Federal Court of Australia

Huber v Singh [2026] FCA 1004

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The proceeding be dismissed.

2.    The Applicant pay the Respondents’ costs of the proceeding.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

O’BRYAN J:

Introduction

1    On 18 December 2025, the applicant, Jason Huber, commenced a proceeding against three individuals: Sukhdev Singh, Hans-Michael Koch and John Buhagiar. The amended statement of claim is difficult to comprehend. However, to the extent that sense can be made of it, Mr Huber alleges that the respondents were members of a “transnational criminal gang” called Project D (Decapitation) which engaged in the theft of shares in a company called CellOS Software Ltd (CellOS) and the theft of its intellectual property, and engaged in other criminal acts that caused Mr Huber loss and prevented him from “obtaining legal representation to rescue his company”. Most of the events referred to in the statement of claim are alleged to have occurred in and around 2015.

2    The reference to Mr Huber “obtaining legal representation to rescue his company” appears to be a reference to a proceeding brought by CellOS against Mr Huber in this Court at the end of 2015. In that proceeding, CellOS successfully alleged that Mr Huber had breached his duties as a director of CellOS: CellOS Software Ltd v Huber [2018] FCA 2069; 132 ACSR 468 (CellOS No 1). Mr Huber was ordered to account to CellOS in the amount of $42 million: CellOS Software Ltd v Huber (No 2) [2020] FCA 505; 144 ACSR 267 (CellOS No 2). Mr Huber was legally represented at the trial of the proceeding until September 2017, but thereafter he was self-represented. Justice Beach summarised his findings with respect to Mr Huber’s breach of directors’ duties as follows (CellOS No 2 at [2] and [3]):

In summary I found that Mr Huber, although the chief executive officer of CellOS at the relevant time and with responsibility for raising funds to run CellOS’ business, instead of procuring potential investors to buy shares issued by CellOS, diverted potential investors to buying shares from him through the Huber controlled entities, which shares he had purchased in a grey market at a substantial discount to the price that CellOS could have issued them for. Further, in order to fund CellOS, Mr Huber caused LGA and Pized to enter into uncommercial loan agreements with CellOS, without disclosing his interest in these lending entities. For convenience and unless I stipulate otherwise, terms used in these reasons have the same meanings as I defined in my principal reasons. What I have just described in terms of Mr Huber’s pattern of behaviour may be defined as “the Scheme”.

I found that Mr Huber had breached s 181(1) and (2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Act) and his fiduciary duties to CellOS. I also found that the Huber controlled entities were knowingly involved in these contraventions and also knowingly assisted Mr Huber’s breaches of his fiduciary duties as reflected in the second limb of Barnes v Addy.

3    Mr Huber attempted to appeal the judgment against him. However, CellOS was placed into administration on 10 January 2022 and was voluntarily wound up pursuant to s 439C(c) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Corporations Act) on 19 April 2022: Huber v CellOS Software Ltd (in liq) [2022] FCA 744. Applications brought by Mr Huber to stay the liquidation and for leave to continue his appeal were dismissed: Huber v CellOS Software Ltd (in liq) (No 2) [2023] FCA 459. Mr Huber appealed against the dismissal of those applications, but his appeal was unsuccessful: Huber v CellOS Software Ltd (in liq) [2023] FCAFC 198.

4    Mr Huber resides in Malta and is not legally represented. He appeared before me by video. At the first case management hearing conducted on 6 February 2026, I informed Mr Huber that there were numerous problems with his pleading and that he would be assisted by receiving legal advice. Mr Huber informed the Court that he could not afford legal representation. Subsequently, a referral was made to the Victorian Bar requesting pro bono assistance for Mr Huber. Prior to the acceptance of the referral, Mr Huber filed an amended statement of claim. The amendments did not improve the document. Mr Raghavan of counsel accepted the referral and agreed to provide advice to Mr Huber with respect to his pleading. The Court expresses its gratitude to Mr Raghavan for volunteering his services.

5    At the second case management hearing conducted on 27 March 2026, timetabling orders were made for the filing of any further originating application and/or amended statement of claim and any further or amended interlocutory applications for summary dismissal of the proceeding, strike out of the pleadings or security for costs.

