FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Universal City Studios Productions LLLP v Telstra Limited (No 2) [2026] FCA 983

ORDERS

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

In this application, the following terms have the following meanings:

(a)    Aussie Broadband means the Forty-First Respondent.

(b)    DNS Blocking means a system by which any user of a Respondent's service who attempts to use a DNS resolver that is operated by or on behalf of that Respondent to access a Target Online Location is prevented from receiving a DNS response other than a redirection as referred to in Order 4.

(c)    Domain Name means a name formed by the rules and procedures of the Domain Name System (DNS) and includes subdomains.

(d)    IP Address means an Internet Protocol address.

(e)    New Release Content means:

(i)    the cinematograph film titled “The Odyssey”, copyright in which is co-owned by the First Applicant;

(ii)    the cinematograph film titled “Spider-Man: Brand New Day”, copyright in which is owned by the Second Applicant; and/or

(iii)    the television series known as “Lanterns”, copyright in which is owned by the Fourth Applicant.

(f)    New Release Content Window means the period from 22 July 2026 until 1 November 2026.

(g)    New Target Online Locations means the locations referred to in Order 13.

(h)    New Target Online Location Orders refers to orders sought or made under Orders 13 or 15 hereof.

(i)    Optus means the Second to Eighth Respondents.

(j)    Spider-Man Target Online Locations means the locations numbered 35 to 79 in Schedule 2.

(k)    Superloop means the Forty-Second to Forty-Seventh Respondents.

(l)    Target Online Locations means the online locations as referred to in Schedule 2 and that are or were accessible:

(i)    at the URLs listed in Schedule 2 to this Order (together, the Target URLs);

(ii)    at the IP Addresses listed in Schedule 2 to this Order (together, the Target IP Addresses);

(iii)    at the Domain Names listed in Schedule 2 to this Order (together, the Target Domain Names); and

(iv)    any other domain names, URLs and IP addresses that the Applicants notified to the Respondents pursuant to Order 12 (subject to the procedure set out in that Order).

(m)    Telstra means the First Respondent.

(n)    TPG Telecom means the Twenty-Second to Fortieth Respondents.

(o)    Urgent Target Online Locations means the locations referred to in Order 18.

(p)    Urgent Target Online Location Orders refers to orders sought or made under Order 18.

(q)    URL means a Uniform Resource Locator.

(r)    Vocus means the Ninth to Twenty-First Respondents.

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

Disabling access to Target Online Locations

1.    Subject to Order 24, each Respondent must, to the extent it has not already done so, within 15 business days of service of these Orders (and thereafter within 15 business days of an obligation to disable access to a Domain Name, IP Address or URL arising under Order 12), take reasonable steps to disable access to the Target Online Locations.

2.    Order 1 is taken to have been complied with by a Respondent if that Respondent implements any one or more of the following steps:

(a)    DNS Blocking in respect of the Target Domain Names;

(b)    IP Address blocking or re-routing in respect of the Target IP Addresses;

(c)    URL blocking in respect of the Target URLs and the Target Domain Names; or

(d)    any alternative technical means for disabling access to the Target Online Locations as agreed in writing between the Applicants and a Respondent.

3.    If a Respondent in complying with Order 1 does not implement any of the steps referred to in Order 2, that Respondent must, within 15 business days of service of these Orders, notify the Applicants of the step or steps it has implemented.

Redirection of users

4.    Each Respondent must use reasonable efforts to redirect any communication by a user of its service seeking access to the Target Online Locations which has been disabled pursuant to Order 1 to a webpage established, maintained and hosted by either:

(a)    the Applicants, or their nominee, pursuant to Order 5; or

(b)    that Respondent or its nominee.

The Applicants’ obligations pursuant to Orders 5 and 6 only arise if a Respondent notifies the Applicants that the Respondent will redirect a communication pursuant to Order 4(a) and for so long as at least one Respondent redirects communications to that webpage.

5.    The Applicants, or their nominee, must establish, maintain and host a webpage which informs users of a Respondent’s service who have been redirected to the webpage pursuant to Order 4 that access to the website has been disabled because this Court has determined that it infringes or facilitates the infringement of copyright.

