Federal Court of Australia

Majak v State of Victoria [2026] FCA 956

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The applicant’s claim in SAD 35 of 2026 against the State of Victoria is summarily dismissed.

2.    The applicant’s claim in SAD 49 of 2026 against the Commonwealth of Australia is summarily dismissed.

3.    The applicant is to pay the costs of the State of Victoria and the Commonwealth of Australia of and incidental to both actions on an indemnity basis.

4.    Leave to the applicant to file and serve, within 5 business days of the publication of these reasons, written submissions (limited to 2 pages, 12-point font and 1.5 line spacing) setting out why a different costs order should be made.

5.    The interlocutory application filed by Mr Piotr Cwalina on 29 April 2026 is dismissed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

O’SULLIVAN J

1    The applicant, Ms Zofia Majak, has issued proceedings SAD 35 of 2026 and SAD 49 of 2026 in this Court.

2    SAD 35 of 2026 names the State of Victoria as the respondent and is directed at orders made by Riordan J of the Supreme Court of Victoria in 2017 whereby part of a proceeding before the Supreme Court of Victoria was transferred to the Family Court of Australia (as it then was).

3    SAD 49 of 2026 names the Commonwealth of Australia as respondent and is directed to Ms Majak’s bankruptcy, an application for relief against travel restrictions imposed under s 272(1)(c) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), and declaratory relief relating to Ms Majak’s proprietary rights.

4    The State of Victoria and the Commonwealth respectively seek summary dismissal of the proceedings instituted by Ms Majak against them.

5    It is for the reasons which follow that:

(a)    Ms Majak’s claim in SAD 35 of 2026 against the State of Victoria is summarily dismissed; and

(b)    Ms Majak’s claim in SAD 49 of 2026 against the Commonwealth is summarily dismissed.

Background

6    In 2015, Ms Majak commenced Action No. SYC 496 of 2015 in the Family Court against Mr Alan Rose seeking final property orders arising from a de facto relationship (Family Court proceeding): see Massalski & Riley [2019] FamCA 1013.

7    In 2016, Ms Majak commenced Action No. S CI 2016 5,260 in the Supreme Court of Victoria against Mr Rose and Mr Piotr Cwalina seeking declarations, amongst other things, that they held a portion of their interest in certain land on trust for her (Supreme Court of Victoria proceeding). In 2017, Mr Rose filed a counterclaim against Ms Majak and Mr Cwalina.

8    On 18 August 2017, Riordan J made orders in the Supreme Court of Victoria proceeding transferring Ms Majak’s claim against Mr Rose, and Mr Rose’s defence, to the Family Court proceeding pursuant to s 5(1) of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (Vic) (transfer order). By the same orders, the balance of Ms Majak’s claim against Mr Cwalina in the Supreme Court of Victoria proceeding was dismissed. The proceeding continued in the Supreme Court of Victoria as if commenced by Mr Rose’s counterclaim against Ms Majak and Mr Cwalina.

9    On 24 December 2019, McClelland DCJ of the Family Court made final property orders: Massalski. On 13 July 2021, Ms Majak’s appeal from those orders was dismissed by the Full Court of the Family Court (Ryan, Aldridge and Watts JJ): Massalski & Riley [2021] FamCAFC 116.

10    On 5 August 2022, Harper J of the Family Court found that Ms Majak had frequently instituted vexatious proceedings in Australian courts and made a vexatious proceedings order pursuant to s 102QB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) prohibiting Ms Majak from instituting proceedings in any court with jurisdiction under the Family Law Act in relation to Mr Rose without leave: Massalski & Riley (No 3) [2022] FedCFamC1F 562.

