjust to lawful community life;

(l)    whether the length of the parole period is sufficient to achieve the purposes of parole;

(m)    any special circumstances, including the likelihood that the person will be subject to removal or deportation upon release.

(2)    Subsection (1) does not limit the matters that the Attorney-General may consider in making a decision under section 19AL.

27    Section 19AN provides for the imposition of conditions upon an offender’s release on parole:

19AN    Parole order is subject to conditions

A parole order:

(a)    is subject to the condition that the offender must, during the parole period, be of good behaviour and not violate any law; and

(b)    if the parole order specifies in accordance with subsection 19AL(3) that the person is to be released subject to supervision—is subject to the condition that the offender must, during the supervision period, be subject to the supervision of a parole officer or other person specified in the order and obey all reasonable directions of that officer or other person; and

(c)    is subject to such other conditions (if any) as the Attorney‑General specifies in the order.

28    In Lodhi v Attorney-General (Cth) [2020] FCA 1383 (Lodhi), Bromwich J at [6] accepted the following propositions concerning the operation of the legislative scheme:

(a)    The power to release or not release a federal offender on parole concerns the administration of criminal justice.

(b)    That power is conferred on a Minister of State (the Attorney-General), rather than some statutory body (such as a State parole authority).

(c)    While s 19AL(1) requires the Attorney-General to make a decision in relation to parole, the Attorney-General has a discretion to grant or refuse parole.

(d)    Section 19ALA, while setting out a wide range of factors that the Attorney-General can take into account, does not make consideration of any of the factors mandatory and – significantly – does not limit the factors to which the Attorney-General can have regard.

(e)    The Crimes Act contains no process for how consideration of release on parole is to be undertaken. It is essentially a matter for the Attorney-General to determine a procedure that is reasonable and will avoid practical injustice or unfairness having regard to the circumstances of the particular case. What is required may vary having regard to what has already occurred and what is said or done during the process.

(f)    When the Attorney-General refuses to release a federal offender on parole, the Attorney-General must reconsider the decision within 12 months (there is no minimum period that must pass before the Attorney-General reconsiders a refusal).

Consideration

29    The applicant submits that the delegate’s decision is affected by jurisdictional error because the delegate failed to take into account two substantial and clearly articulated arguments made on his behalf, namely that the risk of the applicant committing domestic violence could be ameliorated by imposing parole conditions; and the risk was ameliorated by the existence of the Domestic Violence Protection Order and the Temporary Protection Order. The applicant submits that the delegate failed to engage in any active intellectual process in respect of those arguments.

30    It is clear that the rules of natural justice apply to a parole decision made under s 19AL(2): see, for example, Duxerty v Minister for Justice and Customs [2002] FCA 1518; 136 A Crim R 373 at [22]; Khazaal v Attorney-General [2020] FCA 448 at [2]; Stephens v Attorney-General [2021] FCA 204 at [27].

31    Generally, where there is a duty to act judicially, “coupled with that duty is the duty to consider the case put”: Re The Australian Bank Employees Union; Ex Parte Citicorp Australia Limited (1989) 167 CLR 513 at 519. The duty to consider the case put forward by a party may require the decision-maker to consider a “substantial and clearly articulated argument” advanced by the party: Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) 275 CLR 582 at [27] (Plaintiff M1); Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 264 CLR 421 at [13]; Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26; 197 ALR 389 at [24]. If the decision-maker ignores, overlooks or misunderstands a substantial and clearly articulated argument, that may give rise to jurisdictional error: Plaintiff M1 at [27].

32    The obligation to “consider” a submission requires that the decision-maker engage in an active intellectual process with reference to the submission: see Plaintiff M1 at [26]; Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 252 FCR 352 at [35], [43]-[48] (Carrascalao); Minister for Home Affairs v Omar (2019) 272 FCR 589 at [36]. However, “what is necessary to comply with the statutory requirement for a valid exercise of power will necessarily depend on the nature, form and content of the representations”: Plaintiff M1 at [25].

33    I accept the applicant’s submission that his lawyers made a clearly articulated argument to the effect that the imposition of parole conditions would ameliorate the risk of the applicant engaging in domestic violence. The argument was made with reference to parole conditions both generally and, more specifically, conditions that would require counselling and therapeutic treatment, restrict his place of residence and require refraining from domestic violence.

34    The position is not as clear with respect to any argument that the risk was ameliorated by the existence of the Domestic Violence Protection Order and the Temporary Protection Order. The applicant’s solicitors did submit that the Magistrates Court would “closely monitor” the applicant’s actions, which might be taken to encompass enforcement of the Orders. They also referred to, “allegations of past conduct (or perceived risk of future conduct) with which police and the courts are capable of dealing”, which might be taken to be a reference to the Orders. However, no argument was directly or specifically made that the risk of the applicant committing domestic violence was ameliorated by the deterrent effect of the Domestic Violence Protection Order or the Temporary Protection Order. I do not accept that any clearly articulated argument to that effect was made.

35    The next issue is whether or not the delegate applied an active intellectual process to the argument made by the applicant’s solicitors that the imposition of parole conditions would ameliorate the risk of the applicant engaging in domestic violence.

36    Where reasons do not expressly refer to a clearly articulated argument, an inference that the argument has been overlooked may arise, but such an inference is not too readily to be drawn where the reasons are otherwise comprehensive and the issue has at least been identified at some point: Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 593 at [47]. In considering whether such an inference should be drawn, it is relevant to consider the nature of the requirement under s 19AL(2)(a)(ii) of the Crimes Act for the provision of a statement of reasons for the refusal of parole, read with s 25D of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth). As to that matter, the delegate is not required to make particular findings of fact, but only to set out the findings of fact that she did make: Lodhi at [87]; Pulini v Assistant Minister to the Attorney-General (Cth) [2021] FCA 1543; 397 ALR 192 (Pulini) at [57]; Khawaja v Attorney-General (Cth) (2022) 293 FCR 396 at [26] (Khawaja).

