Federal Court of Australia

Ritter v Savills (Aust) Pty Ltd [2026] FCA 996

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The claims made in each of paragraphs 16.1, 16.2, 16.4, 16.5 and 16.7 of the statement of claim dated 14 July 2025 are permanently stayed.

2.    Save as ordered in order 1, the respondents' interlocutory application dated 8 April 2026 be dismissed.

3.    There be liberty to apply as to the costs of the interlocutory application.

4.    The applicant file and serve a substitute statement of claim in accordance with these reasons.

5.    Within 21 days of service of the substitute statement of claim the respondents do file and serve their defences.

6.    There be liberty to apply as to the further case management of the proceedings.

7.    The liberty reserved by these orders may be exercised by email to the associate to the case managing judge.

8.    Until 5.00 pm AWST on 4 August 2026 or further order, the reasons for judgment in respect of these orders shall remain confidential to the parties and their legal advisors.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

COLVIN J:

1    Ms Shelley Ritter worked for Savills, a property advisory business. She claims to have been subjected to sexual harassment, discrimination and victimisation during her employment. Her claims concern conduct alleged to have occurred between 2007 and 2019. Much of the alleged conduct is said to have been engaged in by Mr Graham Postma. He is said to have been the Group Managing Director for Western Australia from April 2016 and the National Head - Office Leasing from August 2018.

2    On 14 July 2025, Ms Ritter commenced proceedings in this Court against Savills (Aust) Pty Ltd and Savills (WA) Pty Ltd. They were said to be the entities responsible for the employees alleged to have engaged in the conduct the subject of the claims made by Ms Ritter. I will refer to the respondents as the Savills Entities. At times I will use the term Savills to refer to the business and to reflect the usage of the parties.

3    Ms Ritter seeks a declaration of unlawful discrimination, damages and costs. Her application is brought pursuant to s 46PO of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (AHRC Act) and alleges unlawful conduct contrary to the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth). It was preceded by a complaint to the Australian Human Rights Commission which was made against the Savills Entities by Ms Ritter on 6 February 2024.

Time limits and proceedings under s 46PO of the AHRC Act

4    Section 46PO of the AHRC Act allows for a proceeding alleging unlawful discrimination to be commenced in this Court where a complaint has been lodged with the Commission and the President of the Commission has terminated the complaint (and given notice of the termination): s 46PO(1). In some instances, leave is required to commence the proceeding. As Ms Ritter's complaint was terminated under s 46PH(1B)(b), she does not require leave to bring her application: see s 46PO(3A).

5    After the commencement of the proceedings, a mediation was ordered. It took place in March 2026 and was unsuccessful. The Savills Entities are yet to file their defence. They now bring an interlocutory application to dismiss the proceedings as an abuse of process. The application is brought pursuant to r 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) and the inherent power of the Court. The basis for the application is a claim that the bringing of the proceedings has been so delayed that they give rise to oppression or otherwise bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Where an application is brought on the basis that delay means the proceedings are an abuse of process and the application is successful, usually the appropriate order will be a permanent stay of the proceedings. An order in those terms reflects the fact that there has been no adjudication of the merits nor has there been a determination that there has been some affirmative conduct by the other party that gives rise to the abuse of process.

6    As to limitation periods, the President may terminate a complaint on the grounds that 'the complaint was lodged more than 24 months after the alleged acts, omissions or practices took place': s 46PH(1)(b). However, that power was not exercised by the President in the present instance.

7    In Baird v Queensland [2005] FCA 1516; (2005) 146 FCR 571, it was held that a cause of action of the kind exercised by Ms Ritter in the present case arises when the President terminates the relevant complaint to the Commission: at [7] (Dowsett J). That is because there was no entitlement to seek relief by application under s 46PH of the AHRC Act unless and until the complaint had been terminated by the President. There is an express statutory requirement for such applications to be commenced with 60 days after the date of issue of the notice of termination of the complaint (or within such further time as the Court allows): s 46PO(2). That requirement has been met by Ms Ritter.

8    In cases where leave is required to bring an application under s 46PH of the AHRC Act, the Court will take into account any delay in raising the allegations of unlawful discrimination when deciding whether to grant leave: Sivwright v St Ives Group Pty Ltd (No 2) [2023] FCA 1063 at [41] (Feutrill J). In the context of such applications, it has been observed that the discretion to grant leave must be exercised having regard to the statutory objective of s 46PH(1)(b), being the provision that empowers the President to terminate an application that was lodged more than a specified period after the occurrence of the matters complained of by the application (at that time the specified period was 12 months): Budini v Sunnyfield [2019] FCA 2164 at [55] (Charlesworth J). I note that in Budini the fact that the application was lodged outside the specified period was given as a reason for the termination of the complaint. More recently, in Rawson v South Metropolitan Health Service [2024] FCA 769 at [71], Horan J reasoned in the following way in dealing with an application for leave:

The delay in the present case is significant. The acts, omissions or practices giving rise to the alleged unlawful discrimination took place in around 2018, and the applicant did not lodge her complaint with the Commission until late October 2022. This is far in excess of the 24 month period contemplated by s 46PH(1)(b) of the AHRC Act. Recognising that this is not a limitation period in the strict sense, s 46PH(1)(b) nevertheless reflects a legislative policy that complaints of unlawful discrimination should be made promptly in the interests of certainty and to facilitate their conciliation and resolution.

9    However, these decisions on leave applications are made for the purposes of a particular statutory provision. Regard to the nature and terms of the legislation is expected when considering whether leave, as required by the legislation, should be given. As has been mentioned, in the present case, Ms Ritter does not require leave.