6.    Within 5 business days of these Orders, the Applicants will notify each of the Respondents in writing of the URL of the webpage established, maintained and hosted under Order 4(a) and, if the webpage ceases to operate for any reason, will notify each of the Respondents in writing of a different URL that complies with Order 5.

7.    If, in complying with Order 4(b), a Respondent redirects any communication by a user of its service to a webpage established, maintained and hosted by it, that Respondent or its nominee must use reasonable efforts to ensure that the webpage informs the user of that Respondent's service that access to that website has been disabled because this Court has determined that it infringes or facilitates the infringement of copyright.

Permanent cessation of enabling or facilitating access or having the requisite primary purpose or primary effect

8.    In the event that any of the Applicants has a good faith belief that:

(a)    any Target URL, Target IP Address or Target Domain Name which is subject to these Orders has permanently ceased to enable or facilitate access to any Target Online Location; or

(b)    any Target URL, Target IP Address or Target Domain Name has permanently ceased to have the primary purpose or primary effect of infringing or facilitating the infringement of copyright,

a representative of the Applicants must, within 15 business days of any of the Applicants forming such a good faith belief, notify each Respondent of that fact in writing, in which case the Respondents shall no longer be required to take steps pursuant to Order 1 to disable access to the relevant Target URL, Target IP Address or Target Domain Name that is the subject of the notice.

Temporarily declining or ceasing to prevent access

9.    A Respondent will not be in breach of Order 1 if it temporarily declines or temporarily ceases to take the steps ordered in Order 1 (either in whole or in part) upon forming the view, on reasonable grounds, that suspension is necessary to:

(a)    maintain the integrity of its network or systems or functioning of its blocking system;

(b)    upgrade, troubleshoot or maintain its blocking system;

(c)    avert or respond to an imminent security threat to its network or systems; or

(d)    ensure its ability to block access to online locations associated with criminal content or its ability to comply with its statutory obligations, including under s 313(3) of the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth), is not impaired,

provided that:

(e)    unless precluded by law, it notifies the Applicants or their legal representative(s) of such suspension, including the reasons and the expected duration of such suspension, by 5.00 pm on the next business day; and

(f)    such suspension lasts no longer than is reasonably necessary and, in any case, no longer than 3 business days or such period as the Applicants may agree in writing or the Court may allow.

Leave to apply

10.    The owner or operator of any of the Target Online Locations and the owner or operator of any website who claims to be affected by these Orders may apply on 3 days' written notice to the Court and all parties to this proceeding, to vary or discharge these Orders, with any such application to:

(a)    set out the orders sought by the owner or operator of the Target Online Locations or affected website; and

(b)    be supported by evidence as to:

(i)    the status of the owner or operator of the Target Online Locations or affected website; and

(ii)    the basis upon which the variation or discharge is sought.

11.    The parties have liberty to apply on 3 days' written notice, including for the purpose of any application:

(a)    for further orders to give effect to the terms of these Orders; and/or

(b)    for further orders in the event of any material change of circumstances including, without limitation, in respect of the consequences for the parties and effectiveness of the technical methods under Order 2.

Target Online Location accessible from a different Domain Name, IP Address or URL (new access means order)

12.    If the Applicants and their solicitor form a good faith belief that a website the subject of any of the Target Online Locations is at any time during the operation of these Orders provided from a different Domain Name, IP Address or URL outside Australia:

(a)    the Applicants may, by their solicitor, file and serve a notice in writing to the Respondents and the Court that:

(i)    identifies the different Domain Name, IP Address or URL; and

(ii)    certifies that, in the good faith belief of the Applicants and their solicitor, the website operated from the different Domain Name, IP Address or URL is a new access means for any of the Target Online Locations the subject of these Orders, and provides brief reasons therefor;

(b)    within 7 business days of the notice given pursuant to Order 12(a), the Respondents must notify the Applicants and the Court in writing if they object to taking steps pursuant to Order 1 to disable access to the Domain Name, IP Address or URL notified in accordance with Order 12(a);

(c)    if any Respondent objects to disabling a Domain Name, IP Address or URL notified in accordance with Order 12(a), or the Court otherwise considers it appropriate to do so, the proceeding will be relisted for further directions; and

(d)    if, within the time period specified in Order 12(b), no Respondent objects to disabling access to any Domain Name, IP Address or URL notified in accordance with Order 12(a) and the Court does not otherwise require the proceeding to be relisted, then upon receipt of a notification from the Applicants that the Court does not require the matter to be relisted, that Respondents must take steps pursuant to Order 1 to disable access to the Domain Name, IP Address or URL notified in accordance with Order 12(a).