6    Following the receipt of advice from pro bono counsel, Mr Huber elected not to further amend his originating application or amended statement of claim.

7    In accordance with the timetabling orders, the first respondent, Mr Singh, filed an amended interlocutory application dated 21 May 2026 seeking orders that the proceeding to be dismissed on the basis that it has no reasonable prospects of success or, in the alternative, that Mr Huber provide security for Mr Singh’s costs. I will refer to that application as the summary dismissal application. The application was supported by amended written submissions also dated 21 May 2026. Mr Singh is not legally represented. In response to the summary dismissal application, Mr Huber filed an affidavit dated 18 June 2026 and submissions dated 25 June 2026.

8    Also in accordance with the timetabling orders, the second and third respondents, Messrs Koch and Buhagiar, filed an interlocutory application seeking security for their costs in the amount of $275,000. The application was supported by an affidavit made by Dean Anthony Jones dated 27 May 2026. Mr Jones is a partner of the firm Eales and Mackenzie Lawyers who are representing Messrs Koch and Buhagiar. The application was also supported by submissions dated 11 June 2026 prepared by Mr L Wirth of Counsel. In response to the summary dismissal application, Mr Huber filed an affidavit dated 24 June 2026 and submissions dated 25 June 2026.

9    The summary dismissal and security for costs applications were heard on 2 July 2026. The affidavits referred to above were read at the hearing and each of the parties made brief submissions which were consistent with their written submissions filed before the hearing.

10    For the reasons that follow, the proceeding should be summarily dismissed pursuant to s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act) and r 26.01(1) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (FCR). The proceeding fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action; I am satisfied that Mr Huber has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding; and the proceeding as formulated is an abuse of the processes of the Court. In those circumstances, it is unnecessary to determine the security for costs application. However, in case the matter should go further, I express my view that, if the proceeding were not dismissed, I would have ordered Mr Huber to provide security in favour of the respondents and ordered the proceeding to be stayed until security was provided.

Overview of the originating application and amended statement of claim

Originating application

11    The originating application purports to be brought by Mr Huber on behalf of himself and other persons and entities identified in the amended statement of claim. The amended statement of claim identifies, at “List 1”, the liquidators of CellOS (and the “genuine” shareholders and creditors of CellOS) and the Australian Deputy Commissioner of Taxation. It is impermissible to bring proceedings on behalf of others, unless specifically authorised by statute. For instance, a proceeding can be brought on behalf of others where it is a representative proceeding brought under Part IVA of the FCA Act and Division 9.3 of the FCR. This is not such a case. Nor does the originating application identify any other basis on which Mr Huber is authorised to sue on behalf of those persons or entities.

12    As stated above, the respondents are Messrs Singh, Koch and Buhagiar. The originating application states that Mr Huber “will seek permission to include Janifer Yeo Tan and Woon Shung Toon from Singapore” as additional respondents. However, as at the date of hearing the summary dismissal application, Mr Huber had not made any application to join those additional respondents.

13    By his originating application, Mr Huber seeks declarations against the respondents “representing the extended Project D transnational criminal gang listed in the statement of claim”. The declarations sought by Mr Huber are stated as follows (errors in original):

1.    A declaration pursuant to section 1317E of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Act) that (as those terms are defined in pages 13-16 and 25-26 of the Statement of Claim), contravened:

1.1.    section 181(1) of the Act;

1.2.    further, or in alternative, section 182(1) of the Act;

1.3.    further, or in alternative, section 183(1) of the Act;

1.4.    further, or in alternative, section 208 of the Act; and further, or in alternative, section 1043A of the Act.

…

3.    A declaration pursuant to section 1317E of the Act that the respondents’ contraventions, as defined of the Statement of Claim Particulars 1-7 by effecting:

3.1.    Project D the sabotage, theft and ruin of CellOS Software Limited, (Australia’s most valuable tech. valued at USD5.6 billion)

3.2.    the secret illegal share trading scheme, (over 23 million shares) and

3.3.    defrauding millions in cash, shares, car and property from CellOS and the founder Jason Huber.

3.4.    the defrauding of the parishioners of City Mission Church, over S$28million, by illegally issuing 600 million CellOS shares under false pretences and without shareholder knowledge or approval, and

3.5.    the fraud and embezzlement of over A$6.8million from the Commonwealth of Australia.

