Federal Court of Australia

Galinovic v Singtel Optus Pty Limited (No 3) [2026] FCA 845

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the oral hearing application and the variation of orders application, fixed at $22,319.00, via electronic funds transfer into the following bank account:

2.    By 31 July 2026, the parties advise the Associate to Justice Meagher of their availability to attend a case management hearing on or after 1 September 2026.

3.    The proceeding be listed for a case management hearing on or after 1 September 2026 on a date to be advised.

4.    Liberty to apply.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MEAGHER J

introduction

1    The substantive proceeding arises out of an urgent interlocutory application for an injunction (Urgent Application) sought by the applicant against Singtel Optus Pty Ltd and Optus Bill Services Pty Ltd (the respondents), which I heard as duty judge on 22 May 2025. That application was dismissed with costs: Galinovic v Singtel Optus Pty Ltd [2025] FCA 611 (Galinovic (No 1)). It concerned an interlocutory application, by which the applicant sought to restrain the respondents from terminating telecommunication services for the supply of broadband, modem back-up, and email and phone services that it provided to her, such threatened termination having been brought on by the applicant’s purported payment for the abovementioned services by promissory notes: Galinovic (No 1) at [1] – [8].

2    Following the dismissal of the applicant’s urgent interlocutory injunction, the applicant purported to make payment of the respondents’ costs by way of a promissory note: Galinovic v Singtel Optus Pty Limited (No 2) (Galinovic (No 2)) [2026] FCA 524 at [9] –[13], [52] – [57]. That promissory note was dated 18 June 2025 and sent to the respondents on that date, and included an “Allonge” which provided, inter alia, as follows:

In accordance with established legal principles, if you wish to disclaim the payment tendered, you must return the payment within 72 hours after delivery and receipt. Failure to do so will be deemed as acceptance of the payment for full and final satisfaction of the outstanding liabilities owed.

3    Thereafter, I granted the following applications:

(1)    The respondents’ application made by email on 20 June 2025 to vary orders made in the hearing of the Urgent Application (variation of orders application). The orders as varied by the variation of orders application now provide that the applicant pay the costs of her Urgent Application by electronic funds transfer (EFT).

(2)    The applicant’s application for an oral hearing (oral hearing application) of the variation of orders application, which I granted having heard the oral hearing application and the variation of orders application concurrently.

4    The respondents now seek orders that the applicant pay the costs of the variation of orders application and the oral hearing application on a lump sum basis in the amount of $22,319.00 pursuant to s 43(3)(d) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 40.02 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). The applicant opposes the respondents’ application.

submissions

Materials relied on

5    The respondents rely on:

(1)    The affidavit of Mr Theodore sworn and filed on 6 May 2026 (Theodore Affidavit).

(2)    Their written submissions filed on 6 May 2026.

6    The applicant relies on:

(1)    Her affidavit affirmed and filed on 13 May 2026 (Applicant’s Affidavit).

(2)    Her written submissions filed on 13 May 2026.

7    In the Applicant’s Affidavit, the applicant makes reference to her affidavit affirmed on 21 June 2025 and her affidavit affirmed on 7 July 2025. The Applicant’s Affidavit also states that the applicant “rel[ies] upon [her] previous [a]ffidavits and other documents filed in this matter, without exhibiting them in full”. This would include her affidavits affirmed on 11 May 2025, 13 May 2025 and 14 July 2025. These affidavits and documents have been considered in this application to ensure that the Court takes account of the entirety of the applicant’s case.

Respondents’ submissions

8    Broadly, the respondents’ submissions are, relying on Byrnes v Brisconnections Management Co Ltd (No 2) [2009] FCA 1432 at [51], that it is appropriate for the Court to fix costs in a lump sum, in circumstances where the matter is relatively simple. They say that though the oral hearing application and the variation of orders application were contested, the matter proceeded by short affidavits and submissions only, and that it was possible and expedient for their costs to be fixed. They submit in this regard that:

(1)    The lump sum “should be fixed broadly having regard to the information of the charges rendered” by their solicitors before the Court, “with the sum of costs being proportionate” to the matter’s nature and complexity.

(2)    “[T]he Court is not required to undertake a detailed examination of the kind” appropriate to taxation or formal costs assessment.