New Target Online Location associated with existing Target Online Locations (brand order)

13.    The Applicants have leave to file and serve a further amended originating application seeking further orders (New Target Online Location Orders) in respect of any additional target online location (New Target Online Locations) that appears to the Applicants’ solicitors to be associated with any of the Target Online Locations (based on its name or branding or the identity of its operator) and to be making available online or facilitating access to the same or substantially the same content that the Target Online Location is or was previously making available online.

14.    Subject to any further order or direction, the leave granted under Order 13 continues to apply for the duration of these Orders.

15.    Subject to any further order or direction, if the Applicants file any further amended originating application pursuant to Order 13, then the following shall apply:

(a)    The Applicants must serve on the Respondents a copy of the further amended originating application together with any supporting affidavit evidence to be relied on in support of the application for the New Target Online Location Orders within 7 days of filing the further amended originating application.

(b)    The Applicants must give notice of their application for the New Target Online Location Orders in accordance with the requirements of s 115A(4) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth).

(c)    Any Respondent who wishes to be heard in relation to the New Target Online Location Orders must notify the Applicants and the Court within 5 business days of being served in accordance with Order 15(a) above.

(d)    If no notice is given by any Respondent in accordance with Order 15(c) above, then the Applicants may approach the Court for the purpose of seeking the New Target Online Location Orders and the Court may in its discretion, consider and determine the application for the New Target Online Location Orders on the papers without further notice and without any oral hearing.

(e)    Unless otherwise agreed with the Respondents prior to the filing of the further amended originating application referred to in Order 13, the New Target Online Location Orders must allow the Respondents a period of at least 15 business days following service of those orders to take reasonable steps to disable access to the New Target Online Location.

Period of operation of orders

16.    These Orders are to operate for a period of 5 years from the date of these Orders.

17.    An Applicant may make an application to extend the period of operation of these Orders using the following procedure:

(a)    the application must be made at least 28 days prior to the expiry of the operation of the orders by filing a minute of the orders sought together with a solicitor’s certification in accordance with (b) below;

(b)    a solicitor on behalf of the Applicant must certify that:

(i)    within the 6 weeks prior to the application, the solicitor or another representative of the Applicant has attempted to access each Target Online Location via each Target Domain Name;

(ii)    following the exercise in (b)(i) above, the solicitor has a good faith belief that each Target Online Location that is the subject of the application has not permanently ceased to have the primary purpose or effect of infringing or facilitating the infringement of copyright, and that each Target Domain Name, Target URL or Target IP Address that is the subject of the application has not permanently ceased to enable or facilitate access to a Target Online Location; and

(iii)    the Applicant has given the Respondents at least 7 days’ notice of the application;

(c)    the accompanying minute of order may specify any Target Domain Names, Target URLs or Target IP Addresses that are excluded from the application;

(d)    within 7 days of receiving notice of the application, any Respondent objecting to the extension of these orders must notify the Applicant and the Court in writing of the objection and the reasons therefor;

(e)    if any Respondent objects in accordance with (d) above, the proceeding will be relisted for directions, unless the Court otherwise orders;

(f)    if no Respondent gives notice of any objection, then the Court may make orders in terms of the Applicant’s minute without any further hearing;

(g)    the Applicant must serve on the Respondents any such orders made; and

(h)    the Applicant must attempt to give each relevant Target Online Location notice of the Orders made by sending an email to one email address identified by such Location as providing a means to contact its operator or administrator (if any is identified), further notifying the operator or administrator that it may seek to vary or set aside such Orders upon the filing of a notice of appearance with the Court and an appropriate application, supported by affidavit evidence.

Urgent Application

18.    During the New Release Content Window the Applicants have leave to file:

(a)    a further amended originating application identifying additional Target Online Locations (Urgent Target Online Locations) in respect of which they seek urgent orders in a form substantially the same as the orders sought in Orders 1 to 17 (Urgent Target Online Location Orders) on the basis that those Target Online Locations are making available online or facilitating access to, and/or promoting that they will make available online or facilitate access to, the New Release Content; together with

(b)    evidence that the Urgent Target Online Locations are making available online or facilitating access to, and/or promoting that they will make available online or facilitate access to, the New Release Content.

