Federal Court of Australia

Puru v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 937

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The application for an extension of time be granted.

2.    The application for review be allowed.

3.    The first respondent to pay the costs of the applicant to be agreed or assessed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ABRAHAM J:

1    The applicant was born in New Zealand. She arrived in Australia at 16 years of age on 30 May 1996 on a Class TY, Subclass 444 Special Category (Temporary) Visa. On 2 March 2001, the applicant was convicted of aggravated robbery in the District Court of New South Wales in Newcastle, for which she was sentenced to a suspended term of imprisonment of two years. She was sentenced to additional terms of imprisonment on 10 August 2005, 9 January 2007 and 19 December 2024. On 10 January 2025, the applicant’s visa was mandatorily cancelled. On 16 January 2025, the applicant sought the mandatory cancellation of her visa be revoked, which was refused on 31 July 2025. On 23 October 2025, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) affirmed the decision not to revoke the cancellation.

2    This is an application for an extension of time in which to apply for a review of that decision. The extension of time was not opposed by the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (Minister). In those circumstances, and given the grounds of review, the extension of time is granted. The hearing proceeded as a review of the Tribunal’s decision. During the hearing, leave was granted to add two further grounds of review, with an opportunity given to both parties to provide additional written submissions to address those grounds.

3    The applicant raised five grounds of review (including the additional grounds), being:

(1)    The Tribunal’s decision is affected by apprehended bias and/or constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction;

(2)    The Tribunal erred in characterising the applicant’s offending at T[99] in a legally unreasonable way;

(3)    The Tribunal failed to comply with paragraph 8.4 of Direction No 110: Visa refusal and cancellation under section 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under section 501CA (7 June 2024) (Direction 110);

(4)    The Tribunal misconstrued Direction 110 and failed to perform its statutory task in relation to T[95] and [99]-[100]; and

(5)    The Tribunal misconstrued or misapplied paragraph 7(2) of Direction 110.

4    The application for the extension of time is granted. For the reasons below, the review application is also granted.

Grounds of review

Ground 1 – apprehended bias/constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction

5    This ground is based on the fact aspects of the Tribunal reasons are identical (or nearly identical) to a previous decision by the same Tribunal Member, being Abbas and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (Migration) [2025] ARTA 1343 (Abbas), such that the inference is they had been copied from those reasons and included in the current reasons. Abbas was also a case where the Member dismissed an application for review of a decision by a delegate of the Minister to cancel an applicant’s visa, following a finding they did not pass the character test. As Ms Puru submitted, there is otherwise no factual commonality between the two cases. The applicant provided an Aide Memoire that highlighted those aspects of the Tribunal’s reasons that corresponded with sections of Abbas. The Minister properly conceded these had been copied from that decision. In submissions, the parties proceeded on the basis sections had been copied from Abbas and pasted into the current decision. However, given the nature of the information from Abbas that appeared in the Tribunal’s reasons, what likely occurred is that Abbas was used as a base template, with paragraphs removed and the applicant’s information inserted. In response to a question from the Court, the Minister conceded as much.

6    In ground 1 the applicant identified the following sections in the Tribunal’s reasons which relate to the Abbas reasons.

7    First, the Tribunal reasons stated at T[27] that the applicant had been found guilty on 5 September 2024 of five counts of sexually touching another person without consent:

In this case, on 5 September 2024 the Applicant was found guilty by the Local Court of New South Wales at Gosford of five counts of sexually touching another person without consent and sentenced to an aggregate term of 15 months imprisonment (‘the index offence’). Having been sentenced to a term of imprisonment greater than 12 months, the Applicant concedes that he does not pass the character test for the purposes of the Act.

8    That was followed by T[28]:

Based on the Applicant’s own admission and the documentation provided, the Tribunal finds that the Applicant has a substantial criminal record for the purposes of s 501(6)(a) and s 501(7)(c) of the Act. The Tribunal finds that the Applicant does not pass the character test and that the requirements of s 501CA(4)(b)(i) are not met. As a result, the Applicant cannot rely on s 501CA(4)(1)(a) of the Act for the cancellation of his visa to be revoked.

9    Paragraphs T[27]-[28] are identical to paragraphs [21]-[22] in Abbas, which summarise Mr Abbas’ index offences and his admission that he did not pass the character test. The applicant does not have such convictions. Her index offence involved two counts of aggravated robbery, to which she pleaded guilty in 2001, and was sentenced to a suspended term of two years’ imprisonment. This is correctly described at T[6], [32]-[34] and [40]-[41].

10    Second, under the heading ‘The strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia’, the Tribunal identified the applicant's immediate family as follows at T[62]:

Paragraph 8.3(1) of Direction 110 provides that the Tribunal must consider any impact of the decision on the non-citizen's immediate family members in Australia. In this case, the Applicant’s immediate family are his father, stepmother, two brothers, two stepbrothers and a stepsister.

11    That paragraph summarises the members of Mr Abbas’ family and corresponds with paragraph [65] in Abbas. The Tribunal later correctly described the applicant’s immediate family in Australia as comprising her “mother, brother, sister-in law, adult son and adult daughter and two minor sons”: T[67].

