Kanevsky v Ahuja, in the matter of M. A Services Group Pty Ltd (in liquidation) [2026] FCA 922

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

File number:	VID 261 of 2026

Judgment of:	WHEATLEY J

Date of judgment:	28 May 2026

Date of publication of reasons:	20 July 2026

Catchwords:	PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE — Characterisation of proceeding — whether proceeding interim or interlocutory PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE — Judgments and orders — Variation or continuation of Freezing Orders application — Whether original Freezing Orders made inter partes — Freezing Orders made and varied PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE — Confidentiality — Suppression Application PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE — Judgments and orders — Amendment — Slip rule

Legislation:	Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1305 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 17, 23, 37AA, 37AE, 37AF, 37AG, 37AJ, 37M, 37N Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 7.32, r 39.05

Cases cited:	Austal Ships Sales Pty Ltd v Stena Rederi Aktiebolag (2009) 263 ALR 384; [2009] FCAFC 179 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v BlueScope Steel Limited (No 7) [2023] FCA 1140 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Ferratum Australia Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (2023) 169 ACSR 553; [2023] FCA 1043 Council of the Law Society v O’Brien [2019] NSWSC 1879 Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Peever (No 3) [2025] FCA 1187 Flint v Richard Busuttil & Co Pty Limited (2013) 216 FCR 375; [2013] FCAFC 131 Lee v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2023) 296 FCR 272; [2023] FCAFC 22 Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v AAM17 (2021) 272 CLR 329; [2021] HCA 6 Ogawa v President of the Human Rights Commission (pseudonym) (2022) 294 FCR 221; [2022] FCAFC 160 Russell v Russell (1976) 134 CLR 495; [1976] HCA 23 Shun Sheng Pty Ltd v Lei (No 2) [2023] NSWSC 1623 Tuberi v Federal Court of Australia (2025) 100 ALJR 397; [2025] HCASJ 46 UFC Enterprise Morley Pty Ltd v UFC Enterprise Northbridge Pty Ltd [2024] FCA 1396 Westpac Banking Corporation v Forum Finance Pty Ltd (Freezing Orders Variation) [2022] FCA 910 Zhen v Mo [2008] VSC 300

Division:	General Division

Registry:	Victoria

National Practice Area:	Commercial and Corporations

Sub-area:	Corporations and Corporate Insolvency

Number of paragraphs:	90

Date of hearing:	27 May 2026

Counsel for the Plaintiffs:	Mr M Galvin KC with Mr N Weir

Solicitor for the Plaintiffs:	Gadens Lawyers

Counsel for the Defendants:	Mr C Juebner KC with Ms B Slocum

Solicitor for the Defendants:	Holding Redlich

ORDERS

		VID 261 of 2026
IN THE MATTER OF M.A SERVICES GROUP PTY LTD (ACN 151 498 001) (IN LIQUIDATION)
BETWEEN:	GLEN KANEVSKY AND JASON TRACY (IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS JOINT AND SEVERAL LIQUIDATORS OF M.A SERVICES GROUP PTY LTD (ACN 151 498 001) (IN LIQUIDATION)) First Plaintiff M.A SERVICES GROUP PTY LTD (ACN 151 498 001) (IN LIQUIDATION) Second Plaintiff
AND:	MICKY AHUJA First Defendant THE MA GROUP INVESTMENTS PTY LTD (ACN 623 505 760) Second Defendant SUNBURY INVESTMENT PROPERTY PTY LTD (ACN 666 877 907) (and others named in the Schedule) Third Defendant

order made by:	WHEATLEY J
DATE OF ORDER:	28 MAY 2026

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. Pursuant to rule 7.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (Rules) and s 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (Act), the freezing orders made on 20 March 2026 (as varied on 27 April 2026) in respect of the first to sixth defendants be amended and replaced as set out in Annexure A to these orders, with effect until further order.

2. Order 2 of the Orders of the Court made on 27 April 2026 be vacated.

3. Pursuant to r 9.05(1)(b)(iii) of the Rules the following entities be joined to the proceeding:

(a) MASG Holdings Pty Ltd (ACN 640 037 734) as the seventh defendant;

(b) M.A International Group Pty Ltd (ACN 629 618 622) as the eighth defendant;

(d) Bunjil Services Group Pty Ltd (formerly MA Bunjil Pty Ltd) (ACN 646 952 169) as the tenth defendant; and

(e) Australian College of Security Training Pty. Ltd. (ACN 085 770 663) as the eleventh defendant.

4. By 4pm 29 May 2026, the plaintiffs file and serve an amended originating application.

5. The plaintiffs shall serve on each of the seventh to eleventh defendants a copy of this order, the amended originating process filed on 29 May 2026 and the statement of claim filed on 20 April 2026.

6. Pursuant to r 5.04 of the Rules, the proceeding continue on pleadings.

7. The defendants shall file and serve any defence to the statement of claim (and any counterclaim) by 30 June 2026.

8. The proceeding otherwise be adjourned for case management, as directed by the docket judge, to 9.30am on 3 September 2026.

9. Pursuant to section 37AF of the Act and on the grounds referred to in section 37AG(1)(a), there be no disclosure, by publication or otherwise, of information which may disclose the current residential address of the first and fifth defendants.

10. Order 8 does not prevent disclosure to and between the following authorised persons:

(a) Judges of this Court;

(b) necessary Court Staff (including transcription service providers);

(d) legal representatives of the parties instructed in these proceedings;

(e) witnesses or proposed witnesses in these proceedings; and

(f) Commonwealth officers acting in the course of their duties.

11. Orders 9 and 10 operate for a period of one year from the date of this Order, in accordance with s 37AJ of the Act.

12. The plaintiffs’ costs of this application be costs in the liquidation of the second plaintiff.

13. Costs otherwise be reserved.

14. There be liberty to apply, on 2 days written notice.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

ANNEXURE A

Federal Court of Australia District Registry: Victoria

Division: General No. VID261/2026

GLEN KANEVSKY AND JASON TRACY (IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS JOINT AND SEVERAL LIQUIDATORS OF M.A SERVICES GROUP PTY LTD

(ACN 151 498 001) (IN LIQUIDATION)) and another named in the Schedule

Plaintiffs

MICKY AHUJA others named in the Schedule Defendants

PENAL NOTICE

TO: The First Defendant

IF YOU (BEING THE PERSON BOUND BY THIS ORDER):

(A) REFUSE OR NEGLECT TO DO ANY ACT WITHIN THE TIME SPECIFIED IN THIS ORDER FOR THE DOING OF THE ACT; OR

(B) DISOBEY THE ORDER BY DOING AN ACT WHICH THE ORDER REQUIRES YOU NOT TO DO,

YOU WILL BE LIABLE TO IMPRISONMENT, SEQUESTRATION OF PROPERTY OR OTHER PUNISHMENT.

ANY OTHER PERSON WHO KNOWS OF THIS ORDER AND DOES ANYTHING WHICH HELPS OR PERMITS YOU TO BREACH THE TERMS OF THIS ORDER MAY BE SIMILARLY PUNISHED.

TO: MICKY AHUJA

This is a ‘freezing order’ made against you on 28 May 2026 by Justice Wheatley after the Court was given the undertakings set out in Schedule A to the order made on 20 March 2026, which undertakings continue to apply.

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

INTRODUCTION

1. Subject to paragraph 2 below, this order has effect until further order.

2. Anyone served with or notified of this order, including you, may apply to the Court at any time to vary or discharge this order or so much of it as affects the person served or notified.

3. In this order:

(a) ‘Plaintiff’, if there is more than one Plaintiff, includes all the Plaintiffs;

(b) ‘third party’ means a person other than you and the Plaintiffs; and

4. (a) If you are ordered to do something, you must do it by yourself or through directors, officers, partners, employees, agents or others acting on your behalf or on your instructions.

(b) If you are ordered not to do something, you must not do it yourself or through directors, officers, partners, employees, agents or others acting on your behalf or on your instructions or with your encouragement or in any other way.

FREEZING OF ASSETS

(a) any of the following real property assets in Australia without first giving to the First Plaintiffs 7 clear days’ prior written notice of any such Dealing or such prior written notice as may be agreed in writing by you, and the Plaintiffs:

(i) 10 Lantern Court, Wallan in the State of Victoria being the land more particularly described as Lot 4 on Plan of Subdivision 625893V (Volume 11245 Folio 876);

(ii) 24 Raindrop Circuit, Fraser Rise in the State of Victoria being the land more particularly described as Lot 376 on Plan Subdivision 832767V (Volume 12401 Folio 881);

(iii) 26 Raindrop Circuit, Fraser Rise in the State of Victoria being the land more particularly described as Lot 375 on Plan Subdivision 832767V (Volume 12401 Folio 880);

(iv) 25 Catchment Drive, Fraser Rise in the State of Victoria being the land more particularly described as Lot 360 on Plan Subdivision 832767V (Volume 12401 Folio 865);

(v) 5 Wildlife Circuit, Fraser Rise in the State of Victoria being the land more particularly described as Lot 317 on Plan Subdivision 832767V (Volume 12401 Folio 822);

(vi) 20 Castella Court, Meadow Heights in the State of Victoria being the land more particularly described as Lot 966 on Plan Subdivision 203395H (Volume 10976 Folio 953);

(vii) 53 Sandover Drive, Roxburgh Park in the State of Victoria more particularly described as Lot 4371 on Plan Subdivision 449517G (Volume 10642 Folio 984);

(viii) 14 Timothy Court, Wallan in the State of Victoria more particularly described as Lot 45 on Plan Subdivision 503042F (Volume 10700 Folio 448);

(ix) 13 Brampton Close, Craigieburn in the State of Victoria more particularly described as Lot 21 on Plan of Subdivision 113700 (Volume 09186 Folio 571);

(x) 15 Catchment Drive, Fraser Rise in the State of Victoria more particularly described as Lot 340 on Plan of Subdivision 832767V (Volume 12401 Folio 845);

(xi) 26 Catchment Drive, Fraser Rise in the State of Victoria more particularly described as Lot 377 on Plan of Subdivision 832767V (Volume 12401 Folio 882);

(xii) 4A Casablanca Court, Greenvale in the State of Victoria more particularly described as Lot 2 on Plan of Subdivision 428320V (Volume 10477 Folio 010); and

(xiii) 18 Kilarnie Boulevard, Wollert in the State of Victoria more particularly described as Lot 122 on Plan of Subdivision 837651P (Volume 12516 Folio 618),

(the Properties); and

(b) any and all Trust Monies (as defined in paragraph 7).

6. For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in this order prevents you from selling any of the Properties in an arms-length transaction or for market value, provided that:

(a) you first provide 7 clear days’ prior written notice of the Dealing to the Plaintiffs by their solicitors; and

(b) the proceeds are dealt with in accordance with paragraph 7.