11    In September 2023, Ms Majak and Mr Cwalina applied for leave for the issue of a constitutional or other writ in the original jurisdiction of the High Court. The circumstances of that proposed application were explained subsequently by Edelman J in Cwalina v Rose [2024] HCASJ 16 at [9]:

… In that proposed application, Mr Cwalina's principal submission was that the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia did not have jurisdiction in respect of that part of the matter that had been transferred to it by order of the Supreme Court of Victoria in August 2017, and that, as a result, all consequential orders of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia were invalid. Gleeson J directed that that application not be accepted for filing without leave of a Justice of this Court. Mr Cwalina sought leave and that leave was refused by Jagot J on grounds which included that the "application and supporting affidavit do not expose any basis upon which it might be inferred that the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia did not have jurisdiction in respect of that part of the matter transferred to it"…

12    On 5 December 2023, Tsalamandris J of the Supreme Court of Victoria delivered her judgment in the Supreme Court of Victoria proceeding: Rose v Cwalina [2023] VSC 721.

13    On 18 October 2024, Ms Majak and Mr Cwalina applied to the Victorian Court of Appeal for leave to appeal from the orders of Tsalamandris J in Rose v Cwalina [2023] VSC 721 (Victorian Court of Appeal proceeding). Amongst other things, Ms Majak contended that the Family Court (by then the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia) did not have the jurisdiction to accept the transfer order made by Riordan J and complained that she had been improperly “excluded” from the Supreme Court of Victoria proceeding.

14    On 30 March 2026, the Victorian Court of Appeal (Walker, Whelan and Kaye JJA) refused Ms Majak’s application for an extension of time to initiate the appeal and dismissed the application for leave, concluding that all claims made by her were untenable and that there was no merit in any of the proposed grounds: Cwalina v Rose [2026] VSCA 54.

15    On 27 November 2025, which was prior to the Victorian Court of Appeal’s decision, Ms Majak applied to the Victorian Court of Appeal to transfer the Victorian Court of Appeal proceeding to the FCFCoA pursuant to s 6(1) of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act alleging that the transfer order was constitutionally invalid such that the orders made by Tsalamandris J in Rose v Cwalina [2023] VSC 721 was of no effect. Notwithstanding that application, the Victorian Court of Appeal proceeding was not transferred and, as noted above, was determined finally on 30 March 2026.

16    On 10 April 2026, Ms Majak applied to the High Court of Australia for special leave to appeal the Victorian Court of Appeal’s decision in Cwalina v Rose [2026] VSCA 54, raising substantially the same issues as she does in SAD 35 of 2026 against the State of Victoria. That application was refused on 11 June 2026: Cwalina & Anor v Rose [2026] HCADisp 121.

Bankruptcy proceeding

17    On 1 December 2022, Ms Majak was declared bankrupt and a sequestration order was made by Judge Cameron of the FCFCoA: Rose v Majak (No 2) [2022] FedCFamC2G 1025. Ms Majak remains an undischarged bankrupt.

Contempt proceeding

18    On 31 August 2023, Tsalamandris J issued an injunction restraining Ms Majak, Mr Rose and Mr Cwalina from entering, occupying or taking possession of the land the subject of the Supreme Court of Victoria proceeding. Further orders were made on 31 January 2024 compelling the sale of that land and extending the injunction issued on 31 August 2023.

19    On 31 January 2024, in separate orders, Tsalamandris J directed that a warrant be issued for the arrest of Ms Majak so that she could be brought before the Court to be informed of and answer to a charge of contempt for a breach of the injunction issued on 31 August 2023.

20    Ms Majak was arrested and brought before the Supreme Court of Victoria on 20 February 2024 at which time she was released pending the disposal of the charge of contempt. By orders that same day, Tsalamandris J directed the Prothonotary to prosecute the charge of contempt against Ms Majak.

21    On 1 August 2025, the Prothonotary was granted leave to discontinue the prosecution of the charge of contempt against Ms Majak on the ground that it was no longer in the public interest to do so.