Relevant principles as to abuse of process

10    The issues raised by the present application do not concern the making of a decision for a particular statutory purpose. Rather, the Savills Entities seek to invoke procedural principles of general application that are concerned with the integrity and fairness of all court proceedings. Delay in bringing a complaint to the Commission (and consequently in the termination of that complaint) may mean that the proceedings are an abuse of process: Eliezer v University of Sydney [2015] FCA 1045; (2015) 239 FCR 381 at [60]-[66] (Perry J). Indeed, in any proceeding, delay in institution may mean that proceedings are an abuse of process even though they are commenced within a limitation period: Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales [2006] HCA 27; (2006) 226 CLR 256 at [61]-[65] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ).

11    As was explained in Batistatos at [64]-[65]:

The truth is that limitation periods operate by reference to temporal limits which are indifferent to the presence or absence of lapses of time which may merit the term 'delay'.

The 'right' of the plaintiff with a common law claim to institute an action is not at large. It is subject to the operation of the whole of the applicable procedural and substantive law administered by the court, whose processes are enlivened in the particular circumstances. This includes the principles respecting abuse of process.

12    The same may be said of the statutory application brought by Ms Ritter. The question whether there has been delay of a kind that means the proceedings amount to an abuse of process is not to be determined by reference to the power conferred upon the President as to the circumstances in which a complaint may be terminated. Rather, it depends upon the consequences for the party called upon to answer the application. As a matter of procedural law, no party may be called upon to answer a claim if the bringing of that claim is an abuse of process of a kind that cannot be ameliorated by some form of procedural order. That is so, even where the application is brought within any applicable limitation period (or where there is no applicable limitation). It is to that procedural law that there must be regard in considering the application by the Savills Entities, not the 24 month period referred to in the AHRC Act.

13    As to the circumstances in which a stay of proceedings will be ordered on the basis of abuse of process, in Willmott v Queensland [2024] HCA 42 at [15] (Gageler CJ, Gordon, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ), the summary by Bell P in Moubarak by his tutor Coorey v Holt [2019] NSWCA 102; (2019) 100 NSWLR 218 at [71] of the principles relating to a permanent stay of proceedings were approved. They are (references omitted):

(1)     the onus of proving that a permanent stay of proceedings should be granted lies squarely on a defendant …

(2)     a permanent stay should only be ordered in exceptional circumstances …

(3)     a permanent stay should be granted when the interests of the administration of justice so demand …

(4)     the categories of cases in which a permanent stay may be ordered are not closed …

(5)     one category of case where a permanent stay may be ordered is where the proceedings or their continuance would be vexatious or oppressive …

(6)     the continuation of proceedings may be oppressive if that is their objective effect …

(7)     proceedings may be oppressive where their effect is 'seriously and unfairly burdensome, prejudicial or damaging' …

(8)     proceedings may be stayed on a permanent basis where their continuation would be manifestly unfair to a party …, and

(9)     proceedings may be stayed on a permanent basis where their continuation would bring the administration of justice into disrepute amongst right-thinking people …

14    As their Honours then explained at [16]-[17] (footnotes omitted):

The relevant inquiry is whether any prospective trial will be unfair or so unfairly and unjustifiably oppressive as to constitute an abuse of process. If a fair trial can be held and will not be so unfairly and unjustifiably oppressive as to constitute an abuse of process, a court ordinarily has a duty to hear and decide the case. If the trial will be necessarily unfair, a stay must be ordered.

The extreme step of granting a permanent stay demands recognition that the question of whether a trial will necessarily be unfair or so unfairly and unjustifiably oppressive as to constitute an abuse of process admits of only one correct answer. The evaluative inquiry in each case is unique and highly fact-sensitive. The correct answer in each case turns on its own facts and requires separate consideration of each claim – its nature, content, and the available evidence.

(Emphasis added and footnotes omitted).

15    The required focus is upon the right to a fair trial that is deeply rooted in the common law: Willmott at [24]. What is fair will depend on the circumstances of the particular case: at [25]. A stay is a last resort and requires an exceptional case. 'An exceptional case will remain one in which it is impossible for the irreducible minimum necessary for a fair trial to be satisfied. The irreducible minimum required to enable a fair trial is not an absolute or immutable concept; it is a conclusion about the individual case that is reached having regard to the statutory context and to the specific circumstances of the case': at [26].

16    It was submitted for the Savills Entities that the approach in Willmot was driven by the radical context of amendments to the relevant Limitation Act to permit historical child sexual abuse allegations. To the extent that the High Court was concerned with the consequences of those amendments, that submission may be accepted. However, there is no indication in Willmot that it involved the application of different principles. Rather, those were contextual matters of significance in that particular case. The question remained whether those matters meant that it was in the category of exceptional instances where any trial would be so oppressive and unfair that a permanent stay was necessary to prevent an abuse of process.

17    Consequently, it is necessary to have regard to the nature of the claims advanced by Ms Ritter's application, the reasons advanced by the Savills Entities as to why they say that any prospective trial of the application will be unfair and unjustifiably oppressive and whether those reasons mean that the 'irreducible minimum necessary for a fair trial' of Ms Ritter's application is not possible. As the reasons advanced by the Savills Entities relate, in part, to the course of events that has preceded the bringing of the application, it is necessary to have an understanding of the relevant chronology. Finally, the evaluation to be undertaken as to whether any trial would be unfair and unjustifiably oppressive must be by reference to each claim advanced.