3.6.    These Commonwealth funds paid for the elaborate coverup perverting the course of Justice in the theft, vilification, framing and ruin of the founder Jason Huber.

Contravened:

3.7.    section 181(1) of the Act;

3.8.    further, or in alternative, section 182(1) of the Act; and

3.9.    further, or in alternative, section 183(1) of the Act.

…

7.    A declaration that the Respondents hold/embezzled monies or interests they received from the disposition of, or any interests they hold in, shares, intellectual property and customers transferred/embezzled personally or to Avanseus Holdings Pte Ltd, SGM Analytics Pte Ltd or Jireh Pte Ltd (as set out in the particulars 1-7 of the Statement of Claim) on trust and is liable to account to the Applicant for those monies shares or interests.

14    Mr Huber also seeks compensation orders in respect of the conduct described in the declarations.

Amended Statement of Claim

15    The amended statement of claim contains a litany of conclusory allegations of criminal, fraudulent and dishonest conduct against 37 individuals and entities who are named in “List 2” and are described as members of the “Project D transnational gang”. The three respondents, Messrs Singh, Koch and Buhagiar, are included in List 2. The amended statement of claim commences with the following overarching allegations:

2.    The Applicant seeks compensation from the Project D (Decapitation) transnational gang, defined below, for the following existential losses they caused and preventing him from obtaining legal representation to rescue his company:

2.1    On 3 September 2015 the theft of 14 million of his shares worth USD25 per share by the accountant Chua Min Wee who was bribed $300,000 by the organised crime gang to commit criminal breach of trust leading to:

2.2.    the theft and ruin of CellOS and the theft of its intellectual property leading to the loss of value of his 65 million shares from USD25 per share to nil. and

2.3.    the loss of his accumulated unpaid salary of USD20 million, since 2005.

2.4.    the theft of his car in accordance with the Singapore Court Order for S$118,100 plus interest. (Case No. DC/DC 3232/2016 Sub Case No. DC/SUM 3945/2016 Doc No. DC/ORC 358/2017 Filed: 06 February 2017 06:10 PM)

2.5.    The loss of his 2 apartment homes in Melbourne and Dubai.

2.6.     Justice and compensation causing existential losses for being vilified and framed in Australian Federal Court Case VID951/2015 using A$6.8 million stolen from the Commonwealth, to pay their legal fees, as listed below.

16    The amended statement of claim is more than 90 pages in length. It is largely incoherent and fails to articulate any material facts, in any coherent form, that could support the above allegations of criminal, fraudulent and dishonest conduct.

17    Significantly, the amended statement of claim contains numerous references to Mr Huber’s affidavits filed in the earlier proceedings brought by CellOS against him. It is apparent that Mr Huber is seeking, through this proceeding, to re-litigate events that were the subject of those prior proceedings and which were determined adversely to him.

18    Further, and perhaps most relevantly for present purposes, the pleading contains very few allegations directed specifically to the three respondents to this proceeding, Messrs Singh, Koch and Buhagiar.

Allegations made against Mr Singh

19    In List 2, Mr Singh is identified as the 32nd member of the alleged Project D transnational gang and is described as follows:

The Thirty-second, Sukhdev Singh was conned into accepting directorship of CellOS Software Ltd ("CellOS") from 19 November 2019 evidently coinciding with the completion of the case VID951/2015 to provide a parachute exit to the illegitimate board after the failure of Project D. Mr Singh appointed the Liquidators and turned whistleblower with supporting evidence of the fraudulent and criminal activities of the illegitimate board reported by Mr Huber in the affidavit dated 7 July 2023 VID404/2023 Index Part C Tab 2 and supplementing the evidence in the appeal application see VID458/2022 Index Part C Tab3 Annexures8,11,12 .

20    Later in the pleading, Mr Singh is again described as a “whistleblower”, but the allegation is incomprehensible (page 12, para 5.3):

The Australian Taxation Office on behalf of the Commonwealth of Australia was defrauded on two occasions into transferring 1) A$6,800,000 (see Page 45 Table 1 below) for the laundered money flow from the ATO to the lawyers provided by the whistleblower Sukhdev Singh, (and see Affidavit Form59 VID404/2023 23 October 2023 Huber) and 2) A$76,402 (see Liquidator’s Form 5602 Annual statutory return of 19 April 2022) to pay for the coverup of Project D.

