FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Tax Practitioners Board v Buckland (Default Judgment) [2026] FCA 950

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    Pursuant to r 5.23(2) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), judgment be entered against the second respondent for 14 contraventions of s 50-5(1) of the Tax Agent Services Act 2009 (Cth) (TAS Act).

2.    Service of the following relevant documents on the second respondent effected in accordance with order six of the orders made in this proceeding on 21 February 2023, is taken to be effective service of those documents, nunc pro tunc:

(a)    the applicant’s interlocutory application dated 22 June 2026;

(b)    the affidavit of Patrick Anthony Long affirmed 22 June 2026;

(c)    the affidavit of Kenis Ling Fung Chu sworn 22 June 2026; and

(d)    the affidavit of Patrick Anthony Long affirmed 25 June 2026.

3.    Pursuant to s 70-5(1) of the TAS Act, the second respondent, whether by itself, its officers, servants, agents or howsoever otherwise, be permanently restrained from providing tax agent services (as defined in the TAS Act), for a fee or other reward, whilst not a registered tax agent within the meaning of the TAS Act.

4.    By 4.00 pm on 10 July 2026, the applicant file and serve on the respondents written submissions in relation to determining the quantum of any pecuniary penalties to be imposed upon the second respondent in respect of its contraventions of the TAS Act, in addition to the question of costs.

5.    The second respondent pay the applicant’s costs of this interlocutory application, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

HESPE J:

1    Orders were made at the conclusion of the hearing on 25 June 2026 with reasons to follow. These are those reasons.

2    The applicant, the Tax Practitioners Board, alleges that the second respondent contravened s 50-5(1) of the Tax Agent Services Act 2009 (Cth) (TAS Act) on some 14 occasions by providing tax agent services for a fee or other reward while not registered to provide those services. The background and context are set out in Tax Practitioners Board v Buckland (Interim Injunction) [2023] FCA 836 at [1]-[4].

3    This is an interlocutory application filed on 22 June 2026 for default judgment and certain relief as against the second respondent. The Board seeks relevantly pecuniary penalties and a permanent injunction. The consideration of penalties is deferred, pending the outcome of this application.

4    In support of the present interlocutory application, the Board relied on four affidavits affirmed by Mr Patrick Long and an affidavit sworn by Mr Kenis Chu. Messrs Long and Chu are solicitors of MinterEllison which acts for the Board.

5    Section 50-5 of the TAS Act relevantly provides:

(1)    You contravene this subsection if:

(a)    you provide a service that you know, or ought reasonably to know, is a *tax agent service; and

(b)    the tax agent service is not a *BAS service or a *tax (financial) advice service; and

(c)    you charge or receive a fee or other reward for providing the tax agent service; and

(d)    you are not a *registered tax agent; and

(e)    if you provide the tax agent service as a legal service—either:

(i)    you are prohibited, under a *State law or *Territory law that regulates legal practice and the provision of legal services, from providing that tax agent service; or

(ii)    subject to subsection (3), the service consists of preparing, or lodging, a return or a statement in the nature of a return.

Civil penalty:

(a)    for an individual—250 penalty units; and

(b)    for a body corporate—1,250 penalty units.

6    Section 50-35(2) of the TAS Act provides:

Federal Court may order you to pay a pecuniary penalty for contravening a civil penalty provision

…

Court may order you to pay pecuniary penalty

(2)    If the *Federal Court is satisfied that you have contravened a civil penalty provision, the Federal Court may order you to pay to the Commonwealth, for each contravention, the pecuniary penalty that the Federal Court determines is appropriate (but not more than the maximum amount specified for the provision).

7    Section 70-5(1) of the TAS Act provides:

Injunction to restrain or require certain conduct

(1)    If, on the application of the Board, the *Federal Court is satisfied that you have engaged, or are proposing to engage, in conduct that would constitute a contravention of a civil penalty provision, the Federal Court may grant an injunction:

(a)    restraining you from engaging in the conduct; or

(b)    if in the Federal Court’s opinion it is desirable to do so, requiring you to do something.

(2)    Before deciding the application, the *Federal Court may grant an interim injunction:

(a)    restraining you from engaging in conduct; or

(b)    requiring you to do something.