19.    If the Applicants file any application pursuant to Order 18, then the following shall apply:

(a)    at least 2 business days before filing the application, the Applicants are to notify the Respondents of their intention to make the application and are to serve on the Respondents a list of the Urgent Target Online Locations the Applicants intend to include in the application;

(b)    the Applicants must serve the material referred to in Order 18 on the Respondents on the same day on which the material is filed;

(c)    any Respondent who wishes to be heard in relation to the Urgent Target Online Location Orders must notify the Applicants and the Court within 1 business day after being served in accordance with Order 19(b) above;

(d)    if no notice is given by any Respondent in accordance with Order 19(c) above, then the Applicants may approach the Court to seek the Urgent Target Online Location Orders and the Court may in its discretion, consider and determine the application on the papers without further notice and without any oral hearing; and

(e)    unless otherwise agreed with the Respondents prior to the filing of the further amended originating application referred to in Order 18, the Urgent Target Online Location Orders are to allow the Respondents a period of at least 5 business days following service of those orders to take reasonable steps to disable access to the Urgent Target Online Locations.

20.    If an application is filed in accordance with Order 19 and the docket judge is unable to determine the matter urgently, the Applicants have leave to approach the duty judge.

Costs

21.    The Applicants pay Telstra's, Optus', Vocus', TPG Telecom's, Aussie Broadband's and Superloop’s compliance costs calculated at the rate of $50 per Domain Name the subject of DNS Blocking undertaken for the purposes of complying with Order 1.

22.    There be no order as to costs.

23.    Orders 3 to 16 of the Court’s Orders of 9 July 2026 be vacated.

24.    Insofar as Order 1 requires the Respondents to take reasonable steps to disable access to the Spider-Man Target Online Locations, those steps must be taken:

(a)    by Aussie Broadband, Optus, Superloop, Telstra and Vocus, on or before 5pm on 28 July 2026; and

(b)    by TPG Telecom, on or before 5pm on 29 July 2026.

25.    If any Respondent wishes to approach the Court and make submissions in relation to these orders, they may do so within 5 business days of being served.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Schedule 2
Target Online Locations

Part A – Odyssey Target Online Locations

Part B –Target Online Locations

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Delivered ex tempore, revised from transcript)

BURLEY J:

1 These proceedings arise as an application brought under s 115A of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) for orders requiring the respondents, who are internet service providers (ISPs), to block access within Australia to various “target online locations” (TOLs). It is alleged that the TOLs in question infringe or facilitate the infringement of the applicants’ copyright works, being cinematograph films.

2 The proceedings were begun by an application to the duty judge on 1 July 2026, seeking short service of originating documents and affidavits. An interlocutory application was listed for hearing on 9 July 2026 at which the applicants sought urgent relief in the form of site blocking orders in respect of 32 TOLs, on which the applicants considered the operators were likely to make available for streaming, without a licence, the upcoming film “The Odyssey”. Interlocutory orders were made to that effect on that day: Universal City Studios Productions LLLP v Telstra Limited [2026] FCA 899 (Stellios J).

3 The applicants now apprehend that another film will be the subject of unauthorised release by a further set of TOLs. The second applicant is the owner of copyright in “Spider–Man: Brand New Day”. It is scheduled to begin screening in Australian cinemas on 30 July 2026. The applicants seek further urgent site blocking orders in respect of TOLs that are not the subject of other site blocking orders.

4 On 17 July 2026, I listed the proceedings for urgent final hearing in order to accommodate the urgency arising from the release of Spider–Man and also to address the form of final orders appropriate to the proceedings more generally.

5 Since then, on 21 July 2026, a further amended originating application and an amended statement of claim, which seeks to add Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. as a fourth applicant, has been provided. I granted leave to file the further amended application and amended statement of claim at the hearing.