21    The pleading also makes the following incomprehensible allegation (page 14, para 3):

The recent disclosure by the whistleblower Sukhdev Singh of very specific list of payments totalling A$6.8million between 2016 and 2020 pretending to be for Research and Development when the company Research and Development department was shut down immediately after the theft of the company on 3 September 2015. These funds were clearly regularly misappropriated over 4 years by the illegitimate board to their Lawyers Corrs Chambers Westgarth to continue unfairly influencing the courts to block the founder from rescuing the company.

22    The pleading makes the following further allegations:

The Whistleblower Sukhdev Singh revealed that they diverted much of the enormous cash reserve of S$28million, to fund the fake lawsuits and to cover up the Project D misadventure and destroy the reputation of Huber, in their efforts to prevent Huber from rescuing CellOS. (page 25, para 4.18)

Sukhdev Singh turned whistleblower after he discovered he was conned and unwittingly provided the illegitimate directors an escape route and as expected appointed the liquidators in their final effort to stop Huber from rescuing the company and obtaining Justice. (page 45, para 7.2)

The whistleblower [evidently a reference to Mr Singh] provided evidence that persons in Authority caused the Commonwealth to illegally fund frivolous Lawsuits designed to block the founder Mr Huber from rescuing CellOS. (page 45, para 7.3)

23    The pleading fails to allege any material facts that support any allegation that Mr Singh was involved in any wrongdoing with respect to CellOS. To the contrary, the pleading describes Mr Singh as a whistleblower.

Allegations against Mr Koch

24    In List 2, Mr Koch is identified as the 30th member of the alleged Project D transnational gang and is described as follows:

The thirtieth, Michael Hans-Koch was an integral co-conspirator assisting Janifer Yeo Tan and John Buhagiar.

25    The only allegation directed to Mr Koch is that he assisted, in an unidentified way, in the establishment of a “phoenix company” to which intellectual property and clients of CellOS were transferred. The relevant allegation is directed to Janifer Yeo Tan, her husband Dr SK Tan, their company JYSK Group Pte Ltd and the alleged phoenix company, SGM Analytics Pte Ltd and is as follows (page 38, para 5.2):

They [apparently a reference to Ms Tan, Dr Tan and JYSK Group] had according to The Liquidators S439A of 7 April 2022 report of Cellos Software Ltd revealed that on 11 October 2019 established a phoenix company called SGM Analytics Pte ltd had been taken over by Janifer Yeo Tan and her husband Dr SK Tan and their company JYSK Group Pte Ltd, with the assistance of the other illegitimate board members of CellOS Software Ltd, Woon Shung Toon, John Buhagiar, Michael Hans-Koch, and the illegitimate board members and management of Cellos Technologies Pvt Ltd (India) Shikha Aggarwal CFO, Naveen Gupta, Anurag Srivastav (Director and CTO), were all officers of CellOS and under confidentiality and non-circumvention contracts, and Gary Yang (CFO of JYSK Group Pte Ltd) (“The SGM Management Team”) to which intellectual property and clients of CellOS had been secretly transferred without shareholder knowledge or approval. Shortly after the transfer of the company assets to SGM Analytics Pte Ltd and Illegitimate Board Director Woon Shung Toon and his company Jireh Group Pte Ltd the illegitimate directors appointed Sukhdev Singh as a director and immediately after resigned from the board of CellOS.

26    The above allegation is largely incomprehensible. It is not possible to identify any wrongdoing alleged to have been done by Mr Koch, and nor are any material facts pleaded in support of any allegation that Mr Koch was involved in any wrongdoing with respect to CellOS.

Allegations against Mr Buhagiar

27    In List 2, Mr Buhagiar is identified as the 23rd member of the alleged Project D transnational gang and is described as follows:

The twenty-third, John Buhagiar an Australian citizen had attempted to blackmail the founder into paying him 15 million shares in 2010, and at the request of Adrain Calleja plotted with the Project D criminal gang in 2015 playing an instrumental and active part in the sabotage theft and ruin of the company and millions from the Parishioners of City Mission Church and the Commonwealth.