The nature of Ms Ritter's claims

18    For present purposes, the claims raised by Ms Ritter's application can be described in general terms. They are disclosed by a statement of claim that has been filed in the proceedings. As has been mentioned, the claims concern Ms Ritter's employment at Savills. She says that she started her employment at Savills in 2007.

19    The statement of claim contains a detailed list of 'particulars' to support her claim. They are appended to paragraph 16 of the pleading. They are set out chronologically and contain some 49 allegations. Speaking generally, they are serious allegations as to things said or done to Ms Ritter by other employees of Savills that were of a sexual nature or that involved discrimination based on her sex. There are also some allegations of victimisation. The claims are very specific as to what is alleged to have occurred. For the most part they identify those involved and provide dates. Many of the allegations are of sexual comments or actions that would be obviously unwelcome. Others are of specific acts said to be discriminatory.

2007 to 2012

20    The claims begin with specific claims concerning the conduct of Mr Postma between 2007 and 2011 (allegations 1 to 5). Then there is a claim based on an email said to have been sent to Ms Ritter on 13 April 2012 (allegation 6). [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (allegation 7).

2015

21    There is a claim based upon a series of emails said to have been sent by Mr Postma to Ms Ritter in February 2015 (allegation 8). There is a claim about the way Ms Ritter was treated by Mr Postma and another employee during a business trip in New Zealand in August 2015 (allegation 9).

2016

22    There is a claim about the conduct of another employee's behaviour towards Ms Ritter from 2016 (allegation 10). There is then a series of allegations about the way Ms Ritter is said to have been treated by Mr Postma as to workload, in office conversations and as to her use of a car bay in 2016 and as to her entitlement to annual leave (allegations 11 to 14).

2017

23    There is an allegation that in February 2017, Savills informed Ms Ritter that she would not be getting Profit Share and that she did not receive Profit Share (allegation 15). Ms Ritter says that in April 2017 her annual leave was substantially reduced (allegation 16). There is an allegation as to what is said to have occurred at an office Christmas party in December 2017 (allegation 17). There is a claim that a specific comment was made by Mr Postma to Ms Ritter in December 2017 (allegation 18).

2018 and 2019

24    There are claims that from 2018 there were objections by Mr Postma without explanation to Ms Ritter using a car bay (allegations 19).

25    There are claims that Mr Postma verbally abused Ms Ritter on various occasions from 2018 (allegations 20, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 33, 35). There is an allegation that in about September 2018, another employee shouted and berated Ms Ritter in a meeting room (allegation 24).

26    There is an allegation about an invitation said to have been extended to Ms Ritter in May 2018 (allegation 21).

27    There is a complaint that that Mr Postma and others regularly avoided and shunned Ms Ritter (allegation 22).

28    There are allegations that Mr Postma and another employee repeatedly commented about Ms Ritter's sexual relationship with her former partner (allegation 23). There is an allegation of a sexualised comment being made by Mr Postma to Ms Ritter in December 2018 (allegation 32). There is also an allegation of a demeaning sexual comment being made about Ms Ritter by one Savills' employee to another on 28 March 2019 (allegation 43).

29    There are allegations about discrimination in approving business expenses for Ms Ritter (allegation 31 and 34).

30    There is a claim about Mr Postma excluded Ms Ritter from his acknowledgment of women in a speech to Savills' Perth employees for International Women's Day (allegation 41).

Complaints and response

31    There is a claim that on 7 February 2019, Ms Ritter notified an employee of Savills that she intended to complain to Savills' Sydney office about the unlawful conduct of employees (allegation 36).

32    There are claims that in 2019, steps were taken by Mr Postma and others to pressure Ms Ritter to accept a redundancy or otherwise leave (allegations 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 45).

33    There is an allegation that Savills pressured another employee not to support Ms Ritter (allegation 44).

34    There are allegations about the process followed by Savills in relation to her grievances (allegations 46, 47 and 49).

Alleged consequences

35    The statement of claim includes details of allegedly serious consequences for Ms Ritter's mental health, of physical symptoms and of the financial consequences of the alleged conduct towards Ms Ritter. Issues are raised as to alleged discrimination in the remuneration paid to Ms Ritter compared to male employees within Savills.

Reasons advanced by Savills as to why there cannot now be a fair trial of Ms Ritter's claims

36    Savills relied upon the following matters to support its claim that a trial of Ms Ritter's claims would be so unfair and oppressive as to be an abuse of process.

37    First, the period the subject of the claims. The acts, omissions and practices the subject of her application were said to have occurred between April 2007 and December 2019.

38    Second, the delay in bringing the claims. As to delay by Ms Ritter in bringing her claims, it was said that Ms Ritter 'said nothing' about her claims until 7 February 2019 and chose not to commence any proceedings in respect of her allegations until 6 February 2024.

39    Third, the consequences for Savills' ability to obtain information from its employees. Of the 17 employees identified in Ms Ritter's statement of claim, it was said that only six are still employed by Savills. The whereabouts of six of the former employees are said to be unknown. One employee has passed away. It was said that Mr Postma, being 'one of the main people that allegations are made against', has left the business of Savills. It was not said when this occurred. There was also no evidence as to the extent to which Savills had been able to speak to Mr Postma about the allegations made by Ms Ritter.

40    It was also submitted for the Savills Entities that it may be anticipated that there would be a diminution in the enthusiasm of a person wanting to get involved in a case concerning old events when they have moved on from a business.

