Federal Court of Australia

Reeve v Fair Work Commission (Leave to Appeal from Refusal of Disqualification) [2026] FCA 1041

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The applications for leave to appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    Pursuant to r 1.37 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), the Registrar be directed to make the necessary arrangements to prevent any:

(a)    email address presently known to the Registrar to be controlled or used by the applicant from transmitting electronic communications to any email address of the Court; and

(b)    further email address reasonably identified by the Registry staff as being controlled or used by the applicant from transmitting electronic communications to any email address of the Court.

2.    The necessary arrangements required to comply with the direction in Order 1(a) occur as soon as reasonably practicable after the Registry emails to the parties a copy of the reasons published today and a sealed copy of these orders.

3.    Until further order, no document submitted for filing by or on behalf of the applicant be accepted for filing by the Court unless and until the docket Judge of these proceedings (or another Judge of the Court) is satisfied that the document contains no scandalous, abusive or otherwise inappropriate material and communicates that satisfaction to the Registry of the Court.

4.    For the avoidance of doubt, any document by which the applicant seeks the variation or discharge of these orders is subject to order 3.

5.    The applicant has liberty to apply to the docket Judge for the variation or discharge of these orders.

Date that entry is stamped: 31 July 2026

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Delivered ex tempore, revised from the transcript)

LEE J:

A    INTRODUCTION

1    As part of the Full Court in Storry v Parkyn (Vexatious Proceedings Order) [2024] FCAFC 100; (2024) 304 FCR 318 (at 320 [1]–[2]), I joined Feutrill and Jackman JJ in noting that s 78 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) relevantly provides that, in every Court exercising federal jurisdiction, “the parties may appear personally” and that it has become “increasingly common” for litigants in this Court to exercise that right.

2    We went on to observe that most litigants in person behave courteously and are often compelled to represent themselves by circumstances beyond their control (at 320 [3]). Sometimes, of course, they present valid claims and defences. But a few litigants in person, unrestrained by the norms regulating the professional conduct of lawyers and aggrieved by perceived wrongs, behave otherwise. This phenomenon has occasioned significant problems for the Court in the efficient exercise of its jurisdiction.

3    These applications are a stark illustration of that difficulty. They are two applications by Mr Oliver Reeve for leave to appeal from interlocutory judgments in which a judge of the Court refused applications that her Honour disqualify herself from further hearing proceedings commenced by him. Although the applications arise from separate proceedings, they involve substantially similar allegations, substantially similar proposed grounds of appeal and overlapping affidavit material.

4    What occurred in Court this morning, and what is recorded as having occurred before the primary Judge, provides an example of a litigant behaving discourteously and inappropriately towards the Court and refusing to accept basic norms governing the way a court goes about resolving disputes.

5    This behaviour is not new. As the primary Judge recorded in Reeve v Chartered Accountants of Australia and New Zealand (No 2) [2026] FCA 242 (at [22]–[23] per Meagher J), Mr Reeve has sent repeated emails to the primary Judge’s Associate and the Court Registry, some of which were expressed in completely inappropriate terms.

6    Things did not start well in the present applications. When Mr Reeve received a courteously expressed communication from the Registry concerning the applications, he responded to the Registry officer: “wind your neck in”.

7    During the oral hearing, allegations about my conduct of the applications for leave to appeal were also thrown around. They included allegations of criminal and other wrongful conduct and assertions that I had been apprised of secret information.

8    The above gives a flavour of what the Court has to deal with increasingly frequently. The Court is, after all, a workplace, and elementary standards of behaviour ought to apply. Judges have a responsibility to behave courteously towards persons who appear in Court. There is also a corresponding responsibility upon those who seek to engage the Court’s processes to treat the Court and its staff with elementary courtesy.

9    Apart from noting it, I do not presently propose to take any step in response to Mr Reeve’s repeated insults to the Court and his rudeness (and it is necessary that I place his discourtesy out of my mind in determining the merits of these applications for leave to appeal).

B    THE APPLICATIONS

10    The first application concerns proceeding QUD 648 of 2025 (Fair Work Commission Proceeding), in which Mr Reeve seeks judicial review of decisions of the Fair Work Commission. The interlocutory judgment from which leave is sought is Reeve v Fair Work Commission [2026] FCA 368.