THE PLEADED CASE

8    By its statement of claim, the Board pleads that:

(a)    the second respondent by its officers, servants, agents or other representatives prepared and lodged with the Commissioner of Taxation 14 income tax returns for eight named individuals who were required to give those returns under s 161(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth);

(b)    the second respondent was not at any relevant time registered under the TAS Act as a “registered tax agent”; and

(c)    the services that the second respondent provided constituted a “tax agent service” within the meaning of the TAS Act. It pleads that is so because each of the services provided by the second respondent:

(i)    was not a “BAS service” as defined in the TAS Act;

(ii)    was not a “tax (financial) advice service” as defined in the TAS Act;

(iii)    was not provided as, or as part of, a legal service;

(iv)    related to ascertaining liabilities, obligations or entitlements of the taxpayers that arose, or could arise, under a taxation law;

(v)    related to representing the taxpayers in their dealings with the Commissioner of Taxation; and

(vi)    was provided in circumstances where the taxpayers could reasonably be expected to rely on the [preparation and lodgement of income tax returns for the relevant income tax year with the Commissioner of Taxation] to:

(A)    satisfy liabilities or obligations that arose, or could arise, under a taxation law; and / or

(B)    claim entitlements that arose, or could arise, under a taxation law.

9    It is apparent that the pleading was prepared having regard to the elements of the statutory definition of “tax agent service” in the TAS Act.

10    The Board pleads that the second respondent knew or ought reasonably to have known that the services it provided were characterised as tax agent services. The Board says that such knowledge is to be inferred from the whole of the surrounding circumstances, including:

(a)    the first respondent, Mr Buckland, was a director of the second respondent until at least 9 November 2022;

(b)    the Board issued correspondence to the first respondent on or around 12 July 2018 advising the first respondent that the Board had received information alleging that the first respondent was providing tax agent services for a fee or other reward whilst unregistered;

(c)    the second respondent repeatedly provided income tax return preparation and lodgement services;

(d)    the second respondent’s interactions with the Australian Taxation Office and MyGov;

(e)    on or around 1 December 2021, the second respondent issued correspondence to the Board indicating that:

(i)    the second respondent was informed that the Board had been writing to various parties in relation to financial services provided by the first respondent;

(ii)    the second respondent provides some services in the name of the first respondent; and

(iii)    the bookkeeping and accounting services the second respondent provides were purportedly provided under the auspices of international law agreements and treaties, none of which have been enacted into Australian domestic law.

11    The Board pleads that the second respondent lodged the 14 returns during the period of 21 July 2020 to 25 October 2022, and charged a fee (which appears to have been between $220 and $275) for each return lodged.

12    The statement of claim appends a schedule which particularises each of the 14 alleged contraventions of the TAS Act by the second respondent. The schedule provides the following information with respect to each alleged contravention:

(a)    the approximate date of payment to the second respondent;

(b)    the taxpayer name, being the person for whom the second respondent is alleged to have provided a tax agent service;

(c)    the fee paid for the provision of the tax agent service;

(d)    the date the taxpayer’s income tax return was lodged with the ATO; and

(e)    the income year to which the income tax return relates.

13    Accordingly, the Board alleges, the second respondent contravened s 50-5(1) of the TAS Act.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

14    This proceeding was commenced by originating application filed on 14 October 2022.

15    On 21 February 2023, the Court made orders joining the second respondent as a party to the proceeding. Those orders also relevantly provided for substituted service under rr 10.24(a) or 10.49(a) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) on the second respondent in the following terms:

6.    Pursuant to r 10.24(a) or alternatively r 10.49(a) of the Rules, the applicant may serve any documents filed in these proceedings, including the Amended Originating Application and the Relevant Documents, on the Company by:

(a)    sending an electronic link to download and access any documents filed in these proceedings by email, addressed to the Proper Officer of the Company, at:

(i)    apatnaseasons@gmail.com;

(ii)    apatnaseasons@protonmail.com;

(iii)    apat_na_seasons@mailfence.com; and

(iv)    jmv@vcolaw.com; or

(b)    sending a copy of the documents in PDF form as attachments to one or more emails addressed to the “Proper Officer” of the Company at the email addresses specified in subparagraph (a).