Applications

22    At a case management hearing on 12 March 2026, Ms Majak’s applications in SAD 14 of 2026 and SAD 26 of 2026 were summarily dismissed and referred for consideration as to whether vexatious proceedings orders should be made pursuant to s 37AO of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth): Majak v Barnden [2026] FCA 363.

23    Ms Majak has now twice sought leave to issue or file an application for a constitutional or other writ in the High Court of Australia in relation to parts of the decision in Majak v Barnden [2026] FCA 363 in both SAD 14 of 2026 and SAD 26 of 2026. On both occasions, Jagot J dismissed the proposed application on the basis that it amounted to an abuse of process: In the matter of an application of Zofia Bozena Majak for leave to issue or file [2026] HCASJ 9 (22 April 2026) at [10]; In the matter of an application of Zofia Bozena Majak for leave to issue or file [2026] HCASJ 16 (29 May 2026) at [10].

24    SAD 35 of 2026, being the action against the State of Victoria and the subject of these reasons, was also heard for case management on 12 March 2026. On that occasion the Court ordered that any application for summary dismissal by the State of Victoria be filed by 20 March 2026. An application for summary judgment was subsequently filed and listed for argument on 5 May 2026.

25    SAD 49 of 2026 is the action against the Commonwealth and is also the subject of these reasons. It was instituted by originating application on 2 March 2026. The Commonwealth’s application for summary judgment was heard concurrently with SAD 35 of 2026 on 5 May 2026.

Notices of constitutional matters

26    In both SAD 35 of 2026 and SAD 49 of 2026, Ms Majak relies on notices under s 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) that the proceedings “involve matters arising under the Constitution, including questions concerning the limits of judicial power under Chapter III of the Constitution”.

27    Both the State of Victoria and the Commonwealth submit that the notices lodged in their respective proceedings are such that no real or substantial constitutional issue is raised and that, therefore, the Court is not prevented from proceeding with their respective applications for summary dismissal.

28    So much so is clearly evident on the fact of the filed material and I accept those submissions.

SAD 35 of 2026

29    The State of Victoria filed its application on 20 March 2026 seeking summary dismissal of the proceeding, relying on r 26.01(1)(a) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) and s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act in that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding. Further or alternatively, the State of Victoria contends that the proceeding is vexatious and/or an abuse of process, relying on FCR 26.01(1)(b) and (d).

30    By Ms Majak’s originating application dated 19 February 2026, she seeks the following relief at [6]:

(1)     A declaration that the existence of a valid federal subject-matter was a jurisdictional fact necessary for the lawful conferral and exercise of federal jurisdiction in relation to the partial transfer of proceedings to the Family Court of Australia.

(2)     A declaration that, if federal subject-matter jurisdiction was absent at the time of the purported transfer, any exercise of federal jurisdiction in reliance upon that transfer was constitutionally ineffective.

(3)     A declaration that the exercise of coercive judicial power in the course of federal jurisdiction, absent determination of the anterior question of federal subject-matter jurisdiction, raises a question concerning the limits of judicial power under Ch III of the Constitution.

(4)     A declaration that where interdependent proprietary rights forming part of a single controversy are separated between courts without constitutional authority, and coercive orders are made affecting a person whose rights have not been adjudicated in proceedings to which that person is a party, the constitutional validity of those orders remains a live question notwithstanding subsequent procedural developments.

(5)     A declaration that the constitutional validity of coercive orders made in purported exercise of federal jurisdiction is not displaced by the characterisation of related proceedings as moot or out of time where the anterior jurisdictional question has not been determined.

(6)     Such further or other declaratory relief as the Court considers necessary to resolve the constitutional question identified above.

31    The State of Victoria submits that the declaratory relief sought is cast in abstract terms. It observes, for example, that subparagraph (1) above does not seek a declaration about the existence of a valid federal subject matter or the validity of the transfer order, and subparagraphs (2) to (5) do not challenge any specific order or exercise of power affecting the applicant’s rights. It submits that the declaratory relief sought is not expressed in a manner with which the Court can engage.