11    The second application concerns proceeding QUD 551 of 2025 (Chartered Accountants Proceeding), brought by Mr Reeve against Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand and Mr Mark Rice. The interlocutory judgment from which leave is sought is Reeve v Chartered Accountants of Australia and New Zealand (No 3) [2026] FCA 518.

12    In each leave proceeding, Mr Reeve filed an application for leave to appeal and a draft notice of appeal, together with two affidavits. The applications advance, with differences of emphasis reflecting the different substantive proceedings, the same essential complaint: that the cumulative conduct of the proceedings before the primary Judge gives rise to an appearance of partiality; that procedural fairness was denied; that insufficient allowance was made for Mr Reeve’s position as a litigant in person; and that the primary Judge erred in refusing the applications for disqualification.

13    Given these applications concern the refusal of the disqualification applications, it is unnecessary to describe in any detail the merits of the substantive proceedings. It is sufficient to explain, in very broad terms, their nature and the procedural circumstances in which the present applications came to be made.

14    The Fair Work Commission Proceeding has its origins in disputes arising from the termination of Mr Reeve’s employment and subsequent proceedings in the Fair Work Commission. Mr Reeve alleges that those disputes followed disclosures which he characterises as protected whistleblower disclosures concerning serious financial misconduct and professional wrongdoing. In the substantive proceeding, he seeks judicial review of three decisions of the Fair Work Commission, contending that they are affected by jurisdictional or other legal error. Those allegations remain to be determined, and nothing in these reasons should be taken as expressing any view about their underlying merits.

15    The Chartered Accountants Proceeding arises from related factual circumstances. Mr Reeve alleges that Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand failed properly to investigate complaints made by him concerning professional misconduct and that action subsequently taken caused substantial damage to his professional reputation and career. As in the Fair Work Commission Proceeding, the substantive issues have not been determined.

16    Both proceedings were allocated to the docket of the primary Judge. Mr Reeve regards them as involving overlapping factual and evidentiary questions and extensive documentary material. They remain separate proceedings, and no order has been made that material filed in one proceeding is to be treated as filed in the other. Each proceeding is accordingly being managed by reference to its own pleadings, evidence and interlocutory history. Despite this, there is no reason why the two applications for leave to appeal cannot be dealt with together at one hearing and in one judgment.

17    The procedural history of both proceedings is lengthy. Mr Reeve has acted without legal representation throughout. His affidavit material describes the considerable burden which he says acting without legal representation has imposed upon him. He explains that he has been required personally to prepare pleadings, affidavits, submissions and extensive documentary material while attempting to comply with procedural requirements and directions made by the Court. He also refers to medical evidence said to explain why prolonged litigation and complex procedural requirements presented difficulty for him.

18    It is apparent from the two judgments the subject of the proposed appeals, and from Reeve v Chartered Accountants of Australia and New Zealand (No 2), that the primary Judge made repeated attempts to accommodate the difficulties identified by Mr Reeve. Those accommodations included explanations of filing requirements, additional opportunities to provide material, extensions of time, adjournments, remote appearance, and Registry assistance.

19    I should also note that on short notice, Mr Reeve was permitted to appear remotely on the present applications before me.

C    THE COMPLAINTS ADVANCED

20    For present purposes, the principal matters upon which Mr Reeve relies may be described under five broad headings. There is substantial overlap between them, and Mr Reeve stresses that it is their combined effect, rather than any individual complaint viewed in isolation, which is said to justify disqualification.

21    First, Mr Reeve relies upon what he describes as persistent procedural difficulties associated with the filing and management of his material. He asserts that substantial quantities of material were prepared over many months, organised in indexed bundles and lodged with the Registry, but uncertainty later arose as to what had been accepted for filing and whether duplicate lodgements existed. He contends that his repeated attempts to obtain clarification materially affected his ability to present his case.

22    Secondly, Mr Reeve relies upon the existence of overlapping proceedings arising from the same underlying factual circumstances, including the Fair Work Commission Proceeding, the Chartered Accountants Proceeding, freedom of information applications, regulatory complaints and other matters. He states that this overlap created genuine uncertainty about the appropriate proceeding in which documentary material should be filed and whether evidence in one proceeding could be relied upon in another.

