Federal Court of Australia

Singh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 895

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The name of the first respondent be amended to Minister for Immigration and Citizenship.

2.    The name of the second respondent be amended to the Administrative Review Tribunal.

3.    The appeal is dismissed.

4.    The appellant is to pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MCELWAINE J:

Introduction

1    This case concerns a secondary applicant to a primary visa holder’s student visa and has a regrettably long history. The appellant now appeals the orders of the primary judge, Judge Ladhams, in Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1217 (Circuit Court and PJ). Her Honour dismissed an application for judicial review of an Administrative Review Tribunal decision, which affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister to cancel his Student (Temporary) (Class TU) (Subclass 500) visa.

2    The appellant filed this appeal on 18 November 2024. (It was not docketed to me until 25 May 2026. I promptly made procedural directions and listed the hearing for today. The delay in docketing the matter has been explained internally as related to a backlog of appeals accumulated during the COVID-19 pandemic as well as significant re-staffing within the Court Migration Team). The appellant relies on generalised grounds that the primary judge’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error, that a fair decision-making process was not adopted, that the law was interpreted incorrectly, and finally, that his circumstances were not properly considered.

3    The appellant also filed an affidavit which provides a vacuous explanation of the matters relating to each of the grounds of appeal. He simply asserts that:

I strongly believe that I have a genuine arguable case, and the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia made an error by dismissing my application on 14 November 2024.

4    Another unsatisfactory aspect of the appellant’s prosecution of his appeal is his failure to comply with procedural orders made on 28 May 2026, which required him to file an outline of submissions by 4.00pm on 12 June 2026. I do not have the benefit of any written submissions from the appellant which may have illuminated why he contends that the primary judge erred. Conversely, the Minister’s written submissions helpfully explain why the appeal must be dismissed.

5    The appellant appeared before me this morning with the assistance of an interpreter. He provided no reason for his failure to provide an outline of written submissions. Despite that failure, I invited him to orally address is grounds of appeal. He had nothing to say in support. I informed the appellant that I was satisfied the appeal was of no merit and must be dismissed and that I would shortly publish my reasons for that order by email.

Background

6    The appellant is a citizen of India. In 2018, he and Ms Simranjeet Kaur Bhatt (Ms Bhatt) were married in India. The appellant then moved to Australia with Ms Bhatt for her to pursue post-graduate study. On 8 September 2018, Ms Bhatt applied for a student visa in which the appellant was included as a dependant family member satisfying the secondary criteria in r 500.3 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) on the basis that he was her spouse. The appellant was granted a visa on 5 November 2025.

7    The marital relationship deteriorated to the extent that Ms Bhatt and the appellant separated shortly after the visa was granted. Ms Bhatt wrote to notify the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (as it was formerly known) advising of the separation on 21 February 2019. The Department provided the appellant with a record of decision to cancel his visa under s 116(1)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) on 6 May 2019, on the basis that he was no longer a member of Ms Bhatt’s family unit.

8    The appellant then lodged an application for review to the Tribunal and attended the hearing on 13 August 2019 with the assistance of an interpreter. For reasons in the statement made on 21 August 2019, the Tribunal affirmed the cancellation (TD). The Tribunal was satisfied that the grounds for cancellation under s 116(1)(a) of the Act were met, as the appellant and Ms Bhatt had separated with no prospect of reconciliation. As such the basis upon which his visa had been granted no longer existed: TD [9]-[11]).

9    In exercising its discretion to cancel the visa, the Tribunal then considered the circumstances of the case including the matters raised by the appellant during the hearing, and any relevant matters identified in the Procedures Advice Manual (PAM3) (TD [12]).