16    On 9 March 2023, Mr Long sent an email to the four email addresses identified in the 21 February 2023 orders (the Email Addresses). That email was addressed in its body to the Proper Officer of the second respondent and attached a copy of the 21 February 2023 orders, the Amended Originating Application and a Form 26A (in accordance with r 10.43B of the Rules). The email included a link which enabled the download and access of the Relevant Documents identified in the 21 February 2023 orders. On the same day, Mr Long subsequently sent six further emails to the Email Addresses, each addressed in their body to the “Proper Officer” of the second respondent, attaching piecemeal PDF copies of the documents identified in the 21 February 2023 orders.

17    Shortly after sending his initial email on 9 March 2023, Mr Long received an email notifying him that the email sent to apatnaseasons@protonmail.com could not be delivered (a bounceback email) because the recipient’s “mailbox is full”. Mr Long did not receive a similar notification in respect of the balance of the Email Addresses.

18    The Board via its solicitors made repeated attempts to notify the second respondent of case management hearings and orders made in the proceeding.

19    On 31 March 2023 and 4 April 2023, Mr Long sent an email to the Email Addresses notifying the second respondent of a case management hearing listed in the proceeding for 12 May 2023. Immediately subsequent to the sending of both of these emails, Mr Long received a bounceback email from apatnaseasons@protonmail.com but not from the other email addresses.

20    The Board filed an interlocutory application on 2 June 2023 seeking to restrain the first and second respondents from providing tax agent services on an interim basis.

21    On 8 June 2023, Mr Long sent an email addressed in its body to the Proper Officer of the second respondent to the Email Addresses other than apatnaseasons@protonmail.com. The email attached by way of service sealed copies of the interlocutory application filed on 2 June 2023 and two affidavits upon which the Board intended to rely at final hearing.

22    On 9 June 2023, Mr Long sent an email to the Email Addresses other than apatnaseasons@protonmail.com notifying the second respondent of the case management hearing listed on 14 June 2023 which concerned the preparations for hearing the Board’s 2 June 2023 interlocutory application. No representative for the second respondent attended the case management hearing on 14 June 2023.

23    On 15 June 2023:

(a)    Mr Long sent an email to the Email Addresses other than apatnaseasons@protonmail.com attaching a copy of the transcript from the case management hearing conducted on 14 June 2023; and

(b)    Mr Long sent a further email to the Email Addresses other than apatnaseasons@protonmail.com attaching a copy of the orders made by the Court on 14 June 2023.

24    On 25 July 2023, this Court ordered that, until the hearing and determination of the originating application or further order, the first and second respondents be restrained from preparing and lodging income tax returns for taxpayers for a fee or other reward whilst not a registered tax agent within the meaning of the TAS Act: Buckland (Interim Injunction).

25    On 12 September 2023, the Court made orders granting the Board leave to proceed against the second respondent in the proceedings pursuant to r 10.43D of the Rules. The second respondent was ordered to file a defence by 16 November 2023.

26    On 14 September 2023, Mr Chu sent an email to the Email Addresses attaching orders made by the Court on 12 September 2023 and notifying the second respondent of a case management hearing listed on 21 November 2023.

27    On 19 October 2023, Mr Chu sent an email to the Email Addresses attaching by way of service the Amended Originating Application and Statement of Claim dated 18 October 2023.

28    On 14 June 2024, Mr Long sent an email to the Email Addresses other than apatnaseasons@protonmail.com attaching by way of service two affidavits upon which the Board intended to rely at final hearing.

29    On 24 June 2024, Mr Long sent an email to the Email Addresses, other than apatnaseasons@protonmail.com, attaching orders made by the Court on 10 May 2024 and by way of service a further affidavit of a taxpayer upon which the Board intended to rely at final hearing.

30    On 19 June 2025, the second respondent filed a Notice of Address for Service appointing Mr Jeff Thompson as its lawyer.

31    On 13 August 2025, the Court made orders referring the proceeding to mediation and timetabling, amongst other things, the filing of a defence by the second respondent contingent upon the proceeding not resolving at the mediation.

32    The proceeding did not resolve at mediation. The second respondent did not file and has not filed a defence.

33    On 23 September 2025, in correspondence sent to the Court, Mr Thompson expressed the second respondent’s intention to file an interlocutory application seeking the dismissal or stay of the proceedings as against the second respondent by reason of the Court lacking jurisdiction over the second respondent or that the Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over the second respondent. The letter provided:

The Second Respondent reserves all rights in relation to jurisdiction and does not intend to take further substantive steps in the proceedings until its proposed interlocutory application … is determined.