9    The amount of $22,319.90 sought comprises $22,000.00 in solicitor fees and $319.90 in disbursements, being the cost of transcription services for the hearing of the variation of orders application and the oral hearing application. The Theodore Affidavit relevantly annexes an invoice for transcription services, and an itemised breakdown of solicitor fees charged to the respondents in this proceeding recording the following amounts:

(1)    The amount billed calculated using the standard rate, being $32,063.00.

(2)    The amount billed calculated using the respondents’ reduced rate, being $28,425.50.

(3)    The amount actually billed to the respondents after applying a further discount, being $22,000.00.

10    The respondents also seek orders mandating payment of costs by way of EFT. They contend that this will avoid an ongoing dispute between the parties regarding the satisfaction of any costs order, submitting that such a course gives effect to the Court’s obligations under s 37M(3) of the Act.

Applicant’s submissions

11    The applicant raises the following broad submissions opposing the respondents’ application regarding costs:

(1)    The Theodore Affidavit shows that the costs were incurred by overlap and inefficiencies caused by multiple fee earners completing the same work. Additionally, the applicant did not request, agree to or receive “either of the transcripts”.

(2)    The Court should be cautious of the evidence in the Theodore Affidavit which originates from and is witnessed by the respondents’ own solicitors and advances their own financial interests.

(3)    No contemporaneous evidence shows that the work alleged to have been completed was actually completed.

(4)    Even though the authorities referred to by the respondents suggest detailed scrutiny is not necessary, the Court must still ensure that the amount fixed is reasonable.

(5)    The characterisation of this matter as “relatively simple” is not consistent with “67.9 hours of solicitor time across multiple fee earners”, as deposed to in the Theodore Affidavit.

(6)    The fact that a “higher amount” (presumably referring to the respondents’ solicitors’ standard rate) might have been charged, does not render the actual lump sum sought reasonable.

(7)    The respondents’ solicitors have retained the promissory note referred to above at [2] made in their favour in purported satisfaction of the costs orders of 31 July 2025. However, they have at the same time (a) denied its validity but (b) failed to return it to the applicant, thereby dealing with it “in a manner consistent with financial benefit”. This was said to be directly relevant to the assessment of costs, both in respect of the respondents’ conduct, and by way of a potential set-off against costs payable by the applicant.

(8)    The issue regarding the promissory note arose after the respondents’ decision to reject the applicant’s proposal (presumably referring to the applicant’s attempted payment on 18 June 2025 of the costs of the Urgent Application by promissory note, which the respondents rejected on 20 June 2025; see Galinovic (No 2) at [8] – [13]) and, given the Court’s consideration of the issue, the promissory note. It was “not unarguable or improperly raised so as to justify any punitive or adverse approach to costs”.

(9)    The respondents’ solicitors’ conduct in retaining the promissory note, after indicating it would be returned, and providing no explanation as to its current status or treatment, raises issues as to their honesty and transparency, which directly bore on the issue of costs. In this regard, the applicant relies on Oshlack v Richmond River Council [1998] HCA 11; 193 CLR 72 at [69].

12    The applicant also seems to seek orders for “full disclosure and accounting” in relation to the promissory note, seeking that enforcement of any costs be stayed pending such processes occurring. She also submits that equity requires “that any benefit derived, or capable of being derived, be brought to account”.

13    The Applicant’s Affidavit contains assertions which are sometimes in the nature of submissions. She states that she has conducted herself in good faith throughout the proceeding, and strongly believes that the promissory note lawfully satisfied the costs order in Galinovic (No 1). She deposes to her alleged attempts to resolve the costs dispute with the respondents in June 2025, which culminated in her sending “a promissory note and other documents” on 18 June 2025.