32    The State of Victoria submits further that, to the extent that the relief sought can be understood as being directed to the transfer order and orders made in the contempt proceedings, for three reasons there is no prospect of the Court making orders of the kind sought.

33    First, the State of Victoria was not a party to the Supreme Court of Victoria proceeding, which means any declaratory relief sought in respect of orders made or powers exercised in that proceeding (including the transfer order, orders effecting the final judgment, the injunction ordered on 31 August 2023 and the order for a warrant to be issued for the arrest of Ms Majak) is not directed to the determination of any controversy between Ms Majak and the State of Victoria.

34    Second, there was no appeal from the transfer order and Ms Majak’s application to rejoin the Supreme Court of Victoria proceeding as a party was dismissed because she had been declared bankrupt on 1 December 2022 by Judge Cameron of the FCFCoA in Rose v Majak (No 2) [2022] FedCFamC2G 1025. That being the case, the State of Victoria submits that there is no reasonable prospect that the Court will declare that the final orders made in the Supreme Court of Victoria proceeding were invalid because of a lack of “valid federal subject matter” or Ms Majak’s exclusion from the Supreme Court of Victoria proceeding.

35    Third, Ms Majak’s grounds in respect of the contempt proceedings cannot succeed because no finding of contempt was made against her. That proceeding was discontinued with no order as to costs.

36    I accept those submissions, all of which are compelling.

37    The State of Victoria submits further that this proceeding is a collateral attack on the transfer order which constitutes an abuse of process. The issue relating to that order has already been decided and such a matter should be addressed through the ordinary appeal process. The State of Victoria observes also that this principle applies notwithstanding that issues might not have been determined to finality through the appeal process or remain active in a parallel proceeding: Hammond v State of New South Wales [2013] NSWSC 1930 at [43]-[47].

38    The State of Victoria submits still further that, in any event, Ms Majak is seeking to relitigate issues decided by the Supreme Court of Victoria in the Supreme Court of Victoria proceeding, which she has done several times: see for example Re Cwalina (Filing of Writ and Statement of Claim) [2024] VSC 349 at [18]-[22].

39    I accept those submissions.

40    It is for these reasons that Ms Majak’s claims against the State of Victoria will be summarily dismissed.

SAD 49 of 2026

41    By originating application dated 10 March 2026, Ms Majak seeks relief in the following terms:

91.     The Applicant seeks the following relief concerning the legality of Commonwealth executive power:

A.     Travel restriction relief

(1)     A declaration that:

(a)     no lawful travel restriction affecting the Applicant presently exists; or

(b)     any such restriction is invalid for want of statutory authority.

(2)     An order in the nature of mandamus requiring the Respondents to:

(a)    confirm whether any travel restriction or alert affecting the Applicant currently exists;

(b)     identify the statutory authority relied upon; and

(c)     identify the officer responsible for its imposition or maintenance.

(3)     An injunction restraining the Commonwealth and its officers from maintaining or enforcing any travel restriction unsupported by express statutory authority.

(4)     An order requiring removal of any administrative alert preventing the Applicant’s departure, if such alert exists.

B.     Declaratory relief about property regimes

(5)     A declaration concerning the legal interaction between the receivership and the bankruptcy regime affecting the Applicant’s property, including that the Applicant’s proprietary interests were subjected to simultaneous coercive control by:

(a)     a court-appointed receiver in proceedings in the Family Court of Australia; and

(b)     a trustee in bankruptcy appointed pursuant to the Bankruptcy Act.

(6)    A declaration that the Applicant’s proprietary interests were interfered with in circumstances where the legality and priority of the receivership and bankruptcy powers had not been judicially determined.

C. General relief

(7)     Such further or other relief as the Court considers appropriate.

42    At subparagraph (2) above, Ms Majak seeks relief in the form of an explanation as to why she had been prevented from leaving Australia.

