Federal Court of Australia

Shlomi v Anything4Views Pty Ltd [2026] FCA 873

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The interlocutory application filed by the Respondents on or about 10 June 2026 be dismissed.

2.    The Respondents pay the Applicants costs of that interlocutory application.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Delivered ex tempore, revised from transcript

JACKMAN J:

1    This is an interlocutory application for further security for costs in the amount of $50,000, in addition to the amounts set out in the existing consent orders. Security has been sought in the proceedings on the basis that the applicants are resident in the United States, without assets in Australia.

2    After some negotiations between the solicitors for the parties, on 4 November 2025 the parties agreed to consent orders which were signed by the respective solicitors to resolve the question of security for costs for the time being. Those orders provided relevantly:

2.    The Applicants, on a without admissions basis, are to pay the sum of $77,000 into Court as security for costs in the following tranches:

(a)    $7,000 by 12 November 2025;

(b)    $26,000 within 7 days after service of the Applicants’ lay and expert evidence; and

(c)    $44,000 no later than 30 days prior to the date set for hearing.

3.    The Respondents have liberty to seek further security, after the filing of their expert and lay evidence, and by no later than 45 days prior to the date set for hearing.

3    The applicants have paid the first tranche of security pursuant to those orders. Those orders resolved by way of compromise a dispute between the parties as to the amount of security to be provided and the timing of the provision of security. In my view, the consent orders represented a binding agreement between the parties to compromise that dispute.

4    The effect of Order 3 made on 4 November 2025 is plainly that the respondents agreed that they would make no further application for security for costs until the respondents had filed their lay and expert evidence. Neither party has yet filed their evidence.

5    I accept that the Court has power to vary a consent order even when it represents a contractually binding agreement: Aravanis (Trustee) v Twin Investors Pty Ltd, in the matter of the Bankrupt Estate of Kapp (Standing of Third Respondent) [2021] FCA 359 at [13] (Perram J). However in the present circumstances, I do not regard there as being sufficient justification warranting a variation of the orders of 4 November 2025. In particular, I do not think that there has been any material change in circumstances. While the respondents may well have spent more on the proceedings than they envisaged spending up to the time of serving their evidence, that is an ordinary vicissitude of litigation which must have been anticipated as a realistic risk when the respondents agreed to the orders of 4 November 2025. The fact that discovery has been ordered before the filing and service of evidence is a usual feature of litigation in this Court, and any experienced solicitor acting for the respondents in the present case would have anticipated the realistic possibility of discovery being sought by the applicants before the service of evidence. The fact that the itemised calculations provided by the respondents’ solicitor in support of their initial claim for security for costs did not include the step of discovery does not indicate, in my view, that the respondents’ solicitor did not contemplate a realistic possibility of discovery having to be provided if the applicants sought such discovery. In any event, discovery has added only $17,000 to the costs incurred to date, whereas the claim for further security for costs is in the amount of $50,000. Further, the evidence shows that the first applicant has made significant financial decisions based on the regime agreed on 4 November 2025 remaining operative.

6    I note that there is also a question as to the reasonableness of the amount sought. That question can be addressed at the appropriate time, if necessary, after the respondents have filed their expert and lay evidence. One issue to be considered may well be whether security in a situation like the present should only be in an amount sufficient to obtain recognition and enforcement of an Australian judgment in the relevant State in the United States. I express no view on that issue, but simply raise the question, and I note that the applicants have indicated an intention to put an argument at the appropriate time that the amount of security should be so limited.

7    Accordingly, the interlocutory application should be dismissed. The respondents should pay the applicants’ costs of that application.

Associate:

Dated:    6 July 2026