7. Until further order or the final hearing and determination of this proceeding, you must pay into a trust account of the solicitors on record for you in this proceeding (your solicitors):

(a) any net rental income in respect of the Properties, after payment of:

(i) any reasonable, third-party property management costs, reasonable maintenance and outgoings; and

(ii) any mortgage repayments due to the applicable registered mortgagee; and

(b) net proceeds of any sale of any of the Properties, after payment of:

(i) the reasonable selling costs of that property sale, including but not limited to rates, land tax, GST, capital gains tax, utilities, agents’ fees and expenses, legal fees and expenses, PEXA fees and other regulatory charges and fees; and

(ii) any debt which is secured by a registered mortgage over that property sold,

(Trust Monies).

8. In respect of any Dealing with the Trust Monies, including pursuant to paragraph 9, you must not instruct your solicitors to release, and your solicitors must not release, any Trust Monies to you without first providing 7 clear days’ written notice to the First Plaintiffs by their solicitor.

9. Subject to order 8, this order does not prevent you from instructing your solicitors to release Trust Monies to you that are reasonably necessary for:

(a) the combined ordinary living expenses, for both the first and fifth defendants (and their child) of no more than AUD$6,000 per calendar month (commencing 1 May 2026, excluding rent);

(b) from and including the month of September 2026, no more than $1,500 a week for the combined ordinary rental expenses, for both the first and fifth defendants (and their child);

(c) upon the prior presentation of the relevant invoice from Blossom Damac Hills for daycare expenses, accompanied by the notice required in paragraph 8, the payment of daycare expenses for the child of the first and fifth defendants for no more than 2 days a week;

(d) upon the prior presentation of the relevant invoice, accompanied by the notice required by paragraph 8, the payment of utilities due by you to Dubai Electricity & Water Authority (DEWA), for the months of May, June, July, August and September 2026; and

(e) upon the prior presentation of the relevant invoice from your solicitors (with any redactions of privileged content), accompanied by the notice required by paragraph 8, for the payment of reasonable legal expenses by you and the fifth defendant in this proceeding (other than insofar as such legal costs are covered by insurance).

PROVISION OF INFORMATION

10. Subject to paragraph 11, you must:

(a) by 4:00pm on the date which is 10 business days from the date on which these orders are served on you, provide the Plaintiffs with any of the following information and documents in your possession, custody or control in respect of any of the Properties:

(i) names and contact details of any agent appointed to sell, lease, dispose of or otherwise deal with any such asset;

(ii) copies of any executed contracts of sale and statements issued under section 32 of the Sale of Land Act 1962 (Vic);

(iii) if any such asset is subject to a lease or licence:

(1) if the lease or licence is recorded in a document, a copy of that document;

(2) if the lease or licence is not recorded in a document, details and particulars of the lease or licence (including the name of the lessee, the premises, rental payable and term);

(3) the identity and contact details of any agent appointed in respect of any such lease or licence;

(iv) if any such asset is subject to any security, including a mortgage, charge or any other encumbrance (Encumbrance):

(1) if the Encumbrance is recorded in a document, a copy of that document (unless such document is available from a public register);

(2) if the Encumbrance is not recorded in a document, the following particulars of the Encumbrance:

(a) the date on which the Encumbrance was granted;

(b) the name of the entity to whom the Encumbrance was granted and the contact details of that entity (including name, address, any known telephone or email addresses);

(d) the identity of the entity who received the consideration, if any, from the entity to whom the Encumbrance was granted; and

(e) if the consideration was paid into a bank account, the BSB and account details of that bank account;

(3) if the Encumbrance secures a loan or other financial accommodation:

(a) if a statement or other document in respect of that loan or financial accommodation records the current balance which remains secured by the Encumbrance, a copy of that document; and

(b) if no such statement or document exists, the balance which remains secured by the Encumbrance.

11. (a) This paragraph 11 applies if you are not a corporation and you wish to object to complying with paragraph 10 on the grounds that some or all of the information required to be disclosed may tend to prove that you:

(i) have committed an offence against or arising under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country; or

(ii) are liable to a civil penalty.

(b) This paragraph 11 also applies if you are a corporation and all of the persons who are able to comply with paragraph 10 on your behalf and with whom you have been able to communicate, wish to object to your complying with paragraph 10 on the grounds that some or all of the information required to be disclosed may tend to prove that they respectively:

(i) have committed an offence against or arising under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country; or

(ii) are liable to a civil penalty.

(i) disclose so much of the information required to be disclosed to which no objection is taken;

(ii) prepare an affidavit containing so much of the information required to be disclosed to which objection is taken, and deliver it to the Court in a sealed envelope; and

(iii) file and serve on each other party a separate affidavit setting out the basis of the objection.

Federal Court of Australia District Registry: Victoria

Division: General No. VID261/2026

GLEN KANEVSKY AND JASON TRACY (IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS JOINT AND SEVERAL LIQUIDATORS OF M.A SERVICES GROUP PTY LTD

(ACN 151 498 001) (IN LIQUIDATION)) and another named in the Schedule

Plaintiffs

MICKY AHUJA others named in the Schedule

Defendants

PENAL NOTICE

TO: the Second Defendant

IF YOU (BEING THE PERSON BOUND BY THIS ORDER):

(A) REFUSE OR NEGLECT TO DO ANY ACT WITHIN THE TIME SPECIFIED IN THIS ORDER FOR THE DOING OF THE ACT; OR

(B) DISOBEY THE ORDER BY DOING AN ACT WHICH THE ORDER REQUIRES YOU NOT TO DO,

YOU WILL BE LIABLE TO IMPRISONMENT, SEQUESTRATION OF PROPERTY OR OTHER PUNISHMENT.

ANY OTHER PERSON WHO KNOWS OF THIS ORDER AND DOES ANYTHING WHICH HELPS OR PERMITS YOU TO BREACH THE TERMS OF THIS ORDER MAY BE SIMILARLY PUNISHED.

TO: THE MA GROUP INVESTMENTS PTY LTD (ACN 623 505 760)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

INTRODUCTION

1. Subject to paragraph 2 below, this order has effect until further order.

2. Anyone served with or notified of this order, including you, may apply to the Court at any time to vary or discharge this order or so much of it as affects the person served or notified.

3. In this order:

(a) ‘Plaintiff’, if there is more than one Plaintiff, includes all the Plaintiffs;

(b) ‘third party’ means a person other than you and the Plaintiffs; and

4. (a) If you are ordered to do something, you must do it by yourself or through directors, officers, partners, employees, agents or others acting on your behalf or on your instructions.

FREEZING OF ASSETS

(i) 27 Silvertop Close, Wallan in the State of Victoria being the land more particularly described as Lot 90 on Plan Subdivision 327704P (Volume 10564 Folio 587);

(ii) 245 City Road, Southbank in the State of Victoria being the land more particularly described as Lot 4703 on Plan Subdivision 811538F (Volume 12307 Folio 201);

(iii) 20 Australis Drive, Wallan in the State of Victoria being the land more particularly described as Lot 123 on Plan Subdivision 540322P (Volume 10957 Folio 844);

(iv) 111 Wallara Waters Blvd, Wallan in the State of Victoria being the land more particularly described as Lot 543 on Plan Subdivision 629208T (Volume 11266 Folio 996);

(v) 245 City Road, Southbank in the State of Victoria more particularly described as Lot 320P on Plan Subdivision 811538F (Volume 12300 Folio 161);

(vi) 28 Wyatt Way, Wallan in the State of Victoria more particularly described as Lot 50 on Plan Subdivision 422114G (Volume 10538 Folio 271);

(vii) 3 Fenway Road, Greenvale in the State of Victoria more particularly described as Lot 214 on Plan Subdivision 814730X (Volume 12173 Folio 981); and

(viii) 91 Dollarburn Road, Warragul in the State of Victoria more particularly described as Lot 1 on Plan Subdivision 341393Y (Volume 10237 Folio 327),

(the MA Properties); and

(b) any and all Trust Monies (as defined in paragraph 7).

6. For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in this order prevents you from selling the MA Properties in any arms-length transaction or for market value, provided that:

(a) you first provide 7 clear days’ prior written notice of the Dealing to the Plaintiffs by their solicitors; and

(b) the proceeds are dealt with in accordance with paragraph 7.

7. Until further order or the final hearing and determination of this proceeding, you must pay into a trust account of the solicitors on record for you in this proceeding (your solicitors):

(a) any net rental income in respect of the MA Properties, after payment of:

(i) any reasonable, third-party property management costs, reasonable maintenance and outgoings; and

(ii) any mortgage repayments due to the applicable registered mortgagee; and

(b) net proceeds of any sale of any of the MA Properties, after payment of:

(i) the reasonable selling costs of the property sale of the asset, including but not limited to rates, land tax, GST, capital gains tax, utilities, agents’ fees and expenses, legal fees and expenses, PEXA fees and other regulatory charges and fees; and

(ii) any debt which is secured by a registered mortgage over the property sold,

(Trust Monies).

9. Subject to order 8, this order does not prevent you from instructing your solicitors to release Trust Monies to you that are reasonably necessary upon the prior presentation of the relevant invoice from your solicitors (with any redactions of privileged content), accompanied by the notice required by paragraph 8, for the payment of reasonable legal expenses by you in this proceeding (other than insofar as such legal costs are covered by insurance).

PROVISION OF INFORMATION

10. Subject to paragraph 11, you must:

(i) names and contact details of any agent appointed to sell, lease, dispose of or otherwise deal with any such asset;

(ii) copies of any executed contracts of sale and statements issued under section 32 of the Sale of Land Act 1962 (Vic);

(iii) if any such asset is subject to a lease or licence:

(1) if the lease or licence is recorded in a document, a copy of that document;

(2) if the lease or licence is not recorded in a document, details and particulars of the lease or licence (including the name of the lessee, the premises, rental payable and term);

(3) the identity and contact details of any agent appointed in respect of any such lease or licence;

(iv) if any such asset is subject to a security, including a mortgage, charge or any other encumbrance (Encumbrance):

(1) if the Encumbrance is recorded in a document, a copy of that document (unless such document is available from a public register);

(2) if the Encumbrance is not recorded in a document, the following particulars of the Encumbrance:

(a) the date on which the Encumbrance was granted;

(b) the name of the entity to whom the Encumbrance was granted and the contact details of that entity (including name, address, any known telephone or email addresses);

(d) the identity of the entity who received the consideration, if any, from the entity to whom the Encumbrance was granted; and

(e) if the consideration was paid into a bank account, the BSB and account details of that bank account;

(3) if the Encumbrance secures a loan or other financial accommodation:

(a) if a statement or other document in respect of that loan or financial accommodation records the current balance which remains secured by the Encumbrance, a copy of that document; and

(b) if no such statement or document exists, the balance which remains secured by the Encumbrance.