34    On 25 September 2025, Mr Thompson appeared for the second respondent at a case management hearing. On 29 September 2025, the Court made orders providing at order 4:

[b]y 4.00pm on 13 October 2025, the Second Respondent may file and serve any interlocutory application in relation to the application of r 10.43A of the Rules and any supporting affidavit and submissions. Submissions are limited to 10 pages with 1.5 line spacing and a font size of at least 12 points throughout.

35    The second respondent did not file an interlocutory application by 13 October 2025 and has not done so since.

36    On 14 October 2025 and 20 October 2025, Chambers by way of email to the parties requested an update from Mr Thompson concerning the second respondent’s proposed interlocutory application. No response to these emails was received.

37    On 22 October 2025, Chambers by way of email to the parties requested the second respondent to confirm when it would file a defence.

38    On 29 October 2025, Chambers notified the parties by way of email that, if the Court did not receive a response by 31 October 2025, the Court would proceed on the assumption that the second respondent would not file a defence.

39    The Court did not receive any further correspondence from Mr Thompson.

40    On 2 November 2025, Mr Thompson filed a notice of ceasing to act. This notice identified the second respondent’s last known residential or business address as one of the Email Addresses. Contrary to r 4.05(2) of the Rules, the second respondent did not file a notice of address for service within five days of the notice of ceasing to act being filed.

41    Around April 2026, the Board received a letter purportedly sent by the second respondent. The letter referred to the “ongoing Court proceedings” and describe some access to software and hardware the second respondent intended to provide in Australia to facilitate the preparation and lodgement of tax returns. The letter stated in relation to those proposed services that “Apat na Seasons Pilipinas Corporation Inc [sic] does not accept that the [Board] holds jurisdiction over it ... or the services it provides”.

42    On 6 May 2026, Mr Long sent an email to Mr Thompson requesting confirmation about whether he continued to act for the second respondent in this proceeding. Mr Long deposed that he had not received a response from Mr Thompson as at 22 June 2026.

43    On 22 June 2026, Mr Long sent an email to the Email Addresses addressed in its body to the Proper Officer of the second respondent and attaching the interlocutory application dated 22 June 2026 and an affidavit of Mr Long and an affidavit of Mr Chu. On 23 June 2026, Mr Long sent an email to the Email Addresses attaching sealed copies of these documents. Immediately following each of these emails, Mr Long received a bounceback email in respect of apatnaseasons@protonmail.com but not from the other email addresses.

44    On 25 June 2026, Mr Long sent an email to the Court, copying the Email Addresses other than jmv@vcolaw.com and attaching three of the affidavits relied upon by the Board in support of the present interlocutory application. The body of the email referred to the present interlocutory application against the second respondent.

45    The Email Addresses other than jmv@vcolaw.com were copied on all correspondence sent to the Court and by Chambers to the parties relating to the hearing of the present interlocutory application.

DEFAULT JUDGMENT PRINCIPLES

46    Section 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) provides:

The Court has power, in relation to matters in which it has jurisdiction, to make orders of such kinds, including interlocutory orders, and to issue, or direct the issue of, writs of such kinds, as the Court thinks appropriate.

47    Rule 5.22 of the Rules provides:

A party is in default if the party fails to:

(a)    do an act required to be done, or to do an act in the time required, by these Rules; or

(b)    comply with an order of the Court; or

(c)    attend a hearing in the proceeding; or

(d)    prosecute or defend the proceeding with due diligence.

48    Rule 5.23 of the Rules relevantly provides:

(2)    If a respondent is in default, an applicant may apply to the Court for:

…

(c)    if the proceeding was started by an originating application supported by a statement of claim or an alternative accompanying document referred to in rule 8.05, or if the Court has ordered that the proceeding continue on pleadings—an order giving judgment against the respondent for the relief claimed in the statement of claim or alternative accompanying document to which the Court is satisfied that the applicant is entitled; or …

49    In order to be satisfied that an applicant is entitled to the relief sought in r 5.23(2)(c) of the Rules, the Court must be satisfied that a respondent has been served with the relevant documents and that the Court has jurisdiction to grant the relief: Speedo Holdings B.V. v Evans (No 2) [2011] FCA 1227 at [18] (Flick J).