14    She refers to the respondents’ solicitor’s email of 20 June 2025 rejecting the promissory note “before they had received it” and stating that they would return it upon receipt, on which date they also filed the variation of orders application, allegedly “before our agreed upon deadline of 4pm that day and before receiving the tender package”. This appears to be a reference to the respondents’ email of the morning of 20 June 2025, by which they withdrew an offer to settle the costs order made in the interlocutory application for the amount of $8,292.44 (GST incl.), which they had previously left open until 4:00pm that day: see Galinovic (No 2) at [7] –[12]. The applicant then refers to the respondents’ alleged failure to return the promissory note within 72 hours of receiving it despite having informed the applicant that they would do so, and despite the Allonge to the promissory note providing that failure to do so would be deemed acceptance (see above at [2]), without the respondents providing an explanation as to its status.

principles

15    By s 43 of the Act, the Court has a discretion to award costs. Section 43(3)(d) of the Act permits the Court to “award a party costs in a specified sum”. Rule 40.02(b) of the Rules permits a person entitled to costs to apply to the Court for an order that costs “be awarded in a lump sum, instead of, or in addition to, any taxed costs”. There is no requirement as to when an application for a lump sum costs order should be made: Masters v Lombe (liquidator), in the matter of Babcock & Brown Ltd (in liq) (Lump Sum Costs) [2024] FCA 1336 at [26]; Hudson v Sigalla [2016] FCA 1204 at [55]; see also Frigger v Professional Services of Australia Pty Ltd (No 6) [2024] FCA 1320 at [36] – [40]. The Court’s discretion to award costs under s 43 of the Act is largely unfettered, but must be exercised judicially: Summers v Repatriation Commission (No 2) [2015] FCAFC 64 at [13] – [14].

16    The Court has a preference for ordering costs on a lump-sum basis wherever practicable in order to finalise the costs issue and, where possible, avoid a potentially expensive and lengthy taxation of costs hearing: Royal v El Ali (No 3) [2016] FCA 1573 at [10]. This is reflected in the Court’s Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS) at [4.1] – [4.2].

17    In Fewin Pty Ltd v Burke (No 3) [2017] FCA 693, Markovic J at [7] – [14] summarised the principles applicable to an award of costs in a specified sum. The following principles are applicable to the present proceeding:

(1)    The Court’s power to award lump sum costs is discretionary and may be exercised whenever the circumstances warrant it: at [10], citing Su v Australian Fisheries Management Authority (No 3) [2008] FCA 2018 at [1].

(2)    Relying on Dunstan v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (No 3) [2006] FCA 916 at [23] – [24], no particular characteristic of a case must exist before a lump-sum award of costs can be made; however, factors considered when exercising the discretion include:

(a)    “[W]here the delay, expense and inconvenience of taxation would be unduly protracted or expensive”: at [11].

(b)    “[W]here the financial capacity of the party liable to pay costs is such that the additional cost of taxation will impose a significant burden on the party in whose favour costs are ordered without real prospects of recovering those costs”: at [11].

(3)    It is appropriate to fix costs in a lump sum amount where the matter is relatively simple: at [12], citing Keen v Telstra Corp Ltd (No 2) [2006] FCA 930 at [6].

(4)    An appropriate starting point is the charges rendered by the solicitors for the party seeking costs orders in its favour. The sum fixed must also be proportionate to the nature and complexity of the case: at [14], citing Canvas Graphics Pty Ltd v Kodak (Australasia) Pty Ltd [1998] FCA 23. The estimation of costs may involve, in the words of Beazley JA in Hamod v New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 375 at [820], “an impressionistic discount of the costs actually incurred or estimated, in order to take into account the contingencies that would be relevant in any formal costs assessment”.

18    In making a lump sum costs order, the Court is not required to undertake a detailed examination of the kind appropriate to taxation or formal costs assessment: Hadid v Lenfest Communications Inc [2000] FCA 628 at [35]. Further, “the Court should be conscious not to cause injustice to the applicants by adopting an arbitrary failsafe discount across-the-board on the costs claimed, but at the same time be careful not to prejudice the respondents by over estimating the costs”: Zafra Legal Pty Ltd v Harris (Liquidator) (No 3) [2021] FCA 441 at [117], [119].

consideration

Lump sum costs award

19    For the following reasons, I agree with the respondents that the applicant should be ordered to pay the respondents’ costs on a lump sum basis in the amount of $22,319.00, by EFT.