12    Third, there are several other incorrect details in the Tribunal reasons that do not pertain to the applicant’s case and are instead reflective of Mr Abbas’ case. The Tribunal referred to the female applicant using male pronouns at T[27], [28], [62] and [91]. These paragraphs are identical to [21], [22], and [65], and almost identical to [92], in Abbas. In addition, the certification page at the end of the reasons recorded the incorrect hearing dates and the appearance of legal representatives for the applicant and respondent, which are those applicable in Abbas. Ms Puru was unrepresented in the Tribunal proceedings. The fact this page is identical to the certification page in Abbas supports the inference the Member used Abbas as a base template and extracted sections out, as opposed to copying and pasting sections from Abbas into a new document prepared for the applicant’s case.

13    The applicant also pointed to particular passages of the Tribunal reasons as reflective of adopting sections of the reasoning or evaluative process from Abbas including in T[84], [95] and [99], which I return to below.

14    The applicant also submitted that, when describing the weight to be given to various considerations that were present in both Ms Puru’s and Ms Abbas’ cases, the Tribunal used identical language to that in Abbas: e.g. T[43], [57], [71] and [84].

15    Against that background I turn to the submissions.

16    The applicant approached ground 1 from two alternative perspectives: that is, the conduct establishes apprehended bias or it demonstrates constructive failure by the Tribunal to exercise jurisdiction. As explained in MZZZW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 133; (2015) 234 FCR 154 (MZZZW) at [30], an error by the Tribunal of this nature can be expressed in a number of ways, including apprehended bias, a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction, and a failure to discharge its statutory function or task.

17    As to apprehended bias, the applicant referred to the test being whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the decision-maker might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question to be decided: CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 50; (2019) 268 CLR 76 at [56]. She submitted both aspects of that test are satisfied as a reasonable observer might consider the Tribunal might not have brought an impartial mind to the determination of the review, because of the errors in the Tribunal’s reasons described above. That is, a fair-minded lay observer might apprehend the Tribunal might have made a decision otherwise than on the merits of the applicant’s case (and instead on the merits of another’s case). The applicant also submitted the fair-minded observer would have been aware of the material objective facts, including that the Member had a previous decision quashed because the Tribunal failed to undertake its statutory task in a material way in DZH16 v Minister for Immigration [2020] FCCA 1041. The applicant relied on Webb v The Queen [1994] HCA 30; (1994) 181 CLR 41 at 73, where Deane J stated that “[t]he fair-minded lay observer is taken to have a broad knowledge of the material objective facts”.

18    For example, the applicant submitted the attribution of a sexual touching conviction might have led the Tribunal to make a decision other than on the merits of her case. This is because: sexual touching is an offence of an inherently prejudicial nature, and the sexual touching offence in Abbas was committed against a minor; the stated offence occurred recently in 2024, whereas the applicant’s index offence occurred in 2001; the Tribunal stated the applicant had been found guilty, whereas she pleaded guilty to her index offence; the offence was for five counts, whereas her index offence involved two counts; and the Tribunal stated she had been sentenced for a term of imprisonment, whereas in 2001 she was given a suspended sentence. Similarly, the applicant submitted the error in identifying her family members might lead a fair-minded observer to conclude the Member might have attributed weight to the consideration of ties to the community, based on links to wrongly identified family members.

19    Alternatively, the applicant submitted the Tribunal constructively failed to exercise jurisdiction and/or failed to discharge its statutory review task.

20    The applicant submitted the nature of the elements copied from Abbas mean the Tribunal did not bring an independent mind to the consideration of the applicant’s case, referring to the matters identified above. The applicant relied upon MZZZW to support the submission that the copying in this case amounted to “an abdication of the Tribunal’s task”: MZZZW at [43]. In that case, MZZZW succeeded on judicial review of a Tribunal decision to affirm a decision of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (as the Minister was then known) to refuse him a protection visa. The Court remitted the matter to a differently constituted Tribunal for rehearing, where the Minister’s decision was affirmed. In doing so, the Tribunal extensively copied passages from the original decision, including passages dealing with findings of credibility about MZZZW and whether his claims could be accepted. The Full Court of this Court held the Tribunal, by adopting the views of a different constituted Tribunal about the same applicant, failed to discharge its statutory task.

21    The applicant submitted that, similarly to MZZZW (at [66]), the statutory function or task of the Tribunal in the present case included performing an independent review, making the correct or preferable decision, and giving a statement of its reasons: see e.g. ss 7, 9, 56(1), 105 and 111 of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) (ART Act). The applicant did not contend that copying from a previous decision necessarily gives rise to jurisdictional error, recognising that it is acceptable to, for example, use standard paragraphs to set out the applicable law for the decision under review (provided they are correct): see e.g. MZZZW at [71]. Rather, the applicant submitted that in the present case the Member copied sections in relation to both the circumstances of an individual applicant and evaluative passages: see e.g. MZZZW at [72].