(i) have committed an offence against or arising under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country; or

(ii) are liable to a civil penalty.

(i) have committed an offence against or arising under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country; or

(ii) are liable to a civil penalty.

(i) disclose so much of the information required to be disclosed to which no objection is taken;

(ii) prepare an affidavit containing so much of the information required to be disclosed to which objection is taken, and deliver it to the Court in a sealed envelope; and

(iii) file and serve on each other party a separate affidavit setting out the basis of the objection.

Federal Court of Australia District Registry: Victoria

Division: General No. VID261/2026

GLEN KANEVSKY AND JASON TRACY (IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS JOINT AND SEVERAL LIQUIDATORS OF M.A SERVICES GROUP PTY LTD

(ACN 151 498 001) (IN LIQUIDATION)) and another named in the Schedule

Plaintiffs

MICKY AHUJA others named in the Schedule

Defendants

PENAL NOTICE

TO: the Third Defendant

IF YOU (BEING THE PERSON BOUND BY THIS ORDER):

(A) REFUSE OR NEGLECT TO DO ANY ACT WITHIN THE TIME SPECIFIED IN THIS ORDER FOR THE DOING OF THE ACT; OR

(B) DISOBEY THE ORDER BY DOING AN ACT WHICH THE ORDER REQUIRES YOU NOT TO DO,

YOU WILL BE LIABLE TO IMPRISONMENT, SEQUESTRATION OF PROPERTY OR OTHER PUNISHMENT.

ANY OTHER PERSON WHO KNOWS OF THIS ORDER AND DOES ANYTHING WHICH HELPS OR PERMITS YOU TO BREACH THE TERMS OF THIS ORDER MAY BE SIMILARLY PUNISHED.

TO: SUNBURY INVESTMENT PROPERTY PTY LTD (ACN 666 877 907)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

INTRODUCTION

1. Subject to paragraph 2 below, this order has effect until further order.

2. Anyone served with or notified of this order, including you, may apply to the Court at any time to vary or discharge this order or so much of it as affects the person served or notified.

3. In this order:

(a) ‘Plaintiff’, if there is more than one Plaintiff, includes all the Plaintiffs;

(b) ‘third party’ means a person other than you and the Plaintiffs; and

4. (a) If you are ordered to do something, you must do it by yourself or through directors, officers, partners, employees, agents or others acting on your behalf or on your instructions.

FREEZING OF ASSETS

(i) 16 Rubrum Rd, Sunbury in the State of Victoria being the land more particularly described as Lot 426 on Plan Subdivision 900033S (Volume 12468 Folio 550);

(ii) 10 Rubrum Rd, Sunbury in the State of Victoria being the land more particularly described as Lot 429 on Plan Subdivision 900033S (Volume 12468 Folio 553);

(iii) 6 Rubrum Rd, Sunbury in the State of Victoria being the land more particularly described as Lot 431 on Plan Subdivision 900033S (Volume 12468 Folio 555);

(iv) 4 Rubrum Rd, Sunbury in the State of Victoria being the land more particularly described as Lot 432 on Plan Subdivision 900033S (Volume 12468 Folio 556); and

(v) 95 Kinnear Road, Mickleham in the State of Victoria more particularly described as Lot 13 on Plan Subdivision 093985 (Volume 08923 Folio 553),

(the Sunbury Properties); and

(b) any and all Trust Monies (as defined in paragraph 7).

6. For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in this order prevents you from selling the Sunbury Properties in any arms-length transaction or for market value, provided that:

(a) you first provide 7 clear days’ prior written notice of the Dealing to the Plaintiffs by their solicitors; and

(b) the proceeds are dealt with in accordance with paragraph 7.

7. Until further order or the final hearing and determination of this proceeding, you must pay into a trust account of the solicitors on record for you in this proceeding (your solicitors):

(a) any net rental income in respect of the Sunbury Properties, after payment of:

(i) any reasonable, third-party property management costs, reasonable maintenance and outgoings; and

(ii) any mortgage repayments due to the applicable registered mortgagee; and

(b) net proceeds of any sale of any of the Sunbury Properties, after payment of:

(ii) any debt which is secured by a registered mortgage over that property sold,

(Trust Monies).

PROVISION OF INFORMATION

10. Subject to paragraph 11, you must:

(i) names and contact details of any agent appointed to sell, lease, dispose of or otherwise deal with any such asset;

(ii) copies of any executed contracts of sale and statements issued under section 32 of the Sale of Land Act 1962 (Vic);

(iii) if any such asset is subject to a lease or licence:

(1) if the lease or licence is recorded in a document, a copy of that document;

(2) if the lease or licence is not recorded in a document, details and particulars of the lease or licence (including the name of the lessee, the premises, rental payable and term);

(3) the identity and contact details of any agent appointed in respect of any such lease or licence;

(iv) if any such asset is subject to a security, including a mortgage, charge or any other encumbrance (Encumbrance):

(1) if the Encumbrance is recorded in a document, a copy of that document (unless such document is available from a public register);

(2) if the Encumbrance is not recorded in a document, the following particulars of the Encumbrance:

(a) the date on which the Encumbrance was granted;

(b) the name of the entity to whom the Encumbrance was granted and the contact details of that entity (including name, address, any known telephone or email addresses);

(d) the identity of the entity who received the consideration, if any, from the entity to whom the Encumbrance was granted; and

(e) if the consideration was paid into a bank account, the BSB and account details of that bank account;

(3) if the Encumbrance secures a loan or other financial accommodation:

(a) if a statement or other document in respect of that loan or financial accommodation records the current balance which remains secured by the Encumbrance, a copy of that document; and

(b) if no such statement or document exists, the balance which remains secured by the Encumbrance.

(i) have committed an offence against or arising under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country; or

(ii) are liable to a civil penalty.

(i) have committed an offence against or arising under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country; or

(ii) are liable to a civil penalty.

(i) disclose so much of the information required to be disclosed to which no objection is taken;

(ii) prepare an affidavit containing so much of the information required to be disclosed to which objection is taken, and deliver it to the Court in a sealed envelope; and

(iii) file and serve on each other party a separate affidavit setting out the basis of the objection.

Federal Court of Australia District Registry: Victoria

Division: General No. VID261/2026

GLEN KANEVSKY AND JASON TRACY (IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS JOINT AND SEVERAL LIQUIDATORS OF M.A SERVICES GROUP PTY LTD

(ACN 151 498 001) (IN LIQUIDATION)) and another named in the Schedule

Plaintiffs

MICKY AHUJA others named in the Schedule

Defendants

PENAL NOTICE

TO: the Fourth Defendant

IF YOU (BEING THE PERSON BOUND BY THIS ORDER):

(A) REFUSE OR NEGLECT TO DO ANY ACT WITHIN THE TIME SPECIFIED IN THIS ORDER FOR THE DOING OF THE ACT; OR

(B) DISOBEY THE ORDER BY DOING AN ACT WHICH THE ORDER REQUIRES YOU NOT TO DO,

YOU WILL BE LIABLE TO IMPRISONMENT, SEQUESTRATION OF PROPERTY OR OTHER PUNISHMENT.

ANY OTHER PERSON WHO KNOWS OF THIS ORDER AND DOES ANYTHING WHICH HELPS OR PERMITS YOU TO BREACH THE TERMS OF THIS ORDER MAY BE SIMILARLY PUNISHED.

TO: BALDWIN AVE PTY LTD (ACN 640 853 292)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

INTRODUCTION

1. Subject to paragraph 2 below, this order has effect until further order.

2. Anyone served with or notified of this order, including you, may apply to the Court at any time to vary or discharge this order or so much of it as affects the person served or notified.

3. In this order:

(a) ‘Plaintiff’, if there is more than one Plaintiff, includes all the Plaintiffs;

(b) ‘third party’ means a person other than you and the Plaintiffs; and

4. (a) If you are ordered to do something, you must do it by yourself or through directors, officers, partners, employees, agents or others acting on your behalf or on your instructions.

FREEZING OF ASSETS

(i) the proceeds of sale of 14 Rubrum Rd, Sunbury in the State of Victoria more particularly described as Lot 427 on Plan Subdivision 900033S (Volume 12468 Folio 551);

(ii) 12 Rubrum Rd, Sunbury in the State of Victoria more particularly described as Lot 428 on Plan Subdivision 900033S (Volume 12468 Folio 552); and

(iii) 8 Rubrum Rd, Sunbury in the State of Victoria more particularly described as Lot 430 on Plan Subdivision 900033S (Volume 12468 Folio 554);

(the Baldwin Properties); and

(b) any and all Trust Monies (as defined in paragraph 7).

6. For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in this order prevents you from selling the Baldwin Properties in any arms-length transaction or for market value, provided that:

(a) you first provide 7 clear days’ prior written notice of the Dealing to the Plaintiffs by their solicitors; and

(b) the proceeds are dealt with in accordance with paragraph 7.

7. Until further order or the final hearing and determination of this proceeding, you must pay into a trust account of the solicitors on record for you in this proceeding (your solicitors):

(a) any net rental income in respect of the Baldwin Properties, after payment of:

(i) any reasonable, third-party property management costs, reasonable maintenance and outgoings; and

(ii) any mortgage repayments due to the applicable registered mortgagee; and

(b) net proceeds of any sale of any of the Baldwin Properties, after payment of:

(ii) any debt which is secured by a registered mortgage over the property sold,

(Trust Monies).

PROVISION OF INFORMATION

10. Subject to paragraph 11, you must:

(i) names and contact details of any agent appointed to sell, lease, dispose of or otherwise deal with any such asset;

(ii) copies of any executed contracts of sale and statements issued under section 32 of the Sale of Land Act 1962 (Vic);

(iii) if any such asset is subject to a lease or licence:

(1) if the lease or licence is recorded in a document, a copy of that document;

(2) if the lease or licence is not recorded in a document, details and particulars of the lease or licence (including the name of the lessee, the premises, rental payable and term);

(3) the identity and contact details of any agent appointed in respect of any such lease or licence;

(iv) if any such asset is subject to a security, including a mortgage, charge or any other encumbrance (Encumbrance):

(1) if the Encumbrance is recorded in a document, a copy of that document (unless such document is available from a public register);

(2) if the Encumbrance is not recorded in a document, the following particulars of the Encumbrance:

(a) the date on which the Encumbrance was granted;

(b) the name of the entity to whom the Encumbrance was granted and the contact details of that entity (including name, address, any known telephone or email addresses);

(d) the identity of the entity who received the consideration, if any, from the entity to whom the Encumbrance was granted; and

(e) if the consideration was paid into a bank account, the BSB and account details of that bank account;

(3) if the Encumbrance secures a loan or other financial accommodation:

(a) if a statement or other document in respect of that loan or financial accommodation records the current balance which remains secured by the Encumbrance, a copy of that document; and

(b) if no such statement or document exists, the balance which remains secured by the Encumbrance.