50    The principles applicable to the power to enter default judgment were summarised by Yates J in Chamberlain Group, Inc v Giant Alarm System Co, Ltd (No 2) [2019] FCA 1606 as follows:

[13]    The power to give judgment against a defaulting party is undoubtedly discretionary. The discretion must be exercised cautiously. Where the defaulting party is a respondent to a pleaded claim, the giving of judgment for final relief on the application will deliver complete success to the applicant without investigation of the merits of the pleaded claim: ACOHS Pty Ltd v Ucorp Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 577 at [27]. There is no requirement that the act or acts of default be intentional or amount to contumelious conduct. There is no requirement that the act or acts of default result in inordinate or inexcusable delay. That said, such features, if present, will be relevant to the exercise of the Court's discretion. So too will conduct that persuades the Court that the defaulting party is manifesting an inability or unwillingness to cooperate with the Court and the other party or parties to the proceeding.

[14]    Rule 5.23(2)(c) requires the Court to be satisfied that the applicant is entitled to the relief claimed in the statement of claim. This requirement has been interpreted as meaning that the Court must be satisfied that “on the face of the statement of claim” the applicant is entitled to the relief that is claimed. It is not a requirement that the applicant prove its claim by way of evidence. Put another way, the facts alleged in the statement of claim are taken to have been admitted: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Dataline.Net.Au Pty Ltd [2007] FCAFC 146; 161 FCR 513 at [42]. If, on inspection of the statement of claim, the Court is satisfied that the applicant would be entitled to the relief sought then this requirement of r 5.23(2)(c) will be met: CNIP Pty Ltd v Chan & Naylor Norwest Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 1170 at [18] – [19]; Speedo Holdings B.V. v Evans (No 2) [2011] FCA 1227 at [23]. The Court may permit further evidence to be adduced, but not evidence that would alter the pleaded case: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Dataline.Net.Au Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1427; 236 ALR 665 at [45], [48] – [50]; United Broadcasting International Pty Ltd v Turkplus Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCA 1413 at [42] – [44]; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Yellow Page Marketing BV (No 2) [2011] FCA 352; 195 FCR 1 at [62] – [63].

51    The Court has entered default judgment in circumstances where the applicant has sought civil penalties and declarations: for example, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v EDirect Pty Ltd (in liq) [2012] FCA 976; (2012) 206 FCR 160 (Reeves J); Australian Communications and Media Authority v Getaway Escapes Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 795 (Rangiah J) and Fair Work Ombudsman v IE Enterprises Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 848 (Anderson J).

52    An overriding consideration in the exercise of the discretion to make an order under r 5.23 is whether any injustice would flow from such an order: Professional Administration Service Centres Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2012] FCAFC 180 at [43] (Edmonds, McKerracher and Nicholas JJ). The Full Court articulated at [44] a number of non-exhaustive matters that it considered ought to be taken into account in forming a view as to whether to exercise the discretion (noting that that case concerned a defaulting applicant):

(i)    the nature of the default involved;

(ii)    the duration of the default and whether it is continuing;

(iii)    the circumstances in which the orders, in respect of which default has occurred, were made including whether the orders made accorded with the practice of the court in making orders of that kind;

(iv)    the circumstances which occurred between the time of making the orders and the order for the dismissal of the proceeding, including whether any attempt was made by the defaulting party to amend or set aside the orders to accommodate or deal with these intervening circumstances;

(v)    whether the continuing default is occasioning unnecessary delay, expense or other prejudice or unacceptable burden on the respondent;

(vi)    the attitude of the applicant to the default and the court's judgment as to whether or not the applicant genuinely wishes the matter to go to trial within a reasonable period;

(vii)    the stage that the proceeding has reached - whether they have only recently been commenced; whether it has been commenced for some time but not advanced due, in whole or in part, to the default; or whether the proceeding is in an advanced state ready or nearly ready for hearing;

(viii)    the likely disruption to hearing dates or, if not fixed, to setting the matter down for hearing at an early date;

(ix)    the consequences to the applicant of dismissing the proceeding.