28    The pleading fails to allege any material facts that support the foregoing allegations of blackmail, plotting, sabotage, theft and ruin of CellOS.

29    The only allegation directed to Mr Buhagiar is the same as is directed to Mr Koch, set out above.

Summary dismissal application

Mr Singh’s submissions

30    Mr Singh contended that the applicant’s claims disclose no cause of action against him, are scandalous and incoherent, and constitute an abuse of process.

31    Mr Singh submitted that the amended statement of claim advances grave allegations made in conclusory terms without pleading material facts capable of supporting them and without pleading any factual foundation linking such allegations to Mr Singh. The relief sought is framed globally against the respondents without differentiation or factual attribution. Mr Singh submitted that “bare assertions of this nature are scandalous and ought not be permitted to remain on the Court’s record”. Mr Singh further submitted that the originating application does not permit him to know the case he is required to meet, nor does it permit the court to adjudicate the controversy. Mr Singh submitted that, considered as a whole, the proceeding does not “represent a bona fide attempt to vindicate legal rights”, with the structure and language of the originating application revealing grievance-based litigation, the use of conspiracy allegations, and an impermissible attempt to advance broad accusations rather than justiciable claims.

32    Mr Singh submitted that leave to replead should be refused, as the defects identified are not matters of form, but rather they are fundamental.

Mr Huber’s evidence and submissions

33    Despite its considerable length and the volume of annexed material, Mr Huber’s affidavit dated 18 June 2026 does not remedy the fundamental deficiencies in the originating application and amended statement of claim. Neither the affidavit nor the annexed documents identify material facts capable of supporting the serious allegations of criminal, fraudulent and dishonest conduct made against the respondents.

34    Mr Huber’s primary submission in response to the summary dismissal application is that the respondents have not denied the causes of action he pleads against them, and that he has provided to the Court “glaringly obvious evidence supporting his claim”. In particular, Mr Huber sought to rely on liquidator reports, which he submitted “confirm breaches caused by the respondents” and a letter he wrote to His Majesty, King Charles, on 20 August 2024 which he submitted “provides details of… serious crimes and legal breaches by the transnational gang in executing Project D sabotage”.

Applicable principles

35    Section 31A of the FCA Act relevantly provides:

31A     Summary judgment

…

(2)    The Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if:

(a)    the first party is defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and

(b)    the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding.

(3)    For the purposes of this section, a defence or a proceeding or part of a proceeding need not be:

(a)    hopeless; or

(b)    bound to fail;

for it to have no reasonable prospect of success.

(4)    This section does not limit any powers that the Court has apart from this section.

36    Rule 26.01(1) of the FCR provides:

26.01    Summary judgment

(1)    A party may apply to the Court for an order that judgment be given against another party because:

(a)    the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or part of the proceeding; or

(b)    the proceeding is frivolous or vexatious; or

(c)    no reasonable cause of action is disclosed; or

(d)    the proceeding is an abuse of the process of the Court; or

(e)    the respondent has no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding or part of the proceeding.

37    Mr Singh’s submissions were framed in the terms of rr 26.01(1)(a), (c) and (d), that Mr Huber has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding, no reasonable cause of action is disclosed and that the proceeding constitutes an abuse of process.

38    Rule 26.01(1)(a) replicates the provisions in s 31A of the FCA Act: Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Rio Tinto Coal Australia Pty Ltd (2014) 232 FCR 560 at [30]. In Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd (2008) 167 FCR 372 (Jefferson) at [124], Gordon J noted that s 31A of the FCA Act was introduced in order to strengthen “the power of the court to deal with unmeritorious matters by broadening the grounds on which federal courts can summarily dispose of unsustainable cases”. The moving party on an application for summary dismissal bears the onus of persuading the Court of the criteria under s 31A: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Cassimatis (2013) 220 FCR 256 (Cassimatis) at [45] (Reeves J). The critical question is whether the applicant has “reasonable” prospects of successfully pursuing his application. That determination “does not require a mini-trial based upon incomplete evidence to decide whether the proceedings are likely to succeed or fail at trial. Instead, it requires a critical examination of the available materials to determine whether there is a real question of law or fact that should be decided at trial”: Cassimatis at [46].