(i) have committed an offence against or arising under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country; or

(ii) are liable to a civil penalty.

(i) have committed an offence against or arising under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country; or

(ii) are liable to a civil penalty.

(i) disclose so much of the information required to be disclosed to which no objection is taken;

(ii) prepare an affidavit containing so much of the information required to be disclosed to which objection is taken, and deliver it to the Court in a sealed envelope; and

(iii) file and serve on each other party a separate affidavit setting out the basis of the objection.

Federal Court of Australia District Registry: Victoria

Division: General No. VID261/2026

GLEN KANEVSKY AND JASON TRACY (IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS JOINT AND SEVERAL LIQUIDATORS OF M.A SERVICES GROUP PTY LTD

(ACN 151 498 001) (IN LIQUIDATION)) and another named in the Schedule

Plaintiffs

MICKY AHUJA others named in the Schedule

Defendants

PENAL NOTICE

TO: the Fifth Defendant

IF YOU (BEING THE PERSON BOUND BY THIS ORDER):

(A) REFUSE OR NEGLECT TO DO ANY ACT WITHIN THE TIME SPECIFIED IN THIS ORDER FOR THE DOING OF THE ACT; OR

(B) DISOBEY THE ORDER BY DOING AN ACT WHICH THE ORDER REQUIRES YOU NOT TO DO,

YOU WILL BE LIABLE TO IMPRISONMENT, SEQUESTRATION OF PROPERTY OR OTHER PUNISHMENT.

ANY OTHER PERSON WHO KNOWS OF THIS ORDER AND DOES ANYTHING WHICH HELPS OR PERMITS YOU TO BREACH THE TERMS OF THIS ORDER MAY BE SIMILARLY PUNISHED.

TO: SASHA AHUJA AKA SAKSHI AHUJA OR SAKSHI VERMA

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

INTRODUCTION

1. Subject to the paragraph 2 below, this order has effect until further order.

2. Anyone served with or notified of this order, including you, may apply to the Court at any time to vary or discharge this order or so much of it as affects the person served or notified.

3. In this order:

(a) ‘Plaintiff’, if there is more than one Plaintiff, includes all the Plaintiffs;

(b) ‘third party’ means a person other than you and the Plaintiffs; and

4. (a) If you are ordered to do something, you must do it by yourself or through directors, officers, partners, employees, agents or others acting on your behalf or on your instructions.

FREEZING OF ASSETS

5. Subject to paragraphs 6 and 7, until further order of the Court, you must not remove from Australia or in any way dispose of, deal with, encumber or diminish the value, including by way of entry into any contract (Dealing) the funds held in the trust account of the solicitors on the record for you in this proceeding (your solicitors) being the sum of $300,000 (Trust Monies).

6. The sum held in a trust account by your solicitors of $449,146.93 (as at the date of this Order), being the proceeds of sale of the property 3 Mandeville Crescent, Toorak, Victoria, more particularly described as certificate title volume 07436 and folio 131, is to be reduced to the sum of $300,000 (the subject of order 5), by the following:

(a) the release of the sum of AED200,000 (approximately AUD $75,967) for payment of the second rental instalment due under the lease dated 23 January 2026, referred to at paragraph 18(a) of the affidavit of Micky Ahuja made 12 May 2026;

(b) the payment of $15,161.16 to Elit Lawyers, referred to at paragraph 30(c) of the affidavit of Micky Ahuja made 12 May 2026;

(c) reimbursement of $8,855 in marketing costs, referred to at paragraph 33 of the affidavit of Micky Ahuja made 12 May 2026;

(d) the payment of $5,136.13 for water and electricity as invoiced by DEWA on 25 March 2026, referred to at paragraph 18(b)(i) of the affidavit of Micky Ahuja made 12 May 2026;

(e) the payment of $4,324.64 for water and electricity as invoiced by DEWA on 23 April 2026, referred to at paragraph 18(b)(ii) of the affidavit of Micky Ahuja made 12 May 2026;

(f) the payment of $962.79 for childcare as invoiced on 26 January 2026 (being the amount outstanding on the invoice of AED 4,044) and generally referred to at paragraph 18(c) of the affidavit of Micky Ahuja made 12 May 2026; and

(g) the balance of $38,740.21 to Holding Redlich in part-payment of invoice 761845 dated l April 2026, as referred to at paragraph 21(a) of the affidavit of Micky Ahuja made 12 May 2026.

7. In respect of any Dealing with the Trust Monies, you must not instruct your solicitors to release, and your solicitors must not release, any Trust Monies to you without first providing 7 clear days’ written notice to the First Plaintiffs by their solicitor.

PROVISION OF INFORMATION

8. Subject to paragraph 9, you must:

(a) by 4:00pm on the date which is 10 business days from the date on which these orders are served on you, provide the Plaintiffs with the following information and documents in respect of the assets referred to above:

(i) names and contact details of any agent appointed to sell, lease, dispose of or otherwise deal with any such an asset;

(ii) copies of any contracts of sale and statements issued under section 32 of the Sale of Land Act 1962 (Vic);

(iii) if any such asset is subject to a lease or licence:

(1) if the lease or licence is recorded in a document, a copy of that document;

(2) if the lease or licence is not recorded in a document, details and particulars of the lease or licence (including the name of the lessee, the premises, rental payable and term);

(3) the identity and contact details of any agent appointed in respect of any such lease or licence.

(iv) if any such asset is subject to a security, including a mortgage, charge or any other encumbrance (Encumbrance):

(1) if the Encumbrance is recorded in a document, a copy of that document;

(2) if the Encumbrance is not recorded in a document, details and particulars of the Encumbrance including:

(a) the date on which the Encumbrance was granted;

(b) the name of the entity to whom the Encumbrance was granted and the contact details of that entity (including name, address, any known telephone or email addresses);

(d) the identity of the entity who received the consideration, if any, from the entity to whom the Encumbrance was granted; and

(e) if the consideration was paid into a bank account, the BSB and account details of that bank account;

(3) if the Encumbrance secures a loan or other financial accommodation:

(a) if a statement or other document in respect of that loan or financial accommodation records the current balance which remains secured by the Encumbrance, a copy of that document; and

(b) if no such statement or document exists, the balance which remains secured by the Encumbrance.

9. (a) This paragraph 9 applies if you are not a corporation and you wish to object to complying with paragraph 8 on the grounds that some or all of the information required to be disclosed may tend to prove that you:

(i) have committed an offence against or arising under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country; or

(ii) are liable to a civil penalty.

(b) This paragraph 9 also applies if you are a corporation and all of the persons who are able to comply with paragraph 8 on your behalf and with whom you have been able to communicate, wish to object to your complying with paragraph 9 on the grounds that some or all of the information required to be disclosed may tend to prove that they respectively:

(i) have committed an offence against or arising under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country; or

(ii) are liable to a civil penalty.

(i) disclose so much of the information required to be disclosed to which no objection is taken;

(ii) prepare an affidavit containing so much of the information required to be disclosed to which objection is taken, and deliver it to the Court in a sealed envelope; and

(iii) file and serve on each other party a separate affidavit setting out the basis of the objection.

Federal Court of Australia District Registry: Victoria

Division: General No. VID261/2026

GLEN KANEVSKY AND JASON TRACY (IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS JOINT AND SEVERAL LIQUIDATORS OF M.A SERVICES GROUP PTY LTD

(ACN 151 498 001) (IN LIQUIDATION)) and another named in the Schedule

Plaintiffs

MICKY AHUJA others named in the Schedule

Defendants

PENAL NOTICE

TO: the Sixth Defendant

IF YOU (BEING THE PERSON BOUND BY THIS ORDER):

(A) REFUSE OR NEGLECT TO DO ANY ACT WITHIN THE TIME SPECIFIED IN THIS ORDER FOR THE DOING OF THE ACT; OR

(B) DISOBEY THE ORDER BY DOING AN ACT WHICH THE ORDER REQUIRES YOU NOT TO DO,

YOU WILL BE LIABLE TO IMPRISONMENT, SEQUESTRATION OF PROPERTY OR OTHER PUNISHMENT.

ANY OTHER PERSON WHO KNOWS OF THIS ORDER AND DOES ANYTHING WHICH HELPS OR PERMITS YOU TO BREACH THE TERMS OF THIS ORDER MAY BE SIMILARLY PUNISHED.

TO: M.A. BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION PTY LTD (ACN 669 261 223)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

INTRODUCTION

1. Subject to paragraph 2 below, this order has effect until further order.

2. Anyone served with or notified of this order, including you, may apply to the Court at any time to vary or discharge this order or so much of it as affects the person served or notified.

3. In this order:

(a) ‘Plaintiff’, if there is more than one Plaintiff, includes all the Plaintiffs;

(b) ‘third party’ means a person other than you and the Plaintiffs; and

4. (a) If you are ordered to do something, you must do it by yourself or through directors, officers, partners, employees, agents or others acting on your behalf or on your instructions.

FREEZING OF ASSETS

(i) Lot 563 on Plan of Subdivision 846200Y, 43 Saric Street, Fraser Rise VIC 3336 (Being the land more particularly described as Volume 12458 Folio 537);

(ii) Lot 562 on Plan of Subdivision 846200Y, 45 Saric Street, Fraser Rise VIC 3336 (Being the land more particularly described as Volume 12458 Folio 536);

(iii) Lot 643 on Plan of Subdivision 846199EY, 3 Lillypilly Street, Fraser Rise VIC 3336 (Being the land more particularly described as Volume 12466 Folio 553); and

(iv) Lot 727 on Plan of Subdivision 846203S 9 Peatland Road, Fraser Rise VIC 3336 (Being the land more particularly described as Volume 12491 Folio 162),

(the MA Building Properties);

(b) any and all Trust Monies (as defined in paragraph 7).

6. For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in this order prevents you from selling the MA Building Properties in any arms-length transaction or for market value, provided that:

(a) you first provide 7 clear days’ written prior notice of the Dealing to the Plaintiffs by their solicitors; and

(b) the proceeds are dealt with in accordance with paragraph 7.

7. Until further order or the final hearing and determination of this proceeding, you must pay into a trust account of the solicitors on record for you in this proceeding (your solicitors):

(a) any net rental income in respect of the MA Building Properties, after payment of:

(i) any reasonable, third-party property management costs, reasonable maintenance and outgoings; and

(ii) any mortgage repayments due to the applicable registered mortgagee; and

(b) net proceeds of any sale of any of the MA Building Properties, after payment of:

(ii) any debt which is secured by a registered mortgage over that property sold,

(Trust Monies).