41    Fourth, there can be no certainty as to whether documentary records are complete. There was evidence as to what had occurred in relation to Savills' records. However, ultimately, in oral submissions, Savills' contention did not give the issue of documentary records a lot of weight. Rather, their focus was upon the need for oral evidence, the difficulties with being able to speak to those involved and issues with resolving matters on oral evidence (as to which, see Savills' fifth point below). I regard the submissions concerned with the consequences of the passage of time for access to documentary records to be unpersuasive of any real prejudice given that most of the allegations concern allegations as to what was said and done. Where documents are identified as the basis for the allegations, it was not explained how the passage of time may make it difficult to respond to those specific allegations.

42    Fifth, the nature of the allegations is such that they are unlikely to be supported by records and they will need to be resolved on oral evidence. There were two aspects to this submission. The first was to the effect that the effect of delay on the availability and reliability of oral testimony was insidious and would operate in a way that was unfair to Savills. The second was that it could be inferred that, in a number of instances, the alleged conduct took place at events where alcohol was being consumed. These were matters that were said to have particular significance by reason of the seriousness of the allegations.

43    Sixth, the nature of the allegations meant that context is important. Savills' submitted that in assessing whether conduct 'crossed the line' and amounts to sexual harassment or sexual discrimination or victimisation, the Court is required to be properly informed of context which can be lost in looking at old events.

44    Savills accepted in general terms that a factor to be taken into account was the fact that it had notice of the allegations, at least to the extent that the notice enabled it to take steps to collect and preserve relevant evidence. However, it resisted the contention advanced by Ms Ritter that notice had been given of the allegations in 2019.

45    As to whether the Court might exclude some of the older allegations, it was suggested for the Savills Entities that the allegations are interlinked and build a narrative of a course of conduct which has been referred to in the correspondence as a 'Boys Club'. It was said to be artificial to try and disentangle them. It appears to be the case that the allegations are advanced on the basis that they indicate a long-standing culture within Savills. However, that is not to say that the forensic burden of meeting all of the allegations is interlinked. No doubt, if some are accepted to have occurred that may lend support to claims that are said to have occurred at a different time, especially where they involve the same actors. However, the nature of most of Ms Ritter's claims is that they identify an event or action that is said to have occurred at a particular time with particular identified individuals involved. The case does not involve a course of conduct in the sense that it is necessary to put together a whole series of events in order to determine whether the legislation has been contravened. For the most part, each alleged action falls to be evaluated as a distinct act of alleged contravention. It is only when it comes to the allegations of discrimination in remuneration and Savills' response to the grievances being raised by Ms Ritter that there is any real interlinking between allegations. Those matters concern more recent events (albeit that it appears that they are said to have occurred in 2018 and 2019).

46    Reliance was placed by the Savills Entities upon the views expressed by McHugh JA (Street CJ and Priestley JA agreeing) in Herron v McGregor (1986) 6 NSWLR 246 at 254-5, a case concerned with disciplinary complaints brought against two medical practitioners. The allegations of misconduct depended on proof of acts and omissions which allegedly occurred in the years 1973, 1976 and 1977. The first of the complaints was brought in 1982, with further complaints in 1983, 1985 and 1986. A leading exponent of the therapy method in issue on the complaints dies in 1985. I consider the reasoning in that case to be an example of a particular instance where a stay of proceedings was ordered. Its circumstances are far removed from the present case and provide no basis for reasoning by analogy or on the basis that the circumstances were similar to the present case.

The chronology of Ms Ritter's complaints being raised with Savills

47    As to the chronology of Ms Ritter's complaints, I make the following findings for the purposes of the interlocutory application based on the affidavit material. Principally, the findings are based on documents in evidence on the application and the conclusions that may be reached from those documents for present purposes.

48    On 10 April 2019, Ms Ritter provided a document that she described as 'a brief outline of some of the most pressing issues of my formal grievances'. It concluded with the following:

I also believe the treatment and discrimination I have been subject to over the course of my employment with Savills is reflective of larger cultural problems that are ingrained within the company and that are routinely ignored and not addressed. I am fully prepared to provide more information and specific examples that relate to this issue, but I would need more time than has been allocated in order to adequately cover it.

49    On each of 25 April 2019 and 28 June 2019, Ms Ritter provided further documents to Savills with more detailed grievances relating to her employment.

50    On 2 July 2019, a WorkCover certificate was issued for Ms Ritter which identified her injury as 'Repetitive harassment, bullying & psychological abuse' with onset from mid-2016.

51    A fortnight later, Savills sent the following letter to Ms Ritter:

As you are aware. Savills is conduction [sic] a workplace investigation based on a number of grievances you have raised on the 11 April 2019, 24 April 2019 and 28 June 2019.

I acknowledge receipt of your medical certificate sent to me on 10 July 2019 confirming you have no capacity to work from 2 July 2019 to 2 August 2019 inclusive. This letter is to advise that due to your extended personal leave Savills has placed the open workplace investigation on hold. As you are unable to actively part take [sic] in this open investigation the business feels it would be procedurally unfair to continue the investigation without your involvement and input.

Savills will resume the investigation upon receiving clearance from your medical practitioner confirming you are fit to actively participate in this matter.