39    A proceeding will only be summarily dismissed under r 26.01(1)(c) for disclosing no reasonable cause of action where it is so obviously untenable that it cannot possibly succeed, and should not be permitted to go to trial.

40    Abuse of process, referred to in r 26.01(d), is insusceptible of a formulation which comprises closed categories: Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Limited (2015) 256 CLR 507 (Tomlinson) at [25] (French CJ, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ). Accordingly, whether the use of the Court’s processes amounts to an abuse requires a “broad, merits-based judgment” which takes into account the public and private interests involved and all of the facts of the case. There can be no “hard and fast rule” to determine whether, on given facts, an abuse arises or not: UBS AG v Tyne (2018) 265 CLR 77 (UBS) at [7] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ) citing Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1 at 31 (Lord Bingham of Cornhill); see also UBS at [69] (Gageler J). Abuse of process is capable of application in any circumstances in which the use of a court’s procedures would be unjustifiably oppressive to a party or would bring the administration of justice into disrepute: Tomlinson at [25] (French CJ, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ); UBS at [1] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ) and [62] (Gageler J).

Consideration

41    In my view, an order should be made dismissing Mr Huber’s originating application and amended statement of claim. Those documents suffer from numerous incurable defects.

42    First, Mr Huber impermissibly purports to bring the proceeding on behalf of other persons.

43    Second, Mr Huber’s pleading is incomprehensible. It is impossible for the respondents, and the Court, to understand the case that is sought to be made.

44    Third, to the extent they can be understood, the allegations made against the respondents are scandalous and should not be permitted to remain on the record. The pleading makes grave allegations of criminal conduct by the respondents, or participation in criminal conduct by the respondents, which are expressed in a conclusory manner and without any material facts to support the allegations. It would cause unjustifiable oppression to the respondents to allow the claims made by Mr Huber to proceed.

45    Fourth, it is apparent that Mr Huber is aggrieved by the earlier proceedings brought against him by CellOS and, by this proceeding, is seeking to relitigate matters previously determined by the Court. The amended statement of claim is replete with references to affidavits he filed in those earlier proceedings. Further, and more significantly, the amended statement of claim complains about the judgments made in the earlier proceedings, including that:

(a)    Justice Beach fail to apply the “Briginshaw standard of objective evidence assessment” in proceeding VID951/2015, thereby causing him to reach incorrect conclusions;

(b)    Justice McElwaine also failed to apply the “Briginshaw standard and House v The King of objective evidence assessment of the 8 legal grounds of appeal leading him to reach incorrect conclusions” and “unfairly preventing due process” in proceedings VID458/2023 and VID545/2023;

(c)    Justices Anderson, McEvoy and Button also failed to apply the “Briginshaw standard and House v The King of objective evidence assessment of the 8 grounds leading them to reach incorrect conclusions” and “unfairly preventing due process” in proceeding VID404/2023;

(d)    the “failures to assess the 8 grounds articulated by the appellant even though they were central to the appeal, unfairly justified the incorrect conclusions by Justice Beach” in proceeding VID951/2015,

and describing the judgment in CellOS No 1 as an “incorrect verdict”.

46    The third and fourth factors referred to above render the proceeding an abuse of process. It would be unjustifiably oppressive to the respondents to allow it to continue and it constitutes a collateral attack on earlier decisions of this Court.

47    This is not a case in which Mr Huber should be given an opportunity to amend his pleading. Whilst Mr Huber is an unrepresented litigant, he was provided with pro bono assistance by counsel with respect to his originating application and pleading. Having received advice, Mr Huber elected not to amend his originating application or pleading, and pro bono counsel withdrew from the proceeding. It is apparent that Mr Huber is determined to maintain the claim in its present form. In the circumstances, and having regard to the serious and fundamental deficiencies in the originating application and the pleading, the interests of justice require that the proceeding be summarily dismissed.

48    Although the summary dismissal application was brought by Mr Singh, the fundamental flaws require that the proceeding be dismissed against all of the respondents. In the circumstances, it is appropriate that an order be made that Mr Huber pay the costs of each of the respondents.