43    The Commonwealth submits that this was addressed by letter sent by the Australian Government Solicitor dated 17 April 2026 to Ms Majak setting out s 272(1)(c) of the Bankruptcy Act.

44    Section 272(1)(c) provides relevantly:

272    Leaving Australia with intent to defeat creditors etc.

(1)    A person who:

…

(c)    after he or she has become a bankrupt and before he or she is discharged from the bankruptcy, without the consent in writing of the trustee of his or her estate, leaves Australia, or does an act preparatory to leaving Australia;

commits an offence and is punishable, on conviction, if the offence relates to the doing of a thing specified in paragraph (a) or (b), by imprisonment for a period not exceeding 5 years or, in any other case, by imprisonment for a period not exceeding 3 years.

45    The case put by Ms Majak in her oral submissions is that s 272 of the Bankruptcy Act has no effect because she is not an undischarged bankrupt. On this point, she relies upon s 91 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) which states:

91    Exclusion of evidence of judgments and convictions

(1)    Evidence of the decision, or of a finding of fact, in an Australian or overseas proceeding is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact that was in issue in that proceeding.

(2)     Evidence that, under this Part, is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact may not be used to prove that fact even if it is relevant for another purpose.

46    The Commonwealth submits that, to the extent the proceeding developed this way, it is an abuse of process in that Ms Majak seeks to re-agitate the issue of her bankruptcy which has already been litigated and determined. It submits further that the proceedings are vexatious for the same reasons as submitted by the State of Victoria in SAD 35 of 2026 in that they are so obviously untenable as to be manifestly hopeless.

47    Ms Majak also seeks relief in the form of a declaration that her proprietary interests were interfered with when the “legality and priority of the receivership and bankruptcy powers had not been judicially determined”.

48    The Commonwealth submits that Ms Majak, being an undischarged bankrupt, has no standing because her property has vested in the trustee of her bankruptcy.

49    I accept the Commonwealth’s submissions.

Conclusion

50    In both cases, Ms Majak has no prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceedings because they are obviously untenable: s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act. Further, the proceedings do not reveal a reasonable cause of action, are frivolous or vexatious and/or an abuse of process: FCR 26.1(a)-(d).

51    Apart from the merits of both sets of proceedings (or rather lack thereof), Ms Majak remains an undischarged bankrupt, such that she has, in any event, no standing to bring the applications.

52    There will be an order that both proceedings are summarily dismissed.

53    The applicant is to pay the costs of the State of Victoria in SAD 35 of 2026 and the Commonwealth in SAD 49 of 2026 on an indemnity basis as a lump sum to be assessed by a Registrar.

54    In the event Ms Majak contends for a different costs order, she is to file and serve within 5 business days of the publication of these reasons, written submissions (limited to 2 pages, 12-point font and 1.5-line spacing) setting out why a different costs order should be made.

55    Upon receipt of those submissions, the Court will:

(a)    determine if any submissions in response are required from the State of Victoria and/or the Commonwealth; and

(b)    in any event, determine the issue on the papers.

56    On 29 April 2026, Mr Piotr Cwalina filed an interlocutory application seeking to intervene in Action No. SAD 35 of 2026. In light of that matter being summarily dismissed, Mr Cwalina’s application is also dismissed.

57    SAD 35 of 2026 and SAD 49 of 2026 are the third and fourth sets of proceedings brought by Ms Majak in this Court within the space of two months.

58    The subject matter of each of the four sets of proceedings is related to events which commenced in or about 2016, and in each case the proceedings in this Court have been summarily dismissed.

59    Further, as noted in these reasons, on 5 August 2022 Harper J made a vexatious proceedings order pursuant to s 102QB of the Family Law Act.

60    In these circumstances, the Court will hear from the applicant as to why an order should not be made pursuant to s 37AO of the Federal Court of Australia Act.

Associate:

Dated:    23 July 2026