6 Proceedings of this type, which concern the blocking of overseas websites from being accessible in Australia, are now familiar to the Court: see, for instance, Universal Music Australia Pty Limited v TPG Internet Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 435; 348 ALR 493; 126 IPR 219 (Burley J) (Universal 2017); Universal City Studios LLC v Telstra Limited [2025] FCA 1390 (Halley J); Roadshow Films Pty Limited v Telstra Limited [2025] FCA 744 (Younan J); Roadshow Films Pty Limited v Telstra Limited [2024] FCA 1388 (Cheeseman J); Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v Telstra Limited [2024] FCA 246; 178 IPR 231 (Nicholas J); Roadshow Films Pty Limited v Telstra Corporation Limited [2020] FCA 507; 151 IPR 449 (Burley J) (Roadshow 2020); Universal Music Australia Pty Limited v TPG Internet Pty Ltd (No 2) [2026] FCA 731 (Burley J) (Universal (No 2) 2026).

7 They tend to involve the owners of copyright providing evidence that identified websites have developed a business model of facilitating the infringement of copyright on an industrial scale. The respondents to the proceedings are not the persons behind those websites, who usually cannot be traced, but rather reputable ISPs located in Australia who have the technical means to prevent access to the TOLs to consumers in Australia. Those respondents generally do not appear or take an active role in the proceedings.

8 In the present case, all of the respondents (of which there are 47) have either asked to be excused from attendance at the hearing and have indicated that they do not wish to be heard, have consented to the orders being made, or have not played any active role in the proceedings despite being served.

9 The orders sought by the applicants are, broadly, to require the respondents to disable access to identified target uniform resource locations (which incorporate identified target domain names at identified target internet protocol addresses) (target addresses) and the redirection of users to a webpage informing them that access to the website has been disabled because the Court has determined that it infringes or facilitates the infringement of copyright. The orders also put in place a system whereby, if the applicants have a good faith belief that any of the target addresses have ceased to facilitate infringement, the blocking may be lifted by the ISPs, and enabling the applicants to add further target addresses to those included in the orders.

10 The applicants seek three forms of orders that vary from the form previously made in such cases.

11 First, they seek orders requiring the ISPs to implement site blocking measures in respect of target addresses that threaten to make Spider–Man available online by 28 or 29 July 2026. The evidence discloses that the ISPs the subject of those orders consent to that order. The applicants frame this order as one seeking interlocutory relief  although as I note below, they have final effect. There is urgency attaching to that application.

12 Secondly, the applicants seek final site blocking orders of longer duration than in previous similar cases. For previous site blocking cases, the duration of the orders has been for three years, with the copyright owners having leave to approach the Court for extensions of those orders in circumstances where there is evidence that the TOLs are continuing to facilitate the infringement of copyright. The applicants now seek that the final orders have a duration of five years.

13 I am informed that the three year duration has been requested by rights owners as a matter of custom (and agreement with the ISPs) but not as a result of any principled decision: Roadshow Films Pty Limited v Telstra Corporation Limited (Extension of Orders) [2023] FCA 1167; 178 IPR 55 (Burley J) (Roadshow (Extension of Orders) 2023) at [12]. The applicants contend that it is burdensome to seek extensions from three years and that frequently, those extensions must be sought because the TOLs continue to facilitate the infringement elsewhere in the world and, but for the site blocking, would do so in Australia. That submission is supported by the evidence. Affidavit evidence indicates that rights holders must typically expend about $30,000 in costs to prepare the materials necessary to justify the extensions. In Universal (No 2) 2026, I observed that the Court was continuing to grant extensions – justified on the materials supplied by the applicants – some nine years after the initial site blocking orders were made in Universal 2017: at [3]–[9]. The applicants in the present matter now seek orders that extend for five years. I am satisfied that this is an appropriate course. It accommodates the policy and purposes of the legislation to which I refer below.

14 Thirdly, the applicants seek orders that enable urgent applications to be brought in these proceedings arising from the release of The Odyssey and Spider–Man, and also the imminent release on streaming services of a television series called “Lanterns”. I address this further below.

15 The applicants rely on seven affidavits in support of their application: four from Andrew Stewart, their solicitor, and three from Jackson Moir who is a paralegal acting under the supervision of Mr Stewart.