PROVISION OF INFORMATION

10. Subject to paragraph 11, you must:

(i) names and contact details of any agent appointed to sell, lease, dispose of or otherwise deal with any such asset;

(ii) copies of any executed contracts of sale and statements issued under section 32 of the Sale of Land Act 1962 (Vic);

(iii) if any such asset is subject to a lease or licence:

(1) if the lease or licence is recorded in a document, a copy of that document;

(2) if the lease or licence is not recorded in a document, details and particulars of the lease or licence (including the name of the lessee, the premises, rental payable and term);

(3) the identity and contact details of any agent appointed in respect of any such lease or licence;

(iv) if any such asset is subject to a security, including a mortgage, charge or any other encumbrance (Encumbrance):

(1) if the Encumbrance is recorded in a document, a copy of that document (unless such document is available from a public register);

(2) if the Encumbrance is not recorded in a document, the following particulars of the Encumbrance:

(a) the date on which the Encumbrance was granted;

(b) the name of the entity to whom the Encumbrance was granted and the contact details of that entity (including name, address, any known telephone or email addresses);

(d) the identity of the entity who received the consideration, if any, from the entity to whom the Encumbrance was granted; and

(e) if the consideration was paid into a bank account, the BSB and account details of that bank account;

(3) if the Encumbrance secures a loan or other financial accommodation:

(a) if a statement or other document in respect of that loan or financial accommodation records the current balance which remains secured by the Encumbrance, a copy of that document; and

(b) if no such statement or document exists, the balance which remains secured by the Encumbrance.

(i) have committed an offence against or arising under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country; or

(ii) are liable to a civil penalty.

(i) have committed an offence against or arising under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country; or

(ii) are liable to a civil penalty.

(i) disclose so much of the information required to be disclosed to which no objection is taken;

(ii) prepare an affidavit containing so much of the information required to be disclosed to which objection is taken, and deliver it to the Court in a sealed envelope; and

(iii) file and serve on each other party a separate affidavit setting out the basis of the objection.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(REVISED FROM TRANSCRIPT)

WHEATLEY J:

INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW

1 Freezing Orders were entered by consent on 20 March 2026, after a hearing on 18 March 2026 by Button J. These freezing orders were not made ex parte, but were made urgently. On 27 April 2026, O’Callaghan J made further orders by consent, which extended the operation of those freezing orders.

2 The matter has again been brought on urgently in the duty list. Initially, the parties approached the hearing on quite different bases. The Plaintiffs contended that this was the Defendant’s application to vary the freezing orders, on the basis that the previous freezing orders were interlocutory, and hence the Defendants needed to satisfy a threshold issue, being a change in circumstances. However, the Defendants contended that this was the continuation of the Plaintiff’s freezing order application, because the orders were interim.

3 Ultimately, the hearing proceeded on the basis of a consideration of whether the Plaintiff had established that the orders were necessary, and whether it was in the interests of justice that some or all of the exclusions or exceptions to the freezing orders sought by the Defendants should be made.

4 The hearing conducted on 27 May 2026, was an inter partes hearing of the freezing orders. For the following reasons, the freezing orders will now be made until further order of the Court. Further, certain additional entities will be joined to the proceeding. The proceeding will continue on pleadings, and certain exceptions will be provided for in the freezing orders to allow for the Defendants’ ordinary reasonable living expenses and reasonable legal expenses, amongst other matters.

Were the Orders of 20 March 2026 Interim or Interlocutory?

5 An initial issue has been raised on the hearing. The proper characterisation of this hearing is in issue. What flows from that characterisation is whether the Defendants carry an onus for a variation of the freezing orders made by this Court on 20 March 2026.

6 Further orders in these proceedings were made on 27 April 2026, which relevantly say that the freezing orders made on 20 March 2026 be extended to a date being one business day after the date of the further adjourned directions hearing. The matter has been allocated to me by way of the duty system, as the docket Judge is unavailable to hear it at the moment. The Defendants wrote to the docket Judge’s associates seeking for the matter to be listed. That correspondence records that it is copied to the Plaintiffs. It is not expressly said to be written with the consent of the Plaintiff.

7 It is well to remember that the Central Practice Note, National Court Framework Case Management, CPN-1 at [15.2], which expressly states that unless in the nature of an ex parte application, parties should only communicate with chambers where it is appropriate to do so, and such communications must always be open and uncontroversial. These emails with the initial Judge’s associate, the docket Judge’s associate, and ultimately my associate have been tendered in the hearing of this matter. The tendering of those emails was said to assist the determination of the characterisation of this hearing. The tendering of such emails is not a practice to be encouraged. It is clearly contrary to the Central Practice Note in that communications must be uncontroversial. Obviously uncontroversial emails would not have been tendered.

8 Such communications with chambers should, at most, have asked for the matter to be listed for case management, in the absence of consent of the other parties. Having said that, the correspondence is relied upon to support a submission that the parties have been and remain in different minds as to the proper characterisation of today's listing and hearing. Such correspondence was not necessary to support this submission, it was clear from the parties’ submissions.

9 The certificate of urgency referred to this matter being related to the “substantive hearing of the plaintiff’s freezing order application and our client’s [the Defendant’s] propose [sic] amendments to the freezing order”. It also described it as a substantive hearing of the Plaintiff’s freezing order application, orders in relation to which were previously made by the Court with the consent of the parties.

10 In Shun Sheng Pty Ltd v Lei (No 2) [2023] NSWSC 1623, Parker J was considering an issue as to the onus regarding preservation orders in that court. In Shun Sheng at [25] to [27], the court refers to a “rule of practice” and observes once the Defendant has had an opportunity to be formally notified of the application and can appear to resist the making of such orders, then any continued injunction is usually granted on an interlocutory basis. That is, on the basis that it will apply until the court has given judgment following the trial.

11 The reasons in Shun Sheng continue and note some differences between interlocutory and interim injunctions and preservation orders, from [31] onwards. Ultimately, Parker J concludes at [40] that these rules of practice are not inflexible rules of law and allow for departure from them where the interests of justice demand it. The ultimate question must be what procedure the court should adopt to promote the just, quick and cheap disposal of the proceedings. Although, ultimately, the rules and legislation which govern the Supreme Court of New South Wales are different to this Court, those principles are akin to the overarching purpose of civil practice and procedure, enshrined in s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the FCA).

12 The orders made on 20 March 2026 provide that they had effect until 4 pm, 29 April 2026. On 27 April 2026, further orders were made, adjourning the matter and relevantly extending the freezing orders made on 20 March 2026 to one business day after the further adjourned directions hearing. At present, the docket Judge has listed the matter for a case management hearing, also known as a directions hearing, on Thursday, 3 September 2026. It was submitted by the Defendants that if this listing and hearing (before me) is not regarded as the directions hearing such as to trigger the expiration of the freezing order tomorrow, then they would seek for whatever might be listed today to be adjourned, and they would seek to bring it back on for a directions hearing to trigger the expiration of the freezing orders. The Defendants do not accept that they bear any onus in relation to seeking a variation of the freezing orders. The Defendants submit, they do not seek a variation of the freezing orders (although it may appear that way) but that they submit that the Plaintiffs bear the onus for the freezing orders, for which the Defendants seek reasonable exceptions, should that onus be met.

13 The Plaintiffs do not accept that they bear the onus, nor do they accept that this listing and hearing is a directions hearing. The Plaintiffs submit that the Defendant needs to establish a change in circumstances.

14 This matter is somewhat unusual in terms of how it has progressed and been dealt with by the parties including by the freezing orders being made initially and continued, by consent. That is not a criticism of any of the parties. It is just the way the matter has eventuated. The freezing orders as initially made were on notice, to the Defendants. The freezing orders were not made ex parte, the orders were made by consent. However, the orders are not in the “usual” interlocutory form, being “until further order”.

15 There has already been an opportunity for the Defendants to have been heard on each of the previous occasions, when orders have been made. This is clear, as both the orders of 20 March 2026 and 27 April 2026 were made by consent. However, the Defendants argue, which is open, that the Plaintiff must still or must continue to satisfy its obligation for a continuation of the freezing orders.

16 I am mindful of the overarching purpose of civil practice and procedure, as well as the obligation of the parties in this Court under s 37M and s 37N of the FCA. That is to facilitate the just resolution of disputes as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible. Both parties were in a position to proceed with the hearing on 27 May 2026.

17 There is a significant amount of affidavit material before the Court for this listing and hearing. It is in the interests of justice that this matter be heard and resolved. In all of the circumstances and given that there are no hard and fast rules, I propose to hear the matter after the luncheon adjournment as to any replacement, if appropriate, of the freezing orders. Further, to consider those aspects in accordance with the overarching purpose and obligations in this Court and what is in the interests of justice in all of the circumstances of this case.

Should Freezing Orders be Made?

18 The Plaintiffs, being the liquidators of M.A Services Group Pty Ltd (M.A Services), continue to press for freezing orders against six defendants under r 7.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (the Rules), and s 23 of the FCA. Rule 7.32 and s 23 of the FCA allow the Court to make a freezing order for the purpose of preventing the frustration or inhibition of the Court’s processes by seeking to meet a danger that a judgment or a prospective judgment of the Court will be wholly or partially unsatisfied.

19 On 8 December 2025, the Commissioner of Taxation issued a lockdown director penalty notice to Mr Ahuja, being the First Defendant, demanding payment of $14,637,139. On 12 December 2025, Mr Ahuja and Mrs Ahuja, being the First and Fifth Defendants, left Australia for Dubai in the United Arab Emirates. On 23 December 2025, Mr Ahuja placed M.A Services into voluntary administration, and the now liquidators were appointed as the voluntary administrators. On 9 February 2026, the creditors of M.A Services passed a resolution that it be placed into liquidation, and the liquidators were appointed. On 20 March 2026, after the hearing on 18 March 2026, Button J made freezing orders, by consent. On 20 April 2026, pursuant to the freezing orders, the Plaintiffs filed a statement of claim, setting out their allegations against the First to Sixth Defendants.

20 The allegations made by the Plaintiffs against the Defendants can be summarised as follows. The liquidators rely on the books and records that are available to them to allege certain indebtedness by the Defendants. Those are as follows:

(a) the balance of the loan to Mr Ahuja of $4,783,987.23;

(b) a loan to MA Group Investments Pty Ltd in the sum of $2,328,629.96;

(d) a loan to Baldwin Avenue Pty Ltd in the sum of $234,309.77;

(e) money had and received by the Fifth Defendant, Mrs Ahuja, in the sum of $300,000; and

(f) a loan to M.A. Building and Construction Pty Ltd in the sum of $1,622,439.67.

21 The principles relevant to an application for a freezing order were recently summarised by Feutrill J in UFC Enterprise Morley Pty Ltd v UFC Enterprise Northbridge Pty Ltd [2024] FCA 1396 at [13]. I gratefully adopt that summary, which is as follows:

[13] The principles applicable to circumstances in which a freezing order will be made are well established. These may be summarised as follows:

(1) The language of r 7.32 of the Rules reflects what has been considered to be a general power of the Court to grant a Mareva injunction under s 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth): Jackson v Sterling Industries Ltd [1987] HCA 23; 162 CLR 612 at 622-623 (Deane J).