52    Ms Ritter provided a detailed statement to Savills on 6 November 2020 (WC Statement).

53    On 15 March 2021, solicitors acting for Ms Ritter sent a detailed letter to Savills which set out claims that she made against Savills. The letter noted that the formal grievance procedure was on hold, but the letter dealt with claims to be made outside that procedure. It included a summary which began as follows:

Our client experienced extreme and repetative [sic] sexual harrassment [sic], bullying and general discrimination in her time with Savills. The sheer breadth and duration of the misconduct throughout the organisation, over some approximate 12 years from 2007 to 2019, illustrate a culture that not only permits, but condones, such conduct at a time when recent movements and exposure has sharpened corporate Australia's focus on such matters and prompted widespread change to attitudes, culture and behaviours towards women in the workplace. Unfortunately, the detail set out below illustrates that sexual harrassment [sic], discrimination and bullying are unfortunately still a common occurrence and endemic throughout the organisation.

The misconduct Shelley was exposed to ranged from explicit sexual harrassment [sic] to pay discrimination…

The majority of the misconduct included, was instigated by, and implictly [sic] condoned by, Shelley's direct boss, the National Head of Office Leasing and State Managing Director, Graham Postma.

54    The letter went on to provide very specific details of the alleged conduct and listed a chronology which included many, perhaps most, of the allegations particularised in the statement of claim in the present proceedings (to which refence has already been made).

55    Savills appointed solicitors to act on its behalf in relation to the claims communicated by the solicitor's letter. They are the solicitors who have conduct of the present proceedings for the Savills Entities.

56    In July 2021, Ms Ritter requested that the grievance investigation by Savills be taken off hold.

57    In August 2021, the solicitors for Savills wrote to the solicitors for Ms Ritter and provided an 'update in relation to Savills' responses to the numerous matters raised by Ms Ritter to date'. As to next steps in relation to the grievance procedure, the letter concluded:

Savills' next step is to inquire in to the balance of Ms Ritter's allegations. To assist it in doing so, we would be grateful if you could confirm the following matters:

1.     First, that the Grievance does not make any new allegations against Messrs POSTMA or SMITH (i.e. allegations not made in the WC Statement). If that understanding is not correct, please let us know, and confirm the extent to which new allegations were intended to be made.

2.     Second, that the Grievance represents a comprehensive record of the allegations Ms Ritter wishes to make about Savills current and former employees. As you will appreciate, an inquiry may be frustrated if allegations are added, withdrawn or re-cast.

58    In September 2021, Ms Ritter's solicitor confirmed that she was willing to attend a medical examination. As to the inquiry as to the extent of the allegations, Ms Ritter's solicitors said:

As regards your questions as to the grievance process and the allegations being limited to those already named, we advise that the allegations raised so far relate only to those persons against whom our client has corroborative independent third party or documentary evidence.

There are other matters that our client can discuss with the investigator directly, and potentially other matters that she may remember at a later date/may be triggered by the investigation. However, we confirm her aim is to be as open and expansive as possible about what has occurred to her. Our client is aware that the more information that she can provide, the more complete the investigation can be.

59    In the following months there were discussions between solicitors about arrangements for a mediation. It appears that also the possibility of a complaint by Ms Ritter to the Commission was raised. On 19 May 2022 there was an exchange of emails between the solicitors as to those arrangements. The solicitors for Ms Ritter sent the following email:

I confirm my client is happy to have workers comp included in the mediation.

As regards the AHRC Complaint:

1.     The Complaint is a last resort.

2.     Provided that Savills agrees not to raise delay or failure to comply with time limits as an objection in any AHRC proceedings which are commenced within a reasonable time after the conclusion of the mediation (say 14 days) Shelley is prepared to postpone filing her Complaint until the outcome of the mediation is known.

3.     Shelley's claim for legal costs will include the costs of preparation of the Complaint to date.

4.     I will send you an advance copy of the Complaint in the next day or so in any event so you are aware of the contents.

60    The solicitors for Savills responded in the following terms:

In relation to your point 1, our client agrees that the commencement of proceedings is a last resort. Being last, it necessarily comes after mediation. For the avoidance of doubt, your client commencing proceedings or otherwise publicising the subject matter of her allegations would significantly impair the quantum of any settlement offer our client might be minded to make at mediation (or at all).

We confirm that our client is not in a position to make the concession sought in your point 2. Again, we caution against your client commencing proceedings or otherwise publicising the subject matter of her allegations before mediation.

61    The response really had a bet each way. Plainly, it sought to dissuade Ms Ritter from making any complaint to the Commission or from otherwise making her claims public (such as by commencing court proceedings) until after the conclusion of the mediation. Yet, at the same time, it did not communicate agreement to the proposed standstill when it came to any complaint to the Commission.

62    On 23 May 2022, the solicitors for Ms Ritter sent to the solicitors for Savills a draft of a complaint to the Commission. The email attaching the draft included the following:

Our client will hold off filing until after the mediation on the basis that, as per your email, your client cautions against it and noting that that suggests it may negatively impact on the mediation, so in good faith we will hold off until after the mediation to give the best opportunity for resolution.

63    A private mediation took place on 31 May 2022. It was unsuccessful.

64    A second private mediation with a different mediator took place on 25 October 2023. It too was unsuccessful.

65    Ms Ritter's complaint to the Commission was made on 6 February 2024. It included an extremely detailed statement from Ms Ritter with numerous attachments. The complaint was terminated on 14 May 2025. Two months later the present proceedings were commenced in this Court. A Court ordered mediation held in March 2026 was unsuccessful.

66    As I have explained, Ms Ritter's claims in the present proceedings arise from the termination of her complaint to the Commission. It was necessary for her to make that complaint and conclude the Commission process before she could raise any claim in this Court. There is no suggestion that her conduct during the process conducted by the Commission caused or contributed to any delay in that process.