22    The applicant submitted the extent, nature, context and degree of the copying from Abbas, including: with respect to the applicant’s index offence; whether the applicant had made an admission that “he” did not pass the character test; the composition of the applicant’s immediate family in Australia, the applicant’s gender; and whether she had been legally represented, mean that this Court, on an overall impression, would be satisfied the Member did not bring an independent mind to the consideration of her case: see MZZZW at [31] and [66]. During written and oral submissions, the applicant highlighted T[95] and [99] as reflecting that evaluative reasoning from Abbas was also copied. She also referred to T[91], which purported to deal with the extent of impediments that she may face if she is removed, for the purpose of paragraph 9.2 of Direction 110. She submitted the failure to bring an independent mind is particularly evident given the Tribunal purportedly addressed her individual circumstances in a decision that involved a fact-sensitive, evaluative balancing exercise as to whether it was satisfied that there was “another reason” why the mandatory cancellation should be revoked: see e.g. s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act), CRNL v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 138 (CRNL) at [35], and LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 280 CLR 321 at [33].

23    The applicant relies on the reasoning in MZZZW including at [59]-[60]:

[59]    […] What the extract does reveal is the underlying assumption in a scheme such as Pt 7 (or for that matter any merits review scheme which has similar features, including constitution of a body by particular members) that the member constituted to the review will bring her own mind to bear on the issues arising in the review, freed not only from infections such as prejudgment or other bias but from the inevitable constraints on thought, consideration and reflection which flow from the adoption of not only the conclusions of others, but the way those conclusions have been formulated and framed in language.

[60]    As Beazley J stated in Huluba, merits review involves considering an application for review, and the arguments and claims put forward in it, “afresh”. In SZDFZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 168 FCR 1 at [20] — to which we refer below — Flick J spoke of a reconstituted tribunal being called upon to “resolve afresh the claims made”…In our opinion “afresh” is simply a shorthand way of saying “with fresh eyes”, and is intended to encapsulate the essence of merits review, and indeed its strength in any robust process of administrative decision-making: namely, that within the limits of the applicable law, a new decision-maker brings her or his own perspectives, approach and reasoning to the claims made by an applicant for review. ….

24    And [66]:

Taking all the circumstances into account, including reading the reasons published [by the Member] as fairly as we can, we are not satisfied [the Member] brought an independent mind to the consideration of the appellant’s claims. She failed to discharge the statutory task imposed on the Tribunal to consider an applicant’s claims on review for itself, afresh (as we have explained that term) and to make the decision which the Tribunal, as constituted, considers the correct and preferable one. The Tribunal’s task includes exposing the reasoning of that Tribunal, as constituted, for making material findings of fact and setting out the material on which those findings are based, not the reasons of some other decision-maker. Necessarily, a conclusion of this kind involves the Court forming an overall impression, and it is one on which it is possible reasonable judicial minds might differ. However, we have reached a clear and unanimous opinion that, having failed to perform the task imposed by the statute, the Tribunal’s decision must be set aside.

25    And [72]:

It concerns the Tribunal member adopting the reasoning processes, findings and conclusions of another member about the same applicant as if they were her own. …

26    As referred to above, the Minister accepted the Tribunal’s reasons contained paragraphs (and passages) that pertained to a different review applicant. However, the Minister submitted these were typographical errors that did not materially affect the Tribunal’s decision. For example, the errors were said to be so obvious that the fair-minded lay observer would attribute them to drafting and editing carelessness, rather than matters that were legitimately taken into account in the decision-making process. In relation to the reference to the conviction for sexual touching, the Minister submitted the analysis thereafter at T[32]-[40] is of the applicant’s convictions, correctly stated. So too, following the misidentification of her immediate family, the Tribunal identified the correct members at T[67] and proceeded with analysis that was relevant to them at T[68]-[71] and [73]-[76]. The Minister submitted that, even taken together, the mistaken references to another review applicant would not lead the lay observer to question the Tribunal’s partiality. Referring to Isbester v Knox City Council [2015] HCA 20; (2015) 255 CLR 135 at [20], it was submitted the lay observer is aware of the legal and statutory context of decision-making. Tribunal members operate in an environment of high-volume decision-making, often with decision-making time pressures: see e.g. s 500(6L)(c) of the Migration Act.

27    The Minister submitted that in such a high-volume decision-making environment, it is not inherently problematic for Tribunal members to employ strategies that save time in preparing written reasons. It was submitted the question of whether copying amounts to an error going to jurisdiction is an evaluative question for the Court and requires the Court to form an overall impression: see MZZZW at [66]. It is a question to be answered objectively: LVR (WA) Pty Ltd v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2012] FCAFC 90; (2012) 203 FCR 166 (LVR) at [92]. That said, the Minister accepted the Tribunal must in fact perform its task as required: see MZZZW at [69]. The Minister submitted the key issue before the Full Court in MZZZW was the wholesale adoption of opinions of a previously constituted Tribunal. In respect of the current decision, it was submitted that while the Tribunal engaged in “short cut” drafting, no case-specific reasoning from the earlier decision was included. The findings were not replicated credit findings made by another decision-maker, as occurred in MZZZW. It was submitted the Tribunal’s reasons indicate it did not give the applicant a “short cut” version of administrative justice with a “patched together” decision: cf MZZZW at [70]. That is because the reasons explain the Tribunal’s findings by reference to the material before it, and indicate the Tribunal engaged with that material. The Minister accepted errors were made in the preparation of the reasons. However, he submitted they are not errors that demonstrate the Tribunal did not attend to the review as required under the ART Act and Migration Act.