16 Section 115A of the Copyright Act provides:

Application for an injunction

(1)    The owner of a copyright may apply to the Federal Court of Australia to grant an injunction that requires a carriage service provider to take such steps as the Court considers reasonable to disable access to an online location outside Australia that:

(a)    infringes, or facilitates an infringement, of the copyright; and

(b)    has the primary purpose or the primary effect of infringing, or facilitating an infringement, of copyright (whether or not in Australia).

(2)    The application under subsection (1) may also request that the injunction require an online search engine provider (other than a provider that is covered by a declaration under subsection (8B)) to take such steps as the Court considers reasonable so as not to provide a search result that refers users to the online location.

Granting the injunction

(2A)    The Court may grant the injunction in the terms, and subject to the conditions, that the Court considers appropriate.

(2B)    Without limiting subsection (2A), the injunction may:

(a)    require the carriage service provider to take reasonable steps to do either or both of the following:

(i)    block domain names, URLs and IP addresses that provide access to the online location and that are specified in the injunction;

(ii)    block domain names, URLs and IP addresses that the carriage service provider and the owner of the copyright agree, in writing, have started to provide access to the online location after the injunction is made; and

(b)    require the online search engine provider to take reasonable steps to do either or both of the following:

(i)    not provide search results that include domain names, URLs and IP addresses that provide access to the online location and that are specified in the injunction;

(ii)    not provide search results that include domain names, URLs and IP addresses that the online search engine provider and the owner of the copyright agree, in writing, have started to provide access to the online location after the injunction is made.

Parties

(3)    The parties to an action under subsection (1) are:

(a)    the owner of the copyright; and

(b)    the carriage service provider; and

(ba)    if the application under subsection (1) also sought for the injunction to apply against an online search engine provider—the online search engine provider; and

(c)    the person who operates the online location if, but only if, that person makes an application to be joined as a party to the proceedings.

Service

(4)    The owner of the copyright must notify:

(a)    the carriage service provider; and

(aa)    if the application under subsection (1) also sought for the injunction to apply against an online search engine provider—the online search engine provider; and

(b)    the person who operates the online location;

of the making of an application under subsection (1), but the Court may dispense, on such terms as it sees fit, with the notice required to be sent under paragraph (b) if the Court is satisfied that the owner of the copyright is unable, despite reasonable efforts, to determine the identity or address of the person who operates the online location, or to send notices to that person.

Matters to be taken into account

(5)    In determining whether to grant the injunction, the Court may take the following matters into account:

(a)    the flagrancy of the infringement, or the flagrancy of the facilitation of the infringement, as referred to in paragraph (1)(b);

(b)    whether the online location makes available or contains directories, indexes or categories of the means to infringe, or facilitate an infringement of, copyright;

(c)    whether the owner or operator of the online location demonstrates a disregard for copyright generally;

(d)    whether access to the online location has been disabled by orders from any court of another country or territory on the ground of or related to copyright infringement;

(e)    whether disabling access to the online location is a proportionate response in the circumstances;

(ea)    if the application under subsection (1) also sought for the injunction to apply against an online search engine provider—whether not providing search results that refer users to the online location is a proportionate response in the circumstances;

(f)    the impact on any person, or class of persons, likely to be affected by the grant of the injunction;

(g)    whether it is in the public interest to disable access to the online location;

(ga)    if the application under subsection (1) also sought for the injunction to apply against an online search engine provider—whether it is in the public interest not to provide search results that refer users to the online location;

(h)    whether the owner of the copyright complied with subsection (4);

(i)    any other remedies available under this Act;

(j)    any other matter prescribed by the regulations;

(k)    any other relevant matter.

Presumption that the online location is outside Australia

(5A)    For the purposes of the proceedings, the online location is presumed to be outside Australia, unless the contrary is established.

Affidavit evidence

(6)    For the purposes of the proceedings, section 134A (affidavit evidence) applies as if the reference in paragraph 134A(f) to a particular act included a reference to a class of acts.

Rescinding and varying injunctions

(7)    The Court may:

(a)    limit the duration of; or

(b)    upon application, rescind or vary;

an injunction granted under this section.

(8)    An application under subsection (7) may be made by:

(a)    any of the persons referred to in subsection (3); or

(b)    any other person prescribed by the regulations.

(8A)    An application under subsection (7) must not request the Court to vary the injunction so that it applies to an online search engine provider that is covered by a declaration under subsection (8B).

