Federal Court of Australia

Jakkireddy v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 913

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The application for extension of time and leave to appeal filed on 1 July 2025 is dismissed.

2.    The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs, fixed in the amount of $4,000.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MCELWAINE J:

1    This is a matter concerning the refusal to grant a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) visa (student visa). The applicant applies for an extension of time and leave to appeal the orders of Judge Mansini of the Federal Circuit Court in Jakkireddy v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 922 in which her Honour refused the applicant’s application for an extension of time for filing for review of the Registrar’s decision of 1 April 2025 (PJ).

2    The Registrar’s decision of 1 April 2025 dismissed the applicant’s application for judicial review of an Administrative Appeals Tribunal decision to affirm the Minister’s delegate’s decision to refuse the applicant’s student visa application.

3    The applicant, out of time, now applies in this Court for an extension of time and leave to appeal from Circuit Court orders on four grounds. I have decided to determine the application on the papers and to dismiss it.

Background

4    The applicant is a citizen of India. On 30 August 2017, he applied for a student visa. On 10 November 2017, a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the student visa because the applicant failed to meet the financial capacity requirements prescribed by cl 500.214 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). The applicant applied to the Tribunal to review the refusal.

5    The Tribunal notified the applicant, on 18 June 2019, of the hearing date on 3 July 2019. On 26 June 2019, the applicant advised the Tribunal he would not attend the hearing and requested the Tribunal to decide the application without his attendance on the available information.

6    On 27 June 2019, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the Minister’s delegate. In the written reasons (TD) the Tribunal stated that due to the applicant not being enrolled in a course of study, the financial capacity requirements could not be determined: TD [12]. The Tribunal then considered whether the applicant satisfied the financial capacity requirement on another basis: TD [13]. The Tribunal noted the evidence of fees paid for enrolments prior to his visa application and evidence of financial support from his father, however ultimately concluded that this evidence was insufficient on its own to satisfy the financial requirement under cl 500.214(3) of the Regulations: TD [13]-[15].

7    The Tribunal found that the applicant did not satisfy cl 500.211 of the Regulations as he was not enrolled in a course of study at the time of the decision: TD [16]-[22].

8    Given the applicant failed to satisfy cll 500.214(3) and 500.211, the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review.

9    On 17 July 2019, the applicant pursued an application for judicial review in the Circuit Court. The Minister then applied for summary dismissal. On 1 April 2025 a Registrar of the Circuit Court upheld the Minister’s application and dismissed the review application with costs.

10    On 14 April 2025, the applicant lodged an application for an extension of time to file a de novo application for review of the Registrar’s decision. Judge Mansini heard the application on 5 June 2025 and for comprehensive reasons published on 13 June 2025, dismissed it.

11    Undeterred, on 1 July 2025, the applicant now applies to this Court out of time for leave to appeal the Circuit Court orders. He failed to meet the 14-day time limit for a leave application: r 35.13 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

Determined on the papers

12    The applicant makes no election for either an oral hearing or for the matter to be determined on the papers in his application. The Minister applies for determination on the papers: r 36.41 of the Rules.

13    I accept the Minister’s submission that determination on the papers is consistent with s 37M of the Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) as it would facilitate the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively, and efficiently as possible. The application does not raise an issue of statutory construction, a general principle of law, or the correctness of a Full Court decision and the principles in this matter are well established. I agree.

14    Another reason is that the applicant failed to comply with my procedural orders of 29 May 2026 which required him to file and serve an outline of submissions by 4.00pm on 12 June 2026. Applicants should have no expectation that the finite resources of this Court will be applied to afford an oral hearing in these types of cases where the applicant ignores reasonable procedural orders designed to expose the arguments relied on.

Application for extension of time

15    The applicant asserts, unsupported by any evidence, that his delay in filing was due to:

2.    The delay in filing was due to English not being my first language and requiring interpreter assistance, which was not immediately available to me.

3.     I attempted to lodge the application within 6 days of the deadline but faced language barriers in completing the proper documentation.

4.     I do not have the financial means to seek legal advice and am representing myself in this matter.

16    The applicant should understand that an extension of time to file an appeal is an indulgence that must be supported by a reasonable explanation. Unverified conclusionary assertions in an application will not be accepted by this Court, save in the most exceptional of circumstances which are not evident in this matter. What is missing is any evidence in the applicant’s affidavit of 24 June 2025 which is the factual basis for each of the applicant’s assertions.