Consideration

28    While the applicant advanced two alternate bases for this ground, given the nature of the submissions and the content of the Tribunal reasons, in my view the appropriate issue to first consider is whether or not the Tribunal has discharged its statutory role. The Court “must decide whether it is satisfied that the Tribunal brought its own independent mind to bear on what would be the correct and preferable decision on the review”: MZZZW at [31]. That is to be answered by objective assessment: LVR at [92]. It is “necessary to examine not only the extent of the copying, but its nature, context and degree”: MZZZW at [31].

29    There is no dispute that passages of the reasons in this case were copied from the Member’s reasons in Abbas, a decision delivered approximately two months prior to the applicant’s decision. As explained above, given the errors in the reasons, these are likely to have arisen by using Abbas as a template and removing paragraphs from it (and adding others that relate to the applicant and her circumstances). It was not suggested that is relevantly any different from the Tribunal copying and pasting passages from Abbas into a fresh document. In considering ground 1, some of the other grounds will also be addressed. Although the applicant framed the grounds separately, grounds 2, 4 and 5 relate to passages of the reasons that were copied from the Abbas decision, and were relied on by the applicant in establishing the first ground.

30    It may readily be accepted that jurisdictional error is not necessarily established simply because a member of the Tribunal copied aspects of previous reasons they had drafted. What impact, if any, arises from the use of aspects copied from a previous decision, necessarily depends on the on the facts and reasons of the case. As Halley J observed in XYJY v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FCA 1572 at [68], in respect to a similar factual scenario where a Tribunal member used previous reasons as a template for a decision:

The overwhelming majority of the 56 paragraphs of the Statement of Reasons that the applicant has demonstrated were included in other decisions of the Tribunal member are relatively anodyne and contain material that is equally applicable to all applications for judicial review of a migration decision. It can readily be inferred from the extent to which these paragraphs are also found in Clark and LKQD that a template has been used to prepare the Statement of Reasons. The use of a template to prepare reasons in itself is not inappropriate. The use of a template in circumstances where there is a prescribed and explicit regulatory and statutory framework can promote consistency in reasoning, ensuring all relevant matters are addressed, and the time taken to prepare the statement of reasons is reduced. At the same time, the use of a template can present dangers if material is not rigorously edited to ensure that the statement of reasons, on its face, makes it clear that it is directed at the particular matter before the Tribunal and demonstrates that an independent mind had been brought to the determination of the issues before the Tribunal.

31    While the applicant submitted there are many editing and typographical errors in the Tribunal decision, that was not the thrust of her contention. Rather, the focus of her submissions were passages where the individual circumstances of another review applicant and the evaluation of those circumstances had been imported into her decision.

32    To begin, it may be accepted that in this case the paragraphs in the reasons that describe the contents of Direction 110 and set out the legal principles in relation to this are identical with those in Abbas. As a general proposition that in of itself is not an unusual feature of reasons, and ordinarily would not, without more, establish jurisdictional error. As the applicant accepted, to a certain extent it is permissible for a decision-maker to rely on generic statements of principle from previous decisions. This is especially true as Tribunal members publish decisions in a high-volume decision-making environment. However, the extent and nature of the passages taken from Abbas does not reflect that the Member merely relied on a previous decision to restate general principles.

33    Further, it may also be accepted that large portions of the reasons refer to and make findings in relation to the specific circumstances of the applicant’s case. For example, as submitted by the Minister, in respect to T[27] (which refers to Mr Abbas’ conviction for sexual touching), the analysis that follows under the sub-heading ‘Nature and seriousness of the conduct’ at T[32]-[40] relates to the applicant’s convictions, correctly stated. However, that submission fails to grapple with the nature of the error. Paragraph T[27] appears under the heading, ‘The character test’. That brief section consists of three paragraphs, all of which are in identical terms to the Abbas reasons at [20] – [22]. Paragraph T[26] provides a generic statement of the legal principles to be applied in determining whether an applicant passes the character test under s 501(6) of the Migration Act. However, this is followed by T[27], which reflects that the copying from Abbas is not confined to a recitation of legal principles, or to matters of general application. This paragraph relates to a topic which required the Member to apply the applicant’s specific circumstances to the assessment under Direction 110. Paragraph T[27] provides the only explanation in the reasons for the Tribunal’s conclusion in T[28] that the applicant does not pass the character test (recited above at [7]-[8]). The Tribunal reasons do not contain a finding on this topic having been made in relation to Ms Puru circumstances. The Minister submitted that T[27] does not relate to the applicant’s conviction, is obvious. However, that does not assist, but rather highlights, at the very least, the significant lack of attention by the Tribunal to the task at hand. (The same can be said of the misidentification of the applicant’s family in T[62], which describes Mr Abbas’ family members). Paragraph T[27] is only one example, and is not to be considered in isolation.

34    I do not accept the Minister’s submission that the only relevant copying in this case concerned paragraphs that summarise case law and parts of Direction 110, provide other non-case specific background to the decision-making process, and supply what might be called “template style” conclusions. There are references to factual matters which particularly relate to Mr Abbas. There are paragraphs copied from the Abbas reasons which purportedly provide and explain the Tribunal’s evaluative reasoning. In addition to T[27], the applicant referred in particular to T[84], [95] and [99], which I turn to address.