Declarations excluding online search engine providers

(8B)    The Minister may, by legislative instrument, declare that:

(a)    a particular online search engine provider; or

(b)    an online search engine provider that is a member of a particular class;

must not be specified in an application under subsection (1) or (7).

Costs

(9)    A carriage service provider or, if applicable, an online search engine provider is not liable for any costs in relation to the proceedings unless the provider enters an appearance and takes part in the proceedings.

(Notes omitted)

17 Based on the evidence, I am satisfied of the following matters relevant to s 115A:

(a)    That the ISPs have been served and are aware of the present hearing;

(b)    That attempts have been made to notify the operators of the TOLs of the proceedings. The applicants’ solicitors have sent them notices of the proceedings by email and post to every address they could find, both on the TOLs themselves and in domain name and IP address searches. Where there are online forms to complete for communicating with the operators, Mr Moir has completed those forms. No operator has engaged substantively with the applicants. Accordingly, in accordance with s 115A(4) of the Copyright Act, I dispense with service on the operators of those TOLs;

(c)    That copyright subsists in each of the 25 cinematograph films identified in the amended statement of claim, and that one or other of the applicants owns copyright, entirely or jointly, in each of those films. In relation to subsistence, the applicants rely primarily on s 126 of the Copyright Act. That provision has application in cases such as the present: see Universal 2017 at [52]–[56]. For an abundance of caution, the applicants also rely on presumptions arising from s 131 of the Copyright Act and the evidence of Mr Stewart, which directs attention to the packaging on various DVDs indicating assertions of copyright ownership on behalf of the applicants on some but not all of the 25 works identified. Taken together, I am satisfied that ownership and subsistence of copyright has been established;

(d)    That the TOLs are each accessible at identified target addresses which are set out in the evidence of Mr Moir. There are two types of target domain names: “primary” domain names, which are the main locations that provide the functionality providing access to infringing works, and “secondary” domain names, which redirect users to corresponding primary domain names. The TOLs are all streaming locations apart from one proxy TOL, which gives hyperlinks to websites on which movies and television shows are made publicly available, and one torrenting TOL from which users can download movies and television shows using a BitTorrent client;

(e)    That the presumption in s 115A(5A), that the TOLs are located outside of Australia, applies. No evidence suggests that a contrary conclusion may be reached;

(f)    That each of the TOLs infringe copyright in one or more of the cinematograph films made available there. Mr Moir visited each of the TOLs and ascertained that at least one of the 25 copyright works of the applicants is present on them. The evidence indicates that in each case, Mr Moir watched parts of the film and confirmed that it was a true copy of the film in question. It also demonstrates that the applicants have not granted any licence or consent to the owners or operators of the TOLs to copy or communicate those films;

(g)    That the primary purpose of the TOLs is to provide access to the impugned works.

18 Turning to s 115A(5) of the Copyright Act, in my view, the operation of the TOLs represents a flagrant infringement of copyright owned by the applicants. The presentation of the webpages at the TOLs is similar to a legitimate online streaming service, yet no permission has been granted in respect of the cinematograph works on offer. I infer, based on the content of the site, that other works on offer – all of which appear to be popular movies or television series available commercially – are offered without the licence or approval of the copyright owners (in that regard, see Roadshow 2020 at [49]–[51]). This demonstrates a disregard to copyright generally by the operators of those sites. Further, the online locations provide directories facilitating the infringement of copyright and indices of their content.

19 I consider that the orders sought represent a proportionate response to the infringement and that it is in the public interest to make the orders, as facilitating the wholesale infringement of copyright is contrary to the public interest.

20 Having regard to all of the factors listed in s 115A(5), and also taking into consideration the policy and purposes of the provision, as addressed in Universal (No 2) 2026 at [12]–[13], and also Universal 2017 at [8]–[20], I consider that it is appropriate to grant the orders sought and that a five year duration for the orders is appropriate.

21 Turning to the orders sought, I am satisfied that there is some urgency in attending to the proposed release of Spider–Man. The movie is due to be released in Australia on 30 July 2026. The evidence of Mr Stewart indicates that it is not possible for the applicants to identify relevant TOLs likely to make the movie available until they show signs of their intention to do so. Generally, they hold back until two or three weeks before the launch.