67    For the purposes of the interlocutory application, the solicitor with the conduct of the matter for Savills prepared a 'Table of allegations' that he described as listing all of the factual allegations in the statement of claim and identifying when (in his view) Savills was first notified of the claim.

68    What is apparent from that document is that the gravamen of the allegations, expressed with considerable detail, were notified to Savills in 2019. Those allegations included the earliest of the allegations in 2007. Significantly, taking the Table of allegations at face value, it indicated that in 2019, Savills had been given very considerable detail about allegations concerning the conduct of Mr Postma and other employees which, if true, indicated a culture of discriminatory sexist behaviour of a serious kind (described in some of the correspondence from the solicitors for Ms Ritter as a 'Boys Club') that had prevailed for a considerable period of time and had involved a number of serious incidents where such conduct was directed towards Ms Ritter.

69    I regard the further allegations that were not expressly included in the grievance materials provided in 2019 as providing additional details in support of a broader claim that had been expressed in sufficient detail in 2019 to put Savills on notice of the nature of the case that is now advanced and the principal actors involved.

70    Further allegations that were of a similar nature were notified in 2020. They were consistent with the notifications that had been given in 2019. Later notifications tended to be related to providing further details of Ms Ritter's case that she had been financially disadvantaged by discrimination in her remuneration compared to male employees of Savills.

71    Ms Ritter took issue with some of the dates recorded in the Table of allegations. She also claims to have raised her concerns more informally at earlier times. It is the case that the Table of allegations does not refer to the notification effected by the letter from Ms Ritter's solicitors to Savills of 15 March 2021 which listed many of the claims in similar terms to their expression in the statement of claim. However, for reasons that will emerge, it is not necessary to address the points raised by Ms Ritter. That is principally because of the nature and extent of the notification that occurred in 2019.

72    Finally, the Savills Entities placed reliance upon the terms of a letter dated 29 November 2023, sent by their solicitors to the solicitors acting for Ms Ritter. Within the chronology, it was sent shortly after the failure of the second mediation, but before Ms Ritter lodged her complaint with the Commission in February the following year. It did not paint an accurate picture of the state of affairs between the parties at that time. It began by advancing the following summary as part of the 'Background':

Since the commencement of her absence - that is, for almost four-and-a-half years - Ms Ritter has threatened to commence proceedings in respect of the Allegations (including in the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC), the Federal Court of Australia (FCA), or both). But she has not done so.

The Allegations may now be described as historical. They date back as far as 16-and-a-half years. Even the most recent allegations are the better part of five years old. Despite this, Ms Ritter has - for reasons that are hers alone - not commenced proceedings.

The purpose of this letter is to place Ms Ritter on notice of the consequences of her delay. These consequences include that any proceeding that she now chooses to bring in respect of the Allegations will be liable to dismissal (including as an abuse of process).

73    It was not correct to say that the failure to commence proceedings was for reasons that were attributable to Ms Ritter alone. As I have explained, the Savills Entities participated in two mediations and did so after encouraging Ms Ritter not to lodge a complaint with the Commission or otherwise take steps to make matters public.

74    The letter went on to say:

Savills has no confidence that Ms Ritter in fact intends to commence proceedings. If she does, then she will do so after a delay that is entirely attributable to her.

In your most recent email on the subject, which we received on 14 November 2023 at 3.35 pm, you confirmed your instructions that Ms Ritter intended to commence proceedings and that the delay in doing so was attributable to her preparing 'proper court ready witness statements'. There was no explanation why it has taken around four-and-a-half years to prepare those documents. Nor can there be any reasonable excuse for such a protracted delay.

75    For reasons that have been given, I regard the delay to be explained and not to be entirely attributable to Ms Ritter. The letter went on to refer to five matters that were said to give rise to prejudice to Savills by reason of alleged delay,

76    The first matter referred to was a general statement that all delay causes prejudice 'in the insidious sense'. That is not the issue. As I have explained, the issue is whether any prospective trial will now be unfair or so unfairly and unjustifiably oppressive as to constitute an abuse of process. It is necessary to consider whether in the particular circumstances of the individual case there are reasons why the delay means that a trial of the claims would be so unfair as to amount to an abuse of process.

77    The second matter was expressed as follows:

…the passage of time is prejudicial because of the effect it has on witness recollection. This prejudice is all the more in the present case because Ms Ritter has indicated that she intends to make very specific factual allegations involving discrete events witnessed by small numbers of people.

78    Expressed in those terms, it rather suggests that the specific nature of the allegations as already notified to the Savills Entities means that the allegations will be difficult to address. As I explain below, the details given and the discrete nature of the events alleged means that the nature of the claims has been known to the Savills Entities in a form that could be considered and investigated and that has been the position for a considerable period of time. The implication from the statement in the letter seems to be that the Savills Entities have not taken any steps to investigate those allegations despite their seriousness and the fact that the Savills Entities have participated in two mediations. That seems most unlikely, especially as Savills may be expected to have participated in the two mediations on an informed basis. In any event, there is no evidence on the interlocutory application to that effect.

79    The third matter raised is a claim that the majority of people said by Ms Ritter to be involved in the alleged conduct 'are no longer employed by Savills'. Expressed in those terms the claims fail to engage with the fact that most of the allegations concern things said and done by Mr Postma and a few other employees. That is, not all potential witnesses could be said to have the same significance for whether a trial would be unfair or oppressive. Further, as I explain below, the Savills Entities has been aware of the allegations for some time. It may be expected that investigations would have been undertaken, at least by speaking with the key individuals.