35    To commence with T[99]-[100], which appear under the heading ‘CONCLUSION’ at the end of the reasons. These are the critical paragraphs in the evaluation task required to be undertaken by the Tribunal. They are as follows:

[99]    The primary consideration is the protection of the Australian community. Having considered the primary and other considerations in Direction 110, the Tribunal affirms the decision under review. In circumstances where the Direction 110 requires that greater weight must be given to the primary consideration of protecting the Australian community from criminal or other serious conduct the Tribunal finds that this consideration outweighs the other considerations given in favour of the Applicant. Paragraph 5.2(2) of Direction 110 states that the safety of the Australian community is the highest priority of the Australian Government. Considering the very serious nature of the Applicant's offences and the risk to the Australian community should she re-offend in a similar manner, any risk that the Applicant may re-offend is one that should not be tolerated by the community.

[100]    As such, the Tribunal is not satisfied that countervailing considerations outweigh the protection and expectations of the Australian community such that the cancellation decision should be revoked.

(emphasis added)

36     The corresponding passages in Abbas are [104]-[105]:

[104]    The primary consideration is the protection of the Australian community. Having considered the primary and other considerations in Direction 110, the Tribunal affirms the decision under review. In circumstances where the Direction 110 requires that greater weight must be given to the primary consideration of protecting the Australian community from criminal or other serious the Tribunal finds that this consideration outweighs the other considerations given in favour of the Applicant. Paragraph 5.2(2) of Direction 110 states that the safety of the Australian community is the highest priority of the Australian Government. The Applicant has been convicted of offences of a sexual nature involving a minor. Considering the very serious nature of the Applicant's offences and the risk to the Australian community should he re-offend in a similar manner, any risk that the Applicant may re-offend is one that should not be tolerated by the community.

[105]    As such, the Tribunal is not satisfied that countervailing considerations outweigh the protection and expectations of the Australian community such that the cancellation decision should be revoked.

(emphasis added)

37    Paragraph T[99] is identical to [104] in Abbas, apart from changing the male pronoun to the female and removing the emphasised sentence which described Ms Abbas’ offences. However, the sentence immediately following involved reasoning which flowed from the deleted sentence. It begins with “[c]onsidering the very serious nature of the applicant’s offences”, with the “offences” referred to being the “offences of a sexual nature involving a minor” described in the deleted sentence. That is, the conclusion at the end of the paragraph was expressed because of the “very serious nature of [Mr Abbas’] offences”. Nonetheless, with this sentence removed and no reference added as to Ms Puru’s offending, that same conclusion is expressed in her reasons.

38    It is helpful at this stage to recall Mr Abbas’ offences. In 2024 he was found guilty of five counts of sexually touching another person without consent and sentenced to an aggregate term of 15 months’ imprisonment. The description of Mr Abbas’ offences in his Tribunal reasons at [27]-[28] only serves to highlight their seriousness (including a serious breach of trust in relation to the victim, who was a minor). Mr Abbas’ Tribunal decision was delivered on 8 August 2025, a relatively short time after his conviction. In contrast, the applicant’s index offence was aggravated robbery, to which she pleaded guilty in 2001, and was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment, which was suspended: T[33]. There were later offences recorded in the Tribunal reasons in 2005 and 2024. The Minister accepted that, in the Tribunal’s reasons, the only offence of the applicant that was found to satisfy the description of “very serious”, is her index offence in 2001. The evaluative process in which the Member was required to engage in this case involved, inter alia, the index offence being a single offence, and one of a different nature, committed at a different time than that in Abbas (relative to the date of the visa cancellation).

39    Several observations can be made in respect of T[99].

40    First, it is appropriate at this stage to further address the finding in T[99] of the “very serious nature of the applicant’s offences”. This is also raised in the second ground of review, which alleges that finding is unreasonable and illogical. The nature of the arguments advanced in ground 2 impact also on ground 1. In oral submissions, the Minister did not advance an argument that the description of very serious applies to any of the applicant’s offences, apart from her index offence. That is, the Minister did not seek to defend the accuracy of the finding, but said this could be explained as an editing issue. The Minister submitted ground 2 is not established because, properly read, the reference to offences is the result of a mistake by the Tribunal in the cutting and pasting process. The plural is used because this section was taken from Mr Abbas’ reasons.

41    I accept, given the nature of the applicant’s history of offending conduct and the Tribunal’s discussion of it, that only the index offence can be described as very serious. The Tribunal’s reasons do not suggest otherwise. Given the submissions, either the Member inaccurately described a critical finding, or the finding that the applicant’s “offences” are serious in nature is unreasonable and lacking intelligible justification. However, at their foundation, both permutations of the error reflect a lack of attention to the task at hand. On the Minister’s submission, the description in the reasons does not accurately reflect the Member’s conclusion. I do not consider the use of the plural term can simply be brushed aside as an editing error as the Minister contends, with the effect of reading the word “offences” as if it were “offence”. Paragraph T[99] applied an evaluative finding from Mr Abbas’ case. The final sentence has been edited to alter the pronoun from male to female, but not to change the reference to plural offences. Given that, and the lack of attention to the task at hand generally displayed in the reasons, it cannot be inferred the Tribunal made its finding in T[99] based on only one offence fitting the characterisation of “very serious”. In the circumstances, I cannot be satisfied that the conclusion is based on an engagement by the Tribunal with the facts of applicant’s case. On the face of the reasons, the finding the applicant committed serious offences is not supported. That finding appears in the reasons because it comes from the Abbas reasons.