(2) As a general proposition, a freezing order may be granted if the applicant demonstrates a prima facie or good arguable case for final relief and the circumstances are such that there is a danger of the respondent absconding, or a danger of the assets being removed out of the jurisdiction or disposed of within the jurisdiction or otherwise dealt with so that there is a danger that the applicant, if it gets judgment, will not be able to get it satisfied: Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Hua Wang Bank Berhad [2010] FCA 1014; 273 ALR 194 at [8] (Kenny J) and the authorities there cited.

(3) The reference in r 7.32 to a ‘danger’ that a judgment or prospective judgment will go wholly or partly unsatisfied is a reference to a risk of that outcome. The risk must be real or substantial as opposed to a remote or speculative or theoretical possibility. The applicant must prove facts from which the Court can infer the existence of a real or substantial risk on the balance of probabilities: Duro Felguera Australia Pty Ltd v Trans Global Projects Pty Ltd (in liq) [2018] WASCA 174; 53 WAR 201 at [42]-[43] (Buss P, Murphy and Mitchell JJA) and the authorities there cited.

(4) It is not necessary to establish that judgment will be unsatisfied unless a freezing order is made. Nor is it necessary to demonstrate that a respondent has a positive intention to frustrate a judgment. However, there must be facts from which ‘a prudent, sensible commercial’ person can ‘properly infer a danger of default if assets are removed from the jurisdiction’. That may include facts concerning a lack of available information about a respondent: Hua Wang Bank Berhad at [9]-[12] (Kenny J) and the authorities there cited. See, also, Severstal Export GmbH v Bhushan Steel Ltd [2013] NSWCA 102; 84 NSWLR 141 at [59]-[60] (Bathurst CJ, Beazley P and Barrett JA agreeing); Trans Global Projects at [45].

(5) The mere fact of removal or danger of removal of assets from the jurisdiction will not necessarily give rise to a danger or risk that a judgment will go unsatisfied. In this regard, it is necessary to take into account any reciprocal regimes for the registration and enforcement of judgments and other means by which a judgment may be enforced: Trans Global Projects at [47]-[48]; Severstal Export at [63]-[65].

(6) Ultimately, it is a question for evaluation by the Court as to whether the degree of the danger or risk is sufficient to justify an order in the terms made. In making that evaluative assessment, the Court will bear in mind that a freezing order is a drastic remedy which imposes a severe restriction on a respondent’s right to deal with its assets, and that the purpose of the order is not to provide security for a judgment which the applicant hopes to obtain and fears might not be satisfied: Trans Global Projects at [44] and the authorities there cited.

22 To those principles can also be added the observations of Forrest J in Zhen v Mo [2008] VSC 300 at [21] to [30] and the authorities cited therein. Applications of this type involve an evaluative process to try and ascertain what will facilitate the interests of justice overall in the proceedings: see Westpac Banking Corporation v Forum Finance Pty Ltd (Freezing Orders Variation) [2022] FCA 910 (Lee J) at [35], and also see at [2]-[4] and [36]-[39].

23 The Defendants seek certain allowances or payments to be made to them for ordinary living expenses, including rent, utilities, childcare, reasonable legal expenses, and some particular past expenses already incurred as well as unrelated past and future legal expenses. All of those allowances or payments sought by the Defendant are sought to be paid from the assets and the funds the subject of the freezing orders. Given the liquidator’s claim, or claims as I have referred to, being to seek recovery for all unsecured creditors, and the position of the First and Fifth Defendants and the Defendants generally, there are clearly competing interests.

24 In undertaking the broad evaluative exercise, the task is to strike an appropriate balance between these competing interests. I am satisfied that the liquidator’s evidence demonstrates a good arguable case for final relief against each of the Defendants. The liquidator’s case relies on the books and records of the company, being M.A Services. The liquidators have access to those books and records and rely on s 1305 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) in that regard.

25 As already noted, Mr and Mrs Ahuja left Australia for Dubai on 12 December 2025. Mr Ahuja deposes that when they left for Dubai, a family holiday had been organised to Dubai, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Mauritius. At the time of departure, Mr Ahuja attests, tickets were held to return to Australia on 16 January 2026, and it was their intention to do so. However, that intention changed on or about 23 December 2025 when in Dubai and having placed M.A Services into voluntary administration. Mr Ahuja attests to his view that he thought it better to stay in one place to be more easily contactable by the now liquidators and his lawyers. However, it is unclear why that place is not Australia.

26 Mr Ahuja also deposes to an intention to return to Australia with his family. However, no decision has been made as to when that might occur. There is no evidence of any return tickets having been booked, timeframe, or the likelihood about that return to Australia. Furthermore, a 12-month lease agreement for a residential property in Dubai was entered into by Mr and Mrs Ahuja on 23 January 2026. That expense is a matter of dispute between the parties, and I will deal with that in more detail in due course. However, what that evidence does support is at least a longer intention to remain out of Australia.

27 In all of the circumstances, I am satisfied that there is a danger of the Defendants disposing of or otherwise dealing with their assets, such that there is a risk that any judgment obtained by the liquidators would not be able to be satisfied. I have reached that conclusion because there is evidence of conduct by the Defendants in the past, which, taken at face value, does support or demonstrate a risk that they might dispose of or dissipate assets in the future. The hearing conducted on 27 May 2026 was inter partes, and the freezing orders that will be made are now to be, “until further order”, that is, on an interlocutory basis.

28 In exercising the discretion and engaging in the evaluative exercise, it is relevant and was properly accepted by the liquidators that at present, there is no proprietary claim advanced by them.

29 The parties were agreeable to certain aspects of the freezing orders continuing, including by way of at least some of the real properties which were identified being the subject of the freezing orders. There was also agreement between the parties that the orders advanced by the liquidators for disclosure of further information were agreed and should be made by consent. Finally, there was also agreement in relation to certain payments or allowances which should be provided for in the freezing orders.

30 I am also satisfied that the payment of these agreed amounts is reasonable and strikes the necessary balance in the circumstances. Those matters are the:

(a) reasonable legal expenses of the Defendants;

(b) payment of past marketing expenses for certain properties in an amount of $8,855; and

31 In relation to the reasonable legal expenses, no cap or upper limit on these expenses was proposed by the parties. I had occasion to consider the relevant principles involved in relation to reasonable legal expenses in Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Peever (No 3) [2025] FCA 1187 at [48]-[51]. I adopt those matters in the context of this proceeding without repeating them.

32 The Defendants also sought a limited form of suppression order in relation to their current residential address, and I will deal with that in due course.

MATTERS FOR DETERMINATION

33 The matters which were in dispute and require determination are as follows:

(a) a limitation on the freezing order in relation to Mrs Ahuja given the quantum of the claim made against her in the statement of claim;

(b) the Dubai rental expense;

(d) the quantum of the Defendant’s reasonable living expenses;

(e) childcare expenses;

(f) past unrelated legal expenses to Elit Lawyers; and

(g) future legal expenses unrelated to these proceedings to Kennedy Lawyers.

A Limitation on the Freezing Order of Mrs Ahuja, given the quantum of the claim

34 The relevant principles are outlined above. Particularly relevant to a consideration of this issue is that a freezing order is a drastic remedy, the Court must exercise a high degree of caution. Such an order is not designed to provide security for an applicant’s claim. It is directed towards preserving assets to prevent frustration of the Court’s processes. An applicant bears the onus to satisfy the Court as to the quantum of any such order. Speculation and guesswork are not a proper basis to make such an order. An applicant must also establish with some precision the value of the prospective judgment because a freezing order should not unnecessarily tie up a party’s assets and property.

35 The statement of claim makes allegations and claims against Mrs Ahuja for money had and received in the amount of $300,000. The liquidators’ report states the following:

A claim was also made against Mrs Sasha Ahuja, also known as Sakshi Ahuja and Sakshi Verma, on the basis that the company made various payments for property and other personal expenses. We expect the quantum of this claim to grow as investigations are progressed.

36 Counsel for the liquidators submitted that there was an inference which could be drawn given the value of the properties, which were significant, of which Mrs Ahuja was a registered proprietor, that the funds for the purchase of those properties were likely to be sourced from M.A Services. However, Mrs Ahuja did have another source of funds prior to the collapse of M.A Services; she had her own business. There is no evidence of what that business earned or whether or not it earned a sufficient amount to enable Mrs Ahuja to purchase those properties. There is also no evidence at this stage that Mrs Ahuja received money from M.A Services to fund those purchases of real properties. The observations of the liquidators in their report is the high point of the evidence to support the liquidators’ claim that the amount to be claimed against Mrs Ahuja will increase. Investigations are clearly ongoing. This is insufficient to support a preservation order as against Mrs Ahuja for greater than $300,000. Currently, the solicitors on the record for the Defendants hold in trust an amount of $449,146.93 as the net proceeds of sale from the property located at Toorak (being Mandeville Cresent, Toorak, Victoria 314 (Toorak Property).

37 The amount of the freezing order in relation to Mrs Ahuja should be reduced to an amount of $300,000, as the liquidators have not established with precision the value of any prospective judgment beyond that amount, at this stage.

38 However, in exercising the appropriate balance in all circumstances, the amount in excess of the sum to be frozen, being $149,146.93, will be directed to certain payments sought by the Defendants. That will include the following matters that were not in dispute:

(a) the reimbursement of the marketing costs of $8,855;

(b) the March account for the water and electricity for $5,136.13;

(d) a balance amount which will be payable to the solicitors on the record in part payment of one of their invoices.

39 These will be detailed in final interlocutory orders.

The Dubai Rental Expense

40 Mr and Mrs Ahuja entered into a lease agreement on 23 January 2026 for a residence in Dubai. The 12-month rental was for a sum of AED600,000, which equates to approximately AUD$226,900. It is a five-bedroom property for Mr and Mrs Ahuja and their young child.

41 At the time of entering that rental agreement, M.A Services had been placed into voluntary administration. Mr Ahuja gives evidence that he provided a post-dated cheque for the rental payment due on 23 May 2026. He also says the cheque is drawn on an account which has insufficient funds for the cheque to clear. Mr Ahuja also deposes to the rent in relation to the Dubai property being due in advance. Mr Ahuja is concerned about the potential ramifications if the post-dated cheque is presented and does not clear (that is, the cheque bounces or is dishonoured). Each of the parties provided articles from the internet in order to assist the Court’s understanding of the relevant position in Dubai, if a cheque does not clear, that is, it is dishonoured. The weight to be given to such material in these circumstances is somewhat limited and, obviously, expert evidence would have been preferable.