20    First, I consider that the matter is relatively simple. The issues in the variation of orders application and the oral hearing application were narrow and were the subject of short affidavits which largely contained correspondence between the parties, and various short sets of submissions no longer than three pages. The oral hearing on 31 July 2025 lasted a total of 46 minutes (including a three-minute adjournment). I do not accept that the characterisation of this matter as “relatively simple” is inconsistent with the respondents’ solicitors having spent a total of 67.9 hours on the proceeding. The itemised breakdown records time from 29 May 2025 to 31 July 2025, the date of the hearing. I do not consider that 67.9 hours of work over a period of approximately two months indicates that the matter was not relatively simple. In any event, the authorities contemplate that an order for costs to be fixed in a lump sum amount can be made where the proceeding is complex: see Clipsal Australia Pty Ltd v Clipso Electrical Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 37 at [10].

21    Second, I consider that fixing the amount of costs would avoid potentially expensive and lengthy taxation of costs, which is consistent with the authorities referred to above and the Costs Practice Note. In this regard, it is also worth noting that the applicant is a litigant in person, and her capacity to pay costs is not known. Ordering that costs be fixed will avoid the possibility of the respondents’ costs in taxation not being recovered, and will diminish the burden imposed on the respondents in the event that the applicant is not able to meet a costs order at all.

22    Third, as to the quantum of costs, an appropriate starting point is the charges rendered by the respondents’ solicitors: Fewin at [14]. In accordance with the authorities referred to above, I agree with the respondents that the Court is not required to undertake a detailed examination of the costs sought. Notwithstanding that, I note that a review of the respondents’ breakdown of solicitor fees demonstrates that the respondents’ solicitors exercised discipline over the time and resources allocated to the proceeding, which included, relevantly, correspondence with the applicant, preparation of affidavit material and preparation of submissions. Furthermore, the respondents’ solicitors’ fees were charged at a significant discount to the rates usually charged. I consider the fees charged to be reasonable in the circumstances of the proceeding. Further, whether the applicant requested, agreed to or received “either of the transcripts” is not relevant to the question of whether it is a reasonable expense of the respondent in the proceeding. In that regard I consider the disbursement of $319.00 for a transcript of the hearing on 31 July 2025 to be a reasonable and ordinary expense in this proceeding.

23    As to the applicant’s suggestion that the Court should be cautious of evidence originating from the respondents’ own solicitors, there is nothing before the Court to suggest that (1) the respondents’ solicitors artificially inflated their fees, or (2) the work undertaken by the solicitors was anything other than as recorded in the itemised breakdown. The applicant has not adduced any evidence contradicting the respondents’ evidence in this regard. Further, as already stated, the itemised breakdown, which the respondents’ solicitors discounted, represents a reasonable quantum of costs for a proceeding of this nature.

24    In relation to the applicant’s suggestion that, in light of the respondents’ solicitors’ retention of the promissory note despite their denial of its validity, there are issues with their honesty and transparency which bear on the issue of costs, I refer to Galinovic (No 2) at [52] – [64], where I found that the purported promissory note upon which the applicant now relies for this submission was not a valid promissory note, and that the respondents’ failure to return it did not amount to an acceptance of its terms. I note for completeness that there is no suggestion that the respondents’ solicitors have acted otherwise than honestly and transparently with the applicant.

25    As to the applicant’s submission that the issues in the variation of orders application were not “unarguably or improperly raised so as to justify any punitive or adverse approach to costs”, I note that, as found in Galinovic (No 2) at [52] – [64], the applicant’s submissions regarding the effect and nature of the promissory note were misguided. In any event, were the issues arguable, that in itself would not displace the usual position that costs follow the event, which also applies in relation to interlocutory applications: see James v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (No 2) [2015] FCA 599 at [20]; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Marco (costs) [2020] FCA 835 at [25]. The applicant has not provided any other reason why the usual position should not apply in this application. Further the mere fact that the Court hears from the parties about an issue does not mean that it is not “unarguable or improperly raised”. Indeed, in this matter, the applicant’s now persistent reliance on purported promissory notes is at best disingenuous. Further, although I granted the oral hearing application in relation to the variation of orders application, that course of action was taken owing to the applicant’s status as a litigant in person. The two applications were heard concurrently and the oral hearing application was inherently linked to the hearing of the variation of orders application, in which the respondents were successful.