23    Thirdly, Mr Reeve relies heavily upon his position as a litigant in person. He explains that he has been required personally to prepare all Court documents while the respondents have been represented by experienced solicitors and counsel. He asserts that the complexity of the proceedings, the volume of documentary material and the multiplicity of interlocutory issues placed him at a substantial disadvantage which the Court failed adequately to accommodate.

24    Fourthly, Mr Reeve asserts that he has experienced continuing difficulty in obtaining documentary material which he regards as relevant to the substantive proceedings. He refers to documents said to be held by other parties, documents which he believes influenced procedural decisions, and material said to be subject to confidentiality or public interest immunity claims. He contends that the inability to obtain that material impeded his capacity properly to present his case.

25    Fifthly, Mr Reeve complains of a series of interlocutory and procedural rulings made during the management of the proceedings. His point is not that any one ruling, considered in isolation, establishes actual or apprehended bias. Rather, he states that their accumulated effect demonstrates an increasing emphasis upon procedural questions at the expense of the merits and would cause a fair-minded lay observer to apprehend that the proceedings were no longer being approached with the necessary impartiality.

26    In the application concerning the Chartered Accountants Proceeding, the proposed grounds allege, in summary: denial of procedural fairness; failure properly to accommodate a litigant in person; misapplication of the test for apprehended bias; failure to consider cumulative conduct; failure to address access to evidence; error in treating filing requirements as neutral; failure to address potentially prejudicial media material; error in the treatment of Mr Reeve’s non-appearance; apparent predisposition towards the respondents’ procedural position; and failure to ensure a fair hearing. These grounds substantially overlap with those advanced in the Fair Work Commission Proceeding.

D     APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES

27    Because the judgments are interlocutory, leave to appeal is required by the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act) s 24(1A).

28    As I explained to Mr Reeve, the exercise of the Court’s power to grant leave must conform to the overarching purpose of the civil practice and procedure provisions, namely to facilitate the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible: s 37M of the FCA Act; Nationwide News Pty Limited v Rush [2018] FCAFC 70 (at [2] per Lee J, Allsop CJ and Rares J relevantly agreeing).

29    Ordinarily, leave will not be granted unless the decision is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration on appeal and substantial injustice would result if leave were refused. In assessing whether a judgment is attended by sufficient doubt, the Court’s task is to evaluate, at a “reasonably impressionistic level”, whether the bases upon which the applicant seeks to impugn it are “sufficiently arguable” or have “reasonable prospects of success”: Olson v Keefe [2019] FCA 339 (at [9] per Lee J).

30    The principles governing actual and apprehended bias were clearly set out by the primary Judge in Reeve v Chartered Accountants of Australia and New Zealand (No 3) (at [24]–[32] per Meagher J). It is unnecessary to repeat them. It is enough to note that the question is not whether Mr Reeve disagrees with procedural rulings, but whether the identified matter could cause a fair-minded lay observer reasonably to apprehend that the primary Judge might not bring an impartial mind to the questions she was required to decide.

E    CONSIDERATION

31    The applications before the primary Judge were not dealt with cursorily. Her Honour was at pains to identify the grounds advanced, to set out the procedural history, and to respond to each ground. With respect, those responses were compelling and identified the correct legal principles. The proposed grounds of appeal from her Honour’s orders are not sufficiently arguable and do not have any reasonable prospects of success.

32    For example, in relation to the allegation that Mr Reeve had been denied procedural fairness, it was open to her Honour to conclude that he had been provided with repeated opportunities to appear, to file documents in proper form and to explain the basis of his applications. The judgments record substantial accommodations made because he was a litigant in person and because of the difficulties he said he faced.

33    The complaints concerning the provision of specific material to the Court, alleged suppression of evidence and alleged regulatory misconduct were also correctly rejected. The occasion to consider the substantive evidentiary material had not arisen. The fact that material had or had not been accepted for filing did not establish that the primary Judge had considered it for an impermissible purpose, suppressed it, or reached a pre-formed view about the merits.

34    The allegations of collusion and improper conduct on the part of the primary Judge were correctly characterised as having no evidentiary foundation. Belief, suspicion and the refusal of freedom of information requests did not establish the existence of undisclosed communications or a logical connexion between any identified matter and an apprehended departure from impartial decision-making.