42    Second, the Minister submitted orally in relation to T[99] that:

[W]hat the Tribunal has done here in part is to leave concluding paragraphs in where…it has suited the Tribunal Member to do so because those conclusions are also the conclusions that the Tribunal has reached in this case. And [there is] nothing in paragraph 99 that suggests that that was not an appropriate concluding paragraph, apart from that errant reference to the “offences”, plural.

43    That submission is premised on the assumption the Tribunal reached the same conclusions as in Abbas at [104]. However, as explained above, reaching those conclusions in Abbas involved reasoning based on the “very serious nature of the applicant’s offences”. If the phrase was used as a result of the Tribunal’s approach of cutting and pasting, without proper thought or consideration to its content, the required evaluation task had not been undertaken. The Tribunal is under a duty to provide reasons for its findings. That duty is not fulfilled if the Member’s reasons do not reflect independent judgement was exercised in assessing the applicant’s particular circumstances.

44    Third, there is one further aspect of T[99] to address. The applicant alleged that as a consequence of using this paragraph from Abbas, the Tribunal has copied an erroneous description of Direction 110. During the hearing, and after a submission by the Minister, the applicant sought leave to raise this as an additional ground, which was granted. This is ground 5 above.

45    Ground 5 relates to the application of paragraph 7(2) of Direction 110, which provides that:

7.    Taking the relevant considerations into account

(1)    In applying the considerations (both primary and other), information and evidence from independent and authoritative sources should be given appropriate weight.

(2)    The primary consideration at 8.1 below (protection of the Australian community) is generally to be given greater weight than other primary considerations. Otherwise, primary considerations should generally be given greater weight than the other considerations.

(3)    One or more primary considerations may outweigh other primary considerations.

(emphasis added)

46    The term ‘generally’ in this context describes what is required in most instances: FHHM v Minister for Immigration Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 19 at [10]. In CRNL, the Full Court explained at [27] (by reference to a previous iteration of the Direction) that a decision-maker’s task is “to evaluate whether it is appropriate for a consideration that is not a primary consideration to be given greater weight than one or more primary considerations”, and to “evaluate whether one or more primary considerations outweighs other primary considerations”. Direction 110 “does not require that any consideration be outcome-determinative”, or state that the primary consideration of the protection of the Australian community “must invariably prevail”: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v DVRL [2026] FCAFC 73 at [45(3)] – [46].

47    In T[99], the Tribunal stated that “Direction 110 requires that greater weight must be given to the primary consideration of protecting the Australian community” (emphasis added). As the Minister accepted in his additional written submission, that is an error. Although the error forms the basis of ground 5, it is also relevant on ground 1. By copying T[99] from Abbas, the Member copied an error. It has been imported into the Tribunal’s reasons. If paragraph T[99] is said to genuinely reflect the reasoning undertaken by the Tribunal in this case, then it has misapplied Direction 110.

48    To return to the Minister’s submission recited above at [42], this error means there is material apart from the reference to the plural “offences” that demonstrates T[99] is not “an appropriate concluding paragraph”. The significance of T[99] is that it leads to the conclusion in T[100], that the Tribunal is not satisfied countervailing considerations outweigh the protection and expectations of the Australian community.

49    A similar issue arises in respect of T[95] (which is the subject of ground 4). This relates to the impediments consideration in paragraph 9.2 of Direction 110 and provides:

In summary, the Tribunal accepts that the Applicant is likely to face some impediments if removed from Australia, but that any weight afforded to this consideration in favour of the Applicant is outweighed by Primary Considerations relating to the nature and seriousness of the Applicant’s conduct and, the risk to the Australian community and the expectations of the Australian community. The Tribunal gives this consideration little weight in favour of revocation of the cancellation decision.

(emphasis added)

50    The emphasised passage is identical to the conclusion to the impediment consideration in paragraph [97] of Abbas. That is the reasoning that leads to the conclusion in Ms Puru’s reasons that the Tribunal gave “little weight in favour of revocation of the cancellation decision”.

51    The applicant submitted that it appears the Tribunal did not ascribe independent weight to the impediments consideration as required by paragraph 9.2 of Direction 110. Rather, the weight it would otherwise have ascribed to that consideration was reduced by, and balanced unfavourably against, the primary considerations of the protection of the Australian community and the expectations of the Australian community. The applicant submitted the Tribunal then impermissibly engaged in a further weighing and balancing process when purporting to consider the impediments consideration in its conclusion at T[99]-[100]: see CRNL at [28] and [37].The applicant distinguished this from Ismail v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 2; (2024) 280 CLR 265, where the High Court found a decision-maker was entitled to weigh the relevance of the same acts of family violence by reference to various considerations under a previous iteration of the Direction: at [42]-[44]. Contrastingly, the current case does not involve permissible repeated weighing of the same facts by reference to different considerations, but rather the repeated counting of the considerations themselves. The Minister submitted that while there is some ‘ambiguity’ in the language it is sufficiently clear from the Tribunal’s reasons that it evaluated each consideration independently as required. Comparing the relative strength of the impediments consideration with the protection and expectations considerations is not indicative of double-counting.