10    During the hearing before the Tribunal, the appellant accepted that his marriage had ended (TD [14]). The Tribunal did not consider it appropriate to make findings concerning the breakdown of the marriage and placed more weight on the purpose of the appellant’s stay in Australia, any hardship that he would face upon returning to India, and the legal consequences of cancelling his visa. In respect of each of these considerations, the Tribunal found there was no utility in allowing the appellant’s visa to be maintained once he separated from Ms Bhatt (TD [15]-[18]), the appellant has a social network and will likely adapt to life in India (TD [21]), and the appellant may apply for a bridging visa while making arrangements to depart Australia voluntarily (TD [24]-[25]).

11    Being dissatisfied with the Tribunal decision, the appellant pursued an application for judicial review in the Circuit Court.

12    The primary judge dismissed the review application on 14 November 2024, and gave comprehensive reasons set for that order, despite the absence of “meaningful detail” in the 13 review grounds: PJ [2]. The primary judge explained the limited role of the Circuit Court on judicial review in these types of cases: PJ [23]. Undeterred, the appellant sought to agitate the merits of the cancellation decision: PJ [24]. Nonetheless, the primary judge considered each of the grounds in the balance of her reasons: PJ [26]-[56]. None revealed jurisdictional error.

Determination

13    The Minister is correct to submit that the unparticularised grounds of appeal to this Court are without merit. The appellant makes no attempt to address his fundamental obligation of identifying error in the reasons of the primary judge: Australian Security Academy Pty Ltd v Australasian Institute of Chartered Loss Adjusters Pty Ltd [2026] FCAFC 16 at [51].

14    The appellant’s grounds of appeal are drawn with a level of generality that obstructs the identification of any tangible error. The grounds fail to identify the paragraphs in which the primary judge allegedly made an error, or what it is that the primary judge should have found.

15    Of itself that is a reason to dismiss the appeal. However, affording some latitude to the appellant as a self-represented litigant, I will briefly consider each of the asserted grounds.

16    The first ground simply asserts that the decision of the Circuit Court is affected by jurisdictional error. It is expressed so broadly that I am unable to identify the error, that this Court is asked to correct. The ground fails for this reason.

17    Ground 2 mixes up distinct concepts. It asserts that the primary judge failed to afford procedural fairness and incorrectly interpreted the law. The appellant has not indicated any substantive way in which he was denied procedural fairness. Before attending the Circuit Court hearing, the appellant was provided with the opportunity to file submissions, an amended application and evidence in support, and yet, he failed to do so: PJ [19]. The primary judge recorded at PJ [23]-[24] the extent that she went to in conducting a procedurally fair hearing. No error is evident in how her Honour proceeded.

18    The assertion that the primary judge incorrectly interpreted the law fails to engage with any asserted error.

19    Ground 3 asserts that the primary judge erred in failing to find that the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error by misinterpreting the Regulations and PAM3 without identification of the error. In any event, the question for determination by the primary judge was whether the Tribunal properly exercised its powers under s 116(1)(a) of the Act when it decided to cancel the visa. The Regulations, while relevant to the Minister’s grant of the visa, are not relevant to the Tribunal’s decision to affirm the cancellation of the visa.

20    Like the primary judge, I am satisfied the Tribunal appropriately considered the PAM3: PJ [31]-[33]. After first determining that the Minister’s delegate was correct to cancel the visa, the Tribunal correctly assessed the appellant’s prevailing circumstances, rather than those that existed when the visa was granted. At the time of cancellation, the circumstances that permitted the grant of the visa, being the relationship of dependency on the primary applicant, no longer existed. This change in circumstances enlivens the Minister’s discretion under s 116(1)(a) of the Act, making the appellant's present circumstances a critical factor in deciding whether the ground for cancellation of his visa existed.

21    Finally, Ground 4 asserts that the primary judge erred by failing to consider “that each case has its own facts and merits and ought to be consider on a case-to-case basis” (sic). This is an impermissible contention that the Circuit Court should have delved into the merits.

22    For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed. The Minister sought the usual costs order which the appellant did not resist.

Associate:

Dated:    9 July 2026