35    The further allegation made in the Fair Work Commission Proceeding (that the primary Judge had undisclosed conflicts of interest comprising material connexions with parties or individuals involved in the matter) was also properly regarded as an allegation without substance. No evidentiary basis for the alleged connexion was identified.

36    The primary Judge did not overlook the cumulative way in which Mr Reeve put his case. Her Honour addressed Mr Reeve’s wide-ranging contentions as to actual and apprehended bias and, with what I regard as considerable forbearance and patience, explained why the test for disqualification was not met.

37    As I have said, nothing in the proposed grounds identifies an arguable error in that reasoning. Repetition of the underlying allegations, or the addition of further material directed to the substantive merits, does not expose error in the interlocutory judgments refusing disqualification.

38    It is not for me presently to determine whether further steps should be taken to restrain Mr Reeve from behaving discourteously towards Registry staff. He should be aware, however, that if the conduct continues, it may be appropriate for the Court, on its own motion, to restrict the manner in which he communicates with Court staff or files further material. The Court should not have to tolerate the sort of behaviour displayed today, which has regrettably been characteristic of aspects of this litigation.

F    CONCLUSION

39    There is no proper basis upon which leave to appeal should be granted. The applications are to be dismissed with costs.

G    SUBSEQUENT EVENTS

40    Subsequent to the delivery of the ex tempore reasons dismissing the applications for leave to appeal, but prior to the revision and publication of these reasons, the conduct of Mr Reeve has not abated. On the contrary, it has continued and, if anything, intensified.

41    On Wednesday, 29 July 2026, at my Associate’s request, the Registry transmitted to the parties the sealed orders made on 23 July 2026 together with the customary advice: “Please see attached sealed orders of the Court. Published reasons of the Court will be provided in due course”.

42    Within a short time of receipt of that communication, Mr Reeve responded to the Registry, copying my Associate and numerous other recipients, in the following terms: “Get fucked you criminal little shit”.

43    Mr Reeve thereafter sent a further email to the same recipients headed “Urgent Request – Complete Record of Hearing and Reasons (QUD280/2026 & QUD286/2026)”. In that communication, he asserted, among other things, that he had not merely been muted during the hearing but that his “connection to the hearing was terminated”. That assertion is incorrect. As I noted during the hearing (T8.39–45):

Thank you, Mr Reeve. I will now proceed to, given I have given every opportunity to Mr Reeve to say what he wishes to say, I will now proceed to deal with the application. During the course of my reasons, I would wish and I direct that the audio feed of Mr Reeve to the Court be silenced, although I wish to ensure that he has the opportunity of hearing my reasons in full. I note for the record that Mr Reeve that, on his own account, disconnected the link between himself and the court. I will now proceed to deliver reasons in respect of the two applications.

44    As I explained during the hearing, it had become apparent that it would not be possible to deliver reasons without interruption. Accordingly, I directed that the audio feed by which Mr Reeve was participating be muted while I delivered judgment. As the transcript records, Mr Reeve thereafter disconnected the electronic connection by which he was participating. The balance of the reasons was consequently delivered in his absence.

45    Within minutes, however, Mr Reeve sent a further communication to the Registry, my Associate and others asserting: “The following article has now been published with evidence. It's easy to find, just google, ‘idiotic decisions made by the known rapist Justice Michael Lee’.”

46    That communication incorporated by reference a lengthy publication containing false, scandalous and abusive allegations concerning the Court, myself and the conduct of these proceedings. Shortly afterwards, Mr Reeve again emailed the Registry, my Associate and numerous third parties providing a hyperlink to an external website upon which substantially the same material had been published.

47    Even as these reasons were being finalised, at 5:46am this morning, Mr Reeve sent my Associate an email, copying others, with the subject line: “I have requested the transcript and reasons for your fraudulent decision. Provide them you little thief”.

48    Such conduct cannot be tolerated. I am not prepared to simply ignore this problem and leave it to the docket Judge and her chambers to now have to deal with a repetition of the conduct that they have previously had to endure and that my chambers have now experienced.

49    Although the law of contempt provides one mechanism by which conduct of this nature may be addressed, it is frequently an unsatisfactory response in circumstances of this kind. Resort to contempt proceedings may serve only to prolong disputation, provide a further platform for scandalous allegations, and consume scarce judicial and administrative resources. In the present circumstances, a more measured and practical response is required.