22 Mr Moir recently checked the TOLs the subject of the originating application and found that some of them are now promoting the release of Spider–Man, and all but one of the TOLs offer access to the other films in the “Spider–Man” franchise (Mr Stewart gives evidence that this provides an indication that the TOLs will also offer the new Spider–Man upon release). In order to ensure that the sites are blocked before the release on 30 July 2026, it is necessary to make an order requiring the ISPs to act more swiftly than for other of the orders sought. That is accommodated by the form of the proposed orders. However, those orders are not interlocutory in form but final, and the orders that I will make will be adjusted to accommodate that difference. As I have noted, those ISPs which have engaged with the applicants in relation to the form of orders have consented to the shorter time period in which they may take action.

23 I am satisfied on the basis of the evidence before me that the operators of each of the Spider Man TOLs identified in the orders threatens to infringe copyright in Spider Man by offering access to the movie. Accordingly, I will grant the styled interlocutory orders as final orders.

24 Finally, I turn to the “New Release” regime proposed by the applicants. This foreshadows the applicants seeking orders blocking further TOLs in respect of three recent releases: The Odyssey, Spider–Man and a television series yet to be released for streaming called “Lanterns”. The regime provides broadly that there be a defined term in the orders called a “New Release Content Window” (release window) which is a period of several months from 22 July 2026 until 1 November 2026. The regime proposes that during the release window, the applicants may seek leave to file a further amended originating application in respect of which they seek urgent orders in a form substantially the same as the orders that I will grant today on the basis that the TOLs identified in the amended application are making available or facilitating access to one or other of those releases. The proposed orders also provide that evidence relating to those TOLs be provided and for a regime granting a shorter period of time than usual for the applicants to notify the respondents of their intention to make the application, to serve the materials relevant, and enable a respondent who wishes to be heard in relation to the orders to notify the applicants and the Court within one day after being served.

25 The broad intention underlying these orders is to ensure that the applicants have an opportunity to obtain site blocking orders during a critical time in the life of a new release.

26 In relation to films, Mr Stewart explains in his evidence that when a website previews a new film before its release date, it will be uploaded to the TOL itself shortly after, and in some cases shortly before, the first theatrical release in any country. It is his experience that the number of TOLs promoting a new release will significantly increase as the date for release approaches. He gives evidence that the only effective method available to the applicants to reduce the impact of the likely piracy of their new releases, including Spider–Man and The Odyssey, is to seek orders under s 115A in order to reduce the availability of infringing copies to members of the public.

27 In relation to streaming content, Mr Stewart gives evidence to similar effect. For high-profile streaming content, new audiences are typically attracted for the premiere and early episodes, with the consequence that new subscribers are attracted to a streaming platform where the release is on that. Mr Stewart gives evidence that the period within several months of the release of a new series on a streaming service has a similar value to the theatrical release window of a film because it attracts new subscribers and therefore new revenue. As noted above, the only effective method available to the applicants to reduce the impact of likely piracy of new streaming content including Lanterns, as for new film content, is to seek orders under s 115A to reduce the availability of infringing copies to members of the public.

28 These matters informed the decision on the part of the applicants to seek to have in place orders that, during what they have defined as the “New Release Content Window”, enable them to approach the Court at short notice to put in place site blocking orders in respect of new TOLs relating to one or other of The Odyssey, Spider–Man or Lanterns.

29 I note that the “New Release” regime does not provide for substantive orders but, rather, timetabling orders to enable the Court and the respondents to have an awareness of the process. I am informed by counsel for the applicants, Ms St John, that the process has been the subject of discussion with various ISPs that are respondents to these proceedings, being those that are prepared to engage with the applicants on the subject, and that they have agreed that this approach is consistent with their ability to comply with such orders.

30 I consider that this is a process that is appropriate and consistent with the policy and purposes of the Copyright Act as I summarised in Roadshow (Extension of Orders) 2023 at [8]–[11], namely that s 115A warrants a broad and flexible application to ensure that serial copyright infringers who facilitate the availability of infringing works to the public are the subject of swift and appropriate orders. Accordingly, I consider it appropriate to make orders in accordance with the “New Release” regime.

Associate:

Dated:    27 July 2026

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