CONSIDERATION

53    For the reasons given in Buckland (Interim Injunction), the Court is satisfied that this Court has jurisdiction in the present matter. There is a clear jurisdictional nexus given that each of the individuals in respect of whom the second respondent (including its officers, servants, representatives or agents) provided income tax return preparation and lodgement services were residents of and physically located in Australia.

54    The Court is satisfied that the second respondent was served, in accordance with the order for substituted service, with the originating process and affidavits in support and is aware of the proceeding. The second respondent failed to file a notice of address for service as required by r 4.05(2) of the Rules. A company must not proceed in the Court other than by a lawyer: r 4.01(2) of the Rules. At no point after Mr Thompson filed a notice of ceasing to act did the second respondent seek for the Court to dispense with r 4.01(2). The second respondent is in continuing default pursuant to rr 5.22(a)-(b) of the Rules.

55    The Court is satisfied that the second respondent was on notice of the case management hearings on 12 May 2023, 14 June 2023 and 21 November 2023. The second respondent failed to attend those case management hearings and is accordingly in default pursuant to r 5.22(c) of the Rules.

56    Order 5 of the 12 September 2023 orders required the second respondent to file a defence by 16 November 2023. It did not do so by that date and has not done so. The second respondent is accordingly in default pursuant to r 5.22(b) of the Rules.

57    Given the defaults, the Court is empowered to make orders pursuant to r 5.23(2)(c) of the Rules.

58    The second respondent was represented between 19 June 2025 and 2 November 2025 and foreshadowed that it would file an interlocutory application challenging the jurisdiction of the Court. No such application has been filed and the second respondent’s legal representative filed a notice of ceasing to act on 2 November 2025.

59    It is apparent that the second respondent has made a decision to not engage in these proceedings. It has evinced no intention to defend the proceedings or proffered any explanation for the various defaults. Indeed, by the correspondence sent to the Court on 23 September 2025, the second respondent evinced an intention not to take a step in the proceeding until its interlocutory application was determined. The second respondent never filed the foreshadowed interlocutory application. Apart from Mr Thompson’s attendance at the case management hearing held on 25 September 2025 and related correspondence sent prior to that case management hearing, the second respondent has not engaged with the Court. The second respondent has also not responded to communication from the Board in relation to this proceeding.

60    For the reasons consistent with those given in Buckland (Interim Injunction), the Court is satisfied that on the face of the statement of claim the Board is entitled to the relief that is claimed. The elements of the claimed contraventions are pleaded.

61    By its failure to file a defence, and pursuant to the principles cited at [46] and [49] above, the second respondent is taken to have admitted the facts pleaded against it in the statement of claim. Accordingly, the second respondent is taken to have admitted that it provided tax agent services within the meaning of the TAS Act on 14 occasions for a fee or reward, whilst not a registered tax agent. It is also taken to have admitted that on each occasion when it provided those services it knew or ought reasonably to have known that they bore the characteristics of tax agent services as defined. It follows that the Board has established the second respondent’s contraventions.

62    Whilst noting that default judgment should not be entered lightly, in the circumstances of this case the Court is satisfied that it is appropriate to enter judgment in default under r 5.23(2)(c). The Court is satisfied that there is no reasonable prospect that the second respondent will engage with or seek to defend these proceedings.

RELIEF SOUGHT BY THE BOARD

63    Although initially sought, the Board has not pressed its claim for declaratory relief. The Court has a wide discretionary power to grant declaratory relief pursuant to s 21 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). In the present circumstances where the second respondent is a contravener located outside of Australia with no public profile in Australia and which, by its conduct, has not recognised the authority of this Court, the Court is not satisfied of the utility of the declarations sought. The Court is not satisfied that a declaration will have any meaningful deterrent effect.

Injunctive relief

64    Having regard to the terms of s 70-5(1) of the TAS Act, the Court is satisfied that the second respondent has contravened a civil penalty provision, being s 50-5(1) of the TAS Act, and, having regard to the repetitive nature of the conduct and at least some indication that the second respondent intends to offer some sort of services to Australian residents, the Court considers it appropriate that the interim injunction granted by the Court be made permanent as against the second respondent.

65    The terms of the injunction sought by the Board are sufficiently clear, and there will be an order in the terms sought.

PECUNIARY PENALTIES AND COSTS

66    The issue of pecuniary penalties and costs will be dealt with on the papers.

Associate:

Dated:    21 July 2026