Federal Court of Australia

Mahmoud v Duty Registrar of the Federal Court of Australia [2026] FCA 985

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The application for an extension of time dated 27 November 2025 be refused.

2.    The applicant file any affidavits and written submissions on the question whether a vexatious proceedings order should be made against him by 27 August 2026.

3.    The matter be listed for hearing on 2 September 2026 at 9.30am on the question whether a vexatious proceedings order should be made.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Delivered ex tempore

JACKMAN J:

1    This is an application dated 27 May 2026 for an extension of time under r 31.02 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) to lodge an application for an order for review under s 11(1)(c) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act). The decision sought to be made the subject of judicial review is the decision of the Duty Registrar of this Court communicated by email to the applicant on 3 December 2025 that the documents which the applicant submitted to the Court on 27 November 2025 ought to be rejected for filing. The application should have been lodged within 28 days of 3 December 2025, that is by 31 December 2025: s 11(3) of the ADJR Act.

2    The documents submitted by the applicant to the Court Registry on 27 November 2025 consist of an application and affidavit. The application names five respondents, namely the Inspector-General in Bankruptcy, the Australian Financial Security Authority (AFSA), the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy, the Official Receiver, and the head of the Sydney office of the AFSA. The application seeks a wide range of declaratory relief as to the commission of various crimes, various pecuniary remedies, and other relief such as removal from office of certain of the respondents. Declarations are sought in relation to allegations of forgery, theft, perjury, fraudulent and dishonest gains and falsification of documents. The affidavit made by the applicant on 27 November 2025 begins with a 21-page section headed “The Crimes Committed”.

3    The email communicating the Duty Registrar’s decision on 3 December 2025 stated as follows:

The Duty Registrar has decided that the documents ought to be rejected for filing because, on their face, they allege criminal offences which the Federal Court does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine (see s 27(2) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966).

4    The applicant submits that the Federal Court does have relevant criminal jurisdiction. In any event, and perhaps more importantly as I understand the applicant’s argument, the applicant submits that this is a civil case. Even though the applicant seeks declarations as to the commission of criminal offences, the applicant submits that the declaration is a civil remedy and the criminal allegations are steps towards civil remedies by way of repayment of money and removal of certain of the respondents from office. It is not necessary for me to form a concluded view as to whether s 27(2) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) applies in those circumstances, as I am able to dispose of the matter on discretionary grounds even assuming in the applicant’s favour that the matter is arguable and arguably within the Court’s jurisdiction.

5    The applicable principles relating to an extension of time under s 11(1)(c) of the ADJR Act were set out in the much-cited decision of Wilcox J in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 186; (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348–9. Of particular significance to the present case are the propositions that:

(a)    the Court will not grant the extension unless positively satisfied that it is proper to do so, and the prescribed period of 28 days is not to be ignored;

(b)    it is a pre-condition to the exercise of discretion in favour of the applicant that an acceptable explanation of the delay be shown; and

(c)    while any prejudice to the respondent is a material factor militating against the grant of an extension, the mere absence of prejudice is not enough to justify the grant of an extension.

6    The application for an extension of time was made almost five months late. The explanations for delay advanced by the applicant in his affidavit of 25 May 2026 are as follows. First, the applicant says he tried to see the Duty Judge until January 2026, but gives no detail of those attempts. Second, the applicant says he kept contacting lawyers to advise and represent him but they were on annual holidays until about 15 February 2026. No other details are provided, and no evidence is given of any attempts to engage lawyers in the three weeks commencing 3 December 2025. The applicant says he later found it difficult to get a lawyer as lawyers demanded large sums of money in advance, but no details are provided. Third, the applicant says that he kept complaining to about 70 people and entities, including His Majesty, King Charles III, various people and entities associated with the United Nations, the Attorney-General, the Prime Minister, and several former Prime Ministers. The applicant says that he thought that would result in getting his case filed in the Court. Fourth, the applicant suffers from health issues, and has annexed some documentary evidence in support of that submission. The applicant submits that he can only work on his case for a few hours a day, and even then not every day, and that his case preparation was interrupted by visits to doctors.

7    In my view, those purported explanations do not justify the delay of about five months in filing the present application, or indeed any delay beyond the deadline of 31 December 2025. There is no evidence to the effect that the applicant was not aware of the 28-day deadline.

8    Accordingly, in my view, it is appropriate to refuse the application for an extension of time.

9    I will not, however, formally dismiss the application at this stage, as there is a further matter to be considered. On 24 September 2015, a vexatious proceedings order was made against the applicant by Rothman J of the Supreme Court of New South Wales pursuant to s 8 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW): see Attorney General for the State of New South Wales v Mahmoud [2015] NSWSC 899. An appeal to the Court of Appeal was allowed in part, by varying the order prohibiting the applicant from instituting proceedings in New South Wales other than with leave of an appropriate court such that that order does not apply to the applicant instituting proceedings in criminal proceedings brought against him as an accused or seeking relief in the nature of a writ of habeas corpus: Mahmoud v Attorney-General of New South Wales [2017] NSWCA 12.

10    That raises the question whether this Court should make a vexatious proceedings order against the applicant pursuant to s 37AO of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) on its own initiative. Section 37AO(4) provides that the Court must not make a vexatious proceedings order in relation to a person without hearing the person or giving the person an opportunity to be heard.

11    I will therefore set a timetable for the hearing on the question whether a vexatious proceedings order should be made against the applicant.

Associate:

Dated:    24 July 2026