Security for costs application

49    As an order will be made dismissing the proceeding, it is unnecessary to determine the security for costs application. However, the second and third respondents requested the Court to rule on their application, in case the matter should go further. In the circumstances, I will briefly consider the security for costs application and express my conclusions on that application.

50    The second and third respondents sought security for costs in the sum of $275,000 for the period until trial. Given the complexity and breadth of the claims made by Mr Huber, the amount sought by way of security is modest.

51    Mr Huber is resident in Malta. The evidence establishes that a costs order made against Mr Huber is unlikely to be satisfied. Mr Huber deposed in an affidavit made on 24 June 2026 that: he is unemployed and has no income; he has been living at his mother’s house in Malta since 1 December 2018; he relies upon financial assistance from his mother to meet his day to day living expenses; his only assets are $50 in cash and $1.45 in his bank account, as well as his clothing. Mr Huber exhibited copies of his Maltese tax statements over the course of three years from 2023 to 2025, which record no income. Mr Huber deposed that if the Court were to order security for costs in the sum of $275,000, he would be unable to provide the security and the proceeding could not continue.

52    The discretion conferred by s 56 of the FCA Act to award security for costs is broad and unfettered, the only limitation being that the discretion must be exercised judicially: Bell Wholesale Co. Ltd v Gates Export Corporation (1984) 2 FCR 1 (Bell Wholesale) at 3. It is a discretion to be exercised according to the merits of each case and without any particular predisposition: Bryan E Fencott & Associates Pty Ltd v Eretta Pty Ltd (1987) 16 FCR 497 at 511 per French J. The Court’s discretion is to be exercised having regard to whether the interests of justice would be best served by making or refusing the order: Gentry Brothers Pty Ltd v Wilson Brown & Associates Pty Ltd [1992] FCA 592; 8 ACSR 405 at 411 per Cooper J.

53    The applicable principles were summarised by Tamberlin J in Cooper v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 642 at [11] and [12]:

11     The Court has a wide discretion in relation to the grant of security for costs. There is no general rule because each case depends upon its own circumstances. In relation to an appeal, Courts have given weight to the injustice that might be caused to a successful litigant if the litigant is compelled to contest the matter for a second time without the probability of obtaining the costs if ultimately successful: Cowell v Taylor (1885) 31 Ch D 34 at 38. In Equity Access v Westpac Banking Corp (1989) ATPR 40 972, Hill J at 50,635 listed some of the relevant matters to be considered when deciding whether security for costs ought to be awarded:

•    the prospects of success;

•    the quantum of risk that a costs order will not be satisfied;

•    whether the making of an order would be oppressive in that it would stifle the reasonably arguable claim;

•    whether any impecuniosity of the appellants arises out of the conduct complained of;

•    whether there are aspects of public interest which weigh in the balance against such an order;

•    whether there are any particular discretionary matters peculiar to the circumstances of the case.

12     Although Courts will be reluctant to make an order for security for costs against a natural person on account of his or her impecuniosity, there is no general principle that prevents the making of such an order.

54    The fact that a party, bringing proceedings, is resident out of the jurisdiction and has no assets within the jurisdiction is a significant circumstance militating in favour of an order for security for costs: Commissioner of Taxation v Vasiliades [2016] FCAFC 170; 344 ALR 558 (Vasiliades) at [75] (Kenny and Edelman JJ); PS Chellaram & Co Ltd v China Ocean Shipping Co (1991) 102 ALR 321 at 323 (McHugh J).

55    In the present case, the fact that Mr Huber is impecunious and an order for security for costs is likely to stultify the proceeding are factors that weigh against an order being made. Against that, the fact that the proceeding has no reasonable prospects of success and Mr Huber resides overseas are factors that weigh in favour of ordering security.

56    In circumstances where I consider the proceeding to be fundamentally flawed and unjustifiably oppressive to the respondents, it is appropriate that Mr Huber be required to provide security for costs. If the proceeding were not to be dismissed, I would make an order for security as sought by the second and third respondents.

Conclusion

57    For the foregoing reasons, an order will be made dismissing the proceeding and for Mr Huber to pay the costs of the respondents.

Associate:

Dated: 4 August 2026