26    Finally, I agree with the respondents that requiring the applicant to pay the costs orders by way of EFT will avoid any potential dispute regarding the satisfaction of a costs order. I consider that this is warranted in light of the parties’ dispute, summarised in Galinovic (No 2) at [8] – [13], as to whether promissory notes issued by the applicant would satisfy the costs order made in the determination of the Urgent Application on 22 May 2025. This course is consistent with the principles and obligations contained in s 37M of the Act.

Dealing with the matter on the papers

27    Section 20A of the Act provides:

20A  Power of the Court to deal with civil matters without an oral hearing

(1)     This section applies in relation to any civil matter coming before the Court in the original jurisdiction of the Court.

(2)     The Court or a Judge may deal with the matter without an oral hearing (either with or without the consent of the parties) if satisfied that:

(a)     the matter is frivolous or vexatious; or

(b)     the issue or issues on which determination of the matter depends have been decided authoritatively in the case law; or

(c)     determination of the matter would not be significantly aided by an oral hearing because:

(i)     there is no real issue of fact relevant to determination of the matter; and

(ii)     the legal arguments in relation to the matter can be dealt with adequately by written submissions.

(3)     This section does not limit subsections 20(4) and (6).

28    At this juncture, I note that the parties did not advance a position as to whether the respondents’ application for lump sum costs should be dealt with with or without an oral hearing.

29    In Kitoko v Registrar, Registry of New South Wales, Federal Court of Australia [2025] FCAFC 41, the Full Court considered the application of s 20A of the Act in the context of an application for judicial review of a Registrar’s decision to refuse to accept for filing an application for leave to appeal, a draft notice of appeal, and a supporting affidavit: at [1]. One of the grounds of appeal against the primary judge’s judgment in that case was that his Honour denied the appellant procedural fairness by denying him an opportunity to clearly present his case, and “the chance to win his application for judicial review”, in ordering that the matter be dealt with without an oral hearing: at [8], [21]. His Honour at that time also ordered that the appellant file any written submissions on which he wished to rely in his application for judicial review. The appellant did not object to the order that the matter proceed without an oral hearing or make submissions alleging a denial of procedural fairness at the time: at [22].

30    The Court in Kitoko held that no denial of procedural fairness was established in the primary judge delivering his judgment without an oral hearing, in circumstances where the issue before him had previously been fully agitated before the Full Court, and there had been no material change in the circumstances considered at length by the Full Court: at [24], [27]. Further, it was clear that there was no issue of fact to be determined, nor was there any issue of credibility to be assessed. In light of his Honour’s determination that the legal argument could be dealt with by oral submissions, it was open to him to be satisfied that the matter would not be aided by an oral hearing: at [24].

31    I consider that the circumstances are similar in this case, such that it is appropriate that the matter should proceed to judgment without an oral hearing. First, the issue to be determined here is one of procedure, namely one of costs. The issue of costs is not one that depends on any real issue of fact, save for the assessment of the evidence as to the costs incurred in this proceeding and whether the applicant has made any payment of the respondents’ costs in this proceeding (by way of a purported promissory note). The issue of the respondents’ incursion of costs is one that can be, and has been, decided by having regard to affidavit evidence (see above at [22]). Further, as decided in Galinovic (No 2) at [52] – [64] and adverted to above at [24], the promissory note by which the applicant tendered purported payment of the respondents’ costs was not a valid promissory note.

32    Second, the law surrounding an award of lump sum costs is well-settled, such that the legal arguments can be, and have been, appropriately dealt with by written submissions. Third, I consider that generally, the determination of the matter would not be significantly aided by an oral hearing in light of the procedural history of this matter. I note that in Galinovic (No 2), the applicant sought and was granted an oral hearing; however, I did not consider the oral hearing to be of any assistance to the Court, as the applicant made the same misguided submissions that she advanced in her written submissions and affidavit material. I consider that the legal arguments can thus be adequately dealt with by written submissions. In these circumstances, I consider that an oral hearing of this matter would be inutile in assisting the Court to determine the matter.

conclusion

33    For the above reasons, I will order that the applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the variation of orders application and the oral hearing application in the amount of $22,319.00 by way of EFT. I will also make orders which progress the matter towards a hearing of the applicant’s originating application filed on 16 May 2025.

Associate:

Dated:    30 June 2026