52    Paragraph T[95] is another example of a section taken from Abbas that involves evaluative reasoning. It is difficult to accept the Minister’s submission that the Tribunal’s reasons in this case involved individual assessment of the considerations, as this is not apparent from T[95]. Given the protection of the community consideration was present in T[95] and weighed with the impediments consideration, in reality the only basis on which it could be concluded that an independent evaluation was undertaken of each consideration is that the copied aspect of T[95] was not applied by the Tribunal. That is, that the Tribunal did not actually take the reasoning contained in that paragraph into account. This issue has arisen because the Tribunal imported this passage from Abbas into these reasons. It applied the reasoning in Abbas to this case (and that reasoning is erroneous).

53    Apart from T[99] and [95], there are other matters complained of in the Tribunal decision, as explained above at [34]. These paragraphs address significant issues for consideration, e.g. T[27] and [28] which, as explained above, purport to give reasons why the applicant does not pass the character test for the purpose of s 501 of the Migration Act. These paragraphs also refer to a concession that “he” did not pass the character test. These errors are relevant, alongside those in T[99] and [95] which involve evaluative reasoning.

54    The applicant also pointed to paragraphs that describe the weight to be given to various considerations in identical language to that in Abbas at T[43], [57], [71] and [84]. It may be accepted that, as the Minister submitted, there are only so many ways some conclusions can be expressed. By itself, the use of generic language in a conclusion may not be an issue. However, those paragraphs are part of the reasons, which must be considered in their entirety. It is unnecessary to address them individually. It suffices to say they are evaluative paragraphs.

55    The statutory function or task of the Tribunal in the present case in determining the applicant’s review included performing an independent review, making the correct or preferable decision, and giving a statement of its reasons: see e.g. MZZZW at [66].

56    As already explained, given the nature of the information from Abbas in the Tribunal’s reasons, what likely occurred is that Abbas was used as a base template, with paragraphs removed and the applicant’s information inserted. Abbas was a case where the Member dismissed an application for review of a decision by a delegate of the Minister to cancel an applicant’s visa, following a finding they did not pass the character test.

57    As explained above, I accept there are also sections of analysis and findings which address Ms Puru’s circumstances. That said, I do not accept the Minister’s submission that to the extent the Tribunal did engage in some “short cut” drafting, no case-specific reasoning from the earlier decision was included.

58    The reasons must be considered as a whole. As apparent from the analysis above, parts of the Tribunal’s reasons purporting to address individual aspects of the applicant’s case are from the Abbas reasons. This includes factual information, analysis and evaluation particular to Mr Abbas. In that context there are also other evaluative passages from Abbas in the reasons, including some where the evaluation involves a misapplication of the Direction. The applicant submitted those parts involve a fact-sensitive, evaluative balancing exercise as to whether the Tribunal was satisfied that there was another reason why the mandatory cancellation should be revoked.

59    In the circumstances, I accept the applicant’s submission that on an overall impression of the reasons I cannot be satisfied that the Tribunal brought an independent mind to the consideration of the applicant’s case. I consider the appropriate characterisation of the error in this case is a failure to discharge the Tribunal’s statutory task: see MZZZW at [53].

60    For the above reasons, the applicant has established jurisdictional error. In those circumstances it is unnecessary to consider the applicant’s submission in this ground in relation to apprehended bias.

Grounds 2, 4 and 5

61    I have addressed these grounds in considering ground 1, and given my conclusion on that ground, it is unnecessary to detail any further consideration. Suffice to say, for the reasons already stated, the error alleged in each ground is established.

Ground 3 – best interests of the minor children

62    Given my conclusion in relation to ground 1, it is unnecessary to consider this ground of review. However, I propose to briefly do so. The third ground of review is that the Tribunal failed to comply with paragraph 8.4 of Direction 110 in affirming the decision not to revoke. This paragraph requires the Tribunal to consider the following:

8.4. Best interests of minor children in Australia affected by the decision

(1)    Decision-makers must make a determination about whether cancellation or " refusal under section 501, or non-revocation under section 501CA is, or is not, in the best interests of a child affected by the decision.

(2)    This consideration applies only if the child is, or would be, under 18 years old at the time when the decision to refuse or cancel the visa, or to not revoke the mandatory cancellation of the visa, is expected to be made.

(3)    If there are two or more relevant children, the best interests of each child should be given individual consideration to the extent that their interests may differ.

(4)    In considering the best interests of the child, the following factors must be considered where relevant:

a)    the nature and duration of the relationship between the child and the non-citizen. Less weight should generally be given where the relationship is non-parental, and/or there is no existing relationship and/or there have been long periods of absence, or limited meaningful contact (including whether an existing Court order restricts contact);

b)    the extent to which the non-citizen is likely to play a positive parental role in the future, taking into account the length of time until the child turns 18, and including any Court orders relating to parental access and care arrangements;

c)    the impact of the non-citizen's prior conduct, and any likely future conduct, and whether that conduct has, or will have a negative impact on the child;

d)    the likely effect that any separation from the non-citizen would have on the child, taking into account the child's or non-citizen's ability to maintain contact in other ways;

e)    whether there are other persons who already fulfil a parental role in relation to the child;

f)    any known views of the child (with those views being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child);

g)    evidence that the child has been, or is at risk of being, subject to, or exposed to, family violence perpetrated by the non-citizen, or has otherwise been abused or neglected by the non-citizen in any way, whether physically, sexually or mentally;

h)    evidence that the child has suffered or experienced any physical or emotional trauma arising from the non-citizen's conduct

63    The applicant has two minor sons, and three minor grandchildren. The applicant submitted the Tribunal failed to consider the effect any separation from the applicant would have on the children in its reasons under the heading ‘Best interests of minor children in Australia’.