42 The Defendants’ solicitor does give some evidence about trying to obtain expert evidence in relation to this issue. However, it appears from his affidavit that such inquiries only commenced on Friday 22 May 2026 (only a few days prior to the hearing). The other relevant circumstance in this regard is that there is a public holiday in Dubai around this time. That has, on the evidence, meant that there has been some difficulty in seeking to obtain that expert evidence. However, that public holiday is also relevant as it does not appear that the post-dated cheque has, as yet, been presented. Certainly, there was no evidence before the Court that the cheque referred to being dated 23 May 2026 has been presented and dishonoured.

43 The internet articles refer to a significant change in the law in Dubai regarding dishonoured cheques from 2022. That change meant that cheques with a value less than AED200,000 would avoid criminal proceedings, but may result in a fine being imposed. The articles still recorded that if a cheque is dishonoured for over AED200,000, then that may result in criminal proceedings. The cheque in this case is for exactly the amount of AED200,000. It was described that such a matter is a simple offence and while no imprisonment can occur, if the penalty is paid, civil actions still may be initiated. As I have already observed, the reliability of such internet articles remains questionable. However, irrespective of what the precise ramification of the cheque being dishonoured is, including if it is only a fine, it is obviously a circumstance that the Defendants wish to avoid.

44 The other relevant fact to consider in relation to the Dubai rental expenses is the terms of the rental agreement itself, including clause 5, which is under the heading “End of Tenancy”. That clause provides:

In the event that the tenant wishes to vacate the premises prior to the expiry of the contract, the tenant shall give 2 (two) months written notice and pay a penalty equivalent to 2 (two) month’s rent, and the landlord shall reimburse the balance of the rent and the security deposit.

45 No provision was made for the Dubai rental expense at the time of the orders on 20 March 2026. That is an expense that would have been known at the time those orders were entered by consent. However, those orders were only made with effect up until 4 pm on 29 April 2026. The limited time for which the freezing orders were to operate might have provided at least some comfort for the Defendants in relation to seeking to advance arguments that the Dubai rental expense should be a necessary exception on any contested hearing or inter partes hearing, in relation to the freezing orders.

46 As already observed, the Defendants were firmly of the view that this hearing was a continuation of the Plaintiffs’ application for freezing orders. In this context, it matters not whether the Defendants were correct in that view. However, that view held by the Defendants informs the approach taken by them in relation to their liability for the Dubai rent and not making provision for that rent in the 20 March 2026 orders or by not terminating the lease agreement pursuant to clause 5.

47 However, it is now clear to the Defendants that this is a contested or an inter partes hearing of the freezing orders. It is clear that they can now exercise the termination clause and give notice in relation to the Dubai tenancy agreement. That termination clause appears to require two months’ notice and payment of a penalty equivalent to two months’ rent. That may require that up to four months’ rent to be paid. That would effectively mean that if the rental of 23 May 2026 is paid, that payment would be sufficient for the period of the notice and allow for the termination and the cessation of future obligations, pursuant to that tenancy agreement, for the Defendants.

48 In all of the circumstances, the right balance is achieved by providing an exception to the freezing orders by allowing this payment of the 23 May 2026 Dubai rent. That is, to ensure that there are funds available for the post-dated cheque of 23 May 2026 to clear. This would also avoid any potential penalty. However, and it is obviously a matter for the Defendants, the termination can now be exercised such that provision for the 23 September 2026 rent is not necessary.

49 Allowing, by way of another exception, payment for the September rent for the Dubai property does not strike the right balance. There has been now an inter partes hearing. The orders will now be made on an interlocutory basis. The Dubai rent is significant, and the property, being a five-bedroom residence, is in excess of what Mr and Mrs Ahuja and their young son could need. There is likely to be at least three unoccupied bedrooms. Further, the termination clause can now be exercised to avoid the final four months of the lease.

50 In undertaking the evaluative decision and striking the right balance, this amount should be paid from the funds from the Toorak Property that are currently held, and I will make provision for this payment from those funds in the final interlocutory orders.

Future Utilities for the Dubai Rental

51 Payment for the utilities for these four months should follow the Dubai rental, and for the same reasons as already given.

52 Such expenses will necessarily be incurred while Mr and Mrs Ahuja live in the Dubai rental. It is not necessary to address this issue any further.

The Quantum of the Defendants’ Reasonable Living Expenses

53 In the correspondence and the evidence directly by Mr Ahuja, various estimates have been given. On 30 April 2026, the solicitors for Mr and Mrs Ahuja in correspondence provided an estimate that they expected their clients to incur monthly living expenses totalling approximately AUD$42,750, comprising of:

(a) $5,000 for water and electricity;

(b) $3,000 for child care;

(d) $1,500 for health insurance;

(e) $2,500 for general recreational expenses; and

(f) $18,750 for what I have termed as the Dubai rental.

54 Mr Ahuja gave evidence in his 12 May 2026 affidavit of the monthly living expenses required for he and his family in an amount of AUD$12,000 as follows (without the Dubai rent):

(a) groceries at $9,200;

(b) fuel and tolls at $400;

(d) healthcare at $800; and

(e) personal items for himself and Mrs Ahuja at $1,000.

55 More recently, in the affidavit of 26 May 2026 Mr Ahuja gave evidence of amounts sought for ordinary monthly living expenses of $9,100, which were said to comprise of the following (without the Dubai rent). These were the amounts ultimately pressed by the Defendants at the hearing.

(a) food and groceries of $5,000;

(b) transport expenses, including public transport and vehicle running costs of $500;

(d) insurance premiums of approximately $800;

(e) personal and household items of approximately $600; and

(f) incidental discretionary spending of approximately $2,000.

56 The liquidators submit that $1,000 a week for ordinary living expenses is sufficient and well within the term “ordinary” (being $4,333.33 per month).

57 On a consideration of ordinary living expenses and weighing and considering all of the evidence before the Court, the following is reasonable and, in my view, falls within a description of “ordinary living expenses”:

(a) transport and tolls of $400;

(b) medical and health of $200;

(d) personal and household items, including matters for their young son of $600; and

(e) then, given the significant fluctuation between the estimates for food and groceries, and bearing in mind the liquidators’ submission, $4,000 a month for food and groceries is reasonable in the circumstances.

58 That is a total of $6,000 per month for ordinary living expenses, and I will make allowance, by way of an exception to the freezing orders, for this matter and in this amount, in the final interlocutory orders.

59 The amount sought by the Defendants of incidental and discretionary spending of $2,000 a month is excessive and will not be allowed.

Childcare Expenses

60 Mr Ahuja deposes that his son currently attends daycare to allow he and his wife to pursue business opportunities and to deal with ongoing legal matters. He refers to an invoice in an amount of AED22,570 and an email from a childcare provider. Mr Ahuja also provides the AUD conversion for that amount, being $5,373.45.

61 Mrs Ahuja gives evidence that when M.A Services collapsed and when they decided to stay on in Dubai, she decided to prioritise her family. Mrs Ahuja also gives some evidence about seeking to start up a new enterprise and initially an allowance was sought for those costs or expenses to be incurred. Those were not pressed at the hearing. I assume this was on the basis that those interests are not being pursued, or at least they are not being pursued in the same way, particularly noting Mrs Ahuja’s evidence that she has decided to prioritise her family. Neither Mr or Mrs Ahuja are currently employed. Given that these interests are not being pursued, Mrs Ahuja does not require time to pursue these business opportunities.

62 The childcare provider invoice bears a different date to that deposed by Mr Ahuja, it is dated 26 January 2026, but it was this invoice that was the subject of submissions by the Defendants and does contain a gross total amount of AED22,570. That invoice also records a discount amount and then a net total due of AED20,313. The invoice continues and records a payment being made on 26 January 2026, together with a receipt number. The payment recorded is in the amount of AED16,000. The invoice also records a credit note with a credit note number of the same date, 26 January 2026. At the very end of this invoice document, it then records an amount due of AED4,044. Earlier in the invoice, it records, in the description, that it is for a period from 19 January 2026 to 18 May 2026 for what appears to be childcare for five days a week from 8 am to 4 pm. That is also consistent with the email in relation to childcare relied on by the Defendants, that the provision of childcare was for five days a week.

63 Although there is some inconsistency in relation to the description of the invoice by Mr Ahuja and the invoice itself, I prefer the documentary evidence of the invoice and what it records. It states at the end of the document that the amount due for that period was AED4,044. That is a cost that has already been incurred and is in that sense a past expense. In the circumstances, it is reasonable to allow that amount, which is outstanding, of AED4,044, and that amount will be allowed, as an exception and paid from the balance of the funds from the Toorak Property, in an amount of AUD$962.79. In calculating that, I have relied on the calculation provided by Mr Ahuja converting the AED22,570 to the AUD amount of $5,373.45. That deals with the past childcare.

64 In relation to future childcare, Mr and Mrs Ahuja sought the continuation of childcare for five days a week. That was said to be on the basis of the evidence by Mr Ahuja to pursue business opportunities and to deal with ongoing legal matters. Although it can be accepted that these legal proceedings would take some time out of particularly Mr Ahuja’s day, given his role in M.A Services, given the lack of business opportunities which are currently being pursued by Mr Ahuja and Mrs Ahuja, it does appear that there is time available for one or both of the parents to attend to some of the care needs of their young son. Having said that, though, it is reasonable in the circumstances for an exception to be made for the provision of some childcare. In this respect, I will allow, as an exception to the freezing orders, two days a week as a reasonable amount for future childcare expenses.

Past Legal Expenses to Elit Lawyers

65 There is some difficulty in the evidence in relation to these accounts. That difficulty may be more properly explained by a gap in the evidence, rather than an inconsistency. There is a trust account statement from Elit Lawyers which records a payment on 15 December 2025 by Mr Ahuja, which contains the description, “On account of future legal costs associated with Micky Ahuja - defamation matter.” There is also email correspondence which refers to an issue regarding defamation proceedings on 8 March 2026. Of course, the earlier payment to Elit’s trust account could not be in relation to matters occurring in March of 2026. There are invoices which have already been issued by Elit Lawyers which are recorded on the trust account statement, but there is a balance owing of $15,161.16. It appears that that balance flows from the last of the invoices issued on 26 February 2026.

66 Although those legal expenses are unrelated to these proceedings, it does appear on the face of the trust account statement of Elit Lawyers, which I should say I have no reason to doubt, were incurred at a time prior to the making of the initial freezing order. That is the freezing order of 20 March 2026, that was made up until 29 April 2026.

67 In the circumstances the appropriate balance is struck by allowing the payment of those past legal expenses to Elit Lawyers, and I will allow for them to be paid out of the funds from the Toorak Property, which will no longer be the subject of the freezing orders.

