Federal Court of Australia

Wijeyekoon by her litigation guardian Haslum v Westpac Banking Corporation [2026] FCA 875

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The urgent application before start of a proceeding filed on 6 July 2026 be dismissed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

GOODMAN J:

1    On 6 July 2026, and in my capacity as Commercial and Corporations Duty Judge for New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory, I heard and dismissed an urgent ex parte application for an injunction to prevent Westpac Banking Corporation and St. George Bank (together, the bank) from discharging – as part of the settlement of the sale of a property in the suburb of Harrison in the Australian Capital Territory – a loan advanced by the bank to Mrs Ranee Wijeyekoon. These are my reasons for doing so.

2    The application was brought by Mrs Wijeyekoon’s daughter, Ms Amanthi Haslum, purportedly in the capacity of litigation guardian for Mrs Wijeyekoon. The application was supported by a lengthy affidavit sworn by Ms Haslum, and by a series of documents that she sent to Chambers prior to the hearing and which I treated as tendered on the application.

3    Ms Haslum, in her affidavit and in her oral submissions, made a number of allegations that the bank has engaged in nefarious behaviour described, for example, as “criminal activity”, “financial abuse”, “fraudulent and criminal conduct” and a “fraud” that is “complex and transnational”. Ms Haslum also made allegations concerning nefarious behaviour on the part of others, including a solicitor who acted for her father Mr Senaka Wijeyekoon. Those allegations, which are obviously grave, did not on the evidence rise above the level of unsubstantiated and oft-repeated assertion.

4    The salient matters established by the evidence are as follows.

5    In November 2009, Mr and Mrs Wijeyekoon borrowed funds from the bank and, I infer, provided security for that loan in the form of a mortgage over the property.

6    On 10 March 2023, a judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) made final orders concerning the property interests of Mrs Wijeyekoon on the one hand and Mr Wijeyekoon on the other. As part those orders, the judge noted Mrs Wijeyekoon’s: (1) “serious non-compliance and lack of engagement, notwithstanding the appointment of a Litigation Guardian, who was subsequently discharged due to significant difficulty in adequately engaging in proceedings”; and (2) failure to appear at the hearing.

7    Those orders relevantly provided for: (1) the sale of the property, including for the appointment of Mr Wijeyekoon as the trustee for sale; and (2) the proceeds of sale of the property to be disbursed in a particular order with the first priority being the discharge of the mortgage over the property.

8    On 15 December 2025, the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory transferred to the Family Court, under s 5 of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross Vesting) Act 1987 (Cth), a proceeding that had been commenced in that Court by Ms Haslum, qua litigation guardian of Mrs Wijeyekoon, against the Registrar General of the Australian Capital Territory Land Titles Office. The transfer order included an order extending the operation of a caveat apparently lodged on behalf on Mrs Wijeyekoon with respect to the property.

9    On 19 June 2026, Mrs Wijeyekoon learnt that the property had been sold in April 2026 and that the sale was due to complete on 7 July 2026.

10    Mrs Wijeyekoon is not living in the property.

11    No application was made to the Family Court for an injunction of the kind now sought.

12    The principles governing the grant of interlocutory injunctive relief are well established. As the High Court of Australia explained in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill [2006] HCA 46; (2006) 227 CLR 57 at 68 [19] (Gleeson CJ and Crennan J) and 81 to 84 ([65] to [72]) (Gummow and Hayne JJ), the Court should consider: (1) whether there is a serious question to be tried; (2) whether the balance of convenience favours the grant of interlocutory relief, including the question of whether the moving party would likely suffer an injury for which damages would not be an adequate remedy; and (3) whether there are any discretionary factors which tend against the granting of relief.

13    I considered each of those questions before dismissing the application. My reasons for dismissing the application were as follows.

14    First, I was not satisfied that there is serious issue to be tried in this Court. The allegations made were cast at a level of generality which made it difficult to discern that there was a cause of action available to Mrs Wijeyekoon in respect of which this Court would have jurisdiction. At best, there may be a case of unconscionable conduct and misleading or deceptive conduct but the strength of such a case was far from apparent.

15    Indeed, the basis on which the injunction was sought was the maintenance of the status quo with respect to the property, for the purpose of allowing time for the Australian Financial Complaints Authority to undertake an investigation into the alleged misbehaviour on the part of the bank.

16    Secondly, even assuming that there was a serious issue to be tried in this Court, I was not persuaded that the grant of the injunction sought was an appropriate remedy. In this regard, as best I could discern, there was no remedy sought which required that the property not be sold, or which could be better effected if the property were not sold. To the extent that Mrs Wijeyekoon might have a cause of action against the bank within the jurisdiction of this Court, it was not apparent that Mrs Wijeyekoon would be adversely affected by the sale of the property. In other words, damages appeared to be an adequate remedy.

17    Thirdly, the sale is giving effect to orders made by the Family Court. I was reluctant to grant an injunction which would have had the effect of stymieing the orders made by that Court, absent compelling reasons to do so. I was not satisfied that there was any such reason, much less a compelling reason. Importantly, no application had been made to the Family Court despite it being the Court that: (1) made the order for the sale of the property; and (2) is currently seized of the proceeding commenced on behalf of Mrs Wijeyekoon in the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory concerning a caveat over the property. These matters provided a powerful discretionary consideration to decline the relief sought.

Associate:

Dated:    7 July 2026