37    The reasons must, “be construed in a practical and common-sense manner and not with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error”: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Sabharwal [2018] FCAFC 160 at [76]; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272. However, “eyes should not be so blinkered as to avoid discerning an absence of reasons or reasons devoid of any consideration of a submission central to a party’s case”: Soliman v University of Technology, Sydney (2012) 207 FCR 277 at [57].

38    The applicant bears the onus of proving that the delegate failed to consider the relevant arguments, and must do so on the balance of probabilities: MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2021) 273 CLR 506 at [39], [60], [64], [68] and [85]; Carrascalao at [48].

39    It may be noted that the respondent submits that no issue of inference arises in this case as the reasons expressly determined that there was an unacceptable risk of the applicant committing domestic violence even with the imposition of parole conditions.

40    The delegate’s reasons commenced by stating that, “I have taken into account submissions made by you and on your behalf”. The delegate then assessed the risk of the applicant engaging in domestic violence in the community, concluding that the applicant posed an unacceptable risk of doing so. The delegate then considered the applicant’s behaviour in custody and his criminal history. The delegate stated that she, “had regard to the fact you were fined for contravening a condition of a Police Protection Notice on 9 August 2022”. The delegate then stated that, “I hold concerns with your ability to be of good behaviour, not violate any law, and comply with the conditions of a parole order and domestic violence protection orders in the community”.

41    I reject the applicant’s submission that it should not be inferred that the delegate read the CPO Submission. The delegate signed the last page of the submission, and the appropriate inference is that she read the preceding pages to understand the recommendation that was being made before signing: cf Khawaja at [98].

42    The CPO Submission noted that while parole conditions could be imposed to enforce the applicant’s compliance with intervention and supervision, “the risk of him reoffending is largely dependent on his willingness and ability to comply with those conditions”. The CPO Submission also concluded that, “the CPO has concerns about Mr Ardalan’s willingness and ability to remain of good behaviour and comply with the parole order and the TPO in the community”. The appropriate inference is that the delegate considered these passages.

43    The applicant submits that an inference should be drawn that the delegate failed to take into account the argument concerning the imposition of parole conditions to ameliorate the risk. He submits that the general statement that the delegate had taken into account submissions made by him and on his behalf is not enough to allow an inference to be drawn that the arguments were taken into account.

44    An assertion in a statement of reasons asserting that all the material before the decision-maker has been considered in making the decision provides some evidence of what was considered, but is not of itself decisive: Minister for Home Affairs v Ogawa (2019) 269 FCR 536 at [103]; Williams v Minister for the Environment and Heritage [2003] FCA 535; 74 ALD 124 at [30]; Pulini at [61]; Khawaja at [101]. If the only indication that the applicant’s submission as to the imposition of parole conditions was taken into account was the delegate’s general statement, then it might have been difficult to accept that an active intellectual process had been applied to that submission.

45    However, the delegate went on to expressly state that she had “concerns” with the applicant’s ability to, “comply with the conditions of a parole order and domestic violence protection orders in the community”. The delegate had earlier determined that the applicant posed an unacceptable risk of engaging in acts of domestic violence in the community. The delegate evidently reasoned since the applicant had failed to comply with a Police Protection Notice in 2022, she could not be satisfied that he could comply with parole conditions designed to prevent him from engaging in domestic violence or with the conditions of domestic violence protection orders. The delegate accordingly engaged in an active intellectual process with the question of whether parole conditions could be imposed to adequately ameliorate the risk of domestic violence.

46    If it were assumed, contrary to my finding, that the applicant’s solicitors in fact made a clearly articulated argument that the risk of the applicant committing domestic violence was ameliorated by the existence of the Domestic Violence Protection Order and the Temporary Protection Order, I would find that the delegate engaged in an active intellectual process in respect of the argument. The delegate expressly referred to her concern that the applicant would not, “comply with the conditions of… domestic violence protection orders in the community”. Accordingly, the delegate considered that the existence of the Domestic Violence Protection Order and the Temporary Protection Order did not allay her concern.

47    Two further matters should be noted about the grounds ultimately pressed by the applicant. First, while Ground (1)(f) alleges that the delegate failed to give “proper, realistic and genuine consideration” to whether conditions of parole could be imposed to ameliorate the risk of domestic violence, that was not submitted to raise any different issue to Ground (1)(d). The applicant’s counsel submitted that “Grounds 1(d) and 1(f) go together”, and that, “1(d) is the principal source of material that… the delegate needed to take into account”. Accordingly, I have proceeded on the basis that Ground (1)(f) raises effectively the same issues as Ground (1)(d).

48    Secondly, I have not understood Ground (1)(h)(ii), which asserts that the delegate erred by conflating the applicant’s breach of a prior Police Protection Notice with an unwillingness to comply with the Domestic Violence Protection Order, to be pressed. In oral argument, the applicant’s senior counsel submitted that, “Paragraph 1(h) operates in a supplementary way, providing some factual material that was relevant”. In any event, there was no such conflation. Rather, the applicant’s failure to comply with the Police Protection Notice was treated by the delegate as relevant to the risk that the applicant would not comply with parole conditions and the Domestic Violence Protection Order and the Temporary Protection Order.

49    For these reasons, the applicant’s grounds cannot succeed and the proceeding must be dismissed with costs.

Associate:    

Dated:    6 August 2026