17    Moreover, as the Minister correctly submits a lack of knowledge by the applicant regarding time limits or the availability of judicial review is not itself a sufficient explanation for failing to file for leave to appeal in the required timeframe; SZJRV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 298 at [6] (Flick J); SZNYE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 500 at [8] (Katzmann J); Mohammed v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 1010 at [55] (Neskovcin J). Additionally, the inability to obtain legal advice or representation is not alone a sufficient explanation for failing to comply with stipulated timeframes; Tran v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 533 at [35] (Wigney J); AZS21 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCA 392 at [16] (Perry J).

18    The time limits prescribed for the commencement of an appeal or an application for leave to appeal are not merely aspirational; parties have the right to assume that once an appeal period expires the litigation has concluded as defined by the judgment at first instance; BLD16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1400 at [3] (Derrington J).

19    Of itself, these considerations require that the application be dismissed. However, there are other reasons. The proposed appeal grounds are manifestly hopeless and it would be inutile to extend time.

Proposed appeal grounds

20    The applicant contends in ground one that the primary judge “made an error in law and [sic] in how it exercised its discretion” when her Honour refused the extension of time to file for review of the Registrar’s decision. The applicant states the factors which the primary judge held weighed in his favour and contends that the Minister “wouldn't suffer any real prejudice apart from the costs of responding to the application, which the Court also recognised”.

21    The Minister accepts that whilst no specific prejudice would be caused by the granting of an extension, the lack of prejudice itself is not a reason to grant the extension of time. The Minister also notes that the primary judge at PJ [24]-[30] and [40]-[45] comprehensively considered the relevant factors and merits of the application for the grant of an extension of time, reiterating the principle that it is rarely in the interests of the administration of justice to extend time to file a proposed judicial review application which has little or no prospect of success: MZZIV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1203 at [6] (Mortimer J); CNM16 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2019] FCA 1358 at [20] (Rares J). The ground simply fails the basal appellate function of identification of error; more so where the House v The King deference standard applies.

22    Ground two mirrors grounds three to five of the Circuit Court application. The applicant contends that the primary judge failed to properly consider whether the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error by not complying with s 359A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), particularly when the Tribunal relied on information about the applicant not being enrolled “without giving me procedural fairness”. The second limb of ground two contends the primary judge “did not address whether the Tribunal's interpretation and application of clause 500.211 was legally correct”.

23    The Minister is correct to submit that the primary judge dealt with these contentions at PJ [39]-[43]. The applicant was required to demonstrate that he was enrolled in a course of study at the time of the Tribunal’s decision: PJ [40]. He was not, and for that reason the primary judge correctly found that his application had no reasonable prospect of success: PJ [41]-[43]. This ground fails to identify why the primary judge erred in that finding.

24    Ground three contends that the applicant “believes” that the primary judge placed “too much” weight on the public interest in the finality of administrative decisions at PJ [30], “without properly balancing this against other important considerations”. The other important considerations being:

i.     The public interest in making sure that executive decisions are made lawfully (which the Court acknowledged at [29]);

ii.     My personal circumstances, including my language barriers and the fact that I didn't have legal representation at the time;

iii.     The other factors the Court had already found to weigh in favour of granting me an extension of time.

25    Complaints about weight rarely establish House v The King error. In any event, her Honour acknowledged the applicant’s personal circumstances and the weight they bore at PJ [43]. She further stated at PJ [45] that “in weighing the relevant factors” the application should be refused. The Minister correctly submits that this ground is misguided as the applicant was required to be enrolled in a course of study at the time of the Tribunal decision pursuant to cl 500.211, which he was not, and as such the Tribunal decision was free from error. In that circumstance remittal to the Tribunal “would be an exercise in futility”: PJ [43], by reference to Singh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 605 at [28] (Rofe J). There is no merit in this ground.

26    Ground four asserts the primary judge made an error in finding that remitting the matter back to the Tribunal would be “an exercise in futility”: PJ [43]. It fails for the reasons given for ground three. On a benevolent reading it might be that the particulars take the ground into different territory:

i.     The Court made a summary decision about whether there was jurisdictional error, without properly engaging with the arguments I raised;

ii.     It didn't consider whether the procedural fairness issues I raised could be addressed if the matter were reconsidered.

27    The applicant does not further particularise how his submissions were not “properly engag[ed]” with nor how the primary judge was to further address the procedural fairness concerns addressed by her Honour at PJ [43]. If the applicant had complied with the procedural order to file submissions, he may have illuminated the point of these contentions and thereby why it is said that the primary judge erred. In that circumstance, it is not the function of this Court to make assumptions about what might be meant and then to engage in speculative reasoning. Accordingly, this ground is of no merit.

28    For these reasons, the application is dismissed with costs, fixed in the amount of $4,000.

Associate:

Dated:    10 July 2026