80    The fourth matter raised is alleged to be 'the availability of documentary evidence' which was said to be jeopardised 'because records tend to be moved and are not retained indefinitely'. Again, there are no specifics and, in any event, this aspect was not pressed as having significance for the outcome of the interlocutory application.

81    The final matter raised is some allegedly prejudicial effect because of a change to the costs regime under the AHRC Act, being a matter not now advanced in support of the interlocutory application.

82    In short, the matters raised in the letter did not reflect the actual circumstances, did not engage with the principles or are no longer pressed.

Would there be unfairness or unjustifiable oppression to the Savills Entities if the case was to proceed

83    In the above circumstances, I regard the Savills Entities as being on notice since June 2019 as to the nature of the claims made by Ms Ritter, their seriousness and the principal alleged actors. Although it was reasonable to defer any further engagement with Ms Ritter as part of a formal investigation into her allegations until medical advice was received as to her fitness to participate in a process of that kind, that was not a reason why Savills might be expected to take no action by way of inquiry into what were serious allegations of sustained discrimination within the Savills office in Perth. It may be expected that notifications would have been made to insurers and, given the legal obligations of employers in relation to discrimination laws, that appropriate investigation would have occurred.

84    Further, I do not regard the attempts to both discourage Ms Ritter from pursuing her complaints in the Commission whilst, at the same time, maintaining that Savills might subsequently raise delay in bringing those claims to be an effective foundation for Savills to now object to the delay between 2019 and 2024 (when the complaint was made to the Commission). On the evidence, Savills sought to dissuade Ms Ritter from commencing any complaint process or from taking any steps that would result in a publication of her complaints. Savills did so in its own interests and for the purpose of exploring mediation between the parties. The solicitors for Ms Ritter explained the basis upon which they were deferring making any complaint, namely to increase the prospects of the parties reaching agreement. The Savills Entities then participated in the mediations that followed. They were a party to the consequent delay. It is a delay about which they cannot reasonably complain as a basis for unfairness or oppression, especially in circumstances where, as I have explained, the Savills Entities were on notice as to the character of the claims, including as to relevant details, from June 2019.

85    For those reasons, I do not regard the delay between June 2019 and the commencement of proceedings in this Court as being delay of a kind that might be said to result in the trial of the claims made in the present proceedings being unfair or oppressive. That is because Savills has been on notice of the claims since June 2019. It has been in a position to take forensic steps in its own interests to investigate those claims. Given Savills' legal obligations, it would be expected to undertake those forensic steps. Since June 2019, it has participated in three mediations and the complaint process before the Commission. It may be expected that in order to do so it has undertaken investigations and taken advice to be able to make an assessment as to whether it has any liability. Significantly, Savills does not submit that it was unable to undertake investigations at that time (nor does it say, in terms, that it did not do so).

86    Therefore, in considering whether the present proceedings will involve unfairness or oppression to Savills it is necessary to focus upon the period before June 2019 and to do so on the basis of the notice that had been given by June 2019.

87    I will begin by addressing the submissions advanced by the Savills Entities concerning the availability of witnesses.

Availability of witnesses

88    As to the alleged issues in obtaining statements from witnesses, it is apparent that almost all of the allegations attribute contravening conduct to Mr Postma. There are serious allegations involving the alleged conduct of other employees, but most of the claim concerns Mr Postma. It is the case that the statement of claim identifies some 17 employees of Savills who are then referred to in the statement of claim. However, most of those references are for the purposes of identifying what is alleged to have been said or done by Mr Postma and a few other employees. There was no evidence to suggest that there may be an inability or unwillingness on the part of those key employees to speak to those acting for Savills. Given the nature of the allegations, it would be expected that they would be motivated to do so.

89    Otherwise, there was no attempt to articulate the evidence that particular individuals may be able to give and why it was said to be of particular significance for defending the allegations made by Ms Ritter. In some instances, the nature of the allegations indicated that the evidence of the witness would not be of particular significance.

90    For example, an issue was raised about the inability to locate a Ms Ishibashi. The only allegation made in the statement of claim that referred to Ms Ishibashi was as follows:

In December 2018, Graham Postma verbally abused the Applicant for allowing Dhyana Ishibashi to work from home.

91    An allegation of that kind does not identify Ms Ishibashi as a person who may be a relevant witness. The reference to Ms Ishibashi is simply the means to identify the matter about which Mr Postma is alleged to have abused Ms Ritter.

92    Further, the allegations about discrimination in pay and other terms require evidence to be given about the remuneration and other conditions within Savills. On the evidence led on the interlocutory application those arrangements were informal. Nevertheless, it may be expected that there are a number of possible witnesses as to those matters. Put another way, it was not explained why Savills would be unable to lead evidence as to those matters from a competent witness due to the passage of time.

93    Finally, there was evidence that a Mr Carpinelli (who had been Savills' National Head of Asset Management) is now deceased. There was no submission as to the particular nature or significance of the evidence that he may have been able to give in answer to Ms Ritter's claims. The only reference in the statement of claim to Mr Carpinelli is that Ms Ritter says that in October 2018, she informed Mr Carpinelli about the issues she was experiencing with Mr Postma. However, that aspect of the claim is advanced to support an allegation that no action was taken in relation to Ms Ritter's complaints when they were raised within Savills. It does not concern whether the alleged events occurred. As the submissions for Savills accepted, the allegations raise serious matters. The allegations concern employees who are alleged to have held senior roles. It was not explained why, in those circumstances, the allegations in relation to the conduct continuing after complaints had been raised were of particular significance for the defence of the claims by Savills. In particular, it was not explained whether the issues in the case concern whether the conduct occurred or whether it was not known to management.