Future Legal Expenses unrelated to these Proceedings to Kennedy Lawyers

68 With reference again to Peever, in [36]-[37], I considered the reasonable legal expenses and whether or not such matters needed to be relevant to the very proceedings the subject of the freezing orders. There is a decision of Campbell J in Council of the Law Society v O’Brien [2019] NSWSC 1879 whereby the costs of defending criminal proceedings were allowed in the context of that proceeding. The future unrelated legal expenses in the circumstances of this case are quite different. I am also of the view that the weight of authority, as his Honour discussed there, weighs in favour of the allowance for reasonable legal expenses are generally those which are relevant to the proceedings in which the freezing orders are made.

69 As such, no provision, allowance or exception will be made for the future legal expenses to Kennedy Lawyers, in the final interlocutory freezing orders.

CONFIDENTIALITY

70 The final matter to be considered is confidentiality. The principle of open justice is fundamental to the common law, as Gibbs J said in Russell v Russell (1976) 134 CLR 495; [1976] HCA 23 at 520. Also see the Full Court of this Court in Ogawa v President of the Human Rights Commission (pseudonym) (2022) 294 FCR 221; [2022] FCAFC 160 at [23] (Rares, Perry and Hespe JJ). Section 17 of the FCA provides that except in certain circumstances the jurisdiction of the court shall be exercised in open court. Section 37AF is such an exception: see Lee v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2023) 296 FCR 272; [2023] FCAFC 22 at [85] (Thawley, Stewart and Abraham JJ).

71 Section 37AE of the FCA puts the principle of open justice as a primary matter to be taken into account when considering a suppression or non-publication order: see Lee at [83]. The Court has the power to prohibit or restrict the publication or disclosure of information which is broadly defined in s 37AA, as provided for in s 37AF(1)(a) by making a suppression or non-publication order: see Ogawa at [24].

72 The Court may make a suppression or non-publication order on the basis of the grounds provided for in s 37AG(1), and the Court must specify the grounds on which it makes such an order: see s 37AG(2), and Ogawa at [24]-[25]. Further, s 37AJ of the FCA provides that any order should not be for longer than is reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose for which it is made: see s 37AJ(2) of the FCA.

73 There is conflicting authority about whether the suppression or non-publication order can be expressed to operate until further order: see Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Ferratum Australia Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (2023) 169 ACSR 553; [2023] FCA 1043 at [60]-[65] (Kennett J). That is relevant as the Defendants sought for the order to operate for a period of two years or until further order. The better view is that it is not appropriate to express the order as, until further order.

74 The material which is proposed to be the subject of confidentiality is limited and of narrow focus. It is the current residential address of Mr and Mrs Ahuja in Dubai. It is submitted and Mr Ahuja gives evidence that there has been adverse interest and it has adversely affected him in relation to the media interest of M.A Services to mean that a limited suppression order is appropriate.

75 In all the circumstances, I am satisfied that the limited confidentiality order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice. However, I am not satisfied that the period of two years is appropriate. The lease entered for the current residence was entered on 26 May 2026 for a period of 12 months. Given the form of orders to be made, it is unlikely that the Defendants will remain in that residence for the entire lease period. However, even if the Defendants were to remain in that residence for the 12-month period, a period of two years from now, is excessive.

76 I will allow a period of 12 months, being one year from the date of the orders. On this basis, even if the First and Fifth Defendants remained in the residence past the current lease, they can apply to the court to extend the suppression order and seek to satisfy the court that it remains appropriate at that time.

CONCLUSION

77 As such, interlocutory freezing orders, which are in accordance with these terms, will be made.

AMENDMENT – SLIP RULE

78 On finalising these reasons, to be published in a written form, in accordance with the principles enunciated in Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v AAM17 (2021) 272 CLR 329; [2021] HCA 6 at [30]-[31] (Steward J, with whom Kiefel CJ, Keane, Gordon and Edelman JJ agreed), it became apparent that there were two errors in the Orders which were pronounced.

79 First, the published orders on 28 May 2026, relevantly stated:

8. The proceeding otherwise be adjourned for case management, as directed by the docket judge, to 9.30am on 3 September 2026.

10. Order 8 does not prevent disclosure to and between the following authorised persons:

(a) Judges of this Court;

(b) necessary Court Staff (including transcription service providers);

(d) legal representatives of the parties instructed in these proceedings;

(e) witnesses or proposed witnesses in these proceedings; and

(f) Commonwealth officers acting in the course of their duties.

11. Orders 8 and 9 operate for a period of one year from the date of this Order, in accordance with s 37AJ of the Act.

….

80 Order 10 should not refer to order 8. Order 8 is not providing a suppression order. Further, order 11 should not refer to orders 8 and 9. There has been an error in the cross-referencing to the other relevant orders.

81 Second, there is an error in Annexure A to the Orders in relation to the penal notice at the front of the orders to the Sixth Defendant, being M.A. Building and Construction Pty Ltd (ACN 669 261 223). That penal notice was in the following terms:

TO: the Sixth Defendant

IF YOU (BEING THE PERSON BOUND BY THIS ORDER):

(A) REFUSE OR NEGLECT TO DO ANY ACT WITHIN THE TIME SPECIFIED IN THIS ORDER FOR THE DOING OF THE ACT; OR

(B) DISOBEY THE ORDER BY DOING AN ACT WHICH THE ORDER REQUIRES YOU NOT TO DO,

YOU WILL BE LIABLE TO IMPRISONMENT, SEQUESTRATION OF PROPERTY OR OTHER PUNISHMENT.

ANY OTHER PERSON WHO KNOWS OF THIS ORDER AND DOES ANYTHING WHICH

HELPS OR PERMITS YOU TO BREACH THE TERMS OF THIS ORDER

82 The penal notice appears to be missing the closing words, after the word Order, being “may be similarly punished”.

Varying Orders after entry

83 Rule 39.05 of the Rules provides that the Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order after it has been entered, relevantly if (see, r 39.05(g) and (h)):

 there is a clerical mistake in the judgment or order; or

 there is an error arising in a judgment or order from an accidental slip or omission.

84 Subsections (g) and (h) of r 39.05 have generally been regarded as making express provision for the traditional “slip rule”: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v BlueScope Steel Limited (No 7) [2023] FCA 1140 (O’Bryan J); Tuberi v Federal Court of Australia (2025) 100 ALJR 397; [2025] HCASJ 46 at [4], (Edelman J).

85 As the Full Court observed in Flint v Richard Busuttil & Co Pty Limited (2013) 216 FCR 375; [2013] FCAFC 131 at [26]:

The purpose of the slip rule is to avoid injustice to litigants (Gould v Vaggelas (1985) 157 CLR 215 at 274-275) by ensuring that the Court’s judgment or order reflects its intention at the time the order was made or the judgment was published, or reflects the intention that the court would have had but for the failure that caused the accidental slip or omission: Symes v Commonwealth (1987) 89 FLR 356 at 357. It may be exercised to prevent unintended consequences of the order and in this way give effect to the court’s intentions: Newmont Yandal Operations Pty Ltd v The J Aron Corporation and the Goldman Sachs Group Inc (2007) 70 NSWLR 411 (Newmont Yandal) at [116], [185], [194]. It is not confined to errors or omissions of the court; it extends to errors or omissions resulting from the inadvertence of a party’s legal representative: L Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council [No 2] (1982) 151 CLR 590 (Shaddock) at 594-595.

86 However, the slip rule does not allow for any correction of the reasoning processes underlying an order: Austal Ships Sales Pty Ltd v Stena Rederi Aktiebolag (2009) 263 ALR 384; [2009] FCAFC 179 at [22]–[25] (Finn and Dowsett JJ).

87 Although the power is to be exercised sparingly and is not available as a matter of course: Tuberi at [6], the slip rule is available to correct a clerical mistake. On any view, the first error in the cross-referencing that has occurred is a clerical mistake, in the final interlocutory orders of 28 May 2026.

88 I have corrected the Orders, with the publication of this judgment. The Orders on the Court file will also be corrected, as follows:

8. The proceeding otherwise be adjourned for case management, as directed by the docket judge, to 9.30am on 3 September 2026.

10. Order 9 does not prevent disclosure to and between the following authorised persons:

(a) Judges of this Court;

(b) necessary Court Staff (including transcription service providers);

(d) legal representatives of the parties instructed in these proceedings;

(e) witnesses or proposed witnesses in these proceedings; and

(f) Commonwealth officers acting in the course of their duties.

11. Orders 9 and 10 operate for a period of one year from the date of this Order, in accordance with s 37AJ of the Act.

….

89 The second error in the penal notice is also a clerical mistake. The formatting imposed by the text box surrounding the penal notice has meant that the closing words of the penal notice are not visible. On extending the text box further, it is apparent that the closing words which appear to be missing are not visible because they were cut off by the formatting of the text box, but were contained in the penal notice. This formatting error is clearly a clerical mistake in the final interlocutory freezing orders.

90 I have also corrected Annexure A to the Orders, in relation to the penal notice to the Sixth Defendant, with the publication of this judgment. The Orders on the Court file will also be corrected, as follows:

TO: The Sixth Defendant

IF YOU (BEING THE PERSON BOUND BY THIS ORDER):

(A) REFUSE OR NEGLECT TO DO ANY ACT WITHIN THE TIME SPECIFIED IN THIS ORDER FOR THE DOING OF THE ACT; OR

(B) DISOBEY THE ORDER BY DOING AN ACT WHICH THE ORDER REQUIRES YOU NOT TO DO,

YOU WILL BE LIABLE TO IMPRISONMENT, SEQUESTRATION OF PROPERTY OR OTHER PUNISHMENT.

ANY OTHER PERSON WHO KNOWS OF THIS ORDER AND DOES ANYTHING WHICH HELPS OR PERMITS YOU TO BREACH THE TERMS OF THIS ORDER MAY BE SIMILARLY PUNISHED.

I certify that the preceding ninety (90) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Wheatley.

Associate:

Dated: 20 July 2026

SCHEDULE OF PARTIES

	VID 261 of 2026
Defendants
Fourth Defendant:	BALDWIN AVE PTY LTD (ACN 640 853 292)
Fifth Defendant:	SASHA AHUJA AKA SAKSHI AHUJA OR SAKSHI VERMA
Sixth Defendant:	M.A. BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION PTY LTD (ACN 669 261 223)
Seventh Defendant:	MASG HOLDINGS PTY LTD (ACN 640 037 734)
Eighth Defendant:	M.A INTERNATIONAL GROUP PTY LTD (ACN 629 618 622)
Ninth Defendant:	BLANCH FAMILY HOLDINGS PTY LTD (ACN 168 912 794)
Tenth Defendant:	BUNJIL SERVICES GROUP PTY LTD (FORMERLY MA BUNJIL PTY LTD) (ACN 646 952 169)
Eleventh Defendant:	AUSTRALIAN COLLEGE OF SECURITY TRAINING PTY. LTD. (ACN 085 770 663)

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