50    The point has been reached where the conduct of Mr Reeve has necessitated the making of protective orders directed to safeguarding the Court’s processes and those who administer them. Court staff, Registry officers, chambers staff and judges should not be subjected to abusive, offensive or scandalous communications of the kind in which Mr Reeve has repeatedly engaged. Such behaviour must be brought to an end.

51    The burden imposed by these communications extends beyond the personal abuse directed at the Court and its staff. They occupy time and resources that ought properly to be devoted to the orderly dispatch of the Court’s business, impede the efficient administration of justice, and distract Registry staff from attending to matters requiring their attention. The Court has both the responsibility and the power to protect its officers and the integrity of its own processes from such misuse.

52    Accordingly, I propose to direct the Registrar under r 1.37 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (FCR) to make the necessary arrangements for any email addresses known to the Registrar to be presently controlled or used by Mr Reeve to be blocked from communicating electronically with any Court email address, and to block any further email addresses that Registry staff reasonably identify as being controlled or used by Mr Reeve.

53    In addition, I propose to order that no document submitted by Mr Reeve be accepted for filing unless and until the docket Judge (or another judge of the Court) is satisfied that the document contains no scandalous, abusive or otherwise inappropriate material.

54    These orders do not deny Mr Reeve access to the Court or prevent him from pursuing any legitimate application or proceeding. Rather, they regulate the manner in which he may engage with the Court so as to ensure that its processes are not abused and that Court staff are not exposed to conduct that should not be tolerated.

55    I am satisfied that the Court possesses ample authority to make both orders. As to the first, FCR 1.37 expressly provides that the Court may direct a Registrar to do, or not to do, an act or thing. As to the second, although FCR 2.26 provides for the refusal to accept certain documents for filing and FCR 2.29 provides for the removal, redaction or storage of documents on a Court file, the proposed order is directed to the particular end of preventing further scandalous or abusive material from being presented to Registry or chambers staff and accepted for filing in the first place (and dealing with other communications with the Registry that are not placed on the Court file).

56    The power to make such orders arises under s 23 of the FCA Act, which empowers the Court to make orders of such kinds as the Court thinks appropriate; FCR 1.32, which empowers the Court to make any order it considers appropriate in the interests of justice; and, independently of those provisions, the Court’s implied power to protect the integrity of its own processes and prevent their abuse.

57    The making of these orders is also consistent with, and promotes, the overarching purpose prescribed by Pt VB of the FCA Act, namely the just resolution of disputes according to law as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible. As s 37M(2) of the FCA Act provides, some of the objectives of the overarching purpose are the just determination of all proceedings before the Court; the efficient use of the judicial and administrative resources available for the purposes of the Court; the efficient disposal of the Court’s overall caseload; and the disposal of all proceedings in a timely manner.

58    The power to make the orders also arises under s 37P(2) of the FCA Act, which provides that the Court may give directions about the practice and procedure to be followed in relation to any part of a proceeding. The disproportionate amount of judicial and administrative time consumed in dealing with Mr Reeve’s querulous and abusive communications detracts from the Court’s ability to devote its finite resources to matters properly requiring attention. I am satisfied that the orders are therefore both necessary and appropriate.

59    I recognise, of course, that the orders will be made in the absence of Mr Reeve. In those circumstances, I will expressly reserve liberty to Mr Reeve to apply to the docket Judge for their variation or discharge.

60    Any application seeking to vary or discharge these orders will, however, be subject to the same requirement that applies to any other document now tendered for filing by Mr Reeve, namely that it not be accepted for filing unless and until the docket Judge (or a judge of the Court) is satisfied that it contains no scandalous, abusive or otherwise inappropriate material. A right to be heard is not a right to be heard abusively.

61    These orders are interlocutory in nature and are directed to the present circumstances. They are not intended to operate indefinitely or irrespective of future events. Nothing in these orders should be understood as limiting the power of the docket Judge to vary or discharge them should the docket Judge become satisfied that Mr Reeve is prepared to engage with the Court’s processes in an appropriate manner and for the legitimate purpose of advancing issues that properly require judicial determination. Should that occur, the continuation of these protective measures may require reconsideration.

Associate:

Dated: 31 July 2026

SCHEDULE OF PARTIES