94    Therefore, I consider the submissions advanced as to the number of witnesses and the possible significance of their evidence to be expressed at a level of generality that did not demonstrate the required unfairness or oppression to sustain the relief sought by the Savills Entities on their interlocutory application.

The claims concerning alleged events between 2016 and 2019

95    As to the period before 2019, I regard the allegations as to events that had occurred in the three years prior to the time Ms Ritter raised her grievances to be a period for which there is no basis for concern as to fairness or oppression in requiring Savills to respond to the allegations made. As I have explained, Savills knew of the nature of the allegations it had to meet in 2019. It may reasonably be expected that investigations undertaken at that time could have obtained information from those alleged to have been involved, particularly Mr Postma and other main actors, as to events that had occurred over the three previous years. It is not suggested that they were not available at that time.

The claims concerning alleged events in 2015

96    As to allegations of matters that were said to have occurred before 2016, there are the allegations as to what was said to have occurred at a business trip to New Zealand that is said to have taken place in August 2015. Those allegations concern Mr Postma and another employee. They concern things that are alleged to have been said by each of them and certain things that were done. The allegations are specific. They were raised by Ms Ritter in her statement of grievances provided to Savills in June 2019. If they occurred, they would be memorable unless they were common practice. If they could not be remembered because they were events of a kind that occurred on other occasions then that, in and of itself, would be significant. Therefore, they are matters about which those to whom the allegations are directed might be expected to have a recollection. For those reasons, I am not persuaded that it would be unfair or oppressive to require Savills to answer those allegations at a trial in these proceedings.

97    The only other allegation as to matters said to have occurred in 2015 concerns the sending of a stream of emails. As the claim is based upon the alleged contents of documents, I do not regard that aspect of Ms Ritter's claims to be unfair or oppressive. It was not suggested that there may be an issue as to the authenticity of the documents relied upon to support the allegation.

The claims concerning alleged events in 2012

98    As has been mentioned, there are two allegations as to events in 2012. One concerns the alleged contents of an email. I regard the issues raised as to whether the sending of the email was harassment or discrimination to turn on the contents of the email and matters that are likely to be uncontentious as to the role of those to whom the email was sent and, hence, the consequences for Ms Ritter. Again, no authenticity issue was suggested.

99    The second allegation is in a different category. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. The employee is a person who, on the evidence, there is no information about his current whereabouts. On the evidence, it was more than six years later that Ms Ritter made that specific allegation. In circumstances where Savills would be deprived of being able to answer that allegation by leading evidence from the employee concerned, I am persuaded that it would be unfair to allow the case to proceed as to that allegation.

The claims concerning alleged events in 2007 to 2011

100    Of the allegations that relate to the years 2007 to 2011, all but one concern Mr Postma. One concerns an email. The observations I have made as to a claim based upon the contents of an email apply to that claim. Otherwise, the allegations concern oral statements that are attributed to Mr Postma. They are very specific. In certain respects, the allegations are of events that would be expected to be very memorable. The detail means that the forensic task in addressing them will depend upon the recollection of Mr Postma. Given the extent of the allegations concerning his conduct, he is a person who may be expected to have an interest in giving evidence. Nevertheless, the passage of time between when the events are alleged to have occurred and the time when the complaints were raised (being more than 10 years) gives rise to the very real likelihood that a trial of those complaints would be unfair. Each allegation is advanced as a separate claim of contravention. Given the very considerable time that has passed since the alleged conduct, I am persuaded that it would be an abuse of process to allow those complaints to proceed.

Conclusion and orders

101    It follows that, of the allegations made, there are five complaints in respect of which there should be a permanent stay. They are allegations 1, 2, 4, 5 and 7. There should be an order limited to those complaints. Otherwise, the interlocutory application should be dismissed. I will reserve liberty to apply as to the costs of the interlocutory application. To reflect that order, I will require the filing of a substitute statement of claim that excludes those allegations. As indicated in the course of oral submissions on the interlocutory application, it is not appropriate for the key allegations to be pleaded as particulars because there is no formal requirement to plead to particulars by way of defence. The allegations to which I have referred are all pleaded as particulars to paragraph 16 of the statement of claim. The substitute statement of claim should also plead each of those allegations as material facts to ensure there is a proper joinder of issues on the filing of defences (to the extent that they have not been permanently stayed and are to be pressed).

102    There was previously an order requiring the filing of defences. It required them to be filed within 28 days of the conclusion of the Court ordered mediation. The interlocutory application was brought on the day on which the Savills Entities would otherwise have been required to file and serve their defences. Accordingly, it is appropriate for an order to be made as to the time for filing those defences. In the circumstances, I will order the defences to be filed within 21 days of the filing of the substitute statement of claim.

103    Finally, as at the time of publication of these reasons, there is a pending interlocutory application by the Savills Entities for certain court documents filed in these proceedings to remain confidential. It is listed to be heard on 4 August 2026. Pending the hearing of that interlocutory application, the documents are not able to be inspected. In the circumstances, these reasons will only be made available to the parties. Any application by the Savills Entities for restrictions on disclosure of these reasons (or any part of them) should be notified to the Court and Ms Ritter by noon on 3 August 2026 and will be considered at the hearing on 4 August 2026.

Associate:

Dated:    29 July 2026