64    Relying on Jabari v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 98; (2023) 298 FCR 431 (Jabari), the applicant submitted the Tribunal should have considered the impact of separation on her two minor children, who were entering adolescence. The Tribunal described the low level of contact the applicant had with her minor children and her grandchildren and simply accepted that the best interests of the children consideration “weights [sic] in favour of revocation”. The Tribunal did not address the applicant’s contention that the impact on her minor sons would be immense, and adverse to their emotional wellbeing, with psychological health being an aspect of a child’s best interests: Promsopa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 1480 at [55]. The applicant also submitted the Tribunal did not address: her youngest son’s diagnoses of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder; her role in passing on Māori culture to her minor children; and her support for her 70 year old mother in looking after the children. She submitted the Tribunal failed to identify the different interests of each of her children and give them individualised consideration, instead lumping them together along with her grandchildren.

65    The Minister submitted the Tribunal was not required to address every point advanced by the applicant, including the effects of its decision on each child individually: see e.g. Goundar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1203, [56]; BFMV v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 199, [18]. The Minister submitted the Tribunal demonstrated it was conscious of the minor children at T[73]. It had regard to their interests, the limits in the applicant’s contact with them, and the current caring arrangements which are predominately provided by the children’s grandmother at T[74] – [75]. The Tribunal found that “it appears the applicant’s involvement in their lives as a positive role model is limited. In circumstances where the applicant has a history of drug abuse and offending, the applicant’s role as a positive influence in their lives appears to be limited”: T[76]. The Minister submitted these findings amount to an implicit consideration by the Tribunal of the likely effect of separation on the children.

Consideration

66    As the Minister correctly submitted, the requisite level of engagement with representations will vary according to, among other things, the length, clarity and degree of relevance of the representation made by an applicant: Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 582; (2022) 275 CLR 582 at [25].

67    In Jabari at [51], the Court referred to the earlier decision of ECE21 v Minister for Home Affairs [2023] FCAFC 52; (2023) 297 FCR 422 (ECE21) as follows:

In [ECE21] at [7]-[9], a Full Court comprised of Mortimer, Colvin and O’Sullivan JJ emphasised two aspects of the statutory task, having regard to Plaintiff M1/2021. The first is a distinction between considering representations in the sense of adverting to and understanding them, and considering them in the sense of evaluating their significance in the course of making the decision. In their Honours’ view, a consequence of Plaintiff M1/2021 is that (ECE21 at [7]):

it is for the Minister, acting reasonably and rationally and having demonstrably identified and understood the representations being made, to determine whether a particular matter is of significance. Therefore, a reviewing Court will need to decide if a failure to refer to a particular matter in the Minister’s reasons, even a matter that was clearly articulated by the applicant or which clearly arose on the materials, may indicate that the Minister was not persuaded that it was of significance, or whether that failure is evidence that the decision-maker did not identify and understand the representations being made.

68    The applicant’s representations in relation to her children were straightforward and clear. They have some prominence in the material she provided to the Tribunal. They were repeated, including in the applicant’s revocation request, her typed statement, and a written statement from her mother. The applicant correctly submitted the Tribunal’s reasons did not engage with the substance of those representations. They did not address the representation that the impact of denying the revocation request on her minor sons would be immense, and adverse to their emotional wellbeing (psychological health being an aspect of a child’s best interests). It was a matter for the Tribunal whether to accept the representations, and how much weight to put on them, but they were serious representations clearly and repeatedly made: see e.g. Jabari at [59]. The Tribunal was required to consider the impact of separation: see para 8.4(4)(d) of Direction 110. Further, the Tribunal was required to consider the impact on each of the applicant’s children individually, noting that although aspects of the representation related to both children, there are some differences between them: para 8.4(3) of Direction 110.

69    At its highest, the Minister’s submission appears to be that the consideration of the representation is implicit from the reasons. The Minister submitted the footnotes in the reasons referenced pages of the applicant’s materials that contained representations about the impact separation would have on her children. In AZT22 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 90 the Court at [61], in relation to the reasons there under consideration, observed:

It might be said that on an application of Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272 the reasons, and in particular para 77, should be read generously in favour of the Authority. However, we are troubled by resort to this principle in circumstances where a real straining of reasons and an element of speculation is required.

70    Even leaving aside my conclusion on ground 1, I am not prepared to draw the inference for which the Minister contends. This is in a context where the Tribunal reasons reflected at the very least a significant degree of carelessness, and inattention to detail and the task at hand. The Minister’s submission fails to grapple with the nature, extent and consequences of the use of the Abbas reasons. I consider drawing an inference in the Tribunal’s favour would strain the Member’s reasons, and involve speculation as to whether the representations were considered.

71    The applicant has also established this ground.

Conclusion

72    The applicant has established the grounds of review. Given the nature of ground 1, no issue of materiality can arise. Accordingly, the extension of time in which to file the application for review is granted and the application is allowed.

Associate:

Dated:    21 July 2026